JPRS ID: 10529 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060042-4
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10529
~ 18 May 1982
~/1/est E u ro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 32/82)
.
F~IS FOREIGN E3ROADCAST ~INFORMATION SERVICE
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. JPRS L/10529
18 May 1982
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 32/82)
- CONTENTS
ECONOMIC
BELGIUM
De Clercq on Budgetary, Economic Problema
' (Willy de Clercq; POURQUOr PAS, 18 Mar 82) 1
- FRANCE
Causes for Franc~s Weakness in EMS, Options Ccnsidered
(L'EXPRESS, 26-1 Apr 82; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 29 Mar -
- 4 Apr 82) 7
Ways to Avoid Devaluation, by Jean Gloaguen
Withdrawal of Petrodollars, by Philippe Durupt
POLITICAL
Sl'AIN
Spanish Magazine Interviews PSOE's Gonzalez
_ (Felipe Gonzalez; CAMBIO 16, 26 Apr 82) 10
Left Atr_acks TVE for Bias, In~ompetence~ Cronyism
(CAMBIO 16, 5 Apr 82) 14
- Liberal Press, by Encarnacion Valenzuela and Sebastian Moreno
PSOE's Guerra,by Alfonso Guerra
UNITED KINGDOM
'TIMES.' Assesses Soviet Policy in Latin America
(Editorial; THE TIMES, 4 May 82) ~ 24
GENERAL
~RANCI's
Franco-Japanese Cooperation on Ariane. Spot, Airbus Discusaed
(AIR & COSMOS, 24 Apr 82) 2;
~ - a _ [III - WE - 150 FOUO)
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ECONC/MIC BELGIUM
_ _ _
DE CLERCQ ON BUDGETARY, E('ONOMLC PRO~,EMS
Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 18 Mar 82 pp 10-11
- [Interview with Wi11y de Clercq~ vice prime minister and minister of finance
and forei commerce: "Willy de Clereq Explains Himself"; da.te and place not
specified~ , '
[Text] Oh, poar, dear Willy de Clercq. What a tragedy for
this man who adores so much being popular and then finds him-
self at the head of the most cruel depaxtment in an adminis-
- tration which intends to gover,~: the Ministry of Finance.
Consequently, he longs to explain himself. How could we
deny him that?... �
[Question] Without wanting to be too disagre~able, some people axe staxting
to wonder about your loyalty i~re mean tha.t of~your party to your campaign
promises. No new costs~ no new taxes. We undarstand the general discontent
~ which is translated into street mav3ments. Now what?
[Answer] A liberal government agreemenc is also a Christian democrat govern-
ment agreement. Both political paxties share in this agreement, and I don't
want to answer the question about where the mo$t important inpu~c comes from.
The four coalition parties approved this agreement and werc~ thus satisfied
about is as whole. But the participation of each of them implies cor~ces- .
sions and consequently numerous measures which have been taken axe the result
of a compromise.
The agreement clear?.y stat~s that the govErnment has based itself on the ob-
servation that "the Belgian sickness" is due to three phenomena: first of a]1~
an unemployment rate which is too h3gh; seconcll.y~ the imbalance of public
finances; and finally, the deterioration of our current balance of pa.yments.
These three elements have reached such proportions that a complete reversal of
the socio-economic policy conducted over the last ~ yeaxs has become indis-
pensable. The government is and will continue to apply itself to this.
[Question] You axe talking about a reversal. Up to now~ wh~at has been turned
- over most is caxs in the street. What do you mear. concretely?
- [Answer] We can a11 easily see that the source of all our prohlems is thz
- continuous and unjustified application of Keynesian concepts, which axe
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translated into a poiicy based on the overstimulation of demand, and this
through the expedient of demand. Such an option has resulted in ever highPr
tax costs for the prcductive forcea in our econo~y, both private individuals
and enterprises.
The shortage of resources has led to an increasi.ngly frequent ca11 on borrow-
- ing, in Belgium or abroad, at 2.st~ronomical interest rates.
The level of the fiscal costs has caused a loss of motivation to work and, for
the enterprises~ an ina.bility to invest, to modernize~ to renew, a11 the more
so as the high interest rates no lo:+..ger a11ow recourse to borrowing for those
who might possibly still have been inclined to fina.nce their investments that
wa,y ,
High taxes, increasing production costs, the absence of investments~ these
- are all reasons which have allowed the competition to exclude us not only on
the foreign markets but a1so, let us not forget it, on the domestic maxket.
~ From year to year, enterprises working for the Belgian maxket have seen their
market taken over by foreign cbmpetitors. Aren't these the reasons for the
~,147 ba,nkruptcies we have experienced in 1981? And for the ever growing rate
of unemployment? When you no langer sell~ it is no longer possible to provide
work.
[Question] Hence the presents to entexprises?
~ ~[Answer] If you want to ca11 it t:i.~t, everyone is of course free to practice
dema.goguery, to tell economic counte:r-truths or, even more simply, to be un-
awaxe of the government measures. Wt~at axe the ma,in measures taken in favor
- of the enterprises? There is the reducti~n o~' the TVA [Va1ue-added Tax] rate
for the construction sector (from 17 percent to 6 percent~.
Next, we have a11 the decisi~::s concerning the reduction of production costs:
~ wages~.energy, financiau. costs~ taxes. The rates of corporate taxation have
been reduced (the general rate has been reduced from 48 percent to 45 percent).
The exceptiQnal solidaxi:ty cont~ributions (Solidarity I and II~ will not be
renewed. Is this a question of presents? Isn't it necessary to leave the en-
terprises with a net profit sufficient to a11ow them to invest and consequent-
ly to create jobs?
We should also note the decisions concerning the temporasy cYlange in the link-
age of wages to the index. I would first. like to stress that a11 categories
of the population are affected: independents~ doctors, managers, etcetera~
als~ have to paxticipate, just like the wage Parners. Second remaxk: the
sma11 tax payer is not affected.~ as the minimum wage remains indexed.
Third remaxk: lt is not a question of "contributions," as people are too
often inclined to write~ but rather of "moderatinn," ~rhich means that incomes
will not be reduced but their growth decelerated. The difference is a signi-
ficant one.
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' All of this may seem a little complicated~ but a careful reading of these
decisions will prove that there is no question of presents ta enterpris~s.
Besides, there axe no longer any presents td be.given~ to anybody: Because
we no longer have anything. The legacy left us ~y those who are so vehemently
criticizing us today is simply indescribalale.
[Question] Aha: The legacya the traditional case of emba.rrassment. What
do you mean by that? ~
- [Anewer] Many things, as a matter of fact, but I am not in the ,habit of cri.- _
tici:~ing others and adding up their errors.
As fo~ :~s~ we ha,ve rejected a total cost increase in the amount of 35 to 40
milli,on francs.
True~ there are cost increases in the amount of 16 billion i'rancs. But, op-
_ posite these increases there is a set of cost reductio:is not only in f~vor of
enterprises, but also in favor of private individuals~ specifically the in-
crease in the level for elimination of cumulative taxation #'or household in-
come up to 750,000 f`rancs, the elimination of taxation on the appreciation of
cadastral income for the house of residence, etcetera~ without forgetting the
measures I mentioned above.
~ [Question] You had announced, promised a 200 billion franc def.icit. And you
have accepted a 252 billion frane budgetary deficit. Is this very responsihl,e?
~ [Answer] There axe two reasons for this: first, the fact that the budget cut
measures can be applicable only for 9 months. Cuts were decided on in a11 the
_ pulilic sectors for an amount of 70 b~llion franes~ which gives an annual
a.mc;unt of approximately 95 bill3.on francs. The second reason, which I have
already mentioned~ lies in the surprises we encountered when we saw the real
figures in terms of unemployment, the interest costs for the debt~ etcetera.
I repeat: I knew that the legacy was a heavy one; but what I have learned
over t}-,e past weeks and months is simply alarming. As leader of the opposi-
tion, I knew that Belgium was economically and financially sick. But it is
only when you are in the government and when you are acquainted with a11 the
da.ta that you realize to what extent the country is sick.
During the la~t few years, the situation has been allowed to deteriorate; the
sick person has been abandoned to his fate.
Ask a doctor what that means.
[Question] To finish with a flourish: at the time of the elections, the slo-
gan of the PW [Party for Freedom and Pr~~:ess (Flemish~] was: ~~More jobs,
less costs'�; do you. think you will be able to realize that slogan?
[Answer] Less costs, certainly. The rejection of the new tax hikes planned
for 1982, the measures aimed at canceling earlier measures (taxation on the
appreciation of undeveloped real estate~ and the like), and the new cost re-
ductions both for enterprises and for private ind3.viduals which I just men-
tioned, prove it.
- 3
~
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More jobs. I have already told you: tha.t requires the cooperation of every-
one. The government ha.s taken the measures necessary to reach this goal. Let
me say it clearly: if a11 of Belgium were to go on strike because the govern-
ment imposes a temporaxy income moderation, do you think that any measures,
wha.tever they ma.y be, could have a positive effect on employment?
We have to save our economy and thus our social security and our social wel-
fare. It is a question af saving that which can still be saved. During the
coming months and year::~ it will be necessary to pursue this effort in order
to achieve more
positive resul~s: Ze~~~- governmeni rema.in-iri ~i~,ce until
_ the end of the legislative session a.nd you will see the positive results.
COPYRiGHT: 1'982 POURQUOI PAS?
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cso: 3~00/511
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ECONOMIC FRANCE
CAUSES FOR FRANC:'S WEAKNESS IN EMS, OPTIONS CONSIDERED
Ways to Avoid Devaluation
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 26-1 Apr 82 p 82
[Article by Jean Gloaguen: "The Franc in Trouble"]
[Text] Three weapons and 45 days to defend the franc.
It is enough?
A currency's loss of parity is always a political and economic failure. The
administration was hoping for a return to a peaceful currency exchange market '
af ter the f itful week before the cantonal elections. However, speculation
continued; the dollar set a new historic record at 6.27 francs on Tuesday
23 March. Was this a return shock from the Left's electoral f.ailure? In any
csse, devaluation rumors started up again even stronger.
The attacks against the franc, which had started in the beginning of March,
became alarming on the 16th. The dollar, quoted at 6.05 on Friday the 12th, .
hit 6.23 a week later. What was even more disturbing was that the france was
weakening dangerously in relation to other currencies of the European monetary
system,(EMS), in relation to which it should fluctuate within a narrow range.
The Bank of France, eager to limit the damage, dug deeply into its reserves
of foreign currency. On Thuraday 18 1~?arch it increased the money market
rate from 15 to 17 percent. Jacques Delors, minister of economy.and.finance,
thought this was a passing fever. He was disappointed. ~
- Technical and psychc4logical factors were at the origin of the unrest.
Payments related to the recent gas contract signed with Algeria have entailed
large purchases of dollars. In addition, non-residents sold their francs
af ter turning in their securities in nationalized companies. On the other
hand, contrary to certain rumors, Arab capital has not deserted Paris. .
In any case, the distrust of the foreign exchange brokers was more of a factor
than the exceptional need for f oreign currency. This distrust began with the
deterioration of the French trade balance at the end of 1981 and worsened
when rumors of a 200 billion franc budget deficit for 1983 were heard. The
conclusion drawn by national and international financial authorities was
that a devaluation of the franc was inevitable.
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rutc urri~iw~ ~u~~ ~i~t-Y
On the Rue de Rivoli, not surprisingly, this reasoning is not accepted. "Any
speculation based on the devaluation of the franc is doomed to fail," repeated
Jacques Delors on 23 March. We are reminded that in May 1981, against the
advice of the governor of the Bank of France and of several m~nisters,
Francois Mitterrand decided to stay i.n the EMS. In October the franc's
parity was decreased by 8.5 percent in relation to the mark, but the excuse
of the former administratian's legacy was given.
In any case, a slide of the franc presents problems. An expert explain2d,
_ _ . _ _ .
"If we want.to change the parity while remaining in the EMS,. our tra e
partners, especi.ally West Germany, will refuse. Will this mean a~omentary
exit from the EMS, as in 1974 and 1976? This would mean the death of monetary
Europe and its traasformatiox~ into a mark zone." Some, however, see this a.s
an elegant way to implement the price increases demanded by farmers, which
Brussels refuses. (~ze the article by Patrick Bonazza.)
Another substantial argument is that the economic advantages of a pullout
are not predictable. As an immediate asset, France's competitiveness with
the FRG, its major trade partner, would increase. As a liability there
would be the obligation of paying more francs for two-�thirds of our imports
- and the one-third of exports which are billed in foreign currencies--8 billion
francs yearly for each devaluation point:
The Speculators' Loss
But can France avoid a devaluation? It all depends, of course, on the ability
of its leaders to reinstill conf idence in foreign capital. The authorities
have three means at their disposal.for defending the currency at all costs:
Interest rates. Already at 17 percent, they could still be raised
sign.if icantly.
Control of foreign exchange. In effect since May 1981, it would be
difficult to increase it for businesses, but increasing it for individuals
has been discussed.
Direct intervention. At lea.st for the moment it is not a question of
digging into the gold stockpilesy which make up the bulk of the reserves of
the Bank of France. This leaves the modest 6 bi.llion dollars in foreign
currency held by the Issuing Institute. More important, this leaves the
unlimited drawing rights on Fecom, a European institution which would give
France access to advances in another EMS currency, when this currency
approaches its ceiling price in relation to the franc. However, these
advances must be reimbursed within 45 days.
Forty-five days is enough for speculators to lose in an unjustif ied attack
against the franc. It is also enough-to avoid devaluing under pressure. But
in monetary matters time is worth only the interest rates of the loans that
have been made. The franc will not regain its status and will not escape
upsets until the country's economic management is deemed orthodox by the
entire world's bankers.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 s.a. Groupe Express
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- Withdrawal of Petrodollars
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 29 Mar-4.Apr 82
_ [Article by Philippe Durupt: "The Hostage Franc"]
[Excerpts] The only realistic way out is to give the
franc a vacation from the EMS for as long as the
inflation differential with our German competitor is
not corrected.
Six months was the length of the respite that the 4 October 1981 devaluation ,
gave to the franc, which has been under new attacks for 3 weeks. Within the
EMS it is declining in relation to all the other currencies, and has been at
a seriously low level against the gulden since 18 March and against the
German mark since the 22nd. . ~
What is this speculation that has been loosed against our currency? The myth
of the wall of money has a hard life. In this case it can be reduced to a
simple fact: the holders of petrodollars are taking their capital out of
France.
Their deposits in French banks, a real sword of Damocles, crea.te a permanent�
threat of instability, while at the same time they reduce the administration's
economic and politica; freedom to maneuver.
This includes petrodollars invested in France as capital entrusted to a
trustee by third parties. The trustee can have this cre3ited to his bank
account to give the illusion of wealth. But the depositors can ~3emand its
withdrawal at any ti~. This is unfortunate for the imprudent trustee who
might have spent the money on himself or fiozen it to finance personal
borrowing. The fate of petrodollars is to come and go. They are at the
mercy of unpredictable decisions.
The latest attacks against the franc coincided with the cai:tonal election
campaigns~ Deducting from this that mr~netary maneuvers are only one weapon
among others for political combat is a step quickly taken by men and a public
opinion lacking in f inancial experience. .
Even if the regime's political opponents were tempted to use this argument,
the f oreign exchange controls which were implemented 10 months ago are such
that this would be discouraged. Only f oreign depositors benef it f rom f ree
circulation. They are indifferent to the political colortng of the host
country as soon as this freedom is assured. However, they are extremely aware
of f inancial security. And for the Arab states there is also a particular
political sensitivity.
_ The speech by the president of the Repubiic to the Knesset on 4 April was
much more important in their eyes than the restructuring of county councils
in France. They apparently took the courageous declarations of the French
president badly and are showing this by withdrawing capital. They have also
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huK urr~~iwL w~ t~iv~Y
taken the nationalization of large French firms badly and have made huge sales
of their compensatory security rights during the month of March.
On last 8 and 9 February, during meetings with foreign investors, members
of the Mauroy administration knew enough to use a realistic language--they
reassured.
The foreign investors were ready to give them the benefit of the doabt, but
the cantonal elections put the party hardliners back on stage. The tone
- hardened and caused an alwayz ].atent worry to be stirred up.
This series of events acted as a detonator in the speculation against the
f ranc . It would have had no more ef f ect than ~ a wet f irecracker if osr
currency had been the faithful refl.ection Qf a competitive economy.
This is far from being the case in our relations with West Germany, our
principal client and foreign supplier.
Since the creation of the European monetary system in April 1979, the Germa.n
mark's value in francs had gradually gone from 2.3 to 2.4 (the old ceiling)
then, lately, to 2.62, a new ceiling since the devaluation of October. In
3 years our currency has depreciated 14 percent. At the same time, our
inflation was 29 percent higher than German inflation.
The 15 percent difference between the difference in inflation (29 percent)
and the f oreign exchange adjustment (14 percent) is a measure of our loss
of competitiveness in relation to German industay. This difference should
be reduced not to the sales volumes of our firms but to their profit margins.
In 1979, these did not exceed 10 percent before taxes in the best of cases.
Clearly, our f irms today are in a losing sit~~xation with their competitors
on the other side of the Rhine, as well as o:i the French market, where German
products are making irreversible inroads, and on the German market, where
French products are beating a retreat. Our trade def3~cit with Germany has
doubled in 2 years, going from 11.1 billion francs in 1979 to 22.7 billion
in 1981.
The Frenah franc is in a state of structural weakness in comparison to the
German mark. Its true value is closer to 3 francs per German mark than 2.62.
In this situation it would be surprising to see it get stronger rather than
to see it weaken as it is doing today.
The administration's obstinacy is probably due to a f etishist conception of
currency, which is very widespread in France. It also reflects the old
dream of European unificaCion, which is more unlikely than ever to happen
when national egos arise during times of crises.
In this second battle, Delors is a lonely man. As flattering as the hopes
~ of the financial community were to Barre, they are today playing against ~
the minister of f inance in equal proportion. The personal worth of the man
is not at all in question; rather, the opposite. But the res*_raints that he
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must undergo appear to be incompatible with any hope of rapid economic
recovery.
The foreign deficit is increasing and Jobert has not ruled out the possibility
of a negative balance of 100 billion francs for 1982.
The budge~ def icit has now reached 3 percent--a rate similar to, if not lower
than, that of our major competitors. But the level of the def icit makes less
of an impression than its trend--it has tripled in 1 year. And the leaks on
the preli~inary estimations of expenditures for 1983 (a deficit of over 200
billion was mentioned) have cast a glacial chill over it.
The hardening of the political rhetoric since the elections leads to the
fear that social reforms will be maintained, if not increased. For French .
firms this means the prospect of a new increase in social and salary costs and
a greater rigidity in employment: the increases in productivity which are
still likely to happen are liable to be absorbed by the cost of maintaining
the staff.
This is the opposite of the tendencies seen in our major competitors. In
, Gem~any,forthe first time since the war, the large iron and steel union has
just accepted a loss in purehasing power for 1982. In the United States the
automobile workers union has given up indexation to the cost of livin~; this
applies both to Ford and General Motors.
- Social mobility has remained almost intact in the United States and in the
FRG. It is increasing in Great Britain and Italy.
Everywhere the battle hinges on reducing operating costs, of which salaries
make up two-thirds and sometimes more. Everywhere except in France, where
the administration is hanging on to very unrealistic parities.
Foreign restraints are being added to domestic ones: increase in domestic
interest rates, exchange subsidies �or imports, additional cost imp.osed on.
exports.
- Profit margins are at a historic low point. The administration seems power-
less to hold back the wave of demands. Under these conditions, maintaining
- the foreign constraint puts firms in a real vise.
The only realistic ~and urgent way out would be to give the franc a break from
the EMS so that the monetary trend could correct the inflation di�ferential.
Th3s break would only be a temporary measure, but would be necessary as long
as opinion had not been thoroughly convinced that the realities of world
competition cannot be avoided.
COPYRIGHT: 19$2 "Valeurs Actuelles"
9720
CSO: 31~0/559
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POLITICAL SPAIN
SPANISH MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS PSOE'S GONZALEZ
PI~41501 Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 26 Agr 82 pp 29-31
[Interview with 5panish Socialist Warkers Party Secretary General Felipe
Gonzalez by Jose Manuel Arija: "T+elipe, Tired of Calvo"--date and place of
interview not specified]
[Excerpts] The situation of the Union of the Democratic Center [UCD] in the
light of the electorate's voting intentions is more than worrying, as can be
deduced from the opinion poll on the preceding pages. But that, according
to what opposition leader Felipe Gonzalez says in his interview, is good for
- nobody.
But its leader, Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, is in an even worse
situation than the Centrist Party. Not even many of tfiose who say that they
will vote for the JCD regard Calvo-Sotelo as having tfie caliber to lead the ~
country. "There has been a,dramatic leadership situation in the UCD since
Adolfo Suarez' disappearance from the chairmanship," Gonzalez asserts. "This
indicates that th e UCD is directionless, since it has nobody capable of di-
recting its own ideas." Since 1977 Felipe Gonzalez has been ir.terviewed by
~AMBIO 16 every 6 months. In this way the socialist leader has rendered
accounts publicly at the same time as expressing his opinion on the national
situation throughout the difficult stage of the transition.
In the present interview a possible socialist election victory, the 23 Feb-
ruary [1981--date of attem~ted coup] trial and the contents of the future
Spanish Socialist Workers Party [PSOE] government program are, among others,
the specific topics he discusses. The results of the poll--"which do not im-
press me, because it is the ballot bo~oes which matter"--were also analyzed,
and his replies begin by explaining the causes of Calvo-Sotelo's lack of a
lead among those polled.
Felipe Gonzalez: Calvo-Sotelo did not 3chieve that lead, among other things,
because the people are far more intuitive and shrewd than they appear. Calvo-
- SoteYo has had a far better press than any prime minister of a democratic
- government in the world can imagine. Nor do I know of any similar instance,
or less harassment from the opposition's ranks, or, even more clearly, of more
determined support from the coimtry's most representative ~pposition party.
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Despite these circ~nnstances, which theoretically should help the image of
the conduct of the govermnent and its prime minister, the voters detect that
there is not sufficient ability to make tfie necessary response to the problems
which the coLmtry is experiencing. Hence the deterioration in his image.
CAMBIO 16: In viEw of all this, is Calvo-Sotelo, in your opinian, any goo~1 ~
or not as prime minister?
Felipe Gonzalez: I sincerely believe that he ha~ not demonstrated that he is
any goo3, at conducting the:ountry's government. And that is what is re-
flected in the poll.
CAMBIO 16: Tf it was made clear throughout these months that Calvo-Sotelo was
no good, why did yau fiarass him with so little vigor?
Felipe Gonzalez: I~hether somebody is any good or not is demonstrated essen-
tially with the passage of a reasonable ampunt of time in office. A govern-
ment's task cannot tie ~udged after 3 or 4 months. Last June the government
had an economic program agreed with the trade tmions from tbe viewpoint of
industrial relations. And it had an autonomy and municipal policy not only
agreed but pledged with the principal opposition partq, ourselves. Hence
in those first few montfis it could be said thatithe balance sheet of cond~zct
was favorable.
And so what happened? That program was never implemented, and now we find
that the government was unable to implement ths~agreements or to conduct an
effective policy to re~olve tfie problems confronting bhe country.
CAMBIO 16: And between now and the election will you continue to support
Calvo-Sotelo, even if you still� find tfiat he is no good?
Felipe Gonzalez: It is difficult to say in advance. Our intention is always
to set democratic coexistence in freedom as a priority of the party above
- what might be merely electoral interests. In our opinion, it is more import-
- ant to safeguard the interests of democracy as a whole than to attempt to kick
a government when it is dawn.
The first people who should be concerned about this situation reflected by the
polls are the members of the government themselves and their party; something
which is not happening, because in some instance we see rather that what
they are conducting is a policy of oppositio.n to the PSOE rather than a go-
vernment policy. All that we can and should do is to hope that the ballot
boxes will change the country's political course.
CAMBIO 16: If the state of the polls were reflected soon in reality, what ~
would happen in the UCD?
Felipe Gonzalez: It is not desirable for democracy that an intemal rift should
occur in the UCD. At the level of the entire state there is a force represented
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fairly homogeneously, which 3s the PSOE, and another, which is less homogen-
eous but has a certain ability to win support, which is the UCD. Until other
political forces capable of filling that gap emerge, I find it difficult to
assess as positive a collapse or crisis of the UCD. On the contrary, it
would be politically negative.
CAI~IO 16: Does the offer of a coalition government to safeguard against
crisis still stand?
Felipe Gonzalez: The possihility is receding, and i find that natural as the
election approaches: but we would never be opposed to an operation which
would serve to safeguard democracy's interests. For that reason we should
attempt to impart a positive nature to the election campaigns by putting
forward platforms and not mercilessly criticizing opponents, as others are
doing in some instances against us.
- CAMBIO 16: The first campaign will be in Andalusia. If the UCD fails, could
the general election be brouglit forward earlier than expected?
Felipe Gonzalez: When an elec~ion result occurs in which the right wins in
Catalonia, in the Basque countrq or in Galicia, nobody makes a great fuss.
However, certain sectors of opinion believe that possible victory for the
Sc;cialists in Andalusia would have greater consequences than are logically
- to be expected. I do not find that fair from a democratic viewpoint. It is
necessary to be able to accept the results both if a reactionary force wins
- and if a progressive force wins.
CAMBIO 16: Could the socialists form a coalition with the communists go govern
_ Spain, if they need their seats to achieve a majority?
= Felipez Gonzalez: I rule out a PSOE-PCE coalition government, because it is
not good for Spain as a historical blueprint, nor is this the time for it,
nor--to be frank--do we trust the cammunists who iaight be in a government.
According to the poll, the communist vote is declining. I believe that in the
coming elections and within the political spectrum of.the left, the concept
of the tactical vote which could bring the socialists to power will begin to
be assessed for the first time.
_ CA1~I0 16: Some questions from 3ourualists and some replies~from centrist
politicians say that u possible socialist general electiori victory could
provoke a coup. What is your opinion?
Felipe G~nzalez: I find that a stup3d thing to say. Those who provoke that
psycholooical reaction are in fact covert putschists. Those who reply in
that way are on the other hand tmablp ~.o defend their conduct from a demo-
_ cratic viewpoint and are attempting to instill fear in the public. On the
other they are also toying with the armed forces. In my opinion, the attempted
coup which took place in Spain was not against a leftwing government but
against a rightwing government.
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That means that there is a section of
the civilian and military populations
which is not in agreement with democracy and which will attempt to elimi:~ate
the system in order to replace it by a dictatorship, not that it is opposed
to a socialist govermnent which, I am certain, will not provoke reactions of
that kind, even because of the very prestige of tfie arm~ed forces.
CAMBIO 16: It has been announced that the PSOE has now almost finalized its
government program. Will it present it soon?
Felipe Gonzalez: We will present the program at the right moment, at the
next election. It amuses me that the Socialist Party is being asked for a
detailed program, which we are in fact preparing, when nobody has presented
one so far since 1977. As far as we are concerned, economic policy will be
aimed essentially at combating unemployment.
All the complementary measures necessary to combat unemployment will be
adopted or implem~nted, from th e viewpoint both of the financial system and
of monetary policy, public investments policy or encouragement of private
investment and so forth. .
We socialists believe that a good policy of creating empZoyment must pay ser-
ious attention to small and medi~ enterprises, although without forgetting
big enterprises interests.
CAI~IO 16: Willthe socialists, when in power, ask the Spanish people to
work harder?
Felipe Gonzalez: In a country in a state of crisis. It is only possible to
make progress when a rnentality of majority collective effort is created. It
would be a matter not so much of working harder as of encouraging a necessary
feeling of solidarity and a psychological attitude of endeavor. In addition,
a politico-cultural program to recover samewhat Spanish society's creative
drive, with the moral basis of gaining credibility in society and creating
momentum to make progress, should be implemented. The people have more wis-
dom th an they are credited with and do not expect miracles; they want an
atmosphere or confidence and solidarity with the aim of surmounting this
- situation of sluggishness in which we are living, politically, culturally
and economically.
CANIBIO 16: Will you continue to visit Calvo-Sotelo at the Moncloa Palace?
Felipe Gonzalez: Of course. We have had a gc~od many meetings to discuss and
talk about matters of general interest--more than are knawn publicly, because
we are not going to make publicity every time we meet. And I believe that
we sh ould continue to hold these meetings in the immediate future.
COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
CSO: 3110/126'.
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POLITICAL SPAIN
~
LEFT ATTACKS TVE FOR BIAS, INCOMPETENCE, CRONYISM
Liber3l Pre~s
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 5 Apr 82 pp 44-50
_ [Article by ~;ncarnacion Valenzuela and Sebastian Moreno: "One, Big and Bad"]
[Text] Five months after Fernando~ Castedo was dismissed by the government and
Carlos Robles Piquer gave a new direction to this country's only television entity,
- the issue of television (and its use by the party in power) has again come to the
- forefront on the current political scene. ~
Five months ago, the criticism of the general director (Castedo) was coming from
a UCD [Democratic Center Union] unhappy over what it deemed excessive criticism
of the government in the newscasts. Now it is the opposition (specifically, the
Socialist and Communist Parties) which is complaining that Robles Piquer's ("Robl~es-
pierre" as he is called in the establishment) television is reporting in a biased
manner favoring UCD and limiting the news space devoted to leaders and parties to
the left of the latter. The criticism is becoming sharper, because it coincides
with a time when the country is preparing to vote (during May, in Andalucia, and
perhaps a few months later in general elections). This week, the secretary general
~ of the Communist Party submitted a motion to censure Robles Piquer the propriety of
which was disapproved (for reasons of procedure) by the president of the Cortes,
Landelino Lavilla, at the petition of UCD. If it had been put to a vote, it is
quite possible that the government and Robles.Piquer might have ended up losing;
although (according to the opposite version) the television viewers who complain
that the newscasts of democratic Spain in 1982 are increasingly reminiscent, for
whatever reasons, of the NO-DO [Documentary Films and Newsreel Co] of other times,
would have won.
The newsmen working for Spanish Television [Tti'E] received the first notion of what
was befalling them a few days after Carlos Robles Piquer assumed his position,
last October, as general director of the ?ublic enti.ty (which also includes Nation-
" al Radio and Radio Network), when Red Cross Day was celebrated.
Those responsible for "Information Services" decided (as had been customary in
recent years) to handle the subject casually, and merely send a camera crew to
film the queen's presence at one of the boards of petition.
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In mid-morning, "orders from above" caused them to see their mistake. Through
_ those orders from the new general director, they were told that cameras were to
be sent to the boards, where not only the queen was requested for the Red Cross,
but also the wife of the president of the government, the wives of various minis-
- ters and Roble Piquer's wife herself, all of whom appeared on the screen on that ~
day`s "newscast."
Shortly after the dismissal of Fernando Castedo and the attempt made by his group
of young professionals for 9 months and 14 days (with relative success) to show
on the television screens ia Spanish homes the real situation on the streets which
those Spaniards were experiencing, the experiment had ended.
Carlos Robles Piquer, aged 56, a diplomatic with a great capacity for work, and
brother-in-law of Manuel Fraga, for whom he claims to have great admiration and
with whom he began his political career as general director of information and
popular culture, arrived in television in response to a"patriotic appeal" (in
his words) from President Calvo Sotelo, willing (as he has proven) to offer
programing in keeping with the Spain which used to be entertained by watching "The
Girls From the Red Cross" with a"ye-ye" Conchita Velasco, in the neighborhood
movie theaters.
Ramon Gomez Redondo, a television director and Socialist consultant for the public
entity remarks: "Robles Piquer considers television~to be the leisure-television
of the aggressive person and not a reflection or a window opened onto reality.
Gomez Redondo adds: "There are clear signs o� the return to the old television of
officialdom, the return to the traditional methods of submission to the network in
control which necessarily ~manates from the government and, in returning, resuming
even censorship in this lavish Francoist 'revival' that Prado del Rey seems to be
celebrating."
Ramon Gomez Redondo is a Socialist, and hence his statement could be labeled parti-
san in the official televised media. But there are agreeing with it many of the
informational professionals queried by CAMBIO 16, who are not so willing to allow
_ themselves to be quoted by name, owing to the wideness of the corridors in the
building in which they Grork.
One of them commented: "There is censorship and, in particular, there is incompe-
tence."
Example: During Castedo's time, the general director was scarcely ever consulted
directly regarding the feasibility of issuing a report or not doing so. The chief
of the "Info~mation Services," first Inaki Gabilondo, and later Pedro Erquicia,
two newsmen in his confidence and with extensive professional experience, made the
decisions. The directors of the three newscasts (Jesus Hermida, Fermin Bocos
and Joaquin Arozamena) had a free hand to give priority or more space to one
report or another, depending on their professional criterion.
The example c:,ntinues: Today, the decision as to what wi11 be reported on the
three "telecast~s" is made in the general director'~ office, at a meeting held
every day at 1000 hours by the high-ranking officials of the estab]_ishment, in
which the "newscast" directors (Joaquin Arozamena, Manuel Roglan and Alberto
Delgado) do not participate.
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FOR OFFICIE .
At "1000 hours in the morning" when Spain is drinking coffee, when nothing has
happened yet, it is already decided which news will be repor*_ed, and which will
not.
A Wasted Medium
An executive (dismissed) from Castedo's group coimnents: "Television, like radio,
- has the advantage over the newspapers of being able to rep~rt instantly what has
tiappened, an advantage that Spanish Television has given up. In this country,
most of the real news is heard first on radio, ia read in the newspaper and,
finally, seen (if it is seen) on television."
The director of the "Information Services," Joaquin Castro, conveys to those in
charge of the "newscasts" the "orders from above" which certain newsmen suspect
may be reaching them exaggerated because of~ too much obedience to the chief.
Castro, who comes from the art critic's world, was dismissed as head of the infor-
mation on the p~esidency of the State government by the Castedo group "for profes-
sional incompetence," according to an "ex" of that group.
But Castro is one of the few television newsmen who is a militant in UCD. His
care regarding fulfillment of the "orders from above" is total. And.the "orders
from above" are aimed (as Robles Piquer himself has reiterated to the point of
surfeit during his months at Prado del Rey) at not allowing "mines" to be set.
Robles Piquer and his adherents interpret as "mines" the possible "shots" that the
= alleged "Reds" situated on Spanish Television's organization chart could make to
achieve the preaching of ideas not to the ~overnm9nt's liking from the cameras.
_ The newsmen have heard Joaquin Castro say: "Television belongs to the State~ and
a little more to the government';; even though television is governed by a statute
that was prepared and approved by Tarliament, which implies (by law) that it
belongs to everyone and is for e~eryone. .
But it is known that the incident which gave Fernando Castedo the ouster as Robles
Piquer's predecessor was the fact that Felipe Gonzalez appeared for 3 days in a
row on the "telecast" first news. Now, Felipe Gonzalez almost never appears any
longer on a"telecast" first news.
The Socialist Party members have kept track of how much time each of the political
parties is appearing on television. A recent study provided the information that
the leader of the opposition was shown on the screen merely 2 minutes and 40
seconds in all, on the three 1�telecasts" combined, over a period of 1 month
(between 25 February and 24 March). The preaident of the government, Leopoldo
Calvo Sotelo, appeared on the screen for 36 minutes and 28 ~e~ond:. during, that
same month. And what is even more peculiar, Robles Piquer himself (who is nor_, or
should not be anyone politically) was on the screen for 5 minutes and 35 seconds,
- more than twice the length of time for Felipe Gonzalez.
However, there are television newsmen ~rho do not agree with Lhe Socialists on the
criterion for gaging whether television is biased nor not using as a timing guide
whether Fraga appears on the screen more than Alfonso Guerra, or whether New Force
is mentioned more than the Communist Party.
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One of thes~ newsmen remarked to CAMBIO 16: "To give an example, no one judges
DIARIO 16 or EL PAIS politically by the num6er of timPS that a politician appears
on their front page. One assumes that this 'honor' is not suct~ an honor, but
rather a reflection of the reality that has occurred in Spain during the preceding
24 hours."
But this latter guide is the one that least prevaiis in the television of Robles
Piquer which, however, does appear to react to the opposition's criticism regar.ding
the number af minutes for political personages. For example, last week, after
Alfonso Guerra and Santiago Cdrrillo complained in the Cortes that Adolfo Suarez
and Francisco Fernandez Ordonez are virtually banned from appearing on the screen,
the "telecasts" on the following days presented pictures of Adolfo Suarez and
Francisco Fernandez Ordonez after several months of absence from thP cameras.
No one would be surprised if they soon disappear again..s until someone complains.
And, meanwhile, the international news will continue to have more space than the
national news (a feature of the Francois*_ press), the weather more than the oppo-
sition, and soccer more than the national n.ews outside of Madrid and its govern-
- ment, add the newsmen.
In Spanish Television, they have their own numbers, numbers (claim those close to
Robles Piquer) which take into account the fact that the total space dedicated to
the newscasts has declined; mainly because the noon one, which used to take an
hour, now consumes only 30 minutes.
_ According to a recent study o~ the TVE technical office (based on percentages of
the time of the news reports, not on combined minutes), the news on UCD last
October (during Castedo's time) accounted for 22 percent of the national reporting,
~ and that on PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], 26 percent. And (the study
adds) those percentages were the same last February. The Communists have dropped,
it is true, from 16 to 13 percent; while Popular Alliance has risen from 14 to 24
percent. ,
The official story on why Robles Piquer is shown on the screen so much is differ-
ent ( the general director is news, and although he does not like to be shown,
those in charge of the news reports consider him news"). Those circles also
stress the fact that Castedo appear.ed often last October (they counted 17 appear-
rances for him on the screen, lasting 51 minutes and 1 second); without regard
for the fact that, last October, the dismissal or discharge of the general direc-
tor of television was, of itself, one of tt?e hottest news items on the national
political scene.
- As for the matter of the weather occupying more sgace than the opposition politi-
cians, Robles Piquer's adherents find it natural. They claim that this holds
true in the television of the developed countries, and admit that one of the goals
of the current group's management is to reduce the volume of political news, some-
thing which "was making the~atmosphere tense and the respectable public fed up."
And, meanwhile, the discharge of the most professional newsmen at Pardo del Rey is
continuing as well. This is related to the reappearance of the announcers on the
"newscasts" and, specifically, the new girls without~professional experience but
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, ~
very pretty indeed, who read more or less what has happened in the coun~ry in a
tone of one completely glossing over those events, seated in the places which
have held professionals such as Rosa Maria Mateo, Clara Francia, Victoria Prego or
Elena Marti.
With what criteria? When it was time to distribute the positions of those respon-
sible for the "telecasts" after their arrival in power, the new heads (applying
~ the theory of "moderation" which reached them from "above") awarded the role~ and
excluded many professionals, laased upon previous lahels of unknown origin. Assign-
ed to a post on one of the "telecasts" was a newsman described as pro-UCD; and,
- as his assistant, a professional whom Castro called "Red," to compensate. The
two newsmen, both of rahom are independents, are still making mutual jokes about
th~ir labels. In another recent instance, they received the shock that President
Calvo Sotelo asked to be interviewed (when he appeared on television upon complet-
ing a year of his term) by a professional whom he had removed from the "telecasts"
for being a "leftist."
"In my 15 years at Prado del Rey, I have seen some things; but what is going on
now is the most unpr.ecedented," commented ~nother newsman a few days ago, claiming
to have personally ascertained that none of the three "telecasts" on television
reported the news of the death of the youth Igr.ac~o Montoya, in Trebujena, who was
shot by the Civil Guard on 2 March; not because of censorship, but rather incompe-
tence. "It was overlooked by those on the first 'telecast' and those on the
second did not report it because the first had not done so, and the same thing
- happened with the 'final edition."'
It is because of incompetence and not because of plots by the superiors that the
media professionals think that Alfonso Guerra (like many television viewers) has
gone so far as to say that television is engaging in coup-oriented propaganda
in its reporting on the 23-F trials. In fact, before the trial began,eTheecheE~s
[General Directorate of Spanish Radio Broadcasting and Television] upp
lons" discussed how to report so as not to make this mistake. An editor for the
"telecasts" expresses the opinion: "The fact is that they don't know how to act
because there are scarcely any professionals. The real professionals, those who
know how to report on what they want to report...they are kept in the hallway,
ignored, or else the; went home a long time ago."
The First Are the Last
Not even certain sources close to the party in power consider the work done by
R~bles Piquer's group to be bringing favorable results for UCD. Those sources
note that, in the recent list given in EL PAIS, measuring the time that the poli-
ticians spent on the screen last month, the first places are monopolized by govern-
ment officials of the second rank, who are not the ones determining the country's
policy.
In order of appearance, after Calvo Sotelc, there are shown Santiago Rodriguez
Miranda, minister of labo~ and social security; Ignacio Aguirre, state secretary
of ir~i~rmation; Luis Gamir, minister of transportation and communications; Jose
Luis A1vaL~~z, minister of agriculture and fishing; and Federico Mayor Zarago7a,
minister of education.
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Except for the eas; excuse for the presence of Aguirre (the s~okesman for the
presidency of the government), how can one explain the fact that the minis~er
of labor appeared on the screen three times more than the first vice~president
of the government, Rodolfo Mar.tin Villa, or that Jose Luis Alvarez appeared onc.e
owing to a works project that he was opening, while the other ministers are
incapable of appearing before the camera unless they engage in a triple somer-
sault?
- in the corridors of Spanish Television, where since Castedo's departure they have
seen a return of the perpetual faces from Francoist television, they do have an
explanation ("it is the doing of Rafael Anson"). Anson, who was general director
of radio-television before Castedo and before Arias Salgado,onc~e again has a"hand"
in his former establishment. And Rafael Anson, who is engaged mainly in preserving
the image of half a dozen UCD ministers, knows how to install his own people so
that they may appear on the screen frequently. This would appear to prove that
- not even Rob12s Piquer's televis~an is devoted to pro-governmental politics, but .
rather to showxng the countenai:ces of those with influential ~obs, provided of
course that they belong to UCD.
Another who has returned is Luis Ezcurra ( a regular holder ef a high-ranking post .
at Frado del Rey for life, and at the Plaza de Oriente demon,strations when they are
called), who was installed in an office as soon as Castedo l~;ft and before Robles
Piquer appointed him to anything (he is now chief of television international
relations).
As a rule, the other direct collaborators of Robles Piquer have been dissociated
from the medium of television and from ~ournalism. The only 3ournalists with high-
- ranking pos.ts are personal friends of the general director: Manuel Calvo Hernandez,
who was assistant editor of YA (and to whom is attributed the "telecasts enthusi-
asm for showing scientific congresses); and Iiafael Ortega, coordinator of foreign
- correspondents, who was director of National Radio in Rome when Robles Piquer was
holding the post of amt+assador t~ the Vatican.
Other names come from that Fraga Ministry of Information �in which Robles Piquer ~
held high-ranking positions; such as Jesus Moneo, now director of the technical
office; or Enrique de la H~oz, former commissioner of festivals in Spain, who has
unseated a prominent composer, Miguel Ange1 Coria, in the RTVE's orchestra and
chorus office; or the dii~ctor of the Spanish Radio N~cwork, Luis del Val, wha at
one time headed the General Directorate of Cooperatives.
But the philosophy of the new group heading "tele" has been that of not "draining"
the intermediate level posts of those appointed by Castedo, whose functions have
been taken away from *_hem, but not their salaries. This has entailed an inflation
of the "Information Sei-~ices" table of organization, the cost of which has increas-
ed by SO percent in recent months.
The bureaucratic burden is such that a reporting space like the nine o'clock
"telecast" has a director, an aasistant national director, an assistant interna-
tional director, a national coordinator, an international coordinator, a deputy
- director, an editing secretary, a chief of economic and labor reporting, an
assistant chief of labor reporting and a chief of parliamentary reporting.
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All of them, of course, collect bonuses of up to 125,000 pesetas in addition to
their salaries, which are already rather large as a rule.
But the standard in Spanish Television is this statement coined in its offices:
"Here one earns a salary for being Spanish, and a bonus for workin~." In other
words, the 9,600 workers on the TVE payroll have an assigned salary equivalent to
that earned by other Spanish citizens in other business firms. If they do not
earn any more it is because they are in.the hal~ls (in more direct language, they
have no work to do). At the time when they become associated with a progrdm, they
are assigned an extra bonus for c~torking; a system which caused the maintenai~ce ~
of the TVE payroll to cost us Spanish taxpayers 31 billion pesetas last year.
The bonus, to make matters worse, does not require exclusive dedication on the part
of those who collect it, at least on the high-ranking level: Luis Losada, director
of "weekend news reports," works in the press office of the RENFE [Spanish National
Railroads]; Angel Urreiztieta, director of that "weekend news," is press chief of
the Ministry of Labor and Society Security; a~d Ramon Barro and Aurelio Rodrigo
(director of "telecast" and coordinator of "final edition," respectively) also
work in the press office of the Health Ministry.
Jose Luis Sanz, editor of "final edition," is press chief of the Ministry of Health
and Consumer Affairs; Ange1 del Rio, assistant director of "open editor`s office,"
also works as press chief for CEPYME [Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium
Businesses]; and Pedro Gonzalez, assistant international director of "telecast;'
is press chief for BANESTO [Spanish Credit Bank]. Other RTVE professionals are
also well placed in other government press offices.
All these problems have cropped up similarly in 10 of the 11 regional centers (the
exception is that in the Canaries, which operates in a model fashion). Owing to
the budget needs, those centers are closed in the afternoon after they have finish-
ed their regional area broadcasts; and this prevents their being connected with
the evening "telecast." If the latter needs news from editors outside of Madrid,
it has to hire them as extras (and with extra pay, of course).
While the "~elecasts" are declining in quality, the same thing is still happening
to the other reporting spaces which are not only declining, but even disappearing.
Spaces such as the current international news report, "Objective," that on topics
of collective interest, "Hand to Hand," and that critiquing the media itself,
"Take the Floor," have become a thing of the past. All that remain now are three
prcgrams of public debates: "Tr~e Key," "This Country" and "Voices Without a Voice";
but the latter two are aired simultaneously on both networks.
And, meanwhile, television is engaged in entertaining, like a boob-tube. Apart
from the news reports, the key questions are: "Will'Inigo'return?" and ':will'One-
Two-Three'return?" There. are many films, many American films made for television,
and soon there will be a great deal of soccer, especially the World Soccer: a
- f.ormula already used (actually, without much success) in Francoist times.
A well-known director claims~ ''This. will be difficult to stop because the philoso-
phy of the First Network director, Enrique de las Casas, is that of airing on prime
time things such as "300 Million" and "Applause" (two low budget programs because
of alleged concealed advertising), and all types of musicals and contests."
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a va~ vi a+~.~...-~ aivra va~~.~
But the contests and the musicals do not concern the leftist political parties so
much as the elections, first those in Andalucia and later the general elections,
with reporting which thex consider totally partial to the government.
According to the minute count made by the Co~unists and Socialists, the reporting
on ministers and the government increased from occupying 22 to 49 percent of the
space devoted to national news from October 1981 to February 1982; while the report-
ing on political parties during that period declined from 52 to 13 percent.
_ Communist Motion
The conclusion reached by the Communist Party after reading the results of its
last study was that it should submit to Parliament a motion of censure against
Robles Piquer which might have succeeded (they had backing from Socialists, Basques
and Andalucians) if it had not been excluded from the agenda by the president of
the Cortes last Tuesday.
The aborted Coimnunist motion states: "This parliamentary group has noted the persis-
tence and seriousness with which TVE has been violating the principles of imparti-
ality and pluralism, and others set forth in the Consritution and the Statute on
Radio and Television. Consequently, it censures the acticn of the general director
of the public entity, and calls upon the government, implementing Article 12 on
Radio and Television, to resolve the dismissal of the general director.
While Socialists and Communists pledge to continue raising the issue both outside
of and within Parliament, no party has yet protested over a news itemc� which the
"telecasts" (significantly) omitted last weekend, despite the fact that it occupied
the front pages of the newspapers.
It involves a decision of the Constitutional Court which, althoughthatdhad filedear
out the arguments of the private television company, "Antena 3,
an appeal against the government postponement of the decree which was abodoes~
authorize the establishment of private channels at the end of last year,
indeed open the door for the creation of private broadcas~ivateitelevisioncisrnot
responsible for overseeing its fnlfillment decided that p
necessarily imposed by the existing legal system, although within the framework of
the Constitution this~~policy decision could be accepted by the government (which,
after its reconquest o~ TVE, is in no hurry to have more television entities in
existence)'; and the leftist Paredein allowingrfreeVStationsaimmediatelyaeitherad-
casting firms, are not interest
Inaki Gabilondo, director of RTV 16, arguve.theeessentialsproblemspof stateetele-
sion exists, it will be impos.sible to sol ust one television system, this medium
vision. He adds: "So long as there is a j
will continue to be considered a constitutional authority, like the Cortes, tor
example, dissociated from the purposes. of a normal communications medium."
Gabilondo gives a reminder that this proposition was hrought up during the night
of 23 February, whenrti~ itgwasafeasibleftoishow~onT elevisionithehseizureeof the
discussing whether o
Congress by Te~ero and his Civil Guards.
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"As a matter of inere informational interest, there would not have been any doubt;
the video would have had to be shown immediately. But TVE is an institution
transcending an informational medium." He remarks: "And so long as there i~
only one, the professional battle will be irremediably doomed."
PSOE's Guerra
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 5 Apr 82 p 47
[Article by Alfonso Guerra: "The One-Dimensional Television"]
[Text] The arrival of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo in the presidency of the government
means the "Kabulization" of Prado del Rey. The latest experiment hegun at RTVE
after the approval of the Statute and the appointment of Fernando Castedo to the
directorship ~ras halted with the cruelty and firmness of the scalpel. After
Castedo's wishes had been extorted, a useless dismissal uras achieved, and steps .
were taken to make the first appointment of the great right (Ca~vo Sotelo version)
or of the natural majority (Fraga Iribarne version): Carlos Robles Piquer. And
immediately, there were purges, persecution, the stoppage of programs and the
rerun of Francoism on television.
If the government risked the political scandal entailed in forcing the dismissal
of Castedo without the presence of any of the reasons for dismissal stipulated in
Article 12 of the Szatute, it was not, o� course, to allow his successor to conti-
nue that first, halting experiment in pluralism in the media subordir.ate to the
public entity; but rather to restore in its entirety the governmental model of
television perpetrated during the Franco era. And this is what we have, what is
obviously: a television with its back turned to reality, one-dimensional in its
tastes, its ethics and its cultural message, whose leaders, intentions, methods
and end product can only be descriUed as a rerun of Francoism.
For example, during the 4 and a half months of Mr Robles Piquer's term, the RTVE's
official statistics show the spectacular escalation in the image of three person-
ages in Spanish public life: Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Manuel Fraga Iribarne and
- Carlos Robles Piquer raho, in an abuse of authority bordering on mE:galomania, far
surpass2s, for example, the president of the Cungress of Deputie~ and the vast
majority of political leaders.
A sign of the governmentalization of the TVE news reporting is the return to what
George Hills, director of BBC programs for Spain and Latin America, defines as an
archetype of "non-news, germane to the news media in undemocratic regimes": the
social activities and travel of ministers and.other high-ranking government office
holders.
With the TVE news reporting space heavily controlled, and adminis~.ered on the
basis of a unilateral polttical plan, with decreased reporting on national issues
and political activity and increased reporting on sports and raeather forecasts,
there remains a residual area enabling the old friends to satisfy their own clien-
tele: and so, with TVE regarded as a private preserve," it is not surprising that
a member of the RTVE Bcard of Administration (from UCD, of course) should manipu-
late a report and furthermore be convinced that this is a normal practice. And
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when something is upsetting, it ~ill suffice not to report it: disinformation,
concealment of facts. The most recent instance: incidents in Lebrija and Trebu-
jena.
If major events are approaching,,for examklP, elections in Andalucia, they
the director of the regional center among the long list of advisers of the honor-
able ministers; which explair,s why Tele/Andalucia 'lias heen converted into a pedan-
tic bulletin of UCD, eager to reflect, with care, the Andalucian excursions of the
government ministers.
As for the non-informational programing, one notes a decline in ti~ production it-
self. There has been an elimination or soft-pedaling of "controversial" programs,
and those of an open, participatory type ("Take the Floor," "Objective," "Hand to
Hand," "The Witness," "Between Two Lights," "Music, Maestro," etc., in the first
instance; and the "problems" of "The Key" and "In This Country," in the latter).
There has been a return to the old formulas: "Open Studio" has returned; "One,
Two, Three" has been announced for after the World games; and "Your Turn" is
already on the ai~-. In short, the television of the past, the forms of entertain-
ment of the past, the comfortable culture of the past and the careful exclusion of
alternative cul`.ur_~es, intended not for adults, not for free citizens, but for
subjects on cor.ditional ralease, who are childish and assiduously protected from
reality.
This policy has caused a widespread situation marked by personal exclusions. A
total of 6Z top-rank appointments (public entity, associations, regional centers)
have been officially reported to the Board o~ Administration. It is impossible
to assess how many other second-rank appointments have occurred during the 4 and
a half months of Robles Piquer's. term.
But, based on the cherry theory, it is not rash to assume that the removal of
individuals and positions (and, if need be, the accumulation of the latter) will
double or triple tiiat ~igure. At the present time, professionals of recognized
quality are suffering a greater or lesser degree of exclusion (in some instances
absolute), and working, when they do work, on tasks that are beneath their compe-
tence.
In the context of an authoritarian relationship with the Board of Administration
on the part of Mr Robles Piquer (a poaition which af�ects the UCD board members,
but which they do ~not dare oppoae), there has been a gradual curtailment of the
- board's authority, with the complicitX and submission of the Centrist board members.
Unaccustomed to undergoing any kind o~ democratic control, Robles Piquer prefers
to state his obligations to the 6oard as "ma~ters of courtesy," being painstaking
to the point of exasperation in minor matters and acting without gi~ving an expla-
nation in the more serious ones.
The current situation of TVE necesaitates a demand for responsihility on the part
of the general director and Mr Calvo Sotelo's government. Spanish society so
demands, and it will achieve this.
COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
2909
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FOR (
- POLITICAL UNITED KINGDOM
'TIMES' ASSESSES SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
PM041159 London THE TIMES in English 4 May 82 p 9
- [Editorial: "Will the Soviets Slip In?"]
[Text] To find the key to Soviet policy in Latin America one has to look at
and listen to Cuba. Opinion in Mnscow may have been confined in the main to
criticism of British "imperialism" and American "hypocrisy". In Latin America,
Cuba has been vociferous in its support for the Argentine junta~ whose g~nerals
only the other day were discussing collaboration with Washington to contain
Cuban-inspiL..d subversion and terrorism in Central America. Underneath
these contradictions, however, it is possible to discover a very clear long-
= term Soviet interest in the dissipation of Washington's power and influence
throughout the American hemisphere.
The Soviet Union is beset by pressures on its own periphery--China, Afganistan,
Iran and Poland. The men of the Kremlin see these pressures not as proof of
communism's inherent untenability as a system of political control, but more
as evidence that the world outside is determined to destroy them. Their
strategy is thus state~ica.lly defensive, in that they have to meet their basic
feelings of insecurity by permanently extending the outer perimeter of their
defenses and seeking to destabilize all other societies which they inevitably
regard as hostile.
In those terms it must be necessa;.y for the Soviet Union to encourage as much
agitation as it can in Latin America, since for historical reasons, that
agitation can most conveniently be targeted on a symbolic hatred of Uncle Sam.
Russia`s patronage of Cuba was correctly seen as a vital first beachhead in
this design; and that is what it has been. But beyond that the sheer vola-
tility of the continent has foxed Marxist minds as much as everybody else
seeking to observe patterns in the ebb and flow of Latin American politics.
The Cuban foothold gave encouragement to guerrilla mnvements wherever they
could get started. In January 1966, for instance, the Latin American solid-
arity organization was set up in Havana after a tri-continental conference
attended by all Latin American communist parties which e~dorsed recourse to
"armed struggle", in the continent, in that group incidentally, were two
Argentine terrorist organizations, the ERP and the Montene:.os.
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rvn vrr~~.ina. ~.~c viv~.t
In 1970 the accession of Salvador Allend2 in Chile was appropriately cele-
brated by the establistffient of close links laetween Havana and Santiago, which
bracketed the continent while terrorism in Argentina contiaued to receive
moral and material support. Until the fall of Allende in 1973, and the grad-
; ual elimination of terrorisw in Argentina--at an appalling social cost--later
in the decade, it must have seemed likely to Moscaw that the t~e of South
America could move decisively out of Washington's orbit, and if that happened,
_ could Brazil--the real jewel of South America--have been far behind?
It was not to be so, though there remained an ambiealenr. relationship between
Buenos Aires and Moscow which was certainly more complicated than the simple
certainties of terrorism and anti-terrorism would imply. However in the late
1970s 9oviet and Cuban interests switched back to Central America causing
President Reagan's Washington to become almost obsessed with the threat this
might ultimately pose to the future stability of M~exico itself. It was that
1 pre-occupation that encouraged Washington to try to enlist more allies from
the South to help contain the damage in E1 Sa].vador.
Moreover, in addition to giving support to subversion, the Soviet economic
presence in Latin America was continuing to graw. Its trade with Latin Ameriea,
excluding Cuba, grew ten times between 1970 to 1977; its credit to Latin Am-
erica, excluding Cuba, rose in that perioc; from 2 per cent of its total cred-
its to developing cour?tries to 25 per cent. Though these figures do not
suggest economic dominance in the area, they certainly help to position the
_ Soviet Union to tak.e further political advantage of any other frontier dis-
putes which might occur on Che continent.
It has never been Soviet policy to put all its strategic eggs in one basket--
the Nazi Soviet pact is eloquent enough testi~ony to that. So when the
Galtieri ~unta invaded the Falklands the Soviet Union was quite satisfactor-
ily placed to exploit the situation to its advantage. Soviet-Argentine rela-
tions have anyway been very good since even before 1980 when Argentina ig-
- nored President Carter's call for a grain embargo on the Soviet Union after
the invasion of Afghanistan. Since then Argentina's commercial dependence
has gro~m, with 80 per cent of her grain crop and 50 per cent of her total ex-
ports going to the Soviet Union. In August 1979 a Soviet military delegation
had already been in Buenos Aires to capitalize on Carter's ban on arms sales
to the junta. These earlier contacts enabled Moscow to provide Argentina
with intelligence about the British fleet presumably with the hope, or maybe
the assurance, that they will be able to secure listen~ng posts and access
- to other maritime services in return. Ar~ sales may also be stepped up
- in the wake of hostilities with Britain, not least because Argentina may not
receive credit from anywhere else to buy arms in the Western world.
The decisive declaration of Amer'_can support for Great Britain will have pro-
vided Moscow with much extra propaganda in Argentina. Whatever regime emerges
in Argentina after the crisis, therefore, is bound to be bruised and even
more wary of Washington than its predecessors. It will thus be all the more
susceptib le to Soviet approaches. Th at cannot be avoided and it explains why
the American administration was so desperate to prevent the crisis deteriora-
- ting to a point of outpight hostilities.
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However, this oppor*~.uiity for th~ Soviet Un~on is not the only consequence
of the crisis. Tn European terms, the alliance and its posture of deterrence
have been immeasurably strengthened both by the decision of the IInited States
to back its ma~or ally--in spite of its own inter-American difficulties--
and by the spectacle of Britain's will to use force to uphold international
law and protect her citi:ens. That messag~ cannot fiave been lost on West
Berliners, who are, in one sense, the Falklanders of Europe; and if it is not
lost on West Berliners, it is certaisily not lost on East Berliners and their
Sov~Let patrons. In the central area of East-West tension, where the deterrent
has long been taken for granted, but more rec~ntly doubted, that point of
reassurance must be significant. The praspect of Soviet strates~istfi fishing
ir. the t