JPRS ID: 10518 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060031-6
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• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~
JPRS L/ 10518
14 May 1982
- West E u ro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 31 /82)
, '
FB~s FOREIGN BROADCAST ~!~lFORMATION SERV~CE
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JPRS L/10518
14 May 1982
~ WEST EUROPE REPORT
. (FOUO 31l 8 2 )
CONTENTS
ENERGY ECONOMICS
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Prospects, Advantages of Nationwide District He~ting Weighed
(Sebastian Knauer; STERN, 18 Mar 82) 1
ECONOMIC
FRANCE
Aron, Senator Discuss Economy Versus Social Benef its
(Various sources, v~arious dates) 6
. Aron Sees Contradiction, by Raymond Aron
Senator Urges Defense of Franc, by
~ - Michel Maurice-Bokanowski
ITALY
Text of Bill on Severance Pay
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 13 Mar 82) 13
Outlook for Inflation, Balance of Payments, Unemployment
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 14 M~r 82) 18
POLITICAL
NETHERLANDS
Activities of Extreme Rightiat Parties Vi~wed
(Hans ~mita; VRIJ NEDERLAND, 3 Apr 82) 23
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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GENERAL ~
FRANCE
ERRATUM: Photo of Ariane Solid Propellant Booster Released
(AIR ET COSMOS, 10 Apr 82) 29
ITALY
Profiles of Prominent Co~unist Industrialists
(Davide Paolini; IL MONDO~ 12 Mar 82) 30
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ENERGY ECONOMICS FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
PROSPECTS, ADVANTAGES OF NATIONWIDB DISTRICT HEATING WEIGHED
Hamburg STERN in German 18 Mar 82 pp 90, 92, 94
[Article by Sebastian Knauer: "Wasted Energy for Millions; Apartments, not the
Countryside, Should Be Heated"]
[Text] It is possible to tap heat for the living room from
power stations and ind4~strial plants. Almost half of the '
FRG could be supplie8 in this way. Is district heating a
magic weapon against increased oil bills and greater
pollution of the environment?
From the depths comes a hissing whistling. ,Brightly shining cylinders push
3.60-meter-diameter concrete pipes into the soil hydraulically. Centimeter by
centimeter the 9iant worm ea:.s its way horizontally under the railroad yards of
Mannheim's main railroad station. After 350 meters the pipe hits the target
shaft with the accuracy of a hand's breadth.
The engineers' brilliant coup is not for a subway line but for construction of .
district heating. Steel pipes are laid through the underground tunnel to conduct
heat to apartments. The 130� Centigrade hot water for the radiators comes from
a large power plant. By the mid-1980s th~ coal colossus on the Mannheim RhinE
bank, together with an additional 800 megawatt unit, is to become the largest
power plant in the Western world. The new plant will produce 50 percent electric
current and 50 percent district heat.
And what the operators of nuclear power plants can only dream about actually
happened here: the giant program was approved in three-quarters of a year with-
out. major protests from the population.
As in hardly any other area of energy policy, politicians, ecologists and
economists are equally in favor of heat fro~r~ the pipes. According to Feder.al
Research Minister Andreas von Buelow, it is to be "built up massively." The
Environmental Council of Experts terms it a"decisive opportunity." And even
the Association of Electric Current Producers assigns "a large significance to
district heating through coupling heat and power as well as industrial waste
heat."
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~ Up to now, energy with which millions of households could be heated has been
wasted from the stacks of power stations and factories. In a conventional power
plant, coal is utilized to only one-third, and in a nuclear power plant urar-ium
to only 1 percent. The remainder goe~ as "waste heat" into the atmosphere or
into rivers. Eaeh year, a cooling water stream with the median water level of
the Moselle flows through a 1,300 megawatt nuclear plant like the one in Biblis.
Federal Transportation Minister Volker Ha~ff says: "Apartments, not the country-
side, should be heated."
District heating is considered a hot tip not only for a sure energy supply but
also for increased prosperity and econoinic growth:
--The~FRG's dependence on petroleum would be reduced through cor~struction of a
district heating grid. Each year, 27 million metric tons of petroleum and thus
DM 13 billion in foreign exchange could be saved. In no other area is it po~-
sible to save as much petroleum as in heating, where the black gold can be
exchanged for hot water.
~ --The environment benef its from district heating, and not only because of the ~
lower temperature load ~xerted by the power plants. By taking individual
heating installations whi~h fire oil or coal out of service, the smog over the
cities will be reduced. With the introduction of district heating in Cologne,
, poisonous su~.fur dioxide was reduced 27 percent; in Munich, 30 percent. In the
Ruhr area 100,000 metric tons less of harmful substances will probably trickle
down after construction of the district heating grid. Renewed environmental
pollution by additional coal heat power plants is avoided by modern filtration
processes.
--E~nployment will receive a strong impetus. More than 200,000 jobs for steel
construction workers, sheet metal workers, erectors, engineers and construction
workers are supposed to be assured f,or 15 years. Nevertheless, in the employ-
ment program currently being passed by the Federal Government, district heating
is not taken into account.
The security of supply for coal power plants is assured until well beyond the
year 200b. Wor.lclwida, 83 percent of fuel reserves are coal, 14 percer.t are
petroleum and only 3 percent are gas. Europe h~s the largest amount of coal
after the United States, the Soviet Union and China.
Is district heating a magic weapon? Not entirely. Up to now, extension of the
- 5,385-kilometer-Ion~g heat coil throughout the FRG has been economical only for
short distances. However, the drastically increased prices of oil ~nd gas in
the meantime have made district heating in conurbations attractive for distances
greater than 30 kilometers, too.
Only in the countryside does the construction of expensive supply lines meet an
obstaclP. A kilometer of pipe grid in the FRG costs half ~ million, and every
connection to a house costs DM 4,000. The fact that it can be different is
shown by the Scandinavians, world champions of district heating: By means of
simple, inexpensive piping systems even thinly settled belts of laad are sup-
plied with district heat.
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In 1977, the Federal Government sounded out future possibilities for district
' heating in a 12-volume r~=^**_: According to the report, up to the year 1990 at
' most 33 percent (today it is 7 percent) of "~1ow temperature heat" is to come from
the pipe: for space heat, hot water supply in apartments, schools, administration
~ buildings and factory buildings.
However, the figures are already out of date. Through increased construction of
small, decentralized heat power plants it is possible to form so-called supply
islands with their own grids. By tying these grids together, 40 percent of all
energy users can receive heat.
No other fuel--neither gas from Siberia nor oil from the nmirates nor electric
current from domestic nuclear plants--is cheaper than recovered energy. Industry
has shown for a long time how money can be made from hot steam. Excess waste
heat is reutilized in their own heat recirculation loops by chemical plants and
refineries, steel plants and smelters. Moreover, industry produces as much
electricity in heat power plants each year as is produced in five large nuclear
power plants.
On the lower Rhine, the district heating track for 150,000 apartments is supp~ied
by industrial enterprises. In Duisburg, a Thyssen blast furnace supplies heat
for 9,000, a sulfuric acid plant for 15,000 and a steel plant for 26,000 apart-
ments of 70 square meters each.
- In Mannheim, the inhabitants also heat apartments with their own trash. More
than 180,000 tons of trash a year are converted to heat energy in a trash incin-
eration plant. Even at Ochsenfurt on the Main, far from the large power plants,
, a sugar plant sells waste heat. And in Stade on the lower Elbe, a nuclear power
station is expected to supply its excess steam to a commercial enterprise 2
years from now, for the first time.
The petroleum age is approaching its end. Al~hough even today almost one-half
of all apartments are heated with expensive petroleum, wher~ever rickefiy oil
burners have to be scrapped, district heating is particularly indicated.
According to Hans Peter Winkens of the Frankfurt District Heating Association,
"It took only 20 years for oil to be accented in the heating market, and its
rejection will not take any longer."
A hard fight is on over the 100-billion market for heating fhe living room.
With the concept "heat 2000," electric current producers want to make night-
storage heating and electrically operat~d heat pumps palatable. During
recessions, it is thus possible to sell excess electric current to consumers at
high prices, including current from nuclear power plants. However, heat from
the wall outlet is a wasteful solution because three times as much energy has to
be made available to produce 1 kilowatt of electric current. Valuable electric
current is necessary above all for illumination and for driving machinery.
The strongest competitor for the lucrative heat market, however, is gas, because
where natural gas lines already go to the consumer, the cnances for district
heating are slight.
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And this is particularly the case of the conurbations suited for district heating.
The gas lobby is shooting full blast at the expensive duplication of supply lines;
it argues that "the present wave of enthusiasm ~or district heating will give way
to a more sober way of looking at things."
The street fight among heat vendors is most often deaided in local goverriment
offices. According t~ Manfred Rommel, president of the German Association of
Municipalities, "The rivalry between district heating and gas should be brought
to an end as soon as possible." .
However, municipal supply enterprises show little imagination in converting to
the coming energy supply.
No wonder, because the manager of a gas plant jeopardizes his own job by deciding
on district heating. rn Flensburg, after rapid construction of district heating
in April of this year, the gas plant will be shut down. Today more than 90 per-
cent of all households are connected to the district heating grid, although as
recently as 1970 the city was classified by the Federal Government as "unsuited"
for district heating. City plant manager Wolfgang Prinz comments: "At that
time they laughed at us."
In the meantime, consumers have stopped laughing wherever district heating fell
by the wayside and gas was propagated. Shocked by the price increases for oil,
and lured by the sales slogans of natural gas vendors ("convenient energy"),
hundreds of thousands.of households have converted to gas heat in the past
decade. The gas share of heat energy rose from 1 percent in 1964 to 17 percent
today. However, once the gas burners were installed prices also rose--since
1978 alone, by more than 100 percent. And the gas monopoly enterprises regularly
send polite letters asking that ~price increases be agreed to or supply contracts
will be canceled.
Noi:hing will change the price dictate because natural gas is still scarcer than
petroleum. Exploitation of the colorless fuel, which since the recent natural
gas pipeline deal with Russia, also has a political price, is controlled by the
same raw-material multinationals as petroleum--Mobile, Esso, Shell ancl BP. The
hoodwinked natural gas consumer now hesitates from bitter experience to change
course to the district heating extolled. As Hans Neuffer of t.he Association for
District Heating says, "Who wants to be taken advantage of twice?"
Price will decide the race of the heating systems in the end. In t~he stronghqlc3s
of district heating, the Steag AG [Hard Coal, Inc] of Essen calculated a clear
lead for pipe heat. Annual heating costs per square meter in a multifamily
house are: for heating oil DM 23.82, for electric current DM 21.69, for gas
DM 19.51 and for district heating DM 17.91.
For the present, however, local residents will have to put up with ~he dirt
and noise of underground construction at their front doors. In Cologne, to be
sure, laying the heat pipe belaw ground was combined ~with construction of the
subway. And in order to break down opposition to dis�crict heating, according to
the SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, cables for the controversial cable television can be
laid at the same time.
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District heating will bring bac~ luck only to the luck-bringing chimney sweeps,
because millions of private chimneys will have stopped smoking.
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A 6,385-Kilometer Long Heat Coil Today Supplies 7 Percent of FRG Citizens
The FRG as a distri~t heating country. At Mannheim the largest coal-fired heat
power plant of the Western world is coming into being. Conduits with hot water
are brought above ground to the consumers. As shown on the map, about 40 gercen~
of the population could be s~~plied with heat from the pipe. Construction oi ~
the district heating network often falls through because gas line laying has
- just been completed at great expense. Natural gas, however, is scar.,�er than
petroleum and almost a~ expensive.
~ Key: 1. Full pipe. District heating for apartments and offices in the FRG.
2. The actual extent of district heating.grids in conurbations is this
small.
3. The potential for an economical district heat supply is this large.
4. Conventional power stations whiah can be tapped for district heating.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
5586
CSO: 3103/382
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- ECONOMIC FRANCE
ARON, SENATOR DISCUSS ECONOMY VERSUS SOCIAL BENEFITS
Aron Sees Contradiction
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 19-25 Feb 82 pp 96-97
[Article by Raymond Aron: "France in the Crisis"]
[Text] Tl~e day after the elections, i~ keeping with his campaign promises,
Francois Mitterrand created a committee to draw up an assessment of the pre-
ceding 7-year term, an inventory of France on the eve of the Socialist experi-
ment. The new majority did not use the outline of the report which was pre-
sented in September. I shall not use the whole report, which too often ap-
pears to be indictment.
Between 1970 and 1980, individual purchasing power continued to rise. In
1970, some 57 percent of all households had a washing machine; in 1980, it was
79.4 percent; and the percentages for automobiles rose from 57.6 to 70 percent.
During that same period the average workweek (for workers and employees) de-
clined from 44.7 to 40.7 hours. In other words, without any action by the
public authorities the workweek declined by about 10 percent. However, thesa
figures can be interpreted in various ways. Although the rise in purchasing
power has slowed down since 1973, purchasing power has nevertheless continued
to rise. This is enough to contradict the critics who inveigh against aus-
terity and seek to find the secret of prosperity in the increase in individual
incomes. On the other hand, one might wonder if inflation and unemployment
are not at least the partial consequences of an incomes policy (or a lack
thereof) whi.ch, in the last analysis, favored consumption at the expense of
investment.
In the publication ECONOMIE ET STATISTIQUE by Insee [National Institute of
Statistics and Economic Studies] I read about the trend in rates of annual
volume growth of the Gross Domestic Product [GDP]. The French rate was 5.3
between 1960 and 1973, and 2.9 between 1973 and 1980. The two rates are
higher than the United Kingdom's (2.9 and 1); close to the rates for Italy
(5.3 and 2.6) and for the FRG (4.3 for 1960-1970; 3.9 for 1970-1973; and 2.6
for 1973-1980). They are less than the corresponding rates for Sapan (10.3
for 1960-1970; 7.9 for 1970-1973; and 4.5 for 1973-1980).
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Other sxatistics bring out France's relative successes and failures during
these ~�ecent years. The GDP grew� by 21.1 percent between 1970 and 1980, co~n-
pare~ with 19.7 for Italy, 17.2 for the FRG, 14.7 for the United States, 5.2
for the United Kingdom, but 33 for Japan. The dislocations following the oil
crisis have brought the rate of GDP grawth down to 1.3 in 1980. The 1981
elections coincide with a recession combined with the decline in growth rate
which characterizes the whole period. _
At the same time France followed a very conservative policy in publi.c expendi-
tures. The budget deficit was barely more than 1 percent of the GDP, while
the deficit reach~d 11 percent in Italy, 4.8 percent in the Netherlands, and
3.5 percent in the United Kingdom. As a result, the burden of the public debt
(in percentage of GDP) reached 16.7 percent at the end of 1980, as opposed to
58.1 percent in Italy, 28.6 in Japan and 22.6 in the FRG.
On the other hand, from March 1980 to March 1981, the retail price index rose
by an average of 12.5 [points] compared to 20.1 for Italy, 5.5 for the FRG,
6.6 for the Netherlands and 7.6 for Belgium. It is striking that there ap-
pears to be no correlation between the rate of price increases and the strict-
ness of budgetary or monetary control. Despite enor~us budgetary deficits
(9 percent of the GDP), Belgium keeps its prices in check better than France.
As fox unemployment, France occupies an in-between position: 7.4 percent of
its labor force at the end oi March 1981; less than Belgium (10.5) and the
United Kingdom (9.5), yet considerably more than the FRG. However, between
1980 and 1981 the increase in unemployment was faster in the countries that
t?ad previously been spared, namely, the FRG and the Netherlands.
Before 1973 the government did not comprehend the signs heralding a change in
the economic climate--many signs (slowdawn in growth, beginning of unemploy-
ment, and acceleration of inflatioii). V:ilery Giscard d'Estaing, after his
election in 1974, immediately taok the initiative of preparing a stabilization
plan, which was obviously needed, and which caused the 1975 recession. It ap-
pears that those in charge did not become aware of the gravity of the crisis,
or rather of the deep causes of a prolonged phase of slackening of the econ-
omy. From the end of 1975, a revival plan was applied which aggravated infla-
tion and brought about a deficit in current accounts. Raymond Barre replaced

~ Jacques Chirac in the fall of 1976 and defined the principles of his adminis-
tration. These were maintained, along general lines, until the Socialist
victory in May-June 1981.
Raymond Barre had reestablished equilibrium in the current accounts by 19?8-
1979, before the second oil crisis. The latter crisis brought about a new
deficit in current accounts; a surplus of Fr 19.208 billion on account of in-
visible transactions, reducing the trade deficit by Fr 52.310 billion.
Taking only these overall figures into account, and stopping at the spring of
1981, an overall judgment could be formed along the following lines: A pru-
dent management left the Socialist government considerable f~reign exchange
holdings (Fr 363.401 billion), a small internal public debt and a positive
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balance in foreign credits and debts. But the positive balance is somewhat
illusory since a certain number of our outstanding credits are uncertain, to
say the least. The picture is darkened by inflation continuing at around
10 percent dur~ng the good years, and increasing to around 14-15 percenc after
ttie second oil crisis.
Of course, in the eyes of the public, the rise in unemployment is much more
important than the rate of inflation. But Raymond Barre was, or so I believe,
even more disappoir?ted by the inflation figures than by the unemployment fig-
ures. The latter almost inevitably resulted from the recession and the inter-
- national s~tuation. But the budgetary and monetary stringency could and
should have produced better results. He himself is wondering aboutthe causes:
the French people's inflationary reactions? Co~ercial trade networks? Or
excessive wage increases?
Stagnation in investment also characterized this period. That is easily ex-
plained. The gross added value of private enterprises increased less than
wages. From 1974 to 1980 it increased (in volume) at the rate of 3.3 percent,
while wages rose at the rate of 4.6 percent; employer social insurance con-
tributions rose at the rate of 7.9 percent; and salarie:s, at the rate of 4.6
percent. Companies' gross disposable income (undistributed profits and re-
serves for d~preciation) only increased at the annual rate of 0.3 percent.
In 1973 the gross disposable income of companies, on which investments are
drawn, constituted 12.7 percent of the value added; i~n 1980, only 10.3. The
financial situation of companies improved in 1978 anii 1979 (11.2 and 11.8
percent); it worsened anew in 1980, following the second oil crisis. The
greatest increase was in social insurance contributions. In 7 years they
rose from 14.6 percent to 18.3 percent of the value added.
Overall statistics show us only one par~ of the picture. One's judgment of
the strength of *he French economy in a changed international economic cli-
mate ~.epends on the place of French production and exports in the world.
Let us begin with a success. Anyone glancing over the statistics on current
accounts cannot help being struck by the si2e of the surplus under "services,"
sometimes called "invisibles." The positive balance under services reaches
more than Fr 35 billion for the year 1980, and more than 22 billion for the
first three quarters of 1981. The amount is the more surprising since the
balance under invisibles [services] shows a deficit from 1970 to 1976. The
change can be attributed to services, since in the mean~ime the amount for
unilateral transfers (foreign workers' remittances) increased. Research and
development projects, large-scale construction work, and services connected
- with exports occupy top positions under services. OECD economists have
calculated various countries' share in the world market for services.
France's share rose from 7.7 percent in 1970 to 10 percent in 1979. This is
a recent market conquest; if maintained, it could make a substantial contri-
bution to balancing current accounts.
On the other~hand, the foreign trade figures are not satisfactory, above all
those for the last 2 years, 1980 and 1981. Surplus sectors show diminishing
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surpluses. Deficit sectors show increased deficits, with the except~on of
agriculture and foodstuffs which continued their growth in 1980. The reserve
ratio of 97.7 percent in 1979 dropped to 89 in 1980. One can conclude that
as a normal consequence of an inflation rate that is higher than most of our
competitors, French products have become less competitive.
Commentators note that we nave trade def icits with the principal industri-
alized countries (FRG, United States, Belgium, the Netherlands), with the ex-
ception of Italy and Great Britain. It would, in fact, be preferable if our
products were able to compete where competition is strongest, but market se-
lection [1'effort de la differentiation des marches] also responds to needs.
The relatively large contribution made by two sectors, automobile and agri-
cultural and food products, which contributed around two-thirds of the total
surplus in all surplus sectors, can be interpreted in various ways. Spe-
, cialization responds to constraints that no industrial country can elude:
Agriculture and food products industries should find an expanding market. On
the other hand, the automobile industry will probably come up against the so-
called newly industrialized countries.
Until 1978-1979 it appeared that France had kept its place in the world. The
results of 1980-1981, following after the second oil crisis and too much in-
flation, cause concern. Trade surpluses in the electricity materials sector
have diminished. Has France fallen behind in the various forms of the elec-
tronics sector, the sector which sets the pace of the new industrial revolu-
tion? Can it catch up? The trade deficit for the whol~: ~f ~he year 1981
scarcely differs from that of 1980 (Fr 59 billion against 62) but the deficit
in December (8 billion) demonstrates the effects of the French recovery,
which lags behind the economic situation in other countries of the EEC. Once
again the GDP growth seems to have caused a stronger rise in imports, and
hence a trade deficit.
The high dollar exchange rate offers France an advantage for 1982: American
products become less competitive. It also offers a disadvantage: Imports
purchased in dollars cost more. The deficit in current accounts is likely to
become worse during the course of the next year without a recovery in the
Ma.rk bloc .
Whatever the responses to these problems may be, one cannot help noting the
contradiction between the dominant ideas of the Socialist government and the
conclusions suggested by the statistics. The former, so-called rightist gov-
ernment wished to spare the French people the consequences of the increase
in prices of petroleum products. Consumption increased, company resources
for investment diminished. However, the men in power today promise to raise
salaries through a fifth week of vacation, by reduction in hours of work, and
to increase employer social insurance contributions. These measures are obvi-
ously contrary to the needs of the French economy, since it is involved in a
formidable competition. Once more the economy must pay the price of good in-
tentions in the social field.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 s.a. Groupe Express
9
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Senator Urges Defense of Franc
Paris LE FIGARO in French 22 Feb 82 p 2
[Article by Michel Maurice-Bokanowski, Senator-Ma.yor of Asnieres: "The Franc
in Danger"]
[Text] The history of the principal Western countries is linkEd to the ups
and downs of their currencies. No great country has escaped monetary problems.
France, no more than any other. On the contrary, the fragility of our indus-
trial fabric, the special character of our savings, and our dependence on for-
eign energy force us to participate in the international monetary world.
Since taking power the Socialists have constantly leaned toward, and now seem
to have been taken in by, the monetary pitfall of devaluations, excessive
F, taxes, considerable increases in unproductive public expenditures and promises
of utopian social measures that cannot be fulfilled. Moreover, the European
monetary system nresupposes a minimum of convergence of the economic policies
of the different member counzries. However, France is practically at an im-
passe over inflation, stimulating budgetary activity and increasing public
expenditures while Germany is doing just the opposi~te.
Public expenditures of the Gern~an Government have increased 4 percent over
1981; those of the French Government, 28 percent.
Also, since the last devaluation, the health of our money has not improved.
Our energy, paid for in dollars, will be more expensive, and as a result our
- production costs will increase, canceling the early effects of devalc.ation
- on our competitivity.
Let us look around us. Which countries have thus far best weathered the
crisis? Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and, for the present, the United States
--the countries with strong currencies. Which are the countries that have
experienced the most difficulties? Italy, Great Britain--the countries with
weak currencies.
Until May 1981, France had succeeded in remaining competitive and in even
improving its record, thanks to a strong currency which held down inflation
- and the energy bill. But in a few months our country has experienced a seri-
ous monetary setback which is soing to increase inflati~n yet further, and,
in consequence, unemployment.
How can the Bank of France reserves designed to support our threatened ~cur-
_ rency, reserves which have melted away by more than 70 billion since the be-
ginning of this 7-year administration, be reconstituted?
The Political Climate
The real solution to our problems, at least those of an economic nature,
would nevertheless be quite classic since they take into account the require-
ments of our times and the material and moral interests of the French people.
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The real solution is to produce in order to assure expansion and full employ-
ment in order and stability. Thus the currency can be strengthened by restor-
ing co~fidence. .
Let the state show great discipline in managing itself; let ~c strive to pro-
mote generous but realistic reforms, let it methodically :~~~form the citizenry
about economic and social problems, then worry would disappear before clearly
expressed truth and clearly defined objectives.
Behind the economic programs and the best financial formulas there is the so-
cial and political climate which always determines success or failure. The
battle of the franc will take place above all on this terrain. It has begun
badly.
There, to remind us, is the "scenario" of the Popular Front: After Laval's
- and Flandin's sjtringent austerity and deflation policy, unemployment increased,
production stagnated, borders were closed to merchandise and capital, taxes
rained down.... And on 3 May 1936, the Popular Front won the elections.
Then strikes and factory occupations broke out from 11 May. Renault came on
the scene on 28 May. Leon Blum called in the CGT and the General Confedera-
tion of French Production on 7 June. Talks resulted in the Matignon acc~~rd:
It provided for collective agreements, trade union rights, a 12 percent in-
crease in wages and a 40-hour week instead of a 48-hour week. Little b; lit-
tle, calm was restored.
But the blow was too heavy for the French economy.... In a few months wages
once more lost the benefit of the raises which had been gained. The wage-
price spiral began, prices roared upward, capital fled. Leon Blum was forced
to devaluate. It was to be 25 percent on 25 September 1936. But that rate
was~not enough and the Popular Front did not inspire confidence, quite the
contrary. Prices continued to climb. They increased 28 percent from Septem-
ber 1936 to January 1937. The rest is well known. History never repeats
itself, but, in the months to come, how can our franc, shaken so badly since
10 May 1981, not risk a collapse as a result of economic causes that are dif-
ficult to analyze?
Toward the Social Explosion
As of now, all French persons should be concerned about defending the franc,
the national symbol of independence and prosperity.
Such a union for the franc was an action undertaken by a small group of clear-
sighted Frenchmen in 1924, following the policies of the "Cartel des Gauches"
[cartel of leftist groups] and it aroused the conscience of many citizens suf-
ficiently to bring back Raymond Poincare, in 1926, and save the country from
bankruptcy.
Let us face it! Confronted with the discontent of all categories of the popu-
lation, its own incapacity to satisfy both its electoral base and the demands
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c~f a modern economy, in the coming months the government wi].1 see a social
explosion which will make May 1968 look like a joke.
- As of now we must again reunite, outside of political parties, to save our
franc, the instrument of our strength and our influence in the world.
9772
CSO: 3160/448
\
i
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ECONOMIC I~~Y
TEXT OF BILL ON SEVERANCE PAY
- Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 13 Mar 82 p 13
fText of the outline for a bill concerning the regulation of severance pay ap-
proved yesterday by the Council of Ministers which will be presented to Par-~
liament for approval]
[Text] Title 1
Regulation of Severance Pay
Article 1 (Severance Pay)
In every case of cessation of employment, the employee has the right to sever-
ance pay. This severance pay is calculated by adding, for each yeaz of employ-
ment, 1 month's salary, equal to, and in any case n~t more than, the amount of
payment owed for the year divided by 13.5.
The above-mentioned month's compensation is proportionately reduced for frac-
tions of a year; fractions of a month over 15 days are coun,ted as an entire
month. .
. Seniority compPnsation that would be owed to single employees in case of ces-
sation of employment at the moment that this law goes into effect is calculated
according to the present regulations up to that moment, and all its provisions
are owed to the new regulations outlined in this law.
Article 2 (Yearly Earnings)
Except for different provision in collective contracts, yearly earnings, for
use in the preceding Article 1, include provisions, production bonuses, shar-
ing in profits or products, the equivalent of room and board owed to an em-
ployee, and of any other compensation of a continuative nature with the ex-
clusion of the amount corresponding to reimbursement for expenses.
Article 3 (Reevaluation Index)
Severance pay referred to in Article 1, with the exclusion of zhe month's pay
accruing each year, is increased according to the follawing composite basis:
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on 31 December, of each year, through the application of an index that con-
sists of a 1.5 percent fi~oed rate and of 75 perceat of the increrise in the con-
sumer price index [CPI~ for blu~e- and white-collar families, certified by the
Central Stat~.stics Inr;titute, with respect to the month of December of the pre-
ceding year. ~
When the reevaluation index explained in the preceding paragraph is applied to
fractions of a year, the increase of the Central Statistics Institute Index is
that which is certified far the month of cessation of work with respect to the
month of December of the preceding year. Fractions of more than 15 days are
computed as an entire month.
J Article 4 (Advances)
An emplnyee.with at least 8 years of service may ask, if the work relation-
ship is continuous, for an advance of not more than 60 percent of the sever-
ance pay to which he would be entitled in the case of cessation of work on
the date of ~the request. ~ ~
The request must be ~ustified by the necessity for:
(a) possible health-related expenses for extraordinary therapies and surgery
recognized by competent public structures;
(b) acquisition of a first hame for residence of the employee or the em-
ployee's children, documented by a notarized atatement.
The advance may be obtained only once during employment, and ia subtracted,
with no exceptions, from the severar..ce pay.
Zhe hypothesis referred to in Article 2122 of the Civil Code, the same ad-
vance is subtracted from the compensation foreaeen by the same norm.
More favorable conditions may be granted in collective contracts or in indi- �
vidual agreements. ~
The provisions of this article are not applicable to co~panies declared in
crisis by the law of 12 August, 1977, No 675, and its snccessive modifica-
tions.
Article 5(Secondary Claims on Fixed Property)
Article 2776 of the Civil Code is replaced by the following;
"Debts relative to severance pay, as well as the compensation referred to in
, Article 2118 of the Civil Code, are claimed secondarily, in the case of non-
payment, on the price of fixed property, with preference given to unsecured
debts.
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"Debts indicated by Articies 2751 and 2751a ~f the Civil Code, and successive
modifications, for tY~e execution of those indicated i~ the preceding para-
graph, and debts for contributions owed to institutes, agencies or special
funds, including those which are substitutive or integr~tive, which control
fornis of obligatory disabili.ty, old age, and survivor insur~zcz, referred to
in Article 2753 of the Civil Code, are claimed secondarily in L`.he ca�~e of
nonpayment, on the price of fixed property, with preference given to unsecured
debts, but after the debts indicated in the preceding paragraph.
In case of failure to replay, governffient credits referred to in Faragraph 3
of Article 2752 of the Civil Code are based on personal property or real ea-
tate, with preference given to unsecured credits, with the exception of those
profits indicated in the preceding paragraph.
Article 6(Computation of Compensation Without Prior Notice)
Article 2121 of the Civil Code is replaced by the following;
- "The compensation referred to in Article 2118 of the Civil Code must be cal-
culated by computing th~ provisions, production bonuses, sharing in profits
or products, or other compensation ~of a continuous nature, with the exclusion of
of reimbursement for expenses.
"If the employee is paid totally or in part through commissions or profit-
sharing, the aforementioned compensation is determined by the average of the
earnings of the last 3 years of employment or of the least amount of time of
services rendered.
"The equivalent for room and board awed to the employee is also part of this
compensation."
Article 7 (SEamen)
Com~pensation referred to in Articles 351, 352, 519, and 920 of the Navigation
Code approved with Royal Decree 30 March 1942, iVo 327, are replaced by the
severanc~ pay re gulations indicated in the presetit law.
When, according to Part IV of Title IV of the Navigation Code approved with
Royal Decree 30 Nt~rch 1942, No 327, severance pay or other compensation is pro-
~ portional to earnings, this is intended as being determined and regulated by
collective labor contracts.
Article 8 (Applicability)
The provisions of the present law apply to all relationships involving sub-
ordinate work for which forms of seniority pay, sev~rance pay, severance pay
delineated in any fashion and from ~y source legally considered responsib le
under the law are applied.
Laws regarding severance pay for civil service employees remain the same.
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Title II
Final and Transitory Regulatio,zs
Arti_~le 9(Computation for the Earning of Acquired Contingency Points)
In partial abrogation of Article 2 of the present law, increases in the con-
tingency compensati.on or earnings of like nature, accrued from 1 Feb ruary 1977
through 1 May 19 82, are computed in the annual.real earnings in the following
_ manner and with the following due dates:
--25 points beginning from 1 January 1983
--25 more points beginning from 1 July 1983 ~
--25 more points beginning from 1 January 1984
--25 mare points beginning from 1 July 1984
--25 more points beginning from 1 January 1985
--25 more points beginning from 1 July 1985
--remaining points beginning from 1 January 1986
Article 10 (Parity)
Until 31 December 1989, and except for more favorable collective contracts,
for employees who, at the moment that the present law goes into effe ct have
the right to seniority pay that is less than that indicated in the law of
18 December 1960, No 1561, the measures expressed in hours or days indicated
by the collective contracts for seniority pay are evaluated proportionately
to the amount of earninga for each year divided by 13.5.
By that date, all categories of workers must be guaranteed the right to the
treatment outlined in the present law.
Article 11 (Abolition of the Fund for Employee Compensation)
The fund referred to in Article 3 of the Royal Draft Bill of 8 January 1942,
No 5, converted, with modifications to the law of 2 October 1942, No 1251, is
declared null and void.
The assets of the fund referred to in the preceding paragraph are passed on to
the employers who have this right proportionate to the reserves put aside ac-
cording to the law. The modalities f or the liquidation of the aforesaid as-
sets are established by decree of the Labor Ministry and Social Security to-
gether with the Treasury Ministry.
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Article 12 (Norms for Abrogation)
Articles 1 and la of the Draft Law o~ 1 February 1977 No 12, converted, with
modifications to the law of 31 March 1977, No 91, and Article 2120 of the
Civil Code are abrogated.
All other no~s of laws or norms 1laving the force of law which concern the
forms of seniority pay, severance pay, and severance pay delineated in any
fashion, are abrogated.
All clauses of collective contracts regulating the aforementioned sub~ects
are null, and are replaced legally by the norms of the present law.
In cases in which the norms of law or nor.ms having the force of law or
clauses of collective contracts which refer to institutes indicated in the
second paragraph or to their regulatory funds, the referral must be considered
as a referral to severance pay indicated in the present law.
Article 13 (Application Date)
The present law will be valid the day after its publication in the OFFICIAL
GAZETTE and will be applied from 1 Jun~ 1982.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Editrice I1 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l.
9941
CSO; 3104/163
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ECON~IIC IxP.LY
OUTLOOK FOR INFLATION, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, UNEI~LOYI~NT
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 14 Mar 82 p 13
[Article by E. J.: "Three Alternative Scenarios for the Italian Economy
1982-198310]
[Text] The beginning of 1982 finds the Italian ecoaomy in the midst of a re-
cessive cycle that has lasted for a year and a half, ev~en if th~ situation has
improved during the most recent period. For the first time in 3 years here,
external factors are operating favorably, attenuating inflationary pressures.
Increases in oil and raw-material prices are not expected, nor are exchange
movements iaqual to those of preceding years. For the Italian economy, there- .
fore, 1982 is a year of possibilities and risks. ~
Possibilities and risks, prospects and alternative involutions are clearly .
seen in the first of ~ix annual reports from the European~'Center for Research,
edited by Maurizio Pala, Antonino Pedone, Giorgio Ruffolo, Luigi Spaventa,
Franco Sartori, Nicol~i Scalzini, Salvatore Tutino.
The year 1982 is one in which inflation will depend almost exclusively on
intemal behavior, without the possibility for shifting responsibility to
international factors beyond our control. The results of analyses carried
out indicate the difficulty of bringing the inflationary process under con-
trol rapidly and eliminating the internal a~nd external imbalances without
suffering too much aamage in terms of income and inflation. The writers of
the report have, therefore, put three scenarios before us, one inertial, one
govemmental, one trade union. ~
The conclusions reached by the group of experts fram Europe Research are out-
lined in a well-articulated, international framework of the economy. For the
OECD countries, the gross product growth rate should t,e 1.5 percent in the
second half of 1982, and rise to 3 percent in the first half of 1983. Only
Japan would consolidate higher development ratea (5 percent in the first part
of 1983). Unemployment will continue to rise to 8 percent in the first half
of 1982, involving particularly the young labor force. Inflation will tend
to decrease on the international level, reflecting the decrease in the price
of basic raw materials and foodetuffs, as well as the prospect of more con-
tained salary raises due to more widespread unemployment. The curreat deficit
of the OECD countriea should remain the same, though there will be great
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disparities from country to country. Fconomic policies will continue to have
a tendentially restrictive character, while monetary policies will consent to
narrow paths toward recovery.
The following hypotheses were made cc~~ncerning world demand and ~rices for the
construction of the three scenarios. World demand expressed by che weighed
index of products manufactured in the principle industrialized nations cam-
peting with Italy will increase by 4.5 percent in 1983 and by 7 percent in
1983. Exports of OPEC will increase more than 10 percent. The price of
crude oil will increase 5 percent in 1982 and 8 percent in 1983. The prices
of other raw materials and foodstuffs should show a slow recovery in 1982,
more consistent in 1983. Prices of manufactured products in dollars should
increase 8.6 percent in 1982 and 8 percent in 1983. The lira-dollar exchange
rate should remain at about the level of the end of 1981 (1,200 lira), while
the exchange rate with the mark should register a devaluatian of the lira of
13 percent in 1982 and 5 percent in 1983.
The aspect which differentiates the basic scenario from the other two ~~is-
cussed in this report is represented by the hypotheses pertaining to t~ne be-
havior of state enterprise concerning income taxes and satary dynamics. The
basic assumptions are: the inflation-ad~ustment scale will continue un-
modified, and salary increases are such as to conserve after-tax buying power
for salaried workers in 1982 and 1983; thus fiscal drainage which weighs on
salaried workers will operate totally on the basis of progressivity. These
hypotheses mark an inertial picture in the sense that each of the principle
economic agents goes its own way: the government is allied with the dictates
of financial laws, union leaders attempt to maintain after-tax salaries.
- Stagnation is predicted in this basic scenario: the PIL [Gross Domestic
Product] remains practic~lly on the same level as that of 1982 (+0.3 percent),
and registers a less than moderate increase in 1983 (+1.5 percent). Total em-
ployment would decline slightly during the 3-year period 1981-83, but given
the predictable increase in the labor force, the unemployment rate would rise
rapidly, going from 7.6 percent in 1980 to 11 percent in 1983. Private con-
sumption would under,go a decrease of 1 percent and slight recovery in 1983
(+0.4 percent). The increase in nominal earnings, (slightly less than 24 and
20 percent in 1982 and 1983), would allow, in the 2 years a gross increase of
3.3 and 2.7 percent, which, because of the effect of fiscal drainage, would
set net earnings at the same values as those of 1981. The available "real"
income would undergo a decrease of 0.8 percent in 1982 and an increase of 1.8
percent in 1983. Investments would show negative rates in both years with a
drastic decrease (-12.7 percent) in real terms in 19E2.
Exports will continue to represent the most dynamic part of the combined de-
mand in the presence, as well, of a reduction in the market quota. A negative
sign would be the influence of the evolution of prices with respect to those
of competitors. Because of reports on the predictions concerning Pxchange
relations of the lira and the still heavy inflation, a gradual deterioration
of our competitivity would occur, causing a lose in market quota, increased
importations, with an increasing quantity from 1.5 to 3.5 percent, a drastic
change of the parity of the lira in the SME. The current debt would be re-
duced to abo ut 2.7 tr~.llion liras, then transformed into a positive balance of
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about 3 trillion liras in 1983. We are dealing with a fragile and costly
equilibrium, because it would be the expression of ad~ustments d~spite the
worsening in competitiveness of our products. Prices in liras would rige!
in this scenario, to a rate over 19 percent and 16 percent in 1983. The quota
of available income from dependent work on the added value of the private
sector would increase again by 1 percent in 1982, to decrease by 0.4 percent
in 1983, so that the gross margins of companies would decrease.
The quota of the net debt on the gross domestic product should be about 2
goints less than th~t of 1981. A more marked improvement should take place
concerning the currency deficit, whose quota aa the PIL should fall from 5.0
to 3.4 percent. The quota on the PIL of the total need of the widened public
sector, finally, should be reduced to 10.3 percent for 1483 (compared to 12.8
percent for 1981).
_ With respect to imports, first of all, a further increase in fiscal pressure
should be registered, wh ich, in 1983, should be about 40.3 percent, with an
increase of about 2 points with respect to 1981. The m~st dynamic component
would continue to be represented by direct taxes, and, in this sense, by the
IRPEF [tax on family income]. The withholding at the source for salaried
workers should show, from 1981 to 1983 a total increase near 80 percent de-
spite the hypothesis adopted concerning tax deduc~tions.
Current expenditures for the PIL should remain at about 45.5 percent.
The scenario that we now outline clazifies the consequences that would come
about in reaching the objective of a 16 percent inflation rate fixed by the
government, without paying any price to obtain it. Thus, a hypothetical
scenario. The PIL could grow by 1.8 percent in 1982 and by 3 percent in 1983,
and total employment would register a modest total growth only in 1983. Total
d~maad would increase by only 2.1 percent in 1982 and 3.7 percent in 1983,
with a large contribution coming from inventories for both years, consumption
would increase less than 1 percent. Real income would increase 1 percent and
2.4 percent. Gross fixed investments would register a modest increase. The
current balance of payments deficit would settle at about 5.5 trillion liras
in 1982, to show a positive balance of 1.7 trillion liras in 1983. The
nominal increment in earnings after indexing would be 16 percent, with a net
decrease of 2.2 percent in 1982 and an increase of 0.5 percent in 1983. In
terms of public financing, a worsening of the deficit in 1982, but a net in-
crease in 1983: the present deficit would be lowered fr~m 20 to 15 trillion
liras. In real texms, the reversal results as still more sharp, with a half
point reduction in 1983. Fiscal presaure increases by a small amount in rela-
tion to the PIL (+0.6 percent for 1981-83). Current expenditures are reduced
with respect to the PIL by 1.8 percent from 1981-83 thanks, chiefly, to the
reduction of interest on the national debt.
The recovery outlined in this scenario is not Ephemeral because it is based
on the renewal of the demand for investments and the increased competitive-
ness of exports. There would, in any case, be an increased cost in terms of
compression of real after-tax earnings and stagaation of employment.
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Three Scenarios for the Italian Economy Coaipared "
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
1982 1983 ~9$2 1983 1982 1983
PIL 0.3 1.5 1.8 3.3 1.8 3.0
Imports 1.5 3.5 3.4 5.4 3.5 5.4
Consumption -0.3 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.6
Gross Investments -6.4 -1.7 -4,6 1.9 -5.7 -0.2
Exports 4.2 5.2 7,0 11.0 5.9 8.9
Current Balance* -2,700 3,035 -5,430 1,731 -6,206 -1,570
Current P.A. �
Deficit* -18,466 -19,104 -20,506 -14,838 -23,785 -25,190
Consumer Prices 19.3 17.0 16.0 13.0 17.2 13.2
Gross average earn-
ings (indexed) 23.7 19.9 16.2 16.1 18.5 14.7
Real gross average
earnings (indexed) 3.4 2.7 0.1 2.8 1.1 1.3
Real after-tax earn-
ings (indexed) -0.1 -0.2 -2.2 0.4 1.1 1.3
~ Cost of labor
per unit 21.6 16.2 11.4 10.2 14.2 1U.0
Total employment -0.4 0.1 -U.3 0.5 -0.2 0.6
*Value in billions of current liras ~
Scenario A = "Inertial" hypothesea
- Scenario B = Gmvernment line
Scenario C = The.union proposal
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`i'he tiiird scenario is that of the unions; it is based on two directives:
union acceptance of the moderation of real after-tax earning requests, and
governmenta~l elimination of the fiscal drain on incomes. In terms of employ-
ment and growth, the results would not be dissimilar to those comprised in the
government scenario, and the social cost of a reduction in real income of
workers would be eliminated. Yet other costs would be seen: a worsening of
the national debt and a worsening in the balance of payment3 that would sig-
nify imbalances in exchange and higher inflation. In this scenario, the GNP
would increase appreciably, from la8 percent in 1982 to 3 percent in 1983, with
an increase in industrial production of 2.8 and 5.4 percent. Global demand
would register an expansion of 2 and 3.4 percent, sustained significantly by
foreign components. Frivate consumption would graw 0.9 percent in 1982 and
1.6 percent in 1983. Investments would diminish by 6.7 percent, and would re-
main more or less unchanged in 1983. ~
- The balance of payments woL:Ld go into the red by 6.2 trillion liras in 1982
~and 1.6 trillion liras ir. 1983. Inflation, though decelerating, would be at
higher levels than thc..~ of Che government (17.2 percent in 1982 and 13.2 per-
cent in 1983). Earnings increase would be 18.5 and 14 percent. Earnings in-
crease after the inflation ad~ust~.~ent scale would be 13.2 and 10.1 percent.
The cost of labor per unit produced w~ould grow 14.2 percent in 1982 and 10 per-
cent in 1983. Industrial productivity would register an increase of 4.3 per- ~
cent in 1982 and 4.7 percent in 1983o Gross margins pushed by industry on ~
the costs of work per unit produced would grow by about 2 points in 1982 and
3.8 points in 1983. With a change unfavorable to dependent workers, a certain
recovery in conditions of profitability in industrial enterprises could be in-
dicated. The union proposal, aside from the reduction of input due to declin-
ing prices, will bring about a further reduction of imports due to the elimi-
nation of fiscal drain. The deceleration of expenditures does not, however,
evade the strong increase in the present deficit of the P.A. [Public Adminis-
trationJ order of 4 trillion liras in 1982 and of another 2 trillion liras in
1983. The present expense for the PIL decreases from 45.5 to 44.5 percent be-
cause interest payments increase by only 6.5 points, contributing halfway to
the reduction of the quota on the gross product of the total current expendi-
ture.
The union proposal would attain positive resul._*.s both in terms of the reduc-
tion of the inflation rate and in the creation of conditions for moderating
earnings requests in nominal terms. However, it would aggravate inequalities
in the balance of payments and in public financing. In this sense, conditions
for a new devaluation which would raise inflation would be created.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Editrice I1 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l. _
9941
CSO; 3104/163
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POI.ITI CAL NETHERLANDS
AC'1'IVITIES UF EXTR~s'IE T~IGHTIST YARTIES YIEWED
Amsterdam VRIJ NEDEftLAND in Dutch 3 Apr 82 p 17
~rticle by correspond.ent Hans Smits: "Extreme Right in the Large
Cities"
LText7 One out of three qualified voters stayed
home during the States elections. That is a
national average. For in some districts in the
large cities more than half stayed at home--
sometimes two out of three qualified vot~rs.
1~ihat is strikin~ is that those figures were re-
corded precisely in districts where extreme
rightist parties such as the Center Pa,rty ("crine
is continually more widespread") and the Peoples
Union usually score high in their campaigns:
The Schilder District in The Hague and the Indo-
nesian neighborhood in Amsterdam. This is a
study of the extreme Right's propaganda and prov~-
ocation.
Un 12 Noverober 19~1~ the Second Chamber approved a number o~ consti-
tutional amendments. Among these was the article which regulates �
foreigners' right to vote.for city councils and the like. Yet, we ~
expect and we actually have a government of Ali Baba and the Forty
Thieves.
A report from ttie winter issue of WIJ NEDERLAYD, publication of the
~M! ~utch People's ITnion7 declares:
"If alt goes ~.ccordinn to plan, ~oreigners will soon get the right to
\ vote. You begin to think like this: The politicians in The Hague
are ne~lectin~ notl~in~ to set their own population ag~.inst each other.
If they a,re so fond of Poreigners, the solution is simple: bring
14 million of ttiem in ~.nd vote the Netherlands away: They are already
nicely busy with tha.t: for the minorities have almost ~our times as~
many children as the Dutch."
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This is a quotation from a pamphlet with which the Center Party an-
nounces itself for the coming city council elections of 2 June.
and still both parties seem to strike a somewhat moderate tone to try
to benefit all the more in the council elections ~rom the dormant and
here and there even obvious racism in cities where many ethnic minor-
ities are housed. No bloodcurdling exaggeration, as, for example,
in the pamphlet w}iich the viking Youth distributed in Amsterdam as--
a reaction to the peace demonstration of 21 November 1981: "Iiowever,
do you ~:now that we have a bacteriologica,l bomb in our midst, which
is much more dangerous than all nuclear weapons together? This bac-
teriological bomb is contamination with rlussulmanitis." That pamphlet
asserted that the Musselmen have 'only one goal~ to'avenge the defeat
which their ancestors had to swallow beYore the gates of Yienra:
"Consequently, they like to doll themselves up to pick up Western .
women in cafes, disc~s, yes even on the street, and convert them to
Islam."
The Center Party is now appealin~ to "Tom, Dick and Iiarry" who must
_ pay for the i~utch government's population and immigration policy with
their goods and chattels, and with their enjoyment of life: "In the
ordinary neighborhoods, the situation is becoming intolerable. Dif-
ferent people with separate cultures are packed close together. That
leads to tensions and conflicts. But the Dutch must adjust and swal-
low everything, for otherwise they are discriminating. A dispersion
policy only means that it is now the turn of the next neighborhoods."
The Center Party emphasizes that you do not recognize our country
anymore, because the Netherlands is no longer only for tl;e Dutch.
'+~Thile the government really should have, in the first place, the obli-
gation of standinQ up for its own population. .
Such texts, in combination with facile slogans about energy policy
("the government sells gas at a ridiculously low price abroad. We
must pay high for ~as in our own country, while it comes out of the
Qround in Groningen"), income policy ("~~e must save everything we �
have, while the government throws money around"), security ("~rime
incre~.ses continually, the unishments for cri~inals ~.re less and
less") and soci~.l benefits ~("~ven there the government wants to con-
tinue to meddle. 'n~e h~.ve certainly paid premiums for them, but that
is nothing to it) a,re characteristic of the way in which Hans
Janmaat, the chairman of the Center Yarty~ f ormer KVP ~atholic
Yeople's Party7 member, exploits fear and insecurity.
Imitators
In the llecember issue of the party newspaper lYlIllll~N'vTLG, J~,nmaat emph~.-
sized especially the neglect of the average Uutchmen. The present
ca,binet allegedly favors the "other population groups" in housing,
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eciuca.tion, employment and social benefits. A form of racism which
aims a.t "the discrimination a~ainst its own peo~le."
The \rVU is also seekin~ a course which is less offensive than in
recent years, when Joop Glimmerveen set the tone. Glimmerveen, who
will participa,te in the city council elections in The }Iague :~ith his
own slate, left the NYU last year, after he first resi_gned as chair-
man. In a,n interview with the HA.AGSE POST (12 Sept 1981) he connected
his resignation with the election result (nif we had succeeded~ th~n
I would not have resigned") and with quarrels about ~Irs Rost van
Tonningen (the widow of the NSB ~ational Socialist riovemen] leader),
who as a NViT member could have been extremely useful to the Center
Party: "Imitators who are tryin~ in ~.n underhanded way to exploit
what we have tried to achieve in 10 years by malcing sacrifices." His
t}~ird reason for resigning from the NVIT was, according to Glimmerveen:
"Someone, who is married to a Jewess,is now on the iJYU Eaecutive
Committee."
~n that occasion, Glimmerveen displayed even more antisemitism with
his statement that the head of a city such as Amsterdam should not
be a Jewish mayor, "for they can never feel attached to our people.n
The fact that the Amsterdam Public Prosecutor, doctor of laws, W.G.C.
Mij.nssen refused to bring an action against Glimmerveen requested by
the Amsterdam Initiative Against Fascism, Ra,cism and Antisemitism,
is a very questionable decision. Mijnssen considered the statements
were discriminating enougYi to bring a criminal actio~, but though~
that an interview is somewhat different than "public statements."
The h'W Lxecutive Committee member, whom Glimmerveen had referred to,
is the present chairman, H.J. Barendregt, Glimmerveen's successor
since 17 Uctober 1981. This geneologist (family tree investigator)
appearec~ to be al.so at the time of his appointment a member of the
_ ~rVll ~eople's Party of Freedom and Democracy] and a sponsor o~ the
Former Combatants Legion. He considers himsel~ "a moderate conserva-
tive with ~.n a;~preciation o~ social needs which exist in spite of the
~.~elf~.re state." lluring his introduction in his own circle, Barendregt
expressl.y declared that he disassociates himself from e~.~ery form of
raci~.l discrimination: "We condemn dictatorship in any form whatso-
ever." The question was brought up in the NViT whether the Odal runic
letter as an identification, formerly also used as such by a SS sec-
- tion, still should be ~~reserved from a tactical standpoint, "in view
of the more moderate course.n
1~'e in the Netherlands speak about the growth of the VVD and the CDA
~hristi~n Democr~.tic Appee.]: "The great advantage of this develop-
ment is tliat we now have been able to strengthen the intelligentsia
in the p~tirty. �e were looked c~own upon because we were only a group
of dumb workesSOf ~,busiveelangua~mustCbelaethingloYetheapastcided
that excha,n~,
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"i~ihen we reject multiracial or multicultural society, this is be-
cause of the ~act that diverse cultures, Sar apart from each other,
cannot go forward without creating tension. we have a Dutch culture
in our country, which has proved its value through the centuries.
That culture is to be preserved.for us."
~.n Atmosphere
The Center Party and the NyU.have both chosen as their ma.in goal: the
Netherlands tor the ]?utchmen. It is a de~i~ite ef~ort to prevent a
repetition o~ a ban or exclusion because ot public racism or ~a,scism.
There is all the more reason to keep a close check on these parties.
In -~he past, the question could be asked if it made any sense to pay
attentioa to neo Nazi and neo-Fascist groups ~rhich did not succeed in
gaining a foothold, now other ~actors play a role. The economic re-
cession, rapidly increasing unemployment, the incre~ase of relative
poverty, the threat o~ more economies at the eapense of the lowest
paid and bene~it recipients and the growing criticism of the presence
of Surinamers, Netherlands Antilleans, Turks and Moroccans crea,te an
atmosphere in which the Center Pa,rty and the NV[T should be able to
thrive.
In the book "Uld and New Fascisid'published by the Anne Frank Founda-
tion at Yan Gennep~ Joke Kniesmeyer ~rrites that the danger of the
NViT and the Center Party does not lie in the large number o~ people
which they can recruit: ~The truth forces us to say that both have
a di4ficult life as an organization. They have not ma~naged in recent
~ years to hold a public meeting undisturbed."
According to Joke Kniesmeyer it is more dangerous that many ideas
which the neo Nazis are spreading are getting a hearing among broader
strata of the the population:"perhaps isolated, a.nd not in the same
ideological context, but they exist: The idea of a strong leader who
makes an end to all that colossal blundering in The Hague, the idea
that it is a shame for a wome.n to work when a man is unemployed~ the
idea that everything would be better i~ large groups df foreigners,
could be removed from the Netherlands~ if not willingly~ then unwill-
ingly." To that is added, writes Joke I{niesmeyer, that with an in-
creasing deterioration of future prospects~ many Kill be read,y to
ac?vocate more radical solutions for social problems, "something which
the extreme right will try to take advantage ot."
`1'1~e h'W and the Center Party Will participate in the city council
elections in many cities. Both parties a.lso participated in the
chamber elections last year. There appeared then no alternative Por
the ~'armer's Party, which was completely swept away and which this
time was called the lti~?htist People's Party. The NYU obtained 10,522
votes (0.12 percent) a~~d the Center Party 12,189 votes (0.14 percent).
1'his scant success was influenced to a great extent by the fact that
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both parties could not compete in all electoral districts. The NYU
Was not allowed to participa,te in North and SoutY: Holland, 'Leeland
and Drenthe. The Center Party was excluded in the Haarlem, Leiden,
Dcrdrecht and ~otterdam electoral districts. In South Holland and
Drenthe the NW lists were declared inv~,lid because a number of the
25 signatures required per voter were obtained under false pretenses.
- In the provinces of Nosth Ho?iand and Zeele,nd objections to the NW
and the Center Party were declared to be based on an appeal to the
European Treaty for the Protection of Human Rights.
The Center Party obtai~ed the best results in Amsterdam (1 percent)
and The Iiague (1 percent)~ the NVtT obtained 0.7 percent in Utrecht.
In the 1977 Chamber elections, the NVZT obtained over 33,000 votes
(0.4~percent) with exceptions in some reconstructed districts in the
urban circle. ~~lhere the NW had appee,led to the original residents
of old worlcing class districts with problems ebout relations with
Surinamers, Netherla.nds Antilleans and ~oreign workers, there the
percentages were the highest. The Station Neighborhood (3.2 percent)
and the Schilder District (3.1 percent) in The Hague stood at the top.
The kotterd~.m Kruiskade and environs gave the NViJ 2.1 percent, in
Amsterdam, this party obtained 1.7 percent in Old Last.
The cities of The Hague (1.35 percent), Amsterdam (1.24 percent) and
Rotterdam (1.06 percent) showed a rather limited but still alarming
tendency to honor racist propaganda. Tha.t had already appeared in
The Hague in the city couacil elections of 1974 when the N'VU leader,
Glimmerveen, with 4,000 votes, lost for the city council by the very
narrowest margin. Shortly before the 1978 city council elections~
the NVU k�as declared a banned organization and consequently excluded
from participation. But after a Supreme Court decision in 1979 the
Way was clear for the N'W, although with the competition of the
Center Party.
The Center Party will certainly participate in the city council elec-
tions in Amsterdam, ftotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague and the NYZT, in
- ltotterclam and The Hague. In the latter city, the Glimmerveen slate
is a.lso allowed. In the States elections last Wednesday in Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, The liague and Utrecht over 600~000 voters stayed at home.
In the Schilder district in The Hague, the turnou~~ was only 34 per-
cent. `Phe turnout was below 40 percent even in the station and
1'ransvaal ciistricts. In Amsterdam the turnout in the Indonesian
neighborhood was less than 50 percent.
The picture was comparable in all problem districts in the large
cities: a big loss for the PvdA LLabor Party~, a gain for the V~V1) and
the small leftist parties, but above all an aversion to the estab-
lished political parties.
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Fear and Insecurity
Joke I{niesmeyer says: �Because confidence in the big political par-
- ties is declinin~, a vacuum is developing which the Center Party and
the y'W are trying to ~ill. The Center Party especially is dangerous.
- Barendregt of the ?JVtT is attempting to introduce it as a genuine
ri;htist party. There are enough of them. The Center Party exploits
much more astutely the fear of ~urther surrender and insecurity about
the future. Fascism has no chance without Year and insecurity."
Still Joke Kniesmeyer is not so pessimistic: When you see what hap-
Pened in 'r:ngland where foreigners are harassed in organized fashion
to get them to leave, when you see how many people with a Nazi past
join in the discussions in the FRG about the Poreign workers. When
you see how many signs are displayed there in Belgium to publicly
keep out foreigners, then it all is still not so bad in the Nether-
lands. But we must be on our guard.
Joke Kniesmeyer takes as an example, a teacher from Zeeland who had
subscribed to the Center Party's neWSpaper MIDDENWEG. He wanted to
get a lesson about neo-Fascism. The tea.cher received the newspaper
with a mistake in his name. He received unsolicited, with the sa,me
mistake in his name, the newspaper RE'VOLTE of the Flemish Outpost,
which also announces itself in the Netherle.nds as a national revolu-
tionary moveraent "with the return of the ~oreign Morkers to their
homeland," as its most important goel.
C~PYKIGIiT: 1982 VN/BV Weekbladpers
8490
C~O: 3105/165
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GENERAL FRANCE
ERRATUM: The following is a corrected version of an item
originallq published on page 32 of JPRS L/10507 of 11 May 198~,
FODO 29/82 of this series. The photograph was omitted in
the earlier vereion.
. PHOTO OF ARIANE SOLID PROPELLAN'P BOOSTER RELEASED
Paris AIR ET COSI~OS in French lO~Apr 82 p 43
[Article: "Ariane 3 Solid Propellant Booster"]
[Text] Aerospatiale has just published the firat photo of one of the solid
propellant boosters for the future European Ariane 3 launch vehicle scheduled
to become operational in 1983. This booster was produced by the Italian
firm Aeritalia. Its erection container was built by ACI~i of France. This
container will be used to raise the boosters to an upright position for their
attachment to the launcher's first stage. Integration of these Ariane 3
boosters is accomplished in A~erospatiale's plant at Les Muresux near Paris.
~
~3.
-~r~,
/
.
`
~
COPYRIGHT: A. ~ C. 1982
8041
CSO: 3100/564
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GENERAL
ITALY
PROFILES OF PROMINENT COrIl~IIJNIST INDIISTRIALISTS
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 12 Mar 82 pp Q8-105
[Article by Davide Paolini, "Comrade Boss"J
[Text] He has membership in both the PCI and
Confindustria. At home in PCI headquarters, yet he
clashes with the unions on his company premises. Who
are the red industrialists? IL MONDO has drawa up a
list of them.
At their most recent conference on 5 December, the agenda covered three sub-
3ects: the consequences of the credit squeeze; the reform of easy credits;
and the plight of Confabi as a result of the internal split among the regional
associations over the renewal of the national summit.
Although the 20 industrialists summoned to the meeting came from various
regions and cities, they convened punctually at the scheduled hour on the
fifth floor of PCI headquarters on the Via delle Botteghe Oscure, Rome.
Awaiting them as always were~the men in charge of the middle class division,
Guido Cappelloni, Giambattista Podesta and deputy Federico Frini, director of
ORIENTAMENTI NUOVI, a PCI monthly dedicated to emall and medium business .
operations. During previous conferences the participants often met also with
Gerardo Chiaramonte, in charge of the PCI's economics division, aad Gianfranco
Borghini, head of the industrial division, with whom they remain ia close con-
tact.
What do they do, these 20 captains of industry, when they convene periodically
- at PCI headquarters? What topics do they discuss? And do they represent a
limited number of economic bigshots close to the party or possibly a wide-
spread phenomenon of industrialists with strong communist sympathies?
How the group of 20 came into exiatence
The 20 are part of a working committee concerned with problems affecting small
and medium businesses in the middle class sector. Set up on the Via delle
Botteghe Oscure, at first the group functioned on a purely formal basis; with
time, however, the number of participating members grew, and their meetings
proceeded with mounting intensity. The impetus that led to the formation of
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the committee was taken up by the party's national direction after various
peripheral experiments had been made, the most importaat in Turin. There
2 years ago, more than 50 small and medium industrialist members of the PCI--
most of them unionists who had lost their jobs during the 1950s--organized
an autonomous working group to concentrate exclusively on issues involving
small and medium enterprtses (it is the only one that eaists on a federatio~a
basis) .
The Turin experiment
The group's ongoing program (its leaders are the industrailists Lorenzo Bonion,
Bruno Pittatore and Ettore Durb iano) is still very active, promoting
discussions with bankers on credits with noncommunist industrialists, with
local administratoss, union officers and politicians. "Sometimes," says Bruno
Pittatore, "we have managed to involve approximately 300 Turin industrialists
in our efforts. Useless to deny it, we have also had some verq heated argir
ments with those of our awn colleagues whose ideas differ from ours."
The Turin committee instituted two research projects. One is a questionnaire
distributed among 1,000 small operators, asking for detailed information on ~
their businesses and their relations with the local authorities and the
unions. "This undertaking was so successful," Pittatore adds, "that ORIENT-
A1~:NTI NUOVI now wants to repeat the experiment on the national scale."
Together with the university, Turin's communist industrialists are currently
conducting an investigation into the dynamics of the motor car industry. The
group's commitments are not restricted, however, to business. During the
national elections of June 1~80, 14 industrialists--Valerio Avogadro, Enzo
Baiardi, Secondino Boero, Lorenzo Bonino, Antonio Delucchi, Ettore Durbiano,
Eugenios Gastaldo, Secoado Greganti, Giovanni Latilla, Sergio Morello, Sante
Peronato, Bruno Pittatore, Gastone Scura and Cesare Valenari--ran as candi-
dates on the PCI slate. They opened their electoral campaign by distributing
a letter-program among all their industrial colleagues.
~ie success achieved by the Turin committee and a second effort made in 2tilan
to draw the industrialists around ORIENTAI~TTI N[TOVI (located in Milaa and
restricted to the Lombardy region until the end of 1978) inspired the PCI
leaders to establish a national group of red indistriali,sts. But haw to choose
the right men for it? The criteria adopted for selecting them were:
inclusion of all productive sectors (metal and chemical products, plastics,
biomedics, clothing textiles, building construction and shoes); the size of
each nominee's operation ~Y10 fewer than 50 employees); and geographical loca-
tion (members come from almost every region of Italy). The committee has put
forth various proposals subsequently endorsed by the PCI, such as organizing
special regional agencies to supply aid to small and mediwa businesses
(financing, marketing, studies, research and promotion abroad). It was this
com~ittee, too, that conceived the idea for a bill to compensate credits be-
tween the state and business.
A map of comnnuiist industrialism
Although the 20 cotmnittee members chosen by communist headquarters (see box)
and the numerous Turin PCI industrialists represent the elite of left
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industrialism, they are by no means an isolated p::enomenon. Indeed, in
almost every region of Italy one will find a healthy group of communist it;.dus-
trailists or simply PCI constituents, as demonstrated in an appeal signed by
some 70 of them, which was published in IINITA after the electoral returns of
3-4 June 1980.
The foremost nuceli of red industrialist~ are located in Tuscany (among the
best known are Mauro Paolanti, Mauro Puliti, Luciano Cungi, Guido Galli,
Alessandro Cecchini and Piero Bianchini, in Florence, and Oddino 2fancini della
Vittoria in Castelfiorentini), but even more promineat are those in Emilia-
Romagna (Monica Ferrante, of Salise iu Parma; Calro Villani, of Anderson, Parma;
Gianfranco Dacci, Marri, Sasso Marconi; Franco Farina, Zola, Presalgraade;
Vando Veroni, Missdeanna; Luciano Bertolini, Pontecchiele, Montecchio; Carlo
Tamburini, River and Rocca, Lugo di RAmagna; Sergio and Giampaola Bonetei,
Fias, Bologna, Ferdiano Bortolotti, Comba, Sasso Marconi, Sergio and Carlo
Fortuzzi, Calderara). In Emilia, moreover, some of these industrialists
campaigned for public office on the PCI platform. Such was the case of Livio
Fornaciari, proprietor of Comet in Reggio Emilia, who raa for a seat in the
Parliament of Europe, likewise of Luigi Cantagalli, o~mer of Arti grafiche
reggiane (Reggio Graphic Arts), member of Confindustria and a candidate in the
national elections.
Even in the South, the number of red indw~~trialists has been rising over the
past several years, pa~ticularly in the Abruzzi (in the province or Teramo
and in Pescara there are Renato Saveni, L~uciano Monaco, Giuseppe Aloisi,
Antonio Rietti and Giovanni Stante) and irt Apulia Federico Piro (Bari), in
_ charge of the middle class division, who t~ias exerted every effort to close
ranks with small and medium business. Pra'~bably the most unusual case in
Apulia has to do with Wally Valeri, a woma~n building constructor of Foggia,
erstwhile vice president of Confindustria's young membership group, and a
candidate for the Foggia provincial council on the left independent ticket on
the communist slate (she was not elected, but came in 13th). In Sicily
there are others, although fewer. In Palermo, for example, apart from Amoroso,
one of the 20, there is only Alcudio Frasca Polara, owner of San Lorenzo,
one of the most successful technological firms in Sicily, brother of Giorgio,
UNITA journalist and press office chief for Nilde Iotti, president of the
Chamber.
In the South, however, the PCI has encountered both satisfactions and
aversities in its relations with the local industrialists. For ir,.:tance,
Antonio Toma, one of the 20, was obliged to interrupt his activities because
the courts pronounced his business a failure. And about one year ago, Bari
saGr the misfortunes of Hermanas, a textile mill in Bitonto, owned (with
another firm, the Th) by Antonio Liaci, former communist deputy mayor of
Bitonto. During one night, all the Hermanas firm's equipment was spirited
away and 400 dependents lost their jobs. The company was declared bankrupt
and Liaci, a lawyer, was expelled from the PCI as an unworthy exponent of
communism.
Identikit of the red industrialist
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In his work, what is the red industrialist like? How does he differ, if he
differs at all, from his nonco~unist peers? IL 1~PID0's eaquiry shaws that
in point of fact, there are no substantial contrasts between~them and
industrialists of other political persuasions; indeed, most of the commuaists
belong to Confindustria but are still affiliated With Confabi. Lorenzo
Bonino and Bruao Pittatore, both Turinese and neither enrolled in any
association, declare that "Between the two organizations we find no great
differences. Act+aally, in Turin, Confindustri~a seems the more advanced,
whereas Confabi clings to 19th century practices, just like mea who owaed
iron works i~ the past. Remember that their ideologist is Luigi R~ossi di
Montelera..."
Something else is even more surprising: red business barons do not nurture
the least sympathy for the unions. "Every man must fend for himself,"
declare all the interviewees [in substance]. "Let the uaions pursue their
own eads, but they may not question what we do or how we perform our func-
tions." The result: on their premises the words "self management" and
"comanagement" are never uttered. Only in isolated cases (Edoardo Elmi,
Guido Vicario) does anyone speak of "informational exchanges on investments"
but no more about matters which are naw consecrated in national labor con-
tracts. Ia fact, the red industrialists' objections to the positions taken
by the unions' equalization policy, in force over the last fes~ years. Elio
Cecchini, building constructor and one of the 20, told a PCI meeting on
economics, "You cannot fail to criticize the distorting effects of the wage
structure law, which counters the need for professionalism in developmeat
and obstructs the expansion of productivity by penalizing individuals who
make innovative contributions. Moreover, its so-called egalitarianism is
debatable: it is not egalitarian because it detracts from the valorization
of individual potentialities."
The complaints against the unions involve another problem, the question of
mobility. "I am convinced," says Cecchini, "that mobility does not contradict
real economic-industrial democracy, indeed it is an indispensable presupposi-
tion because mobility plus the acquisitioa of professionalism in both a
hypothetical industrial order and technological development are essential."
All communist industrialists agree on still another point: the need to
revise the employment statute. "The law in force," maintains the Turin
co~ittee, "constitutes one of the worst hindrances to the proper functioaing
of industry."
But if the red economic leaders aggressively oppose the unions, they are
also openly critical of certain PCI economic policies. "On the issue of
credits," says Mauro Frilli, of Siena, "my party spouts fine theories, but
when it comes down to brass tacks, it accomplishes precious little. Talce
what is happening in Tuscany, for example. Although we now have authoritative
expoaents of communism on the boards of the Baaca Toscana and the Banca del ,
Monte dei Paschi, still the policies of these two institutions have not
changed in the slightest."
The communist industrialists, however, are most critical of their party on
still another count: the PCI's lack of any decisive apening to the middle
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class. "The labor class," says William Lugli of Emilia, "will always be
numerically inferior in importance. Given the introduction of new technologies,
within a few years you will have more people employed in the tertiary sector
than workers in industry. The PCI must be more aiert to this dev~lopment
and therefore follow the middle class and its problems more closely."
What the red lambs are like ~
Some of them are former workers who, having been fired, went on to become
industrialists because they could not find jobs; other inherited their
enterprises from fathers or grandfathera. All of them are savoring theix
success without suffering any guilt complexes, without hesitating to denounce
the uaions, and without entertaining any doubts about their activities con-
flicting with their political ideas or militancy--this is the identikit of
the industrial captain who feel altogether comfortable with the PCI. IL
MONDO herewith profiles 11 of them.
Agostini the turncoat
"My worst problems I've had with my bourgeois friends; many of them still ~
consider me a traitor to my class. But perhaps this is typical of a city
like Genoa, where industrialists face the fact of life with very little
courage. On the other hand, I have good relations with my communist workers.
None of them has ever thrown my double positioa, so to speak, in ury face. I
have made what Giorgio Amendola has called a choice of life--and within the
party, which is part of it. In fact, I have participated in dozens of
rallies before stevedores and other workers without any adverse consequences."
This comment was made by Renata Agoatini, Milaaese by birth but Genoese bq
adoption, proprietor of a firm in Genoa which employs 40 persons to produce
mechanical converters much appre~ciated in Italy and abroad (they are eaported
to Germany). She is an atypical figure in the city's restricted bourgeois
industrial world. Enrolled in the PCI since 1943, Renata Agostiai has held
various public posts, first as provincial councillor, then communal councillor
(until the last elections) in Genoa. Her company, which has hired as many
as 250 hands, was founded by her father in 1935 in Cornigliano, near the
Italsider works. Elpidio Agostini originally produced lathes and machinery,
much in demand in Germany and still asked for, although no longer in produc-
tion. With time the firm changed its orientation, but still specializes in
precision instruments, a sector which had not previously e~dst~ed in Genoa.
With the death of her father in 1962, Renata assumed con~rol of the company.
Amoroso the antimafioso
He has run one of the oldest building coastruction outfits in Palermo since
1949, the year he took his diploma in engineering. Fraaco Amo~oso, in fact,
owns the company that bears hi~ name (50 permanent employees), founded some
80 years ago by his grandfather. By tradition his company builds private
dwellings, but recently it has exteaded its operation to in~lude public
structures (law 25), financed by collective corporate investments or by
federal or regional subsidies. Apar~ from construction, Amoroso also controls
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a unit of 24 dependents, whi~h produces domestic fixtures in metal aad wood
for the homes he erects--an undertaking he esta~lished some 20 years ago.
One of the very few Sicilian industrialists to declare his sympathy for the
PCI, he is the only one oa the island summoned to join the PCI national
directior's working group on the problems of small and medium busin~ss.
"Although I am not earolled," he declares, "I feel close to the communist
party because of the decisions it has taken on economic policies over the
past several years--its policies concerning the South, for example. In fact,
I fully share the PCI's prefereace for interventions in company structures
and infrastructures over the other political parties' program of incentives
and economic corner cutting. The PCI's stand is not finding many proselytes
because it does not promise to pay off immediately; instead it anticipates
well equipped areas and new methods of tradiag, whereas the majority of indus-
- trialists want easy loans." .
President of the local association for small business (API), he is an
implacable enemy of the mafia and its methods. When Piersanti 2iattarella,
Christian Democratic president of the regional council, was assassinated, he
had no doubts about the perpetrators of the crime. "They murdered Mattarella,"
he affirms, "to intimidate others because he was different from most of the
island's politicians. He never had his hand in the sack..."
The erstwhile Mayor Angelini
' In 1946 at a very young age, he was called to join the central committee of
FGCI (Italian Communist Youth Federation), then he was elected mayor of
- Bellante, a town in the province of Teramo, and thereafter became chief of
the PCI provincial council for Teramo. By all indications it looked as if he
would rise rapidly in his political career, but an obstacle unexpectedly
blocked the way: the lure of industrialism. "My comrades didn't under-
stand," he explains, "nor did they consider it advisable for me to be both
an industrialist and a militant. Al1 the same, I've gone on in politics but
without taking on any official duties, even though I belong to a working group:
on the problems of small and medium business."
This latent politician is AntoniA Angelini, 52, proprietor of Lian di Nezeto
(Teramo), a knitted goods plant, vice president of API Teramo, and formerly
Abruzzi correspondent for UNITA and PAESE SERA. Following his journalistic
and political co~itments, for two years he represented a firm selling bar
equipment, inheriting this metier from his father upon the latter's death.
"But I disliked hawking other peaple's wares," he says, "so after working as
a clot~ing salesman ar.u having acquired the necessary know-how for producing
clothing, I decided to stiike out on my own. In 1962 he went into business
for himself and established Lian di Nereto. In 1981 his sales totaled 2.5
billion lire, 60 percent of it for export to the United States, USSR,
Belgium, France, and the Ivory Coast.
Today Angelini employs 25 persons to style his products and administer the
operation. His knitted goods are produced mainly (over 70 percent) by
tertiary workers in the Abruzzi. ~his is a classical example of decentraliza-
tion, many cases of which the unic~ns know about but lack representation in
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the plants because they hire fewer than the minimum number of personnel
_ required for unionization. Nevertheless, "I have a good relationship with
the unions," Angelini declares. "You have to face up to them and collaborate
with them, but always keeping the two roles clearly distinct."
Good (Bonino) but gutsy
He embarked on his industrial vocation after an abrupt dismissal from his job
in 1962 because, although a section chief (in practice one of the heads of
the small company where he worked), he staged a one-man strike after organizing
the firm's first union.
Lorenzo Bonino was one of many Turin workers who became industrialists after
the fierce union battles of the 1950s and 1960s. Like the majority of Turin's
new production managers, he began his independent pro3ect selling supplies
to Fiat. "It wasn't easy to find a job after my troubles with the unions,"
he explains, "therefore I went into a business partnership with my brogher-in-
law. At first ours was a typical small industry, but gradually we took on
more workers, and SSL (Printing, Stamping and Laminiating) now has 35
employees working in advanced technologies. The potential for such output
today is considerable."
His company was still a small one when he was named national president of FNAM
(National Federation of Artisan Metalworkers), allied with DNA (National
Artisan Confederation).
A com~unist from the outset, Bonino has assumed various political duties,
among them communal councillor in Turin for 10 years, concerned with decen-
tralization and ecological problems.
_ Controversial and gutsy like many old unionists, Bonino has a gift for con-
vincing others with his logic. He spares no one his barbs, including the
union su~mmits, which he rebukes especially for the obstacles they put in the
way of employment. Says he, "The hiring of specialized manpower should be
guaranteed to manufacturers because not only professionalism is a question of
fundamental importance but also the need to trust your specialists' abilities."
His discourse changes when the subject of conversation shifts to his workers
and the union representation in his plant. "There are no conflicts in SSL,"
he points out, "because I am still looked upon not as an adversary but as one
of them. In fact, whenever a worker has problems, he comes to talk them over
with me and ask for my advice."
Shot by Cecch ini
"The less you come around the better. I don't want any bosses here." This
is how building constructor Ilio Cecchini is regularly greeted by his one-
time switchboard operator, now on pension, when he shows up at the PCI federa-
tion in Pisa, of which he has been a member fo~ decades. Son of a railroad
worker, former partisan commander and renowned throughout Tuscany for his
exploits during World War II, Cecchini duly accepts the man's injunction.
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"More than an industrialist," he says, "I am a party member. But evidently
there are many militants in the party who cannot understand how a r_omrade
could own an industry."
This Pisan is the owner of Edilcostruzione, with 30 permanent workers (he
has hired as many as 80 in the past) specializing in prefabricated building
(by private investment and government subsidies). A geometrist in a construc-
tion cooperative immediately after the war, Cecchini took his degree in
business and economics, then founded his own construction company, famous in
Tuscany for its output, including laboratories for the University of Pisa and,
in 1968, the stadium, built in only 100 days.
. The controversies over Cecchini, which are the order of the day, extend in
every direction. For example, on various occasions he has fought the unions
on the matter of leveling salaries. But his arrows are not reserved only
for the union: he is always ready to attack local and regional administra-
tions, which he deems woefully inept. "My protests," he explains, "are not
directed only against the DC's inefficiency in local government but in some
cases also against local and regional administrations run by the Left."
Despite various "ifs" and a few reservations, Cecchini still professes to be
a convinced militant communist. "Some years ago," he says, "I was asked to
join the Association of Constructors (ANCE) of Confindustria, but I turned
down the invitation. I knew that part of Con.findustria`s funds were earmarked
to fund parties of ::he Right."
Durbiano and the API
"The Turin association of industrials affiliated with Confindustria follo;as
a political line, supported by the majority, with wh3ch I cannot agree in
everything, although the positions I object to are certainly not reactionary.
One thing I cannot accept, for example, is the Turin API's positions. which
are still anchored in the 19tn century." Thus speaks Ettore Durbiano of
Turin, one of the animators of the Turin communist federation's committee on
small and medium industry. Member of the industrialists' association,
Durbiano heads an old, established company founded by his grandfather back in
1920 to process wood and produce industrial crating supplies. His organiz~-
tion leads the sector with 50 employees and a gross of 2 billion lire, of
which 15 percent represents exports to European countries. In the past,
his major client was Fi;t, but he has since lengthened his roster of clients.
"To survi~e the crisis," he says, "we had to find customers other than mamma
Fiat." Descended from a traditionally liberal family, Durbiano was politically
active during his university years and then joined the PCI in 1968. "At the
time, I had thought of remaining within th~ university (political) structure,"
- he explains, "because I thought of industry as a negative factor that exploited
labor, but then I modified my views in various respects and quit the university.
Now I think I am functioning in a socially positive way as an industrialist."
An attentive reader of the PCI central committee's documents, Durbiano has
written several essays for ORIENTAMENTI NUOVI and won a sizeable following,
particularly with an article (December 1979) on the labor hegemony and the
role of industry. He contends that the industrial class is a key factor in
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planning for the reconstruction and reorganization of production structures
and social relations, which the workers' movement must--and indeed wished to
--further in the current stange of development.
Elmi's models
His ascent was meteoric. Hired in 1964 as a technician, after 10 years he
was named to the top post in his company, which by then had become a complex
manufacturing plastic materials on the European scale. This is Edoarda Elmi
of Bologna,-director genreal, administrative delegate, and shareholder in the
Caleppio group of Milan.
Until 1968, Elmi was engaged in production, but af ter a period in the United
States to study the problematics of marketing plastic materials, he moved into
marketing until 1975, when he was appointed to the group's summit. "At that
~ time, things were not going very well in our sector," he recalls, "and when
the board appointed me deputy administrator, it was probably to involve me
more deeply." The society heading�~the Calepp~angroup--~O~~biilion li~e in
revenues and 600 employees--controls five plants: Caleppiovinili, Caleppio
Gia, Caleppio Gmbh in Germany, Caleppio France, and Carrel Italiana. Its
branches are located in Settali (Milan), specializing in rolled steel;
Tribiano (Milan), laminated thermoplastics; Fucine di Casana, laminated thermo-
plastics; Sulmona, durable robex products and catering equipment; Weil am
Rhein, Germany, specializing in various do-it-yourseYf items; and Wittenheim,
France, to which all products are shipped for distrilbution in France. The
strategy Elmi wanted was a planning center in Milan and diverse production
points in various parts of Italy, with a preference for the Abruzsi. "It
is an optimal area in Italy, well supplied with discreet infrastructures," he
says. "Our Sulmona branch, in which FIME (Finanziaria Meridionale) owns a
20 percent participation, has already begun to pay out dividends. It is
probably one of only a very few investments that has yielded FIME a profit at
the end of the year."
In his dealings with the unions, his password ia "clarf.ty." "~e do not ask
the unions to accept impossible terms," he says, "as some industrialists
persist in doing. In fact, we have stipulated a company commitment to main-
tain employment on the national level. You must be clear if you want to have
a constructive dialogue with the unions, and to do this it is essential to
keep them informed; and never confront them with an accomplished fact. And
then, you must honor your agreements. If that is how yos treat them, you
will see your workers take their distance from the absentees--and so they do
in some of our plants." Although he is not a card carrier, Elmi's political
point of reference has always been the PCI; Berlinguer's document on a third
way fully satisfies him.
What Frilli distills
"Profit is the due and proper remuneration for putting production facilities
to good purpose. It is the unrenounceable reward in a social reality that
entails risk. Having exported to countries with centralized economies for
years, I am positive that the society I belong to is the best." Decisive,
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given to speaking his mind openly with his collaborators, the unions and his
comrades ia the PCI, in which he has beea registered for many years, Mauro
Frilli of Siena typifies a family which has run an industry for generations:
the Frilli firm was founded by his grandfathers in 1914. At first it special-
ized in distilling the residue of pressed grapes and constructing copper
equipment for distilling it. Today I~illi ranks among the most t~chnologically
advaaced manufacturers of ready-to-use equipment for distilling and rectifying
grape residue, sugar cane and whatever other matter tbat can be converted
into alcohol.
Some of the installations developed by Frilli is eaported (about 30 percent if
the entire output in 1981, for a value of some 10 billion lire) to South
American countries, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola and Libya,�where.a plaat for
extracting alcohol from dates for pharmaceutical purposes is being readied.
In this respect, however, the pro3ect closest to Mauro F`rilli's heart is the
production of alcohol capable of powering motor cars. "We have already
developed some equipment," he says, "and we hope that very soon in Italy we
will be able to realize a product called sweet sorghum, typical of the
Mediterranean basin. By a process we have prefected, it will be possible to
convert sweet sorghum into carburetor fuel as well as products for zootechnical
~ uses. Moreover, from the residue, it will actually be possible to estract
wood for burning in furnaces."
In addition to constructing distillation plants, Frilli has set up another
enterprise to make bathroom furniture, turning out a high qualitq line,
designed by well known names.
Loporchio the tough
He began his political career in high school as a militant in the ranks of
young socialists. Then, as he likes to recount, he was persuaded to transfer
his loyalties to the PCI by the logic of Beppe Vacca, communist philosopher
and recognized leader of the Bari school; of Federico Pirro, currently in
charge of the federation's middle class policies; and of young leftist uni-
versity professors he frequented. Oace in the PCI he dedicated himself un-
sparingly to the party. In 1975 he was elected to the com~unal council of
Trani (and reelected in the last local elections) after a bad experience with
the Republicans in 1970, a subject he prefers not to talk about. This is
Paola Loporchio, 36, married with two children, proprietor of ConfLevante in
Trani (Bari), which manufactures shirtings and knitted wear. His firm (80
employees, mostly very young girls) racked up revenues of 3 billion lire in
1981, 2 billion in export trade mainly to Germany and the EE nations. fle
initiated his operation early in the 1970's, producing knitted goods in a
small laboratory in Corato (Bari), but in 1975 he took over his father's
plant, which was then earning hundreds of millians with a personnel of 30.
The two units were then merged into ConfLevante fa Trani, where Loporchio
" turns out his own brand as well as lines for other important clothing pro-
' ducers, among them Cassera.
Lugli of the platform trucks
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"I am not activP in PCI affatrs nor do I participate in Confabi union activ-
ities although I belong to the association. The reason is very simple:
they're always talking in vague, futile terms. It is just a waste of time.
Anyway, an industrialist can pursue his politics through more congenial
channels, that is by constant discussions with his factory unions." Willism
Lugli, 34, is deputy administrator of the firm that bears his name and pro-
duces platfor*n trucks with diesel or electric motors at Carpi, near Modena.
Earning 21 billion, almost all in the domestic market, Lugli gives work to
230 persons. Extremely yourg when he was obliged to take command of the
business--he was still a student in university--after his father died, William
Lugli is a third generation industrialist. Ais paterual grandfather, a black-
smith in a town mear Carpi, began manufacturing tractors after the war,
equipping them with salvaged parts of English diesel motors. From rudimentary
tractors to platform trucks was a short step; the idea was conceived by
William's father, who sparked the family's industrial rise. Along with an
industrial tradition, the Luglis have maintained a tradition of political
militancy in the PCI, the father as a partisan and militant, the son as a
party member from the beginning. "In my youth I took part in many Communist
manifestations--the UNITA festivals in Italy, for one thing, and youth
festivals abroad. I r.ecall with pleasure the 1968 festival in Sofia. It was
on that occasion that I realized the enormous difference between the really
bureaucratic socialism you find in the East European countries and the
socialism pro.noted by the Italian communists. Yes, I am still registered in
the party, but with many reservations. but when I scan the electoral slates,
I have no doubts..."
- Vicario and ASTRU
A student of physiology at the University of Milan, he determined to become an
industrialist when the means were handed to him like a gift. The means "were
five test tubes, two of them broken, kept in an old wooden container. I~e-
diately it occurred to me that in Italy it would be possible to achieve a lot
in the field of scientific instruments. American firms in that sector were
a thousand light years ahead of ours." And indeed, Guido Jacario, Milanese,
student of the renowned physiologist Rodolfo Margaria, soon lef t the univer-
sity to go into industry. Within a few years he became deputy administrator
of the Elvi Lagos company (150 workers), with seven plants in Bari, Naples,
Rome, Florence, Z~rin, Padua, and Bologna. Today one of the top eight Italian
producers of biomedics, Elvi Lagos earns approximately 8 billion lire, in-
cluding a 30 percent export trade to 46 countries. These seven Elvi establish-
ments (Lagos is the marketing division) manufacture biomedical instruments
and, analyses reagents for hospitals, pollution research centers and univer-
sities. Apart from his work, Vicario is committed to the political and
associative front; in fact, he is one of the founders--and for many years
president--of ASTRU, an association of biomedical production f irms, which
remains independent of both Confindustria and Confabi. Among other matters,
the ASTRU industrialists were consulted during the preparation of Law 675 for
industrial reconstruction and reconversion on the aspect of research. "It was
a good provision, and the PCI made a notable contribution to it; too bad that
- it was boycotted politically in its development stage." According to Vicario,
who often chairs PCI meetings, the co~uniszs merit high praise for being the
most attentive to the problems that beset small and medium enterprises.
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In his relations with the unioas, the Milanese industrialists favors
utilizing the maximum information on his company's plans aad combatting
absenteeism. "It is important," be saqs, "for the uaions to attack absentee-
iam or, at least, not to support the absentees. I must admit thst our plants
have always had a hard time--thanks to the unions."
All Chiaramoate's 20
The industria]_ists who compose tbe PCI direction's working group are: Renata
Agostini (Agostini, Genoa); Fraaco Amoroso (Amoroso, Palermo); Antonio
Angeliai (Lian di Nerto, Tersmo); Lorenzo Bonino (SSL, Borgato Torinese); ~
Elio Cecchini (Edilcostruzioai, Pisa); Ettore Durbiano (Industria Lavorazioni
Legao, Rivoli); Edoardo Elmi (Caleppio, Settal~, aear Milan); Lidio Foraaciari
(Comet, Reggio Emilia); Mauro Frilli (Frilli, Poggibonei, near Siena); Memo
Gastaldo (Gastaldo Prefabbricati, 1~rin); William Lugli (Lugli Platform
Trucks, Carpi, near Modena); Sergio Pianti (Gruppo Tessile, Prato); Paola
Querci (Metalmeccanica Montemurlo, Florence); Guido Riva (Samo, Bologaa);
Ugo Sala (Fashion Clan, Carpi); Giuseppe Sardena (Scantor, Paderno Dugnano,
near Milan); Aristide Staderini (Staderini, Rame); Giacomo Stradaioli (Edile,
Aprilia, near Latina); Antonio Toma (Toma, Lecce); and Guido Vicario (Elvi,
Milan) .
COPYRIGST: IL MONDO 1982 � ~
9653
CSO: 3104/164 END
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