JPRS ID: 10452 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R004500050028-1 :d:~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - JPRS L/ 10452 13 April 1982 - S~ub-Saharan Africa Re ort p CFOUO No. 768) _ FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500450028-1 - NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency ' transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text) or [Excerpt] in the f~.rst line of each item, or following the la;st line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was pr~~cessed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mat:ion was summarized or extracted. UnEamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in t:~e body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no wa; represer.t the poli- cie~~, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. _ ' COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGUI.ATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 ; JPRS L/10452 ; ~ 13 April 1982 ' SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT , ; (FOUO No. 768) ' CONT~NTS i ~ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS i Deficiency c,f .,frican Economies Ascribed to Colonial. Dism~mbering ; (Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 Jan 82) 1 CHA D ' Pessimism in Njamena Said To Con tinue (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 Jan 82)............ 3 Cot on French Objectives - (MARCHES TROPIt.~T~X ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 Jan 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 E'I~i IOP I A B rie t,~ ~ Guerrillas Repo rtedly Take Town 5 i Gue rri llas Amb ush Army Convoy 5 ~ GAB ON ~ ~I SMIG Increase, Cabinet Decisions Annotmced ' ! ~ (MARCHES TROPICAti~X ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 Jan 82 6 ; ~ i OCTRA Increa.ses Rates f (MAR(~iES TROPI~AUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 Jan 82) . . . . . . . . . . 7 Briefs Ango lan Cooperation Ag*-eements 8 CHANA Briefs Embassies to Close 9 - a - L I I I - NE & A- 12 0 FOUO j FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R004500050028-1 IVORY COAST Problem of S.uccessor to Houphouet-Boigny Discussed (Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 Jan 82) 10 Situation Grows More Precarious; Successor Still Not Named _ (Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 Jan 82) 13 - MADAGASCAR ~ President Reshuffles Cabinet, Discusses Econoiuy (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDT.TERRANEENS, 22 Jan 82) . . . . . . . . . 18 MAURITIUS , MSIRI Experiment Backed by British (L'EXPRESS, 31 Jan, 4 Feb 82) ............................o. 22 Drip Irrigation Study Drip Irrigation Results NIGER Briefs '1'hirteen CCCE-Financed Pm~ects � 26 Civil Service Salary Increases 26 = SOU'I~I AFRICA Gove rnment Said To Use Biological Methods Against Blacks (Mirta Balea; PRELA, 17 Mar 82) 27 ZAIRE Economy Department R,eviews 1980-1981 Economic Situation (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 15, 22 Jan~ 82) 29 - b - . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 FOR OFFICIAL USI~ ONLY II~TER-AF~IC~.:J Ar'FAI1tS DEFICIENCY OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES ASCRIBED TO COLONIAL DISMEMBERING - Paris JEUNE AFRIQU~ in French No 1099, 27 Jan 82 P 31 [Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Did,tl:P Whites Leave Too 5oon?"] [Text] Commenting on the return to power of Flight Lieutenant Rawlings in Ghana on 31 December 1981, the Bra~inotDArematureG~Of coursekethiseshouldibe understood after all, decolonization w P to mean that the whites should have stayed in Africa longer to teach Africans to _ govern themselves.... _ but even among This belief is rather common, and not only in colonialist circles, - the Africans. It der.ives from the worsening economic and social situation that most of our independent states are facing. Indeed, under colonial empires ti~e various economies, though less prosperous, allowed the people to feed themselves, while also serving as a basis for the i~r~plementation of e~~smafterf theeadvent ofe lated to the establishment of infrastructures. Twenty y . independence, most of these countries cannot feed themselves, to such an extent~ that one may well ask if, rather tha~heaal ellation ofpfailingncountries! STheLd not actually place squarely on them PP few hastily established industries seldom work at full capacity, while agriculture is in decline. , This situation is, first of all, due to the fact that the governments have beer. unable to correctly restructure the economies inherited from thE colonial the~im- since they wexe founded on the export of cash crops involvinot onlurhas~it been - portation of manufactured products. Ever since that time, Y impossible to set them up again--that is, to bas~heeindustrial cropsathemselves~od crops), but the purchasing power represented by has beeii increasingly declininglationerAfricanicountriesfareebeeomingrp~~re1~Yeare terms of exchange and wor1d inf ~ by year. ' Consequently, if it is true that there are instances where the inefficiency of those in power is partly to blame for Africa's difficult sjtuation, one is duty- ~ bound to acknowledge tha~ most of the responsibility shoulr~ be ascribed to the former colcnial powers, both because of the developmental models they had imposed on us in years past ane ofsourerawsmaterialsigncoffeepecoca,icopper,hbauxite,3C- tice today on the pric 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R004500050028-1 / manganese, phosphates, etc. The queation, therefore, is not whether the decolo- - nization of Africa was, or was not, premature. But rather why, after having been compelled to put an end to the colonial pact, Lv~stern countries continue to ex- - ploit our continent in other ways. Are they seeking new justifications to recolonize the third-world countries? So much contempt, so many injustices and such exploitation, alas, can only be explain- ed through our own weakness. How could it be otherwise, considering that Europe, by dismembering Africa fn the 19th.century, prevented it (for a long time) to ac- quire strong states? Precisely because the African empires were murdered before - completing thei,. ~estation. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982. CSO: 4719/692 - , 2 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE OhILY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 ~ - ~ I i i CHAD i , PESSIMISM IN NJAMENA SAID TO CONTINUE Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jan 82 p 205 [TextJ Radio Tripoli announced on 14 January that the city of F~ya-Largeau, in the prefecture of BET (Borkuu-Ennedi-TibESti), had fallen to Hissein Habre's FAN (Northern Armed Forces). This news was confirmed on 18 January in Yaounde by a"reliable source" of the AFP. The rAN has thus chosen not to attack Ati, where soldiers of the inter-African force are stationed, and rather than move toward N~amena, t.o instead return to the north ' of Chad, from which that guerr3.lla force initially set out and, with Libyan mil~tary aid, has managed to establish men from Tibesti in Nj~,uena, at the cost of a continual struggle ~or power. The seizure of Faya by Hissein Habre's forces is significant in that it cuts President Goukouni off from his ethnic base, the "Toubous" or the Teda Tu of .Tibesti. Hissein _ Habre, himself a Teda of the plains, a member of the Anakaza group, is "at home" in Faya, as are a number of his followers. This new aspect of the Chadian political situation has ended the government euphoria which followed President Goukouni's visit to Khartoum (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEENS of 15 January 1981, p 134). It was in fact Uelieved that the result of that visit included the Sudan's "total support" for Chad's current government, with Khartoum pledging, according to a~oint communique of 12 January, not to pro- vide any aid to "any force acting against the legitimate government of Chad, in particular the Northern Armed Forces." Both parties had also decided to immediately restore diplomatic relations between Njamena and Kharto~un, as well as to .resume flights of the Sudanese Air Company ~ ' Uetween the two capitals and to reopen the Chadian-Sudanese school in N~amena. Chad _ also requested that the Sudan use its good offices for national reconciliation and , some observ~rs anticipated a reconciliation between Hissein Habre and Goukouni Oueddei. - Is such a reconciliation still possible? And is the FAN seeking only to negotiate with the greatest number of winning cards in its hands? This is not inconceivab~~.e, but there is still pessimism in Njamena, particularly as a result of the stagnation . of the economic reconstruction process, the continuing rivalry between the various , factions comprising.the goverr?ment and the goverrunent's decision to reduce the salaries , of.civil s.ervants by one-half,_ The.UN HiRh Commission for_RefuQees announced on - 14 January that 15,000 Chaclian refugees in Cameroon have refused to be repatriated and are being moved to the Poli area. This is not a good sign either. I COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1S82 ~ 11915 CSO: 4719/533 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500050028-1 ' CHAD COT ON FRENCH OBJECTIVES Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jan 82 pp 205-206 [TextJ The French minister for cooperation and development, Mr Jean-Pierre Cot, told the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly in Paris on 14 January tha~ France can have only limited goals in Chad. According to a communique pubZished by the commission on the following day, the ~ main features of French policy, as Mr Cot reiterated, are "absolute support for the decisions of the Organization of,African Unity, no military intervention, approval of any effort to achieve a politi~~al solution and continued civilian ~ cooperation" with the Njamena government. The minister pointed out that France is also trying to make its principal FEC partners and the United States aware of the problems of the Chadian people. Tlie communique added that Mr Cot had noted that the Chadian situation is characterized by three main features: the withdrawal of Libyan troops, the installation of the inter-Afr.ican force and the problems of the Chadian Transitional National Union Government (GUNT) in establishing its authority throughout the country. Mr Cot added that the ambiguity concerning the role of the inter-African force has nc~t been completely eliminated, since the OAU considers it merely a police force whereas the GUNT wants it to be a spearhead against Hissein Habre's troops. Mr Cor recalled that France helped to establish this inter-African force through tl~e total absorption of the Senegalese contingent ~materiel, transportation, logistic siipport), by supplying munitions to the Nigerian contingent and by rotating means oi~ tran~portation for the benefit of the Zairian contingent. CUPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 11915 C:~O: 4719/533 4 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY ETHIOPIA BRIEFS - GUERRILLAS REPORTEDLY TAKE TOWN--Rome, 22 Mar (REFITER)--Guerrillas fighting for the independence of Ethiopia's Tigray Province have killed 600 government troops and taken the Wollo Province town of Battie, the Tigray Peoples Liber- ation Front [TPLF] said here today. A communique from the TPLF's foreign rela- - tions bureau said its forces seized the town, which lies on~ the Addis Ababa- ~ Aseb highway, after heavy fighting on March 19. The highway to the coastal town from the capital was still blocked, the TPLF said, adding that it cap- tured 36 prisoners, 33 trucks and large quantities of arms and munitions. [Text~.] [JN221912 London REUTER in English 1850 GMT 22 Mar 82] , _ (~UERRT.LI.AS AMBUSH AfiMY CONVOY--Khartoum, 19 Mar (REUTER)--Guerrillas fighting Cor the independence of Ethiopia's northern province of Tigray said today they h~id killed or wounded 300 Ethiopian soldiers in a battle on Wednesday. A spokesman for the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) here said guerril- _ las ambushed a government supply convoy as it was travelling to Addis Ababa from the Eritrean port of Assab. The convoy, carrying large stocks of fuel, grain and cooking oil, was hit 50 km (30 miles) east of Dessie, the capital of Wollo Province, and some 200 km (130 miles) south of Tigre, said.�spokesman Yemani Kidane. The TPLF captured 19 government trucks, destroyed 14 others and captured over 300 tonnes of grain, 6,000 gallons of cooking oil, and large - quantities of arms and ammunition, he said. The Afar people of Wollo Province helped by acting as guides to the guerrillas, he said. [TextJ [JN192201 London REUTER in English 2159 GMT 19 Mar 82 CSO: 4700/994 - 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850ROQ0500050028-1 GABON SMIG INCREASE, CABINET DECISIONS ANNOUNCED Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jan 82 p 206 [TextJ The Gabonese Council of Ministers met for the first time this year in Libreville on 15 January with President Bongo presiding. In an address delivered during the meetcing, Mr Bongo referred to his year-end message and to the importance of the resolutions of the PDG (Gabonese Democratic Party) Special Congress in 1979, while also announcing that "concerned with promoting the welfare of Gabonese and improving their living condit~ons, the chief of state and the gavernment have dec.ided to increase wages as of 1 January 1982. Thus the inter- occupational guaranteed minimiun wage (SMIG) is raised from 30,000 to 35,000 CFA francs. - Compensation for national service is alsa raised from L0,000 to 15,000 CFA francs." The chief of state also expressed his concern over people not providing proof of gainful, regular employment. In its report of 15 J~nuary, the daily L'UNION stated that a decree has therefore been issued, requiring ~.nyone free of educational obliga- tions to provide proof of gainful employment. A monthly check will therefore be made throughout the country by local and national police to determine the number, identity and addresses of unemployed persons and to subsequently orient them toward economic sectors needing their services. The council approued the draft law and proposed guidelines concerning water and forest resources, which adapts and updates the decree of 20 May 1946 and its prin- r_ipal implementing regulations, which still constitute Gabon's Forestry Code. W~th regard to housing, which the government intends to promote, the minister of state for public domain announced that the Gabon Land Bank (CREFOGA) will resume _ operations. Beginning 1 March, CREFOGA will grant loans to Gabonese wishing to purchase property for the first time and whose monthly income is between 150,000 and 600,000 CFA francs. The council recalled that citizens whose monthly income is between 40,000 and 80,000 francs are eligible for the Self-Construction Assistance Program, which can provide for a portion of the work of building a house, up to the maximum amount of 2.5 _ million CFA francs. Persons whose monthly incomes are between 80,000 and 150,000 CFA fra:~cs can purchase low-cost housing built by the National Building Society (SNI) through the lease- purchase program. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 6 ~~$15 9/533 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 l'Va\ v~ 1'l\-~f1L VJIi Vl\L! GABON OCTRA INCREASES RATES Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22, Jan 82 p 206 [Text] The board of directors of the Trans-Gabonese Railroad Office (OCTRA) met in Owendo on 9 January with Mr Emmanuel Mefane presiding. ~ - The question of rates, in particular, was discussed. The directors agreed titat it ~ was necessary to increase passenger and freight rates by 15 percent, instead of by 30 percent, as of 1 February 1982. First-class passengers on the Owendo-Ntoum line will now pay about 1,230 CFA francs instead of 1,075 francs. With regard to timber shipments, the OCTRA board of directors pointed out that the new rates will be applicable only when the railroad will be operating beyond PK [point kilometrique: kilometer point] 200. The prices set in January 1981 shall be maintained until then. The directors also granted the office free rein in setting lea~ing rates for land within railroad territory. A rate of 480 to 900 francs per square meter is therefore proposed, depending on the transaction concluded between the office and the company _ wishing to establish itself along the railroad. The 1982 operating budget was also set at 3.8 billion CFA francs (+15 percent over 1981); the government's subsidy will be 2.6 billion francs (+4 percent over 1981). The b~ard of directors noted that six General Electric switch engines were put into _ service in 1981. Average monthly passenger revenues rose from 14.1 million CFA francs in 1980 to 19.3 million in 1981 for a ciunulative total of 11 months, representing 85,475 passengers or a monthly average of 7,770 passengers. , The railroad will reach Booue (PK 341) by Aecember 1982, but it will be necessary to wait 6 months after reaching Booue before freight shipments can.be made. However, the Owendo-Ayem line will be open to freight traffic by September 1982. It is also reported that the loading platform between the Franceville~station and the Lebombi river (20 km) is entirely f inished. Studies p lanned for 1982 concern the conclusion of contracts for completing the second section.in early 1982 and the call for bids on pipes for the Booue-Franceville section. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 11915 ~ CSO: 4719/533 7 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GABON BRIEFS ANGOLAN COOPERATION AGREEMENTS--Thas first economic talks between Gabon anri Angola ended on 15 January in Libreville with the establishment of ~ooperation agreements and a legal framework for supervising the implementation of those agreements. The talks were held in the Gabonese capital from 12 to 15 January and were conducted by Mrs Honorine Dossou Naki, Gabonese secretary of state for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and Mr Paolino Pinto Joao, Angolan secretary of state for cooperation. According to the final communique, the proceedings took place "in an atmosphere of understanding" and both sides initialed a general cooperation agreement and two other agreements on commercial and merchant marine affairs. These agreements will be signed in Angola by June 1982. Internationally, Gabon and Angola reaffirmed "their adherence to the princi~les of sovereignty and nonintervention in the affairs ~ of other nations." They also pledged to continue to provide "their moral and material support to the Namibian people" in their struggle for independence. Concerning the - situation in the south of Angola, the communique finally noted that Gabon "expresses its deep concern and requests the racist government of Pretoria to end all aggression." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jan 82 p 206] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915 CSO: 4719/533 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 FOR OFFICpAL USE ONLY - GHANA BRIEFS IIKBASSIES TO CLOSE--Accra, 30 Ma.r (REUTER)--Ghana has decided to close , several African embassies and open mission in Libya and Cuba, the Ghana. News Agency reported today. Quoting Foreign Secretary Obed Asamoah, the _ agency said 25 ambassadors named by the deposed president would be recalled, - and the mission in Kenya downgraded to consular status. The embassies - to be closed included those in 5enegal, Zaire, Zambia, Uganda, Mali and = Egypt. The fate of th e missions in S3.erra Leone and Liberia were still being - considered, the agency quoted Dr Asamoah as saying. Ten of 43 existing embassies would be closed in all, in a drive to reduce government expenditure. - [L~xcerpts] [AB301836 London REUTER 3n English 1732 GMT 30 Mar 82] CSO: 4700/1021 1 - 9 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504050028-1 ~ . ~ i i ~ I IVORY COAST ~ I I ~ _i ~ PROBLEM OF SUCCESSOR TO HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY DISCUSSED Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Jan 82 pp 20-22 [Article by Siradiou Dia11o: "The Emnty Chair"] [Text] The fever pi:~ch continues to rise among Ivorian politicians. Despite the wave of renewal following the Seventh Congress of the PDCI (Democratic _ Party of the Ivory Coast) and confirmed by the legislative elections of October and November 1980, temperatures have not returned to normal; quite the contrary. As we have seen at recent meetings of the National Council (November 1981), the people are asking questions,.growing impatient and more and more irritated with every passing day. They cannot resign themselves ~.o seeing the chair of the ' constitutional successor to the chief of state remaining empty, even for an instant, much less 14 months! It is true that this is the first time since inde~endence that the Ivory Coast - has experienced such a constitutional vacuum. The constitution adopted in , 1960 provided (in Article 11) that if the Office of President should be vacated by the death, resignation or absolute incapacitation of the chief..of state, then his duties would be temporarily entrusted to a person chosen from within the National Assembly by its president. Consequently, the latter i~ invested with a power that seems not only excessive, but inherently uncertain. The power to appoint, even temporarily, tYie successor to the chief of state was juclged too ambiguous and Article 11 was therefore modified. By virtue of the law of 31 Ma.y 1975, the president of the National Assembly became, in the case of a vacancy in the Office of President, "the legal presi- dent of the republic, with all the rank, powers and prerogatives attached to ~ - the office." The text, which had the advantage of clarity, removed all ambi- guities regarding the succession. However, in politics, clarity is not neces- ; sarily a synonym for agreement! By naming the successor intuitu p~rsonae and - presenting him as the future president of the republic, he was thereby desig- na~ed as tt?e sacrificial lamb. In addition to his duties as president of the � National Assembly and secretary general of the PDCI, Philippe Yace, who held the ~ office at the time, was overnight viewed as the successor to President Felix ' Houphouet-Boigny, a formidable position that immediately turned him into a target around whom all discontent crystallized. At any rate, depending on ' ~ whether one loved or hated the No 2 man, one deputy at the time recalls that ' "one assumed the attitude.needed to support, exalt or fight him." The result was - 10 , " FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 a totally vitiated atmosphere. Accusations, intrigues and slander =lourished to such a point that all low.byows were permitted. _ In order to put an end to the clan battle and restore unity and uriderstanding within the party and tt~e government, P.resident Houphouet-Boigny once again had ~o undertake a revision of the constitution, of the famour Article 11, to be _ more precise. On 26 November 1980, the Na~ional Assembly adopted the follow- - ing wording: "In case of vacancy of the Office of the President as a result of his death, resignation or absolute incapacitation, as confirmed by the - Supreme Court at the request of the government, the vice president becomes the legal president of the republic." At the same time, Article 9, which provides f or the election of the chief of state for 5 years and by direct, universal suffrage, had to be modified. In its new provisions, it now stipulates that "he (the president of the republic) chooses a vice presidenfi, who is elected along with him." Since that, time, it has been the status quo. Not only doe:s President Houphouet- Boigny remain stubbornly silent about the name of his suc~cessor, but he does not say when or how he intends to designate him. Will he wait for 1985, the - date his term ends, to appear with the vice president~ he names? Will he resign before 1985 in order to appear with his "candidate," as some suggest? Or will he appoint the vice president he wants, without any popular backing, as~R3,chard _ Nixon did in the United States when he named Gerald Ford to replace the resign- ing Spiro Agnew? Or as Ford himself did when, at the time of his sudden acces- sion to the Presidency of the United States and maxing his own choice, he invested Nelson Rockefeller with the office of vice president? - Privately, at least, it is not rare to hear President Houphouet-Boigny refer to . American constitutional provisions, unless he is tEmpted by the Maoist exp~ri- ment. It will be recalled that the father of the Chinese Revolution gradually gave up the reins of power to the No 2 man he had chosen, while continuing, ~ from his apartments in the Forbidden City, to inspire and guide the political life of his country. Once the vice president is chosen, in one way or another, the Ivorian chief of state may well think about that role as guide and symbol oE unity for the Ivorian nation. What is certain is that Houphouet wants neither a prime minister nor coordina- tor. He remains viscerally hostile to any idea of.a diarchy at the head of state. He believes, in fact, that any mechanism suggesting or, what i~ worse, organizing shared power is not only monstrous, insofar as it breaks the unity of command, but also dangerous for young nations. He is deeply convinced tha:. authority cannot be divided, even if it can, if need be, be delegated.. The problem is that, given his advanced age (77), the burden becomes overwhelm- ing Eor the chief of state, who is, as Article 12 of the constitution states, the "exclusive holder of executive power." And, except for the vice president; the constitution provides for no other person in the ~rder of succession. In the United States or France, for example, the mechanism is perfectly set up: and even more graduated. Even in Africa, most of the nations have finally settled the problem constitutionally, in one way or another. 11 FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400500050028-1 . . . . . . . ,_,.h FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Howe~:er, Algeria remained some 1S years without a constitution. If ;,~umediene had died during that period, no one would have kn~wn who was to call together the Revolutionary Council, which had fallen into disuse to boot. Nor would _ anyone have known who was to succeed him. In Tunisia, there has always been ~ - an appointed successor, even if the person has changed four times since inde- - pendence that is, pr~.ctically onee every 5 years. In Morocco, where there is a monarchy, the problem has been settled. In Senegal, Cam.eroon and many other African countries, clear and stable choices have bee:~ made for the succes- sion. In view of these examples and aware that, since the constitutional revision of 26 November 1980, President Houphouet-Boigny no longer has any successor or real second-in-command or even any scapegoat, officials and intellectuals are worried and restless. They quite rightly fear that in the case of an accident, the Ivory Coast would plunge into the unknown, if not adventure and chaos. But in the 40 years that he has been in the political arena, Felix Houphouet- Boigny has had to meet many challer?ges. Knowing ttie concerns and way of think- ing of his fellow citizens perfectly well, he.refuses to be in any hurry about choosing a successor, for far from wanting to make him a"poisoned offering," he intends, on the contrary, to clear the way for him bef ore stepping down. 7'he "Old Man" has to be trusted. Provided that he has the time, he will be able to complete his work without any need to touch the foundations or even ~a~;>er the architecture of the Ivory Coast house. . COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982 11,464 CSO: 4719/683 . 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 ~ I IVORY COAST SITUATION GROWS MORE PRLCARIOUS; SUCCESSOR STILL NOT NAMED ' Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Jan 82 pp 22-25 - [Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "The Wait"] [7ext] Long known as an island of prosperity in the region, the Ivory Coast is now going through a fallow period. Difficulties of every stripe have piled up, month after montti, to such a point that the commentaries of certain members of the government an~l the writings in the official press now sometimes resemble the tracts of a still fictitious opposition germin�ting within the system. Nearly everywhere, one can feel the discontent and unrest building up, with outbreaks of fever caused by unemployment and banditry. Nevertheless and with all things being equal, one can still live better today in Abidjan than in Bamako, Ouagadougou, Lome or even Dakar, even if fear, frustration and hope are just as great. Furthermore, the country is standing up well to dangerous temptations, which is not without merit when one realizes that over the past 2 years, the Ivory Coast has simply had half of its export receipts cut off in absolute value (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1092), without counting inflation, when it was precisely on the sales of agricultural products that a flourishing industry, prosperous commerce and very dynamic construction sector once developed. . Ttie efEects of the world situation were added on to this brutal drop in prices ot export commodities, penalizing especially those countries that dared to ali::ige into the whirlwind of development without many safeguards. This is ~anat the Ivory Coast did, with large oil purchases, waiting to become a pro- :.ur.:,~r (planned for 1984) . Nor does t~.is L�ake into account the appetites of the bankers and the unsettled conditions on international financial markets. Many government, semi-public or private companies of all sizes are thrashing about with wrenching money pr~bl.~ms, aggravated by the high salaries of expatriate cadres and scourges ~.ahich President Houphouet-Boigny enumerated in his speech on 7 December ~,981 on the occasion of the 21st anniversary of independence: absenteeism,.favoritism, prafessional negligence, misappropriation of funds, poor management, and so on., 'Phese evils have always existed to some extent, but are infinitely more bearable ii~ rim~s of tne "fatted calf" and increasingly intolerable for the unemployed 13 ~ FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 r Vn vr r w~~a, vva: v~ w a - today, unemployed now numbering some 1,100 to 1,200 among higher-level and management personnel, plus some 5,000 intermediate-level emplovees and foremen. On 11 December 1981, several huadred of thes~ intermediate-level employees organized a march on the pre~=.dency, in downtown Abidjan. They ~1id x~ot stop until they were only 200 met-~rs short of their goal. After bitter negotiationa . with the mayor of the city, Emmanuel Dioulo, a delegation of 12 unemployed workers was recei.ved by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. He assured them of his understanding and promised that a National Solidarity Fund would soon be _ set up, supplied by a 1-percent deduction from all wages for 2 years. _ A fea days previously, Abidjan nearly experienced a much more dangerous march. - In the low-income section of Abobo-Gare, a policeman killed a taxi driver. Spontaneously, thousands of persons, engaged by other excesses, set out for downtown Abidjan, but Abobo-Gare is a distant suburb and the army had time to intervene. "Fortunately, the killing did not take place in Treichville. The consequences would have bEen much more serious," offieials told me. In Treichville today, the rich neighboring sections (Plateau, Cocody, Deux- Plateaux) are no longer looked upon with the same pride or indifference as in the past. The many famous glowing towers of over 30 floors in Plateau are deemed at least partially responsible for the poverty of the rest of Abidjan. And whenever anyone speaks about the buildings in Plateau or the ~ houses in Cocody thinks first of all about the 50,000 expatriates, most of them enjoying every luxury while the upper-level.national personnel are unemployed and while those below them cannot even ~ake both ends meet. Here again, the problems are more acute and viewed morc emotionally than before. People are not afraid to speak openly about two resounding failures: those of the univer- sity and Ivorianization. The university (about 12,000 students in 1981, compaxed with 13,000 the pre- vious year) has become "a factory turning out unemployed." PresidentHouphouet- Boigny himself does not hesitate to say that the country has "servilely inher- ited the Fren~h educational system," which "does not correspond to the coun- try's real needs." We are very far here from the euphoria manifested in Janu- ~ _ ar.y 1978, at the time of the visit of then French Chief of State Valery Giscard d'~staing. At that timer in fact, Houphouet-Boigny rendered homage "to the - 1?i~;~~ sense of du~y, the admirable development, the fervor; courage and excel- lent human and professional quality demonstrated by French technical assistants, - particularly the teachers." As for Ivorianizatibn, this governmental campaign, officially begun in 1971, has not attained its goals. Former Minister of Agriculture Charles Donwahi, member of the Political Bureau of the PDCI, president of the party's Ivorian- ization committee and the association of Ivorian cadres in the private sector, _ explained at length in the 4 December issue of tne government daily FRATERNITE- ~ MAT.IN, "The problem of our way of thinking still seems to me to be the most im~~ortant thing," Donwahi writes. "It is not~certain that after 10 years, we have yet succeeded in making certain expatriates. admit that Ivorianization is first of all a legitimate political act, one of the attributes of our sover- - eignty. Token ivorianization still exists because certain enterprises engage in it only.in order to provide a response to a political demand." 14 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 But there are othF,r obstacles. For example, having come in principle for a limited stay, cerLain expatriates later do everything to remain. In the com- panies, this can ~result in the creation of needs requ~ring their presence and _ the im~lementation of a tactic aimed at preventing Ivorian management personnel from uriderstanding the opeiation of the enterprisE. In the face of the rPti- cence of certain boards of direc.tors often meeting in Paris or elsewhere, the - Ivorians have tried to circumvent the difficulty by acquiring a greater share of the capital. The movement did accelerate, especially in the banking sector , (at the government level as well as with respect to private capital), but it has slowed down the past 2 years hecau5e of the circumstances. Undeniably, the Whites have lost a.great deal of th.eir magic and the cult that surrounded them is dying, the victim of their own e~otism. It is a pu~itive consequence, mingled witn concern and disappointment over education and Ivor- ia~iization and the desire to conserve the national languages, which have been totally neglected because of the use of French. It remains to be seen which ones to choose out of at least 60 ethnic groups, which are often rivals. It would appear nevertheless that a consensus is emerging in favor of the Dioula, Baoule and Bete. Another consequences c;iis one more dramatic ~f the s*~ing from pYOSperity to stagnation: a resurgence of banditry and armed ittacks. Abidjan (with its suburbs) is be~inning to resemble Chicago in the 3(~'s. Security measures have be~n stepped up. It is no longer a rare sight in tlie evening to see armed police patrols walking the streets in Indian files in groups of four. Raids, ar.r.ests, inspections of suspicious sites have increased in number. And yet, there is a definite lack of security, as well as an escalation of ineans used in attacks. In particular, more and more weapons are being stol~n from police ~ stations. - A year ago, the names of Sirike Konate, known as "Zerbo," an Upper Voltan, Lawson Trusty, "Prince Tony" or "the Aviator," a Togolese, and Issiaka Traore were constantly in Abid~an headlines. The attacks they pulled off with their rings before being arrested now seem old-fashioned. Other bolder gangs have n..~w appeared and have gone after the banks, heretofore o�f limits, particu- larly the BIAO (International Bank for West Africa) in Cocody, the SIB (Ivorian ~Ranking Company) in Marcory, and the SGBCI (General Banking Company of the ~~vr>r_y Coast) in Treichville and Vridi. 'Che holdups are generally attributed to f.oreigners, mainly the Upper Voltans, some of wt3om have been arrested. But for the SIB, one of the authors of the robbery (which involved sox~e SO million CFA francs) sho~ted, as he left: "Tell yo�r authorities that we are not Upper Voltans, but Ivorians...unemployed!" Hc: thezl sprayed the ceiling with a maehine-gun burst. Emotions were even higher when an arms cache (eight cases containing about 40 autom~tic pistols) was seized "by accident" at the Port-Bouet airport in Abidjan. The cases were reportedly sent from S~vitzerland in mid-December by. ~7 Lebanese who,.when he arrived, did not find his accomplices who were to take delivF~ry without inspection. "I have already gotten others through!" he re- = portedl.y said upon being arrested. 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 - Precisely who was to have received the weapons? Members of the underworld or other suc:~ circles? Ivorian officials are extremely reserved on the sub~ect ~ and hide behind "the ~.nvestigation underway." They obviously do not wish to add to the rei~ning r~alaise, or to the politieal uneasiness maintained by the ignorance in which Felix Houphouet-Boigny has kept the country regarding his success:Lon. At the age of 76, the "Old i~1an" remains the main bulwark against any mishaps that might assail the country on the pretext of the crisis it is now going through. But for the very reason ~f the difficulties, people are beginning to ask whether Houphouet still has the energy needed to head the nation's affairs alone, as he has always done. He is urged to name a vice president, as the constitution provides, or at least a"coordinator," as sug;;ested by close aides aware of the Old Man's reservations on this delicate probiem. A few days before the now famous statement by dissident Deputy Camille Adam, "Resign ar~d have yourself represented by your appointed vice president!" = Houphouet declared that his suecessor would ~e named�in a will, which declara- tion was various interpreted. Consequently, in order to cut short any errone- ous interpretation, he said on the day of the closure of the National Council: "Speaking of my will, I h~ve said that this is not a family matter. There is. not a single member of my fami~y who has political responsibilit~ies in this country.... I do not want any son, nephew or cousin to enter the political arena to compete against anyone." ~ He then whispered: "You are speaking about the vice presidency! Do you know how many candidates there are?" Silence in the room. He then resumed: "In the difficult struggle in which we ar.e engaged, I do not want to add any more divisions at this time...." The Old Man e~ zn allowed a glimpse of a certain skepticism about the results of the free elections last year because many of - those defeated "have not accepted the choice of the ballot boxes." Felix Houphouet-Boigny's reticence is also explained by the fear of renewed tribalism, even at the highest levels: "There must nofi be a Baoule president, a Bete president or a Dioula presidert, but a president of the Ivory Coast." The f.ar_t remains tha~, despite certain rumors, the good health of the chief o~_ state should yui~:t tears, even if each of his stays in Yamoussoukro, his native village, does feed Ra.dio-Trottoir [Sidewalk Radio]. Some speak of fatigue; others of sickness. At any rate, late in 1981, Houphouet made several trips abroad, particularly to France, on the occasion of the French-African Conference (3-4 November) and Dakar for the CEAO (West African Economic Com- munity), ANAll (Nonaggression and Defense Agreement) and UMOA (West African Monetary Union) summit conferences at the end of November. ~ Finally, Houphouet missed only one meeting: the C~ncun summit conference - (22-23 October). But it is said in Abid~an that the illness invoked on that occasion was diplomatic! During preparations; the Ivorian chief of state had~ learned that his speech was being limited to 10 minutes and that he should not speak of raw materials. Furthermore, there eould be no question of discussing the prices of these same.raw materials, even though they a~e one of the under- lying reasons for the ~.nequality in international trade, especially between the North and the Soutn. 16 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500050028-1 FOR OFFIC[~L USE ONLY On this subject, Houphouet's bitterness grows and he speaks more than ever _ about the "looting of our raw materials by the West," condemning the "egntism of the rich, who do not care about our situation." This observation he illus- trates by the colorful sayi*~g, "You do not offer a chair to a frog crouching for the spring." ' COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982 11,464 CSO: 4719/683 17 ~ FOR OFF~CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504050028-1 , FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY r I ~ MADAGASCAR i l' ~ PRESIDENT RESHUFFLES CABINET, DISCUSSES ECONOMY ~ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jan 82 pp 210-211 [TextJ As Presidezt Didier Ratsiraka announced in his important speech of 10 January, in which he explained hi~; "development strategy" (see below), the government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar was considerably reorganized on 15 January, as was the Supreme Revolutionary Council. This reshuffling, the fourth since 1975 and one of the announced measures for rational implementatio~ of the new "strategy," is characterized by thc Following principal actions: National Police Colonel Deslre Rakotoarijaona, who has been prime minister since 1977, will be retained as such. Two ministers who are considered "liberals" and who occupy key posts will be dis- missed: Mr Rakotovao Razakaboana (Finance and Planning) and Mr Justin Rarivoson ~ (Economy and Commerce). They are respectively repla:.ed by Mr Pascal Rakotomavo, former general manager of the ARO [Insurance, Reinsli~ance, Omnibranch] insurance comp~iny, who has been named minister of finance (Pla.nning will be directly reassigned to the Office of the President of the Republic), and Mr Georges Solofoson, former director of President Ratsiraka's civilian staff, who becomes minister of industry and commerce. Transportation and Agriculture will be assigned to men close to the president and who are considered "loyal": Mr Joseph Bedo, former general secretary to the president _ of the republic, will become minister of transportation, food and tourism, replacing Mr Jean Bemananjara, while Mr Nirina Andriamanerasoa, former assistant general manager of ARO, will be appointed minister of agricultural production, fishing, livestock breeding and agrarian reform, replacing Mr Pierre Simon. Tr,ansfers of posts should also be noted: Mr Georges Ruphin, former minister of in- formation and ideological orientation, will become minister of public administration, labor and civil service; he will be replaced by Mr Bruno Rakotomavo, former minister of public work~. A military engineer, Maj Victor Ramahatra, will become minister - of public works. Am~~ng the six ministers who have not been reassigned to their posts, four will be ap~~ointed supreme revolutionary councilors: Messrs Rakotovao Razakaboana, Pierre Siinon, Celestin Radio and Georges-Thomas Indrian~afy, respectively the former ministers of finance and planning, rural development and agrarian reform, labor and justice. 18 FOR OFFIC[AL L'SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500050028-1 hUE( VMf'1l.lAL U7~ I/IVLY Finally, the departure of Iiessrs Ch~rles Ravoajanahary, Gilbert Sambson, who has been appointed minister of j ustice, keeper of the seals, and Robert Koto from the Supreme Revolutionary Council should be noted. The previous government dated from August 1977 and included the same number of - ministers. - The reshuffling of 15 January appears to be a political-technical arrangement re- quired both by the country's current very serious economic problems, of which President Ratsiraka has made no secret in his most recent speeches, and by the up- coming presidential elections in late 1982, for which Mr Didier Ratsiraka, elected president on 27 December 1975, has announced his intention to request a new 7-year term. The government's socialist choice is obviously not being called into question; much to the contrary, as confirmed by the retention of the present prime minister and the elimination of "liberals," Mr Rakotovao Razakaboana and Mr Rarivoson, who had obt~ined the confidence of international financial circles, in particular the IMF and World Bank group, at a time when the Malagasy economy needs foreign aid more than ever. In his New Year's message to the nation, President Didier Ratsiraka discussed the country's economic problems and announced that he would himself soon disclose the measures which he intended to take (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS of 15 January 1982, p 156). On 10 January, the Malagasy chief of state elaborated on the topics already discussed in two long speeches (one in French and one in Malagasy) delivered to members of the diplomatic and consular corps, the Malagasy Government and the Supreme Revolutionary Council in Ambohitsorohitra Palace. We have excerpted statements from those speeches concerning the "consistent and har- monious overall strategy" which the Revolutionary Government intends to implement. 1) Agricultural Development: '~ood self-sufficiency is still the priority of priori- ties. We must therefore increase productivity in the agricultural sector in order to eliminate food dependency. Such a development is possible onlq through a radical transformation of social structures in rural areas. And in this area, we need the means of our policy." 2) 7:ndustrial Development: "Increasing agricultural productivity requires the use ~~f industrial products (fertilizer, insecticides, equipment, construction and energy). _ But the installation of the respective industries is also the first stage in establish- in~ the autonomous basis for domestic accumulation (industrializing industry)." 3) Reorganization of Public Finances, the Economy and Government: "To achieve these = goals, we must complete the very hard but absolutely necessary effort to stabilize our finances and our economy, without which Madagascar would undergo a ridiculous and absurd disaster, but thanks to which it will see the road to prosperity open for all men and women, as well as the road to a socialist para~iise." President Ratsiraka proposes the following means for.achieving these goals. 19 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY a) Concerning the economy, finance and government, an overall macroeconomic model - for the Malagasy economy is being prepared w~th the aid of staffs of national and international experts. The management of public finances is also in the process of being totally computerized (operating and investment budgets, debt monitoring, supervision and control of expenditures An economic model.wil:l.also be established for better selection of investment pro~ects and for,verifying their consistency and profitability. Finally, government officials will tackle the problem of profound tax reform to prevent budget revenues from becoming too dependent on import taxes. b) Concerning agricultural and industrial investments in general: "With agriculture - as the basis of development and industry as its driving force, we will orient in- dustrialization toward the satisfaction of agricultural development needs." It is on this basis that- investments have been made for the purchase of tractors, the production of farm ~.mplements (plows) and spare parts (Toly, Ecam plants the construction of cement plants (Ibity, Amboanio, Soalala) and an electrical steel plant for the production of reinforced concrete in particular. It is also on this basis thaC nitrogen (Ze Ren) and t~egetable (Zema) fertilizer plants have been built. Finally, it is on this basis that efforts are being n~ade to achieve energy self- sufficiency: Electric power: Namorona, Andekaleka; unconventional petroleum at Bemolanga (bituminous sandstone), whose exploitation will begin this year; fuel , oil at Tsimororo; uranium at Tolagnaro and alcohol Plant at Ambilobe; conventional = petroleum in the Morondava region with Mobil Oil ancl in the Sakaraha region with Occidental Oil Company. c) Concerning agriculture, the main effort is oriented toward satisfying national - rice and cooking oil needs. In the case.of cooking oil, the palm oil operation at Toamasina and soybean oil (MAMISOA [expansion unknown] at Antsirabe) operations ~ are underway and there is optimism concerning their results. - With regar~ to rice, whose importation currently accounts for nearly one-half of the trade balance deficit, a major policy for stimulating production and productivity h~~s been launched. It consists mainly of making the most of the important existing n~tential in this area. Aid priority should therefore be given to the farming sector, ~;!Zi.:~h is the basis of this production, whether it is large farms managed by develop- ment companies or other areas under government supervision (state farms, OMIPRA - [Agricultural Production Military Operation], cooperatives). _ Such an agricultural policy implies a revitalization of basic resources (organiza- tions for training and popularization) and the achievement of better organization at~the national level for better coordination of the various programs. An initial priority phase for implementing this policy has already begun, which consists of rectifying the situation of development companies. A study is now teing conducted to obtain a detailed diagnosis of their internal situation and to analyze tlieir place in their overall environment, in order to lay out reorganization programs ~ 20 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 . . . . - and to revive those enterprises. A maximum p~riod of 6 moaths has been set for doing so and this operation is already underway with the aid of the Bache Company, the World Bank and national technicians (Lake Alaotra, Samangokq, etc.). It is also known that German cooperation is financing the measures for the recovery and intensification of the Marovoay farm, and for making it more profitable, follow- ing the FIFABE [expansion unlaiown] improvement. A second priority is naturally the expansion or improvement of new arable areas by OMIPRA, state farms and cooperatives. Finally, applied research agencies in agriculture will be reassigned to the Ministry of Rural Development. To implement this policy, President Ratsiraka has announced: --a goverrnnent reshuff- _ ling for better cohesion and better efficiency; --his intention to request a new 7-year term at the end of his present term in office; --the floating of a large national loan (whose details will be specified later) to reduce public spending (FNDE [National Development and Equipment Fund]) and subsidies, to reduce the total amount of money in circulation and to f inance the accelerated development of rice production to halt the heavy drain of foreign exchange caused by the importation of approximately 200,000 tons of rice annually. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie 1982 11915 CSO: 4719/535 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 ~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL L I I I i ~ MAURITIUS ~ ~ MSIRI EXPERIMENT BACKED BY BRITISH Drip Irrigation Study Port Louis L'EXPRESS i.n French 31 Jan 82 p 1 ; [Article: "Drip Irrigation Study Will Benefit From British Aid"J [Text] The Mauritius Sugar Industry Research Institute (MSIRI), which had requested British assistance in setting up a comprehensive study project concerning drip irrigation in the sugarcane fields, has obtained highly ' interested support from the British Institute of Pvdrology. As a matter of fact, the latter has gotten the go-ahead from the British government to set up a comprehensive study. According to a press release issued yest~rday the the British high commission; the project, which will ~ require 7_J0,000 pounds (4 million repees) will be financed by British technical - cooperation funds. According to the high commission's press release, however Great Britain will ; put at PISIRI's disposal an agriculturaZ expert specializing in irriga~ion research. The exper:r will work in conjunction with the institute for a 3 to ; 5 year period in order to study the various aspects of irrigation and its effects on the harvest. -I In addition to the scientist's services, the British Government will lend the ~ entire experience of th.e British Institute of Hydrology, including equipment for irrigation programming and analyses of the data of computer studies. . Some of the latest equipment of the British Institute of Hydrology, such as the neutron sound for detecting the water content of the soil and the automatic scanning devices for microclimate data, will be utilized in Mauritius during the execution of the project. Two scientists of the Institute of Hydrology (Bell and Batchlor) are expected in Mauritius today for preliminary discussions with MSIRI concerning the project. MSIRI has set up an entire program of visits to sugar plants and irrigation projects. 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 FOR UN'N'IC:IAL US~: UNLY J. Goldson, the natural resources advisor to the Office of the British Overseas Development Administration in Nairobi, will accompany the two scientists and will~visit other pr~jects in the country which have received British aid. Drip Irrigation Results Port Louis L'EXPRESS in French 4 Feb 82 pp 1, 6 [Article: "Average 50 Percent Increase in Tonnage in Medina Thanks to Drip , System"] . [Text] An experiment performed in Medina on a 40 acre area planted in cane using the Agriplas drip system yi~lded results considered very satisfactory _ for the 1981 sugar campaign. Roger Fayd'herbe & Co, Ltd officials, who represent Agriplas (Pty) Ltd in Mauritius, told L'EXPRESS that the tonnage of cane harvested.per acre had increased by an average of 50 percent, up from 33 tons to 49. As is known, there has been much talk about drip irrigation in Mauritius over the past few years, and several experiments have been attempted, ba5ed on different systems, but as far as the Agriplas system is concerned, only the Medina experiment, instituted in 1979, was set up with truly modern standards. Since drip irrigation appears to be assuming prime importance in the develop- ment of agriculture and of sugar production in particular, the Mauritius Sugar Industry Research Institute furthermore solicited (and obtained) assistance from the British Institute of Hydrology (see Sunday's L'EXPRESS) in order for a careful study spread over a 3 to 5 year period to be done in this field. In another connection, it is interesting to note that in a recently published interview (L'EXPRESS, 21 January 82) Herve Koenig, the new director and president of the Mauritius Sugar Producers' Association, expr~ssed the opinion that drip irrigation will result in increasing production and that if this growth caere about 50 percent, that would represent an appreciable gain. This increase is precisely what has been achieved in Medina, and the Roger ~ Fayd'herbe officials have disclosed to L'EXPRESS that three new plans for sugar businesses (20, 40 and 90 acres respectively) are presently under study. The Roger Fayd'herbe firm has been representing Agriplas (Pty) Ltd in Mauritius for 8 years. This system was initially set up in Israel, before being Americanized. As with most systems, the water passes through a control station equipped principally with filters and a small computer which makes daily or weekly programming of irrigation possible. Fertilizers, and in certain cases a _ herbicide are also supplied to the main pipes conveying the water to the - fields to be irrigated. 23 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 i _ i ~ I These main pipes, as well as the lateral pipes, a~e all madt of PVC--which makes them particularly strong--while the smallest pipes crossing the fields I (the dripper lines) are polyethylene. ~ These small pipes, which are generally placed between & and 10 inches und~r the ground's surface, are equipped with very solid emitters at the rate of 1 - per meter. These emit exactly the amount of water programmed, thus making ~ possible the most efficient irrigation with a minimum of the precious (and ' costly) liquid. . ~ Before the Medina project, Agriplas had equipped several ot;.ier smaller experiments, not exceeding 15 acres, for~MSIRI, ~t Antoine, Mon Desert Mon ' Tresor, Case Noyale and Bel Ombre, among others, but all these projects had - to cope with major drawbacks, such as the necessity of laying th~e pipes on - the 5urface or that of connecting them over old installations. ' The lands chosen in Medina for the experiment were not the best. This fact gives the 50 percent increase in yield its fu11 significance. An Agriplas ; technician who recently came to determine the results of the ~fauritian ' experiments on site said he was otherwise satisfied with these results. ~ The injection of fertilizers in small, continuous doses also makes possible maximum yield and savings in this fielri as well. If herbicide is used, it makes a zone immediately next to the emitter sterile; this prevents any roots - from growing across and obstructing it. It should also be stressed that depending on the space between two rows of canes, a cover crop is possible with the addition of a surface pipe. For the major projects, the preliminary studies 1re performed by local technicians, and plans are proposed to A^riplas' South African agents. In order to avoid the problems of financ:. ; new projects (the initial cost is proving quite high), the Roger Fayd'herbe firm has also made arrangements to set up a financing system spread over periods varying between 2 ar.d 5 years of credit, at relatively low interest rates. -i ; Even though the Agriplas system was still at the experimental stage in ~ Mauritius and even though very encouraging results are only now being ; obtained, the system had already proved itself, especially in Hawaii, ~ Australia and South Africa. i Drip irrigation has the following advantages, among others: substantial ~ savings in use of availabie water; reduction in electrical energy consumption; reduction of labor employed; better distribution of fertilizers and savings ' in fertilizers; the virtual disappearance of weeds; and, of course, increased ~ production. We note, finally, that the Agriplas system could be adapted to individual , . -i needs--orchards, kitchen gardens, and other agricultural activities. Pipes and other equipment are available for that purpose with money, and the investments involved are quite low. One-thirtieth of the projects have been 24 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500050028-1 rux urr?uAL u~r, ui~LY carried out at this level and as many more look as though they will be carried out. Advances to Sugar Producers On Wednesday 10 February 1982 the Sugar Assoeiation will give a new advance to sugar producers on sugar from the 1981 harvest on the following basis: Category of Producers Advance Per Metric Producing for Export Ton Rupees 0 - 20 tons 250 20 - 75 tons 175 75 - 1,000 tons 160 - 1,000-3,000 tons 125 _ More than 3,000 ~ 60 . Manufacturers and manufacturers/planters 60 This advance is granted after taking into account differential payments made ' by the association for each category of producer 1. For the export tax 2: To MSIRI 3. To SIFB [expansion unknown] COPYRIGHT: 1982 s.a. Groupe Express - 9380 CSO: 4719/592 - 25 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 _ - F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NIGER BRIEFS THIRTEEN CCCE-FINANCED PROJECTS--The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) granted 13.745 billion CFA francs to Niger in 1981 to finance 13 development projects in the sectors of rural development (2.665 billion), energy (6.120 billion), tele- - vision and telecommunications (2.740 billion) and transportation (2.220 billion), according to a CCCE communique released in Niamey on 7 January. The biggest single grant is earmarked to finance the construction of 2 SONICHAR (Nigerien Coal Company of Anou-Araren) thermal power plants in the desert, in the department of Agadez. Other CCCE financial aid is earmarked for areas as diverse as the development of aquiculture, the spread of cooperative farming, agricultural projects at Maradi and ' D~sso, expansion of the passenger airport and the establishment of a freight airport ~it Niamey, the installation of telecomff;unications ground stations and establishment of a transit depot in the port of Lome. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET M~DITERRANEENS in French 22 Jan 82 p 200] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11915 CIVIL SERVICE SALARY INCREASES--The Nigerien Council of Ministers, under the chair- manship of Col Seyni Kountche, adopted 4 decrees on 7 January, increasing the minimum - wages of employees and officials of the government and related establishments by an average of 10 percent as of 1 January. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jan 82 p 200] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreu.x et Cie Paris 1982] 11915 _ CSO: 4719/533 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 ; FOR OFF[C[AL USE ONLY ~ ( SOUTH AFRICA ~ I I' . GOVERNMENT SAID TO USE BIOLOGICAL ME7~i0DS AGAINST SLAQ~S PA172200 Havana PRELA in English 1920 GMT 17 Mar 82 I [Report by Mirta Balea] ' [Text] Havana, 18 [as rece3ved] Mar (PL)--The Pretoria regime appears to entrust its future in part to biological and chemical methods used to ~ r.educe the African maj~rity population. The South African authorities, report the w3re sc~rvices, have contaminated ! the waters supplying the regions inhabited mostly by black people with - chemical and genetic substances that effect the rate of growth and increase infant mortality among other dama.ge. i For the ruling class in South Africa ~aith its wc~rld view that has nothing ~ in common with normal nati~ns or ethics, any method is valid so long as it eliminates the national liberation struggle against apartheid.~ Disdain for public opinion, a characteristic symptom of the regime per- formance seems to be present in its plans to develop bacterialogical weapons which can be used ag~inst its neighbors as well. The South African press admits that genetic warfare is broadly used in the black townships and in the Bantusians where the African majority population is confined. ~ The practices are applied by the Bureau of African Affairs, allegedly created to take care of the "needs " of the black people, but which the ; ruling Nationalist Party assigns funds mainly for that macabre program. 1'he aim of the plan is aggressively immoral, with a venge,ance. It is the conception o.f a ruling miriority group that utterly ignores elementary human rights in favor of the insane idea of "white supremacy." At the end of last year news media reported the creation'of a special base for training troops in the methods of nuclear, chem.ical and bacteriological warfare on Red Hill near the Simonstown Base at the Cape. 27 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500050028-1 . rvn vcra~.aha, v~c vi~a..i , That work began, however, back in 1960 3,n violation of the convention _ banning the development, production and storage of bacteriological or toxic weapons of which Sbuth Africa is a signer. The South African virology inst3tute which has rhe cooperation of the, biological research center of Porton Down, Great Britain,.has become s center for the development of those weapons. It has a laboratory where the most dangerous viruses are stud3ed that are capable of killing as much as 90 percent of the persons e~f ected. But really, should it come as a surprise that the apartheid regime is using a new form of extermina.tion against the Africans? Its defenders can be relied upon to make every effort to cover up those practices. Nonetheless, the truth cannot be kept from public opinion. Condemnations can be expected of these most recent v3olat3ons by "public enemy n~ber one" of all Africa, including, of course, the people of South Africa. � CSO: 4700/961 28 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ZAIRE ECONOMY DEPARTMENT REVIEWS 1980-1981 ECONOMIC SITUATION Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ~T MEDITERRANEENS in Frercch Nos 1888, 1889, 15, 22 Jan 82 [15 Jan 82 pp 151, 152J [Text] The Zaire Department of National Economy, Industry and Commerce has released issue No 20 of its annual report (December 1.q81 edition) on the economic situation during fiscal 19~0-1981, and Mr Leonard, adviser to that department, . is described by Co~ni.ssioner of State Pay Pay Wa i~asige in tne preamble as having been the "driving forc~" behind that re- port for many years. The report comes out at a time when, in accordance with the commitments made when a"rescue" loan was granted by the Ir.- ternational Monetary Fund in June 1981, the goverrnnent is - engaged in the difficult task of implementing austerity mea- sures and of stringent management in an effort to reestablish ~ a balanced budget, rehabilitate the public finances, restore foreign credit, realign the economy and reorganize the state apparatus to correct serious inadequacies which have been perpetuated over the years and which are at the root of a profound deterioration of the country's position. This important docinnent covers the various sectors of Zairian aativity in 1980 and the early months of 1981, and contains many statistical. tables (production, foreign trade, budget, : balance of payments and others). In June 1981, the very serious financial situation and the burden of its for- eign debt forced the Zairian Goverrnment to carry out a further 40 percent currency devaluation which, added to a previous 30 percent readj~ustment made in February 1980, has reduced the parity of the zaire to 0.1575 SDR [special ; drawing rights] (that parity had been set at 1 SDR in March 1976 when the exchange rate of 1 zaire for $2 was abandoned). - On 22 June 1981, the IMF provided extended facilities for Zaire by opening a ' credit line of 912 million SDR or $1.2 billion (the largest amount of aid 29 FOR OFF[C[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' ~ . . . . . ~ ~'V~\ V~'~'l~.ll1L VJL Vl\V! given by the IMF) to be disburs~ed over a 3-year period to finance the 1981- 1983 recovery plan which hinges on modernizing the means of production and the infrastructure. _ Also, on 9 July 1981, 14 creditor countries (Abu Dhabi, the FRG, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the United States, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Nether- lands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland) and the World Bank agreed to ease the burden of their outstanding debts by rescheduling the still pend- ing annual payments for the 1976 to 1980 period (funded debt). On 1 January 1980, outstanding debt (financial, governmental and commercial) totaled . $3.2 billion and pending arrears on the funded debt amounted to $400 million. The gross domestic product which had dropped in real terms by a yearly average _ of 3.7 percent between 1975 and 1978 registered a positive growth estimated at 1.8 percent in 1980, and figures for the f irst 6 months o~ 1981 indicate a 1.6 percent growth. The rate of inflation, which in 1979 was still above 100 per- cent, was brought down to 50 percent in 1980. The budget deficit, which climbed to 1.9 billion zaires in 1979 and to 2.1 billion in 1980, has been reduced in the 1981 budget in which a deficit of 500 million zaires is anticipated. Trade and Finances Foreign Trade--To measure the growth in foreign trade one must take ~nto account the changes in the par value of the zaire over the past 3 years. The following figures in millions of zaires show the growth in today's terms: 1977 1978 1979 1980 Iinports 1,629 850.7 1,673.7 3,748.9 ~xports 986.3 1,311.4 3,130.6 5,304.4 Balance - 642.7 + 460.7 + 456.9 +1,555.5 In 1980, mining production accounted for 83.6 percent of all export receipts . :~n~' agricultural products for 12.8 percent. In spite of a substantial in- crease in copper exports in 1980, Zaire's earnings from these exports did not increase because the prices for copper and cobalt dropped and have continued to drop during the first 6 months of 1981. Balance of Payments--After large deficits between 1977 and 1979, the general balance of payments showed a surplus of 48.5 million zaires in 1980 due to a ~ surplus in the trade balance and despite the deficit in the category of serv- ices (1.6 billion), the payment of commercial arrears (1 billion) and the servicing of the debt. 13udb~t--The budget for f iscal 1981 pro~ected revenues of 5.6 billion zaires (up by 2.3 billion compared to 1980) and o utlays of 6.1 billion (up by 2.9 billion). ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 iinder the tieading of expected resources, revenues from direct taxes will in- creuse by 1.3 billion and r~ceipts from indirect taxes by 0.9 billion. Under expenditures, economic operati~ns account for 1 billion and credits for equip- ment for 0.4 billion. Energy and Mines Energy=-The amount of electricity generated increased by 3.2 percent in 1980; = the Shaba industrial region greatly increased its cons~mnption of high voltage electricity. The Inga II hydroelectric plant is scheduled to carry out trial tests in January 1982 with actual operations due to start in July 1982. Two - Belgian groups (for civi]. engineering and for the power plant) have been en- ~ trusted with the building of the Mobaye Dam on the Oubangui River, at the border with the Central African Republic, and this project will take 4 years to complete,. In the development snhere, the creation of the Inga free industrial zone ~ should attract renewed interest on the part of foreign investors; the ordinance-law of 2 April 1981 granted various tax advantages and a guarantee of transfer to enterprises set in that zone. Compared to 1979, petroleum production declined, ~;~.th 6.7 million barrels pumped in 1980 (down by 12.58 percent). During th: first 6 months of 1981, 3.4 million barrels were piunped. Only 14.5 percent of the crude extracted was delivered to the Zairian-Italian Re~ining Company (SOZIR, a joint com- pany) which had to import the rest of the crude it required and which produced 405,600 tons of refined products in 1980 while operating at only 54 percent of its capacity. In addition to it~ exploitation of and search for hydrocarbons in the coastal zone, toward the end of 1980 the Zaire-Amoco-Shell partnership began a series of drilling operations in the asphalt sand beds in the region of Mavuma. Mining Output--The country's chief mining operations, concentrated in the South Shaba region, underwent a marked recovery in 1980 and during the first half of 1981. Copper production was estimated to be 495,000 tons for 1981 (compared to 462,200 tons in 1980). In 1980, GECAMINES [General Quarries and Mines Company) extracted 425,700 tons and in 19E1 it is approaching its full produc- tion capacity of 470,000 tons. But low market prices and ttie ensuing lack of fundti liave forced GECAMINES to postpone plans to inerease its copper production by 100,000 tons and upgrade its metal concentration and refining plants. Cobalt production amounted to 14,500 tons in 1980 (a 3.2 percent increase) and to 7,500 tons during the first 6 months of 1981. Zinc production remained at - ttie 43,800-ton level and pewter production continued to drop. Production of concentrated manganese ore was not resumed because the Dilolo-Lobito railroad line, which is the only cost effective route over which to haul the output, remains closed. In Eastern Kasai, there was a decline in the mining of industrial diamonds which dropped to 8 million carats. In 1981, barely 6 million will be mined. In 1980, 1,834 kg of gold were mined, a 19.8 percent decline. ~ 31 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 l'VL\ V1l1~lI"1L V?L V~\L~� ~ Total earnings from mining exports amounted to 5.3 billion zaires in 1980 (compared to 3.1 billion in 197~8); the higher figure is partly due to the de- valuations of the national currency. G$CAMINES (a state company) and the Industrial Development and Mining Company - of Zaire (SODIMIZA, in which the state holds a 20 percent interest) are the two big mining companies operating in the South Shaba region. In the Kivu re- gion, the Mining and Industrial Company of Kivu (SOMINKI, a joint company), which extracted 2,600 tons of cassiterite in 1980, has discovered a gold deposit in the southern zone but big investments are required to mine it. . The existence of an important deposit of pyrochlorite has been established in North Kivu. Lake Kivu is estimated to contain 50 billion tons of exploitable reserves of methane ga~s. A study conducted by a German firm in 1980 sets out methods to extract, treat and transform this gas into products which can be utilized by countries which are members of the Economic Co~nunity of the Countries of the Great Lake, by directly burning the gas, by transforming it into methanol or by making fertilizers. The International Finance Corporation is expected to provide financing.to diamondiferous mine rocks and alluvial deposits in Eastern Kasai ($80 million). In Western Kasai, there are iron ore deposits in the Luebo region. The Lower Zaire region contains bauxite deposits with estimated reserves of 65 million tons with an average aluminum content of 35 percent, but for the time being tliese deposits do not seem to be profitable to mine. Agricultural Production Agriculture has a low priority in the 1981-1983 investment prograzn because the head of state has decided to get that sector back into private ownership in order to boost production. I'ood production remains inadequate and some 120,000 tons of corn and 141,000 tons of wheat will have to be imported in 1981. The cof~ee crop remains at F(1,000 tons. Ti~e output of palm oil has continued to decline because palm groves are too old; in 1980, it amounted to 93,200 tons (down by 5.5 percent). ihe same problem is facing a gradually declining rubber production amounting . to 19,500 tons (down by 5.7 percent). On the other hand, cotton crops have improved, yielding 29,200 tons of cottonseed in 1980 (up by 55.5 percent). Cfforts have been made to increase the soya harvest and at the beginning of 1982 cash crops to produce tomato ~uice will be started on an expeximental. hasis. ]:n ,lanuary 1981, the International Development Corporation and the Central l~und for Economic Cooperation agreed to finance a project to rehab~,litate and expand sugarcane plantations in Lawer Zaire (487,300 tons of cane i:n 1980): Two sugar companies produced 64,500 tons of sugar in 1980 (up by 24.9 percent~. Tobacco growing continues to increase given the short supplies o$ imported - tobacco; the crop for 1981 will amount to approximately 2,600 tons (an 80 percent increase). 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 i FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY I ~ ~ Tt~e tiarvest of hard fibers (mostly punga) was brought up to 900 tons in 1980; that fiber is used locally. ~ Industrial Production i For several years, the activity of the manufacturing industries had been ~ hampered by the shortage and irregularity of supplies and obsolete equipment. ~ At the end of the first half of 1981, a quota of $50 million was allocated to the manufacturing sector for supplies. Also, prices were decontrolled but the i profit margins allowed were lcept under control. ~ ~ In the food industry, 132,900 tons of wheat flour were milled in 1980 (an in- crease of 3.8 percent) and 57,900 tons during the first 6 months of 1981 from , grain imported from the United States. Production of cornmeal from corn im- ported mostly from southern Africa amounted to 180,800 tons in 1980 (down by , 2.7 percent) and to 96,000 tons for the first 6 months of 1981. The amount of beer brewed dropp~~d by 5.1 percent to 2.6 million hectoliters. The pro- ; duction of carbonated beverages is increasing and 600,000 hectoliters were produced in 1980. The cigarette industry produced 2.7 billion cig~rettes in , 1980 (a S.1 percent drop) but increased its output in the earlier months ~f 1981. The cotton textile industry registered an increase of 8.1 percent in 1980, ; producing 60.8 million square meters of cloth. That cloth, woven from local , cotton fibers, was used to make 28.2 million square meters of printed fabrics. P'or 1981, the textile industry required 21,300 tons of cotton. The Kinshasa ' Textile Cotton Factory (UTEXCO), which is the biggest textile enterprise in the country, is operating at only 55 percent capacity; the same applies to - the rest of the textile spinning, weaving ~nd piLnting mills. ; The synthetic textile industry is also working below full capacity as a result of short supplies of imported yarn. In 1980, the manufacture of synthetic fabrics registered a 17.2 percent drop. The same problems have affected the footwear industry. In 1980, Bata-Zaire, the main manufacturer, operated at only 24.8 percent of its capacity and during the first semester of 1981 that level dropped even further to 21 per- cent (2.5 million pairs of shoes were made in 1980). , [22 Jan 82 p 207] [Text] Since 44 percent of the country is covered with forests and these forests represent 47 percent of all the thick forests of tropical A~rica, Zaire's second most important resource after copper is.timber. The felled timber is used mainly to make veneer by SIFORZAL [expansion unknown], a subsidiary of the DANZER [expansion unknown] group which exported 8.6 million square meters in 1980 (compared to 6.1 million in 1979). Production contin- ~ ued to climb during the first 3 months of 1981 when 2.8 million square meters wcre exported. The management of the state-owned Forestry and Commercial Company (FORESCOM) has been entrusted to cooperating Canadians as part of a loan agreement which will make it possible to replace the equipment and to resume exploitation. 33 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540050028-1 r~vn vrri~.wi. VJG V1rL1 1 Several enterprises are manufacturing light packaging from recycled paper and cardboard boxes. In 1980, Goodyear-Zaire produced 2,600 tons of tires for light and heavy vehicles (down by 18 percent). In 1980, some 2,600 tons of margarine and fats and 3,900 tons of cooking oil were produced, mostly by the Margarine, Soap and Cos~metics Company of Zaire (MARSAVCO) which~is currently expanding its production capacity. One of two sugar mills also produces alcohol (2,750 hectoliters). The Zairian Match Factory (MAZAL), owned by the SIFA [expansion unknown] group, made 100,700 cartons, each containing 1,500 boxes of matches, in 1980 (down by 8.7 percent); production went up in the first quarter of 1981. - Plants manufacturing plastic packaging which are entirely dependent on imported supplies had to stop production many times and their output was only 46 per- cent of the 1972 production. The completion of repair work on the furnace of the Kinshasa Bottle Manufactur- ing Company (BOUKIN) in February 1981 will make it possible to boost production (15.4 million bottles were made in 1980). The Steel Manufacturing Company (SISIDER) plant has been operating at less than 10 percent of its capacity since it was built in 1972 due to a shortage of supplies. A project is under study to build a copper refinery in Malaku using cathodes from GECAMINES. In the metal manufacture branch, the CHANIMETAL [expansion unknown] complex in Kinshasa consists of a naval shipyard (river material), a foundry and different kinds of inetal manufacturing works; it did 90 million zaires worth of business in 1980. Several enterprises are manufacturing, among other tliings, sheet metal, f rames, pipes, farming tools, metal furniture, household utensils and metal containers for the local market. - The manufacture of bicycles registered another big drop in 1980 (9,800 units compared to 16,100 in 1979) due to l.ack of supplies. During the past 3 years, nl:~nts where veilicles :~re assembled and mounted have operated at a very re- ciuced rate: 121 cars, 300 pickups and 230 trucks in 1980. Three subsidiaries ~L- worldwide automotive companies (General Moto~s, Fiat and riagirus) are established in Zaire. A local branch of a U.S. company producing electric batteries needs to be protected against imports of similar goods. in the sphere of construction materials, five cement plants produced 402,000 tons of cement in 1980 (down 3.1 percent). There was a recovery during the - first semester of 1981 (a 20.9 per~ent increase), mostly the result of exports, - since ttie domestic market remains depressed. The overall production capacity of these five plants is 1 million tons a year with the Zaire Cement Company (CIZA), located in Lukala, able to produce 550,000 tons. Starting in the second half of 1982, tiles and marble slabs to cover walls will be exported to the Congo and to Cameroon, and granite to the United States. 34 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Transportation and Counnunications In 1980, the volume of traffic for the big rail and river transportation net- works went up by 6.6 percent over 1979 but transportation of the mining output of GECAMINES accounted for most of this increase. The upward trend continu~d in 1981 and, in August, more than 20,000 tons of copper had accumulated in the transit river port of Ilebo. The question of building a national railroad system, without abrupt changes in fees charged, is becoming a priority. The Zairian National Railroad Company (SNCZ), a state-owned company, op~rates three different networks with a total of 4,752 km of track of different width. Zaire's National Transportation Office (ONATRA) operates 502 km of railroad lines, 12,174 km of river transportation services, the ports of Matadi, Boma and Banana and river ports on the Zaire and Kasai and their tributaries. Eig investments a.re required to repair and standardize the railroad tracks, to electrify the railroad, to replace the engines and rolling stock and increase their volume, to improve the river ports and modernize the river fleet. In addition to the national airline Air Zaire, many small companies operate domestic air routes. In 1980, the vol~ne of Air-Zaire traffic increased by 2.5 percent compared to 1979. The year 1980 and the first half of 1981 were, for the Zairian economy, the lowest point in a period of gradual deterioration. As a condition for the rescue aid granted by the IMF and for the rescheduling of the debt arrears over a 9-year period, the Zazrian Government has had to make a commitment to follow a strict financial discipline, to boost the manufacturing sector by assigning to it quotas of foreign exchange to purchase vital supplies of raw materials and spare parts and, in the domestic sphere, to correct its manage- ment defects. So far, the effects of the Mobutu recovery plan are hardly noticeable. A study of the overall economic situation in Zaire at the end of 1982 will make _ it possib le to judge the determir~ation, tenacity and austerity of the present government team. A permanent increase in copper prices would greatly help. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 8796 c:SU: 4719/562 END 35 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050028-1