JPRS ID: 10532 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060045-1
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS 10532
20 May 1982
W~$t E u ro e Re o rt
p p
(FOUO 33/82)
J
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JPRS L/10532
20 May 1982
WEST EUROPE REPORT
ZFOUO 33/82Z
CONTENTS
EOONOMIC
~ F[ZAN CE
Nati.onalized Groups Head List of Irbst Profitable Compaiiies
(Philippe Durupt; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 8 Mar 82).......... 1
EfFects of Foreign Deficit, Private F3.rms on Left's Policies
(Jean Gloaguen; L'EXPRESS, 19-25 Mar 82) 11
I T1~. LY
Industry Minister Gives Gloomy View of Ec;ono~y
- (Giovanni Marcora Interview; CORRIERE DELLA SERA,
� 13 Apr 82) ~14
_ POLITICAL
NE THERLAN DS
Van lhijn on Labor Party, Government I7ifficulties .
(J_ Van Tijn, Max Van ~eezel; VRIJ NEDERT~I~TD,
3 Apr 82) 18
- MILITARY
FRAtJ CE
llespite Some La~inch Problems, Exocet Miss~l~s To Be on 236
Ships ~
(Pierre Ian~ereux; AIR ET COSM05, 17 Apr 82).......... 27
- a - ~IZI - WE - 150 FOUO]
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~
i
i Command Chain, ~.fense Priortties of Finistere Sea Ragion
~ ~ (Lilian Cotteaux; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Apr 82) 29
I
i Briefs
Subsonic Target Tested 32
i SNECMA Orders 32
-I
4
GENERAL
I FRAN CE
Ariane Delay Upsets Remaining Launch Schedule
; (Pierre Langereux; AIR ET COSMOS, 20 Mar 82) . . . . . . . . ~ . . 0 33
Ariane Parachute Recover3? System To Be Tested in September
( (AIR ET COSMOS, 17 Apr 82) 35
~
; Brie fs
_I Vo lvo Participating in Ariane . 36
Ariane Booster Fails 36
I
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- ECONOMIC FRANCE
NATIONALIZED GROUPS HEAD LIST OF MOST PROFITABLE COMPANIES
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 8 Mar 82 pp 65-74
[Article by Philippe Durupt: "The 150 Largest Taxpayers"]
[Text] For the last 18 months Frencb.:;usiness has been ,
involved in a new crisis. Our cla~aification measures
how they overcame the previous one. It gives a good
idea of their ability ta adapt.
- 'Chis third honor roll of the 150 largest taxpayers in indus~ry and trade is
. a good vintage. On the whole, the taxes paid are up considerably.
'Che reason is that the 3-year average which is used to calcualte the results
no longer includes 1977, which was a wretched year. (The amount of tax firms
- plid increased only 6.5 percent, less than the inflation rate.)
This average does include, however, the figures from 1980, which were excel-
lent when judged by the increase of taxes on profits (plus 24 percent).
It was, therefore, a year of recovery, but not for all companies and not to
_ the same degree. T.ne classification is still changing.
`I'h:is surnrises no c:p for the automobile firms because their activity is highly
cycl.ical. More unexpected among the leaders is IMB-France's gain of one place
with a worse performance than the year before. Air Liquide has stayed in 4th
pl.ace, and the CGE [French General Electric Company] has only advanced one,
despite a large increase (more than 30 percent) in their taxes.
'I'i~e variations are decreasing: competition for the first palces is fiercer
than ever.
- Bon~;r.ain wen* from 83rd to 47th place because of a well supervised internal
clevelopment. Creusot-Loire moved up 35 places--the beginning of a recovery
wl~ich within a few years should result in a place which is more in line with
the size of its turnover.
1'l~e most favorable changes seen last year are continuing--unrestrictedly in
tlie food industry, but with more subtlety in electronics. Construction and
p~~blic works are more complex.
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E:xcLusively French busir.esses have advanced in the cYassification, a tQmporary
- phc~nomenon which was interrupted in 1981 with the real e~~ate crisis.
'I'h~ large public works firms, who left to conquer foreign markets, ha~e slid.
- B~it here is a casP (the only one of this size) where the tax criterion is mis-
l~acling. The major public works firms are making large profits on their f~ieign
projects in coun~ries where they are not heavily taxed. Their tatal net profits
ar~ thus Quite higher tnan their taxes, almost 3 times as much in the case of
Bouygues. 'I'he years 1Q78 and 1980 are a transition period, since the conse-
quences of th2 second oil shock had not begun to be felt until the second
0 - stock exchange
13. Rhene-Poulenc 315.33 - 344,67 29 812,67 12 136,00 sm = parent company
14. Esso 295,10 240,50 28 340,27 -
15. BSN Genrais-Danone 294,24 362,97 16353,52 6909,64 Pechiney, Ugine,
16. C'� G~n~rale des Eaux 284,00 265,20 8 397,37 4 180,23 Kuhlmann
- 17. Avions Breguet-Dassault 275,98 276,69 8 061,47 2 995,95
18. Lafarge-Copp~e 266.39 367,75 7881,57 3368,06 = West African
- 19. L'Or~al 228,52 310,15 6896,62 3076,25 French Company
20. Carrefour 226,36 328,69 17 576,24 2 284,20
21. Schnelder S.A. 214,70 - 209,03 26447,37 10966,43
~ 22. Pemod-Ricard 211.78 229,61 5277,14 1281.97
23 Matra 200,01 186,67 4111,01 -
24 Casmo 175,84 105,51 9 437,85 1 806,39 .
25. CFAO
~ 169,44 126,18 6754,62 1256,52
26. ~yonnaise des Eaux 154,99 159,88 10084,32 4104,38
27 Bull (CII-HB) 150,77 193,50 5292,81 -
28. Esso-Chimie 125,26 128,63 3178 500,4
- 29. Imetal 124,83 156,82 8999,64 -
30 Auchan (sm) 124,10 166,90 8206,70 -
31. Bic 119,54 154,96 2607,46 -
32. Radiotechnique 107,76 124,21 3 545,45 1249,05
33 G~nerale Occidentale 105,60 178,10 22213,46 -
�
34. Maisons Ph~nix 104,29 119,75 2 453,46 907,77
- 35. Groupe Maison Familiale 102,66 102,66 2 196,33 -
36. Mo~t-Hennessy 98,87 101,07 2384,19 1071,93
37. Pollet 97,20 119,83 4407,52 988,13
38. Lesieur 97,03 94,65 3 561,52 768,84
39. C" G~n~rale de G~ophysique 95,77 123,87 1 318,70 -
40 3M France (nc) 92,66 94,33 1 601 -
41. Frves- Lille 91,67 67,12 3216,44 -
42. Legrand 91,63 107.86 1605,72 -
- 43. Air-Inter Inc) 86,66 43,86 2 285,63 -
44 Eurafrep 85,84 46,48 214,4A -
46 Roussel-Uclaf 84,87 114,90 4348,37 2097,67
46. Kodak�Path~ (ncl. 84,21 93 3457 -
47. Bonc~rain 83,59 - 81,70 2274.39 553,05
48. Elf-Gabon 82.24 29,36 212,19 154,46
49. Hachette 81,33 108,76 6307,90 1835,50
50. Revillon 79,01 118,23 1 825.73
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Automobiles: Peugeot vs. Renault
- (in million~ of francs)
Tax Paid by
Renault Peugeot and Citroen (1)
1969 18,9 183,3
1970 2,7 � 183,3
1971 0 185,9
1972 0 316,8
1973 0 270,2
1974 0,1 93
1975 0 166,9
1976 69,1 1 100,5
1977 211 1 091
1978 184 999
1979 558.68 1044
1980 (2) 826 0
'Che comparisons above are given as examples. The series are not in fact
homogeneous. (1) Peugeot and Citroen had different accounting systems;
their taxes have been added. (2) However, the 1980 figures are combined
results for both companies.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "Valeurs Actuelles"
9720
CSO: 3100/495
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FRANCE
ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF rOREIGN DEFICIT, PRIVATE FIRMS ON LEFT'S POLICIES
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 19-25 Mar 82 pp 75-77
[Article by Jean Gloaguen: "Warning--Slippery"]
[Excerpts] The warning lights are on-~-the government
should soon reconcile the generosity of its ideas with
the available means.
~ The government has changed its tone on econamic affa~,rs. This is not the
effect of the f irst round of cantonal elections, but of the first budget
discussions. Reassuring statements and 5peeches about respecting promises
have been succeeded by praise of strictness. The management makes a 3oke of
the electoral programs.
Since May 1981 the economic debate has been a sham, used for exclusively
political ends by a Left worried about combating the relative akepticism over
its management abilities and an opposition which had to use any means at its
disposal, In the end, there was a real cacophony: on nationalizations, on
the tax on wealth, on social security financing, on energy (nuclear and
natural gas) and on agricultural policy, the ministers blithely contradicted
each other. In the end they gave the impression that the gover~ent had not
set a clear economic policy. In addition, the misunderstanding among employ-
ers, professionals and f armers--groups which were already hesitant about Che
"change"--had been aggravated.
Tlie authorities were liable to lose the~r credibility at this game sooner or
later. The economic machine cannot run with ~ust c~vil servants and arms fac-
tories. On Wed'nesday, 10 March, Francois Mi.t~errand took advantage of the
goverrnnent's preliminary work on the 19~3 budget and of the cammunique wxitten
by Pierre Mauroy to make a call to order. "Old expenditures wiil be reexam-
ined, even reconsidered, and new expenditures will~be chosen very strictly."
Doubtless, purely political considerations were not alien~to this warning: the
theme of a balanced budget has always pleased in this country and, in any
case, there was some urgency. Had it not been said that the deficit in public
finances was reaching sizable proportions? Some 200 billian of the requests
from all the ministries were taken into account. Besides, it was not a bad
. idea for the president of the Republic to appear worried about austerity and
orthodoxy 3 days before meeting Ronald Reagan.
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' No matter--the intervention of Francois Mitterrand is the result of real con-
cern. With its solo recovery, France is haunted by two dangers: a serious
decline in foreign exchange and an enormous balloening of the deficit. Some
people are already waving scarecrows, talking of chain reaction devaluations
and runaway inflation. A situati~n which, slowly but surely, will drive the
French economy out of the international scene, will lead to protectionism and
will cause purchasing power to f all. A gradual decline.
The theme of decline is not new. It was talked about during Valery Giscard
d'Cstaing's term, and not just by the Left. Beyond considerations on the fate
~f rural Albania in 1925 or on the return of the candle, beyond sociological
and political convictions which find this a fert3le theme, the real question
is this: Will the French still be willing to give a good pull during the next
decade? Can the goverrnnent make a mixed economy work without a minimum of
~ guud will from the private sector? Can it convince those who are backing it
tl~at tt~e free lunch has been put off until later because of the crisis?
Medium- and long-term economic development depend on the answers to these
questions.
In the short term the analysis is simpler. The Lef t has avoided making any
big mistakes in 1981 and, even if clouds gather, there seems to be no indica-
tion of anything drscnatic happening during the next few months.
Uelors' Double or Nothing
T}~e Sucialist Party would like an exercise in high jumping: a reduction in un-
employment without upsetting the major monetary and foreign balances, and a
slowing of the hike in prices with, as a premium, a redistribution of income.
lluring the good days of more than 5 percent growth a year such goals were not
compatible. However, since the first oil crisis and the automization of pro-
duction tools it is a different story, as shown by the inescapable increase in
unemployment in most major Western countries.
These Western countries quite unanimously think that their competitiveness in
tl~e eighties lies in a cure to inflation, through severe restriction of the
money supply, public expenditures and the foreign debt. These choices are
based on the thesis that employment comes only as the result of a"good
economy."
Lver since his arrival at the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Jacques Delors
has claimed that a decrease in unemploymEnt and the lowering of prices could
go iland in hand. He bet the recovery of the French economy on this. During
ttie first stage the pump would be primed by increasing low salaries and family
allowances, an increase which is inc.luded in the Left's program. Investment
:ind recovery on the foreign market should eventually take over from domestic
~ consumption to keep up the economic ~chythm. This workirtg hypothesis has led a
number of specialists to fear the worst and to say so.
The figures for 1981 show that those who announced catastrophes were wrong.
'fhe results would hardly have been any different if Valery Giscard d'Estaing
had been relected.
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At ttiis point i~: is hard to see how France can follow its courae for long
alone. Increasing budgetary expenditures will certainly support consinnption.
But, to a great extent, this consumption will benefit foreign competitors
who will have the advantage of more stable production ~.~.~;~ts. The exampJ_e of
vehicle registrations in February leaves hardly any ill.usions--more than 25
percent were foreign a.utamobiles. Tt is not surprisinb that unemployment
figures continue to cli.mb under tl:~~~;e ennditions.
It is notsurprising either that firms are protesting their increase in costs
].inked to the reduction in the workweek and that they f ear they will again be
called upon to contribute in order to balance the budgets of UNEDIC [National
Union for Employment in I~zdustry and Co~nerce] and of Sor.ial Security.
And it is not surprisinQ that rtnnors of a devaluation o� the franc have
started again. Unless sales increase, the trade deficit cannot help but swell
considerably. The fig~re of a 100-bi;.lion-franc deficit has been heard; that
would be double last year's.
Of course, the small foreign debz left by Raymond Barre gives his successors
" t}ie possibility of finding financing on the international market. The advis-
ability of such an approach, however, is highly questionable: it would, most
especially, mean mortgaging the future in order to allow the French to con-
sume more. It would also indicate a tendency toward the easy solution which
would mean pressure on the franc.
'I'llis pressure is all the more dangerous because the money supply is also likely
to be called upon to f~nance the public deficit. In September 1981, Laurent
~~abius, minister of the budget, presented a budget with expenditures up 26
- percent and a deficit of 94 billion f rancs for 1982. A few days later, after
- the dev aluation, the deficit dropped to 80 billion. Since then, it has not
stopped growing; latest estimates place it between 110 and 120 billion francs.
One discovers that hiring civil servants is not paid for just in salaries
and z~dditional pencil sharpeners. One discovers that Algerian natural gas,
n~itic~nalizations and the textile plan are expensive.
'I'l~e change in prices will depend on foreign and dome~tic imbalances. Delors'
I>rocedure for f reezing salaries, based on the expectation that prices will go
down, assumes, by defiuition, that prices will not climb upward. One under-
stands the tenacity of the minister of economy and finance in preaching
- ~-~usterity.
An economy's orientation is a function of its environment. In the euphoria
of victory the Socialists thought they had a large margin for maneuvering.
After testing the facts they have learned that France cannot play alone against
everybody else forever.
'll~eir economic specialists are now thoroughly convinced. The question, however,
is whettier or not these specialists have succeeded in persuading the Elysee
that there are no miracles.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 s.a. Groupe Express
9720
CSO: 3100/516 13
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ECONOMIC IT~Y
INDUSTRY MINISTER GIVES GLOOMY VTEW OF ECONOMY
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 13 Apr 82 p 13
[Interview with Minfster of Industry Giovanni Marcora by Ferruccio de Bortoli;
date and place not given: "Marcora: ~Un~ustified Optimism; the Italian Malady
Is Still Serious
[Text] There is a recurrence of the economic emergency, with
liabilities of almost 3 billion in February's balance of
trade.
According to the minister of industry~ the "hole" is the
result of the payment of overdue bills and the replacement
of supplies.
"Beware of the resumption of inflation in September."
The crux of the energy problem: "An agreement with Algiers is
necessary; but who will assume the increased burden must be
made clear."
Russian gas pipeline polemics wtth Longo.
A bad surprise, from the celebration of one Eastern to another. February's
balance of trade showed the negative increase of 2,931 billion, of 65, over
the monthly level of last May. Imports amounted to 10,516 billion (+41 percent
compared with February 1981); exports amounted to 7,585 billion (+28.1 percent).
Striking figures, taken from Spadolini's television message which advised one
not "to let one's guard down" during the econamic emergency. The weakness of
the lira (Friday the dollar equalled 1,329.75) seems confirmed by an increase in
expectations of a devaluation. And yet there is a ray of optimism. The ISCO
[Institute for the Study of Economic Trends] - Economic World leans slightly
toward revival. But how does one find one's bearings amid apparently contra-
dictory indications? This is what Ministry of Industry Giovanni Marcora thinks.
[Question] "How is one to interpret this macroscopic "hole" in the balance of
trade?"
[Answer] "The situation has always been dramatic. Ever since I became minis-
ter I have continued to say the same things. But every once in a while some
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PVn ~La'l'1t.ana. vva: vi~a..�
important person says: `Everything is fine; the fight against inflation has
been won.' But no. In February ovzrdue bills had to be p2id. The prior deposit
(abolished on 8 February: editor's note) had been removed and it was to be
expected,.."
[Question] "But this, too, is.~n~t a positive symptom. More purchases of raw
materials; more faith in the resinnption of productivity?"
[Answer] "Let us look at the variation in supplies. In 1980 compared with
1979, their value increased 16,459 billion. In 1981, compared with the preceding
year, it decreased 3,700 billion. Because of loan difficulties,~~and a certain
stability in the price of raw materials, firms cut down. on supplies. And it was
clear that, upon resumption of their replacement, there would be a negative
impact on the balance of trade. And then there are other factors: the expecta-
tion of an international recovery causes one to think that there might be a rise
in the cost of raw materials. If, then, there are problems of denaluation--we
- hope that there will not be any--there will be a greater tendency to make pur-
chases sooner."
[Question] "Is re-introduction of the prior depos~t possible?"
- [Answer] "I do not think so. Also because the EEC [European Economic Co~unity]
probably would not accept this."
[Question] "Well, then?"
[Answer] "We have to reduce the treasury withdrawal on the f inancial market.
They say 50,000 billion. I don't think so. There are more. And the receipts
are less than estimated. With readjustments in the financial law, then, new
burdens have ~nerged. And who is to cover them? The chief aim is that of
avoiding a considerable resumption of inflation in the fall." ~
[Q�estion] "But there has been some success, even if there is still a struc-
tural inflation."
[Answer] Yes. We have reduced it; but less than the Federal Republic of
Cermany. The diff erential is what counts. Saturday night the president of the
council draRnatized~ the situation for the thousanth time. But why did he say
that there had been some success with respect fo inflation? It is not true.
There is no change in the formula: taxes, more work,~~sacrifices. There is
nothing to be done."
[Question] "So, circumstances have not changed. Has there been no progress,
even from the attempts at containment of the cost of labor?"
[Answer] "The only result of this long, enervating negotiation with the labor
unions was the postponement of the negotiations on contracts. Which now are
exploding. And then there is the big sword of Damocles regarding liquidations.
No one knows how that will turn out."
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[QuestionJ The~question of energy, augmented by the revaluation of the dollar,
has been a determinant factor 3.n the deficit of the balance of trade, which
in the first 2 months was 4,547 billion (3,025 in the corresponding 2 months
of 1981). The matter of making purchases at hetter prices is being proposed
again. Is there a near-at-hand agreement with Algeria for gas?"
- [Answer] "If we were to purchase natural gas from the Algerians at the present
price, the added burden would be 600-800 billion. It is clear that sooner or
later there will have to be an agreement. But if we have to pay ~more than the
market price to Algeria because of a broader agreement regarding cooperation,
it will be necessary to establish who will pay the 300-400 billion difference,
or whatever it will be. There are two possibilities. Either the treasury will
pay the sum to ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency], in order to balance the
accounts again; or the rates will increase. But it will not be like when a
person who does not have shoes goes to the shoemaker and sa}*s to him: I need
some shoes and I can buy them only from you. Tf there had not been that national
bla bla, the agreement would already have been reached. I am ready for a poli-
tical agreement with Algeria, but I must be told who will pay the difference
between the market price and what Algiers wants. Because then, as chairman of
the CIP [Interministerial Price Committee], I will be the one who will have to
_ increase the rates."
[Question] "And what about the Russian gas pipeline?
[Answer] This is our situation. It seems that Socialdemocratic Secretary
Longo says�that we cannot finance Soviet armament. But this past 18 November
the minister of foreign trade already signed an authorization for a 2,000 billion
- loan to the Nuovo Pignone Company and to other Italian companies interested in
~ the construction of the gas pipeline. Longo should not turn to me, but should
ask the minister of foreign trade to revoke the funds. If we do not purchase
Soviet gas, we will cut ourselves off, to the camplete advantage of Germany and
Trance. Because the gas pipeline will be constructed. Certa~nly Longo will not
be able to stop it. We are already consuming 7 B.illion cubic meters a year of
Russian natural gas; we will use 14. And we would depend on Moscow for only
3 percent of our energy needs. But that's not the question: it is the diversi-
fication of supplies that wi11 assure us that we will not be sub~ect to possible
closings of this or that gas tap. And this is stated in the National Energy
Plan,passed by both the socialists and the socialdemocrats.'~
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[Translator's note: Following is a copy of statistics as they appear in the
original Italian charts. The English equivalent requires replacing the Italian
commas with periods and periods with commas. Example: Italian s 1.000
English = 1,000 ]
I. (a) Balance of Trade Balances
(b) Billions of Current Liras
(c) Source: Our elaboration of
ISTAT [General Statistics
Institute] data.
Sald a IIA oilancia commerClale ~ ~
~ ~'91981 Q 1~6'2~~~ ` (miTa~di i qre correnU). .
' 0 IGi F~MIA'M'`G.L A 8. ~N D...~
' j
I / I
-1.000
j , I
~
I
I
-1.509~ . ~ .
- 2.000 i _ - - .
, . ' , ~
I
~ i ~
~ 2.931
. -3.000
(
C~ FoMe: nOStra ~IaOorezixro su Ceti ISTAT
II. (a) Lira/Dollar Exchanges III. (a) Stock Exchange Week
UIC [expansion unknown] (b) COMIT [expansion
Average unknown] Index
1 cambi Lire; Dollavo l.~ settinana In Borsa (3)
`a~ Media UIC ' � ~
= ~ ;
~ - - - ~ � .i'~:. igg~22 - ('Ei) ~ ,
1.329,75 . (indlce COMIT
; I ~I 195t'� 1972=100)
' 1.324,b � "
. ~ 1.325, ; 1.92,91
. -
~ ~ 1.3 ,35~ .
1~ �'1~1,18':
3D ~6 8 9
mor. epr. 1982 S.. '6 7 A 9
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
8255
CSO: 3104/182
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POLITICAL NETHERLANDS
VAN THIJN ON LABOR PARTY, GOVERTIl~tENT DIFFICULTIES
Amsterdam VRIJ NEDERLAND in Dutch 3 Apr 82 pp 3, 4
[Report of an interview of Eduard Van Thi~n, minister of internal af�airs, by
J. Van Tijn and Max Van Weezel: "Ed Van Thi~n: 'I Fear That the Party's
Tendency To Take Heads Will Not Be Suppressed Everywhere Effectively
[Excerpta] Why did he, as an opponent of Van Agt, bring
this cabinet about? Why did he consider that Joop Den Uyl
must also become minister of employment? Why was the
struggle for the chairmanship so disastrous? Why did the
prime minister leave his cabinet in the lurch, and how did
that feel? And what must the party do with the people who want
to take up the arguments of the opponents, Che New Realists?
Is the PvdA program after "Weerwerk" jBaclc to Work] to be
- "Wegwerp" [Throwaway]? While the calls to arms are being
sounded in the streets of Ams~erdam and Hilversum: the
opinion of an insider.
[Van Thijn] "You will just have to begin by writing that I make such a
belligerent impression. When I read the interviews, I can see that seems to
be mandatory. In reality, I am thoroughly sfck of it."
The minister is dressed in brown: brown trousers, brown shoes, brown 3ersey.
He pours coffee into A3ax cups--"That wi11 get your spirits up, but I had all
I wanted while you were standing around downstairs." On a side table there
are framed clippings from the last cabinet formation, in which the current ~
minister of internal affairs piloted his party into the govervment. The
clippiz5s are bound in a yellow copper frame with the inscription: "Hope
may ebb, Courage Never," a thought that seems to be very much in style a few
days after the provincial elections. The originator of the present was
Milou Van Dam, the wife of the minister of housing, who found it in the dark
street of Jan Nagels Haagse Bluf the evening before this interview took place.
"I was very pleased to get it," says Ed Van Thijn, "but perhaps now they will
want it back." He takes a cigar from a gigantic box of Balmoral. Next to
tlie box, there is a vase with white roses and snowdrops, and a yellaw tin box
of chocolate covered candies.
[Question] What did Ed Van Thijn really think about the study in Haagse
Bluf that showed that Andre Van Der Louw, close friend of the final editor and
Marcel Van Dam, was appraised higher by Chose who did not vote from the PvdA
than Joop Den Uyl, no friend of the fittal editor?
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rutc urri~iew ua~ vi~L.
Van Thijn, still rambling: Oh, as a~iece .o� ~ournalism it was good, but it
seemed to me to be more of a th~ng for TROS jTelevision Radio Broadcasting
Foundation], AVRO jGeneral Broadcasting Association], VERONICA, or what not.
I find the whole discussion rather objectionable at this time."
[Question] But the discussion is not unexpected, is it?
Van Thijn answers: "Oh, its simmering same, smoldering ltke a fire in a peat
- bog. But that is not how you do tllose things, no t at all. The last thing
the Labor Party can use right now is a discussion of the succession. Den Uyl
is still the spearhead, an.d if this question ever comes up an the agenda,
that cannot be as the result of a kind of popularity poll. There wi11 have
to be a considered decision, in which more factors will have to be involved
than Maurice De Hond's botanical sample box. Let us learn a lesson from the
chairmanship battle between Max Van Den Berg and Wim Mei~er. That caused
tremendous damage to the Labor Party. If you follow the electora3. develop-
ments, that battle for the chairm~nship was the beginning of the decline. No
matter who wins, after an internal competition of 3 months, someone has beco~e
unsuitable to act as a binding figure, by definition. We are not aa American
party with primaries. Cutthroat competition does not fit into the party
culture of the Labor Party."
[Question] What requirements will a new standard bearer have to meet?
[AnswerJ "In the first place, he must have charisma. By that I do not mean
someone without warts, but someone who radiates warmth, who can inspire people
and who is up to the deadly rays of television spotlights. Further, he must
be someone who has vision, sameone who is the same all the time. Not someone
who turns the page over in a book and says: 'I have a vision.' Not someone
who says: 'According to the public opinion figures, chapter three will not do
any more, now it is time for chapter four.` And it; must be someone who is
unifying, someone who does not belong to one wing of the party, someone who
stands in the heart of the purty and someone who has the courage to give
leadership." Laughs. "That last, in particular, is obviously a new demand
since tt~t provincial e.lections."
jQuestxon] Ir? an interview with Puchinger (CHRISTEN DEMOCRATISCHE
VERKENNINGEN, October 1981), you expressed yourself as being satisfied as the
Former coalition negotiator with the seats the Labor Party had pulled in. Now,
6 months later, Den Uyl is being attacked from all sides as the minister of
social affairs and employment: from the labor movement because of the Health
Insurance Act, and by others because his employment program would not produce
any employment. We have the impression--and we had it at the time--that the
CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] had 3ust distributed the departments the
way, in fact, that they saddled the WD with the rotten departments during
the first Van Agt cabinet. Has the PvdA [Labor Party] been painted into a
corner by the CDA?
[Answer] "No, not at all. We were not painted into a corner. Really, we
fought it very hard. The only variant that might have been worked out--I saw
it as worse, there were others who thought it would have been better--would
have been to have Den Uyl in finances. But just imagine how it would have
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looked if a CDA minister of social affairs had carried out the Health
Insurance Acz operation at the urging of the socialiat Minister of Finances
Joop Den Uyl, would Den Uyl's political prospects have been any better? I
_ know Den Uyl as a dedicated technician, who ~ould have been a right-thinking
finance r~inister. Put I remembered Che Vondeling story all too well. I was
~ not too opposed to Den Uyl as finance minister. Den Uyl himself had his own
ideas about that. I saw much more in Den Uyl as the minister of social
affairs and employment, particularly in employment, in that connecCion. I
was counting a little bit on Den Uyl en~oying the benefit of the doubt from
the labor movement, but I was wrong there. Well, it did not turn out that
way. To get back to your question, if you look at the functioning of this
cabinet, you cannot accuse our people of any lack of quality. We have the
~ best people, sorry that I have to say it, in the areas best suited to them.
The whole story of, 'you were roped into it,' I can assure you, and I carried
out the negotiations: in private there was a war of attrition."
Bazooka
(Question] And 6 months afCer that war of attrition, then, the PvdA suffers
a big defeat and the polarization with the labor movement is almost complete.
Van Thi~n, now suppressing anger: "The labor movement carries a heavy respon-
siUility for the creation of this cabinet. Groenevelt was the first one who
pled for the formation of this cabinet, who did not want a leftist ma~ority
cabinet. The labor movement felt that it must not fall out over personalities.
By that they meant the person of Van Agt. This cabinet must come to be,
otherwise the labor movement would flounder. In part because of that pressure,
we ~oined in the government. It is really crazy, then, that after the first
and best measure that we have underCaken, they have unlimbered their biggest
gun. I could have understood it if they had started out with foils, but they
grabbed for the bazooka right away. The tragedy of the situation was the
Labor Party's tragedy. Why had Den Uyl been sa popular? Because he was the
personification of the PvdA which stood up for the little man. And naw sud-
denly they saw the reverse. That was a shock, a cultural shock. The image
was called up that now he wanted to attack the little man. And that is not
true, that bs not true. I find it shameful of people who bear responsibility
on the left, even from the leaders of trade unions. The cries of 'the
minister of a-social affairs' and 'hang Joop from the highest tree': such
demagoguery must not be tolerated."
jQuestion] The PvdA did not guage the labor movement's reactions right.
[AnswerJ It is all because the Labor Party has not had the space as yet to
pursue a policy which is recognizable to the labor movement, and to carry
out the cure of the welfare state in harmony with the labor movement. The
image of Kok against Den Uyl is even less credible than that of Den Uyl next
to Van Agt."
[Question] But the problem is that there has not even been the start of a
comprehensive policy. Shell and Che medical specialists may do as they
please, but the vulnerable are attacked, by a cabinet including the Labor
Party.
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[Answer] "We are still faced with the inheritance from the first Van Agt
cabinet. That cabinet's mistake Gras that each time, it picked out one group.
If you ask Netherlanders whetfier they want alterations to be made, in the
abstract they all say yes--and they all vote for the ones that call for that
the loudest--but it stop~ when you start with them. The most miserable thing
that I have ever seen was that column of 10,000 motnrcyclists. I did not
even know that we had done aaything to tfiem. We had barely put a finger on�
their valvestems before they rode to the Hague in a really unimaginable
column. That is what you get if you start to say: 'We will pick on this
group Monday and that group Tuesday...."'
[Question] And on Sunday on Shell.
[Answer] "Gentlemen do not work on Sunday."
[QuestionJ Why should the CDA really still need the PvdA, after Wednesday's
[provincial government elections] results? Now they have their potential
alternative again, after all. And you people only want to cut back with all
kinds of conditions.
Van Thijn, emotionally: "They cannot get away with that. It is a three-
party cabinet. Surely, assuming that a rightist ma3ority tries to have things
its own way, that can only be temporary. It is a question of the quality of
the form of government. There has not been an economic crisis that did nat
see parliamentary democracies fall. That is the lesson of the 1930's. The
point is not merely to solve the economic crisis; the point is to solve the
- crisis and after that to be able to keep the constitution intact. All of
those people who took the day off Wednesday [did not vote] form a disturbing
signal."
[Question] It was primarily PvdA voters who stayed away.
_ [Mswer] "We made two mistakes. In 1981, we were hit hard because we had
sat in the corner the years before, and last week we were hit hard because
we were not recognizable. I think that is not fair. We have only been in
for a few months. But it was a signal that the Pvdr1 can only continue to bear
some of the responsibility if we are allowed to remain recognizable to the
people whom we represent. As long as it is ~ust a question of power politics,
we had better get out."
[Question] But it is precisely a question of power politics. The CDA aub-
mitted Co a government with the PvdA because the socialists were supposed to
be able to keep Che labor movement under control. Now, that does not seem to
have been entirely successful. So what do they need with you any more?
[AnswerJ "If that is what they thought, then they were completely wrong, and
I could have told them that in advance. And in a certain sense, it is really
a very good th~.ng that they made that mistake, for we are not here to keep
the labor movement under control. But if they were thinking in terms like
that, and if they are just talking about the budget deficit, now they can
just push us out. We will not allow our principles to be thrawn on the trash-
heap."
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Intermediary
[Question] For an awful lot of people, the question now is just what the
principles of the PvdA are naw. Can you imagine that?
[Answer] "The PvdA is in a cred~biltty crisis. First you had 1977: not
- governing. That was a blow to our voterse On top of that came the chair-
manship crisis. Then a kind of coalition cgbinet within the PvdA came into
being. Every position the PvdA published was the result of negotiations
between Den Uyl and Van Den Berg, even the election program, for example,
while we often knew perfectly we11 that no one beli2ved in it."
[QuestionJ Still, you can scarcely ob~act to that: you were usual].y the
negotiator yourself. Or to put it better, the intermediary.
- Van Thijn, a bit abashed: "That is just my way. I never believe in 3ust one
truth."
[Question] As delegation chairman did you not have a whole ;~ear of the truth
at the time? With the VAD jExcess Profits Sh~ring Bill] and the WIR [Law
on Investment ComputationJ and the Law on Industrial Councils, and the land
policy and a11 of those glorious episodes of the recent socialist history?
Van Thi~n is silent for a whiXe, mumbles, "M~mm," and says pensively: "You
will have a feather in your cap if you can report that now we are going to do
everything differently.
[Question] 1'ou must be talking now about that new realism of a number of
your prominent party members.
[AnswerJ "I find that an unfortunate term. It carries samething of the ~
sense of: 'We were wrong all along and now suddenly we are going to be
realistic.' And some people got the idea: 'IIntil the provincial government
elections.' If you start ad~usting your opinion to the public opinion figures,
that is not credible, but if you try to say, 'Our policy is good, but ~ust
misunderstood,' then that too is not credible. You have to learn from s~t-
backs, you have to adjust. But not with a throw-away attitude."
[Question] So now you already have the title of the next election program.
Do you think these things up all the time?
Van Thi3n, lsughing slowly and a bit red: "Yes, Thro~w Awa}� '85."
Mighty Irritation
[Question] Back to the New Rea~ism.
[Answer] What irritates me no end, is that you have one group in the party
who say that everything must stay the way it is, and you have another group
who say that we have been wrong about everything all along, let us 3ust coopt ,
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rvn vrrt~itu~ virLi
our opponents' argtunents. There is so much talk, I do not want to take part
- in it. I do not ~ant to ~ust coopt my opponent's argimnents for waut of any-
_ thing better to do. It really got me upset when I heard it said in my group,
'the most important thing is to cover the budget deficit."'
[QuestionJ Van Der Louw? Van Dam?
[Answer] "I am not talking about people. But hvw does the party react to an
election defeat like that? I can tell you thati precisely, for I have been
there many times. You will have people who explain it out of the fact that
we have become unrecognizab le. Thus, they say: 'We have to sing a tone
higher; we must become more socialist, more radical.' And you will have
~ people who feel that we were already too radical. They point out that the
PvdA must not alienate itself from reality: the moderate groups, the entre-
_ preneurs and whatever else counts as reality. I sun already sick, weak and
miserable in advance about this repetitive break between the two-party
cultures. As a party, we have a grizzly`s image. There are movements, but
certainly there have always been movements that want to get their own way to
tl~e extreme. But you cannot make an alterantive out of an anthill. We under-
- ertimated the seriousness of the economic situation, thaC is true. We can
now see that seriousness before our eyes. But tra~ cannot mean that we come
to see alterations as a goal in themselves, as same in our group have done.
I am certainly someone who goes a long way to reach a compromise. I also
believe in the necessity of remaining seated in the cabinet. But you must not
go so far that you really believe in your opponent's policies.
There is another danger: That comes about if you try to analyze why the PvdA
lost in the old sections of the big cities, last year to D'66 [Democrats of
1966], this year to the WD and in the 1960's to the Farmera' Party. How can
that be? So we say that our people are running to follow Wiegel. And then
you come to the area of the taboos: the misuse of the social security abuses,
_ the foreigners. Then I say, 'We are not just opinion followers, we are also
opinionated. So we will just become a smaller party. Sorry. We must not fall
into cliches and then say: 'we were not realistic enough, so we will adopt
our opponents' cliches.' For years we were criticized by ecanomists who said:
'The party does not choose. You cannot maintain Jan Modaal's [the average
man's] buying power.' So we chose. But not even a year later, 6 months later
we were sitting around discussing whether the zero line could be maintained
for the people with a minimum income or a minimum wage. Then I too said,
'We have to hold on somewhere.' Whom are we representing now as a socialist
party?
"What have you done to your identity if you cannot even guarantee the buying
power of the people on the bottaan? I myself am mightily irritated by this
surrender by the party. I am a person who came up through the party, who even
put his stamp on it, and that is true of many others who are now suddenly
calling that the party must do this, or that the party cadre must do that.
There is a certain tradition in our movement to believe that as soon as you
are called to a higher posit~on, you know better than the party. I do not
accept that. I have trouble wiCh speaking critically to the party. I feel
that it may very well happen that a principYe that you used to defend can no
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longer be maintained. That can occur. But then you have to consider your
own position. Then credibility may deanand that you let someone else seek
other solutions. The ease with whicli the aame people.take up different
positions at a given moment naturally does tlie credibility of the PvdA no good."
[Question] Now you are talking about your party chairman, your delegation
chairman and a nwnber of miaistera.
- [Answer] "Yes, that really is a problem."
[Question] That seems to be the understatement of the century.
[Answer] "I find it to be a problem."
[Question] There is an image of the top of the PvdA as not being cohesive.
Those are the hard facts.
[Answer] "I think that in the beginning of this cabinet, that played a role,
- but that was because we were all new at being ministers. At first, everyone
was frightfully obsessed with his own angle, that was true from the beginning,
and also because the first thing that we had to do was to make up the new
budget. Almost of itself, that is a cutthroat battle. Then a climate was
really created of everyone having to justify hiaaself. Therefore, not only
Den Uyl, but everyone came to be a little bit isolated. In that period,
every PvdA minister felt lonely. That was true for the new ministers, too.
We did not see soon enough that Den Uyl, hum, was facing a much more difficult
task than everyone else."
Credib~.lity
[Question] Have you ever gotten together to decide at what poiat the PvdA
can no longer continue to participate in the cabinet?
- [Answer] "Without having talked it out, we all knaw precisely where the line
is. The line is tihe uncoupling of the minimimm social security benefiCs from
_ the minimum wage. And for me personally, there is also the breakdown of the
system of equal treatment for employees in private industry and in the govern-
ment. For the party, then, uncoupling is the breaking point, but for me there
is also the breakdown of the trend policy iC~2LAj. If the PvdA should develop
a different policy on that at any time, I could no longer defend it with any
credibility." ~
[Question] So you are still thinking of stepping down in that case?
[Answer] "A different man would have to do that."
[Question] In the past months, the PvdA ministers have continually been
confronted with ultimata from the prime minister. Furthermore, Minister Van
Der Stee of finances was continually feeding aew, or so-called new, informa-
tion to the cabinet.
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~j [Answer] Those are precisely the t~o th3.ngs that have made me feel uncomfort-
able as a member of this cahinet. Or to put it better: there are threee In
the first place, there cannot be good management if every day you get a fresh
blow delivered to your office from your colleague in finance. The manner in
which financial decisio~aking takes place ia a cabinet like that will always
be chaotic. Anyone who constantly wants to stack alteration on alteration, at
the tempo of a repeating rifle, ia calling for ad hoc decisions and quasi
cutbacks. I know very well that our colleagues from the CDA do not trust us
as far as cutbacks are concerned. We are paying our tuition to the WD. The
ministers in the last cabinet did not cut back. Thus, according to the CDA,
we have to pay for the bad policy of our liberal predecessors. I do not find
that to be reasonable. If we com~it ourselves to certain cutbacks, then
perhaps it will take awhile, but it will happea."
[Questionj You spoke of the tempo of a repeating rifle, with which the so-
called new setbacks whirl in. Did that not primarily also have the function
of a repeating rifle, that is: to shoot you dawn?
jAnswer] "I cannot rule that out. And as far as the presentation of policy
by the prime minister is concerned: the manner in which the cabinet policy
- is made public will have to be improved, for it can certainly not go on as it
is. It is completely essential for Che existence of this cabinet that the
coalition partners are given the latitude to carry out their own policy.
Finally, the question: has the prime minister bagatellized and ridiculed
this cabinet and thereby the PvdA contingent in it? I must admit that this
has been the case. The image which the prime minister presented to the public
did not always correspond to the actual course of events. I have often felt
in the past months that I have not been defended by my prime minister. I
refuse to accept that I am a member of a bad cabinet. There is enough talent
available to do something. It ie up to the prime minister to weld that talent
together and to stand up for the cabinet as a whole. What he said 2 days
after the provincial elections, that he would no longer act as a party man,
- but as the prime minister of a coaliCion cabinet, that ought to have happened
much earlier, long before the provincial elections. This cabinet can only
survive and function if the first salesman of its policy carries out that
function. I do hope that will be the case now that the provincial government
elections are over, but during the past monthe it has certainly been colorful
sometimes."
Rolling Heads
[Question] Why did you put up with all of that public sneering? Many of
= your voters must not have like that.
[Answer] "I ~ertainly was on the point from time to time of putting in a
call to Thailand." (Embarrassed laugh.) "But seriously, we did refuse to see
a lot. Too much."
[Question] But why did you do that?
[Answer] "Because of the famous personal relationships in the cabinet, I
fear."
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rva~ vrri~.iru, uoi: vi.i..
- jQuestion] And they need onlp be cu].Ci.vated in the cahinet council on Frlday.
After that, Van Agt could go hi.s oam way, heg3.ani.ng ~ith the preas conference
after the council of mini~aters meeting arhere you had once again cultivated
those personal relationships.
[Anawer] "Oh, usually you did not see Van Agt for another week, at the next
council of ministers. You must understand: this cabinet began under very
trying circ~stances, under the curse of ths iafamous personal relationshipa,
between Dries jVan Agt) and Joop jDen Uyl], for instance. But there are
limits, and they will have to be drawa now."
[Question] But that will have to be made clesr to Van Agt very quickly.
[Answer] "Who says that that has not already happened."
[Question] You have talked with him?
[Answer] "Hahaha! I am not going to say anything about that."
jQuestion] Finally, then, to the si~uation within the party: Den Uyl's head
~ is now only being demanded by the NkC jNIEUWE ROTTERDAMSE COURANT (HANDELSBLAD)]
and the HAAGSE BLIIF. But it does not seem that a long political leash has been
allotted to Chairman Van Den Berg.
~�[Answer] "I fear that the party's Ceadency to take heads will not be sup-
pressed everywhere effectively. I would think it an extraordinarily bad
thing, and rather rank, if discussions were to come about now about the people
who should be termed responsible for the setback. Indeed, no one would escape,
it is the collecCive responeibility of very many people."
[Question] Good. Max Van Den Berg can keep his seat, then?
[Answer] "Why shou~.d he not?"
[Question] Because there are slready people who want to put the blame on him,
as you probably do already know too. There are also some old scores to be
settled.
[Answer] But he is not the only one. We are not, after all, in a party
where one potentate hands out all of the parts, who can therefore be called
to account if thiags go wrong."
COPYRIGHT: 1982 VN/BV Weekbladpers
6940
CSO: 3105/164
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MILITAKY ' FRANCE
DESPITE SOME LAUNCH PROBLEMS, EXOCET MISSILES TO BE ON 236 SHIPS
- Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 17 A,pr 82 p 43 ~
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "236 Ships Equigped with the Exocet Antiship Mis-
siles"]
('t'ext] The Exocet antiship missiles from Aerospatiale, versions MM-38 and
MM-40, are or will be installed on 236 ships of all types belonging to more
than 20 countries, including France. The Exocets are or will be installed on
127 stiips of more than 1,000 tons, 79 of them with MM-38's and 48 with MM-40's.
But more than a fiundred (109) ships of less than 1,000 tons will also be armed
with Exocet--78 with MM-38's and 31 with MM-40's. To date, l year after the
first deliveries (March 1981), the MM-40 has been ordered by 6 countries to
equip 22 missile-launching patrol boats of less than 300 tons. This demon-
strates the interest in the MM-40 as modern antiship armament for light patrol
boats, explained Mr Bussieres of Aerospatiale at the Naval Exposition of
Maastricht.
Yowerful but Very Compact ArmamenC
Patrol boats do indeed need weapons of the same performance ~hasacteristics (in
terms of range, precision, reliability, effectiveness) as those equipping the
biggest units; and this is made possible by the current antiship missiles,
which are capable of giving a patrol boat of a few hundred tons' displacement
the firepower of a minicruiser.~ But in particular, the antiship weapons sys-
tems have to be sufficiently compact (in view of the limited space on board
small vessels), while at the same time giving the patrol boat simplified ease
- of use, salvo-firing capacity and also a"second strike" capacity.
The NIId-40 is an antiship missile with a transhorizon range (70 km) optimized in
function of performance characteristics of autonomous flight at high subsonic
speeds (Mach 0.9) and with high probability of destruction. The experience of
the MM-38 has shown that the missile is 93-percent successful in operational
firings, with 94-percent availability after 1 year of storage (without mainten-
ance) on board ships.
The MM-40 weapon system is compact enough to be easily installed on a light
patrol boat, in sufficient quantity to offer high �irepower. The light firing
installation produced for the MM-40 by Aerospatiale comprises a central unit,
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Ships Equipped with Exocet Missiles
Missile-Launching Ships
Less than I~ore than '
1,000 t 1,000 t Total
NIl~I-38 78 79 157
MM-40 31 48 79
Total 109 127 236
connected to the missiles by a junction unit and to the vessel's operations
center by a control console that enables a single operator to operate the com-
plete weapon system, with the aid of a tactical-assistance computer (CATS).
The firing installation (ITL) can put eight missiles into action simultaneous-
ly, which corresponds to the nwaber of r4t-40's that can be installed on a light
patrol boat. In effect, the MM-40 is presented in the form of a completely
self-contained munition: the missile is installed (with sirfoils and cnntrol
surfaces folded back) in a watertight cylindrical container (diameter 0.65 m)
made of a fiberglass-resin composite that is both strong.and light. The com-
plete munition (missile in container) weighs 1,250 kg, the missile itself
weighing 850 kg. This makes it possible to install four MM-40's in the same
space as two IrII~(-38's, thus providing double the instantaneous firepower, which
is very important for patrol boats that cannot reload their missile launching
ramps at sea. The MM-40 weapon system thus gives patrol boats a second-strike
capacity (for protecting themselves, if necessary) and enables them to fire in
salvos (to saturate the enemy defenses). In particular, the light firing in-
stallation makes it possible to fire a salvo of 4 missiles in ~ seconds (in a
calm sea), Aerospatiale states.
Patrol boats may nevertheless have difficulties in taking full advantage of the
range performance characteristics of the new first-generation transhorizon
antiship missiles such as the MM-40, whose range ~70 km) requires the use of a
relay for acquisition and target designation for the launching ship. In this
reF;ard, patrol boats are indisputably at a disadvantage in comparison with the
bi~ units, which often have helicopters available on board, or at least advance
support from smaller units.
Aerospatiale considers, though, that this disadvantage can be palliated by the
use, as relays, either of maritime-patrol airplanes or of other patrol boats in
an advanced position in the attack formation. It is also possible to take ad-
vantage--quite often and in many places--of exceptional propagation conditions
(reflection off the lower layers of the ionosphere) that in practice extend the
range of the radars beyond the horizon.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
11267
CSO: 3100/598
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MILITARY � FRANCE
COMMAND CHAIN, DEFENSE PRIORITIES OF FINISTERE SEA REGION
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Apr 82 pp 33-35
[Article By Colonel Lilian Cotteaux: "The Defense of the Finistere"]
[Text] Essential to credible deterrence is a solid defense of
the sensitive points. This is an important mission which the
maritime prefect of the second region is carrying out with
the assistance of a general-staff element from the Army.
I3ecause of the facilities that it offers to the Navy of the western ocean and
to the service departments that support it, the roadstead of Brest, a calm har-
bor on the edge of an ocean of legendary angers, has always experienced intense
activity that has given rise to the development of many organisms of a maritime
nature.
The extension of the independence of weapons systems to nuclear deterrence, re-
presented materially by the placing in service of the missile-launching nuclear
submarines, has entailed the creation of the Ile Longue operational base and a
command and support environment along the roadstead but also inland.
The multiplication of major sensitive points in the territory of Finistere led
the government to assign to the admiral who is maritime prefect of the second
region and comanander-in-chief for the Atlantic the responsibilities for main-
tenance of order, protection of sensitive points and operational defens2 of the
territory throughout the entire departurent of Finistere (decree of 24 August
1970 creating the command for defense of Finistere: CDF). On this basis, the
maritime prefect comes under the general commanding the West defense zone.
This is the admiral's third cap.
In order to enable the maritime-prefect admiral to exercise this command, an
Army field officer is assigned as an assistant to him and an office for opera-
tional defense of the territory is included in his general staff. It is com-
posed of three Army officers and a secretariat. The Army assistant exercises.
the functions of this command by delegation, but with the exception of mainten-
ance of order.
As DOT [Operational Defense of the Territory] assistant to the maritime pre-
fect, he assists him in all matters relative to land protection and defense in
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the second maritime region and represents him vis-a-vis the prefect of Finis-
tere as adviser for preparation of crisis plans and the general protection
plan. He also acts as an interface between the command of the second maritime
region, the land territorial commands--third military region, 31st territorial
military division and fourth military region--and the second air region.
The Sensitive Points in Finistere
Without wishing to neglect the importance of certain civilian sensitive points
(PS's), we shall deal here only with the military sensitive points. This gen-
eral term covers installations of all kinds and of very different dimensions.
The Brest naval yard, Ile Langue and the Brignogan signal station are three
sensitive points, of course, but their interest to the command obviously is not
- identical. These sensitive points are assigned a classification, in function
of their purpose and the quaiity of their equipment, that determines a level of
protection to be provided, either permanently or in case of threat.
Finistere has a;reat many PS's of all categories, coming under the three armed
forces and the General Delegation for Armament. Each armed force is respons-
ible for the protection of its own installations, and for this purpose estab-
lis~ies a particular protection plan for each PS.
In the matter of defense, command and coordination of operations comes exclus-
ively under the CDF, wh~~ch in this case activates the defense plan for Finis-
tere, which is an emanation of the defense plan for the West zone.
The CDF's Resources
These resources, limited in peacetime, expand very rapidly in time of crisis
and peak in the first stages of mobilization. The installation of the 41st In-
fantry Regiment at Ty-Vougeret, near Chateaulin, in 1979 permitted better ad-
aptation, in a normal time, of the means devoted to the protection and defense
of the PS's coming under the Strategic Naval Force (FOST).
These means, furnished on a permanent basis by the 9th DIMa ~~rine divi-
~11C1)~ of which the 41st RI [Infantry Regiment~ is an integral part, combine
Eor immediate reinforcement of the PS's of the strEtegic nuclear force on the
decision of the maritime prefect for the first echelon, and the coimnanding gen-
eral of the 3rd Military Region for the totality. Their mobilit~ is particu-
larly increased by the helicopter-transport capacities offered by the Naval Air
Force, with its Super-Frelons, based at Lanveoc-Poulmic.
From the first stages of mobilization, the Navy activates its reserve units
(UR's [Reserve Units] and UMD's (expansion unknown]): The Gendarmerie doubles
its strength and sets up several intelligence platoons. The Army calls up two
' infantry regiments (the 19th and the 118th RI's) and a division type of general
staff. Basic coverage of the entire department is thus achieved--that is, the
security of the PS's and the significant first-level interventions.
1'he various interbranch exercises and maneuvers within the framew~rk of the CDF
or within that of the West defense zone emphasize the importance and effective-
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ness of the defense instrument which the command can have at its disposal, no
matter what the type of threat or the general situation is at the moment.
But security rests in the first place on the effectiveness of the means of re-
- search and exploitation of intelligence. The presence of many PS's/FNS ;Sensi-
tive Points of the Strategic Nuclear Forces] in North Finistere has led to the
creation of a special surveillance area encompassing these PS/FNS and a liaison
bureau (BDL) within which the coordination of intelligence is done. All the
administrations and the military organisms of the three armed forces and the
Gendarmerie that have the mission of participating in-the gathering and exploi-
tation of intelligence within the limits of their assignments are represented
within this liaison bureau, which has a permanent secretariat.
'Phe BDL of Finistere permits collaboration and very fruitful regular exchanges
among the various parties, thereby giving the lie to a banal and too often
evoked stereotype--that of the war of the intelligence services.
The diversity of the objectives that the CDF has been given the mission of pro-
_ tecting and defending, the range of sensitivities that they represent, and the
variety of the resources that combine for fulfillment of the missions assigned
imply that the authorities permanently responsible at all levels weave a net-
work of solid and unequivocal relations and that they be able to have total
confidence in one another in order for the relative fragility of the structure,
due to its apparent heterogeneity, to be transformed into a solid block that
can endure any trial.
~ Nuclear deterrence forms a whole. The Finistere de�ense command participates
in this deterrence in a considerable manner by combining in particular for pro-
tection of the systems for transmission of orders and data between the chief of
state and the missile-launching submarines and by ensuring the security of the
installations of the Strategic Naval Force and of the maritime approaches of
the roadstead of Brest.
Colonel Lilian Cotteaux, of the Marine Troops, has been Army
assistant to the maritime prefect of the second region since
1979. He holds the BEMS (Diploma of Higher Military Studies)
- and the BT jtechnical baccalaureate'degree] and is an offic~r tif
the Legion of Honor, an d he has received four citations.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 REVUE DES FORCES ARMEES FRANCAISES "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
11267
c;SO: 3100/599
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rUK vrr~~iwL u~~ ~NLY
MILITARY FRANCE
BRIEFS
SUBSONIC TARGET TESTED--Aerospatiale announces that the lOth flight test of the
C-22 target missile was carried out successfully on 25 March at the Landes
Testing Center (CEL), the site of the preceding tests of this new autonomous
target intended to replace the CT-20 target missile, also produced by Aerospa-
tiale for the French and foreign firing ranges. This lOth test flight was~made
with C-22 target No 004, which had been recovered by parachute after a preced-
ing test flight and had been subjected only to the routine checks and recondi-
tioning before being reused. In the course of this lOth flight, which lasted
38 minutes, the C-22 target did maneuvers at various altitudes, speeds and load
factors. In p3rticular, it did a continu~us bank under 4 G and over more than
400� of change of bearing without loss of altitude. The speeds reached during
~ this test varied from Mach 0.4 to Mach 0.9 (maximum speed), which made it pos-
sible to explore the entire flying range of the target-missile's engine. The
C-22, as we recall, is powered by a TRI 60-2 turbojet from Microturbo. The
C-22 is a subsonic target missile with variable speed (Mach 0.4-0.9) and long
range (1,300 km), capable of flying at very low altitude and up to 13,000 km.
_ The missile measures 5.1 m long by 2.5 m airfoil span, and it weighs 530 kg.
The C-22 development program has now entered the principal phase of flight-
testing, which is to proceed with many other flights between now and this sum-
mer, particularly with target 004, which will be reconditioned for coming
tests. The C-22 is to go into service on the French firing ranges next year.
['fext) [Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 17 Apr 82 p 41] [COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982]
11267
SNECMA ORDERS--The total of the orders taken by SNECMA [National Aircraft En-
gine Design and Manufacturing Co] last year came to Fr 4.55 billion, as agairist
Fr 3.3 billion in 1980. At the end of last year, the total of the orders in
the book for military engines was Fr 3.3 billion. During the year, 470 persons
were hired over and above those needed to compensate for the departure of 540
personnel from the national company. [Text) (Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French
17 Apr 82 p 48] [COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982] 112~~1
CSO: 3100/598
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GENERAL FRANCE
ARIANE DELAY UPSETS REMAINING LAUNCH SQiEDULE
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 20 Mar 82 p 33
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "At Least a 2-Month Del~y for the Next Ariane
Launch"]
[Text] ThQ first actual launching of the Europeaa spaceship "Ariane," which
was to take place on 23 April 1982, has been delayed "for at least 2 mr~nths"
due to the lack of availability of one of the two European satellites con-
stituting the payload. Zhe European Space Agency (ESA] has just officially
announced this postponement due to recent operational defects in the "MARECS
A" satellite, which is currently in synchronous orbit. This satellite, identi-
cal to the "MARECS B" which is to be launched in 1 month, did indeed find that
its remote-control, remote-sensing ayatem was affected by electrostatic dis-
charges caused by increased solar activity occurring as of the beginning of
February. Changes in operational procedures (manual control of the satellite)
were implemented to protect the "MARECS A," which then functioned properly.
Hawever, it proved necessary to make modifications to the "MARECS B" before
its launching, entailing a delay of undetermined duration. Similarly, the
"ECS" satellites, also built uader British A~erospace contracts, will have to
be modified, as they use the same launching pads as the "MARECS." But this
should not affect their launches. On the other hand, considering the length
of launch campaigns (generally 3 months), a delay in the next Ariane launch
by at least 2 months--in other words, to the end of June 1982 at the earliest--
may mean skipping a launch s lot at Kourou. For there are no other satellites
ready to substitute for the "MARECS B" and the "Sirio 2" in April. So�now we
can only count on three Ariane launches this yesr instead of four. This would
also affect next year's launch szhedule, which is already filled.
This is what will happen unless, despite everything, the CNES [National Space
Studies Center] and the ESA can succeed in holding four Ariane launches this
year, the "MARECS B" is indeed available in 2 months, and the launch campaign
can be reduced to ~ust 2 months--as was planned beginning in 1984. For the
moment, however, the April 1982 launch has been canceled and the launch teams
have been sent back home, leaving the rocket with its three stages assemtiled
on the launch site.
This incident, which prevented the initial linkup via the "MARECS A" on
23 February, is also going to delay the actual putting into service of the
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"MARECS" and to disrupt the operations program at Inmarsat, the organization
which was to use them.
- The "MARECS" satellites definitely pose many problems. In fact, the launch-
ing of the first one, "MARECS A," had to be delayed for seeeral months, fol-
lowing the belated discovery of a technical fai.~ure in the electronic cir-
cuits of the satellite's antenna.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982.
9b93
CSO: 3100/5 14
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GENERAL FRANCE
ARIANE P~.RACHUTE RECOVERY SYSTEM TO BE TESTED IN SEPTEMBER
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 17 Apr 82 p 41
[Article by P.L.: "Delivery of the Recovery System for the First Stage of Ari-
ane"]
[Text] Fokker (The Netherlands) will shortly deliver to the CNES [National
Center for Space Studies] the parachute recovery system for the first stage of
the Ariane launcher, to be flight-tested on the occasion of the seventh firing
of the Ariane rocket, planned in principle for October 1982 with the European
- astronomical satellite Exosat.
Fokker is responsible for the design and construction of this device for recov-
ery by parachute, intended to brake the fa11 into the sea of this stage which
is 18 m long and weighs about 16 t(after combustion), and also to ensure that
it floats until the arrival of the recovery ship. The system is composed es-
sentially of four main parachutes made by Irvin (Great Britain) and a number of
small extractor parachutes supplied by Autoflug (FRG). The total system
. weighs 850 kg and is installed in the interstage skirt (between the first and
second stages), which is also made by Fokker, as part of its principal partici-
pation in the Ariane program.
The recovery system functions in two phases. After extinction of the first
stage (liquid fuels), the stage is separated from the rest of the launcher at
about 40 km altitutde. It free-falls at 160 m/sec to about 6 km altitude,
where the extractor parachutes open that stabilize the stage and deploy an in-
termediate parachute that slows down the fall. Then at about 1,000 m altitude,
the four main parachutes (diameter about 20 m each) open simultaneously so as
to finally reduce the speed of fall (and impact in the sea) to only 12.5 m/sec.
Recovery of the first stage of the present Arisne launcher should make it pos-
sible, if successful, to save about 10 percent of the launcher's cost, by the
recovery and reuse of certain elements such as engines and tanks.
Fokker, we note, has prooosed to make the nose cones for the liquid-fuel boost-
ers of the future Ariane 4 launcher, which could also be equipped with a para-
chute recovery device.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
- 11267 ~
CSO: 3100/598
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" GENERAL
r~uxcE
. ,
Bx~~s
VOLVO PARTICIPATING IN ARIANE--Volvo Flygmotor (Sweden) has begun work on the
development of the nozzle and turbines for the future 90-100-ton thrust,
I-I~1 60 heavy cryogenic engine for the Suropean rocket that is to succeed the
Ariane 4. Volvo Flygmotor is one of the three European manufacturers cur-
rently involved in developing the new HM 60 cryogenic engine, with SEP
[European Propellant Company] (France), in cooperation with MBB [expansion
unknown] (Germany), being the ma~or contractor. Volvo already has received
a contract from the Swedish Space Corporation for this work. We may recall
that Volve has been participating since 1974 in the building of Viking en-
gines for the first and second stages of the Ariane rocket--likewise as a
subcontractor for SEP. [Text] [Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 20 Mar 82 p 33]
- 9693
ARIANE BOOSTER FAILS--The first test-bench firing of the new solid-fuel booster
intended for the Ariane 3 launcher ended in failure. After normal ignition and
initial functioning, two perforations appeared in the rear base of the engine after
some 10 seconds of combustion. These leaks of hot gases caused destruction of
the rear base and ejection of the propelling nozzle about 20 seconds after fir-
ing. The expert investigation has revealed very heavy erosion of the propel-
ling nozzle's internal heat protection, as the result of combustion more turbu-
lent than expected. The rear part of the booster is going to be modified be-
fore the second test-bench firing, which will be delayed 1 to 2 months. The
Ariane 3 booster has been developed by the Italian company Difesa e Spazio.
One booster was recently delivered to Aerospatiale (cf AIR ET COSMOS, No 902).
[Text] [Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 17 Apr 82 p 41] [COPYRIGHT: A. C.
1982] 11267
CSO: 3100/598 END
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