JPRS ID: 10448 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500054424-5 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPr~S L/ 1044~ - 13 April 1982 / � Near East North Afr~c~ R~ ort p CFOUO 15/82) ~ FBI$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ; APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 NOTE JPRS publications contain information pricnarily from foreign new,spapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency - transmissions and broac~casts. Materials from foreign-language ~ sources are translated; those from English-language sources - are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text) or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following rhe last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in r.o ~oay represent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of tre U.S. Government. - COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02149: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 " FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/10448 13 April 1982 = NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT (FOUO 15~82) _ CONTENTS I RAN Descruction of Baha'i Community Seen as 'Final S~lution' (Marcel Peju; ,TEUNE AFRIQUE, 2p Jan 82) - 1 , Kurdish Leader Explains Anti-Khomeyni S truggle _ (Edward Mortimer; THE TIMES, 27 Mar g2) , . . . . . , , . . . , , . t, Mojahedin-e Khalq Leader Ra~avi Interviewed _ (Mas'ud Rajavi Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, = I9-25 Feb 82)........ . ( ' Tudeh Said To Be Assisting Government Against Opposition (AL-WATAN RL-'ARABI, 19-25 Feb 82) 12 - Revolution Guard Terror Seen Creatin~ Many Enemies (Bahman Nirumand; STERIV, 11 Mar 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Briefs Communist Leader's Governme.nt TYes Agricultura~ Loans 21 21 ~ ~ ' a- IITI - NE & A- 121 FOUO] Fl1R /IFFTf TAT f tCF l1NT V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 ~ i 'i ~ IRAN I DESTRUCTION ~F BAHA'I CDMMiTNITY SEEN~AS ~FINAL SOLUTION~ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1098, 20 Jan 82 pp 58-59 [Article by Marcel Peju: "The Final Solution"] [Text] Tae young woman went to Evin Prison in Tehran on 25 December, on a night that for others was Christmas. "I want my hiisband," she sa~id. "He was arrested." "What for?" "Because he is Baha'i." "What was he doing?" "Noth- ing except on 13 December, he went to the Spiritual Assembly of our community. There were eight of them and they took them all awciy." "Then it is useless to come baek. He will be hanged tonight." At first, the woman refused to believe what she had heard. She made more ap- peals, did ev~rything possible. On 29 December, a rumor spread that five mem- _ bers of the assembly (the community's highest body) had been executed without a trial. On the 31st, it was reported that they were all dead and had been secretly buried in the "cemetery of the infidels." On 3 January, the Ayatollah Moussavi Ardebili, chief magistrate of the Islamic Supreme Court, made the strange reply that "while this information wds recent,.it was groundless." . Three days later, the same ayatollah nevertheless confirmed tY~e execution of eight leaders for "spying on behalf of foreign powers." The next day, the announcement was made of the murder of six more Baha'i arrested at a meeting on 2 November by an "unidentified axmed group" and of the ~~oman at whose home they had been meeting. Of nine more Baha'i who "disappeared" on 22 August 1980, there is still no word. isut this tragic episode is only the last in a series of'murders, kidnapings, destruction and per.secution whose systematic nature leads one to fear that r_he lslamic government today wants nothing more than the extermination (or " forced conversion) of the entire Baha'i community, a community of over 300,000 members, represented in all ethnic groups and all classes of Iran, but parti- cularly in the intelligentsia: The eight leaders assassinated included a doctor, lawyer, economist, writer, and so on. And yet, it is an.acc~irsea community becau~e in less than a century and a half of existence, it has been persecuted by every regime i.n Tehran, which seems all, the paradoxical because _ xt preaches religious tolerance and forbids its members from practicing any kind of political militancy. Who are the Baha'i, af ter all? In short, they are the followers of a religion first preached in Persia by a 25-year-old Shiite merchant, Seyyed Ali Mohammad. 1 � FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500050024-5 On 22 May 1844 in Chiraz, proclaiming the end of the propheS:ic times of Islam, Seyyed Ali Mohammad announced that he was the Bab, the "doorway" to truth and entrusted with the task of setting forth new lawa to replace those of the _ Koran, now outdated. His message found such a response in all strata of society, including the Islamic clergy and the royal family, that fierce re- pression was unleashed by the shah. Over 20,000 Baha'i would be e~cterminat~~l. The Bab himself was arrested, tortured and finally shot in Tabriz in 1850, at the age of 31. Thirteen years later, one o� the survivors of the massacre, Hossein Ali Nouri, called Baha'U'llah, was recognized as the continuator, while clarifying and developing his doctrine, whence the name of Baha'i taken from then on by his disci~,les, who would swarm all over the world. There are now over 3 mil].ion in some 130 countries, with more in India than in Iran. The central theme of the Baha'i doctrine is that of the unity of an inacces- sible god, who is manifested by su~cessive revelations. Abraham, Moses, Buddha, Zoroaster, Jesus, Muhammad and finally, the Bab, are the messengers through whom he addressed himself to men, adapting his."language" to their intellectual developmen.t and to their historic, geographic and social condi- tions. Today, the Bab proclaim~, the time has come for human unity. It is therefore necessary to go beyond religious oppositions, ban any kind of clergy, drastically reduce ritu ats and re~ect political parties, ~ f.actor of division. - At the same time, Baha'ism affirms the equality of the sexes and the primacy _ of science over faith, condemns extreme poverty and extreme wealth and finally, preaches a new world order with free access of peoples to all natural resources. - The fact that this ecumenical and nonviolent doctrine should have given rise to such hatred might seem surprising. Actually, it suffered first of all from spring from Islam and then splitting off from it. In all religions, heretics are more diRgraced than instj.tutional adversaries. It has also suffered from its modernism, which has opened the doors of the intellectual elite and some- times, of material success, to its members. Finally, it has been reproached for its solidarity in the face of persecution itself. In many ways, the fate of the Baha'i in Iran resembles that of the Jews in Europe: the eternal scapegoats of the tiost primitive "em~ ~ions" of the people and of governments in difficulty. Actually, with times of paroxysm interspersed with calmer periods, the perse- cution of the Baha'i has never ceased. From the time of the monarchic consti- tution of 1906-1907, worsened under the Pahlavi (1925-1979), they have been outlawed. Only four religions are in fact recognized: Muslim, Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian. The result is that the Baha'i are exeluded from the administration, driven of the army and of educa.tion, financially strangled by special taxe~, and pogroms are regularly launched against them by the masaes ~:tth the complicity of the police. ~he year 1955 was parti.~ularly harsh, marked by murders, _ rapes, arsoi:; iooting, the destruction of spiritual centers and the prof,ana- tion of cemeteries. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 ~ ~ I ' Far from improving since the fall of the Shah and the Islamic revolution, the situation has worsenede And if a tragie para],.].el exists here, it is once more ' with the Nazi policy on the Jews. Initially, the government tried to gradually wipe out the Baha'i cammunity by depriving its members of resources, seizing their businesses and their religious holdings and paralyzing their institutions~ This was followed by the physical elimination of the leaders of the community (the elected members of its spiritual assen~blies) and its intellectual elite. - The third phase meant that the Baha'i, divided and demoralized, would no longer have any choice except between forced conversion and disappeara~nce. In this persecution, one must undoubtedly make room for all the fantasies of the sexual obsession. Because they procla3m the equality of the sexes and refuse to veil their women, the Baha'i are deliberately accused of libertinage. How can this be established? Very simply. According to the law, only mar~ riages celebrated according to the rites of one of the four legal religions can ' be officially recorded. Cor_sequently, the Baha'i are not legally married. The certificates issued by their community are lik.ened to an invitation to deb avch- ery. Their relations are labeled as concubinage or prostitution. Their chil- dren are illegitimate. Al1 crimes are punishable by death based on "earthly corruption." A very bitter humor is not out of place here. Among the property seizQd f rom ~ the rich Baha'i, one serious opponent tel~s, is a ~mall palace, an imitation , of the Trianon at Versailles. The Islamic Republic turned iC into a bordell.o. But morals are safe: At the entrance, while collecting his tax, a mullah pro- ceeds to effect a"temporary marr~,age" (si gheh) provided for by Islamic law which he will dissolve at the exit. ~ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982 11,464 CSO: 4619/67 3 FOR O~FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540050024-5 IRAN KURDISH LEADER EXPLAINS ANTI-KHOMEYNI STRUGGLE PM291707 London THE TIMES in English 27 Ma.r 82 p 9 [Report by Edward Mort~ner: "Relaxed Guerrilla's Tight Grip"] [Text] "We were fighting Khomeyni before the Iraqis, and I have the impression we'll be f ighting him af ter them too." Dr Abdulrahman Qasemlou, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, does not conform to the Western image of a Kurdish guerrilla leader. He is a relaxed, humorous middleaged man who used to teach economic planning at th e University of Prague. But Kurdish Pesh Merga under his command have been holding Ayatollah Khomeyni's forces at bay in the Kurdish mountains for nearly two years. ~ "We still control more tha.n [figure indistinct] square kilometres and all - the main roads from the Soviet frontier to Kermanshah" (th e main city of southern Kurdistan), he declares. "We have 12,000 regular fresh merga (guerrilla forces) and between 50,000 and 60,000 armed peasants who are ready to help when called out. "Against us the Iranian Government has mobilized 40,000 regular troops and 45,000 revolutionary guards and bassij--teen~gers who are called up and sent straight to the front after only three days' training." Dr Qasemlou has been in Euro~+e for the laet six weeks or so, mainly holding _ discussions with other leader;~ of the National Resistance Council, led by - former President Bani-Sadr and Mr Masud Ra~avi, leader of the people's Mo~ahedin guerrilla organization. Dr Qasemlou hopes to return to Kurdistan (by an undisclosed route) wit:~in the next two weeks. In an interview with THE TIMES, Dr Qasemlou descr3bed his relations with _ the Iraqi Government as those of "good neighbours." They shared a common enemy, but the Iranian Kurds were not dependent on Iraqi support, he said. Their supplies reached them partly through Iraq, but they were smuggled in, not.sent officially. "Contraband has alwavs been an important branch of the economy in Kurdistan." , 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 His relations with Iraqi Kurdish groups fighting the Baath regime were also good, he said, with the exception of the group led by the sons of General Barzani, which had been obliged to participate in an Iranian Government offensive against the Iranian Kurds last suartner as a condition of being allowed to retain its bases and refugee camps in Iran. COPYRIGHTs Times Newspapers Limited 1982 CSO: 4600/369 ~ ~ 5 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504050024-5 IRAN MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ LEADER RAJAVI INTERVIEWED Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 262, 19-25 Feb 82 pp 42-44 [Interview with Mas'ud Rajav i by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Paris: "Wash ington- Tehran-Tel Aviv: A Standing A1liance, and Relationa Are a Mere Formality"; date not specified] /Text/ Three full years after Khomeyni's return to Iran, all illusions have been dispelled and the emoke has drawn away, showing the scene in its dreadful reality: the people who exulted at the fall of the Shah are now colliding wi*h their most cherished hopes. Indeed, they are etarting to ask God's mercy over the dictator- ship of the recent pasto The Iranian Liberation Movement is today in political abeyance and the alliance between the Mojahedin-e Khalq and former President Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr seems to be the only possible alternative to the post-Khameyhi stage, now that the new regime has lost every social, economic and political juatification for its exist- ence. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is going back to the Iranian file through a meeting with Mas'ud Rajavi, the leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, who exiled himself to France, and a review of the lateat developments in the domestic situation following the incident which ended the life of Ashraf Rajavi and 10 people in the Mojahedin's central committee last weeko A. f~w days before the death of Mas'ud Rajavi's wife and 10 oCher members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq central com~ittee, we met for a conversation that lasted about 3 hours in his headquarters in Paris. Meetings with Rajavi are not always easy. On top of the exceptional security measures that the Fr~nch police.and the young leader's aides have imposed on his headquarters, there is another "obstacle," which is the personality of Rajavi himaelf. He has become well versed in the "profession" of ineeting with joumalists, followir~g his departure frrnn Iran, and - it is not easy to entice him to say what he does not want tfl say. Moreover, he has become well versed in dealing with the Iranian political arena, aince he is aware of the weight and the influence of every word he says. Then he is~shrewd, and there is nothing harder than to conduct a presa interview with a ahrewd man. I asked Rajavi: "Do you intend to open your heart and apeak freely? He replied smiling, "I alwaye speak freely." 6 FOR OFFIC7AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500050024-5 rl i I ~ I asked him, "They say that there is a dispute between you and Bani-Sadr. What is the truth on that?" ~ - a ; /Answer/ Listen, President Bani-Sadr doee not belong to the Mojahedin organization; why ahould he be expected to agree wiCh us over everything? Of courae there arc some disputes, since he has his premises and we have oura. However, the program of the council to which we ~ointly belong and which we propoaed to the temporary ~ government delimits the agreement between us. I~an regssure you that there are no disputes over the program. President Baai-Sadr has signed it, as have I. The matter required some concessions on one side and the other, but that is the law of all alliances. The talk about disputes ia ~ust rumor whose intent is to cast doubts : on the fact tha+t we are the only democratic alteraative to Rhameyni's regime. /Question/ At a meeting, President Bani-Sadr addressed himself zo the status of the _ three Arab islands that Iran occupied in the era of the Shah. He said "These islands would be converted into American basea if we returned them to the Arabs. Therefore he in turn refuses to return them, although he does admit that the in- habitants of these islands are Arabs. When I told him that his way of thinking makes it lawful for Iran to violate international law and even occupy Arab Gulf countries for reasons related to these couatries' policies toward the United States, he replied, in brief, "Why not?" You are an ally of Bani-Sadr's; how would you � comment on this position? /Answer/ I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the issue of export- ing the revolution or going beyond Iran's borders is not one that has been raised - among us here in Paris. I believe that revolution is not a commodity that can be exported. God, in his glorious book, said "God does not change a people's lot un- less they change what is in their own apirits." Change therefore comes fran with- in peaple and one therefore cannot say that the I~anians should change from outside what is going on in a Gulf couatry, for exan7ple. As regards the Arab islands, I ask you to try to understand our political problema. I do not want to talk about this issue now, for anything I say will be misinterpreted and Khaneyni may use it in his propaganda against me. He is aitting there, waiting for me to talk, and I do not want to provide him with anything that will benefit him. /Question/ However, the issue of Iran's relations with ita neighbors still needs a frank statement on the part of tha opposition, and clarity here is the only proper position to take, especially since this issue has not been dealt with by itself, in spite of its importance, in your most recent program which was issued about 3 montha ago. /Answer/ The program, like all programs, etipulates the general bases that are to be applied in each case. We have said that we are a nonaligned country striving for international peace and cooperation and I will describe what I mean ~o you in more detailed atatements. In the war with Iraq, for example, the issue is not one of water, islands or land; it ia a matter of the survival or disappearance of the Iranian regime. If Khomeyni stops the war, the Iranian regime will collapse right afterward. If he agrees to stop interfering in the affairs of other countries, he will fall early the next morning. l~mam Khomeyni has had more than one favorable opportunity to stop the war but he does not want to do so. Wi,thout war, he cannot 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500050024-5 justify the inflation or justify the deprivations that the people are suffering from, or the incessant executions and the constant rPpression. So what does Khomeyni want to export? What does he want to give the Arabs or others? Execu- tions? Hanging innocent 10-year olds? Killing wounded people? Chaos? Further schisms and disputes? What can Khomeyni export? /Answer/ We have informatian that Khomeyni has established camps on the eastern shore of the Gulf to train some Araba and Iranians to stir up cammotion in the Gulf, above and beyond the broadcast bulletin we have received frrnn Iranian Radio's Arabic broadcast asserting the blatant provocativ~e approach the Iranian government is pursuing toward the Arab governments in the Gulf. Do you have any special in- formation on this subject? ,~Answer/ The fact is that I do not have any more information than you do. How- ever, what I do know in general is that there is a reactionary policy that makes a show of progressivism, but they are liars (he said that in Arabic). They try to justify repression in Iran by talking about exporting revolution. Khomeyni's for- eign policy is part of his dome~.tic policy. Not only that--his foreign policy, as I si~ated, is necessary for the regime's survival. Otherwise, Khomeeyni would not have used napalm in Kordestan. He would not have dealt with Israel. By the way, a few days ago Rafsanjani ma.de a statement which the official news agency PARS transmitted, in which he frankly said "We bought arms with Israel through contracCs signed in the days of the Shah." The odd thing here is that PARS translated Rafsanjani's statement, including his mention of Israel, verbatim into English, and when the news agency broadcast this statement in Iran in Persian it neglected to _ mention Israel but instead used the phrase "foreign countriea." They are afraid of the wrath of the Iranian people and perhaps for this reason are setting up gallows for them. On the Walls in Tehran /suestion/ What about the blocs inside Iran? /Answer/ Listen, as long as Rhomeyni remains these blocs will be of no importance. It is he who is managing the country'~ actual policy. Seventy percent of the re- gime's staffs have been liquidated while Khomeyni has t~een saying that Iran is the most stable country in the world. The main bloc is that of the Iranian people themselves. The phrase "death to Khomeyni" is written on walls in Tehran. Go to the south of the capital and you will see that for. yourself. /4uestion/ I do not believe I can, /Answer/ Nor can I. AC least not now. (He laughed.) /4uestion% But you cannot get at Khomeyni himself? /Answer/ We can, I asaure you of that. But we have a betr_er solution: we do not want to kill Khrnneyni physically, we want to kill him politically. 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 i ; /suestion/ But you have not applied the same rule in the other cases. ~ /Answer/ Because those people, in people'~ minds, were not Khomeyni. Rhomeyni gives people the illusion that he is the "source," the mufti, the religious jurist. /guestion/ However, you say that the phrase "death to Khomeyni" is written on walls. T.hat means that people know the truth about what Khameyni is doing, and therefore his "political" death has already taken place. j /Answer/ Listen, when Khomeyni went back to.Tehran 6 million people met him. That was a historic event. Now, however, people ask me "Why don't you kill Khomeyni?" My answer is "Thanks, I wanted to get to this point precisely, the point where you would ask me this question." 10 Percent /guestion/ In last October's campaign, the cam~paign of armed demonstrations that the Mojahedin started, hundreds of people died. Do you believe that this Cactic was a mistake? /Answer/ We previously told Khomeyni that we were xeady to hand over our arms if he would stop retreating from stifling %sic/ the reLative freedoms thAt prevailed at that time. However, he refused and accused us being agents of Zionism, of Saddam Husayn, of the United States, of Communism, of everything. Then don't for- get that we stoed in the ranks of the opposition the second week after Khameyni's return. My name was kept off the list of candidares for the presidency, then off the list of candidates for the Ma~les. Our policy was to exercise our opposition role by criticizing the substance of Khomeyni's pGlicies, whose reactionary side we discovered at tY.e beginning. It was his policy tu direct criticisms against us in an indirect manner. After that, the dispute flared up and passed Chrough the stages you are aware of. One of these was the tactic of armed demonstrations. To state that one tactic or another will lead directly to the overthrow of the regime is to fail to realize the facts of the situation. All these tactics are successive steps toward the ultimate goal. /guestion/ However, some of the Mojahedin's adversaries in the detachments of the opposition say that the tactics were based on the erroneous assum~tion that the people would gaCher around the armed demonstrations that the Mbyahedin started and that everyone would move to bring down the regime. /Answer/ The matter cannot be simplified in such a naive manner. Nonetheless, the assumptions that Khomeyni's regime ia lacking in any popularity are correct. The latest reports which have reached me from Iran state that school administra- tions have appointed special supervisors for students when they go to the bathroom, now that the phrase "death to Khomeyni" that they write in these bathrooms has be- come widespread. In fact, ir is certain that people are going to mosques not just to pray but to obtain the special cards that allow their bearer to obtain specific 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500050024-5 foodstuffs it is not easy to find in the market. I can tell you that the number of Khomeyni's supporters does not exceed 10 percent of the whole Iranian population. /Question/ So what is the social base on which the regime of the ayatollahs is con- centrated now? - /Answer/ The regime is not concentrated on ang?thing except the policy of wholesale _ executions. The talk about a social base is talk that would have been valid 3 years ago. Now there are collective resignations from the reactionary guards (he means the Kevolutionary Guards, in Iranian official language), and the social classes that supported Khomeyni's regime are now looking for an alternative. They know that if Khomeyni dies now the regime will come to a tragic end and therefore they cannot gamble on the regime. You know the nature of "business." ausiness seeks out a secure climate, but what is secure in Yran? Only idiots are gambling on the current Iranian regime, because that will be a losing gamble. The Gallows Are the Solution /Question/ Does this remind you of Ayatollah Kashani and his supporters in the early fifties? /Answer/ It does, with one difference, which is that Khomeyni is 1,000 times more reactionary than Kashani. Kashani opposed Mosaddeq, but Ayatollah Khomeyni re- cenCly made a speech in which he said "With God's graee Mosaddeq was a liar and fell." /guestion/ However, broad segments of the Iranian people still consider Mosaddeq a national hero. Doesn't that provoke them? /Answer/ What if it does? If anybody speaks, the reactionary guard's minions will hand him over to be sent to the gallows. /Question/ But what is the alternati;?e? /Answer/ Name me one detachmEnt in thQ opposition that is offering a coherent _ alternative to the regime except the council that includes President Bani-Sadr and ti~e Mojahedin. w~r1 the Tudeh offer such an alternative, or the oppos~tion figures in Europe, in the fo~tn of the royalists and the like, who are planning to bring Iran back to the era of the Shah? We are quietly broadening our base in Iran. _ We have 500,000 copiea of our paper being distributed inside Iran, we have a radio station that is broadcasting four times a day, and our voice is heard over iC, in spite of the government jamming of the broadcasts. /4uestion/ What if other groups ask to join the council you have drawn up with - Bani-Sadr--the Z~deh, for example, or Peykar? /Answer/ I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. The Tudeh is a group of traitors. We _ do not make alliances with traitors. Can you mention to me one way in which I can be made sure of their sincerity? 10 ~ FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 i ~ ; i /Question/ Are you suggesting that they go to you and swear that they are sincere? I The issue seems purely political. If they declare their positions on the council i program, agree to execute the agzeementa the council reaches, once ~hey become represented in it, the council demands that broad demonstrations start, and they : carry them out, will you continue to oppose their inclusion? /Answer/ Firs't they must regain people's trust. The Iranians know that the membera of the Tudeh are traitors; if the Tudeh is able to eliminate this image we will think about dealing with them. However, I am confident thaC it will not be able ~ to. Trea~on is one of the basic components of the party leadership. That was a constant during the past 40 years. Can you imagine that it is possible to renounce a legacy as heavy as the one the Tudeh left during this period in a few days, even if the party leadership wanted to forego treason, which naturally believe me, it ~cannot? - Relations with Israel /guestion/ Do you believe ~hat Iranian-American relations will be openly restored to the level they were at in the days of the Shah? Do you believe that Tehran will establish diplomatic relations with Israel? /Answer/ It is a question of time. It will start w.th the release of the remaining Iranian funds frozen in Washington, to finance the ~urchase of arms to continue the war. Then, after that, the issue of diplmnatic relations will be a formality. Even as regards Israel, diplomatic relations fram the official standpoint, in their turn, will be a formality. The man declares Jeruaalem Day, demands the execution of 'Arafat, buys arms from Israel and pays it mor~cy that it puts into bullets for the Arabs and the Palestinians. This is the picture; in the light of that, don't diplomatic relations become a formality? Rajavi was still bri~ning with vitality. I said, "Let us talk about you a little, your remembrances of the Shah's prisons, aecret work, flight from Iran." He pointed to the tape recorder and said "Shut that off first. I do not like to have anything circulated abouC me personally. You are just one p~rson, one brother in the Mojahedin." He shut off the tape recorder. Ra,javi talkeci to me about Khiabani, "my brother," as he called him. Ra~avi did not know that Khiabani would be killed in a few days, bloadied by the bullets of the "reactionary guard." The sacrifices the Mojahedin are offering are continuous. Will they see the day when they realize their rose-colored dream of a society of "unification?" COPYRIGHT: 19 82 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI - 11887 CSO: 4604/23 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 IRAN ~ TUDEH SAID TO BE ASSISTING GOVERNMENT AGAINST OPPOSITION Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 262, 19-25 Feb 82 pp 44; ~+5 /Article: "Tudeh Members: Unsalaried Informers in the Service of the Ayatollahs"/ /Text/ In the case of the Tudeh Party, one can talk at length about the complex of "self-loathing" which some Jews accuse the chancellor of Austria, Bruno Kreisky (of Jewish origin), of having. The coannon factor, perhaps the only one, that links all the Iranian leftist organizations is hostility, toward the Tudeh, to the point sometimes of cambat. I;t is odd that the Tudeh does not just bring the left to- gether with its various detachments; it also brings these detachments together with ones on the right as well. Everyone, left and right, accuses the party of being a school in its own right for an education in political opportunism. The fact is that the history of the Tudeh is the history of its fiascoes. It gambled on Stalin, and Stalin abandoned it when he ordered the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from northern Iran fn 1947, once the British had guaranteed Che Soviet leader an acceptable share of Iranian oil. The Socialist Republic of Azarbayjan the Communists had established collapsed, as their first republic, which Kuchek Khan had proclaimed, also in the north, under the title of the Socialist Republic of Gilan, had collapsed 26 years before. The party then took part in the cabinet of Qavamossoltaneh, in the regime of the late Shah, in 1946. Then the Shah`s cabinets departed in 1951 and Mohammad rtosaddeq's cabinet came in. The party refused to support Mosaddeq, and the new premi.er swept the polit3cal stage clean, drawing millions of Iranians about the policy of oil nationalization he declared. When the party started to think of supporting Mosaddeq, his cabinet was on the road to collapse in the August 1953 coup. When Che party tried to court the American companies, allegedly deepening the contradictions between them and ttae British, raising the slogan of nationaliz- ing the oil in the south only, the Americans furnished it with the caup by Kermit Roosevelt, which the Shah carried out, opening the doors of the dungeons wide and full to the party's leaders and its base. When the party members gambled on their leaders in the hard circumstances Iran went through, which raged about the party after the coup, they were surprised to see Dr Bahrami., the party secretary, sending a long letter from his cell to the royal presence, asking forgiveness because he had "slipped beyond the bounds of waywardness." _ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500050024-5 ~ , ~ Befoia snd after the Storm When the sto~c~tn passed and the party resumed ~he attempt to get its fragmented parties togeth,sr, it gambled on a.group of re~volut~onary slogans to regain the - trust of the malsses and was surprised to find the Shah presenting slogans that - were more "revolutionary" than Chose of the party in 1963--apportioning land to peasants, eliminating the system of landlords and subjects, and starting the "white" revolution. After the upheaval aga~nst the dictatorship of the Shah started in the late _ seventies, the T~deh took a middle-of-the-road position, keeping in line with Moscow; then the two, the Tudeh and MoFCOw, were surprised tc? find that the Pahlavi citadel, packed with arms, hr,d collapsed and the Ayatollahs had leaped - onto the boat of the revolution, ex,~elling everyone fram it, one group after the other. The Tudeh experimente~ with trir~sning its sails to the wind, but the wind did not show it mercy. At the end of last y~ar, Haseyn Musavi, the prime minister, started to swoop down on party members working in min.istries and government departments, starting by distributing forms showing the political affiliations of all ~mployees and ending by expelling the coffinunists fram their iobs, in an attempt to bind up the severed relations with the "Great Satan," the i3iited States. _ In spite of intervention by Vladimir Vinogradov, Mo.;cow's ambassador to Tehran, to put a stop to the Ayatollahs' anger at their Tudeh Party aides, and in spite of BreLhnev's dffer to give massive economic and food aid.to Iran in exchange for "pardoning" the Tudeh members for their commounism, the lines of employees departing from the Ministries of Finance, Oil, and Foreign ~.ffairs were incessanL, each one of them holding in his right hand his party membe.ship card and in his left hand his letter of dismissal. Nonetheless, the bitter feelings of "ardor" that the Tudeh members harbored toward the Ayatollahs did not abate; it even reached the point where they turned their party into a branch of SAVAMA (the Iranian government's secret political police). In a report the party's central coamnittee sent to the Iranian Ministry of the In- terior, the following appeared, verbatim: "There is a lady called Yadollah, re- cently resigned fram the Ministry of th~ Interior, who has been pursuing special activities in the recent events the country has experienced. This lady has special relationships with Bakhtiar, the bazaar, the Mojahedin (Mojahedin-e Khalq) and Bani-Sadr's sympathizers. This lady is not at all religious, has a sweet tongue, is most energetic, and says that she is implicated in every demonstration: "The latest mission she performed was to get in touch with Mrs Turan Shari'ati, the wife of Dr Shari'ati, to get her to cancel her trip to Syria to celebrate the anniversary of her husband's trip out of the country and to convince her to hold the celebration in her home, in order to get people to gather together and link the celebration to the country's current problems. The party will-be held on 19 June." Then the signature and seal of the central co~ittee of tne Tudeh Party: 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 Informers without Salaries This, one example of dozens of reports, shows that the party leadership has turned its members int4 unsalaried Iranian government informers. Not just that, Che party continues to play a political role in confronting other opposition groups. For example, in the face of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the newspaper EITEHAD-E MARD(1~i, the party organ, demanded the execution of the leader of the Mojahedin organization, Mas'ud Rajavi, publishing an article which began wi.th the statement "This murderer, who has killed other, innocent people, must be handed over to the revolutionary execution teams." Therefore it was not strange that the opposition groups should, in their own ways, take part in the party's celebrations of the 40th anniversary of its birth the middle of last November in the British capital, London. The party chose to celebrate the anniversary in the hal~. of the American youth organization, the YMCA, whose connection with American Central Intelligence has become generally known. Tudeh members came to the hall in draves in their fine clothing to celebrate the anniversary of "40 years with the toilers." A number of inembers of other opposition groups had infiltrated the people who attended, and, when the celebration began, - the Tudeh members were surprised by slegans of condemnation of the Tudeh's stands, and Khomeyni's policies, and the British police intervened to break up the meeting. What happened in London was a picture in miniature of what is happening in Iran. COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 11887 CSO: 4604/23 � 14 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 FOR C~~'~ICIAL USE ONLY ~ IRAN REVOLUTION GUARD TERROR SEEN CREATING MANY ENEMIES Hamburg STERN in German 11 Mar 82 pp 27-28, 202, 205 . [Report by Dr Bahman Nirumand] [Text] The 46-year-old Dr Nirumand studied philosophy and German philology in Munich and Tuebingen. In 1964 this ac- tive opponent of the ahah was forced to flee to the FRG from the feared secret service Savak. Now he has returned to his homeland secretly and has lived for half ,s year in Teheran's undexground. Here is his report. Among the moat shocking pieces of news which I have obtained in recent days in the Teheran undergr~und was that of th~ shooting of Shokr~.llah Pakne~ad. He was a symbol of i:he resistance to the tyranny of the shah regimQ. Condemned to life in prison he had passed 12 years in the dungeons of the shah while en- during the worst tortures until it was possible Lo free him in an aes3ult on the prisons ehortly before the fall of the monaxchy. Three months ago Pakne~ad was arrested on the street by Pasdaran, the Khomeini- loyal "guardians of the revolution." When his brother a couple of days ago sought information about his whereabouts he was told in reply that Pakne3ad had already been shot 2 weeks before and lay buried in a cemetery outside Te- heran. He, like all relatives of the executed maii, was even called upon to pay for the bullets with which his brother had been shot. No trial in court, not even a few words of farewell to his family and friends: all that remained of him--a forged "will" and.a grave among a thousand other graves bearing not even Shokrollah Pakne~ad's name but only a number. Even a cemetery visit is extremely risky for his family. For in that area there are troops of bullies paid by the mullahs who spit upon surviving next of kin, insult them and strike.them. When 3 years ago Ayatollah Khomeini came to Teheran out of French exile he had practically the entire populace hehind him. At that time the Iranians were happy and ready for any sacrifice because they had finally overthrown the dic- tatorial regime of the shah and now believed that they were free. But at the end of these 3 years Khomeini, hie mullahs and his 10,000 heavily armed "revo- lutionary guards" are conducting a relentless war againat the people. 15 FOR OFFICIA~. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050024-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504050024-5 � V~~ Vl1 ~1.1t11tJ VJL Vl\1~� In a short period of time the successors to the ahah have been able to destroy . almost all the industry of the country and to ruin agriculture. In addition, they are entangled in a grinding war with their neighbor Iraq, which up to now has claimed almost 100,000 dead and produced over 2 million refugees. In the name of Islam the self-styled "dieciples of God" have thus far bestowed upon the country 6 million unemployed. Most of those wealthy who failed to flee promptly abroad have in the interim lost their wealth; the poor have be- come poorer and prices, especially for foodstuffs, climb higher ~aily. The black market enlarges steadily, the treasuries of the state are empty, foreign exchange is completely us~,d up and total collapse and catastrophe have become unavoidable. - Khomeini's apparatus of power has hounded trained personnel, the most important possession of the country, out of their ~obs. Tens of thoueands have fled out of the country, tens of thousands are 3obless and hundreds of them have already been executed as unbelievers and enemies of the state. Any en3oyment of life is looked upon as blasphemy. Anyone who reads material other than the sacred Koran and the religious and propaganda writings peddled by the state is considered to be a potential criminal. If the reading matter is opposition literature or even juet modern entertainment literature he is threatened with the death penalty. Leaflets of an opposition organization were found in the car belonging to three friends of mine. All three were immediately apprehended and after 2 months' imprisonment they were condemned to death last September without a trial and were executed. The regime is even proud of the fact that within the last 6 months it has executed around 4,500 people, mostly young people from 14 to 18 years old. Of course, this figure is 3ust for the executions which have be