JPRS ID: 10434 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10434
2 April 1982
Near East Norti~ Africa Re ort
p
tFO~UO 13/82)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFOR~VIATION SERVICE
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,
JPRS I,/10434 ~
2 April 1982
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REP ORT
(~o~0 13/s2~

.s; CONTENTS
~
POLI TI CAL
il~? TE R-ARAB AFFAI RS
Concept of Maghreb Parliament Supported
" (Habib Boulares; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 10 Feb 82) 1
I RAN
- Briers
New Office 3
Ammimition Supp'_y 3
LEBANON
Sa'ib Salam Interviewe d on Elections
( S a' ib S al am In te rview; AL-WATAN AL-' ARABI ,
22-28 Jan 82) 4
Syria Seeks T~ Extend Sarkis' Term
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 29 Jan-4 Feb 82) 9
SYRIA
Publication Gives Details of Recent Coup Plot
(AL-WATAN AL-'AF.ABI; 12-18 Feb 82) 13
Diplomat Blamed for Magazine Bombin g
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 22-2~ ~an 82) 19
Briefs
Attempt 'fo ~muggle Arms Foiled 20
- a- [IIZ - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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POLITICAL INTE2-ARAB AFFAIRS
CONCEPT OF MAGHREB PARLIAMENT SUPPORTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQU~ in French No 1101, 10 Feb 82 p 21
[Commentary by JEUNE AFRIQUE adviser Habib Boulares: "For a Maghreb Parliament"]
[TextJ "The source of everyone's pain is also the supject of everyone'
uttack." This verse of Corneille can certainly constitute a basi~ for Colonel
Qadhdhafi's meditation. King Hassan with a rare vigor accused Colonel Qadhdhafi
of every sin. The Algerians 'have received him, from 18 to 23 January, with a
discreetness that bordered on indifference. The Tunisians treated him as a
tourist of a certain notoriety (J.A. No 1100). His idea of a union with Algeria
did not create any enthusiasm in President Chadli Bend~edid's entourage. How-
ever, to know what happened in Algiers we can only rely on what was made public
by the Libyan sources.
We must admit that Tunisia has reasons to fear the intensive training in Libya
- of approximately 10,000 of its nationals. Algeria discovered to its surprise
that Algerians are also being trained in Libyan camps. This has created, for
the time being, nothing but a shrug. However, this was not the case a few
months ago when Libyan soldiers positioned themselves to the south beyond their
borders in Algerian territory. They were requested sharply to go camp else-
where.
~ Union by force has no greate:~ chance of succeeding than the direct occupation
of the land. The attempt d�: persuasion through dialogue does r.ot seem to have
borne more fruit in Algiers than in Jerba. Furthermore, there is something
confusing about this "Guide of the revolution" who has proposed a union at
times to Bourguiba and at times to Bend~edid, while at the same time asserting
- to the public that union a.iong Arabs can be accomplished only through the
people and by bypassing the leaders and goverr~nents.
No! Following Qadhdhafi's visit to Algeria and his passage thru Tunisia, the
idea of Pan-Arab union, or that of a Greater Maghreb, has not evolved.
However, we have to admit that Qadhdtiafi is not the only cauae. Surely, with-
out Libya, as Hassan II stated, the Saharan war could not have lasted that
long. Algeria certainly gives the impression that it is trying to find a way
out of the conflict. Nevertheless the Polisario is today a political and
military force that intends to use alY its potential to pr~:~eat it from being
sacrificed during a referendum or a multilateral negotiation.
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Mauritania distrusts Morocco and the time has passed when an understanding
between Rabat and Nouakchott could have paved the way to a peaceful solution.
The Saharan question is at an impasse, and the latest declarations of the King
of Morocco have not been encouraging.
Wzo can in these circumstances endorse and advance the concept of a Maghreb
union? Qadhdhafi speaks action of the masses, and his target is a Pan-Arab
unicn. The Tunisian jurist M~hamed Charfi, who animates the "Maghreb En-
counters," considers the separate actions of the rulers and the people to be
insufficient, and advocates theiz union. This is the path of wisdom. Never-
theless, this concept can only take shape if an organization is willing to
endorse it.
However, until now there is a framework that has not been used, i.e., parlia-
mentary action. Why not actively support a North African parliament, a Maghreb
assembly, where the parliaments of Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and
Libya can send their representatives? Why can't this parliament, based on the
example of the European Parliament, be established in a central city, which is
not a capital of a state, e.g., Constantine, this Cirta of ancient Numidia which
had its moment of glory during the time of Massinissa and Jugurtha?
Parliaments constitute, despite their limited freedom of a~tion, ideal fora
for open debates that would permit the clarif ication of the rulers' actions.
It is in such a forum that the supporters and the adversaries of a ur~ited,
federated or confederated~Maghreb can confront each othei without such a
confrontation turning into a war. It is here that the peoples' act�~on through
their representatives, and the rulers through their parties, can c~imbine their
efforts to spread an idea that all the crises were unable to bury because
everyone continued to believe in it.
COPY RI (~fiT :.Te une Af ri que GRUP.TY A 19 81
- CSO: 4519/? ~+3
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IRAN
BRI~FS
NEW OFFICE--There is a new office for Iranian embassies, that for "Dissemina-
tion and Explanation of the principles of the Islamic Revolution." The
dire ctors of these new servicas are carefully chosen by the High Coimcil
of the Guardians of the Revolutton. The f3rst poat so provided is London.
Paris and Bonn will follow. [Text] [Parie L'EXPRESS in French 5-11 Mar 82
p 85] [COPYRI(~iT: 1982 s.a. Groupe Expr~ss]
ArIlrIUNITION SUPPLY--A number of Khomeyni's generals telephone their cotmter-
- parts in Israel regularly to specify their neede of ammtmition and spare
parts and ask advice from their former instructors. These messages go
through Rome and are rec::ived in a few minutes. [Text] [Paris L'EXPRESS
in French 12-18 Mar 82 p 89 ] { COPYRIQiT: 1982 s. a. Gro~tpe Express ]
CSO: 4619/73
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~
~ LEBANON
SA'IB SALAM INTERVIEWED ON ELECTIONS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 258, 22-28 Jar~ 82 pp 32-33
[Interview with Sa'ib Salam in Beirut by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI; date not ~
specified]
[Text] Sa'ib Salam, former prime minister and a leader of the Islawic Coali-
tion, is one of Lebanon's most courageous and hardline Muslim leaders. Mr
Salam, a supporter of Prime Minister Shaf iq al-Wazzan, is known fox his out-
spokenness and a disposition to call a spade a spade, o~ten zo .the ire or
embarrassment of others.
Our `irst question centered on the American and Sov~.et positions on the
Lebanese crisis as gleaned from the visits of the two countries' envoys jto
Lebanon] last year. Mr Salam had this to say:
"Competition between the tw~ superpowers in all parts of the world continues.
It is becoming more acute in the Middle East. The new American republican
administration says its first priority is to stop the extension of Soviet in-
fluence in the Arab world and the Middle East. But all Anerican actions are
so absolutely stupid that they are producing the opposite effect: opening the
door wide to the growth of Soviet influence. Foremost among these actions is
Washington's insistence on continuing the policy of blind support for Israel
which that country has enjoyed since its birth.
"Because I met with Philip Habib, I know more about his mission than that o~
the Russian envoy. We discussed all topics, but his foremost concern, as I
discovered, was to strengthen the ceasefire.
"[:y interpretation of his preoccupation with the ceasefire is that the U.S.
~ wants to maintain the present situation, that is, one that, while not
exactly calm, is free of ma~or eruptions until next April, the deadline for
settling the Sinai issue.
'7n brief, here is what I told Habib: 'Go to America and look for a solution
there. You will not find one here? The solution is not here, but there. By
this I mean that a solution can be found only if America changes its policy
and frees itself f rom Israeli domination. This is the way to safeguard
America's interests in the region and in the Arab world.
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"The Soviet envoy came to register his presence; his main concern, apparently,
was to exploit America's mistakes for some new [Soviet] purpose."
[Question] It is r~ored th~t in addition to his concentration on j~trengthen-
ing] the. ceasefirP, Philip Habib wanted to explore the possibility of a Syrian
pullout ~rom greater Beirut. Do you support such a move?
~ [Answerj ihe only thing I know about this is what T read in the newspapers.
I talked wiih Habih~ for over 2 hours. We diecussed a11 iesues and all aspects
of each issue. Fram what I could see, Habib's only obsession was to strengthen
the ceasefire. He did not even mention the Syrian missiles in Lebanon--and
neither did I. The way I see it, America is confused, and its con�usion is due
to the tension in Israel and much of the Arab world. America is worried that
this tension might lead to an explosion that cou:Ld threaten next April's
[Sinai] deal.
Who Represents the Muslims? ~
[Question] In the western zone [of Beirut] the pxoblem of secur~.ty is tangled
in politics. People are clamoring for representation. Is the Tslamic Coali-
tion the only representative of the Muslim co~unity?
' [Answer] There is not only one representat3.ve for the Musli;m conunun:ity.
When the conflict in Lebanon reached the stage of violence, and when foreign
propaganda, abetted by the Zionists, portrayed the situation as a confronta-
tion between the Christian Right and the Muslim Le?.ft, we ~�~~x%. deeply hurt.
The majority of Muslims did not rush to arms ~ust to enter into a v~.olent
confrontation, but rather because there was no choice. ~rom the outset we
made our position c.lear: violence was noC the answer to *.he Lebanese probJ.em.
Several long years of destruction and a great toll of huma~z life have yet to
solve our problem, just as we had predicted. We were also dismayed to have
the Muslims portrayed as Leftist. Not only are the Muslims not Leftist--in
the sense of being terror-bent co~nunists directed fram outs~:de the country,
as the term is understood here--but they are anti-Left. That is why we
established our coalition and why we named it the Islamic Coalition: to de-
prive the real Leftists of the right to speak in our name. We have succeeded
to some extent in undermining the synonymity of the terms Leftist and Muslim
- in the minds of the people and to discredit those who~.claim to speak for us.
Now, when a Leftist or a commiunist rtepresentative attempts to speak in the
name of the Muslims he is ridiculed in and outside Lebanon. (As a further
measure of our success, Leftist and co~nunist announcements are now made in the
name of the National Forces rather than the Muslims.)
While the Islamic Coalition does not pretend to speak for the Muslim community,
its actions over the past 6 years have always been a more accurate expression
of the will and aspirations of that coffinunity. Tn this respect, anyone who
expresses the will and the aspirations of the Muslims can be termed a repre-
- sentative of the Muslim conamunity.
I agree with your description of thE se~urity situation ~.n the western zone
[West Beirut]. Those who seek control of the area are divided. They collide
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inside and outside the area; the victima, unfortunately, are the residente of
the area. While the various factions claim to be concerned w~.th security in
the area, they, the~mselves, are the cause of lawl:essness. They are responsi-
ble for the explosions, assassinations and uncountalile breaches o~ aecurity.
This is not my view alone. The prevailing view is that the head of the so-
called National Movement is responsible for chaos in the western zone.
[Question] You say the army is the vital element in the search for a ccnqpromise
solution. Can the army, with its current composit~on, bring r3ecurity to all
_ parts of the country?
[Answer] Let us look at the question frotq a different perspect~ve. I have
indicated earlier that the Lebanese people, Christians and Muslims, aze
anxious to get together 3n an effort to save the3.r country. This :ls the
ob~ective of the "national compromise" movement. Man}* say "compromise before
security," but those who advocate this course are m3sguided and si,mplist~c, ox
they are misguiders who want to maintain the troubled situation. Every
rational person knows that one cannot have compromise unlesa there is a legal
authority that can provide security, and the only way for the legal authority
to provide security ~;e through the army. Here is where the proble.~n begins.
The goverrunent has not been able to convince the groups opposed to the army
to let the army carry out its security duties. The opposit~on is cpmpletely
internal; some of the opposition is d3rected from outside jthe country].
The roads from east Beirut to west Beirut are closed because certain fact~.ons
do not want the Muslims and the Christians to get together. I am convinced
that if the Christians and Muslims were left alone, many would suffocate
in the rush to embrace. They all want peace. That is why T support the
ai-my and ~zant to see it strengthened. There were timss o~ small or signifi~
cant disagreements with the army, nevertheless I have always cont~,nued to
work for the creation of a strong army. Those who oppose the axmy use any pre--
text to re~ect it. The truth is that they do not want an army in the first
place. Many would criticize the army for being "unbalanced," a term they
~ invited to misguide people. When most people rejected this depiction of the
army, the opposition admitted that theq have mieused the "unbalanced"
- adjactive.
It is essential that we have a str~ong army based on a nat3onal foundat~.on.
I invite my Maronite brethren to discourage the idea of "Maronizing" the
army, We must have a Lebanese Army, and it must remain Lebanese if it is to
succeed in extending the legal authority [of the goverrnnent] to all parts of
Lebanon. In view of the collapse of civil and security [police] authority,
the army is the only ar~ of the state that can restore legal authority.
I Support Sarkis
[QuestionJ You were among the first to "open f~re" on.the government and to
� accuse it of poor performance. Suddenly and unexpectedly you are opening a
new leaf with him (President Sarkis]. What are your real reasons?
[Answer] I am surprised at your use of the terms "suddenly" and "open f:Cre."
I have always had some disagreements with the goverrnnent, but my posit3.on has
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always been made clear and in an open manner. Everything I say openly I have
said to the president in f ace-to-face meetings. ~ have always insisted that
the president take the initiative, particularly after things worsened in the
wake of the Riyadh Conference. That conference involved things that exceeded
the president's constitutiona.l powers, but we overlooked that becau~e we wanted
to save the country by any means. We supported the president and I was the
first to do so. You refer to my criticism of the president but.forget that
I was the first to support him when he assumed the presidency. We requested
the president to move on behalf of Lebanon. We asked h3~a to go to Washing-
ton, to Moscow and to the UN. ~en when Lebanon itself became the problem,
they [the outside world] continued to point to the Palistinian proble~m despite
the fact that we were the first to shoulder the burden of the Palestinian prob-
lem and continue to do so today as much as the Palestinians themselves. Now ~
Lebanon has a problem and we must concentrate on it. Yasir 'Arafat constantly
moves from capital to capital in search of a solution to his problem. King
Hussayn [of Jordan] does the same thing. That was the point of my criticism.
The moment the president began to move, however--by taking part in the First
Tunis Conference, the Ta'if Islamic Conference, and the Second Tunis Confer-
ence, followed by h3:s decision to reactivate the Arab Follo~ca-up Committee--it
became my duty to support him. When he explained Lebanon's position at the
Ta'if Conference and was subsequently assailed by those who wish to perpetuate
the Lebanon crisis, I found it my duty to support him. I was pleased to note
that for the first timQ the president and the pr3.me minister were working co-
operatively, something I had repeatedly called for in the past.
Not once during the 4 years of [formerJ Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss' tenure
did I withhold my support. Oa the contrary, my support was unqual3.fied. I
also supported Prime Minister al-Wazzan. I even defended Prime M3.nister al-Hoss,
and, if I may say so, repeatedly. I did not, however, always take his side in
his counterproductive, nonstop dispute with the president. I am a positivist
by nature and temperament and favor a positivistic approach to work. When I
noted that the president and Prime Minister al-Wassan were working coopera-
tively, I gave them my support. It is wrong to say that the prime minister
is not his own man because he cooperates with the president, who in turn is a
- tool of the Phalange Party, which in turn is a tool of Israel. By this
"logic," al-Wassan is an Israeli tool. This is the logic of those who do not
wish Lebanon well.
This is why I have supported President Sarkis' moves on behalf of Lebanon. It
is my duty to support him against his assailants of ill will.
[Question] Prime ~-iinister al-Wassan is the target of a campaign to remove him
from off ice. Do you favor that his goverrnnent remain in power till the end of
its term?
[Answer] In my opinion, Prime Minister al-Wazzan is do~.ng his best. The prime
minister's job is difficult under the best of circumstances, and is much more
so now. Not only do I oppose a change of government now, but I support Prime
Minister al-Wazzan's goverxnnent. Those who want to replace al-Wazzan want to
destroy rather than rebuild Lebanon.
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I Oppose Extending Pres~dent's Term
[Question] The presidential election campaign has already begun. You are a
very close friend of General Raymond Iddih. What are his chances of becoming
the next president?
' jAnswer] It is known that T have in the past supported General Iddih for the
presidency. I did not support him on the basis of his friendship alone~-a
f riendship of which I am proud--but because of his patriotism. He is a capable
man, one who can shoulder the burden of the presidency. Should I support his
bid again, it would be for the same reasons. He is patriotic, capable and
inspires confidence; and these attributes qualify him for the presidency.
Nevertheless, there are others who have these attributes and who are equally
qualified. There is a saying in Lebanon that "every Maronite is a candidate
for the presidency," but there will be many changes before election time. A
group of people has of late been calling for amending the constitution and
= holding the elections now. I have opposed this group and s~icceeded in silenc-
ing it. Why? Because the situation in Lebanon and in the region at large is
not clear and will remain so until next April, pending the resolution of the
Sinai problem. The situation will become clear then ia Lebanon and the region.
No one knows whether the Sinai will be returned [to Egypt] or not. If the
Israelis do not withdraw, the situation will change. If they withdraw, we
will still face a new situation. Furthermore, why should we advance the elec-
tions when the constitution stipulates that elections take place 2 months
before the president's term ends? That is not till next July. Let us wait
till after the Sinai return to see how things develop and what e�fect they
will have on Lebanon.
[Question] The possibility of extending his term of office has been raised
_ with Mr Sarkis. Do you support such a move?
[Answer] I am against the idea and .believe Mr Sarkis hiznself is also opposed
to it.
[Question] It is rumored that Mr Philip Habib has proposed the idea. Is that
true?
(Answer] I read that in the papers, but I have not heard it from any reliable
source. A11 this, however, must await Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.
[Question] In the wake of the Fez Conference, what do you foresee for southern
Lebanon?
[Answer] Many like to portray the Fez Conference to the outside world as a
great tragedy. I do not agree with this portrayal and believe it harms the
Arab cause. I simply say the conference did not succeed and its failure was
expected. While I had expected the confarence to fail, the objectives of
the conference remain valid. These objectives are yet to be fulfilled.
While saying farewell to Mr Sa'ib Salam, he asked me to convey h;ls greetings
to Professor Walid and to inform him that he [Mr Salam] had read Z4r Walid's
inte!`view with President Saddam Hussayn [of Iraq] and was very impressed with
it.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'AREIBI
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LEBANON
SYRIA SEEKS TO EXTEND SARKIS' TERM
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 259, 29 Jan-4 Feb 82 pp 36-37
[Article: "Barter Transaction Between Sarkis and Damascus"]
[Text] After the session of the Arab Follow-Up Coumnittee was postponed until
the first part of next March, talk began about a Sarkis-Syrian "deal" in con-
nection with the presidential election campaign, which can be summarized as
establishing "special and privileged relations" between Lebanon and Syria, in
exchange for Syrian support for Sarkis either to extend his term or to deter-
- mine any alternative as president. What about the new deal? Postponing the
meeting of the Arab Follow-Up Committee until March might be the start of
abandoning the committee, and consequently cancelling its meetings, unless
positive developments suddenly appear on the Lebanese scene, leading to a
move to convene, and an adjustment in the climate leading to implementation -
of the resolutions previously issued by the committee.
Ministerial sources say in this regard that, since the last meeting held by
~the committee, Lebanon has lost hope for the possibility of achieving any
progress toward solving the crisis at this stage, since many problems,
including the "Syrian groblem" have prevented any progress to apeak of. Con-
sequently, the member nations in the committee .(Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) have
been forced to be tantamount to "false witnesses," because these states know
the Syrian positions and reasons that are blocking Lebanese accord. Neverthe-
less, they have been forced to disregard the reasons which are too numeroua to
mention.
The sources add that if Syria carriea a ahare of the responsibi~ity for the
failure of the Arab solution, other parties in Lebanon, such as the Lebanese
Front, the National Movement and the Palestinian Resistance also carry a
portion of the reaponsibility, for selfish or personal reasons.
These sourc~s say that the highest authorities told some of the leadership a
few days before the date to convene the Follow-Up Committee that it was the
Arab parties' intention, especially Lebanon, to postpone the date for the
committee's meeting. When the Kuwaiti foreign minister, Shaykh Sabah
al-Ahmad, excused himself from attending, along with Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal,
Lebanon was sure that the meeting had become passe. When the Saudi position
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was sounded out, the reply came back that the Riyadh government preferre~.i ~
to postpone the Follow-Up Commtttee's meeting, because none of its resolu-
tions could be achieved on the spot. Lebanon's position was similar. When
Syrian Foreiga Minister 'Abd al-Halim Kh~ddam came on a sudden visit to
Beirut, carrying a measage from President Hafiz al-Asad to Lebanese Presid~nt
Ilyas Sarkis on 17 December, the picture became very clear. He was con-
veying the other Arab positions. They had no ob~ections to the postponement.
Postponement or Abolishment?
Minist~rial sources say that Lebanon preferred not to go on record as being
for a meeting without results. The meeting, if held even with the attendance
of the foreign ministers, was not cap able of producing new and decisive
decisions, e..pecially since the existing decisions are still ~ust ink on
paper. Therefore, how could it be producXive if held with the attendance of
other ministers, representing the foreign.ministers, who would not be con-
versant with the developments and nuances of the Lebanese situation.
These sources disclosed that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had told Lebanon, about
a week before the date of the Follow-Up Committee meeting, that they wo~ld not
participate in the committee meeting, at the foreign minister 1eve1, unless
the two previous decisions issued by the co~nittee were implemented. They
are:
1. To open the traffic lanes in the Sodeco area.
2. To form a Lebanese security force, under the command of the minister of
the interior, Prime Minister Shariq a1-Wazzan, to take charge of maintaining
security on both sides of the confrontation line from the Sodeco area down
to the al-Marafa' quarter.
These two measures are considered sufficient to cool off the security situa-
tion, which would encourage the Lebanese government and the Arab parties
participating in the Follow-Up Committee, trrough their representatives in
Beirut, to prepare for the dialogue, and then the national accord. _
These sources think that postponing the meeting of the Follow-Up Committee
until March may be the start of finally abolishing the committee's role,
especially since there is no evidence on the horizon to 3ndicate the possi-
bility of achieving any progress toward implementing its previous decisions.
This means the failure of the Arab solution, by virtue of the fact that the
Follow-Up Committee represents locally, Arab-wise and internationally the
only way to deal with the Lebanese crisis. Lebanon was bet*_ing on the Arab
solution, for fear that it would get involved in other solutions, especially
international solutions.
Lebanon beiieves, as President Sarkis told the members of the Follow-Up
Committee at their lasC meeting, that the aspirations and hopes that were
pinned on the committee have been lowered a great deal from what they once
were right after its formation at the Tunis summit. The reason, according
to President Sarkis, is that the committee has shifted from dealing with the
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fateful issue as a whole, since it was charged with dealing with the Lebanese
situation in its entirety, with its Arab and Palestinian rami�ications, to
dealing with trivialities, such as opening the roads and removing the barri-
cades, while not coming close to the nub of the Lebanese problem. Official
Lebanon has tried to shift the consensus of the committee to a more effecti.ve
and comprehensive level, through a working paper which it submitted and which
proposed solutions for various political and security issues, including the
national dialogue leading to accord. However, the committee preferred not to
plunge into the details of the Lebanese working paper, because that would
require specific positions from the various parties influencing the Lebanese
scene (Syria, the Palestinian Resistance, the U1~I forces and the local par-
ties). This could have reached specific political sensitivities between
these parties and the Arab member states on the Follow-Up Committee.
Privileged Relations
At this time, informed sources told AL--WATAN AL-'ARABI that Syrian Foreign
Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam arrived to discuss with President Ilyas Sarkis
how to "normalize" special relations on the o�ficial level between Syria and
Lebanon. He perceived f rom the Lebanese president a desire to comply with
this request He is the one who, so f ar, has re~ected even a discussion
of subjects like this, being anxious about the f actors of Lebanese sov-
ereignty, or what is left of it.
Those in the know say that Pres~dent Sarkis, who is nearing the end of his
tern?, is trying to ensure Damascus' support for himself, his methods and his
programs. At tr.e same time, he is trying to exchange "special relations"
for the withdrawal of Syria from Beirut and certain suburbs, which would
permit peaceful presidential elections. The president might go as far as
exchanging security information with the Syrians, in addition to better
economic coordination and coordination of political positions on the interna-
tional scene, for the purpose o.f ensuring this withdrawal.
In the context of the presidential campaign, which is preoccupying the
Lebanese more than at any time, those who are striving to bring the points
of view of Damascus and Raymond Iddah closer together note that Syrian-
Phalangist relations are not as ba~ as some imagine. As evidence of that,
Muhammad Ghanim, director of Syrian Intelligence says in his private meetings
that Syria has not yet lost hope for the return of the Phalangists to "the
husband's houae." However, this return would have to be deferred, if Israel
continues in its intransigence with regard to the Golan annexation or if it
intends to launch a new attack against South Leb anon.
The statements that have been attributed to Phalangist officials recently
bear out the belief that there is a tacit Syrian-Phalangist understanding to
extend President Sarkis' term, with specific security arrangements, such as
deploying the army in the eastern area and handing over security in the
Western area to the internal security forces, while awaiting propitious
international circumstances to atrengthen the Syrian-Phalangist solidarity on
the level of comprehensive solutione.
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Arab Reservations
In this context, observers have nated that the routine extension of the Arab
- Deterrent Force in Lebsnon has not met witfi any Phalangist opposition this
time. Perhaps this Phalangist "silence" played a part in facilitating the
mission of Phillip Habib, the American envoy, who returned to the area to
ensure the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire, and to ensure
the legal formalities of the presidential elections, or tihe extension of the
~ present president. However, there are those who talk about the "contradic-
tion" between the Phalangist position and the position of the Maronite
Patriarchy in this regard, since the patriarch says that Maronites in Lebanon
must not consent to any measure which would amend the written constitution,
such as an extension for President Sarkis, for example.
Phillip Habib has in fact retu;ned for three politi~al purposes:
--Follow-up the coordination between the Syrians and the Phalangists.
~ --To cool off Syrian-Israeli relations, after the "scenario" of Israeli
orbiting over the Biqa' and the rumors about Syrian "SAM" missiles being fired
at the Israeli aircraft...without hitting them, of course.
--Preparation for the election campaign, in light of President Sarkis' posi-
- tion regarding the extension.
Perhaps the Syrian and Leb anese presidents will both find it necessary to
meet at this stage (in the second half of February in all probability) before
the reconvening of the Arab Follow-Up Cammittee, to review the situation in
the region as a whole and the role of the deterrent forces in the future
stage, which will follow the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL�WATAN AL 'ARABI
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SYRIA
PUBLICATION GIVES DETAILS OF RECENT COUP PLOT
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 261, 12-18 Feb 82 pp 22-23
[Article: "Names of Officers Arrested in Coup Attempt; Entire MiG Squadron
Tasked With Bombing Defense Company Bases and the Republican Palace"]
- [Text] Was American Intelligence the one that uncovered the recent coup
attempt in Syria, as compensation to the Syrian regime for the American
position in the Golan case? This is the information that was leaked at least
by Western diplomats, in a letter that AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI received from
Washington, which also included previously unpublished infoxmation about the
officers who carried out the attempt, their names and their military respon-
sibilities.
When tfie Syrian authorities confirmed that they do not expect an Israeli
attack on the Syrian army in Lebanon, what was the ~ustification for these
assurances? The evidence is the information which was leaked by sources
well-connected Co the American State Department to the effect that none
other than American intelligence gave the Syrian regime the details of the
recent coup attempt, and provided it with the names of the of~icers and
civilians who had prepared it, for the purpose of "saving face" for the
Golan case, after the recent American veto in the United Nations.
It can be said that American-Syrian relations are not as bad as some maythink,
and that Washington has not yet lost hope in the Syrian card in the coming
negotiations that will follow the withdrawal from Sinai.
In light of this fact, Washington is still covering the Syrian role in Lebanon.
It is a role which is in direct agreement with the logic of "red lines," by
which the Syrians and Israelis deal with the Lebanese crisis and for which,
sometimes, the Lebaneae and Palestinians pay a price.
Liquidations
American diplomatic circles are talking about the American "watchfulness" in
Damascus, which presupposes that there is a Soviet eye in the area. These
circles confirm the information thaC the number of Syrian officers, who
were arrested after the coup attempt, ranged between 180 and 220 of various
branches of service and ranks, including about 30 officers of the rank of major
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general, brigadier general and colonel. There was also a number of retired
officera and about 50 civilians.
The arrests included most of the important corps and units of the Syrian
army, but were concentrated largely among pilots of the Air Force, the naval
forces, armored divisions, command officers in the ~;rian Chief of Staff
office, the engineering corps, some officQrs of the military survey unit and
- a small number of officers of the defense companies, whose names are not
known.
_ The information indicates that Brig ~en Muhammad al-Khuli, the director of
air force intelligence and an advisor to President Hafiz al-Asad, personally
supervised the arrests with the assi~tance of military intelligence, headed
by Brig Gen 'Ali Duba. It was learned from some informed sources and from
- those who had a connection with the investigation, conducted in strict
secrecy by the Syrian authorities, that some of the arrested officers were
required to talk by telephone with their wives and families and pretend that
- t4ey had suddenly been sent on special military matters to Lebanon with the
_ deterrent forces, in order to give the auChorities more opportunity to
arrest those whose names had been provided by the officers who were con-
nE^.ted with the coup attempt.
The names of some of the arrested officers have been leaked. A number of
them were liquidated by firing squad after their interrogation. The fol-
lowing were known to be among them:
Maj Gen Marwan al-Juqdar from Damascus~ who held the post of assistant chief
of staff and director of training in the Syrian army.
Brig Gen Ahmad 'Abd al-Nabi, from the Third Armored Division Command.
Brig Gen Ibrahim al-Malki, who was described ae director of operations for
- the Fifth Division.
Brig Gen Salih Hallawah, one of the senior officers of the First Armored
Division.
The name of Brig Gen Ibrahim al-Safi was repeatedly mentioned among those
arrested; he is an 'Alawite, previoualy known to be a support~er of Sallah
Jadid. However, President al-Asad appointed him as commander of the First
Armored Division, and he was leading this division on 22 November 1980, the
day the Syrians mobilized forces on the Jordanisn border. His division w~s
one af the main divisions concentrated on the border.
The Plan
The information confirms that 40 off icers f rom the Air Force were arrested,
including five high-ranking officers. It has been confirmed that at least
four of them were brigadier generals. They also included some 25 pilots,
and known to be among them, Lt Col 'Assaf 'Assaf. The cammander of one of
the MiG-17 squadrons was also arrested, along with most of hia pilots.
There was also a number of sir base commanders, including the cammander of
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one of the helicopter bases and the commandera o.f one of the other air
wings close to Damaecus. The name of Lt Col K:;ytham, one of Brig Gen
Muha~ad al-Khuli's aides, w^,s also bruited about by those arre$Ced. The
arrest of Brig Gen Taysir Lutfi al-Hamawi fias been confirmed, and it was
said that he was executed a week after his arrest. He held the post of.
army operat~ons in Office of the Chief of Staff.
Damascus' information states that some Christian Ba'thist officers were also
arrested or discharged from service. A small number of 'Alawite officers,
from the First and Third Armored Divisions, were also arrested, as we11 as
some from the Seventh Armored Division. However, it is so far apparent
that most of the officers confirtned to be eithet arrested or executed were
from Damascus, Hamah, Aayr al-Zawr, Aleppo and Homs.
Reports have been gathering to the effect that these officers were preparing
a ma~or coup attempt, beginning with air bombardment of the defense com-
panies' headquarters and main camps, followed by bombing the Republican
Palace, the party's national headquartera, the Central Committee and the
headquarters of the Air Force and Intelligence. The~ some armored unita,
based close to Damascus at al-Kiswat~ and al-Qabun camps, would move on the
capital to occupy the vital centers there and take control o.f the gove~nment.
Discharges
It has been confirmed that scores of senior Syrian army officers were
discharged before the start of the recent arrests. These were officers who
were cleared of any connection with the coup attempt. These dismissals in-
cluded a large number of officers of the Air Defer~se Corps and the naval
forces in Latakia and Tartus, as well as several senior officers f rom the
Supreme Military College, including 10 officers of the rank of ma3or general,
about 20 brigadiers, and some other ranks such as colonel, lieutenant colonel
and ma~or. Those identified include Brig Gen Lutfi Mikha'il Haddad, Brig
Gen 'Izmi 'Adi, both from the naval forces in Latakia, Ma~ Gen Ghazi al-Jabi
and Brig Gen 'Abdullah Nummar, both from the Supreme Academy for Military
Science, and some officers from some of the infantry brigades, the missile
and artillery forces and the air force, including Brig Gen (pilot) Mu'taz
Barbuh and Lt Col (Infantry) Salim al-Hushaysh.
The Free Ba'thist Officers
Another aspect of the attempt was contained in the information given to ~
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI to the effect that the investigation revealed a new mili-
tary organization within the Syrian army, bearing the name of the "Free
Ba'thist Officers." The leader of this organization committed suicide, as
soon as he was discovered, while Ma3 Gen Na~i Jamil was being interrogated
and as soon as President al-Asad postpon~d his execution.
The discovery of the organization came about in stages, starting, to be
precise, on the afternoon of 5 January, when the commander of President
Hafiz al-Asad's spPcial security guard granted permission by telephone Co
one of his officers to take leave because of illness.
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~iowever. *_h�_ special miliCary intelligence organization urgently reported
*_o the president that evening that a aurveillance force, subordinate to it,
reported that one ~f the president's aecurity guard officers, i.e., the
"sick" officer, had been seen in a meeting on the outskirts of Damascus with
Staff Col Harb al-Samman, who for more than 3 months had been under intenge
- surveillance, because of his susp3cious movements within ~he armored corps
to which he belonged. In addiCion, he had warm friendships with some of the
youthful air corps pilots.
At dawn the next day, forces from the defense companies raided the home of
the guard officer. During the meticulous search, a large quantity of
pamphlets were seized, which attacked the regime and called for its over-
thraw. They bore the signature cf the "Free Ba'thist Officera."
The special guard officer was interrogated for 3 days, during which he was
subjected to severe torture. He finally confesse~" the names of seven fellow
members of the "Free Ba'thi~st Officers," including Col al-Samman, who was
described as the leader of the organization..
All those whose names were given by the guard officer were arrested, except
for al-Samman who remained free under intense surveillance, so that he could
_ be the trap for other officers who might contact him.
Per.iods of Torture
The investigation, which was accompanied by periods of torture for 5 full
days, was only able to obtain from those six arrested officera the names of
18 other officers from various army corps who were members of that organiza-
tion. The shock that ~olted the r~gime was that three of those arrested
held leadership posts in the defense companies and that 11 of them were
'Alawites. All of them held ~party membership. In addition, one of them
duri*~g interrogation mentioned the name of Ma~ Gen Na~i Jamil, who was men-
tioned in some of the meetings as being an outside supporter.
Na3i Jamil was arrested and interrogated at the defense companies' head-
quarters. He was later transferred to the ~tepublic~:n Palace, where President
. al-Asad personally interrogated him. Na~i Jamil de^~ed knowing anything
about this organization or having contacts with i~. However, he did confess
that he had heard, as othera had heard, rimmors about hoatile movements in
the armed forces, although he had paid them no attention, and therefore,
he saw no reason to tell the suthorities, since they were merely rumora.
Rifa't al-Asad believed that because of what NaJi Jamil had candidly con-
fessed, he.deserved to be executed. However, President al-Asad, who consid-
ered Naji Jamil to be guilty, refused to execute him on Che grotmds that
that would shed light on the rebellion within the armed forces against the
regime, which could lead to ser~ous compllcat~ons.
Intense surveillance of Col al-Sa~an produced no results. It was obvious
that al-Samman had detected the surveillance, and had suapended his activ-
ities and had cut off all contact with the officers and his friends and
companions.
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On 18 January, the order was issued to arre~st Col al-Samman. When the
defense companies' force raided his home, he drew his pistol against the
co~mander of the force. The orders carried by this officer reauired him to
arrest al-Samman alive, no matter what the cost. The force remained in its
positions, unable to move against Col al-Samman, �or more than 3 hours,
during which time the district in which the house was located was blockadea.
Suddenly Col al-Samman raised the pistol to his head and said: "YOU will
not take me, and you will not learn anything. If we have failed this time,
there will be another time, and we will succeed!" He fired a bullet into
his head and fell to the ground.
A secret and swift military trial was held, after which a sentence of execu-
tion was issued against 19 of the arrested officers, while aix others were
sentenced to dis~uissal from the service and prison terms ranging between
10 and 15 years. The sentences were in fact carried out on the same day
that Ma~ Gen Na~i Jamil was seen on television, in an indirect attempt to
refute the reports, circulating within the armed forces and political cir-
cles in the Syrian community, about the discovery of a revolutionary organ~-
zation of army officers working to overthrow the regime, and about the con-
nection of Ma~ Gen Na~i Jamil with them.
Howevei, the regime is still doing all it can to carry out a campaign of
arrests and widespread purges within the army and the defense companies,
and to discover the answer to the question that is haunting it: What is
the organization of "Free Ba'thist Officers."
Other Details
Regarding other details about the abortive attempt, the disturbances that
occurred in Syria last month, and which atill continue, caused the Syrian
president to cancel his trip to Arab North Africa. Foreign correspondents
who had gone to Syria reported that there were severe battles between units
of Ma~ Gen 'Ali Aslan, one of the advisora to the Syrian army chief of staff,
and special forces, subordinate to Rifa't al-Asad, near the town of Duma,
and that Aslan's forces had shelled Rifa't al-Asad's headquarters in that
taan.
Information was also reported that the Syrian authorities had banned foreign
correspondents and photographers fram covering some of the locations of
these incidents. They took away their documents and cameras upon arrival
in Damascus, at the same time that some Syrian civilians were watching a
large migration to the mounta3ns, out of fear of renewed disturbances. An
armored unit has been permanently deployed around the Republican Palace
in Damascus, while President al-Asad has aent his children to his village
of al-Qardahah, his birthplace, in Jabal al-'Alawiin.
At the same time, a group of Syrian special forces was withdrawn from
Lebanon in two batches: the f irst time, 8,000 troops were withdrawn, and the
second time, 2,000 troops were sent to Damascus.
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In any event, the size of the "conspiracy" is clear evidence that the
Syrian opposition is not confined to Ba'thist circles, nor to the Muslim
:6rotherhood, nor to any specific sect or quarteY. There is evidence that
those who carried it out belong to various sects. They are active military
and retired, as well as civilians, who form the active national foundation
for the popular opposition. The Syrian 3uthorities today can of course be
forgiven if they feeY less than reasaur~u about the loyalty of the military
establishment, whether in Syria or in Lebanon.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL WATAN AL 'ARABI
7005
CSO: 4404/323
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- SYRIA
~
DIPLOMAT BLAMED FOR MAGAZINE BOMBING
Paris AL-k'~TAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 258, 22-28 Jan 82 p 16
[Text] AL-WATAN-AL-'ARABI has learned from a diplomatic source here that the
French Foreign Ministry has forwarded to the French ambassador in Damascus, a
complete file on the Syrian diplomat Mikha'il (nicknamed Michel), Kasuha, who
is believed to be responsible for the unsuccessful attempt to bomb the offices
of. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI. The f ile reportedly contains doctanents and evident~al
materials linking the Syrian diplom-at to the crime. It has been confirmed
that the French ambassador to .amascus last week turned over the file to offi-
cials of the Syrian Foreign Ministry in Damascus. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI f eatures
the first artist's sketch of the accused diplomat on this issue's front cover.
It is known that Mikha'il Kasuha, born in Homs in 1948, first entered France
in October 1980 as a cultural adviser to the Syrian Embassy in France. He did
not serve in this capacity, however, but concentrated instead on his other
mission, the one having nothing to do with cultural af,f ai,rs. AL-WATAN AL-
'AF.ABI was the first to disclose his real mission following the assassination
of Salah al-Bitar and Banan~al-'Attar. The question now is why the French
authorities failed to expel him iz~ediately as a persona non grata. The
answer lies in diplomatic conventions which bar expulsion except when a diplo-
mat is caught in the act, which was not the case in the Kasuha incident. In
such situations, the authorities where the crime takes place merely inform the
or_her country's authorities of all legal evidence linking the diplomat to the
crime, in the hope that the offender would be withdrawn by his own country.
When such action is delayed, the host country orders the diplomat to leave.
It is expected that the Kasuha case will soon be resolved, particularly in
view of many indications that the French Government has decided to crack down
on terrorist activities following the assassination last Monday in Paris of
the American diplomat Charles Ray. The Elysee Palace has issued direct orders
to French Security agencies to take all necessary measures to stem the wave of
terrorism in France. A total of 13 assassinations and assassination attempts
on foreign diplomats have taken place in France in the past 5-1/2 years, cu~-~
minating in. the assassination last November of the American diplomat Christian
Chapman.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
9063
CSO: 4404/256
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~ i
SYRIA
BRIEFS
ATTEMPT TO SMUGGLE ARMS FOILED--On his most recent visit to Paris 3 weeks ago,
Mr Rif'at al-Asad (brother of President al-Asad nearly precipitated a diploma-
tic crisis between France and Syria. When French security authorities learned
that Mr al-Asad, accompanied by a~roup of armed bodyguards--some with sub-
machineguns--was leading a motorcade from Geneva [Switzerland] to France, they
sent a police delegation to meet. him at the Swias-French border. When French
police insisted on searching the Syrians, the latter revealed their identities
and produced diplomatic passports which give them immunity against police
searches. At that, the officer in charge demanded that the Syrians surrender
their weapons or return to Switzerland. After much debate and several tele-
phone calls to the highest gover~anental authorities, the Syrian bodyguards re-
turned to Switzerland, while Rif'at al-Aead, accompanied by only two of his
bodyguards, was allowed to continue hie trip to Paris. Three hours later, and
to the surprise of French airport police, the Syrians, still armed, landed at
Orly Airport. Informed of etrict instructions to bar entry to any of them
while armed, the "diplomats" finally surrendered their weaons and were per-
mitted to enter France. The incident nearly precipitated a diplomatic crisis
between the two countries. The French Foreign MinisCry, acting through d3plo-
matic channels, communicated its displeasure to the Syrian Goveriunent and ~
warned against repetition of similar incidents. It also made clear to the i
Syrians that responsibility for protecting foreign vis~!tors to France ~as the 1
business of French police. A similar incident reportedly took place last year,
causing widespread anger in French pQlice circles. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI in Arabic Ko 258, 22-28 Jan 82 p 17] [COPYRTGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'
ARABI] 9063 ~ .
CSO: 4404/256 END
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