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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY JPRS L/10479 26 April 1982 ~1/est E u ro e Re ort p p ~FOUO 26/82) FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST IN~ORMATIO~I SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500050055-1 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcr ibed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Aeadlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indic~tor is given, the infor- ma tion was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear a.n the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattr ibuted parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publicatton in no way represen~ the poli- c ies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF TH IS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444544454455-1 ~ JPRS L~10479 26 Apr31 1982 WEST EUROPE REPORT (~'OUp 26/82~ ~ CONTENTS TERRORISM ITALY Revelationa by Neo-Fasciat 'Repentant' Terrorist Tisei (Antonio Carlucci; PANORAMA, 1 Mar 82) 1 POLITICAL ITALY ] Liat of Pro-Soviet Personalitiea in PCI (Matteo Spina; PANORAMA, 1 Mar 82) 4 MILITARY FRANCE Radar, Attack Qualities of New Generation Alpha Jet Described (Gerard Collin, Jacques Morisset; AIR ET COSMOS, 13 Mar 82) 8 'Datex 82' Exercise Tests Attack, Defenae, Detection Capacity (Jean de Galard; AIR ET COSMOS, 20 Mar 82) 18 Training, Recruitment, Selection of Helicopter Pilots (ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Mar 82) 25 Training Methods, by Michel Mage New Selection Criteria, by Maurice de Vasselot de Regne Colonel Urges Preparation for Chemical Warfare (Claude Meyer; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Mar ~2) 33 - a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500054455-1 rvK vr r n.ina. v~c. vi~i, t GENERAL FRANCE CNES Plans New Buildings for Satellite Projects (AIR ET COSMOS, 6 Mar 82) 38 NETHFRLANDS Mission, Problems of Security, Intellige:~ce ~prvices (Rudie van Meurs; VRIJ NEDERLAND, 2C Mar 82) 41 ~ - b - FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 TERRORISM ITALY REVELATIONS BY NEO-FASCIST 'REPENTANT' TERRORIST TTSEI Milan PANORAMA in Italian 1 Mar 82 p 49 [Article by Antonio Garluc,:i: "What a Big, ]?umb Black Mole!"] ~ [Te;:t] T~:e repentant Tisei's c~nfessions open a new chapter in the ~^.quiry into the "state massacre."] The latest broad::ide against the carabinieri has been fired. Aldo Tisei, 28, the most impor~tant black terrorist of those who have co~laborated with the magistracy after their arrest, has made serious ::rouble for two colonels, one a major, the other a former captain. For these twomembers of the armed forces his accusations have been so exact that the Roman ~udges have signed warrants of arrest against them. The ma3or, Sergio V~r.chioni, until his � arre~t a liaison off icer with Crimin$lpol, and Sandro Spagnoli, ex-captain and businessman since his discharge, have both ended up behind bars. As for Salvatore Pappa and Luigi Caraco, both lieutenant colonels, the ~udges did no more than issue a 3uuicial communique and cancel their passports. Vecchioni, now conf ined in Fort Boccea, Rome military prison, has had to defend himself against grim charges: having for years favored the members ~f the black ce17. headed by Prof Paolo Signorelli, marked by the ~udges as one of the top leaders of fasciet terrorism. According to Tisei, an iron pact between the fascists and the efficer--for five years commander of the Tivoli company, 30 kilometers from Rom~e--called for information in exhange far his protection. ~ The first contact t~et:.~een Vecchioni and Tiaei occurred in 1975. From information furnished by the black terrorists, the carabir.ieri discoverd the cache of pistols and other weapons captured in an underworld armory. From this initial contact between confidant and po?ice, the aff iliation expanded to other actions. "We turned over to Vecchic^ i the irformation we collected during our investigations into the ]ocal reda, and [i.n return] he guaranteed us adequate protection," Tisei told Judges Alb erto Macchia and Ro~erto Napolitano. This compact was functioning smoothly when t::e caxabinieri officer advised Tisei and Sergio Calore, a fascist accused of murder, to take a change of air for a while: the carabinieri in Tivoli had recieved a firm request from 1 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 rvK ~rr~t_~w~ u~c uiv~Y Rome for data on the black terrorists in the area. But the problem was resolved within a few weeks with a watered-down report. Mi~c:i different in the Sandro Spagnoli story. Tisei maintains that this ex-off icer had always been a militant in the Ordine Nuovo, the extreme rightist group which had gone underground after it was dissolved, although it was responsible for some of the goriest crimes committed by fascist terrorism. To provide better cover, Spagnoli decided to enlist in the carab in ieri. Was he an inf iltrator beyond suspicion? This is a question the judges continued to ponder even when they read the list of black militants commanded by the ex-off icer, who is now accused of armed assault. Just when he was on guard service with his unit at the Celio military hospital, the escape of Nazi criminal Herbert Kappler was being prepared and carried out. These facts involving the carabinieri are the latest in a long series outlined in hundreds of page~ of interrogation. When Aldo Tisei went to prison in the spring of 1981 for extortion against the businessmen ~f Tivoli, the judges investigating black terrorism had no interest in him. But then he let it be known that he had something to say and, within a f ew days, proved to be a goldmine of information. Lest it be thought that he was telling fables, he promptly confessed to having conceived two murders--of Judge Vittorio Occorsio and Adelmo Cipriano, one of whose relat~ves was a weapon collector and target of the neofascists. Then came a roobery in which millions of lire were seized at the Ministry of Labor and various bank holdups. This revelation Tisei f ollowed by reconstructing the history of Ordine Nuovo and other units of the terrorist right. He explained how professor Signorelli became head of the group in 1970, first by maintaining close contacts with the unit's former leaders ~aho had fled abroad (Sal.vatore Francia and Elio Masagrande), then abandoning them to realize his own ideas in organizing the Autonomia Fascista movement on two levels, one clean and public, the other clandestine, ready for "military action" and holdups for self-financing. A position of out~c.anding importance now went to Aldo Tisei, particularly after the arrest of Pierluigi Concutelli, who assassinated Judge Uccorsio in January 1977. Following that event, Tisei. rose to the rank of the band's mi.litary chief in tandem with Sergio Calore. Thus, the repentant was always abreast of. everything that happened; he also gathered information on the black terrorists' past exploits. In fact, he offered the judges a hitherto unpublished witness report on the role played by Stefano Delle Chiaie, re~ognized leader of the Avanguardia Nazionale, at the same time full time confidant for the Ministry of the Interior in Che case of the Piazza Fontana massacre and the complicity of all black terrorist units which helped Franco Freda escape from obligatory confinement in Catanzaro. But ~he repentant did more than clarify details of many episodes which the magistracy had been probing for years. His revelations have been new and h~ghly disturbing. Incredible at f irst was his account of fascist espionage 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY in behalf of the Libyans in exchange for arms, drugs and money. And when Tisei declared that the corpses of two youths killed by mistake could be found in a small artificial lake on the periphery of Rome, the investigators obtained firm confirmation of the secrets he had up his sleeve. Before opening the chapter on the carab inieri, Tisei had told another tale, , one that landed Germano Sangermano, Florentine lawyer and ever a defender of fascist killers, in ~ail. "he was the liaison between our comrades in jail and the organ ization." COPYRIGHT: 1982 Arnaldo Mondadori Editore, S.p.A. Milano 9653 CSO: 3104/158 3 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 POLITICAL ITALY LIST OF PRO-SOVIET PIItSONALITIES IN PCI Milan PANORAMA in Italian 1 Mar 82 pp 35-38 [Article by Matteo Spina: "All Brezhnev's Men"] [Text] This is the list of the personalities who remain faithful to the USSR, and their real political weight. As Vadim Zagladin, CPSU vice deputy of international relations, confided to Adalberto Minucci, member of the PCI secretariat, the Soviets have no intention of abetting or financing a rupture within the Italian conmunist party. And as PANORAMA has been able to ascertain in Moscow, the CPSU only wants to stimu- late the debate, and provoke censure against the present PCI leadership, promote efforts to document and disseminate information on the socialist countries, just as INTERSTAMPA, the review founded by Ambrogio Donini and his feisty septuagenarian comrades, is doing. The Soviets are counting on Armando Cossutta and his numerous friends.all over Italy, in sympathy with the old-time partisans. Hoping for active Italian-USSR exchanges, they rely on the tough elements in the unions, detecting favorable prospects in the South, in the traditionally labor zones of the North, the region of Veneto, and the red cities of Emilia and Tuscany. After taking an extensive poll in many regions of Italy, PANORAMA can now trace a map of the PCI members who do not see "the thrust of the October Revolution" as exhausted by any means. Paolo Robotti--Communist worker of the first generation, brother-in-law of Togliatti, iron-bound Stalinist, even though he was imprisoned and tortured in the USSR during Stalin's regime. In 1980 Roberto Napoleone published his book "Chosen From Life." In his presentation he declared positively that had the PCI summit broken off with Moscow, it would have been swept into oblivion. Roberto Napoleone--Before undertaking INTERSTAI~A, among other publications he - issued the works of the Czechoslovak Husak. Always in difficulties, neverthe- less he disdains charges that the East is financing his current pro~ect. Ambrogio Donini--For the nth time, this octogenarian professor has thrown himself into the pro-Soviet adventure with youthful confidence. After the PCI's protests on the Soviet takeover in Prague in 1968, he organized a 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500050055-1 rvn vrrwana. "conser~vative" pressure group which, it was said, followed a program which had much in common with the Manifesto group. Guido Cappellor.i--Party administrator responsible for the Middle Classes Section and typical apparatchik, he is known to be moderate in internal politices but pro-Soviet in international affairs. Nino Pasi--Former NATO commander, senator of the independent Left, he was among the f irst to spend full time i~ pro-Soviet a~itarions at the PCI base, participating in dozens of assemblies in every part of Italy. He publishes a review STRUGGLE FOR PEACE. Luigi Cioff i Degli Atti--Vicepresident of the Centr~,.l Control Commission, PCI unit endorsed by many old-time leaders, some of them once consigned to the periphery by Togliatti. Shy, unwavering in his loyalty to the party, he is considered more a case of conscience than anything else. Giulio Cerreti--78, collaborator of Sorel, Thorez and Togliatti, from 1932 to 1945 he was a member of the PCF Central Committee. The USSR awarded him the Victory medal. Elected to the Constituent Assembly, he served in four _ parliamentary legislatures. He is on the board of directors of INTERSTAMPA, and contributes to it an anti-Berlinguer column. Giorgio Colorni--Partisan ex-commander and former chief editor of UNITA. He resigned his post as secretary of the Milan Togliatti section because of irreconciliable difference with the party's central committee decisions. Guido Valabraga--50 years old, expresident of the Italian Youth for Zionism, ex-director of the Contemporary Hebrew Documentation Center, for years a collaborator in the Mid~~le East section of RINASCITA, today professor of Near East history at the University of Bologna. He is one of the drafters of a document drawn up by the leaders of the Alliotta section rejecting the party leadership's resolution and the decisions of the central committee. - Alberto Maria Cavallotti--Deputy to the Constituent Assembly, he is an _ adherent of the old guard in every respect. On Sunday, 14 February, in Milan, with Nino Pasti he co-presided at the assembly of the pro-Soviet peace committee. In his speech he declared, "We are much stronger than the 50,000 men recruited in the streets by the Solidarity union." Giovanni Pesce--Gold medal Resistance winner, 64, he headed the Milanese armed partisan group. He was a Togliatti bodyguard, later full time function- ary in the Milanese federation, but abandoned the militia when Cossutta stripped Alberganti of his post as secretary. Today he is president of the City of Milan private vigilance police. His speech before the presidency of the pro-Soviet assembly at Anpi, Milan, was greeted with enthusiastic applause. Serio Ricaldonea--Onetime Alfa Romeo worker and director of FGCI in Milan during the 1950's. Now somewhat estranged from the party, he works for the Milat~ Italia-Vietnam association. Under his sponsorship, numerous telegrams of solidarity were dispatched to Cossutta. 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500450055-1 Antonio Costa, Leonardo Banfi, Alfredo Novarini, Gianfranco Rossinovich, Elio Del Pizzo--After the state of siege was proclaimed in Poland these five Milanese communal councillors abstained from a motion passed at the Palazzo Marino denouncing "Soviet imperialism," signed by the communist group among others. Lauro Casadio--A partisan in his youth, today vice president of the Lombardy region. In Milan he is considered a trusty ally of Cossuta, whom he has followed since 1956, year of the clash between the old Stalinists and the young party innovators led by Cossurra and supported by Amendola. He likes to define himself as an "Amendola-Longhiist." Bruno Cerasi--Former partisan and member of federation units since 1946. He is now sports assessor for the province of Milan. More than a veteran Stalinist, he is classif ied as a"pure-blooded Cossuttaite." Arnaldo Bera--Wholly loyal to Giuseppe Alberganti, ex-member of the secretariat. Decidedly a Stalinist of the old guard, ex-senator, today a member of the INTERSTAMPA board of directors. Alessandro Vaia--73 years old, with an honorable record as commander of the Garibaldi Battalion in Spain. After the war he was vice secretary of the Milan federation in charge of the Office of Cadres. Highly regarded by all in the Milan PCI branch, he is considered the "eminence grise" in its relations with the USSR, the man best f itted to lead the party's most nostalgic current in the shadows. Manlio Pirola--He is one of the worker cadres most esteemed in the party, ex-president of the Pirelli internal committee, former secretary of the Bicoeca Temolo section. When he was abruptly dismissed by Pirelli, he 3oined Cossutta in the Milanese provincial secretariat. Since 1976 he has headed the Milk Center and participated on the Milan PCI federal committee. Amerigo Ciocchiatti--Ex-senator for Varese, 70, he wrote enthusiastic letters to NEW TIMES, the Soviet weekly published in Italian, to endorse the USSR's good motives. Alfio Caponi--City councillor in Perugia, ex-senator, and historical figure in the struggles of the Umbrian share croppers. Bruno Donatelli--56, president of the Narni (Terni) Italia-USSR, with 300 members one of the strongest branches in Italy. Dino Rebbio--Retired, 52, enormously popular secretary of PCI section 39 in Turin. Adelio Albarello--Former deputy, president of Italia-USSR in Verona. He organized an active nucleus of dissidents, deplored by the Veneto PCI as "a thorn in its side." 6 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500450055-1 Salvatore Careri--55, ex-regic~nal deputy, currently secretary of the Palermo Noce section. He told PANORAMA, "I do not think that the USSR has exhausted - its propulsive thrust toward sacialism. Thanks to it, today there are free peoples." Carmelo Lupo--0f Palermo, 39, formerly naval shipyard laborer, now member o: the regional FIOM-CGIL secretariat. To PANORAMEI he declared, "I was a pro- Soviet when I 3oined the party many years ago, and I still consider myself as such." Salvatore Rindone--A native of Catania, PCI deputy, 38, credited with an extremely long series of party jobs on the local, regional and national level. Luigl d'Auria--One of the PCI party founders in the province of Naples, At 75, he is a popular party figure in Campania. COPYRIGHT: 1982 Arnaldo Mondadori Editors, S.p.A. Milano 9652 CSO: 3104/158 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500050055-1 MILITARY FRANCE RADAR, ATTACK QUALITIES OF NEW GENERATION ALPHA JET DESCRIBED Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 13 Mar 82 pp 26-31 [Article by Gerard Collin and 3acques Morisset: "The 'New Generation' Alpha Jet Trainer/Support Plane--a Very Advanced Weapon System, Unparalleled for an Airplane of This Class"] [Text] In about a month, a modified Alpha Jet will fly at Toulouse-Colomiers, specially modified to receive a conduct-of-fire system designed for battlefield attsck, advanced in technology, and presenting operational characteristics far superior to airplanes of its category. This plane's possibilities are such that its promoters do not hesitate to speak of a new-generation Alpha Jet. A1- though is official designation--at least as far as its first cumstomer, Egypt, is concerned--is Alpha Jet MW2,* we have therefore adopted, for the present ar- ticle, the expression New-Generation Alpha Jet Trainer and Attack Plane, or "Alpha Jet NGEA," which corresponds perfectly to the operation carried out by the Dassault specialists~with a view to developing this new fighter. The Alpha Jet was originally, and remains, a tandem two-seater and twin-jet plane, designed for carrying out basic-training missions, advanced-training missions and tactical-support missions. The advances achieved over the train- ers of the preceding generation areconsidered remarkable by the users: its fly- ing qualities are excellent, tailspins can be done without danger, its piloting characteristics are very close to those of the mast modern fighters, and its firing-training or fire-support capacity is considerable, thanks to carrying capacity rarely achieved on an sirplane of this size. Added to this are siz- able internal volume available for mounting supplementary equipment, the high security offered by the twin-jet design, and considerable range due to the com- bination of three factors: very carefully worked-out aerodynamics (reduced drag), large internal fuel capacity, and low fuel consumption by the double- flow Larzac 04 turbojets (developed by SNECMA [National Aircraft Engine Design and Construction Co] and Turbomeca). The Past, the Present... The Alpha Jet program, launched ~y Dassault and Dornier at the request of the French Air Force and the Luftwa�fe, made it possible first of all for these * The MS1 is one of the veraions--of conventional type--presently offered for export. 8 ~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500450055-1 � v~? V� � a~.~f1u vuu V/\L� air forces to modernize their fleet, but with the FRG favoring the fire-support function and France the advanced-training function. Other air forces soon took an interest in the Alpha Jet, and to date, some 10 countries have chosen the Franco-FRG airplane (543 planes). The countries mentxoned so far are Belgium (33 planes), Abu Dhabi (6), Ivory Coast (6), Togo (5), Morocco (24), Nigeria (12), Qatar (6), Egypt (45) and Cameroon (6). More than 330 have been deliv- ered to date, including a little more than 100 to France and 150 to the FRG. To fill these orders, two assembly lines were initially installed in the pro- moting countries, but without duplicating the models made. The maximum output of 13 planes per month was reached last year. ...and the Future This, we are tempted to write, is the past and the present; as for t:~e future, it is marked by the development of the Alpha Jet NGEA, already ordered by Egypt (two)~tiand Cameroon. We note first of all that rational use of modern combat planes such as the Mirage 2000 requires ongoing operational training in conduct of fire. But simulators (which also happen to be very expensive) do not entirely fill this need; whence the necessity of a trainer with advanced equipment, of the same technological level as the reference airplane. Apart from the new-generation Alpha Jet, such a plane does not exist, for a very simple reason: its design requires experience with the combat plane that is possessed only by t?ie builders of airplanes of this type. And Dassault is the only one offering a complete range: the Mirage III, Mirage F1, Mirage 2000, A1- � pha Jet, etc. With its industrial logic thus combined with its experience, Dassault was the builder in the best position to develop a plane such as the Alpha Jet NGEA, with the synergy fully effective and making it possible to de- velop, from the basic airplane, a machinP capable of evolving over time and of being fully valid at the end of this centu~y. As for Egypt, that country will be the first to use a panoply of airplanes as formidable as that which joins the Mira~e 5-E2 witl: the Mirage 2000 and the Al- pha Jet NGEA. Before going on to consideration of the Alpha Jet NGEA's avion- ics and armament, we mention also that the Alpha Jet's airframe and engines will also be capable of evolving. The engine cc~rrently mounted on the assembly line is the Larzac 04C6, characteri~ed by its having an oil accumulator that makes it possible to extend the range of reverse-thrust flight. But SNECMA, Turbomeca, MTU [Motor and Turbine Company~ and KHD [Klockner Humboldt Deutz] are already developing a Larzac 04X that offers in particular the advantage of furnishing, at low altitude and high temperature (ISA [International Standard Atmosphere] + 15 �C), 13-percent more thrust. For a given mass and runway length, the Alpha Jet equipped with ttii, improved Larzac version will be able, for example, to take off at outside temperature some 10 degrees higher. In parallel, it would also be possible to envision an increase in carrying ca- pacity, which is already 2.5 tons for outside loads, with the internal fuel tanks (1,520 kg of fuel) full. * Egypt has ordered 20 MS1's for training and conventional attack, and 15 MS2's for "high-precision" attack. It should be noted that the same country is going to receive some Mirage SE2's, equipped with an ider_tic,31 weapons system. 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500450055-1 The Alpha Jet NGEA Practically since the Mirage IV, Dassault has progressively developed the weap- ons-systems capacities of its combat planes. Since the first analog computers for attack and bombing, the processing of information has been largely digital~ ized. There have been very important developments of the data-pickup devices themselves, especially as regards the kinematic pickups--for altitude, bearing, speed, position. The progress at this level has recently taken the form of adoption of inertial power plants of the 1-nautical-mile-per-hour-or-better class; as regards Dassault, this occurred first with the Super Etendard, but now it is the case also with the Mirage 3, 5 and 50, the Mirage 2000, 4000, etc, and now with the Alpha Jet. By virtue of its weapons system, the Alpha Jet NGEA is a"mini-Mirage 2000," overall, except for the radar. It carries: --a SAGEM ~Company for General Application of Electronics and Mechanics] ULISS- 81 inertial power plant. This power plant is in the "80" series of ULISS's, . already adopted on Super Etendards ("80"), export versions of the Mirage F1, Mirage 5 and Alpha Jet ("81"), and the Indian Jaguars ("82"). In addition to the inertial-power-plant function (bearing, course, speed, position), this power plant also functions as a computer for attack, for management of the Di- gibus multiplexed digital-bus line, for aerodynamic calculations and for elabo- ration of the summary data presented in the heads-up sight; --the Thomson-CSF [General Radio Co] VE-110 haeds-up sight adapted to the Alpha Jet, with its ;ymbol generator; --a Thomsan�C~F TMV-630 laser telemeter; --and therefore a Digibus multiplexed digital-bus connection analogous to that of the Mirage 2000. The rest of the avionics is relatively more conventional: radionavigation, communications, IFF [information friend or foe], radioaltime- ter, weapons-control housing, etc. It should be noted that it has been easy to integrate th~s.~ molern avionics into the Alpha Jet: the space available in the electronic "holds" was sufficient; the electric-power supply was also sufficient; only the 400-VA [volt-ampere] converters (ATEI [Electronic Industrial Techniques Applications Co]) had to be replaced by 1,000-VA converters, also made by ATEI. - "Nav-Attaque" Family of Systems One of the most interesting aspects of the Alpha Jet NGEA is that this airplane fits in with a logic of avionics-systems development which, practically speak- ing, has existed from the Mirage III's to the Mirage 'L000/4000's, with the Mi- rage 5, Super Etendard and Mirage F1 and 50 inbetween, covering many types of weapons: bombs, missiles, cannon, rockets. The family of SNA's (Navigation and Attack Systems) is based essentially on the principal elements consisting of: SAGEM's ULISS family of inertial power 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500050055-1 r~K urr~~iw~ u~~ u~~Y Installation of the Alpha Jet's Inertial Navigation and Attack System TELEME RE LASER COLLIINATEUR BOIiIER DE N.~VIGAflON 11 N CSF TMV 6701 7ETE HAUTE ~ 3~ ~[ENTR LE A~ NER71F ~ 4~ I ITH CSF VE 1101 C(~MPAS f'`. SCCOURS uAGEM UNA 91~ ~ 2 ~SFIM :G 90~ (6) ~OITIER uENcwiiEUR r~ RADIU ALTIMETREl~ , ~ bE SYMBOLES ~j ~ITRT AHV 91~`.1 ._J iTH {SFI ~ INDICATEUR COLLIMATEUR RADIO 1ETE HAUTE~ 3 INDICATEUR INDICATEUR ~ ~ THOMSON CSF SPIIERIQUE DE NAVIGATION ALTIMETRE VE I10 C ~ 9~ ~ ZO ~ (11) (12) AV AR PAN PAN (13 (1 ) ~ fHOM50N� CSF VE I10 C~ 1[l SYSTEME NAV�ATTAQIJE BOITIER GENERA E~a SAGEM ULI55 81 DE SYMBOLES ~ 1 S ~ ~1~ IELEMCTRt t.ASER THOMSON/CSF ~MV 6;i0 ( HAGIO AL I Ih1ETHE ~8~ Above, the installation sites of the essential elements of the Alpha Jet NGEA's avionics. Below, a synoptic diagram of the system. The bold line represents the Digibus multiplexed digital-bus connection. The two "PAN's," fore and aft, are the inertial-power-plant command and visualization stations. Key: 1. Laser telemeter (Thomson-CSF 7. Radioaltimeter indicator TMV-b30) 8. Radioaltimeter 2. Emergency compass (SFIM [Measuring- 9. Spherical indicator Instruments Manufacturing Co] CG-90) 10. Navigation indicator 3. Heads-up collimator (Thomson-CSF 11. Fore VE-110) 12. Aft 4. Navigation and attack housing (SAGEM 13. [expansion unknown] liNA-81 inertial power plant) 14. Thomson-CSF VE-110 C symbol- 5. Radioaltimeter (TRT (Radio and Tele- generator housing phonic Telecommunications] AHV-9) 15. SAGEM ULISS-81 "Nav-Attaque" 6. Symbol-generator housing (Thomson- system CSF) 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500054455-1 plants, the heads-up cathode-tube sights (VE-~t10, 120 or 130) from Thomson-CSF (and ESD [expansicn unknown]), the radars ~AGAVE [expansion unknown), Cyrano IV or RDM [Multipurpose Doppler Radar]), for which can be substituted laser tele- meters for particular mission purposes, even at the cost of the volumes avail- able in the nose. The flexibility of installation of such systems on an air- plane such as the Alpha Jet is greatly strengthened by the integration made possible by the Digibus multiplexed aigital connection, which in effect offers greate ease of interconnection by comparison with point-to-point connections. This bus line architectur~ also offers great self-testing and maintenance capac- ity. Finally, it appears that the avionics system of the Alpha Jet NGEA is the log- ical result of the weapons sytems already developed for the Dassault family of combat planes. There are three consequences of this fact: --the first is that the Alpha Jet NGEA's avionics system has, for practical purposes, already flown; integration of it into the new carrier that the Alpha Jet constitutes should therefore be only a simple routine matter in the last anal~~sis. Furthermore, integration has already been achieved without difficul- ty on the Bretigny bench, with Dassault's considerable experience with equival- ent systems taken advantage of in this case too; --the second is that a Dassault customer can define, for two or three types of weapons-carrying planes, avionics systems that offer a high degree of commonal- ity, which has obvious advantages in the matter of logistics: spare parts, bench-testing, training of maintenance personnel, etc. This is the case with Egypt, for example, with the Mirage 2000, the Alpha Jet NGEA ~called "MS2" in this case) and the Mirage SE2's (modernized); --the third consequence is that the pilots themsel~rns will have, between one plane and another, an avionics system from the same family, which also presents several advantages, and training in the Alpha Jet then becomes a real prepara- tion for an advanced system such as that of the Mirage 2000. To our knowledge, Dassault is the only builder in the world who can thus offer this avionics-system "family" approach, which testifies to the effort made by the airplane builder and its principal associates (SAGEM, Thomson-CSF, ESD) to obtain maximum synergy between a modern avionics and the sirplanes carrying it. The Advantage to the NGEA What does the NGEA version of the Alpha Jet offer by comparison with the pre- ceding versions? The answer to this question first calls for consideration of some of the possibilities offered by the system: --the inertial power plant offers great attitude precision (on the order of 1 minute of arc) and speed precision (on the order of 1 meter per second). This ~ overall precision gives high quality of kinematic reference for sighting at:d triggering of fire. The navigation precision (better than 0.8 NM [nauticalltile per hour CEP [circular error probahle is advantageous first of all in its short-term potential (as in the CCPI/PI (continuous calculatiun of point of im- pact]/PI [initial point] attack mode; see below): the quality of navigation is such that a localization precision of some 10 meters can be guaranteed after 12 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500054455-1 MVK UrClI.IAL U,C. UIVLY readjustment on a known point for several minutes, which is sufficient to en- sure maximum effect of the weapons used. Overall, thanks to the inertial power plant, the navigation and attack system is higher performance characteristics than a conventional system with gyroscop- ic power plant and Doppler: the precision of the inertial power plant is not affected by accelerations (in close maneuvers, for example). Likewise, an in- ertial power plant does not suffer from the fluctuations of the echoes encoun- tered by the Doppler on the ground, or from the weakness of the Doppler echoes in calm seas. Navigation is fully autonomous, and the inertial power plant offers precision be*.ter than 0.8 NM/hour CEP, readjusted from time to time in accordance with the needs of the mission; --the laser telemetry makes it possible to readjust the sirplane's navigation on a known point (a steeple, an accident of relief, etc) with precision to a few meters; the telemeter also makes it possible, in attack modes, to measure the dislance to the objective, and therefore to trigger fire with great effec- tiveness. Of course, a laser telemeter, even if it is more precise in measure- ment of distance to an objective on the ground, does not give all the possibil- ities offered by a radar. But it does not cest what a radar does either, and it is relatively easy to install in an airplane. In the case of the Alpha Jet NGEA, the airplane is thus equipped with a"laser nose"; the optical window cuts across the airplane's nose slantwise. By comparison with a"telemetry" calculated by triangulation (distance + radio- sonde altitutde), direct measurement by laser is, of course, distinctly more precise, being free of the errors of distance evaluation and of altitude fluc- tuation due to the accidents of the relief flown over. Several Modes The Alpha Jet NGEA has five modes of attack: CCPI, CCPI/PI, delayed CCPI, CCPL [continuous calculation of point of drop), CCPL/PI. --CCPI for braked bombs, cannon and rockets--that is, principally for the weap- ons fired with flat trajectory. A reference mark presented in tr~e sight gives continually the point of impact on the ground of the weapon chosen; the pilot triggers fire when this reference mark coincides with the target. --The CCPI mode exists also in the CCPI/PI version, which offers the possibili- ty of designating a known point (called the initial point) in relation to the target. --The delayed-CCPI mode, used for braked or even superbraked bombs. In this case, the high downgrade of the trajectory means that the target is out of the sight's field of view before fire is triggered ("the rear sight is...too low"). In this case, a phantom target appears in the sight's field, and the pilot triggers fire when the phantom target and the likewise fictitious point-of-im- pact reference mark coincide. --The CCPL mode, used for smooth bombs and certain braked bombs. The pilot triggers his attack by means of a laser-telemetry designation of the target. 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 F( ~ POINT DE LARGAGE TkAJECTOIRE DE BOMBE AUTOMATIQUE ~ DESIGNAiION ~ 3 ~ \ ~ 2 ) \ \ _ - (5) ~ ~ POINT INITIAL , ; ~ ; . _ -'~l'~`.~`~''~- ~ I \ , r , , ~ _ _ , , ~ . \ cl~ ~ , Illu~tntion ~u mod~ d'aKaqw ~n CCPL/PI : I~ dMiqn~tlon�tilim~hl~ ~~C~~~ ~ur I~ poiM Initid (I~ poM) I~ Is p~~w d'~tnqw ~ I'~bH d~~ ( 6)~, ob~tael~t n~tunl� (lol la eolllny, 1~ Ivy~p d~ 1~ ~ iWit eomm~ndi autom~tl4wn�M p~r i~ ealeul~NUr d'Nf~qw lee w d~n~ CIRLE ~ 1~ antnl~ IMrtINI~ Key: 1. Illustration of the CCPL/PI attack mode: the telemetry designation on the initial point (the bridge) launches the attack pass under cover of the natural obstacles (here, the hill), with dropping of the payload commanded automatically by the attack computer comprised in the iner- tial power plant. 2. Designation 3. Point of automatic dropping 4. Trajectory of bomb 5. Initial point 6. Target (1) TIR ( 2) LARGAGE ~ 3~POSITION A L'EXPLOSi:.~N (4) . I TRAJECTOIRE BOMBE I , ~ ~ ~i ~ ~ ~ ~ f~ ' ~ ~ ``1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ j 20NB D'ECLATS \ � ' ~ (7) . , ~ ( 6 )cis~.e Illustration of the delayed-CCPI attack mode, in which the objective is outside the sight's field; a phantom objective is created to provide for the firing of braked or superbraked bombs. Key: 1. Firing 4. Bomb trajectory 6. Target 2. Dropping 5. Line of sight 7. Burst zone 3. Position at explosion The attack computer then takes charge of the sequence; it begins by giving the pilot the pull-out order, so as to prepare for the pilot's "disengagement." In 14 FOR OFF[CU?L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 rvK urri~iwL uJC. V1VLY doing so, the computer continually calculat~s the bomb's point of imnact on the basis of its behavior in ballistic flight. Firing is triggered automatically when the calculate~ point of impact coincides with the objective designated at the beginning of the sequence. --The CCPL mode makes it possible to use a phantom target that is offset by g quantity (geometric vector) that is known in relation ~o a real objective. The pilot then designates the phantom target: an accident of relief that is known very precisely in terms of longitude/latitude coordinates, or in terms of rela- tive distance/bearing magnitude, in relation to the objective. ~his desi.gna- tion is associa*ed with a laser telemetry that makes it possible ta adjust the Alpha Jet NGEA's navigation to within a few meters. Navigation is then continued by means of the inertial power plant. Because of a deviation of less than 0.8 NM/hour (CEP), a simple calculation shows that ov- er a distance of some 10 kilometers, this position retains a precision on the order of some 15 meters--in other words, a precision more than consistent with the zone of effect of the weapons used. This mode, called CCPL/PI, then enables the airplane to engage its attack in the best way, so that the plane can remain "covered" for as long as possible under the protection of natural obstacles (hill, valley, cliff, etc). Thus the entire initial approach from adjustment/designation on the phantom objective can be done under cover, without possibility of direct detection by the enemy attacked. Because of the automatic pull-out and dropping commands, the attack will have the benefit of maximum surprise effect; for what is involved~is an attack with- out ever seeing the target--and thus, vice-versa, without ever being seen by it. The maximum distance between the initial poin*. and the target is on the order of some 10 kilometers; this distance is related to the short-term quality of the inertial power plant's deviation. The distance between the dropping point and the target is, of course, limited by the range (ballistic) of the bomb--typically a maximum of 4 or 5 kilometers. The resulting overall precision at impact (navigation precision + precision of ballistic flight) is a few 10's of ineters, which is still entirely consistent with the radius of action of the bombs used. The CCPL/PI mode offers--it should be noted--the considerable advantage of en- abling the pilot to prepare for his mission (before leaving on it) by offering him the possibility of entering the coordinates of the adjustment point and en- abling him subsequently to adjust his navigation, and thus to engage the attack phase before reaching the front line--and therefore under the best calm condi- tions. He is then freer in his movements, especially in order to see to his own defense. The total NGEA system thus offers a range of attack and firing modes from di- rect fire--target in the sight's field, with continuous calculation of point of impact (CCPI)--to the "stand-off" firing modes (CCPI/PI). This latter mode of- 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 fers the least vulnerability, but presupposes a short-term kinematic reference of very high quality--that is, position equivalent of less than 1 nautical mile per houi, levels beyond the reach of the conventional combinations of Doppler and gyroscopic power plants. It has also been calculated in Dassault that the Alpha Jet NGEA (wihout even taking into account the laser telemetry, and on flat terrain) offers the fol- lowing gains in firing precision by comparison with a"conventional" Doppler- gyroscopic power plant version: --CCPI (superbraked bomb) at 400 knots, 200 feet: 30 percent; --68-mm rocket: at 1,500 m, 400 knots, 10� dive: 40 percent; --cannon: 5� dive, 400 knots at 1,000 m: 20 percent. The A~GEA's advantage increases if the terrain overflown is irregular, for laser telemetry adds 10-percent precision by comparison with use of the radioalti- meter. Soon to Be Flying The NGEA program is under way. A mockup bench has already been in operation at Dassault in Aretigny since last Fall. A complete bench for integration of the navigation and attack system began functioning at Bretigny in February. The first NGEA plane is to fly at the beginning of April. The first delivery (to Egypt) is to be at the beginning of next year. Two other benches will be built: one for the Toulouse plant and the other for Egypt. The Alpha Jet NGEA is obviously a long way beyond the trainers transformed into attack planes by the addition of external attachment points and conventional avionics. The Alpha Jet NGEA is indeed unique, and comes as an extension and natural complement of the Mirage 3 and 5/Mirage F1/Mirage 2000 family. It will be surprising if other buyers, after Egypt and Cameroon, do not come along. Total Safety in Case of Ejection Among the elements contributing to the ease o~ use of the Alpha Jet and the se- curity of its use, we mention the landing gear, of Messier-Hispano-Bugatti de- sign, with low-pressure tires and of such dimensions that an increase in total mass can be envisioned with few modifications (wheels and brake), and the ejec- tion seat. The French Alpha Jets are equipped with type-Mk 4("zero-90") Mar- tin Baker/SEMMB [expansion unknown] seats, and the FRG Alpha Jets with Stencel S-III S"zero-zero" sests. The Belgian Alpha Jets also have Martin Baker seats --B10N "zero-zero." The customer indeed has the choice: since the Martin Baker Mk 10, for example, is also used on the Mirage 2000 (and the F1), the customer may be interested in choosing the same type of seat for a fleet composed of two or three types of plane. This is the case with Egypt in particular. We note finally that the Alpha Jet take the window-glass fragilization system equipped with a pyrotechnic sequence, developed by Dassault at Velizy and en- suring absolute safety. This system, qualified up to 600 knots, is the last - word in fragilization; it eliminates the ejection-speed limits. 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 rvrc vrr~a.~wa. .~o~c. vi~i.t PHOTO CAPTIONS 1. p 27. Under an Alpha Jet wing, two examples of load-carriers developed and produced by the Rafaut company: at left, a bi or tri adapter, type AM1000/2000, carrying two Beluga bombs from MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Co]/Thomson-Brandt, and at right, a TG600 releaser-ejector (14-inch loads, maximum of 1,450 pounds/650 kg) carrying a drum. 2. p 29. This configuration--one of the very many already flight-tested-- shows that in addition to the four inodular 400-kg bombs, the plane can also carry a fifth bomb by using the under-fuselage cannon- container attachment point. - COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982 11267 CSO: 3100/473 . 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 MILITARY FRANCE 'DATEX 82' EXERCISE TESTS ATTACK, DEFENSE, DETECTION CAPACITY - Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 20 Mar 82 pp 26-28 [Article by Jean de Galard: "'Datex 82': Air Defense Put to the Test--This Ma- jor Exercise Is Integrated with a Vast Log~istical Operation This Year"] [Text] It was in the heart of the Detection and Control Center of Cinq-Mars- la Pile, near Tours--the most modern of F.urope's air-defense installations, presented to the press for the first time--that Lt Gen Bernard Capillon of the Air Force, air-defense commander and Air Force commander of the air-defense forces, chose to comment at length on "Datex 82." This major exercise, which once a year enables the Air Force to train its air- defense personnel--in particular, the crews, the interception controllers and the ground-to-air gunners--under conditions as close to reality as possible-- was held last Tuesday and Wednesday. It is a punishing and constraining opera- tion--in our last issue we stressed the fortunate compromises that it occa- sioned on the part of the civilians and the military--but a necessary one, since it makes it possible to evaluate the capacities of the national air ~le- fense system. It put into action not only radar and sight surveillance organ- isms, the air bases and all of the Air Force's active defense facilities (air- planes with their air-to-sir weaponry, ground-to-air missile batteries and double-barreled antiaircraft cannon), but also elements of the Navy and of the Army. Datex 82 therefore made it possible to put the coordination of all the components of air defense to the test. Furthermore, this year like last year, Datex was integrated into a vast logistical operation (exercise Ex Log) started on 15 March, the purpose of which was to check the effectiveness and coherence of the measures to put the Air Force on a war footing in the areas of backup and technical support of the forces. The aim was also to check the ability of the manufacturers and maintenance centers to increase their rates of delivery or repair of materiel in a situation of sudden crisis. The balance-sheet provided for at the end of the exercise involved 2,750 re- sults: 1,200 defensive and 1,550 offensive, with the latter involving the par- ticipation of airplanes of the Strategic Air Forces, the Tactical Air Force and air forces of allied countries: the FRG, Spain, Great Britain, Italy, The Neth- erlands, and American and Canadian forces in Europe. The air-space zones af- fected by Datex 82 ranged from low altitude (500 to 4,000 feet, 150 to 1,200 m) to high altitude (flying levels above 320-340). This exercise was to entail 18 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 a�vi~ V~�a'aa.~Ma. li.7G Vl\L! the closing of some 20 airports to traffic under IFR [Instrument Flight Rules] conditions. Datex 82, which was carried out in accordance with the usual safety norms and with respect for the rules concerning nuisances, did not, of course, correspond ~ to any particular fictive political-military situation. The CDC [Detection and Control Center] of Cinq-Mars-la-Pile The CDC of Cinq-Mars-la-Pile was put into operational service on 27 October 1980. It is operated by 370 persons, including 200 controllers. It is one of the 10 stations that support the Air Defense Command in the execution of its missions. The CDC's and Satellite Detection Centers (CDS) that belong to the air-defense chain of command are installed at Contrexeville, Drachenbronn, Doullens, Mont-de-Marsan, Lyon Mont Verdun, Nice Mont Agel, Brest, Romilly and Narbonne. What characterizes this center, which is located 30 km downstream from Tours and occupies a very central position, geographically, is that it is the most recent and most modern station of the STRIDA ~Air-Defense Data Processing and Representation System) system, the automation of which began 20 years ago. STRIDA, as we recall, is based on two essential principles: real-time process- ing of radar data and linking of the stations, both among one another and be- tween each~of them and the Air-Defense Operations Center ~CODA) located at Tav- erny. This linked network offers multiple reconfiguration possibilities that enable one to make up for the unavailability of one radar station or another. STRIDA's chain of command involves three levels: --the satellite detection centers, which may be either civilian or military and which do not have any operational function; they normally have only facilities for detection and for extraction of digital plots, linked to one or more CDC's; --the detection and control centers, which constitute the basic units of the system and provide for: establishment and transmission of the general air situ- ation in the zone of responsibility of each of them; management and control of the interceptor planes; control of military operational traffic and coordina- tion with the other traffics, for the purpose of proper management of the air space; --the CODA. This main center, installed at Taverny, has an emergency center in- stalled at Mont Verdun. As the organism for synthesis and command linked with the CDC's and with the allied air-defense systems (NADGE [expansion unknown), 412-L and Combat Grande), it has permanent responsibility for threat evalua- tion, broadcasting of alert, and general conduct and coordination of opera- tions. The CDC's of Nice and of Tours are equipped with new-generation materiel (Visu IV); the Drachenbronn station--the oldest--is still equipped with CAPAC (expan- sion unknownJ Visu II materiel; the CDC's of Doullens, Contrexeville, Lyon and Mont-de-Marsan are equipped with standard CAPAC III Visu III materiel. Visu IV is distinguished from Visu III by the independence of the consoles; each of them constitutes, in fact, a minicomputer that provides for its own image-gen- 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 ~ ~ . i a >:~,~4 s, ' t:~ ~ t' iT . ~ �d ' N I O " i~+ ~ N O w ,C v+ 9 N a~ u � 'l. ~ ~ d u .C ~ ^ � a~+ u~ u c'ud ! . p N O O N ' ~ U .~C al ~ L ~ ~~.v. �rl 'b iJ Q. H ~ ~ ~ 1~ W O 1+ ~ ~ O t11 O�~ Gl Gl ~ . - o a~i v~ a o u ~ ~~v ao o ua~ ~ . . , a~ ~ ~ u ~ ~ a o ~ ~n . a ~n ?-a ~ o J~ ~ ~1 N ~ y i+ ~ O u f+ � m a.~ c0 O 1+ W u 4J ~ N v! O u a.+ 'b aaa.c~a u~ou�o~ x ~ v a~ u oo x~ o ,-i co a~ u 1+ ~ a.~ a~ v a d ~ w x ~ iAbovo ~ ~ ~ b ~ v U ; ~ Iy ~O ~ t11 G1 O ' f : - yr JJ GJ � ~ ~~i~' f tb R! O i.i , ~ ~ a+ H v1 c0 ~ / Gr' 'O ~ U O �r~ v u ~ �rl Q W ' , `;~~s U U y O ~b0 , d H 1+ �rl ~ ~ a~ .C R1 \ O a~w ~ ` w O U .C O ~,I ~ O H a~ . . ~e~~ ~ ' 7 a+ ~ w n ~ � rl ~ O ^ Gl O U O �.i N �~I i~ , p ~ U a~ ctl .C w c~ u~ s~+ ~ ~ J 3 ` c~ v k~ o A w sb,+ .a~C +'c-~ ~ v~vou .~~w, ~ o~uc�~~o ~ , ~ u i i 4 `..i~: � v .d o . _ p ca w ~ . y~ W H 41 o~~U~ ~;s F-~1 GO H v N ~EI ; 1 ~ . -.':.a 4. n( 2~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500450055-1 . _ ~ . ti ~ ! N c0 �r1 O .G ~ � . RI .C ~ ~ Cl J~ �~I . ~ x ~u . ~ ~ _ a o u , v�� or+ ~ , ? ~ o H u a , " 0J a~ . r-+ Q � N N O ~ ~ _ ~ ~ ~ r--1 ~ O 1 a ~~�.i N a (O r; ~ ' O ~ . O I u N 'C1 u~~' F+ a~ z ` ,C ~0 N N s~ - ' 00 O ~ ~ a~ .G Gl ~ t~tl N O ~ ~0 LL N ~ ,y~ a~ u .C eU ctl a+ ..~?'a C~, W N W O ~ O a �.1 Ol ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~tl ~ 3~+ a~ a co y ~ ~ a x O Rf y 1+ G1 ��a r - O Gl .C ~ "3 . 3 a +,.i u 1 ~ f y, ~ ctl ~ ,e~i 4., ~ ~tl � 'i v d, O H^ N ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 9 A. u N ' /r',~ r I~ y b O 1 i~%fs r i~~'t N rl i~ i~ y~1 ~ ~-d O N~I ~ , ~ ~~;o v m v ~ `~.o'~ 9 O a~.~ N G N ~ O a u ~n N ~ ~ i d ~ v ~.c N a o ~v ~ ~ a � o p a.+ ~ H ~ 21 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 eration and its own management, by means of a microprogrammed computer block. The improvements incorporated in the equipment of the Visu IV involve mainly the typing of instructions, presentation of data (colored cards), and technical organization. The operations room of the CDC of Cinq-Mars-la-Pile has been built underground at a depth of 25 m(at the level of the bed of the Loire), and connects with a large group of underground galleries used by an Air Force depot. The missions of the CDC have a triple character. Where air-defense missions are involved, a distinction has to be made between aerial surveillance and in- terception guidance. The former is done continually and makes it possible to establish the general air situation in the national air space at any time. It comprises the conventional phases of detection, identification, threat evalua- tion and broadcast of alert. Guidance of the interceptors makes it possible to carry out the sky-policing mission: guidance of the fighter planes on alert to- ward any unknown or infringing aircraft; assistance to any aircraft in trouble; control of fighter-pilot training missions. The CDC of Cinq-Mars-la-Pile can also handle military operational traffic-con- trol missions: offensive, liaison, reconnaissance, tactical-suuport and in- flight refuelling missions and control of the flights of the trainers of the Fighter School (GE 314) based at Tours. The third type of mission--NBD (nuclear, bacteriological, chemical)--is the preparation and broadcasting of radioactive alert: on the one hand, activation of the BGA (General Alert Office), and on the other hand, activation of the CEDAR (Center for Evaluation and Broadcasting of Fallout Alert). The alert is broadcast both to the armed forces and to the population at large. On the surface, the radars (a Satrape radar plus a 23-cm 2D main radar, plus three manual altimetry radars), the radio centers, the living area and the ra- dio relays constitute four distinct blocks. A number of IBM computers (360/30, 370/135, 3031) do the processing of all the radar data received. Very advanced logical elements make it possible in par- ticular to transmit air-defense data to Taverny and the other stations automat- ically, to aid in decision-making and to control interceptions. In the STRIDA stations of the first and second generations, using the VISU II's and ~II's, a linear modeling has,been adopted. In the Visu IV stations, such as those of Nice and Tours, the performance characteristics of the computing units and the new form adopted for the consoles, as is shown by the photos on the preceding pages (the low consoles are for direction and the high ones are for exploitation), have led to a new layout: the direction consoles are grouped at the center of the room, while the exploitation consoles are attached to the walls and are in the direct view of each section chief. The visualization capacity of the CDC of Cinq-Mars-la-Pile represents a square area of 4,800 km on each side. The center can provide 26 simultaneous data- transmission connections and the central computer makes it possible to process 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500050055-1 ruec urr~t,~AL u~r, utvLY 1 million pieces of information per second. Thirty-two simultaneous intercep- tions can be done. An electric power plant installed underground ensures the center's autonomy in case of need. - The COZ [Zone Operations Center] North Air-defense operations at the national level are directed from the CODA of Tav- erny, which, as we recall, has an emergency center installed at Lyon Mont Ver- dun. The national territory is itself divided into four air-defense zones whose limits coincide with the four air regions (but without strict superimpo- sition of these limits). Under the authority of a general officer, each zone has an operations center (COZ) that conducts the operations at the regional level. The COZ North is installed at Cinq-Mars-la-Pile; it is geographically "very close" to the detection and control room of the CDC of Cinq-Mars. The COZ Northeast is installed at Contrexeville; the COZ Southeast, at Lyon; and the COZ Southwest, at Mont-de-Marsan. The COZ North, responsible for instantaneous conduct of air-defense operations in the north and west of the country, has at its disposal three Mirage F1 wings, based at Creil, Cambrai and Reims; three CDC's (installed at Cinq-Mars- la-Pile, Brest and Doullens); and connections, proper to each of these CDC's, with the civilian, allied and neighboring organisms and, as the case may re- quire, with the Navy's ships at sea. The missions of the COZ North are carried out in six areas: --identification surveillance of all aircraft penetrating into its zone; --tactical direction of air-defense missions, in peacetime as well as in time of crisis, war or exercises; --distribution of the training missions among the control centers; --supervision of proper execution of military operational-traffic controlled flights; --direction of search and rescue operations involving civilian and military aircraft presumed to have suffered accidents; --conduct of in-flight operations for aircraft in trouble (general-aviation aircraft in particular). Its facilities are, on the whole, those of the CDC for everything related to detection, processing, exploitation and visualizatic~n of data, as well as to communication transmissions. In the operations room of the CDC, it has a civ- ilian coordination detachment (DCC) that participates in air-s~ace management by ensuring, with it, coordination of civilian and military air activities. Responsible for activation of the Coordination and Rescue Center (CCS) around the clock, it received 126 alerts last year, resulting in the initiation of 17 operations. 23 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 In case of tension, crisis, or exercise, such as Datex, the COZ North becomes the fIQ of the ~eneral commanding the North air-defense zone. In the operation- al-control chain that en~ompasses the operations rooms of the air bases, the Crotale firing sections, the control squadrons and the Military Coordination Detachments (DMC's) installed with the civilian control organisms, the COZ is the last link before the CODA, the Air-Defense Operations Center, at the heart of the air-defense command. Exploitation of Datex For every major air-defense exercise of the type held in the skies of France last Tuesday and Wednesday, there is a very detailed expoitation of the re- sults. This exploitation involves a fine restitution of the operations of at- tack, defense, detection and neutralization. It yields valuable information about the rates of activity, the thresholds of saturation. In this regard, it should not be concluded from the short duration of the exercise--48 hours--that it corresponds to what the national air defense would be capable of supporting in time of crisis. The restitution of the operations also furnishes valuable information on everything that has to do with logistics: availability and reac- tion time, especially this year, in view of the fact that the Ex Log and Datex exercises were simultaneous. It makes it possible to evaluate the capacities and the deficiencies correctly. The dates for Datex 83 have already been set. The exercise will take place at the beginning of March next year. COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982 11267 CSO: 3100/513 24 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500050055-1 a va~ va a'l~.ana. v.i~ vl\Ll MILITARY FRANCE TRAINING, RECRUITMENT, SELECTION OF AELICOPTER PILOTS Training Methods Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'I~[JI in French Mar 82 pp 41-42, 47 ~ [Article by Colonel Michel Mage, FYench Army, commandant of the Army Light Aviatton Tactical Training School; a Saint G~r graduate, class of 1945, his past assignments include: executive officer, lst Artillery Regiment, G-4, 3d Military Region, and C.O. lst GALDIV [Division Light Aviation Group]; he served in Indochina and Algeria, and holds a BEMS [certificate of advanced military education]: "Instruction in ALAT"] [TextJ ALAT [Light Army Aviation] schools have the mission of forming proficient pilots capable of serving in operational units. But these schools must also train, with the assistance of other service schools, all support personnel, nonspecialists, and other enlisted men assigned to ALAT. Upon reading the title of this article, "Instruction in ALAT," your first reaction is undoubtedly: "Ah yes, pilot training." Pilot training is, of course, the ma3or training activity because, year in, year out, some 120 officers and noncommissioned officers must receive the basic technical knowledge and skills required of a helicopter pilot. Yet this training is but the initial phase of a lengthy apprenticeship and continuing instruction and training designed to assign to units those operational pilots capable of effectively holding their own in combat. Pilots, however, constitute only 40 percent of all ALAT officers and NCO's. Hence ALAT's specific training activities also encompass all those persons who are either aircrew members or ground personnel who keep the aircraft flying: mechanics, radio operators, air traffic controllers, meteorologists, firemen, photographers, and simulator instructors. This article's title covers, therefore, a broad sub3ect area and my comments cannot possibly cover all aspects. 25 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Helicopter Pilot ALAT's Specialization Training School at Dax has the mission of providing basic helicopter pilot training to officers and NCO's of the French Army, Navy, Gendarmerie, and Custams Service, plus military personnel from a certain num6er of foreign countries. The course is 7 months for NCO's and 9 months for officers, because the latter also get an additional period of observer training. These courses may seem long to the unitiated reader, but their objective is far different from simply learning to fly solo, a skill that can be acquired in some 20 lessons taken in a flying club. Course lengths in foreign armies are similar to ALAT's. At Dax, the student pilot must learn to fly under all possible day-night conditions: nap-of-the-earth as well as at 3,000 meters in mountainous terrain, and in bad weather with horizontal visibility reduced to 800 meters. A pilot must also know where he is at all times and be able to employ all methods of navigation. Lastly, he must be able to land his helicopter in a small clearing, on a valley floor, or on a mountain peak with ~ust enough room for his skids. Ae must do all this without neglecting his regular military training and while keeping himself in good physical shape. After the primary flight training phase, the school program, therefore, includes cross-country flying, low-and very low-level navigation, night contact training, mountain flying, and instrument training designed to teach the young pilot to make instrument landings utilizing radar or beacons and markers. These activities total approximately 130 flying hours in Alouette 2 and Gazelle SA 341 helicopters. Operational Pilot . After that, however, this "conventional" pilot has to be transformed into a combat pilot, in ether words, given the knowledge and skills required to make maximum effective use of his helicopter in combat operations. Effecting this transformation is the role of the ALAT Tactical Training School at Le Luc. This additional training begins with the "Voltac" or tactical flying course. The school devised this special course and it now has been copied by all foreign army aviation schools. Its purpose is to teach pilots how to perform and survive on the battlefield by using terrain for cover while flying at appropriate speed over and around obstacles. Certain pilots are then trained as gunners and misaile operators o*_- reassigned to transition training into the SA 330 [Puma tactical transport helicopter). After this, they all spend 3 years putting their training into practice and acquiring their own experience in a unit ~ith the guidance and advice of their seniors. ~ 'I'he next course of instruction and training is for pilots having 1,000 flying hours. In this course, they receive the additional knowledge and skills 26 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500450055-1 FUR OFFICIAL USk: ONLY required of an aircraft com~nander: particularly the special procedures for f]ying as member of a patrol, further training in flying by instruments, and detail~d instruction on identification of ground and airborne equipment and weapons likely to be encountered on the battlefield. Upon graduating from this course, the noncomonissioned officer may be considered an operational pilot. Squadron Commander _ The process described above for NCO's is not easily applicable to co~issioned officers who are assigned to ALAT after having served as lieutenants in a regiment. In their case, primary flight training is followed by more - intensive tactical training which rapidly qualifies them as patrol leaders. But their most important phase of~instruction occurs when, after 3 years service in a unit, they are about to be assigned as aquadron leaders. This phase is the ALAT "captains course" similar in lerigth and general sub~ect matter to the company commander courses offered in other service schools. In the ALAT course, however, emphasia is placed on the internal operation of a squadron, the missions of the three types of regimental helicopter aquadrons-- reconnaissance, antitank, and utility-tactical transport-and lastly on thorough familiarity with the organization, equipment, weapons, and tactics of French Army divisions and corps, echelons which the squadron commander is frequently called upon to suFport. This epecial instruction and training is indispensable. Support Personnel A pilot is capable of flying, however, only because of the presence alongside him of comrades in arms who have received equally intensive technical instruction and training. - 1. Mechanics first of all. They are almost as numerous as pilots in ALAT units. They greatly outnumber them, however, if we include the mechanics in ~ third echelon maintenance activities.* All of these mechanics or repairmen-- airframe, engine, avionics, and radio mechanics, plus flight controllers or engineers--receive nearly a11 of their instruction and training outside ALAT at the Advanced Ordnance School in Bourges. 2. Air traffic controllers operating Spartiate radars, meteorologists, and fire safety officers, all receive their basic instruction and training in civilian or ~oint service schools. 3. ALAT nonspecialists--18 percent of ALAT's total personnel strength--and its 3,000 privatF:s must not be forgotten because without vehicles, refueling tankers, and gr~und-based radio facilities, the helicopter is but a lifeless machine. All o.f these personnel have to be trained to perform the same overall combat mission. * Third edition: Major repairs that are an Ordnance responsibility. 27 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 FOR ( , Hence instruction and training is a priority matter not only in ALAT schools but likewise in all ALAT units. Training Costs and Facilities What is the cost of this peacetime instriiction and training? In personnel, equipment, and helicopters or flying hours, this cost accounts for 20 percent of ALAT's total budget. At first glance, the bill seems quite high. Yet can a student pilot fly for an hour without requiring an hour of an instructor pilot's time? And how can annual flying hours be expressed other than in the ~ours of work performed by a mechauic? Admittedly modern technology is making it increasingly possible to use simulators as training sids. For instance, there are flight simulators for the SA 330 and Gazelle helicopters, plus a HOT [antitank missile] fire simulator. But while these aids do facilitate the instructor's task, they do not exclude his presence in the large ma~ority of cases. For the time being, however, simulators are capable of imparting only a certain knowledge and not real know-how. _ Some 10 years ago, a missile operator's training program included the firing of 10 live rounds. Today, a HOT operator completes his training by firing one real missile after having "fired" about 500 with a simulator. Mountain Training The pilot training program at both the ALAT Tactical Training School and ALAT Specialization Training School includes a mountain training phase. Why? The answer is simple. Except for those who live in them, mountains mean wild and jagged terrain, an unusual and hence hostile environment with surprising reactions that are at times difficult to foresee. Yet all of our crews must be eapable of operating in mountainous terrain in support of our , Alpine troops. It is, therefore, altogether logical to teach our piiota to fly in this environment where they can sharpen their skills and become more aware of the limits of their equipment. This training is progressive and always includes a pre-mountain phase before flqing above 2,000 meters. At that altitude, the pilot will be confronted with a view altogether different from what he sees in flat open country. He will fly in thinner air and will have to land in extremely varied terrain such as ridge lines, slopes, and valley floors. His chief ally--or enemy if he misunderstands it--will be the wind that may even prevent him from making some landings. Consequently mountains are, as for the alpinist, a veritable training school. For that reason, ALAT operates a permanent flight training center in Saillagouse, near Mont Louis. All French pilots and many foreign pilots train there. The obvious conclusion is that instruct3on in ALAT represents a considerable investment. It is still a very modest expenditure, however, if we compare it with the cost of the equipment traineea are being taught to use. Furthermore, it is necessary if ALAT units are to perform their assigned missions effectively. 28 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 rvn vrr~~.i~sa. vJL v~~~~ New Selection Criteria Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 82 pp 43-44 [Article by Captain Maurice de Vasselot de Regne, chief of the ALAT sircrew ~ personnel selection branch center; a 1966 graduate of Saint Cyr (EMIA), he first served as a platoon commander in the Armor; after earning his wings as a helicopter pilot in 1972, he was assigned as instructor pilot at the ALAT Specialization Training School in Dax and later as C.O. 3d Squa.dron, Sth Light Helicopter Group; he has logged a total of 3,000 flying hours: "Recruitment and Selection of ALAT Personnel"] [TextJ In 1956, Headquarters ALAT approved the use of psychological-technical tests in its aircrew personnel selection process. These tests were devised by the Air Force Center for Applied Psychology Studies and Research (CERPAIR) in Le Bourget. For the past few months, these tests have been administered to women candidates for helicopter pilot training. Following the 1973 decision to transform ALAT into exculsively a helicopter force, the Directorate of Armament Research, Studies, and Techniques (DRET) directad the Center for Applied Psychology Research and Studies (CERPA) in Toulon to develop a new aircrew personnel selection system. After a feasibility study based on a survey of 165 instructor pilots and 800 student pilots throughout their training, an ALAT selection branch of the lst CS [Selection Center] was established on a trial basis on 10 May 1977. Because of the results obtained, the ALAT aircrew personnel selection branch center was officially activated in the Fort Neuf [New Fort] at Vincennes on 13 April 1981. Recruitment ALAT officers and NCO's are drawn from extremely diversified sources. Officers Cadets attending the military academies at Coetquidan--ESM-EMA [Special Military Academy (former Saint Cyr)-Interarms Military Academy]--who opt for service in ALAT are required to take the flight physical and psychological- technical tests for aircrew personnel during their first year after graduation while attending the lieutenant's course at one of the service schools. After 2 years of troop duty as a platoon commander, they are required to confirm their option before being assigned to the Flight Training School at Dax. Approximately 150 off icers in each graduating class at Coetquidan opt for ALAT, but the latter's annual requirement is only for 30 officer pilots. 29 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 FOR OFFICIAL U ~ Noncommissioned Officers There are several recruitment methoda: 1. Direct Recruitment Young persons recruited by army information centers and meeting the "branch 09" eligibility requirements prescribed for admission to the National Noncom~issioned Officers 5chool (ENSOA) at Saint Maixent, are given a flight physical and aircrew personnel psychological-technical tests. They are selected by Headquarters ALAT. 2. Lateral Recruitment Regular NCO's of the army's arms and services who are under 30 years old and V have at least 5 years of service may be admitted into AI~AT after having been rated "aircrew qualified" upon completion of their flight physical and psychological-technical tests. 3. Semidirect Recruitment EVSO's [volunteer student NCO's] who have successfully completed the ENSOA course and who meet the same eligibility requirements as applicants for direct recruitment are offered the opportunity of serving in ALAT upon graduation from that school. Before being assigned to the Flight Training School at Dax they muat have served 2 years in a troop unit after having obtained the BMP 1[First Degree Professional Military Certif icate]. In addition, their "aircrew qualified" status must be revalidated. 'Branch 09' Eligibility Requirements SIGYCOP [physical profile]: 1 2 2 1 1 2 2; NG [expansion unknown]: 12 or higher; NS [expansion unknown]: 3 or higher; general knowledge test; score of 15 or higher; height: between 1.6 and 1.9 meters. Certain air force and navy noncommissioned officers may apply for aircrew duty in ALAT. Eligibility requirementa are described in directives specific to each of the two services. Selection The aircrew personnel selection branch center administers a batter of tests adapted to ALAT requirements: tests to measure an applicant's aptitude for helicopter pilot training and his ad~ustability to militarq life. The selection system's originality consists in introducing tests designed to assess the applicant's military and aeronautical motivation and study any vulnerability manifested during stressful situations. 30 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 rvn vrr~~tr+a. l~J?. V~~L~ The battery of tests includes: 1. A neurophysiological examination designed to screen out applicants who display certain traits liable to make them unfit for operational flying. 2. Psymochetric questionnaires that inquire into the applicant's antecedents, his military and aeronautical motivation, and his psychometric and temperamental characteristics. 3. Psychomoter tests or simulated flying tests, the results of which are used to construct a perfectibility curve. The applicant's behavior during these tests is also scrutinized. An applicant's processing in the selection branch center ends with an interview with the clinical psychologist attached to the center and an officer observer-pilot. A synthesis of the results is prepared jointly by the psychologist and the chief of the aircrew selection branch center. The resultant classification of applicants cannot be considered to be a positive index of success or failure but merely a statistical index expressed as a percentage chance of success. The ALAT selection branch also examines helicopter pilot training applicants for the Gendarmerie, Ordnance Corps, Paris fire brigade, Civil Defense Organization, and Customs Service. It processes approximately 1~000 applicants per year. In 1980, 52 trainees were accepted for the ENSOA; 48 of them graduated and were promoted to NCO rank; 47 of these NCO's entered the Flight Training School and 39 are now rated pilots. Thus the success rate from admission to the ENSOA to graduation from the ALAT Flight Training School is 75 percent. Any selection system whose validity is not checked regularly is liable to become ineffective quite rapidly. For that reason, parts of the test battery were validated during the trial phase. Such partial validation has continued with regard to all applicants accepted for pilot training since July 1973. The new selection system is based on modern methods of obtaining and interpreting, in real time, a well-rounded picture of the applicant's personality. The system uses situational tests that place the applicant as closely as possible in real-life situations faced by a pilot. These tests constitute the first step in seeking an essential correlation between the selection of personnel and their military and technical training. The continuous effort to enhance efficiency and performance in the use of complex and sophisticated equip.ment demands of aircrew personnel a high degree of skill and military motivation. 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500454455-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Their processing at the AI.AT aircrew personnel selection branch center in Vincennes is the first stage in the selection of this personnel. COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui" 8041 CSO: 3100/500 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 FUK Urrll;lAL UJC. U(VLY MILITARY FRANCE COLONEL URGES PREPARATION FOR CH~"IICAL WARFARE Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 82 pp 62-64 [Article by Colonel Claude Meyer, commandant of the ~Yench Army NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) Defense School. After graduating from Saint Cyr (ESMIA), class of 1955, Colonel Meyer served in artillery regiments and staffs. He completed his advanced techn.~cal military education (BTEMS) in chemistry in 1965 and has since then hac? various duty asaignments in NBC units and staffs: "Chemical Warfare, Past and Future"] [Excerpts] The t~~levision viewer and even the least informed re~der cannot help but note the frequent references to chemical warfar-e in all of the media thesp days. TI1i3 situatiun raises +.he following qvestion: Have ck~emical weapons--introduced onto the battlefield:~ in 191!~ but absent therefrdm dur'^g World War II-~-d.efinitely iallon into disuse or, on t~ie contrary, m�tst indications of their seeming resurgence be tal.cen seriously? The following article does not discus~ the problem of protecting civilian populations from this threat. It examines chemical warfare from the standpoint of forces conducting combat operations. Nor does it deal with biological warfare which is altogether different in nature from chemical warfare. The article expresses the author's personal views and does not necessarily reflect official French Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces policy~ Preparation for war implies extensive knowledge of the threat in a11 of its forms so as to enable us to cope with it and turn the situation to our advantage. If we were to ignore or overlook an entire ma~or category of weapons possessed by a potential enemy, we would be under an insurmountable handicap. The specificity of chemical weapons, with their background of terror and the inhuman aspect we attribute to them, would make the situation even more serious. That is why it is essential for us to examine with the greatest possible care the chemical risks in the context of a European conflict during the period 1980-2000 and be clear-sighted enough to draw the necessary inferences from such study. 33 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY From a technical standpoint. the new toxins are extraordinariZy more effective than first-generation toxins. This qualitative "leap" is measured by a factor af approximately 50 for nonpersistent agents~~-those called gases for a long time--and reaches a factor of 500 for certain persistent agents, i.e. those which enter into the body through the skin in the form of undiscernible droplets. Consequently a man can be incapacitated by minute quantities of such substances and their employment requires merely reasonable logistical support. Furthermore, recent advances have further increased the effectiveness of modern chemical agents: thickened toxins that impede decontamination measures, mixtures that complicate protective measures. We are, therefore, obliged to conclude that the nature of chemical warfare has changed. If not a new type of warfare, it is at least one that must be ~ viewed in an entirely new light. Techaical progress has radically changed basic tactical considerations. Chemical warfare is now militarily "credible." What is kno~m about the available means of waging chemical warfare? How prepared are the armed forces of the wo~ld's major nations? It is common knowledge that the Western World's chemical warfare capability is that of the United States. In the 1950's that country made a very great effort and built itself a respectable arsenal of modern chemical weapons. But failure to have replaced it in time has caused the arsenal to become obsolescent. As a matter of fact, chemical ammunition occasionally poaes serious storage and preservation problems and much of it has to be disposed of for safety reasons. The U.S. armed forces are currentlq believed to have a chemical weapons stockpile equivalent to 35,000 tons of toxins. In the U.S.A. there is a certain noticeable desire to "upgrade and update" this arsenal by getting back int,~ chemical weapons production. For while the American capability has eroded, such is not the case in Soviet bloc countries where there has been a continuous massive investment in chemical warfare. The ratio of chemical warfare forcea is considered to be 10 to 1 in favor of the East. Actuallq this figure is probably an underestimation because of the geographical distribution of stocks. Moreover, experts concure in acknowledging the excellent level of operational and psychological readiness of the Warsaw Pact forces. Their troops train with real chemical agents. Staffs take chemical warfare factors into consideration in their planning. There are chemical warfare specialists assigned at all command echelons. The Soviet Union reportedly has some 100,000 men in its so-called "chemical" troops. All of this has changed the tactical context and created conditions conducive to an imbalance. All of this blurs the reasons for refraining from the use of chemical agents, reasons that may formerly have prevailed. 34 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 rvK vrr~~iwL v~r_ uivi.ti Geneva Convention - All of this brings up a philosophical question. What influential role could international conventions play? Whenever chemical weapons are at issue, the temptation is to take cover behind the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of "asphyxiating, toxic, or similar gases" and casts "the civilized world's" discredit upon this type of weaponry. To begin with, however, this protocol was a follow-up to several other agreements--the most important one having been signed at The Hague in 1899~-- all prior to World War I, and all of which remained a dead letter in 1915. Furthermore, the signatories actually agreed only not to use chemical weapona first, while reserving the right to retaliate in kind. Thus the slightest incident, the slighest provocation, would be enough to trigger a general chemical war through a series of successive reactions. Lastly, the actual validity of referring to world opinion is questionable. Could the fear of international reprobation restrain nations fully prepared for such disapproval from using a type of weapon capable of giving them a ma~or advantage? The great powers are, of course, quietly continuing chemical disarmament talks at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Yet even though an agreement ~ is theoretically not impossible in the long r.un--despite some very slow ~ progress--we have every right to be skeptical about such an agreement's I significance if it does not include a system of verification. But ~ implementation of such a system on nat3onal territoriea does appear to be utterly impractical, and especially since certain modern production methods I would make it possible to easily foil any inspection. , Consequently the ri~terrent character of international conventions is not such as to reassure us when faced with the risk of chemical warfare. The aforementioned conditions--decisive technical developments, acknowledged absence of balanced forces, and skepticism about the effertiveness of. agreements--mean that dodging the issue by referring to past conflicts would now be tantamoimt to our assuming a suicidal attitude. In other. words, we cannot finesse our way out of this problem. This necessitates preparing our armed forces for chemical warfare. To maintain our operational capability, such preparation must render us capable of withstanding, without excessive losses, or; attacks liable to be launched against us. This problem has long been neglected. Hiding beh3nd the broad concept of "special weapons," some persons placed chemical and nuclear weapons in the same category. This had the dual advantage of artificially moving the threat away from the troops by placing it in the military~political sphere, and of completely handing the problem over to specialists. 35 FOR OFF[CIA L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500050055-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Now, however, a new and contrary pattern seems to be commanding attention. _ Literature on the sub~ect indicates that chemical warfare is being conventionalized. While nuclear weapons remain capable of completely changing the nature of a conflict, chemical weapons can strike anytime and anywhere on the battlefield like weapons. Meeting the Threat The threat thus having been defined and confirmed~ one vital question remains: Are we prepared to meet it? These past few years, France, like its allies~ has taken cognizance of its c;~rrent necessities. Our units are equipped with first--generation equipment. Our personnel are receiving increasingly better instruction and training. Above all, however, we have entered an important stage characterized by the following measures: issuance of second-generation individual protective clothing and equipment plus detection and warning devices; activation of NBC defense regiments at army corps level, thereby enabling commanders to concentrate their reconnaissance and decontamination efforts on a required area; offering staff-officer courses at the Army NBC Defense School, courses based entirely on operational considerations. Our progress is on a par with that being made by our allies. In general, there is no noticeable difference between our standards and those of our allies. This is quite normal in view of the present very active cooperation in chemical warfare matters. Does this mean then that everything is running smoothly in the best of chemical worlds? - Unf~rtuna.tely things are not that simple. The truth is that chemical defense will long remain cumbersomely restraining. Suitable protective measures can, of. course, save the lives of most troops provided they are well-trained. Defense against liquid toxins requires complete protection of the body. The effectiveness of protective clothing has a severe counteraction, however, in the form of physiological discomfort, and the higher the temperature the greater the discomfort. Hence a choice would have to be made between � acceptance beforehand of losses due to chemical agents, an intolerable situation, and a reduction in the operational capacity of units through physical and psychological attrition, a situation that is not much more satisfactory. It is even less satisfactory when one realizes that the heavy odds are that the enemy will not have similar handicaps inasmuch as he will seek to make maximum use of his advantage by attacking preferably those forces incapable of retaliating in kind. Is this problem therefore insolvable? Is there no appropriate response to this challE.nge? A larger and larger nim?ber of Westem experts believe and write that there is only one feasible solution which would consist in reducing the present 36 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500050055-1 NVK VCPII,~NL tlJf UiVLti imbalance so as to keep the enemy from yielding to temptation. It is sound tactics to encumber the enemy by compelling him in turn to fight swaddled in unwieldy and exhausting protective clothing and have the pace of his maneuver slowed by the multiple precautions he would have to take. Yet the risk of such tactics cannot be accepted without caution. A drastic solution with the attendant dangers inherent in proliferation? Certainly, and the problem is not a simple one. But it has to be faced because, here as in other fields, military history shows us the deterrent character of certain balances, even partial balances. Thus, for nations desiring to have a coherent defense, the fact of arming themselves with a limited chemical arsenal could contribute to banishing � the specter of chemical warfare. Though paradoxical, would this not be the most effective way of complying caith the Geneva Convention? COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui" 8041 CSO: 3100/501 37 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500054455-1 GENERAL FRANCE CNES PLANS NEW BUILDINGS FOR SATELLITE PROJECTS Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 6 Mar 82 pp 42, 48 [Article: "New CNES Space Installations in Toulouse"] [Text) The forthcoming development at the Toulouse Space Center [CSTJ, which is operated by the CNES [National Space Studies Center], of activities for the operation of satellites, and in particular application satellites (SP~T, Telecom 1, TDF 1, Sarsat-Sargos), will involve the construction, beginning this year, of two new buildings (see AIR ET COSMOS N4 867) with a surface area of 7,400 m2, or one-tenth the existing area of the buildings of the CST. The first new building--provisionally given the name "Space Systems" building--will house, in three stories, the Center for the Processing of Space Messages (CRIS), the Mission Control Center (CCM) for "SPOT," the two Specialized Con~rol Centers (CCS) for TDF-Expo!�t, and the "Sarsat" project. This building will have a surface area, spread out on three stories, of 2,855 m2. The necessary equipment for the management of the "SPOT" system--at the Aussaguel-Issus image-reception station, at the Center for the Processing of Space Messages (CRIS), and at the Mission Control Center (CCM)--will be very substantial. There will be no fewer than 15 calculators of the Solar type, with their accessories, wtiich will take up 150 m2 of floorspace at Aussaguel-Issus for the image-reception station, and 1,100 m2 for technical installations and about 35 offices at the CST. Two zones will be provided for the operation of the "TDF 1" satellite. One of them will be for the installation of the specialized control center for the preoperational "TDF 1" satellite, whose principal mission is to provide for the management of the plat'form and of the payload, as we11 as for maintenance on board the satellite. This control center will be connected to two other stations (a switching station at Bprceney-en-Othe and specific station) and to the center for operation of the payload. The other zone for the "TDF 1" satellite will involve the installation of a control center serving operational satellites, the responsibility for which will be turned over to the CNES (particularly for the Swedish satellite 38 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500050055-1 rux urrt~~,L u~~ uNLY "TELE-X"). This center will also be able to provide for the maintenance, on a temporary hasis, of these satellites during ''receiving~' operations when they , are in flight, or in case of a failure of domestic systems for the maintenance of the satellites. It will also be able to be used in the development and preparation of particular operations. For the "Sarsat" project, a station to receive and process signals from American and Soviet satellites is presently being set up at the "Sarsat" mission control center, where distress signals will be processed. This center will be connected, on the one hand, to the other control centers of the countries participating in the program and, on the other hand, to French and foreign rescue centers which will direct rescue operations. The functioning of the alarm service of the control center will be handled by a team from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation assigned to the CST, while the initial startup of the station is to be handled by the CNES. The teams will provida for a continuous watch, 24 hours out of 24. The demonstration phase of the "Sarsat-Cospas" ~roject will last for at least 1 year. It will begin in 1982, 4 months after the launching of the first satellites such as the "NOAA-E." The first few months will be reserved for technical trials for systems evaluation. The experimental distress beacons are now being developed. The second building will have a surface area of 2,470 m2. It will be assigned to the SPOT-Image Company, which is charged with the promotion and I commercial sale of imagery provided by the "SF~DT" satellite tiiroaghout the I world. ~ I At the time of the launching of the "SPOT" satellite, expected in May 1984, the ~ SPOT-Image ComFany will have need for: 500 m2 for a photographic lab~:atory, ; 300 m2 for information offices, 250 m2 for the reception of customers, and ; 250 m2 for files and office space for 39 people by 1985 (50 people in 1990). As this building will be constructed for the SPOT-Image Company out of the CNES budget, the SPOT-Image Company will pay the CNES annual rent for the building and for services rendered. FIAS Center ~ In addition, in response to the growing demands for training of foreign engineers and technicians which have resulted from the interest shown by many countries in space technology, the CNES has decided to join in the effort undertaken by the French Aeronautical and Space Industries Group (GIFAS) to establish a Center for International Aerospace Training (FIAS) in Toulouse. The CNES is putting at the disposal of GIFAS 17,000 m2 of land ad~oining the National Civil Aviation School (ENAC) for the construction of the Toulouse center of the FIA'S, which will include: a classroom building (450 m2), a conference room (with space for 250 people), and a residence for the students (2U0 rooms, a restaurant, and a gymnasium). 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500050055-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Construction of these pro~ects~ which will begin ~n February' will be completed at the beginning of the 1983�-1984 university year. COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982 5170 CSO: 3100/431 40 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 GENF.RAL NETHERLANDS MISSION, PROBLEMS OF SECURIT~, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Amsterdam VRIJ NEDERLAND in Dutch 20 Mar 82 p 10 ~ [Report by Rudie van Meurs: "How Was That Again with the Intelligence Services?"] [Text] Two ye ars ago the Internal Security Sexvi.ce (BVD) had been in existence for 35 years. In his congratulory speerh, Minister H. Wiegel (Internal Affairs) took into account that the question about the "good faith" of the service would come up again and again. "We must not lament that or get irritated about it," he soothed those present. "It is the democracy itself which puts this thorn in our flesh, and it is good that it stings." The lumps and wounds this thorn leaves behind regularly become public. Just last week it became known how the BVD misled a widow from The Hague in order to spy on a former member of the Red Youth from her front room. That same day HET VRIJE VOLK described the attempts of the BVD to increase drastically the number of con- fidential posts in the government while according to policy that number should be decreased instead The Internal Security Service, during its 37 years of existence, has become the most famous or the most infamous if you like es- pionnage service in the Netherlands. An apparatus with 750 permanent civil ser- vants, part of whom operate from the headquarters at Stadhouderslaan in The Hague and another part of whom work in the "external service." Yet, the BVD is only one of the intelligence- and security services of the Netherlands. Last week the Foreign Intelligence Service (IDB) caused a controversy. The ALGEI~EN DAGBLAD reported an exit of civil servants who can no longer cope with the tensions. Not because their work is so nerve-racking, but because the person- nel policy is failing. It has been like that for years. Alrea dy in 1977 the report of the permanent chamber commission on intelligence and security mentioned problems within the IDB. "They were partly in the personne~ area, and partly they concerned the limitation which charges the co-workers of the service only with the gathering of information and does not give them the opportunity to in- volve themselves also to some extent with the judging and evaluating of that in- formation for its possible significance in the forming of policy." A change was made in the orgar~ization, but the gentlemen remained dissatisfied. The Foreign Intelligence Service falls directly under the prime minister (general aff airs The task of the IDB is "the gathering of inf ormation on foreign countries which can be of importance to the government." Until recently the information gathered 41 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500050055-1 by the Foreign Intelligence Service has been 80 percent of a military nature, while the remainder is in the political-economic area. For a long time already, the ministers wanted the "political-economic area" to gain more importance. That did not happen. The foreign espionnage service is led by officers of the ex- ternal service who come primarily from the Marine Corps of the Royal Navy and those people have their preferences. There are also military intelligence se~~ vices: the Naval Intelligence Service (MARID), the Land Forces Intelligence Service (LANID), and the Air Force Intelligence Service (LUID). Those three ser- vices operate under the responsibility of the minister of defense. LANID, for example, recently went after a former military man in Land van Heusden and Altena who had founded a grassroots group of the Organization of Conscientious Objectors in his hometown. The three military intelligence services have a grand tasks they must "gather information about the potential and the military forces of other powers,which i~ necessary for a proper build up and effective utiliza- tion of the military forces." Moreover they must gather information "necessary for the protection of the army." One might say that the Foreign Intelli~ence _ Service and the military intelligence services are involved in active espion- nage for the Dutch Government. The five intelligence- and security services have a coordinator who falls under the responsibility of the minister. That co- ordinator is a powerful man. He is authorized to "invite other government bodies, government services and civil servants to supply information considered necessary by him to carry out his task." And the various intelligence services, in their turn, can reap advantage from that. But r.he most powerful of all is the Internal Security Service of which H. Beernink said on one occasion (but that was before he was minister of inter- nal affairs and responsible man of the BVD): "In my opinion the BVD, as an in- stitution, as a secret police, means a violation of the Dutch polity as desired by the legislator. It is a shame that the government has preserved this insti- tution after the war." The BVD, just like the other services, operates secretly. Its task is to "gather information concerning organizations, groups and individuals with respect to whom in view of their goals or actual activities there are serious suspicions that they are a danger to the survival of the democratic legal order in the state, or that damage to the security or other important interests of the state is to be feared from them." And the BVD further serves the promotion of ineasures to ~ protect information whose secrecy, in the interest�of those sectors of the govern- ment service and of industry, is of vital importance for the keeping intact of society." Which those organizations are that want to overthrow the democratic legal order is determined primarily by the BVD itself. The secret services are controlled by the pe rmanent chamber commission for intelligence- and security services (the parliamentary group chairmen of the big parties) which meets in secret. Thus the democracy is being preserved. The espionnage and counter-espionnage services are assisted in their work by the Police Intelligence Service (PID) which is housed in any good-sized police bureau; the protection officials of the departments, Second Chamber and other government services; the military police and especially the border guard; the security of- ficers of the larger Dutch companies such as Philips, Holland Signaal and DAF; and officials in the tax service. And that is only a small handful. A complete inventory of all secret operations would approximately furnish the picture of one half of the Netherlands controlling the other Y?alf. END 8700 42 CSOt 3105/147 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1