JPRS ID: 10464 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 40
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2Q071Q2/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R0005Q0050040-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L! 10464
16 April 1982
N / �
ear East North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 16/82)
~
FB~$ FOREIGN ~ROADCA~T IN~ORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504050040-7
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
- transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
- sources are t:anslated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are suppliQd by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or f.ollowing the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as ~ppropriate in context.
Other unattribu~:ed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the soucce. Times within items are as
giver. by source.
~ The contents uf this publication in no way represent the poli-
c ies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNIN~ OWNERSHIP OF
MAT.ERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/10464
16 April 1982
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
cFOUO ld~'g2~
CONTENTS
IN'1TR-ARAB AFFAIKS
French Agricultural Exports to Region Detailed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 19-25 Mar 82) 1
MOROC ;0
Hbtiamed E1-Basri Looks To Unity of Maghreb, All Arabs
(Mohamed E1-Basri Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE,
15-28 Ma.r 82) 3
~
1
_ ' a - [IJI - NE & A - 121 FOUOJ
~fOD /1CCT('i ~ T T iCC llAii V
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
_ FRENCH AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO REGION TIETAILED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 266, 19-25 Mar 82 p 57
('r~Xr.) The latest foreign trade statistics on France and the Arab world in
tli~~ area of fnod exports reveal that Saudi AraUia imported the largest amount
of French meat last year and that Sudan, the land of sugar, today impor*_s
- I~ r~~ncl~ sugar!
, Lde have chosen tlie five f_ollowing categories of French food exports: grain,
meat, dairy products, grain products (pasta and others), and sugar, to show
that last year French exports of these products rE~ached almost Fr 10 billion
(Fr 9,924,100,100). This is an enormous figure i:z view of the fact that the
_ Arab countries ~re preponderantly agricultural and not industrial. What
makes it eve-~ larger is that it represents Arab imports from one country,
= France. It is true that France has the largest share of Arab food imports,
- but even so, it is still one of a group of 30 major agricultural countries
which export products to the Arab world.
Morocco imparted the highest percentage of grain (almost Fr 1.5 hillior.),
Saudi Arabia imT~orted Fr 680 million worth of ineat, Egypt imported the larg-
est amount of grain products (pasta and ~thers) worth over Fr 1.29 billion,
and ~tidan imported over F;- 1 million worth of sugar.
~io~t Important rrench Agricultural Exports to the Arab World in 1981
(in millions of francs)
- Dairy Grain products
Country Grain Meat ~products (pasta, others) Su ar
I,cL~inon 31.8 16.3 131.5 24.5 4~..5
' Ir.:iq 82.3 157.9 384.2 4.5 249.5
.Iordan 44.0 1.3 43.8 10.7 42.2
Saudi Arabia 740.8 680.6 155.0 42.0 177.6
Kuwait 120.6 30.2 7.6 48.0
Bahrain 8.5 3.5 2.0 37.3
Qatar 12.0 3.2 1.0 14.0
Ut1~ 5.2 98.5 21.3 6.2 82.5
Oman . 6 3. 4 2. 6 10 . 4
North Yemen 2.6 245.8 65.2 4.2 77.7
South Yemen 28.9 18.0 0.3 19.4 1.7
1 ~continued]
FOR aFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
[Table continued]
Dairy Grain products
Country Grain Meat products (pa~ta, others) Sugar
Morocco 1,496.4 15.4 61.1 39.6 43.7
Algeria 301.5 63.6 ~47.2 14.8
Tuni.sia 320.0 41.6 142.0 19.8 191.7
- Libya 23.6 39.7 78.7 17.0 1.1
Djil~outi 0.7 11.4 15.9 11.7 15.0
Syria 20.0 10.5 80.9 81.8 154.2
Mauritania 18.8 0.9 25.8 33.0 20.0
Sudan 0.5 5.1 4.6 111.8
Egypt 60.5 90.0 298.6 1,290.6 215.2
Somllia 19.5 5.2 ~.8 9.2
Total 3,196.6 1,639.7 1,902.1 1,641.4 1,544.3
COPI'RIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
CSU: 4404/389
- 2
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
~ MOROCCO
MOHAMED EL-BASRI LOOKS TO UNITY OF MAGHREB, ALL ARAB:,
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 261, 15-28 Mar 82
[Interview with Mohamed E1-Basri by Simon Malley; date and place not given]
[Text] He is called e1 fquih l: the teacher, the wise man. And it is true.
He says that the time of "historic leaderships" is past, which is probab,ly
completely accurate. But at the same time, it is difficult not to consider
Mohamed el-Basri as one of the last representatives of that prestigious race
of inen whose history, positions and defense of the principles, rights and
di~nities of nations and men have marked the histo.:y of the Arab world, parti-
cularly the Maghreb. He says that he is but an "anonymous soldier" of the
cause of national liberation and yet, is it possib.le not to see in him one of
the most enlightened conscience~ of the Arab world today?
~
- An ardent Moroccan, unrepentant Maghrebian, resolute Arab, earnest African and
perspicacious Third Worldist, he lays claim to and assumes that multiple con-
- science as a unique, integrated fact, just as nowadays, the major question of
national liberation is one and indivisible.
~ Tliirty years of militancy and struggle and yet, Mohamed eJ�-Basri has never
granted any interviews. The only picture of him in the archives of newspapers
~i~ld news agencies is one in which he is seen on the stand, confoundin~ the
king's prosecutor, who in March 1964 accused him of conspiracy against the
internal security of the,regime, for the mere "crime" of having opposed the
arbitrariness of a despotic regime and its repression of pub]ic freedoms, its
policy of torture.
Ti~en why break a 30-year silence? Why would the founder, organizer and head of
the Moroccan army of liberation, who took up arms against the French colonizer
and contributed decisively to his country's independence, now believe that the
Corms of struggle must no longer be what they have been so far?
1 Mor.e precisely, in the domain of Islamic theology. However, concerning
Mot~nmed el-Basri, this label refers to no religious function. It expresses the
r.espect of all who know him f or his moral and intellectual integrity, his poli-
ti.ceal courage, the straightness of Yiis thought, the simp~icity and warmth of
fiis personality, his erudition and many other qualities worthy of admiration
and cited as an example.
- ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
"Because," he says, "these are extremely grave times. Because King Hassan II
has sold out the country. Because the reconquest of Morocco American this
time has begun. Because every citizen, every group, every party must now
set forth before histor5~ its attitude in the face of this recolonization. And
finally, because the myth of the "democratic opening" has died do~-n.and it ia
now clear that to free Morocco from America means to free Morocco from those
who brought America in."
E1 Fquih Mohamed el-Basri chose AFRIQUE-ASIE for this exclusive interview.
During the meeting he granted Simon Ma.lley a meeting of exceptional length
but of real intensity which we have decided to publish as a separate section so
that it may be removed and kept as an instrument of reference for the Arab
world and particularly the Maghreb ~,l Basri exposes and tries to unravel
the intricacies of the many different bonds that either block or promote the
liberation impulses of the peoples in the region. He does it simply, without
any pretentiousness, but with that moving certainty bestowed by yeaxs and
years of struggle, prison, living underground and in exile.
Let ~is listen to him.
[Question] Imperialism never ceases entering into relations and agreements
with a number of nations in the Arab world, from the Maghreb to the Middle East.
In your opinion, how can progressive Arab forces view their �response?
[Answer] First of all, the Arab National Liberation Movement must emerge from
the impasse in which it is in. Naturally, that impasse has several causes,
but in my opinion, the cause of causes, the major cause, is, for Arabs today,
tfie c~ne that springs from the domain of culture, culture in the'broad, mu~ti-
dimensional sense, closer to the civilizational destiny of the Arab people
than to the mere dissemination of food for the mind. For it has now become
essentiai, ir~ order to move in th.~ right direction of things and history, to
have a clear v~sion of the world or worlds.
Let me explain: By culture, I mean the possession and appropriation of all
thosF.~ objective and subjective element-s apt to create a dynamic, to play a
r.~~l~~ as a catalyst in Che .coming to awareness of the masses. In my opinion,
~hac is what that very intense effort of reflection and interrogation -
:~lioul.d give rise to rigor and coherence, without which there is no salvation.
It i~ coherence, as we well know, which leads to a clear awareness and vision
tliings. It also orders phases, defines needs, initiates cadres and trains ~
nu~n in ~lie strict deployment, well-known to everyone, of a true strategy.
~iid l_ believe that there is not, in what I say, any unbridled, metaphysical
~~~iii-Arabism. There are only the hard lessons of immediate history,.for it is
r.o~ally useless at the present time to envisage any patriotic counterstroke
in the Gulf, f or example, when the other flanks, especially in the Maghreb,
:ire c:.ither unguarded or already underminEd by the neocolonialist malady. An
cE[ective response in Morocco requires resolute, determined, positive support
Erom rhe other Arab parties for the effort being developed locally by the
democratic forces in Morocco. Otherwise, what would we see? A clearly ex-
_ pressed desire for hegemony. It crisscrosses the world. It is integrated.
It has its center and its satellites.
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
' � .
Let us take a satellite country su~h as Morocco. Hassan II has undertaken to
do more and to go further than Anerica's traditional allies in the ~ulf, su~h
~ as Saudi Arabia. He has clearly set the country up as an experimental field,
~ a laboratory,,in the matter of the reactivation of American,bases in Morocco.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia and certain Gulf.eountries have refused to ,
accommodate anal9gous bases out oi~fear of zep~rcussions of different sorts.
' But that refusal is in no way f inal.. The emirs governing those countries are
actually awaiting the results of the Moroccan experiment. And there can be no
shadow of a doubt that they wil~ in turn come over, at the proper time, at the
: time chosen.~ That choice is exelusively the work of the center right, whieh,
_ by means of its ineessant emissaries, w~.].1 have woven the plot. Quite.often,
moreover, this happens in broad daylight. Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein-
berger, on his visits to the two ends of the Arab world., quite literally has
his colleague from the State Department, Alexander Haig, breathing down 'his
" neck. Haig tries to give the image of diplomatic respectability to undertak-
ings whose harmful effects on the ~entire region will soon be seen.
We must also use our memories here, especially recalling the role of inter-
_ mediary already played by Hassan II in introducing Henry Kxssinger to the re-
gion. The result of this famous shuttle diplomacy has been the near conflagra-
tion of the region, exacerbation of the conflict.between Syria and Iraq, the
confiict between Algeria and Mor.occo, the confliet between the different mem-
bers of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and so on. However, quite
obviously, this is~not a matter vf fate either. The means to respond do exist.
' Correctly used, they could be form~.dably effective. Our absolute weapon is
our peoples. Without their irruption into the life of the country, without
their participation in decisions, nothing could be done. As you can see, we
_ are already quite far from the time of "historic lead~rships" which acted
alone, in the name of the people, in the fight tc counter ~nperialist plans.
For its part, the spontaneity of the people is incapable of turning the ratio
of forces in its favor. Narrow nationalism, not to say chauvinism, also proves
that in the final analysis, it~ essential'function was to facilitate the hege-
monic task of imperialism and neocolonialism. What then is to be done? First
of all, we must make the masses aware of the exact role of the leaders who
. betray them. Here, the betrayal is not an end in itself; it does not only
- benefit the native guilty of it. Rather, it is above all the means by which
- one enchains the entire country. As a corollary to this statement, we must
ensure that the vision of the gover~ment, its forms and attributes, changes and
evolves among the masses. "The sovereign people" is~not a slogan. That must
become the absolute, sole source for designing the articulations of power of
an authentic national .leadership. ~
T}~ere, I think I have answered your question. If I have avoided personalizing
situations,.it is in no ti~ay out of a f ear of hurting anyone's f eelings. I
quite simply took advantage of an opportun~.ty.to say what I believe constitutes
the new aspects of a truly legitimate, advanced;movement or government�in the
- countries of our region. .
- [Question] What are your fixst reactions to the announcement of negotiations
between Rabat arid Washington on the reactivation of the old American bases in
Morocco?
5
FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540050040-7
[Answer] Actually, it is not a new question. Even.before independence, wj.thin
the framework of the national movement, we eon~idered that the presence of
American bases on our soilr a presence then "legalized" by Freneh-American
agreements, actually constitu~ed a violation of our na~ional soverelgnty and
a typically colonial intrusion in our coun~ry on:the part of these two powers.
Consequently, fighting that presence was a national duty. TMat is why, once
independence had been acquired and in order to,complete the nafiional libera-
~tion, the withdrawal of American torces was.considered as a prime neeessity.
What is more, President Eisenhower's visit in 1960 was for the purpo~e, among
others, and the fact is weli-known, of signing ai.i agreement for the evacuation
of those bases. ~hat is why we then thought thrst a~ phase in sovereignty was
coming to a close when, the last of .the foreign,forces on our soil, the Ameri- ~
can units left the base.s of Bengrir, Nouasser, Bouknadel, Sidi Slimane and.the
Kenitra naval base, which was actually not completely evaeuated until 1976.
You have given me an opportunity here to recall that the withdrawal of all
foreign forces and the consolidation of national sovereignty aiways constituted
the backbone of the country's policy at the time, a policy included in the pro-
grams of the government and political parties as well. As you will recall,
King Mohamed V and~the government of Abdallah Ibrahim w~re in perfect agreemPnt
on this matter and together, had signed accords with~the United States along
these lines.
Remember this also: We are in the early 1960's. The great colonial empires
began to dwindle. France and Great Britain were withdrawing and the American
adcninistration Secretary of State Foster Du11es, to be more precise
thought the time had come to occupy the ground lost by the Europeans~. Dulles'
idea was that the Arab world had not yet come of age. Unfortunately, one has
to admit that some leaders shared the idea. I would mention Nouri Said,
Fai.sal II, Emir Abdel~Ilah and King Abdallah, all of whom thought that_ foreign
protection was necessary.. This collaboration, not.to say betrayal, would be ~
paid for with their lives. This fatal destiny would in a way ahift the pole
of interest of the Americans and it was in Israel and the Shah's Iran that
- America would seek the powerful bastions.destined to maintain its presence in
- the region.
Tl~~ results of ttiat policy are now obvious. The Shah was swept away and the
5trategic accord with Israel is both an admission of impotence and proof that
_ tlie peoples of tlie regions resolutely reject the pTans. This clearly amounts
to saying that here also, history has relentlessly ruled. It was precisely
hc~c,itise lie failed to recogni~ze this judgment of liistory that Sad~at~ met his fate.
~nd toctay, what could one expect of that same policy which, in order to cut
~off and encircle the Arab world, uses that same Israel and a newcomer, Morocco?
Lfndoubtedly, the same fate. .
That seems to me to answer the political aspect and historical experience
part of your question. With respect to the physical or technical aspect, the
United States' need for those bases in no way seems to me to be absolute; far
from it. We are in the age of intercontinental missiles and spy satellites .
capable of detecting anything that moves in regions of interest. In my opinion,
therefore, that presence has no true military ~ustification.
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R040500050040-7
! What remains? The defense of "freedom"? Let us note in this case that the
operation comes at a time when the situation is terrible for the regime. -
On the domestic scene, the regime cannot even claim the legitimacy of the
democratic institutions. There are no institutions. The announcemEnt of the
establishment of the bases was preceded and is accompanied by a vast wave of
repression that has not even spared the representatives of the political par-
ties tolerated by the re.gime itseif, We therefore see that even according to
the American canons of the "defense of freedoms," Morocco is wide of the mark.
- And that America is in a very poor position to justify, as in Poland or else-
= wllere, that it is there to defend the right of peoples. It is impossible for
a reasonable mind to consider that official Morocco is distinguished by its
legalit}~. Even i.mportant persons whom the throne considered as representa-
tives of Moroccan political opinion are now rotting in prison.l We are almost
in a state of emergency and furthermore, that is how the international organ-
izations for the def ense of human rights, in the West and elsewhere, view the
situation in Morocco. Actually, the American presence responds to motives of
Moroccan domestic policy and regional considerations.
The argument of domestic policy is that the regime needs an agreement of this
nature to protect it from its own instruments of power and ensure its survival.
The American presence would then be explained as an internal security operation
making the support of foreign experts necessary. 7f this should be the case,
and I think it is, this means that the regime is nct sure of itself, that it
tias lost all support of the people or even of the administration and that more
tllan ever, it fears and dreads any popular initiative. Does this not remind
you of the f inal days of Sadat, fleeing everyone and entrusting his own sz:ety
to foreign experts?
But it was illusory: No expert, no arrangement, even the most sophisticated,
cou.ld protect a man or regime from the anger of an entire people. It is illu-
_ sory and contradictory as well: One cannot sell off the rights of the nation.
One cannot mortgage the entire country when makes the recovery.of provinces
one's main warhorse.
On another level, it is said that the purpose of the American presence in
Morocco is to counterbalance Soviet influence in Libya. Fine! But what
interest does Morocco have in restoring a balance at the cost of its sover-
eignty? Does the sovereign policy of a country not f irst of all consist in
defending itself, its own territory, its dignity? There is deFinitely some-
thing bizarre about the kingdom of Hassan II. Obstinately refusing to heed the
lessons of history, agreeing to do for America what even the Allied governments
in West Europe can no.longer do out of fear of public opinion, physically
turning over the country after throwing thousands of patriots into prison and
murclering over 1,500 others: This is to throw at an entire people the insult
oE not knowing w.here its national interest lies. This is no longer political
blindness. It is a crime, a betrayal.
1 Three of them; including the secretary general of the USFP [Socialist Union
of Popular Forces], Abderrahim Bouabid, were freed on 27 February.
7
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
i~or its part and considering its own experience in the Arab region, America
sliould know that the defense of its interests is aiways flawed when it bases
that defense on local potentates, agents and traitors. For my part, I remain
absolutely convinced of this certainty: The peoples of the Maghreb are and
will always be vigilant and they will foil all maneuvers, all neocolonial plots
foL~nd along the path leading them to edification, brotherhood, peace and unity.
[Question] Do you believe that the Moroccan people, de~pite the repression
perpetra~ed on them by a regime not of the p.eople, have the means to fight this
new American domination?
~ [Answer] Let us observe, first of all, that this operation (the bases), took
place at a particularly bloody time of the repressive phase. Reaction to the
- repress'ion cannot come at one blow and alZ at the same time.. It will be slow
in being articulated, but what is sure is that the people will never pardon
the attempt on their.dignit.y and their sovereignty. Whence the difference
between an individual reaction and a collective reaction, which obeys much more
complex laws. But there can tie no doubt on this subject: The reaction of the
people is unavoidable and will occur when the conditions exist. The examples
are legion. Look at the Shah's Iran. Elsewhere, they have groped around for
philosophical "explanations" for a suicidal approach. I mean Sadat, his ob-
stinacy and the obstinacy of those who used practices in keeping with the,
shall we say, Pharaonic specificities of Egypt.
But let us get back to my country. The history of our people in this area is
well-known. For me, it is a simple question of time. I am deeply convinced
that the Moroccan people will know how to regain their sovereignty and indepen-
_ dence from neocolonialism and its agents, just a:; it will achieve its territor-
ial and popular unity.
[Question] You just mentioned the consequences of the new American policy
for Algeria and Libya. What are they?
[Answer] My hope is that the Saharan affair has not, in the eyes of the
leaders of those two countries, conce~led the crux of the problem. I repeat
tl~1t the heart of the m~~tter is that for America, it is a matter of protecting
rE~himc~ ~_otally incapable of guaranteeing its existence and sovereignty.
_ ~ctually, as for the loss of its sovereignty, the Moroccan regime is rather
willing. It remains to be hoped that neither Algeria nor Libya will make the
~~x~~ected faux pas consisting of also securing outside protection.
Wit~li respect to the Saharan question, for the Rabat regime, the matter is de-
c~icled: paralyze national energies, mobilize domestie, regional and world
c~pinion around the question, cut off any possible dissent by. giving primacy to
the slogan "No voice louder than the voice of battle," and all for a precise
purp~se: remair~ing in power. But it is true that, in order to remain in
power, the regime in Rabat may go as far as the destabilization of all the
11raU Maghreb.
You know that one infallible way of judging the pat~'iotism of a team of leaders
consists of ineasuring its degree of independence from foreign countries and its
8
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
, ~
~ attachment to achieving the people's will. Our opinion has always been that
one must guard against undertaking anything'in one's country that might
streng~then or give rise to foreign control over the eountry or region. In the
' Maghreb, the future is for unity, unity of the.peoples serving their interests
and aspirations. But the greatest obstacle~to the achievement of that goal.
has always~ been the Moroccan regime itself, which appears to be structurally
' and fundamen~ally different from, even~the.opposite of, the other regimes in
the region. But this is not a matter of destiny. In my opinion, Algeria's
; role is very important here. Algeria must give ~he best example. It must
constitute the rear base and the natural depths of the Moroccan people until
they free themselves from neocolonial dominat~on~and the hol~' of its agents.
The Moroccan people will then in turn be able to make their decisive eontribu~
tion to the building of unity.
[Question] Ronald Reagan's new policy is obviously marked by a will to counter
' Soviet influence everywhere in the world, mainly in North Africa~and Black
Africa. That could well lead to the war, the possibility of which you seem to
discard.
' [Answer] I believe that Algeria will always maintain its independence. . A1-
geria is not the USSR. Moreover, we have noted that even when it is a matter
of countries with a stated ideological choice, as in the case of Cuba, the
attitude of the two superpowers remains in keeping with rules established by
the f ear of war. That is the price of peaceful coexistence.
i ~
; [Question] Bu~ the Americans are nevertl~eless in Morocco and some believe
~ that there is reason to counterbalance that presence by signing analogous
~ agreements with the USSR or socialist France, for example. What do you think?
i
~ [Question] As I have already said, the real response to this situation is to
~ rely resolutely on the masses. In my opinion, it is a mistake to resort to a
' series of all-points agreements. This would only confirm, both here and there,
~ that we have lost confidence in ourselves, in our people. My belief is that
~ the determination of the Moroccan people to get rid of the bases is real. It
is powerful. It goes against the decision of the king. It will win out in
~ the end. That is why I do not see the purpose of contracting alliances in the
opposite direction.
i
~ [Question] During his recent visit to Paris, the tcing of Morocco tried to con-
i vince France to act as a middleman betwEen him and Algeria. It is also said
! tI1~1t Hassan II would like to meet with President Chadli Bendjedid. How do
i you view all these maneuvers?
i
' [Answer] I believe that there is no true solution to the basic problem except
! in understanding between the Moroccan and Algerian peoples. T believe that
~ colonialism, old and new, has succeeded in its task. Not only has it estab-
, lished artificial borders.that our people did not know before colonization, but
~ it has also succeeded in erecting a psychological wall between our peoples.
; As I have already said, the question of the Sahara could have provided an
; opportunity to overturn all obstacles and eliminate all agents standing in the
; path of.legitimate unity between our two peoples, for unity between Algeria
I
9
; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
~ va\ V~ ~ ~~.~A1i vJL'~ V!\LJ
znd Morocco could truly guarantee the real independence of the M~ghreb, which
' in turn would become a solld rear base for the Arab world as a whole. I be-
lieve that the Arabs of Africa, from the east to the west, from Bab el-Mandeb
to Gibraltar, are a hinge for anything affecting the re~t of Afriea, on the
one hand, and Europe and the Western world, on the other. From Bab el-Mandeb
to Gibraltar, tnE~re ar.e the same imnulses, the same rhytYrm, in short, the same
civilization that has s~ways lived in perfect harmony with the rest of Africa.
That is the reason why I see no purpose to the creation of a new entity that
could only constitute an obstacle to this fluidity in hiszorical r~lations with
countries in the South Sahara. This is very important to take into account,
~ especially when one realizes that imperialism definitely intends to regenerate
itself in Africa and to find there the forces and means needed for its fight
in other parts of the world. Nature commands us to open up and communicate
with Africa through the Sahara, just as it orders us to use the Mediterranean
for our trade.
To get back to.one of the aspects of your question, I believe that in order to
stimulate true cooperation with France, the latter.must 'ue totally freed from
any neocolonialist complex. I think that France and ~urope in generally have
everything to gain as soon as that cooperation becomes truly prof itable for
nations. Consequently, socialist France, Mitterrand's France, must set itself
apart from the intentions of a monarch who acts more like a courtier concerned ~
about his own interests and those of his throne and the real interests of
Morocco and its people. How can one credit Has$an II with knowing the inter=
ests of France and of Algeria when he does not know where his country's inter-
ests lie? Actually, the only prospects that Hassan II and his regime can offer
are those of enslavement and dependency. That serves neither the interests
of the Moroccan people or those of the French people. A socialist France,
once rid of the temptation of neocolonialism, can have a place in the region,
just as it would gain another in the Arab world as a whole if its position
would evolve with~more fa:.rness and justice with regard to the Palestinian
� cause. �
[Question] It has been hinted that Hassan II would like to go to Algiers.
~ What do you think? ~
[Answer] The route leading from Morocco to Algeria goes through Oujda, not
Paris or Brussels. I do not have enough elements to judge the possible Fosi-
tion of the high spheres of the Algerian Government. Nevertheless, given the
long past of common militant life between the Moroccan and Algerian peoples,
it is inconceivable that such a trip could take place, given the fact that
wl~at t[assan would go to Algeria for would be support for remaining on the
throne and means to hold his people in check. That would be perfectly illogi-
cal.
_ (QuestionJ Let us get back to the question of the Sahara. Why do you never
- speak of the Saharan people, who are f ighting with exemplary heroism and who
are demanding that their voice be~heard? If the idea and need to unite the
_ peoples of the region are proper, then in my.opinion, this would in no way
- prevent the Saharan people's xight to self-iietermination from being recognized~.
, 10 ~
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
; ~
[AnswerJ I believe that we have to be frank with ourselves and with the
Sahazan militants: Self-determination with respect to the monarehic regime,
' agreed. That is proper. This is true for the Saharans as well as for all
' Moroccans who have never ceased rising up against monarchic oppression, as
- shown by the years 1965, 1971, 1972 and 1981. The establishment of a Saharan
national entity has come precisely at a tir~e wh~n the entire Arab world is
enduring imperialist attempts at Balkanization and when the people's aspira-
_ tion to unity is the strongest. For my part, I believe that the path of unity
between peoples in the region in order to wipe out the e~isting barders is
proper.
~ Look at the number of flags in the Gulf region alone. Do you believe that
- these are all expressions.truly formulated by the peoples in the region?
Let us take the case of Jordan, to be precise. It has all the attributes of
a nation: a flag, an army, an administration, and so on. But what does
Jordan mean hir,torically speaking? It i~ a geographic anomaly. Its main
function is to be a Uuffer state for Israel, a barrier to the action of the
Palestinian fedayeen and finally, an obstacle to Iraq's rapprochement to the
field of battle. Far be it from me to underestimate the sacrifice or fighting
ability of the Saharan militants, but I wonder: ?s the path they have chosen
the right one? Would it not be better to see that the time has come for a
radical reconsideration of the question, more in k^eping with our common fu-
' ture? In other words, make the Sahara a rear base in order to free Morocco and
an avant-garde army for that l~.beration? Furthermore, would it not be better
to avoid the worst that is, a break and injuries between militants for the
same cause? I believe that all of th~se is possi}~le. And this can spare us
the difficulties of a reunification that I believe to be inevitable in the long
run.
[Question] But the struggle of the ~aharan people has contributed and is still
contributing to a weakening of the monarchic reg~.me. In addition,.why not re-
cognize the former Spanish Sahara as a separate country, like Tunisia, Algeria,
Mauritania and Libya, which would not prevent the formation, along with it,
as with those countries, of an Arab Maghreb? After all, have its representa-
tives not just been admitted to the OAU?
[Answer] The Sahara question has weakened the throne. One can debate it.
= I personally have a tendency to believe that this matter has given the Rabat
regime a new wind. The government would not have survived its internal contra-
dictions or withstood the jolts it experienced in the 1970's if it had not been
f.or the Sahara question. Remember 1973 and 1974. The government was totally
- isolated, from the army as well as from the political parties. Then came this
affair, which was immediately elevated to the rank of a national iss~ie. No
more political or economic problem~. The "Green March" was undertaken; social
peace was.demanded. In short, the k3ng broke out of his isolation. To answer
your question, I believe that the union achieved in the unity of combat is
infinitely easier to obtain than between nations that are already structured.
Look at the union between Egypt and Syria. It was achieved in the people's
gaiety and broken by imperialism and its local agents. Closer to us, in the
Maghreb, remember the f ine fighting unity that existed between our p~oples,
11
FOtt OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7
� Vw V~ ~ ~a.~~~Y VVV VI \V � ~
between the fighting men of the three countries. They began by pulling Tuni-
sia away, then isolated Morocco from Algeria. Today, the results are there
~ for everyone to see.
[Qi~estion] You refer to the d;vorce in the 1970's between King Hassan and the
army. Today, some speak of a lassitude and disarray in the Moroccan Army.
ShoLld one expect a revolt by the army?
[Answer] I can definitely tell you a bout changes in the Moroccan Army. As
for the possibility of an uprising, that is another problem.
Immediately after independence, groups were formed.around former officers who
served in the.French Army. The mission of the corps, which had just taken the
name "Royal Army~" was clear: to protect the throne from the people. In 1959,
the congress of the Union of Moroccan Students, in one of its motions, labeled
the corps as an "aperetta army." I was myself convicted of an attack on the
army and its dignity after publishing the motion in the newspaper EL-TAHRIR,
of which I was the editor. A little later on, in 1965, the army received the
order to put down the Casablanca uprising, in a fr3ghtful bloodbath. Going
- from repression to repression, it became apparent to the army that it was
being made to play a role not it~ own. The army therefore began to be trans-
formed and even to seek means of taking.revenge for having been frequently
forced to fire on their own, a eousin, a relative.... Whence the 1971
_ (Skhirat) and 1972.(the Boeing affair) attacks. From that time on, the army .
became a force of opposition to the regiaie and no longer a faithful protector
of the throne. The king perceived the danger and made ~rastic deeisions:
retirements in the reserve, transfers in the gendarmerie, the sending of
troops to the Golan and Senai. In the meantime, major transformations were
_ taking place.in the armed forces. Former officars from the French Army were
replaced by young cadres~from the peasantry and the middle class and trained
in the milit~ry academies after independence. That is why, when I say that
the Americans returned to protect the throne, I am referring to the protection
of the throne from the people, naturally, but also from the Moroccan Army,
whicY~ has become a national army, solidary wi~h the people from which it~
springs.
[Question] Does this mean that one henceforth has to consider the Moroccan
~rmy as a patriotic force? ~
[Answer] Without a doubt, the M~roccan Army has become a national. army by
virtue of its makeup and structures and it no longer has as its essential
Eunction the protection of the throne and the regime. Consequently, the .
army has become a potential opponent, especially if the.war in the Sahara ~
should come to an end. There now exists an intention of sending that army to
the Gulf countries and other satellite countries of the United States in~order
to ensure the protection of local governments in exchange for petrodollars
For the king's personal purse, just as colonialism once used Moroccan soldiers
to fight in Syria, Spain or Indochina. And in fact, some regiments have al-
- ready arrived in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
In ttiis c,peration, the interest of the two regimes (the one that sends and the
one that receives) is obvious. For the king of Morocco, it is a matter, on the
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050040-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540050040-7
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
j .
~
~ one haad, of dismantling the army and, on the other hand, of derivi.ng a finan-
I cial advantage from it by "renttng" it. This makps it posaible to replace ~
these regiments with American soldiers deemed to be more reliable, especially
! af ter what happened in Egypt (Sadat's assassination). Finally, for the
~ Americans, "reliable" surveillanee of the oil fields has no price. ~
[Question] Throughout your lif e, you have taken a revolutionary path from
which you have never devisted. But. that conduct has isolated you from some of
your camrades, many of whom are now in~prison. When you loolc back, what do you
- f eel?
(Answer] Throughout my life, my con~tant attitude has been to help forge a
strategy of national union cap~ble of transform{ng the political, economic
and social conditions of my country. I have always concentrated my efforts on
the union of national patriotic forces, ba~ed on what I have already said, with
the conviction that the future belongs to those who now march with all those
~ who struggle. An avant-garde capable of leading the current struggles is
generally one that will tomorrow have the e~earest vision of the collective
future. Furthermore, only the reality of the struggle makes it possible to
~ bring about the real split a.nd shows in a speetacular manner those who take
the side of the government and ~hose who are with the people.
For myself, I am not convinced that the different.~.~litical structures (the
parties) truly reflect the real political sensibilities of Moroccan society
; today. I would even say that the people here are totally absent, both with
respect to their representation and the objectives whi~h those structures
~ have chosen. The leaders of these parties are oftpn hesitant and do not always
know which side to pick at crucial ti.mes. Even bptter, these vacillations
sometimes push them to the brink of crime, prevenring them from making a
resol~ite choice and in the end,.allowing them on~ly the possibility of
' pleading with the regime for moderation in the pressure put on or repression
' used against the people, whieh also guarantees that its positions and privi-
leges will be safeguarded. These are incorrect positions! The government
has another view of things. It knows that its interests are in violent contra-
diction with those of the people. Consequently, it leaves these elites but one
choice: immobi.lity or cooperation. That is the situation which, through
const