JPRS ID: 10443 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050019-1
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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J PRS L/ 10443
9 April 1982 ~
Near East North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 14/S2~
- FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10443
9 April 1982
NEAR EAST~JNORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 14/'82 j
CONTENTS
PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS
5tatus of Women's ~tights in Gulf 5tates E~camined
(AL-WATAN AI,-'ARABI, 12-18 Feb 82) 1
AI~GERIA
Energy Policy Repercussions Examined
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Feb 82) 7
EGYPT
Fahmi: Egypt Must Avoid Signing Any Document of Autonorr~y
- (Isma'il Fahmi Interview; AL-WATAN AI~-~ARABI, 26 Feb-
Lt Mar 82) 11
IR.AN
Ahwaz Liberation Front Leader Commen ts on Oppression of Arab s
(Ahwaz Mahmud Mashari Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
12-18 Feb 82) 20
- KUWAIT
_ Investment Strategy I7iscussed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 5-11 Feb 82) 27
SUDAN
Internal, External Forces Affecting Numayri~s Survival
(~Isam ~Abd-al-!Aziz; AI,-WATAN AL-~ARABI, 11 Mar 82) 29
SYRIA
A1-Asad Brothers Feud Analyzed
(AI~-WATAN AL-~AR.ABI, 5-~1 Max 82) 34
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOL'0]
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Deterrent Force Activities Criticized
(AI~-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 5-11 Mar 82) 38
TUNISIA
General, Economic Budget Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Feb 82) 41
-b-
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PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS
STATUS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN GUL~' STATES EXAMINED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabi.c No 261, 12-18 Feb 82 pp 18-21
[Article: "They Re�uae to Give Her the Right to Vote, to Travel or to Drive;
The Argument between l:onservatives and Liberals: Gulf Women Are a Burning
Political and Social Iasue"]
[Text] In Kuwait the parliament has refused to give women the right to vote.
In Saudi Arabia, His Eminence tfie Mufti has issued a decree prohibiting them
from driving, and in same Gulf countries, women are not allowed to travel
_ abroad to complete tfieii education. A correspondent from AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
who visited the Gulf recently wrote this report about the political and
social aspects of the Gulf women's issue in the midst of the controver$y
between traditional, conservative institutions and liberal social circles.
The women of the Gulf are a touchy political and social issue. They are part
of a confrontation that is sometimes silenti and at other times vocif erous
between conservatives and libera3.s in the Gulf count~c.ies. They are always
in the line of fire, a fact wfiich educated, learned Gulf women know quite
well. ~
They join in the current controversy and have ambii.ions and hopes to see to
fruition their progress and liberation. However, the ma3ority of average,
uneduca~.ed or slightly educated women are satisifed and content with thAir �
marginal role in a society dominated by men, both in political and religious
institutions and in the spheres of labo::, economy, business and information
media.
Gver. educated, learned women who part icipate in this controversy do not
hasten ch~age, for they know the limits of their abilities and pref er to let
_ime play its role, for opportunitie$ will undoubtedly come in succession
for them to achieve their rights and equality with men.
Perhaps the Gulf women are slow and deliberate because Islam itself upholds
the ~roman's pusi*ion in the family and in soci.al institutions, gives her
respect as a mother and a w3fe and guarantees her divorce and inheritance
~ rights.
J
There are also unwritten, inherited trad itions and customs which make women
rea:i;ze that their ab ility to make changes is limited. Gulf society is still
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HUR UFi~'ICIAL USr; ONLY
a society of tribes, bedouin and large ~a~uilies where men are dominant. A
woman's roie in this family society is still the role of a wife who devotes
her life to housework, rearing children and taking care of her husband. He
is the only man in her lif e and she does not talk to any man other than her
father and brothers. Associating and meeting with men are prohibited. How-
ever, the religious establishm~nt issued a decree last April permitting a
suitor to see a girl's face, but forbidding forcing her to marry against her
will. Nonetheless, young men are turning away from marriage because of the
high cost of dowries, and polygamy is on the wane. One can thank the tele-
phone, the only means of contact, for a quick conversation between the new
generation of boys and girls, far removed from the eyes and ears of others,
or perhaps for a date to meet at a distance in the supermarket or library.
The tremendous speed of develo~nent in Gulf society, which has skipped the
lengthy, traditional stages gone through Tiy other societies, is the caus~~ of
all the controversy surrounding the role and position of Gulf women. The
abundance of oil has spurred a great lea.p in economic development, but has
not yet succeeded in imposing social and poli~.ical development at the same
speed because of tradition and customs.
The Gulf women's problem is that they see the economy and development growing
faster than social f reedom. They find themselves in the society of the modern
city with all the housirig, cars, videos and televisions provided by civili- ,
zation, b~it their role in society is still backward and marginal and does
not parallel the role of their Arab sisters in countries which are still
economically underdev eloped, s~ich as Egypt and Syria. It is also not com-
parable to the role of women in a Gulf country like Iraq, where women have
obtained all their rights, and educated women carry out this role in com~lete
freedom under the auspices of the goverriment, without any opposition from
conservative institutions.
Confusion and Concern of Gulf Women
This ~onfusion about the Gulf women's position in political and social forces
and the concern about their political and social role dominate the thoughts
of educated, learned Gulf women today.
In spite of all this and despite the common characteristics of Gulf women,
there are minar 3iff erences in their vieRas from one Gulf country to another.
In Saudi Arabia for example, women are hostages in the home before and after
marriage, even when they have obtained the highest level of education; they
devote their lives to rearing their children, and i: they go out, the aba
covers them from head to to e.
This almost total absence from productive society makes them the subject of
controversy between conservative institutions and lib.eral circles in society.
The liberals want to attract educated Saudi women to the work force to f ill
the deadly unoccupied time that the women have and to make up the shortage
in the Saudi labor force. How ever, the conservatives disagree and see th e
role of women as Islam defines it, in the home, and believe that their
associating with men at work is tempt~tion for both men and women.
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Saudi women are in the line of fire in this ongoing argument. In general,
tt~ey are satisfied and do not see themselves as repressed socially. The excep-
tions to this are educated, learned women who have completed secondary or
higher education. 1'hey are anxious for change, but know that they cannot
challenge customs and powerful traditional institutions. They are optimistic
that change will come slowly, but through persistence. One indication of thie
is that the field of banking has been opened for them, as the teaching and
nursing f ields were earlier.
. The lack of opportunities for social activity and ~obs make Saudi women spend
their lives waiting--waiting for the hu~bands that their mothers try to f ind
for them or that their fathers will cfioose for them. This waiting may be
f illed by means that the electronic revolu~.ion has afforded--videos, tele-
visions and radios. They prefer waiting to breaking with tradition and cus~-
toms. They do not want tu bring shame upon themselves, their families or their
f athers .
Saudi women do not go out often. If they do go out, they go in their cars
which are driven oy their husbands or the family driver. To go.on a trip,
they must consult a religious advisor, and going out does not mean associat-
ing with men. If they have to frequent public buildings, lianks or universi-
ties, they must use special entrances, meeting with men 3n any way is for-
b idden and the punishment for fornication is dea~h, if there is a witness.
The ruling family in Saudi Arabia takes taking a moderate position on the
argument which occasionally heated argument about women's role in society.
In general, they encourage a gradual widening of opportunities for women,
but this within the framework of religious law, tradition and cust~ms.
King 'Abd al-'Aziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia, took the first step in this
respect. His son, King Faisal, reaffirmed this position when he argued with
' the people of Baridah in the Na~d who were pnotesting the opening of a girls'
school in their city. He ask~d tfiem to f ind one Koranic passage that forbade
educating women. He was supported in this stance by his wif e'Iffa, who
deserves the credit for opening the first modern girls' school in 1956. She
still oversees a numher of social and educational centers dedicated to
serving Saudi women.
Although the trend toward opening up opportunities for women grew after the
death of King Faisal, i*_ has slowed down since the spread of the Salaf i move-
ment.
His Fminence ~haykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Bin Baz, the Mufti of the Wahhabi sect
followed in Saudi Azabia, recently issued a religious decree forbidding women
to drive cars or hire foreign drivers or servants of a different religion.
In Qatar, where the Wahha6i sect is also followed, the law does not forbid
women to drive, b+it they do not do so out of tradition, while in Kuwait,
women take pride in driving their Mercedes.
In the United Arab Emirates, women live outside the society of inen, but do
so more freely than their Saudi or Qatari sisters and less freely than their
~ sisters in Kuwait and Bahrain.
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N'UR UM'H'[CIAL U~~ ONLY
In Kuwait, y~u find you~cself in s completely different society. The Kuwaiti
women yoc. see are often unveiled in the markets, government offices, compan-
ies, banks, shops and universities. They wear the most up-to-date European
fashions, yet the parliament recently rPfused to give them the right to vote--
which it did for the second time in less than 10 years--so astonishing and
angering them that they protested and demonstrated. Here, women are the
ladies of the house and of society also, tbey en3oy wide social influence,
their vo ices are audible and courageous and their power to challenge men is
stronger in a more f?exible and less.stri�t society.
Education Is Universal, but As~ociati.ng with Men Is Generally Forbidden
Education is one of the true instruments of change which work like f ire in
straw. The f irst girls' school in Saudi Arabia was founded just a quarter
of a century ago. The credit for this goes to 'Iffa, the wife.of King Faisal.
Today the number of gir? students has grown to 700,0~0, and the number of
f emale university graduates will reach 40,000 in 19~35.
Associating with men is forb.idden in the various levels of education in~;Saudi
Arabia. "because it deprives women of their femininity," as the conservatives
say, and schools are usually surrounded by high walls. A sharply-worded
warning was issued recently to students and young men against gathering in
front of girls' schools and harrassing f emale students. Statistics show that
50 percent of Saudi young women f inish element~ry school, 40 percent attend
~ junior high school, 20 percent reach high school and a minority attend
unive.rs it ies .
There are four vocational institutes for women in Saudi Arab3.a giving them
the opportunity to study home economics, nursing, accounting and secretarial
skills. At 'Abd al-`Aziz University in Riyadh, female students can study .
arts and sciences, including medicine, taught by female teachers. If a male
teacher is required, he will give his lecture through closed circuit tele-
vision. There is a plan to combine the scattered university colleges in one
location, but mixing of the sexes will of course remain forbidden.
However, fP.male students in the UAE can travel abroad for their education,
usually at government expense. In Bahrain, educ~tion for women began in the
1920's. Coeducation there is common, especially at higher levels. Two-
~thirds of the 3,000 students at Qatar University are females. This develop-
ment occurrsd when Shaykh Khalifa Bin Hamad al-Thani sent his two daughters
to study at the university. In Kuwait there are a quarter of a million male
and f emale students in 400 schools. Sixty-f ive percent of the 20,000 students
attending Kuwait University are female, and this large university is co-
educat ional .
A Diversion and Prof ession, but Forbidden
Although the field of education is wide open to Gulf t4omen, the work force
is relatively closed. Nonetheless, work would f ill the deadly empty time
that educated, learned women have and is the goa? for practically every
educated or university graduate woman. Tn Saudi Arabia, for e�ample, it is
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a diversion more than a source of income, but is not available except in the
f ields of education and nursing, which the government encourages, and in the
banks tor women which now number 13.
Educated Saudi women are ansious to work, but husbands forbid iti, families
refuse, society does not approve, r~ligious inst~.tutions fear that they will
be tempted and the Saudi labor law of 1~70 forbids women from working if they
would be forced to associate with men. There are inspectors who make sur-
prise visits to companies and institutions to arrest women who work as secre-
taries. Fines are large, somet3mes as much as 60,000 riyals.
Despite these rest~tictions, Saudi women are gradually moving into the work
force. The trend for the future i~ women working in the private sector by us-~.
ing the wealth that they have attained through inheritance, for example.
There are scores of specialty shops for women which were opened and are
managed by wom ai, such as those for fashions, perfumes and "nouveaut ~s," as
well as beauty salons and perhaps even restaurants. There are respected
veiled women in this f ield, such as the wif e of Mr Nabih Fir'awn, who has
opened a shop to sell ob~et d'art, and Mrs Layla Yusuf Bin Ladin, who has
opened a shop for Yves Saint Laurent fashions.
Female students go tb.tkheir schools or universities wearing the most fashion-
able Eu~ropean clothes under their atias, inclLding ~eans, as do working women.
The debate about women's working is furious. The problem is no longer "Should
women work?" but "What should they do and in what f ie1dY Would their working
limit the increasing immigrat3on of foreign laboi, especially from Asia?"
Even the present 5-year deve3.opment plan encourages opening the work force to
women, and it is expected that the numbex of working women will reach 120,000
in 1985.
Saudi women have recently entered the f ield of journalism. Some are editors,
authors, writers and editors-in-chief for women's magazines. However, pic-
tures of women are forbidden in Saudi newspapers and magazi~les, although
love poetry is not. Arab and other foreign newspapers are forbidden if the}r
exceed the standards for publishing pictures of women.
Saudi men generally, as fathers, brothers and husbands re~ect the idea of
women working and consider it a step down for themselves and their wives
socially, asidP from their being influenced by the religious establishment,
wtiich re~ects working with men in any way.
University women in the UAE are ahle to f ind 3obs, but f inding husbands is
much easier. Women in 8ahrain are 20 percent of the work force, and the
government encourages them to work. The percentage of women in the govern-
ment has grown to 40 percent, and women even serve on the police force.
Women there gen.erally receive equal pay with men, even if they do not have
enual opportunities for promotion to the upper tevels of employment.
Educated Bahraini women are very courageous, despite their r.espect for the
conservative family system. They can go out unveiled if they wish, and
husbands have started accepting the idea of their wives' w~orking to help
them economically.
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In Qatar busitiessmen petitioned the government several years ago asking that
women be encouraged to work, but the government is stt.ill hesitant to approve
the petition. The c~~iservative families in a small society guided primarily
by Wahhabi ideol:ogy refuse to accept working women, and therefore, women
here constitute only 2 percent of tfie total work force.
The picture is completely diff erer.t in Kuwait. 4lomen here make up 12 percen*
of the labor force, and there is no discrimination between men and women
in government. Women receive equal pay with men, have equal opportunities
and can be promoted to the highest positions, becoming undersecretaries,
directors general, foundation directors or factory managers.
For the above reasons, Arab women in the Gulf countries are one heated aspect
of the political and social issues in the area and are always the subject
of debate and argument between proponents of the old and proponents of what
is new, between the~~.nanserva~ive, traditional school and the liberal, emanci-
pated social and political circles.
The future of the Gulf rests to a great extent on this argument and debate,
as a society which will progress politically and socially to the same degree
that it has progressed economically. Tn the framework of this future, the
position and role of Gulf women will be ~efined socially and politically.
I'oreign Women in the Gulf
Arab women who come from Egypt, Lehnnon or Syria and non-Arab women who come
from Europe to the Gulf countries to work or to accompany their husbands
will f eel a jolt. They must follow the customs and traditions that Gulf
women are bound by, especially in Saudi Arabia, as far as complete separat ion
from the society of inen and wearing the aba, which covers the face and body
down to the feet.
- Arab women usually follow tradition and accept this situation, while European
women rebel, especially if they have been sub~ected to pur.ishment in the pub-
lic street by the stick of a volunteer who will not hesitate to hit a woman
on the back if her face shows, part of her aba is turn ed up or if she bends
to check whatever she is buying and part of her body shows.
In Saudi Arabia the issue of associating with men is very diff icult for
European women, even in the large hotels where mixed swimming was forbidden
recently.
The problem of European women has increased with the influx of tens of
thousands of Europeans and Americans. An interim solution has been found to
this problem by the creation of closed societies, or "ghettoes," for these
communities where women can exercise a large part of the socia.l freedom
which they en~oy in their own countries.
Within these closed societies, women mix with men, go out unveiled and also
work with men. However, if th~y go to the local Saudi market, they must
follow tradition.
Nevertheless, some European women rebel, unabl e to tol erate these restric-
tions, and return to their countries without their husbands.
COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 1981
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ALGERIA
ENERGY POLICY REPERCUSSIONS EXt~,MINED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 359-360
[TextJ Coming a few days after the signing by France of the contract for the sup-
plying of gas by the USSR, the agreement with Algeria for delivery of liquefied
gas has given rise to passionate commentaries and criticism. Relations between
France and Algeria have apparently retained their emotional content on both sides
of the Mediterranean. In the case of both agreements, it is a matter of a politi-
cal decision on the part of Che French Government, despite the embarrassed explana-
tions of the prime minister. Although couanercial conditions obviously cannot be
ignored, it is therefore essentially this policy that muat be ~udged and from this
standpoint, the contract with Algeria must be approved because it translates into
fact the stated determination of the government to make overtures to the Third
World.
It is not customary to officially divulge certain details of such agreements, par-
ticularly prices and indexing clauses. Consequently, the precie,e cost of the
Soviet gas was not given by the French Government. Nevertheless, official state-
ments and indications from various sources enable one to have a rather accurate
idea of the terms of the contract.
The latter provides for an annual shipment of 5.1 billion cubic meters for 20
years, adding to the 4 billion cubic meters supplied by Algeria in accordance with
the 1964 and 1972 contracts. The first deliveries under the new contract should
come in March, bufi it will not be until the end of the qear that the annual
"cruising" rate of S billion cubic meters will be attained. About half of the
deliveries will be ~arried by Algerian methane tankers.
- Ti~e pi-ice that will henceforth apply to all gas fram Algeria is reportedly $5.10
per million BTU (FOB price).* This is the figure given by the MIDDLE EAST ECONO-
MIC SURVEY published in Nicosie, which is generally well-informed, and by the
French and international press, including the FINANCIAL TIMES of London. To the
price leaving Algiers, one must add about $1.00 for transport and regasification
in France. The cost price for France is reportedly about $6.00, very close to the
* 1 million BTU (British Thermal Unit) represents 293 kilowatt-hours and 25 cubic
meters of gas in the gaseous state. 1 cubic.meter of liquefied gas represents ,
600 cubic meters of gas in the gaseous state or some 7,000 kilowatt-hours.
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rvx ~rri~,~wa~ vaG vtvLY
price charged by SONATRACH for ccntracts now being carried out but which the
French Gas Company (GllF) never accepted, content to pay an advance on the increase
demanded by its supplier. Recognizing the worth of part_ of SONATRACH's arguments,
the French Gas Company did in fact agree, through a 1979 rider, to arrange a
price higher than.that in the contract. According to the general manager of
SONATRACH, Yousfi, the new price should 3pply retroactively to deliveries mad.e
for the past 2 years, but Yousfi gave no deta~ls on how the retroactivity would
be calculated.
The price will be indexed on rate5 for eight crudes to be chosen by common agree-
ment between Paris and Algiers. Finally, payment will be made by the French Gas
Company (86.5 percent) and the French Government (13.5 percent).
French Minister of Foreign Relations Claude Cheysson said that the price was
"higher than certain long-term contract prices, but lower than that of certain
deliveries now being made." The general manager of SONATRACH said, for his part,
that the price "is at the level seen on the international market."
Why should this contract, whose financial conditions ara not particularly favorable
to France according to semi-official estimates, the price is some 15 to 20 per-
cent higher than the price of the contract signed with.the Soviets nevertheiess
be considered beneficial to France, despite the fact that the agreement in no way
forces Algeria to use all or part of the "surbonus" accepted by Paris upon the
purchase of French pro;iucts or to go to French firms in order to carry out its
equipment program? The response is obvious: for political reasons whose advan-
tages will, in the opinion of the French Government, largely make up for the
financial effort ma.de.
First of all, France has long wanted to diversify its sources of energy an~1 reduoe
its dependency on oil for security reasons. It now depends 50 percent on imported
oil, mainly from the Near East, a particularly unstable region and one with vul-
nerable lines of communication. The government wants to reduce that oil dependency
to 42 percent by 1985 and 32 percent by 1990, by which time oil imports should
represent only 75 million tons, compared with 93 million today. This concern for
security is one of the constants of the French policy and was shared by previous
- governments, which planned for the development of alternatives to oil and began
the now-c.ompleted negotiations with the Soviet Union and Algeria.
For fihe French economy, the "fallout" of the Algerian contract must be substantial,
independently of the startup of the Montoir-de-Bretagne gas terminal, representing
an investment of 1 billion francs and unused since its completion in 1980. With
a capacity of 10 billion cubic meters, it will not only receive gas going to
France, but 2 billion cubic meters that will cross French territory on its way to
Belgium.
There was concern immediately following the signing of the contract regarding the
will of Algerian authorities to entrust contracts to French industries. On 4 Febru-
ary, Beregovoy, secretary general of the Elysee, stated that the contracts already
"acquired" numbered about 15, according to a list drawn up by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, and that they represented some 12.5 billion francs. This statement
was disputed by members of the opposition and part of the French press, emphasizing
that Algeria has entered no agreement to give counterparts to France and that the
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firmness, not to say ruthlessness, of Algerian negotiators in the past did not
augur well for the future. These doubts are being wiped awaya One after another
came official announcements of the successful conclusion of an agreement with
- SOFRETU [expansion unknown], a subsidiary of the RATP [Independent Parisian Trans-
port System], for the study and engineering on the Algiers und~rground railroad
for 150 million francs, the signing of a contract for 525 million francs with
TECHNIP [expansion unknown] and Saint-Gobain for construction of a plate glass
plant at Jijel, while NECIM [expansion unknawn] obtained a 450-million-franc con-
tract for an aluminum anodization and extrusion plant at Stresa. In evaluating
this contract, one must therefore consider fiscal income received by the French
Treasury and the social security for workers extended to French personnel, as well
as the cost of unempl~yment compensation thereby avoided.
That the signing of these initial contracts with French firms has closely followed
the signing of the gas agreement means that Algeria and France share a determina-
tion to give their relations a much broader significance than that of commercial
trade carried out strictly according to the rules of the market.
It is this determination, clearly stated by the French Government, which has
clearly resulted in the successful conclusion of negotiations underway for 2 years,
negotiations that were particularly hard and during which French authorities went
far in trying to understand the Algerian point of view. Andre Giraud, minister of
industry under the previous government, revealed in a Parisian daily that he had
already accepted the principle of the equivalence of the price of gas with that of
oil, increased by a quality factor, one of Algeria's essential demands.
In the definition of its policy regarding Algeria and developing countries in
genera.l, the French Government was inspired by long-term considerations.
The first stems from an analysis of the results of France's f.oreign trade in recent
years. Our commercial trade with other industrialized countries regularly results
in a net deficit. In contras~, we register a positive balance sheet (20 billion
francs in 1980, essentially due to manufactured products) in our trade with devel-
oping nations, trade that represents one-fourth of our foreign trade. According
to all commonly accepted projections, the economies of those developing nations
must, in the years to come, enjoy ~tronger and more rapid growth than those of
ttie industrialized countries,. meaning that their import needs will offer promising
prospects for our own exports. It is therefore in our own interest to broaden
our commercial relations with them and to assure ourselves of solid positions for
tlle f.uture, trying to join with them in defining a real co-development policy.
Speaking more generally, France is~convinced that the world will not emerge from
the current economic crisis except by helping the development of the Third World.
'lhis conviction, based on an economic analysis and not moral considerations, is
also shared by many independent economists, specialists from the ma~or interna-
ttonal institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, and by World Bank President
Clausen himself, who said, at the time of his Paris visit in September, that the
development of economically less advanced countries is in the interest of the West.
That is what the French president has constantly repeated since he came to power,
trying to persuade the heads of other industrialized countries in Ottawa and Cancun.
Coing Eurther, Mitterrand tried to translate into action the French determination
to help improve the operation of trade between the North and the South by upgrading
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~'vn vr. ~~..~A~. v?.-. vJ\u~
t.he natural resources of countries which derive most of their exports from one or
a iiandful of basic products, as is the case of Algeria.
This is the essential reasoning behind the French decision to sign the contract
with Algeria, which for its part will derive substantial profits through greater
returns from its gas exports, not only to France, but obviously, with other buyers
as well, particularly Italy, buyers that w.ill probably be forced to accept condi-
tions comparable to those in the French contract. Should one then accuse France
- of having failed Western solidarity? If the French analysis is correct, the other
industrialized nations that buy Algerian gas will find in Algeria a solvent partner
whose equipment and consumer goods needs are enormous, as are those of any develop-
ing country whose population is growing at a very fast rate.
Finally, the new relations that France has tried to establish with Algeria fit into
a much broader political picture. .Azi average-size pawer, it can become a pole of
attraction for Third World countries desirous of reducing their dependency on the -
two superpowers. As the new secretary general of the United Nations, Javier Perez
da Cuellar, recently said in an interview with a French daily, "One undoubtedly
expects, more than in the past, that France will be a link between the North and
the South. Nothing would be more pleasant for me than to see that hope confirmed."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11,464
CSO: 4519/130
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EGYPT
FAHMI: EGYPT MUST AVG~D SIGNING ANY DOCUMENT ON AUTONOMY
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 263 26 Feb - 4 Mar pp 33-35
[Interview with Former Foreign Minister, Isma'il Fahmi, by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
in Cairo; date not given]
[Text] The aristocratic native stings you with his Egyptian sarcasm and jokes,
half a cigar not leaving his fingers and another cigar showing in the pocket of
his trim jacket. They have said of him that he was the engineer of Egyptian-
American relations and that he was the skilled architect who rebuilt the
bridges of the relationship between Egypt and the United States after years
of hostility and lack of trust. In fact, they have gone further than this
and have said that he was America's man in Egypt and, in fact, was the man
through whom Washington was able to move Egypt from.the stage of absolute
hostility to the stage of a strategic alliance with.Sadat's Egypt....until he
surprised the whole world with his famous resignation in opposition to
al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. To the same extent that the resignation was a
surprise and embarrassed al-Sadat's reg:irae, it also made the chair of the
Egyptian Foreign Ministry an undesirable seat for a multftude of politicians
for almost 2 years. He made his resignation a tradition the basis of which
were laid down and reaffirmed by the late Muhammad Riyad and wh{ch reached its
peak during Camp David when Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil also resigned (see his
important interview in the previous issue of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI.
Isma'il Fahmi appeared to get very emotional when we asked him about the
mistakes he should have avoided when he was Egyptian foreign minister; his
diplomatic phrases with a golden polish turned into punches and bullets, .
relating his achievements and successes during those critical years in the life
o.E ~gypt, and then closed off the dialogue, saying: "Enough, I'm tired."
However, we did not get tired dur.ing our important interview and here is the
text of our dialogue with Isma'il Fahmi:
[Question] If the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied part of Sinai is
completed of 25 April, how do you view Egypt's relationship with the Arabs on
- the one hand, and with Israel on the other, and how do you view the map of
relations in the area in the post-April stage?
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[Answer] rhe key to building bridges in the Arab world is in Egypt's hands.
Consequently, the issue depends on what decisions Egypt makes from now on and
until the date of the complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai on 26 April. I
mean, to be precise, if Egypt concentrates on implementing the clauses of the
peace treaty with Israel fully, some bridges can then be established, not all
bridges with the Arab world. To put it more clearly, if Egypt signs no paper
of any kind involving autonomy before 26 Apri1, then a start can be made in
building bridges with the Arab world. If Egypt puts its signature on a
document involving autonomy in any form and under any name whatsoever in the
form of general principles or special principles or with any approach of any
kind accomplished as an American-Israeli departure, then I do not believe
that bridges can be restored with the Arab world. The reason is clear--Egypt
signed a unilateral peace treaty with Israel involving oniy the Sinai. Any
evaluation of the Camp David agreement outside this context is to be regarded
as incorrect on the level of politics or international law. The overall
framework of autonomy was originally, as is well known, Begin's plan which he
presented to Carter in November 1977 and the� raised in al-Isma'iliyah when :~e
came to visit Egypt for the first time. It is an Israeli plan, and Begin's
plan in particular, designed ultimately to enable Israel in stages (over a
period of years) to wipe out Palestinian rights, the Palestinian entity and
any process whatsoever that would help to form the Palestinian state or help
to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its right to self determination.
It is clear that since the visit of the late President al-Sadat to Jerusalem,
Israel has been continuing intentionally--not before the visit--to take steps
which it had never taken since the 1967 war, including, by way of example
but not confined to this, increased building of settlements, plans to annex
Jerusalem and Golan and the process of changing the military government system
to a civil system by applying Israeli law in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
and changing the geographic and demographic character of the Bank itself.
These are actions which Israel had not been bold enough to take and, in fact,
had not taken any of them whatsoever before al-Sadat's visit. Why? Tor the
obvious reason that before the visit, the southern front of~Israel was open
because Egypt was in the battle with its power, strength, army, potential
and radiating influence. After the visit and after the peace agreement was
signed, Egypt was no longer present as a threat to Israel from the south, the
strongest front that Israel could fear.
So Israel secured the southern front by Egypt's total departure from the Arab
cordon and from posing a threat to Tsrael. This, as everyone knows, was
Israel's goal in making peace with Egypt and, to be more precise, removing
Egypt from Arab unanimity, from Arab solidarity and from the Arab front, so
that the entity would collapse since the Arab entity cannot stand without
Egypt except through a new miracle.
Israel succeeded in this as the result of the unilateral peace agreement it
signed with Egypt (Article 7). So, Israel's fundamental goal behind peace
was to remo~?e Egypt from the world and isolate it from the Arab world and to
destroy the Arab structure from the bottom. For this reason, we find that at
the start of the peace process and after the signing of the treaty, Israel
was affirming that there was no connection between the peace treaty and
autonomy, while at this time Egypt was so emphatic that there was such a
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' connection that it appeared as if it would not sign a unilateral peace.
:iowever, Israel has recently begun--to be precise, during the past 6 months--to
revive the linkage theory. This means that it urgently wants to obtain
Egypt's signature to a document involving autonomy prior to the withdrawal.
If Israel is successful in this, with support from the United States, it would
mean that Egyp~ had left the Arab world. Why? Because Egypt will have
signed a documei~t involving the future of the Palestinian people and it cannot
sign anything or speak in their behalf. This means that Egypt would enable
Israel to obtain this document and to begin the policy of de 3ure or de facto
annexation over 5 or 10 years, and Israel would confront the Arab world, the
Western world and the Arab Islamic world with the statement that Egypt had
signed so why all the emotion and clamor since it is the largest Arab country.
So, Israel would begin to implement its policy under the protection and
umbrella of the Egyptian signature, interpreting it as it wished, and then
= would enter the mazes of interpretation and vague, elastic formulae.
This objective finds acceptance in American policy in the sense that it is in
America's strategic interests in the Middle East, and in the Arab world in
particular, for Egypt not to return to the Arab world nor to restore solidarity
to the Arab world nor to have an Arab-Egyptian front established that would
cope with problems and discuss them from the Arab angle and from the standpoint
of Arab interests. We, therefore, find that the United States has suddenly
begun to get active after having been snoring in a deep slumber. The American
secretary of state has come to the area twice during one month and is beginning
to talk about new plans and about hope of coming up with a plan on autonomy,
or at least general principles, shortly before or during the withdrawal stage.
� So, the issue is clear. The important thing for Egypt is to digest all this.
We know precisely the nature of the factors hidden behind this rapia movement
and heavy pressure which I expect to increase. If we assume that Egypt--
justly--were to refuse to sign any agreement whatsoever on autonomy or even
the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, there is no American, non-American or
Tsraeli powe~,r that could coerce Egypt into signing any document of any sort
concerning the Palestinian people following the withdrawal.
� [Question] How do you think Egypt can get out of this dilemma? ~
[AnswerJ By not signing anything and by urging Israel to apply and respect
its obligations regarding Sinai, an international agreement or treaty tl~at must
be implemented and adhered to unless one of the parties shows bad faith. The
- agreement is inrErnational and has absolutely no connection with the sub~ect
of the Palestinian autonomy agreement.
[Question] You have profound and lengthy experience in dealing with American
foreign policy. In fact, Isma'il Fahmi built the bridges of Egyptian-American
relations after the October 1973 war. Given this experience and this role,
how do you evaluate the policy of the Reagan administration compared with the
course of the Carter administration?
[Answer] During the era of Nixon, For3 or Carter or even now, there has been
no pure American policy on solving the Middle East crisis. Anyone who claims
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utl~erwise knows nothing at all. Were Reagan to have a policy on solving the
Middle East problem, he would have preaented it. Where is this policy? If
we go back to the platform of his Republican party during the campaign, we
find it to be a disaster for the Middle East crisis. Anyone, eve.t from the
_ American side, who claims that they have a policy is evading the truth. I
challenge any American whomsoever who claims that they have a definite
American policy in the area, based on the principles whic~z America advocates
in other area.s and for other peoples. The fact is, America has at no time
presented a specific policy. I used to deal with them on this basis, that
is, on the basis that everything they submit and propose had been discussed
with the Israelis and that they had reached agreement with them on it and that
it was originally an Israeli plan on which the Americans have put some
embellishments and ~ustifications, presenting it as an American plan. I know
that it was not originally an American plan because there was not originally
any American policy.
[Q~lestion] Is the lack of this specific American policy toward the area in
itself a policy or is it a real inability to formulate a specific policy in
the area and with regard to the Middle East crisis?
[Answer] We can view it as a policy and an inability simultaneously. It is
a policy in the sense that America has felt and still feels that Israel is its
extension in the area, strategically, militarily and psychologically from the
standpoint of regional political geography and from the standpoint of political
geography internationally. All of America's committments to Israel are quite
clear, starting with what Egypt promised Israel and America's fu11 committment
to it which was primarily against Egypt and going on to the rapid deployment
theories and military strategic cooperation agreements. The basis of all
these things is that there.is a policy supported by the Pentagon people which
states that Israel is America's extension in the area and ultimately America
can depend on no one but Israel. So, it is a policy. At the same time, it
is an impotence since America is now unable to freely reach a decision. Things
have developed to the point that any American decision on the Middle East
crisis, supposed to emerge from Washington, now is issued from Tel Aviv. The
United States cannot move unless it is completely confident that Israel is
satisfied with this movement, in total and in detail, even if it is an interim
movement.
American-Israeli Fraud
[Question] In the light of this analysis, what is the importance of the
abrogation of the strategic cooperation agreement between America and Israel?
[Answer] Nothing was abrogated. This alleged abrogation is nothing more than
an American-Israeli fraud. The agreement stands. This decision to suspend it
temporarily is a public relations dec:ision to influence the Arab world, as
usual, and to polarize it. Secondly, because the Americans knew that the
proposal to impose sanctions on Israel would be submitted in the Security
- Council where Washington has the right of veto, they did what they did from
the public relations standpoint. Behind the scenes, the,y apologized to Israel
and gave it sufficient guarantees, following the same approach as when they
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postponed delivery of some ai.rcraft to Israel after the bombing of the Iraqi
nuclear reactor. So, it is a publicity operation with a specific, dedicated
objective which has absolutely no effect nor will it have any effect on the
American-Israeli strategic relation~hip.
[Question] Can Egypt continue to ignore the Soviet role in� the peace process?
[Answer] The Soviet role can absolutely not be ignored and America itself
cannot ignore it. It is not in the interest of the Arab parties, including
Egypt, to ignore the Soviet role. The Soviet Union is a great power like
America and has more than one overt and covert policy in reaching its
objectives and to protect its strategic ob3ectives. If we move beyond the
boundaries of the regional competition in the area between the Soviet Union
and the United States to the competition between the two big powers cn the
broader scale, we find that the relationship between the two is very close and
there is no separation between them. You may remember when Carter began
preparing for and advocating th~ Geneva conference (before he did this with
the parties to the dispute), he consulted with the Soviet Union and came up
with the announcement which was released on 1 October 1976 and which defined
the overall framework of the comprehensive peaceful solution based on the
perspective of the two big powers. In other words, they reached agreement
between themselves on the Americans' initiative without consulting with the
parties to the dispute. The game of the big powers in the Middle East is an
inseparable part of their game on the broader international scale.
[Question] So America will go it alone in the area?
[Answer] Wrong, wrong. That is not in the interest of the Arab countries or
of Egypt itself. Rather it is in their best interests that there be a non-
aligned country, a country with its own capabilities and its own international
weight in the area and that country is Egypt. It is able to play the game of
benefitting from both big pcnaers and to deal with them at the same time on the
basis of preserving the international balance in the area. It is not essential
that the benefit be equal as it is very difficult to deal with the two
countries on the same level of relationship.
[Question] Was Egyptian policy at any time able to operate under this balanced
formula?
[Answer] We almost accomplished that at one p~:riod of time but special
circumstances then arose that were not conducive to this. During the time of
the late leader, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, Egypti threw its weight on the Soviet
side and during the time of Anwar al-Sadat, particularly in his last years
after I resigned, Egypt threw itself completely 3nto the arms of A~erica.
- [Question) Do you see in the Egyptian-Indian-Yugoslav dialogue that took place
recently any attempt to revive and renew the nonaligned movement and to revive
the Egyptian role in it?
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[Answer] The nonaligned movement is passing through a very grave and sensitive
phase. The reason first of all goes back to fundamental changes in the
countries that pioneered the nonaligned movement. Radical changes have
occurred in Egypt, India and Yugoslavia which have had an impact on the
nonaligned movement and its phtlosophy. Therefare, I feel that the nonaligned
movement needs a new conference designed to evaluate and improve the movement
itself. Bil.ateral conferences will only be a repetition of what is happening
in the UN or in other international conferences. Therefore, as I view it,
the nonaligned movement needs new preparatory conference of no less importance
than the first conferences.
[Question] Do you feel that the faltering of the policy of nonalignment now
goes back to the lack of ~,larity of the formula itself or to the fact that
the movement was born in conditions of the cold war and has not adapted itself
to the formula~ot international detente or international relaxation as a new
characteristic?
[Answer] No political movc,ment whatsoever on any level whatsoever can dis-
regard existing international political conditions. The era of colonialism
had its own values and manif estations. During that time, colonialism gave
birth to the reasons for solidarity among the small countries and this made
peoples "explode" toward independence and freedom and to sacrifice themselves
and adopt clear and explicit positions. The independent sources of wealth
of peoples, the exploitation of the peoples themselves and international
monopolies--all these things were in themselves suff icient tc strengthen the
solidarity of the peoples of the Third World, making them forget their local
and regional disputes to counter the sense of being threatEned. As part of
these specific components, a new system was born called nonalignment, a
system created by changes and crises of that time. When that time with its
own conditions ended, a sort of lassitude occurred, as if the world had
become clean and free of the approaches involving subordination, exploitation
and colonialism, despite the existence of something called neo-colonialism,
colonialism wearing various hats, a Russian hat, an American hat, a French
hat and a British hat, as well as the hat of technology and exploitation of
- the need for it on the part of countries of the Third World and the
exploitation of the resources of small countries in a covetous, delicate
manner.
We say again that nonalignment needs a new preparatory conference, not for
reaching decisions but to study the nonalignment philosophy, what has happened
to it and what methods and decisions need to be adopted to cope with
developments, both negative and posi.tive, in order to reevaluate the policy
of nonalignment. This is what I advocate.
[Question] What is the thrust of Egyptian policy toward Africa? Is it an
attempt to escape the isolation Egypt is sufferin~g in the Arab homeland?
[Answer] I view any talk about Egyptian-African relations �rom the political
standpoint as constructive. Africa needs Egypt politically, and as a model
as well, in the sense that if the African countries see that Egypt is a.�.truly
nonaligned country and gives special status to neither the Soviet Union nor
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the United States, Egypt becomes a model to the emerging African countries
politically, especially if these countries find that Egypt still retains its
- power to radiate influence both in Africa and among the Arabs. If Egypt
loses some or part of this ability to radiate influence in the Arab world
and to adhere to it, in this event the'African countries will search for
another lighthouse or in another direction.
Besides the political and psychological aspects, we will find that from the
practical aspect the African countries need real technical and technological
assistance. This is what used to happen under the aegis of the leadership of
Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. During this time, Egyptian-African relations received
very large appropriations--to be precise, millions of dollars--both in.the
budget of the Foreign Ministry and the Presidency for development of bilateral
relations in the form of missions and scholarships. There were Egyptians sent
there, working in all fields as technicians and experts so that Egypt could
in f act be with the African on the farm, in the factory and at the hospital.
This was the Egyptian-African connection and there is no other approach. A
simple comparison of numbers of heads of state and foreign ministera who
used to visit Cairo in those years with the number during the last 5 years
reveal some alarming indications; the issue is not merely one of attending
African conferences, voting ~ith their countries and giving speeches and
reiterating slogans about incontestable facts.
[Question] How do you view the Arab League outside Cairo and the Arab summit
without Egypt?
[Answer] The issue is not whether it is outside or in Cairo. Let us suppose
that the Arab League still were in Cairo with the situation between the Arab
world and Egypt ~ust as it is now. Of what value would the Arab League be?
The effectiveness, the positive or negative character of any regional
organization depends on the actions of the countries which formed it.
Were the Arab League now in Cairo, would it be reasonable for it to hold any
meeting whatsoever there? Even were some meeting held, could any decisions
emerge from it if they were not in agreement on the ABC's of Arab policy?
Egypt in ttself is the cause of all this. There is not doubt about that. The
reason for the deterioration of the Arab situation is attributable to Egypt
and to its departure from the Arab ranks. If the Arab world is unsuccessful,
we are a part of it. No one can claim wisdom unless we are with the Arabs.
Egypt claims that it established the Arab League dnd that there is no Arab
world without Egypt. The story is not words, mere words, but action and policy
and adopting positions. I would add that even if I combined with by brother
and my colleague on an error, when I tried to correct the error, I would have
to consult with him, talk with him. A1-Sadat should have consulted with his
Arab brothers, not adopt a position and co~unicate it to al-Asad at the last
moment. It is not essential to get their views but they have to be put in
the picture. A1-Sadat did not do this. After he returned from Israel and
from giving his speech in the Knesset, he could have called for convening an
Arab summit conference before the situation deteriorated any further. He could
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have convened an Arab su~it conference and related tc~ the kings and heads of
state what happened, that he had challenged Israel, as he claimed, on its own
gr~und, that this was the situation and that we must reach agreement, unite and
impose a comprehensive peace on Israel. A1-Sadat did not do this although he
announced that he would convene an Arab summit conference after he returned
from his visit to Israel. He was unable, no, was unwilling to do so. Those
are the facts.
[Question] If we can go back to the year when you had the Egyptian Foreign
Ministry, what are the mistakes which should have been avoided at that time
and which led to what we are facing now.
[Answer] In my days, when I was minister, there were no mistakes, not one. I
would remind you of an example to show you how our policy was. Go back with
me. I am ready and I challenge you or anyone in this regard. We achieved
th~ first disengagement and Syria got a little upset. We worked out the
disengagement on the Syrian front and then accomplished another one and Syria
also got upset. Then al-Asad came to Cairo after Syria had been so vexed and
we were able to reach agreement on establiehing a unified political command
between Syria and Egypt. I then went to Khartoum with al-Asad and al-Sadat
and we were able to bring Khartoum into the agreement on the unified political
command between Egypt and Syria and the agreement became tripartite between
Egypt, Syria and Sudan. In my time, we signed the first, and most significant
mutual defense treaty between Egypt and Sudan to run for 20 years, something
that had not happened in Egypt during the past 50 years. During my days ~
there, Egypt did not sever relations with any Arab country. Then there was
what Egypt saw approved at the Tunis conference in November 1977. At that
time, the Arab countries approved everything to the letter that Egypt
- advocated. Those at the conference praised the resolutions and said that
the credit went to Egypt's representative. This was before al-Sadat's visit
to Jerusalem, In the past this is how Arab solidarity was. For this reason,
I could not take these positions and Chen go back to Cairo from Tunis and get
on a plane to go to the Knesset. What a thing to happen. That's not Isma'il
Fahmi. I'm not like that. It was Isma'il Fahmi who worked out the program
for Egyptian-Sudanese integration and then the Sudanese treaty, the basis of
everything you see today that is unprecedented in Egypt's history, even in the
days of the King, the days of the British and after the British and the days
of the leader, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir.
Lebanon? Who stopped the fighting in Lebanon? Egypt. We held a six-party
conference in Riyadh and from Riyadh we returned to Cairo. In Cairo we held .
the Arab League conference which brought stability in Lebanon and formed the
Deterrent Forces and....and....in Cairo.
There's more. The first Ara?~-African conference for economic cooperation in
the history of the area and of the world was held in Cairo. It was a highly
successful and constructive conference at Egypt's initiative in which all the
Arab and African countries took part. The record speaks for itself. Up to
now they study him and what Isma'il Fahmi did. This is history. It will tell
you that no one did this except Isma'il Fahmi. I can't go any further into
detail. Egypt did not sever relations with any country whatsoever, be it Arab,
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African, European, American, Latin or even the Soviet Union at any time
whatsoever, even after we abrogated the treaty of friendship with it. A1-Sadat
abrogated the treaty with Moaeow but Egypt did not break off relations. I met
with Gromyko in Sofia 6 months after abrogation of the treaty and I went to
Moscow and then Brezhnev was coming to Cairo. The decisian to visit Egypt was
reached in January 1975 with Isma'il Fahmi, no one else. It had been 10 years
since he visited Egypt. After thia the man bacame ill and I met with him in
the hosgital. After the abrogation, it wae ~~::~ded that he would come to
Cairo.
[Question] How do you view the Saudi role in bringing peace to the area?
[Answer] The Saudi role is fundamental and is to be regarded as the focal
point in the area. It is a natural transforma.tion following the slackening of
the role of Egypt. It is quite natural for Saudi Arabia, with its potential
and its special relations with America and the West, to be a vital and positive
focal point. The issue is: How should Saudi Arabia exploit this eituation?
I think that it is important for Saudi Arabia to continue to play its role.
Prince Fahd's plan should be pushed, with a possible rephrasing of Paragraph 7.
I don't know with any certainty what the Arab world can do without Saudi
Arabia. Saudi Arabia paid for the rearming of Egypt in cash and without any
argument whatsoever, even after the Egyptian-American aircraft deal (it was
abrogated after Camp David) for which Saudi Arabi,~ paid in full. It paid the
full cost of the French aircraft for Egypt. Any axms requested by Egypt were
paid for by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries without argument and the sums
of money were not recoverable. These are facts attested to by history. The
statement that Saudi Arabia or the Gulf countries were remiss with regard to
Egypt are wrong. It should suffice for us to recall that Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf countries were also hel~ing Egypt econamically.. When Egypt wanted to
replace the short-term high interest debts with short-term low interest debts,
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries agreed to ~armark a sort of balance
totalling $2 billion to be collateral for Egypt in the international market.
This happened and we cannot deny it.
Yes, indeed....and as of now...they say that Saudi Arabia is helping Egypt, ~
they do say that.
The interview ended when Isma'il Fahmi said: "Enough....I'm tired." He stood
up and we shut off the tape recorder.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8389
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IRAN
AHWAZ LIBERATION FRONT LEADER COMMENTS ON OPPRESSION OF ARABS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-ARABI in Arabic No 261, 12-18 Feb 82
[Interview with Secretary General of the Arab Front for the Liberation of
Ahwaz Mahmud Mashari, by Ahm_ad Hafiz in Paris; date not specified]
[Text] The Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz recer..tly organized a tirip
to Europe to explain its cause to W estern public opinion. AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
met with the members of the delegation in Paris 3nd had an intervie~a with
Mahmud Husayn Mashari, the front's secretary general, r~gaYdi^g the libera-
tion of Ahwaz, the Iraqi-Tranian War and the Arab situation in general.
We shook hands and I studied him closely. His face bore genuine Arab features,
and I was surprised at how well he spoke Arabic. .
question: Is it true that the Iranian authorities have endeavored to wipe
out Arabic in Ahwaz, or is that merely a rumor?
Answer: It is not a rumor; it is the painful truth. Ever since 1925 when the
forces of.Emperor Reza Pahlavi, the father of the Iate Shah, arrived in the
Arab principality of Ahwaz, which was then ruled by the last of the Arab
rulers Shaykh Khaz'al, Persian colonialism has spared no effort to wipe out
all traces of Arab culture, including language, customs and traditions. It
has even replaced the Arab style of dress. This went on during the reign
of the Shah--both tYre father and the son--and it continues iti much the same
fashion under the Khomeyni reg3me. There are harsh laws banning the esCablish-
ment of any school for teaching the Arabic language. Moreover, the laws
ban the speaking of Arabic, which is the language of the Koran, the message ,
of Islam and the vo ice of heaven on earth, despite the claim of the rulers
of Iran that they are the "defenders of Islam."
Quest ion: Nevertheless, many Iranian nationals,�including those o� both
Persian and Arab extraction, apeak Arabic. You are the best exampLe of this.
Is that not so?
Answer: This is true; however, it is due to the fact that many Iranians
have emigrated to neighboring countries, especially Iraq, where they learned
Arabic in the schools and u~tiver~.ities. The people of Ahwaz also do their
best to teach Arabic to their children at home since it is a crime to apeak
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ruK vrri~~wL ~~~r. uNi.Y
it in public in the streets or markets. To sum up, the people of Ahwaz have
a very inten se passion for their nat ional language. This is what has helped
to keep Arabic as the primary language in every home in Ahwaz.
Question: What. did you come to do in Europe?
Answer: Our mission is limited to acquainting officials and public opinion
- in Europe w ith the cause of the Arab people of Ahwaz. Actually, this is not
the f irst trip to Europe. A delegation representing the front previously
~ attended the conference on "The Struggle in the Arab Gulf," which was held
in Spain in May 1980. Now we are in Paris, after having completed a success-
ful trip to Austria where we took part in the "World Youth Conference" and
met with a number of Austrian officials. In Paris, we have held talks with
officials in the Gaullist Party. We also held other talks with the Franco-
Arab Friendship Society and some of the French liberation organizations in-
side France. Our trip will also include a number of other European capitals,
following which we will return to Ahwaz.
What About Ahwaz and the Arabs?
Quest ion: That was in regard to your ac~ivity in Europe. What about the Arab
world? .
Answer: Bonds of friendship and understanding link us to our sister country
Iraq. It is the neighboring Arab state and the one to which we have joined
in close bonds for some time. Moreover, we are fighting against one enemy,
that is, tt-~e Iranian authorities represented by the I.'homeyni regime. As for
the Arabs in general, we have contacted Arab organizations, starting with the
Arab League, and we have submitted memoranda to the recent Arab Summit Con-
ference in Fez and before that of the Ta' if Conference.
Question: What exactly are your basic demands? Are you, for example, demand-
ing secession from Iran and the formation of an independent state?
Answer: Our basic demand is the right to self-determination. We are an Arab
people occupied by the Iranians. We are living just like any other occupied
people and we are treated as second-class citizens in Iran. Therefore, we
are demanding the right to our own self-determination. Our strategic goal is
the establishment of a progressive national Arab society in the Ahwaz through
the liberation of the land and the people.
Question: Is the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz the only political
organization involved in political activity inside Ahwaz?
Answer: At the present time, yes, although political organi;:ations had been
established before the Arab ~'ront at different periods. A11 of them were
aimed at 1 iberating Ahwaz from the Persian occupiers.
Question: Why had Arab public opinion not heard of the de~nand to liberate
Ahu~az until the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian War?
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Answer: The fact is that the Arab people of Ahwaz never stopped demanding
, this, nor have they ever stopped trying by every means to liberate them-
selves from Pzrs ian imperial ism ever since th e Persians tob.k our territory
in 1925 and abducted Shay kh Khaz'al, the last Arab ruler of the region. Our
Arab people in Ahwaz have never stopped strugg?ing against their occupiers
and the usurpers of their land. Less than three months after the Iranian
occupation in 1925 the "Youth Revolution" broke out against the occupiers.
It was so called in reference to the supporters and helpers of Shaykh
Khaz'al who launched this revolution. They were called the young people.
However, this revolution was met by the harshest typ ~~of violence, mass mur-
der, and deportation. Nevertheless, Ahwaz witnessed a second revolution in
the very next year (1926). This was known as the "Bani Tarf" Revolution. Then
came the "al-Hoveyzeh" Revolution in 1936, the "al-Mir,av" Revolution of 1940,
the revolution of Shaykh Hasib, the son of Shaykh Khdz'al, in 1943, and the
revolution of Shaykh Abdullah in the following year, Tn 1946 there was tthe
"al-Nussar Revolution" and in the same year came ~.hei.f irst of the political
party organizations. Some of the young people ~:~d the tribal heads fo-:med a
party known as al-Sa'adah Party and were ba~ed in Abadan. They sent letters
- and envoys to the Arab countries. However, the Pers.ian authorities, in

~ coordination with the British Petroleum Company and elements of the Iranian
Communist Party, artacked the headquarters, killed at least 30 Arabs and put
an end to this group. Beginning in 1956, revolution consciousness began to
~ take on a new form of organization. In that year the "Arabistan Liberation
I'ront" was established. This was followed by the "Popular Front for the
Liberation of Ahwaz" in 1958. The Popular Front for the Liberation of
Arabistan was established in i96p, but changed its name to the Ahwaz Libera-
tion Front. In 1968 the Popular Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz appeared,
and so on, unt il the "Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz" was formed. It
issued its f irst historic stat~nent on 22 September 1981.
Why Did the Revolution Fail?
Question: But all thesE revolutions and political organizations have not yet
achieved Che aspirations of the Arab people in Ahwaz? WHat are the reasons?
Answer: (Anoth er member of the delegation, who was obviously completely
conversant with the history of the revolution in Ahwaz, r2sponded. He pre-
ferred not to give his name, f~r security reasons.) There are many reasons,
bi~t they can be summed up as follows:
these revolutions did not rely on a comprehensive precision organization;
~norale was weak and material, educational and other resources were also
weak and limited;
revolutionary activity was limited to small specific geographic areas
and did not encompass the entire region;
careful and attentive revolutionary thinking was not used as a guide for
keeping the revolution on the right track since positions must be determined
and conditioned by ev ents;
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t'VK VrCII,IAL UJC. ~iIVLY
- the establishment of these revolutions oocurred when the Arabs in general
wer~ weak and off 6alance, with the result that these revolutior?s lacked any
possible material or moral support which they might have had from Arab
organizations which existed at that time;
the Persian government did not hesitiate to use aiiy method, no matter how
harsh or barbaric, to stamp out all elements which were suspected of belong-
ing to these groupings;
the authorities relied on a plan of penetration into the ranks of the
strugglers by planting suspect elements inside the organizations to strike
them from within.
He went on: In any event, we in the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz
are attempting to learn from all the mistakes which w ere committed. ~ve are
doing our best to take advantage of the new realities in the arena of the
struggle in order to create a spirit of revolution among the ranks of the
masses in Ahwaz. Perhaps what we have done so far against the Khomeyni regime
prov ides reliable and reassuring evidence that the policy which we are pur-
suing to achieve our goals is sound.
Question: Throughout Iran at the present time there is more than one movement
opposed to the regime. What are your relations with them. Specifically, what
are your relations with Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr and Mas'ud Rajavi?
Answer: We are meeting on a common ground with all movements which are cur-
rently opposed to the Khomeyni regime regarding one strategic goal, that is,
the downfall of the Khomeyni regime. From this standpoint, there is no dis-
- pute with Bani Sadr, Rajavi or others. The important thing is to bring down
the regime; after that, we can talk about everything.
Black Wednesday
Question: But did you not join up with all the Iranian parties and organiza-
tions in the struggle to bring down the Shah before that? And did you not
form an alTiance with various factions of the "Islamic Revolution Under the
Leadership of Khomeyni," which turned against you as soon as it achisved
victory? Could this situation not be repeated?
Answer: Naturally~it could be repeated. However, in order for us to reach
the strategic goal, we must work in stages. The f irst stage is the downfall
of the Khomeyni regime, which is against us, which does not hesitate to em-
ploy a11 sorts of bloody measures against u~s, and which has rejected all
attempts at persuasion and dialogue which we began with theRn on the eve of
the take-over by Khom~yni. We asked for no more than the recognition of our
national rights as Arabs, s~lch as permitting us to teach Arabic to our sons,
reviv ing our Arab traditions and customs, and developing the Ahwaz region
with economic and social proj ects, because this region, urili:ke most regions
in Iran, suffers from severe backwardness, poverty and illness, d?spite the
- fact that it is one of the richest regions in Iran. Tranian oil, for the
most part, comes out of the land in Ahwaz, but the people of Ahwaz do not
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benefit from the bounties which God has bestowed upon it. Thus we find our-
selves in the situation described by the Arab poet:
1
Like camel dying of thirst in the desert,
While carrying water on its back!
The Khomeyni regime has re~ected all forms of dialogue. In fact, he refused
to meet a delegation of inhabitants of Ahwaz which went to ccngratulate him
" on the success of the revolution and the end of the Shah's regime; inatead,
he sent us Rear Admiral Adhmad Madani, the commander of the navy, who com-
mitted mass murder and wreaked havoc in every region. He was no more merciful
to us than the army of the Shah before him. Khomeyni crowaed his methods
and his crimes w.ith the bloody and harsh slaughter committed by his "Revolu-
tionary Guards" in the city of al-Muhammarah [Khorramshahr] on Black Wednesday,
25 May 1979. On that day, more than 100 Arabs were killed and 500 were
wounded. In addition, a large number of thean were arrested, most ~f whom
were executed later.
The off icial f rom Ahwaz added: If you go to Ahwaz and to the areas which have
not yet been liberated, you find that the policy of persianization which the
Shah pursued against Arab nationalism was pursued and is still pursued even
more harshl; and more viciously. One example will suff ice: the people of
Ahwaz, as I said before, were not allowed to speak Arabic; moreover, they were
not allowed to learn to rea.d and write since oniy very few schools were
opened in the region. They.were also forbidden to wear the Arab style of
dress, and the Arabs were deprived of the right to work, hold positions, or
own property. In addition, commerce and commercial dealings depended on~~.the
native Persians. The Khomeyni regime has already begun to launch organized
campaigns intended to weaken the Arabs economically in the long run. The
government cut off the water supply to many areas in the Hoveyzeh secto.r and
other rural sectors.in the Iraqi border area and they diverted this water to
the areas where Persians lived. Their methods also included the encouragement
of foreign establi:shments to exploit arable land and to deprive its Arab
people of its use. In addition, they continue the policy of forcing the

' Arabs to emigrate to other areas inside Iran and resettling Perstans in their
place:after building them modern villages, including the v illage of Yazdasav
in Hoveyzeh and the village of "The Crown Prince" in al-Muhammarah
[Khorramshahr]. We should also add to this the persistent attempts to re-
place the Arah names of cities and villages with Persian names.
For all these reasons taken together, says the off icial from Ahwaz, the road
- is now closed to any dialogue or. any dealings with the Khomeyni regime.
Therefors, our strategic goal is to use every possible method to bring
down this regime regardless of whom we might ally ourselves with. If a ne-~r
regime in Iran were to give us our national rights, then there would be no
. problem.; If that does not happen, we will continue our struggle until the
end. We are Arabs; we cannot be anyth3ng else. We have been in Ahwaz for
hundreds of years. This is what the history books say, and they stress that
there was a strong Arab state in this a~ea throughout history. It radiated
- its own distinct culture and it was a si.rong state. If we were to compare
the presence of the Arab and Persian racc:s in Ahwaz, we would find that the
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FUIt Ul~'FlClAL U~~ UNLY
Arab race is more deeply rooted, for the Persians came to the area only as
invaders. They occupied Ahwaz as they occupied the Middle East in the days
of their kings Cyrus the Second, Darius and Cambyses until they reached
Egypt. The Arabs lived with the Elamites, who were not Persians. In both
civilizat ion and government, ancient Iraq a~nd Ahwaz had a commpn history and
were 3oined by events which were all intertwined by virtue of many factors,
including similar topographical f eatures since the area includes the level
plain between the southern part of Iraq and Ahwaz. When the rule of ancient
Babylon ended, there remained Arabs in Ahwaz who had their 9emitic laws in
Susah, one of the most importiant cities of Ahwaz at that time. When the
armies of the Arab conquest arrived at the time of 'Umar Ibn Khattab, they
found support among the Arabs there since these were genuine Arabs.
All We Know Is Ahwaz
Question: Your country has more than one name; sometimes it is Arabistan,
at other times it is Khuzistan, and now it is Ahwaz [with Arabic spelling
in text], or Ahvaz [Farsi spelling in text] as the Iranians call it. What
is the reason for all the different names, and which is the most correct
one geographically and historicall~i?
Answer: Whatever the case, all these names attest to the Arab character of
the region. In ancient ti.m2s, 3,000 B.C., it was called the "Land of the
Elamites," a reference to the Elamites who inhabited the area; they were Arab
Semites. There is still an area in northern Ahwaz called "Elam" to th is day.
As for the word "Ahwaz," it harks back to several centuri~s before the dawn
of Islam, when Arab tribes of the Bani Marrah, A1 al-Kathir and the Bani
al-'Amm came to the region. They established sites and farms and divided
them up into plots ~d called each plot a"hawz" and they gave each auch par-
cel of land to the tribe whose meanbers farmed it or to the individual who
owned this parcel of land. It was called the parcel of so-and-so, or the
so-and-so parcel. "Hawz" is from the root "haz" and denotes possession or
ownership of a specific piece of~land by an individual. It belongs to him
and is known by his name. The plural is "ahwaz," and this name gained
currency in the area.. It is a genuine Arabic name since the original Arab
inhabitants called this land by this name. As for Arabistan, it is a non-
Arabic designation. It is said that the Ottomans, when they controlled most
of the Arab nation, applied that name to the lands of Greater Syria, the Hi~.az
and Ahwaz to distinguish them from their own territory. The.name means
"Land of the Arabs" and consists of the word Arab, which is understood, and
t~+e word "ostan," wHich means province or region in Turkish.
In any event, it is a word which indisputably attests to the Arab character
of the area. The Persians used it as an off icial designation of this region
during the rule of the Safavids and the Qa3ars::and continued to do so until
1925, that is until Emperor Reza Khan, the father of the late Shah, occupied
it and imposed his mil itary control over it. He then began planning to wipe
out the Arab character of the region and incorporate into the melting pot of
the Persian state. The f irst step was to change the name of the region from
Arabistan to Khuzistan, sincP the word Arabistan indicates the Arab charac-
_ ter of the region and since the word "khuz" has a number of ineanings in
Persian, including "al-khuz," which means ':the place" or "the site." Itc also
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means faction or group or mixture. Thue the foreign name of "Khuzistan"
was circulated as part of the plan to persianize the area. The original
Arab designation remains Ahwaz, which is the most correct historically,
culturally and socially. When the Iranians do sometimes say Ahvaz [Farsi
spelling in text], the letter "h" is softened because there is no Arabic
"h" in the Persian language.
The Failure of Persianizat ion
Question: What is the Arab population of Ahwaz at the present time and how
large is the area in which they live?
Answer: According to the latest census, which the Tranian authorities con-
ducted in 1962, it appeared that the population of Ahwaz was 4.7 million,
includ3s~g both Persians and people of other nationalities. The Arabs consti-
tuted 70 percent of the population, that is, there were more than 3 million
Arabs. But those were 3ust the ones who had Persian identification and
Pers ian birth certif icates. Most of the population in the countryside do not
hav~e Persian identity papers. Thus it could be said that the Arab popula-
tion of the region at the present time rarages between 3.5 mill3on and 4
million people-inhabiting an area of approximately 159,600 square kilo-
meters. It should be noted that the Arab area before the Persians came to
settle it was 185,000 square kilometers. In the framework of the policy
of racist persianization by the government of occupation, it was decided to
cut off part of the territories of the Ahwaz region and ~oin it to Persian
provinces, the provinces of Isfahan, Fars and Khorramabad. What remains
is the area mentioned above.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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KUWAIT
INVESTMENT STR,ATEGY DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 260, 5-11 Feb 82 p 55
[Article: "Kuwaiti Investments in Britain Expanding and Diversifying in
Industrial and Financial Spheres"]
[Text] Kuwait is expanding and diversifying its investments abroad by not
limiting them to one industrial country, but dispersing them throughout many
countries and in different f inancial, commercial and industrial sectors.
The Kuwaiti Investment Off ice in London is considered one of the most active
and secretive outside Kuwait. It is managed by a group of e~inently quali-
f ied British f inancial experts, the foremost being the two Scotsmen, Bruce
Dawson and David Buchanan.
Kuwaiti investments in Britain ha~te multiplied during the laet 5 years and
are estimated at about 441 million pounds sterling ($900 million). The
off ice usually prefers not to help direct or manage the companiea in which
it is majority stockholder, and its represantatives do not always attend
board of d irectors' meetings. However, when it is necessary, and in rare
situations, it w i11 exercise its right to vote to prevent transf er of owner-
ship of some of the companies in which it has stock to other companies or
investors.
This secrecy and centralization have helped the off ice to expand investments
without any clamor in political and media circles, which are usually
sensitive about Arab investments, especially when Zionism plays an important
role in inciting political and public opinion agai~ist the Arabs. However,
financial and industrial circles in general welcome Arab capital and consider
it new blood circulating through the almost dry veins of British industry.
Kuwait's public investments in British stocks and bonds are estimated at
200 million pounds sterling and control a large part of a great number of
real estate companies, textile mili~s, banks and fuel and electronics distri-
butorships.
In West Germany, K:iwait owns a signif icant ahare of the largest German com-
panies and industries. For example, it owns 25 percent of the KORF STAL AG,
10 percent of the Metallgesellschaft Ag [Metal Company Ltd.] and 10 percent
of the Daimler-Benz Company.
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ruK urri~~w~ u~r, urvLY
Kuwaiti investments are also expanding in the American market, where they
recently purchased the Santa Fe Oil Company for $2.5 billion, but failed to
obtain 14.6 percent of the Getty Petroleum Company although they offered $1
b il l ion.
Kuwait also owns the Western and Trust Banks in the State of Arizona, which
are valued at $40 million, and owns 10 percent of the West Gern?an Volkswagen
subsidiary in Brazil.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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I
SUDAN
IN'fERNAL, EXTERNAL FORCES AFFECTING NUMAYRI'S SURVIVAL
Paris AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI in Arabic No 264, 11 Mar 82 pp 40-41
[Article by 'Isam 'Abd-al-'Aziz: "The Game of Chicanery between Washington and
Khartoum: 'The Palace Coup' Is Coming f rom Outside the Palace"]
[Text] The question that is being raised today in Sudan is this: When will
Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Majid Khalil return to the presidential palace in Khartoum, not
as vice president but as president? Ja'far Numayri is finished, and the preven-
tive ous[er of Khalil has increased Khalil's popularity and "saved" him from
the responsibility of taking part in the new austere economic measures. "The
palace coup" is being postponed, at least this time, from outside the palace.
What has been said about "a palace coup" in Sudan led by Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Majid
Khaiil has been magnified and re-broadcast directly to the presidential palace.
Maj Gen 'Umar Muhammad al-Tayyib did not have a good relationship with Khalil's
group in the army. When Numayri's fears about a blow against him coming from
within his camp increased, al-Tayyib's broadcas;: news about Khalil's commvnica-
tions on the side with the Muslim Brothers became clearer. The Sudanese presi-
~lent preferred to begin with his vice president rather than have his own fate
s~oled by his vice president.
tlowever, Khalil's political demise did not come about with the decision to
remuve him from office, nor has al-Tayyib advanced a step closer to succeeding
Numayri. Despite the close surveillance imposed by Sudanese security on the
I~ume vE the former first vice president, a group of Sudanese politicians see
in 'Abd-al-Majid Khalil a possible successor to Numayri. Regarding al-Tayyib,
Numayr.i knows that his popularity in the ranks of the army is at its worst,
ancl he is conEident that Washington which finds Maj Gen al-Tayyib "a suitable
man" may �ot think oE making him president because he lacks the necessary
pupularity to manage affairs in the armed forces.
A revi~w of recent events that took place on the scene of power in Khartoum
~~[firms that Maj Gen 'Umar al-Tayyib "played his hand," or rather played
Niun~iyri's hand, as a professional would. Lt Gen 'Izz al-Din 'Ali Malik, chieE
c,l ~;eneral staff and 'Abd-al-Majid Khalil's best friend was quickly surrounded,
~~nd a number of "trusted" officers was charged with serving notice to Lt Gen
(ia~fawi, commander of the presidential guard and to Lt Gen Nasr al-Din
al-Mubarak, commander of the armored division about the decree to remove them
tc~~m c~tfice. Al1 of them were then placed under mandatory house arrest.
_ 29
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But tor how long will al-Tayyib's fortunes continue to climb? There are limits
which Numayri himself deEines carefully, and these cannot be overlooked by
aides. First, he tempts one who is far [Erom power] to move towards one who is
closer [to power]; then he uses [the former] to get rid of the one who was
close [to him], sending him to a new "farther" position so he can repeat the
same old-new game. Proximity and distance are measures used in calculating the
distance between the men of the regime and the seat of Numayri himself.
In Khalil's case the game was more complicated. Despite his limited intelli-
gence, Khalil was able to establish his own following in the Socialist Union,
in the ministry and in the army. When the situation became critical on the
econumic scene and Numayri was forced to accept the conditions set by the IBRD,
conditions which began with removing the subsidies on popular foods, the
Sudanese president was faced with harsh choices. He could either accept having
Khalil and his ~roup continue in office, or he could remove him from office and
dismiss his group.
It was obvious that Ja'far Numayri could not accept the continuation of
Khalil's group for a simple reason: the president's position had become so weak
atter the outpouring of popular displeasure because oE the economic measures
that the existence of a relatively homogeneous group in the highest levels of
power could not be allowed without risking liquidation by that group at an
opportune moment.
Numayri thus chose the second solution: to weaken everybody because he had be-
come the weakest. He removed Khalil from oEfice, disbanded the Socialist Union
and accepted the resignation of government.
It is certain that Numayri thought many times before remuving his first vice
president Erom ofEice. The political moment in Sudan was extremely volatile.
There wece demonstrations in the streets, and the voices of the opposition were
being heard even inside state institutions. There was nothing to induce opti-
mism regarding the future of the regime. Nowever, all this aEfirms the fact
that Numayri chose the road of a calculated risk by making the decision to
remove his vice president Erom office. He had not been able to postpone this
decision, for every day that went by bruught more support for Khalil and his
group.
Pitting Peuple against Each Other �
The [ac:t is that the Sudanese president excels in the art of pitting his aides
against each other. At the outset he backed up the communists, and then he cut
off their heads after the coup of Hashim al-'Ata. He cooperated with a division
ot [he religious movement and later had airplanes bomb them in Aba island. Then
he began the maneuvers of national reconciliation to cover up later the tact
thac he kept the decision making power to himself. He promoted Khalil only to
remove him from office [later], and he is now promoting Ma,j Gen 'Umar al-Tayyib
and moving beside him Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Rahman Sawar al-Dhahab. IE it occurs ta
him one day to remove al-Tayyib from office, Sawar al-Dhahab will be there tu
carry out the operation and to get the promotion in preparation for the moment
he too will be removed from office. It is a moment that will undoubtedly corne
about, Eor Numayri does not like to change his habits in the political game.
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'1'liis reminds une of a sCory about a monkey who was sought to serve as an
~~rbiter and divide a piece of cheese into two equal halves. He brought the
scales and divided the cheese into two unequal pieces and placed each piece on
une side of the scale. Then he cut himself a large piece of the heavier piece
of cheese and ate it saying, "We must make this piece equal in weight to the
uther." When the other piece turned out to be heavier, he cut another piece of
that and ate it making the same statement. He went an doing this un[il he ate
all the cheese.
Numayri "balanced" the politicat forces so he can devour a portion of them each
time ~ntil he liquidated them or almost did. Now he finds no one who will coope-
rate with him�except those with raw opportunism, that is, those who have reached
the point of risking themselves for a position. Everyone knows that an alliance
with Numayri is a temporary alliance no matter how much the Sudanese president
insists that it will continue. Thus the cheese was finished, but how can Numayri
~u on?
it is evident that the Sudanese president's "cleverness" in the balancing act
[in which he is engaged] will bring about his downfall. This cleverness which
can reach unexpected limits in the small details that have to do with the daily
mana~;ement of power is a cleverness that can serve Numayri in his efforts to
overcume tactical crises, but it cannot get him out of the strategic crisis in
whi.ch he has hurled his entire regime.
The Crisis Policy
There is an economic crisis [in Sudan], some of wlnose principal features are
debts which exceeded 3.5 billion dollars; a deficit in the balance of payments
tV~at amounted to 630 million dollars; demonstrations in the street pratesting
- the high prices of popular foods; and "development" projects which have become a
reason for backwardness with the opportunities they created for the inter- '
national companies and the "fat cats" inside the country to plunder the
coun[ry's resources.
Tt~ere is a political crisis that manifested itself in the fact that all the
pr,litical torces, except Eor a limited exceptions, moved [c the ranks of the
o~position. Even al-Sadiq al-Mahdi whe was part of the national reconciliation
r,~ct with Numayri in 1977 announced that that pact had come to a dead end and
ctiat "tt~e Sudanese president's program was economically erroneous and socially
de~:truc[ ive."
'('hc~re is a national crisis that began to unfold in the south after the re-
[Ut'maLion of the South Sudan Unity Council. Then 17 provincial leaders were
arrested, and this was accompanied by the separatist tunes which surfaced [on
tl~~ sc:ene]: the oil of the south for the south; the poverty of the north for
[he nurth and Numayri for no one.
I~i~~ally, there is a military crisis that Numayri has not been able to salve
~,~tiily. The Sudanese president's reliance on Cairu's military support is provo-
ki~i~; sume old sensitivities with the Sudanese people, especially since this
reliance is not pr~ceeding on a road that would serve the interests of the
Sucianese people themselves. Furthermore, Numayri was forced to pay the price for
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his reliance on the llnited Sta[es: he met with the Israeli minister ot defense
Ariel Sharun in Khartoum; he shouk hands with Prime Minister Menahem Begin in
al-Sactat's funeral in Cairo; and then he accepted the Bright Star maneuvers
which brought to the area the largest U.S. military presence in the region's
history. This provoked ttie stafE officers and the junior officers in the
Sud~nese army.
_ Numayti's reliance on Cairo and Washington is naturally not confined to the
military field. Relations between Sudan, Egypt and the United States are reflec-
ted first on the political scene inside Sudan. Numayri finds no one he can count
on inside the country, so he counts on people abroad, but to what extent can
hc trust these people he is counting on?
Egyp[ian Support
On 28 January, at the height oE the Sudanese crisis, Numayri traveled to Aswan
tu mee[ with Mubarak and took Ma,j Gen 'Umar al-Tayyib with him. The principal
purpose uf the mee[ing was for the Sudanese president to explain to Mubarak the
reasons for removing 'Abd-al-Majid Khalil from office and the efEects this
action could have in the ranks of senior army ofticers.
Iiut can Cairo ofter Numayri disinterested "fraternal" support if the army were
[u take ac[ion after the remuval of Khalil?
The reply to that question is the same as that [one would give] to a question
that pertains to the extent to which the Americans wish to keep Numayri. This is
because the fact that the Sudanese president has fallen into Washington's and
al-Sadat's arms has made the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency the only source--
at l.east at present--that can reply to the question: who should rule Sudan?
_ Numayri asked Mubarak to rest assured about the safety of cunditions in
Khartoum. However, this is not the question. The Sudanese president asked his
Ggyptian "brother" to atfirm this to Washington and to persuade Washington that
o�ly Numayri can resture matters to their former state. He would thus intercept
any Washingtonian ideas of having him replaced. He himself had intercepted such
ideas be removi?~~ Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Majid Khalil from oEfice.
It seems now that Washi.ngton did agree tu give Numayri a chance after he
ubserved all the conditions of the IBRD. What would he do now?
Tt~e question of all ques[ions in Sudan now is that of the Socialist Union:
whetkier that organi.zation is to remain or be disbanded is not the problem, but
the problem is brieEly thaC of the political formula which Numayri will try to
put into eEfect.
Thc Socialist Union is finished. Everyone knows that it is "a prup" whose pur-
puse is tu confiscate political freedoms in Sudan, except for those of the
ruling gruup like Dr Baha' al-Din Idris and Muhammad 'Abd Rabbuh who are amo~~g
the millionaires og Sudan; Mustafa Numayri; Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Salam Salih 'Isa;
ancl the brothers of Brig Gei~ Mustafa Kamil who are related to the president and
married to his relatives. This is the only "party" that has full freedom in
Sudan.
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Wi~l~ ~I~c uutbreak oC events early this year Numayri came to a crossroads where
t~c� t~~un!1 hi?nself facing the problem of the poli[ical formula that was being
apE~lied in the cuuntry. He could either accept the opinions pruposed by some
mernbers of the independent popular committee which he had formed to reorganize
the S