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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500074430-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - JPRS L/ 10584 14 June 1982 Worldwide Report TERRORISM FOUO 2/82 = FgI$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFF[CIAL l1iE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500074430-6 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign - newspapers, periodicals and books, hut also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; thuse from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and - other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] _ or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicat2 how the original informatien was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. - Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or tranGliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or -:ames preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. - Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an i.tem originate with the source. Times within items are as _ given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. _ COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION - OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ODTLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040500074030-6 ~***~*~~**~********~******~*~***~*************~r*~***~r**~~************~ - ~ * NOTICE � ~ * * * * ~k * * This new JPRS serial, WORLDWIDE REPORT: TERRORISM, is * - * devoted to international terrorism and antigovernment * revolutionary violence. It is FOR OFFIC7AL USE ONLX and * includes material on the organization, objectives and ~ methods of terrorists and the consequences of terrorist * actions. Items on terrorism formerly published in other * * JPRS reports will henceforth appea_;, in this report. It * ~ is expected that the report �ai1.1 be published weekly. * * * k - 9c * ~k *~c~~4e~Y~c~F*~*~c~cic~tic~e~44c*~ic~Y~t~F~*4t4c~c**~t~F~Y9c~F*~k~k~kyk9c4t**~k9Fie*~t*~k**~k4t*~t~k~k*~c+t* ~k*~k* APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOF! OFF[CIAL USE ONLY ' JPRS L/10584 14 June 1982 - ~ WORLDWIDE REPORT - TERRORISM ~ Pouo 2/s2 CONiENTS - LATIN AMERSCA COLOMBIA - I Am Corrmander One (Jose Fajardo, Miguelange? Raldana SOY EL COMANDANTE l, 30 Apr 82) 1 - GUATEMALA ' ORPA Subversive Group Security Material (M.4TEt2IAL DE SEGURIDAD, Max 80) .....e 47 WEST EUROPE FEDERAI, REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - R.AF Leader on Concept of lirban Guerrilla: B1 ack September - (TEXTE: DER RAF, 1977) 68 - FRANCE Debre on Security, Courts Policies: Terrorist Testabilization _ (Michel Debre; PARIS MATCH, 23 Apr 82) 109 - ITALY Brief s Rightwing Terrorists Arrested 113'. ~ ~ - a - [III - WW - 133 FCUOj FOR OF.!CIaL liSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OE'FICIAL USE ONLY SPAIN GRAPO Terrorist Training Manual (EXPERIFNCIAS DE TRES ANOS DE LUCFiA ARMADA, May 78)..... Threat Posed by ETA M Ilnphasized (F. Castano; EZ SOCIALISTA, 28 Apr-4 May 82) Carrillo Speech to CC Deals Wth Terrorism, Populax Front (MTJNDO LIBRE, 30 Apr-6 May 82) Caxrillo Sees Terrorism as Linked With Coupism - (MUNDO OBRERO, 30 Apr-6 May 82) - - b - - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 114 134 139 146 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-40850R040500074030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ COLOMBIA I AM COMMANDER ONE Rogota SOY EL COMANDANTE 1 iti Spaitish 30 Apr 82 pp 3, 131-158, 180-195 - [Section 2, chapter 4, extract from chapter 6 a.nd of contents from book "I Am Commander Qne�' by Jose Fajardo and Miguelangel Raldan. Editorial La Oveja Negra, Bogota, April 1980, 10,000 copies, 220 pages] [Excerpts] 2. Concept and Structure of the Political and Military Organization - of the M-19 (Sixth Nattonal Conference held in March 1978) _ Chapter ] The Sixth C onf.ereTice of the 19 April Movement (M-19) approved the followirig = structure and concept for the political and military organization tn March of. 1978, af.ter a discussion in all of the units and three months of practice in _ which the justness and the necessity of this concept was put to the test. - It is not nor has it been difficult for our organization to maintain a critical _ spirit regard to our own practice. We keep the theoretical thuses we have not tested by our owii experience on the level of resources, hypotheses, and we ~ orily relate the applicability of these theories to concrete practice in the - process of practice and later systema.tization. - lt took long years of struggle and painf.ul frustrati.on to achieve this evalua- - tio� of the.political and military crganization, not only in our country, but in the whole of America. These aqd other experiences have clearly revealed the rieed to compare any theoretical thesis with the historical conditions and cir- , cumstaiices aiid the experience in struggle of our people. No thesis which has - not been incorporated on thc basis of our experience can be endorsed as a strategic or poli!_ical line f.or our organization. But when our experience is : iiiadequate, we must adopt r.hese theses provisionally, and proceed to test them ' constantly in action. This is what is happenitig with this document. Although it is iiot a finished pri.mer, it does represent our basic principles for f.uture work. This is the reason for the importance of study and application of it, which is how we can proceed to enrich it. ~ - The same thing happens with the political resources, which we have to conti^ue _ to compare with the masses, to see if they are sterile or ineffective. We have 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY defined our policy in general as a strategy of power the basic elements in which are found in the definition of our enemies (U. S. imperialism and the Colombian ol'_garchy and our friends (workers, peasants, popular sectors). The definition of these two irreconcilaole camps leads us to the conclusion that the prQblems of our people cari only be resolved in aur country through a national liberatioh revolution, leading the people to guide their destiny and their state, in otter words, a revolution which can mobilize the majority of the people for a concrete goal--total liberation from the oligarchic and imperialist bonds, which neces- sarily leads to the construction of the socialist fatherland. But these goals cannot be achieved except through a long and difficult struggle wherein the political struggle must have popular participation as its central ' and basic axis. To achieve this it is necessary to utilize all those forms oi struggle and popular organization making it possible to proceed to deprive the enemy of power in this process, and to proceed to create a popular authority capable of political, trade union and military dealings until the long-term ~ goals are achieved. And when one speaks of politics, one must speak of organized forces. This is why the central idea of linking the people with a struggle against the enemies mentioned ab:;ve, who are organized, disciplitied, armed and aware of their tasks, aware of the difficulties and weaknesses of the people, also requires that th` - people learn to organize and discipline themselves and to have an overall view - of the necessary tasks in a long and difficult struggle. And if these are the tasks of the people, to a much greater extent they mt!st be the tasks of the most consci.entious sector of the people--the revolutionaries. They must in addition equip themselves with a clear understanding of the process, of the organiza- tional and military elements. In the f.inal analysis, launching a strategy of power without having an organization capable of plantiing development and traiii- ing men to assume leadership of the process in the trade union, political and - military struggies, capable of resisting the enemy's attacks and of achieving - the final -results means drafting plans without any concrete results and con- ti.nuing the long path of frustration and defeat. ' Part II--On the Political-Military Organizational Concept 2.1 The Experience in Latin America The political history of Latin America provides us with dozetis ef examples of organi.zations which have had initial development which could not be cherked but have ended up in less than one could imagine as small graups of pro- Marxists or organizati.ons in exile, split into thousands of factions or simply elim:nated from the political picture. Guatemala, Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay, Argentiiia, Bolivia and Peru have provided us with valuable experience concerning - what we should and should not do in the implementation of a r.evoluti.onary policy, in the choice 4nd treatment of our allies and our enemies, in the for-es of revolutiotz and the enemy forces, and the ways of combining ideology with politics, the armed struggle and the broad mass struggle, between reformism _ and vanguardism. 2 ;IAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400500070030-6 _ What should have been the unity of opposites became the antagonization and elim- itiation of one of the extremes. Either armed struggle or mass struggle, either political or roilitary, either political leadership or military leadership, either socialist revolution or democratic revolution. Such polarization of the - contradiction within a given strategy became simple Paths adopted by one of the two 2lements as the basic and unique way. As a product of the Cuban revolution, the decade uf the '60s blinded revolutionaries, and ever.ybody plunged into armed struggle, contrasting it with mass struggle and its multiple expressions, with results which are known to all. In the decade oti the '70s, a formidable mass movement developed throughout the Southern Cone but was never completed by armed _ struggle, being on the contrary defined as antagonistic. The results were no better than in the preceding case, with the difference that in some instances (Chile), they etided in vialent terrorist dictatorships. When within a given concept of revolution, elements which should coincide and in some cases be simultaneous are viewed as antagonistic, the very process develops such that some of them experience a shift and reject the others. This is what has happened with the Latin American revolution, wherein the discussion - oE revolutionary paths has become the leading mechanism for dryitlg up the imaginaticn wrich the people themselves revealed 'co u5 in the struggle. 2.2 The Colombian Experience - It is a secret to no one that the polarization between the vanguard struggle and the mass struggle in our country has come about in almost absoltite terms. As e.arly as the fifth conference the f.ollowing statement was made: - The left wing has fragmenred the problem of revolution, setting forth dilemmas in which the incapacity of each of the groups has prevented them from _ fully assuming the comple:c tasks of the revolutionary process. The comple- mentary tasks have been converted inte antagonistic and exclusive elements. "Let us see how Ealse alternatives are postulated: either armad struggle or 1ega1 struggle, either construction of the party or construction of the army, - eithei� a vanguard struggle or a mass struggle, either creation of a front of ex- - ploited classes or creation of a political organization of the proletariat, etc. These are false alternatives because we regard them as dialectic elements-----"" and complementary aspects of a single struggle, the struggle to seize power, to destray the oligarchic state and to build a state of workers, laborers and - peasants" (fifth conference). , _ In genei�al, and despite the conditions under which the class struggle has devel- oped aTid the peculiarities of each group or party, their options and proposals have beeii limited by a linear view: either elections or armed struggle, either , tlie woi�kers class or the peasants, either revolution or reform, etc. Those who - have neither beeii atitagonized or denied either of the two extremes have simply contetited themselves with a tactical accumulation of forms of struggle without ititegrating them in strategy, dividing them by geographic zone. This calls for ~ oiie form ef struggle for the cities and another for the countryside, without - seeing one as the continuation of the other, integrated within a single 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY strategy, as complementary parts tactically. This J.s the case with the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) and the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]. The ELN [National Liberation Army' provided a typical instance of entagonization of the vanguard, ideological and mil.itary pole and deception or - destruction of the mass or political pole. To be clearer, we can identify the various factors in revolutiona:y strategy with two main poles--the ideological and the political. All of those factors which have to do with the final or strategic aspects are grouped around the . ideological pole, while everything functioning in terms of the training and _ mobilization of forces and mass mobilization is associated with the political pole. Where did the error lie? In the fact that these two poles were taken as irreconcilable opposites and not as the permanent and constantly changing inte- gration of the various components. If we adopt the principle that the workers class is the vanguard class, which when faced with the possible alliance with the antimonopolistic bourgeoisie rE- _ jected that alliance because it (the bourgeoisie) only produces reforms, and _ coiitinued to wage the struggle for socialism with the workers class alone, then we are dealing with a principle which is correct--reliance on the basic class. But at the same time we are rejecting the possibility of winning political sFace and mobilizing forces. At the present time, this is pure ideologism. At the risk of being simplistic and schematic we would like to illustrate this _ point graphically: _ Ideological Pole Political Pole revolu`_ion reform - power. ....................................government basic class people - vanguard masses armed str.uggle struggle principles alliances strategy .................................tactics _ If we as revolutionaries function in daily life solely on the basis of the _ factors having to do with ideology, strategy and principle, we will perhaps prove to be very firm, solid and pure revolutionaries, revoltationaries who krlow that t:he workers class is the basic class, who know about the need to organi.ze the most coiiscientious sectors into a vanguard organization (party), a struggle f.or power and socialism. But we will be, with absolute certainty, very isolated arid lonely revolutionaries who are not interested in the lagging masses, revolu- tionaries without allies because alliance means dealitig with interests different from those of the basic class. We will be revolutionaries who do not seek organizational farms for the less aware sectors of the people, giving the enemy _ the gift of ample space for reforms, legal strz:ggles, etc. This is what we call - ideologism, excessive reliance on strategy, purism, overemphasis on principle. - And this inclination leads only to inefficiency, isolation and failure to multi- ply the effort itivested. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 If on the contrar.y our action is based solely oiI the level cf reform, using only legal struggle, always in terms of the masses, while f.orgetting the vanguard organizaticn aspect, moving from tactic to tactic and engaging in alliances without pri.nciples or defined goals, we will be able to point to a broad mass audience, concrete achievements in the struggle to gain recognition of de- mands, etc., as the fruit of our labor. But these political forces, when faced with the enemy onslaught, will have neither goal nor organization, neither the forms of struggle needed to defend or to advance in what has already been won iii the political or trade union sector. In other words, revolution does not. appear on its political horizor.. This is what we term reformism, tacticism, - politicism, etc. This incZitiation, then, leads only to the defeats which have bathed the great hopes of our continent in blood, repression and death. What is needed then is to join both poles together and to integrate them ^ - permaiiently. It is not a question of adding one to the other or creating rigid _ schemes. It is a matter of bearing the mass problem always in mind, anchored in solid ideological principles. In other words, strategy makes sense if it is reflected in flexible and effective tactics. The vanguard makes sense if it is linked with a mass process. The basic class serves its vanguard function when it is capable of rallying around it the various popular sectors. The armed struggle makes setise if it is a tool af the people in general, of the struggling masses. In short, ideoTagy makes sense if it is capable of developing forces, projecting proposals and drafting tasks in the political sector. 2.3 Our Owri Experience In cur case, although the organization has tended clearly toward the pole con- cerned witi: the vanguard, mechanism, military and ideological aspects, basically _ because of our class origins and our relative isolation from the masses, it is _ also true that we have been able to deal with the contradiction without antagon- - izing it, without destroyi;ig either one of the two poles. At the f.ifth con- ference we succeeded in reorienting the path, better synthesizing our experience _ and regaining the indispensable level with regard to the political struggle pole. This explains why the organization, although it has committed innumerable err.ors, has always kept itself on ait ascending line of development, for despite everything, we have kept the political pole and the ideological pole, in the of continuing struggle, coexistent within the contradiction. Therefore, oiie of the general conclusions of the fifth conference which we must stress is that pertaining to the impetus and importance we must give politics - as compared with ideology, and the mass struggle as compared with the vanguard = struggle. "'Che basic direction of our work from now on will be an orientation toward ser- ; ving the masses, being with the masses, throtigh: l. Political agitation, armed propaganda; mass organization, based on the - interests of the masses; 'L. Political and military action, working from tlie smaller to the larger in the course of further linki,ig the people wit}i armed struggle; anci 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3. Establishment and consolidation of the political-military bodies" (fifth conference). - To give priority to all political activity over the activity of our apparatus, to our mass activity over our internal activity,-and to our political-social weapons over nur military weapons does not in any way mean abandoning the apparatus or neglecting internal tasks. Quite the contrary. The mass struggle, the training of the masses without an apparatus, without cadres trained for everything, without the infrastructure, is an impossibility, an absurdity. When we say "giving priority to the political," we mean for example that all or at least the majority of our actions shauld basically support the struggles of the masses themselves and have to do with concrete matters, not simply involving principles or ideology or stopping at mere denounciation. A?so, in our finances, the greater part of our budget should be directed toward work with the masses, with a lesser sun. devoted to maintaining the apparatus. And this does not mean - a change of attitude. It simply means being consistent with the line of devel- oping the war of the people which we have approved. "If we withdraw into the _ apparatus, into compartments, into our own forces, we will be doing the enemy a favor, because thus, by confining ourselves 41ithlil limits we have set, we can mor.e readily isolate ourselves. If we plunge into mass work with a very clear political-mil.itary concept, we will be gaining a broad political-military space which it would be difficult, not to say impossible, to destroy. 2.4 We Are Not a Party As to concept and contenr, the fifth conference was right in its assertion of tl.e basic need to sink our roots in the masses and to train ourselves as integral cadres in the period of transition between the initial apparatus we established and the party we want to build. 11 . With the first stage--the construc.tion of a political-military apparatus--completed, what is wanted of us Tiow is to break with earlier concepts and to plunge into the task of taking on the struggles of the people and the masses as such, rather than the simple struggles of specialized apparatuses" - (fifth conference). This stage already completed was a necessary one or a"necessary evil," sirice it allowed us to acquire the basic prerequisites for the development of a political-military organization. What was not needed was to begin to slide, as we were doing, into overemphasis on the apparatus, in other words the tendency to isolate ourselves from the masses, to rely solely on the infrastri-!ture, to thiiik only of our owYi forces. 11. A period of transition is then necessary, involvitig the creation of political-military units which in their mass work will lead the exploited classes to take on the tasks of their own liberation, a pericd of transition which, breakitig with the concepts, practice and organizational forms of the _ apparatus, will incaYporate the positive things already achieved and prepare us for the �uture tasks of the party atid the army.... " 6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL Uf And we visualized a necessary period cf transitioi: in the following terms: - Creation of a revolutionary (political-military) organi%dtion with mass support and i.r,f.luence capable of combining and centralizing the most varied - torms of struggle and d:fferent demands of the people, waging a battle for cotiscious and combative unity, toward alliances with and integration of vari.ous revolutionary forces, zn organi2ation with cadres armed with a political-mili- tary concept and practice which will promote the war of the people." But although these ccncepts were valid and accepted, we ~-;ere not capable of giving them a truly adequate structure and organizational form. We leaped thoughtlessly from the political-military apparatus to the establishmelit of = party cells without having completed the required period for the shaping of the _ necessary organizational, ideological and political bases. We say "leaped"�be- cause we wanted to be a party without the minimal prerequisites for the purpose; beciouse we have no influence with a large part of the population, especially the workers class and the peasantry; because we have not succeeded in establishing popular organi.zational forms reflecting the leadership of the vanguard organiza- tion; because we have not learned to articulate, to combine, *o integrate the forms of political work with the forms of military work; because we do not have the integral cadres capable of directing the masses in all sectors and under all conditions of struggle; because we still do not have a completed strategic plan converted into a material force on being adopted by the masses themselves; and because ideolegical schemes which had no parallel in our reality nor any place in its transformation still weigh in our th;nking. 2.5 In What Stage Are We? We are not in the stage of planning an offensive against our enemies. We are _ only in the phase we have defined as strategic defense. We are preparing the conditions for launching our efforts in truly active defense, which will lead us. based on small successes, to confront the enemy forces. ?n shnrt, then, it is a matter cf accumulating power. We speak of accumulation because power is riot a yuestion of contemplating an imminent attack oTi the oligarchic state. Power is a question of capacity to impose our will on our enemy or at least to - neutralize our enemy. Therefore, then, the accumulation of power is essentially a mass action. If r_he masses move toward satisfaction of their dpmands, if the tra:ie uiiion oi-gani.zar_ion is a weapon for struggle and triumph, and in its devel- - opnjent it is givzn political weapons, we will be creating power, and this political power requires and involves our own military force to consolidate, ex- pand and create new spaces fcr our advarice. In this period of strategic defense, it is not simply a quesrion of proceeding to create a trade unlon force, a political force, a nilitary force or an organizational force. What is , involved i.s relatiiig each of these forces to the others so that they can be con- verted irito power. This process ef accumulating power is the only way of making a revolutionary strategy real and concrete, the only way of proceeding to complete stages which ; will change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. In other words, it is a matter of proceeding to create a real shift in the social forces =i . 7 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500470030-6 FOR OrI'ICtAL USE ONI,Y _ while incr.easing ours. Normally we speak of proceeding to create popular power _ fr-om be]ow. What we have never gone into more deeply is how this power is developed, defended and expanded. We must be much more than propagandists. We - must be much more than agitators. We must be builders who not only conceive of = large undertakings but also implement them, make them a reality. - Power is something which is being built, being accumulated. For example, when = the organi.zation undertakes to carry out any type of operation, it takes three = factors into account: - l. Plannitig, whereiri we study the political, social and military conditions, aiialyze the future development and consequences, as well as our capacity aiid - [.hat of the enemy. 2. Execution, including the implementation of all that has been planned through = individual responsibilities. . 3. Consolidati.on, in which the operation should become a mass and forceful - event, not only because of the organizational results achieved in the trade. union or political sectors, but because it coincides with a given project and = situati.on of the masses. In conclusion, the accumulation of power means in the final analysis making of = all of our political, organizational, military, propaganda, financial atid ideo- - logical activity deeds which need to be or can be materialized in mass organiza- tions, in an increase in our influence, in an increase in our infrastructure and in the consolidation of what has been woti with a view to a further future advance. 2.6 What Are We and What Should We Be? The curi�ent situation of the organizati.on, along with undeniable advances, mass receptivity, increase in political space and limitations on development, reveals - to us that we are still not the organizati_on we need to be. Arly organizational structure must be able to meet four basic requirements: 1. 7t must be capable of responding to the strategic concept established. We have said that the parti.cipation of the people in their own destiny, in the management of their struggle and in the use of the methods of struggle the pro- cess requires are basic to the implementation of our strategic plan. This obviously requires an organization capable of establishitig, capable of - proposing solutions, creating organizational forms and also of implementing, executing and integrating military activities with the level of mass demands and politics. These tasks �re only possible at the current stage reached by our - f.orces and given our political space through a structure integrating the - pol.itical and military aspects, the ideological and the political, in a single = whole, in other words, mergiiig its vanguard and mass leadership functions. In the final analysis, it must specifically expand its space, stretigthen = acid def.end it and open up new prospects for i.t through political-miii.tary _ action, in order thus to continue to accumulate power. 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 2. A structure capable of ensuring arid reproducing its functions. The opera'- tion.of such an organi.zation is nothing other than its capacity to respond in each concrete situation (neighborhood, factory, peasant sector, etc.) to the political and military requirements of the struggles the masses are waging. It is not a question of isolated little groups which aid the masses from outside. It is a question of advancitig in integrating the political with the military, arid tiot only iti general (conceptual) terms, but under real and concrete condi-' t10IlS. Base units whose sole function is to study and applaud the organiza- _ tiotial activities they read about in the newspapers are groups which in no way guarantee or carry out any political project. Groiips which have failed in their = trade ut,ion or legal work and call upon sectors of the organization to undertake tlie military effort, without the slightest concern about the development of these tasks, are either groups which have not realized that the unity between = the political-military concept and practice is implemented in each of the parts - oE the structure or are groups which having understood this, have ilOt had capacity enough to develop this concept in their sector. _ 3. A structure which reproduces the cadres needed for the plan. A capacity to produce cadres is an indispensable requirement for any organi.zational structure, - and in our case, it is one of the key elements in the decision to develop a . political-military crganization now and tiot a party. That is not our task now, = much less is it to train only trade union or political or military cadres in the present stage. Our task today is to train ourselves as integral cadres capable of ]ater assumirig specxalized tasks, in other words integral cadres which can in the f.uture devote themselves to trade union, military, peasant and other sectors of work. - It is impossi.ble that cadres required to prov:de the masses with military and - pol.itical ]eadership would have no vision, concept, plan or overall practice in tlle process. It is no lotiger conceivable that our militants in the mass sector would be iiicapable of proposing a military action to support, create an opening ' for oi- consolidate the poli.tical struggle, or on the other hand, that officers - capable of plarinitig mi litary operations weuld be itiefficient and mute when it = comes to making political proposals in ati invasion neighborhood or a trade o uiiion. Our intention is to train them as men capable of making political gro- posals to the masses, of organizirig them, of supporting them and facilitating - their advance through military means, while characterized by a new and socialist ity. 4. A structure which guarantees control of development as a whole rather than - separate parts. This means that the structure will be subject to control mecharii.sms, such that each movement in a specific area corresponds to a general- _ ly established goal. Planning is not only a problem of analysis or the under- taking of tasks, but also a proUlem of efficient mechanisms for control anci _ evaluation of its fulfillment. Indiscriminate growth without prior determina- tion of whar_ the principaZ thing is, or acti.on subject only to local or regional reyuirements and methods of work and functional dnalysis which are the product of improvisational individual criteria prevent political efficiency, scatter e(forts and leave room for error which would otherwise not have been committed. For all of these reasons, centralization in leadership, planning, decentralized 9 FOR OL'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY execution, rigid discipline, responsibility and command are riot formal problems = but a requirement for the rational use of the forces for internal development - and for the fulfillment of the requirements of the current period ir, the class struggle. - The four basic requirements we have listed should be the basic supports on which a political-military structure is built. We tieed a political-military organiza- - tion which integrates both ideological and political aspects, the vanguard tasks and the mass tasks, sinking our roots in the masses and traiciing us as integral - cadres. In other words, it is a question of taking on the tasks, the require- - ments and the f.unctioning of a political-military organization with all its _ consequences, politically and organizationally, functionally and individually. The tasks of such a structure are none other than the tasks required for the - political plan we have established. And this plan is based on a fundamental _ axis--the masses. If the people are to begin to accumulate power, a policy for _ each concrete sector, a joint policy and political-military action to support atid consolidate the tasks of the masses are urgently needed. It is not a question then of an organizational structure makirig it possible to implement both political and military aspects, or of carryitig out the two - activities at the same time. What is involved, and this is very different, is - integrating and combining the political and the mi.litary in a single strategy, making progress in the relation of the two elements which are parts of a single - practice. Political-military activity provides the only possibility for con- solidating, increasing and power. Anything else is a reformist or - militaristic combination, for even though armed struggle is waged with technical efficiency, if the plan is reformist, the general concept with which the struggle is carried out continues to be reformist. Arid if one engages in politics tactically, but strategy i.s solely a function of - the military, this is nothing other than militarism. = 2.7 Criteria for Integral Cadres a. Criteria of wholeness. The characteristic of wholeness does not depend merely on the time we devote to each of our activities. It is not sufficient _ for us to study, to be iiivolved in mass work and to participate in military - operations in order to claim that we are being integrally trained. It is the = very nature of our activities, the concept with which they are carried out which provides this characteristic. If our studies are purely acaciemic, i.f our mass woi�k is undertaken with reFormist concepts, and if our participation in the military sector is purely mechanical, however much we engage iti these three thiiigs we will not be acquiring training as integral cadres. The aspect of wholeiiess in this stage has an aXiG providiiig cohesion which is our link with - tlie masses. On the pol.itical level, this involves our incorporation iii the = dytiamics of mass struggle. On the military level, this means actions which are - withiti the reach of the masses, which aff.ect their most immediate interests, - r.eflect their feelings and which open up new prospects for the development of the struggle. On the theoretical level, this means acquiring tools f.or 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 iiivestigation and interpretation enabling us to know in wha*_ country we are operating, enabling us to situate ourselves more justly at various times, and allowing us to formulate proposals i`or action and work toward a concrete reality. _ b. Difficulties in integral training. As we said above, the history of the recent struggles on the American continent has been developed by rEVOlutionaries on the basis of antagonistic contrast of the forms of struggle, and *on this basis, each organization yields very special fruit. SomQ produce only theoreti- cians, others only activipts on the mass level, and still others only military _ techniciar,s. This leftist heritage has its logical repercussions on an organi- = zation which for better or for worse is still affected by it, and this is where = the organization should focus all its effort so that, incorporating the best of - the experience in the revolutionary struggle, it will be able f.o extract from each unit and each officPr the product of a new concept and a new style. Sur- . mcuntiiig this heritage oF schematism, dogmatism and excessive emphasis on ideclegy i.s not something we can claim to have already accomplished. It is true that doing so has been a constant concern, and that we are now beginning to $ee a new type of cadres, more committed to our reality than to the international - conflict of the socialist camp, cadres beginniiig to give theory its true meaning as a dynamizing element in revolutionary practice, provided always it is mass practice--new cadres who in their language and thinkitig do iiot lose their riational and popular identity, their Colombian nature, when they engage in - analysis, speak to the masses, or plan or implement a political-military action. These values which are now beginning to crop up within the organization, and which break with a whole tradition of leftist orthodoxy, must be developed much f.urther. They must become a characteristic of the collective and nci- the privi- lege of just some cadres. � c. Steps taken toward integral training. Our organization is not the product _ of a group ef enlightened *_heoreticians, nor was it born of any abstract prin- ciples. Neither is it the product of the need to demonstrate that this or that method of struggle is the correct one. We have developed in response to a mass = need, and since our origins, we have kncwn that our main interlocutor was these masses and not leftist groups. We were not born tied to a single method of - struggle. Since the begintiing we have triea to develop vari.ous 'torms of combat, aware that we were testing a new path. We have tried to keep an open mind, ; acknowl.edging the mistakes made and correcting them and launching new proposals in order to continue to advance. Naturally, the impression of covering the easy, beaten pa*h of p roleftist schematism has always been present, but it has _ beeri possible to reject it iot because it is a beaten or easy or proleftist = path, but because it is inefficient. _ We believe that we stil] suffer from many shortcomings in terms of the integral - r..aining of cadres. Shortcomings such as believing that tne official cadres - know everything. Man must orchestrate. Integral cadres are those who have mastered a series of political, military, trade union and other techniques. A step farther iri the evaluation and assessment of the *asks is necessary to over- come r_hese failings. We must not be content to know if things were done: we must ktiow how they were done. We must not be content wit}i the fact that a given unit fulfilled its pamphlet goal. We must know how that quota was fulfilled, 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500074430-6 FOR OFFICIP,L USE ONLY _ how ttie action was organized, if it was evaluated later. We must know if each such effort raised the technical, political, military and organizational levels. " Fart III--What Is the OPM? An OPM [ organization] is then a structure which allows the - political-military leadership to use all methods of struggle in a single culture - and a single plan. It is a structure which exists as a function of a mass policy, a part of the level of awareness of the masses and a part of the organi- zati.cnal ]evel with which to progress with the masses, using the political- military concept as the basis for the accumulation of power. If this is the task of such a structure and if political-military action exists as a function of the masses, i.t will then be possible to achieve two goals: achieving roots in the masses and the training of integral cad;:es. The first is necessary be- cause the people will always see us struggling for satisfaCtion of their de- matids, struggling not for a future they do not yet understand but for their con- crete and real needs. Then they will understand that the military aspect repre- - sents a weapon for winning, for achieving goals, for defending what has been won, for growing or dealing blows to their enemies. The OYM is a structure which allows a complete dematid to respond to each mass demand, rather than a simple ideological proposal. When the masses demand higher salaries, public freedoms or seek iTnplementation of a list of demands, it is absurd to respond with a ideological slogan such as "Long Live the Armed Struggle," "Support the Popular War," "Long Live Socialism," etc. What is in- volved is pr.oviding the political, military and organizational weapons to fight, - to witi, to consolidate what has been won and to fight again. The second goal, integral cadres, is the basic requirement for proper and real leadership of a mass procPSS. If our political proposal requires the organiza- _ tion and mobilization oiE the camplex of masses witli a view to winning power, = what is needed then is men and women provided with an overall view of this pro- = cess, capable of the political planning of the political, organizational and military proposals, based on a mass approach and mass practice. The integral cadres take on the political-military leadership of the masses, on the basis of their tieeds, develop and deepen the established policy atid eiirich it in their daily activity. They interpret the political responses for each period, launch organizati.oiial and mil.itary proposals valid for each situation, _ and translate our policy plans in thousands of proposals consistent with con- - cr.ete situations. They are the directors and it is they who regularly supply the tools and mechanisms which make it possible to achieve the goals of the r.evolutioti, to seize power. ~ We are not preparing to gain power solely by electoral triumTll. If this were - the case, the legal leaders of the masses would suffic;--. We are not preparing for the destruction of the state by a handful of bold and well-armed men. If this were the case, we would only need the military cadres. Nor are we prepar- _ ing to have power wrested for us by a spontaneous popular rebellion. 12 FOR OFI'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 It is a question, and this shoulu be reiterated, of a prolonged war in which the masses, using all the methods of struggle, will increase their power with each specific instance of struggle for economic or political gain. The power won - will be consolidated and expanded, necessarily making use of the political- military aspect as the main axis in each neighborhood, each factory, along each path and in each mass work effort. 3.1 Centralization and Vertical Structure of the OPM In addition tc sinking roots in the masses and the training of integral cadres, the OPM needs centralized leadership and decentralized implementation, and therefore verticality is needed in the structure and the command. - Centralized leadership is needed so that the organization can function as a whole, as a complex, overcoming heterogeneity or inequality in development, so that it can establish general directives and plans, assigning responsibility both to the collective and to individuals, and, finally, to maintain strict atid ; rati.onal control over the nlans and these specific work areas. Cetitralized leadership presumes that the vices which prevent Lhe necessary de- - velopment toward concrete goals will be overcome. On the one hand, thexe is - absolute dependence on the orders issued by the leadership, thus restricting initiative, concrete analysis of one's own situation, and planning consistent with concrete iieeds aiid general requirements, while on the other, there are - liberalism, anarchy, and absolute autonomy, in which each individual does what he warits as a function of his own and petty local or group interests, thus _ losing the overall perspective, whether pertaining to the nation or the organi- zation. - We need then first of all a general plan and general guidelines, and secondly, aiialysis for the executioii of general policies and their implementation on the local and regional levels as well on the basis of plans; strict fulfillment of the plan and control mechanisms on all levels; and finally, reports on the ful- fillment of plans, on contributions and shortcomings and a synthesis undertakeil by the national leadership, on the basis of the participation of the entire organizati on. Any orgatiizati.on is a camplex whole made up of parts which implement the gerieral policy which has been set forth in the general plan. A revolutionary or.ganization is made up of parts, including men and organizational units belong- = ing to HI1 apparatus allowirig the classes interested in revolution to pursue the jciiit struggle of the people arganically iii order to win political power. Thus = we have a goal (national ]iberation) and a joint plan, i.nvolving: - a. The experience of the masses and their forms of organization; - b. The program making it possible to rally the greatest possible social efforts around the workers class and the people against the principle enemy _ (the anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist program with regard to socialism); and c. The strategy for witining power (the combined popular war). ~ ~ 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Thus each part of the organization participates in the drafting and constant re- = vision of the overall plan (through ?ts task in each unit, on each intermediary level, in each column and on each regianal ]evel, as well as in the mass fronts - and apparatus). At the same time, each part is constantly subordinate to that plan as it is formulated by the central bodies. - In short, what causes the revolutionary organization to exist and develop are the actions adapted to the general plan, and this is the final basis of disci- pline, that is to say the subordinatioii of the parties to the whole. If actions - are not carried out or are partially carried out, some parts of the organiza- - tion deteriorare, always affecting the whole. Here again is a reason for the im- portarice of centralization as the only means of disci?line and control, and a - vertical structure as the form in which the concept of centralization is ex- pressed. , In order for an organization to function as a whole, homogeneity not only in _ the political and the ideological aspects, but also in the political-military - practice in var.ious s.ittaations and in different class sectors is itidispensable. Jtitil a certain level of homogeneity is achieved, the leadership bodies must be - much more centralized and must carry out a more dynamic fuziction lIl the achieve- ment of tliis goal. Moreover, the levels'of consultation and that of the democratic bodies become factors in disintegration for lack of a common framework, and fail to carry out their task of collective drafting and synthesis. In additi.on to the need for greater homogeneity in the sector where the leader- ship carries out its basic task, the fact of engaging in political-military activity makes it iiecessary for us to adapt the organizational structure in order to adhere to the laws of war wherein, in addition to leadership of the masses, a single command and rapid decisions are required for the implementa- tion of the political-military decisions. The urgent iieed for a clandestine orgariization to have bodies which can at ariy time and without delay adopt the decisiois which the political circumstances dictate is much greater when that organization is iii charge of inadership of the armed and uiiarmed political struggle. These decision-making bodies (leaderships) must exist on a permanent basis iti order for the life of the organizatioii to expand. In this way, central- ization aiid the vertical structure and their maiti consequerice, which is the sub- ordiriation of the whole to the decisiotis of the leadership, are expressed. The democrati.c aspect does not always exist on a permatient basis. It appears only at certain mometits. This meaiis that the democratic aspect of the organiza- ttoii of joiiit participation in the decisions comes duririg ttie national coiifer- ence. The confereiice is the poitit of greatest democracy, and it should not be viewed as a large gatheriiig of delegates, which may occur under circumstatices of maximal legali.ty, but basically as a process iii which the organization as a whole discusses the political, military and orgafiizational theses, aid in this way shares in the collective planning. ' 14 FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 3.2 Democracy in the OPM - In crder to implement democracy in the OPM, it must be stressed that in it and in any revolutionary organization, we speak not abstractly but in concrete fcrm. However much democracy there may be, if training is not of the best kind, the participation iii the discussion and in decision making becomes mechanical and slavish. If on the contrary we promate integral training, we make it - possible for each one of us to assume his responsibilities, and on the basis of political-military capability, we are establishing the real foundations for - building the principles of democratic centralism. If the cadres heading the organization have neither the training nor the conviction that they are strug- gling as a function of the masses, the development of bossism and militarism be- comes possible, and if the internal mechanisms allowing a compai�ison between their leading role and achievements in practice are lacking, we will readily ~ lapse into bureaucracy. - Thus we must advance in the method of operation and leadership called demo- cratic cen*_ralism, a method which establishes a relati.on between absolute cen- ~ tralization and democracy, providing a given combination of these elements allowiiig us to respond to two questions: - a. The need f.or the existence of decision-making bodies which have the author- ity on a permanent basi; to make decisions by themselves, without consulting any organi.zational level; and b. Participation by all of the members of the organization in its decisions. 7f we consider only *he first of these two aspects, we will have a centralist system iri which there will be no participation by the whole, while if we con- - sider only the second of these twa elements, we will have an operational system of contiiiuing consultations or assemblies for the adoption of any decision, leading the organization to total inoperability. A whole range of possibilities exists between these two extremes in which one or the other aspect may prevail. Under democrati.c centralism, the central - aspect prevails, for which this term is Lsed rather than centralized democracy. - In order for this method to function fully, there must be in the organization a - substantial degree of homogeneity, making the organization a living body which = seeks a single goal based on the same criteria. _ The current mechanisms f.or leader.ship, evaluation, consultation, criticism and - self-criricism must be deepened, bearing in mind that we must no longer channeZ them toward the discussion or the formulation of plans which are scattered or isolated from the gerieral policy established, but in such a way as to implement the overall plan, adapting it to the concrete conditions of each group and sec- -j tor of the masses affected, and the product of a discussion, of these assess- ments, should be taketi up and centralized by the leadership for the maicing of ~ future decisions. l~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3.3 Hierarchic Structure of the OPM - The organizational structure must correspond with the political line, and is not a complementary element. We can say that the structure is the materializa- - tion of the political line at a given moment in its development. We caniiot con- - ceive of an organization which has the goal of s2izing power, while its form of _ orgatiization does not correspond to that goal. The arganization is the tool with which the revoluti.onary social force directs the st.ruggl.e for pclitical power. Therefore, its organizational structures express the concept of power ' and the political strategy. The organization guarantees the possibility of directing the development of the ideology of the workers cl.ass through popular policies. _ Organizational Structure - of the M-19 National Leadership DIRECCION NACIONAL Miximu outorided = Highest Authority . High _ HCANI.GC PERIORES C o mm a n d s rioref la wf~ tieo-rnilitx t e est ig r officers - under the pol tical-military , commander egional DIRECCIONES :higher IONAlEB 3 6 5 oticiabs nt baio L e a c~ e r s h i p un oficid rbr U n i t s = Column 1-3 or 5 f f i c e r s = Leadership under a highes -ranlcing Units officer OIRECCIONES DE CO UMNA 3 5 6 oficisiet primsroo bojo un oficial mayor I n t e r m e d i a r v Leadership _ 3 or 5 first Units officers -unde 3 or 5 a h i g h e r DIRECCIONES TERMEDIAS - o f f i c e r 3 b 5 ofici~let tapundos bajo s e c o n d un oficisi primsro f f 1 C 0 T S , under a Base Unir.s first officer COMA OS 0S 9ATE 3 6 5 miembrot bojo ~ un olicid fipundo 3 or 5 members under a second = officer - 16 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 - Our owTi policy is based on the mobilization and organization of the masses, so as to proceed to accumulate political-military power guided by a revolutianary party, which must develcp a tooZ capable of uszng force ta challenge our ' enemies for power. This purpose requires the training of revolutionaries who will combine the _ armed policy and the nonarmed policy iti theory and in practice. It requires an organizatiorial structure which allows us and helps us to adopt this double con- _ cept beginning now, a structure which wisely reconciles the tasks suited to the present period with the longer-term tasks, a structure capable of preparing us - internally and of projecting political goals outward. To summarize, we need an organizztional structure to develop the prolonged combined and mass war. The highest organizational authority is the national conference, made un of the national leadership and the sectorial and regional delegates. The national leadership is made up of the national officers and the high-rank- irig officials. _ The high command, the highest permanent body, is made up of the leading officials. Below it, on a regional or geographic basis, are the regional, column and inter- mediary leaderships and the base units, as well as the groups of candidates and collaborators. This entire structure, the ranks and hierarchies, the elements and symbols, make no sense if the basic goal of an organization is not sufficiently clear. - The gcal of our organization is not to contribute a"graiti of sand" to the pro- cess, ro add to its development, or to make some contributions forced by circum- stance, but to become the vanguard force in this process. To do this the OPM will have to be organized to carry out the leadership functions which result from this task. This does not mean that we are a vanguard today, if that is the fear, but we must indeed constantZy combat the deviations of those who refuse = to accept that the process needs a vanguard for its development, and we musL combat those who say that the organization problem is a matter of a simple sum - of cadres with an already completed program. The goal of the variguard in the process, and this is the role we want our organ- ization to play, can only be achieved through development which has two stages. The First is the constructiori of the organization, and the second is that in - which the organization becomes the real leadersYiip of the revolutionary pro- cess. This division is not absolute. Both elements in the revolutiotiary process = are pre.scnt iri both stages, except that one or the other takes on the leading role iti each of the two, in other words the OPM is constantly being built, just : as r_he need to exercise leadership is also a constant. For a time we mainly srressPd tlie tasks of constructicig the organization. Now, without neglecting - this task, the conditions in the country and our political plan force us to place the basic stress en leadership tasks. 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE CNLY In makiTlg political propositions to the people, it is necessary to bear in mind . that they can only be imposed to the extent that they are correct. It is a prob- lem of tHe quality of the proposals and the quantiity of those adapted, of the leadership in the tasks and their execution. This is the basic problem for our revolutionary process. Either we are an organization of cadres for internal operation (all of the tasks and actions for the apparatus, financing, propa- = ganda, logistics), or we ace an organization incorporated in the masses which sets forth proposals which because of their quality, correctness and breadth are accepted. Within this situation we nave two limiting factors. One occurs when proposals a are not put forth or t:1ey are insufficient and we then seek to compensate for them, using our military capacity, and the other occurs when we propose broad goals to the masses but they are only taken up by the activists or our own mem- - bers. These problems derive basically from the manner and the criteria on the basis of which the organization is exte:.ded into the masses. In other words, - what underlies each organization officer? In our view -_xtension of the = political-military structure to the mass level is not the important thing. The pol.itical-military structure is established, is created in a qualifying proeess in order to put forth proposals and plans on the mass level. But if each organi- zation officer who is the final link in this pyramid lacks a direct relation with the masses, what we mentioned above happens, and either he is bolstered by - military actions or he himself must do this. Therefore, it is true that not just any individual can be an organization officer. Betng an organization officer equals leading the masses. A comrade who does not represent the masses - but represents himself has no reason to be an organization officer. But this is not a disqualifying process. On the contrary, our structure recog- nizes the member of the organization (different from an officer) on this inter- - mediary level between the people as a whole and the organization officer, that individual we have termed a collaborator and candidate, who because of the acceptance of some of our views and support of some of our activities is re- garded as a participant in a strategic project. In other words, the organization should be capable of responding on each level of awareness witti organizational and political proposals for each concrete cadre or mass situation. We have = always spoken of the need for the masses to have (and they do have) political- - demand and even military bodies, such as the self-defense and civil defense groups, committeps �or s,!gp^r- of r.he organization and committees to propagan- _ dize our proposals, etc. They must have their own structure, which cannot be that of the organization, their own tools of struggle, their own propaganda, _ etc. 3.4 El.ection and Evaluation Mechanisms Ii a compartmented and centralized organization, the election of individuals to - leadership posts on any level cannot be carried out by means of the old voting criterion, nor by personal election either. In o u r OPM structure, the leadership is elected from the top down, based on the criterion of evaluation of each com- rade and collective work. In the unit, intermediary, column, regional and - nati.onal ]eaderships, those chosen must be the comrades with the best evalua- - tions on each level, in other words, the cadres with the most nearly integral - training. . 18 ;iAL USE OPILY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 = Evaluation, which is a system of ineasuring the capabilities of the members, _ taking their practice and their political, miliLary, organizational and ideo- logical concepts into account, is based on the criterion of integrality. In the evaluation of each comrade, the following aspects will be taken into account: l. Political--In this connection, the concept implemented by the comrade on � tt,e mass level and in the handling of the politieal line of the organization = will be analyzed, along with the implementation of the organizational line in mass wcrk, political practice, the method used and the proposals put f o rth. 2. Military--The concept of combined and mass war and the implementation of iz in practice will be analyzed, taking into account command capability, disci- pline, capacity for planning-and for operations. _ 3, Organizational--Concept of the OPM, the centralized structure and the rela- = tioiiship of the OPM to the mass movement, o'rganizational capacity, functioning within the structure, work with candidate members or officers within his jur3s- diction, leadership capacity, command practice, criticism and self-criticism. 4. Ideological--Concept and practice with regard to the people, the individ- - ual's comrades and his family, as well as matters pertaining to revolutionary morality, the ideological values reflected in his daily life, etc. Part IV 4.1 Differences Between the OPM and the Party - The OPM is a necessary and prior stage far the construc[ion of the partv. With- out real mass leadership, no party is a real party, but rather formalism and _ self-definition. The party is the first organizational level existing in revolu- tionary leadership. It develops under precise and specific conditions, and is not based on the existence of small groups of inen affiliated or identified with a common program. The party emerges when the political, organizational, ideological and military requirements can izo longer be met under the old leadership structure. _ Often there is confusion between the party and the formal facts of a plan, con- - gress and democracy. When it is forgotten that the basic fact of a party, above - all in our reality, is political and mtlitary leadership of the masses, one is forgetting the basic principle which gives it reality and defines it as the leadership of the masses and a simple internal organization. -The difference between the OPM and the party does not lie in the difference in j coiicepts. The concept continues to be the same and continues to become more pro- - Eouiid. This reveals the need to defirie the forms of party organization, which ~ is a dialectical development of the tasks of the OPM. When its roots in the masses and the scope of the class struggle exceed the capacity of the OPM, due I k' lg ! FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY t APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ to its verticality, its centralism or the integral cadre requirements, a cen- tralized structure, but one with greater participation by the masses and the cadres in decisians and in political decision making becomes necessary. In this - structure, it is no longer for all of us to do everything: rather it is then re- quired that cadres specialize in trade union, political, legal, and other work. In other words, the requirement of integrality does not exist in the party for the militant, but for the whole of the structure. When the breadth and complex- ity of the military tasks makes them a mass phenomenon, then the emergence of = another specialized structure, the army, becomes indispensable. 4.2 Differences Between the OPM and the Political-Military Party Unlike what happens with the party, the differences between the political-mili- tary organization and the political-military apppratus are differences of con- - cept, practice and criteria. - The apparatus concept is based in the final analrysis on the idea that it is revolutionary organizations which defeat the enemy, denying in fact that this _ task is the task of the masses. The basic and essential thing in ttie apparatus is the determiiiing weight of the technical infrastructure, its own forces and the internal needs, or rather the also internal potential atid rhythm. Far the apparatus, the masses are always aTi object on which i.t dcts in order to dynamize, guide, enlighten, teach them, = etc. The vanguard is elitist, with overemphasis on ideology and strategy. We have given this policy the name "apparatism." The typical militant with such a concept is in the best of cases an individual identifying with the polit- ical ]ine but lacking in concrete activity oiith the masses; an individual with technical resources above the popular average and with military operational techniques beyond the reach of the masses. The rear guard is the infrastructure - itself, the technology and the apparatus itself, while the organizational struc- - ture is determined by results, functional efficiency and technical level. Democracy does not function, centralism is b?Gau on execution, and the criter- _ ion f.or selecting militants does not go beyond their functional efficiency. The differences between this and the OPM are obvious--the difference in polit- ical criteria, the focus always placed on the masses as the subjects of the - revolutionary process, the requirement of integrality iz the pol!.tical, organi- zati.onal, military and biological aspects--these contrast with and differ from _ the apparatus criterion of technical specialization. ~ The technical.level of Functional capability is reduced in the OPM for a time, but with the advaiitage that it is generalized to all the members. This occurs in order to apen up, expand and basically consolidate the political space (with- - out neglecting inf.rastructure needs) and is in the short run within the reach of the technical level of the masses, since the technique isless complex, the _ weapons are more popular and the goals to be sought more immediate. The struc- ture therefore i.s different. It is no longer a specialized structure f.or opera- tion, for functiotiitig, but is a centralized structure for draftiiig, plannitig and directing orgaiiizational, trade union aiid military proposals within the same political plan. 20-21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070030-6 Part V--Internal Regulations The internal regulations are designed to be a complex of norms which will guarantee collertive functioning and serve as a framework for the development - of the members along an integral approach toward a single goal. Thus they are designed to be functional, providing a leadership structure, indi- , vidual respoiisibilities and specific tasks suited to a combat organization, and political leadership for a strategy seeking power for the masses. Article 1--Goals and Methods The 19 April Movement is a part and the continuation of the people's struggles f.or national liberation and for socialism. It reflecXs the national aspiration for true independence, the need of the people for social justice, and the work- ers struggles for a socialist f.atherland. These struggles for independence, social justice and a socialist fatherland joiTi together the needs of the nation and the people and basically of the work- ers class, and they will be victorious through the participation of the people - as a whole in winning their own power. This requires the development of politi- cal aiid military power such as to confront and defeat the attacks of the oli- gar.chic power. The 19 April Movement is developing aiid encouraging the power of the masses, aiid to this end it is organizing and waging the struggle as a political-mili- tary body capable of reflecting the aspirations, the battles and the forms of orgaiiization and struggle in a single process leading to power. Thvs we are a nationalist, revolutionary aiid prosoc.ialist political-military - organization. Article 2--Members That complex of men and women who accept these goals, contribute their concrete aiid voluntary efforts, and work in orderly fashion for such goals are members of the 19 April Movement. 7n this voluntary integration and coordination of efforts and goals, there are various l.evels depending on degree and discipline, availability and concept. - They include off.icers, candidates and collaborators. 1. 9'he officers cf the organizati.on are those members who: _ a. Implement and develop the line of the organization; b. Carry out and endorse these internal regulations; - c. Are always ready to execute the tasks assigned by the organization; aiid 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - d. Participate permanently on some internal organizational level. 2. Candidates for the organization are those members who: _ a. Accept and implement the line of the organi.zation; = b. Accept and observe the internal regulati.ons; c. Participate in a candidates' unit; and d. Aspire to reach the officers' level through continuing discipline and conscious participation in the life of the organizationo 3. Organizati.onal collaborators are those members who: - a. Accept our general proposals; and - b. Collaborate consciously and voluntarily in some tasks assigned by the organ- ization. - Article 3--Promotion and Officers' Posts _ Officer hierarchy. The officers of the organization come under a hierarchy - uf command with the f.ollowing designations: officer, second officer, first officer, higher off.icer, highest afficer. 2. Numbers. Each officer in the organization has a number within his unit and - on his level. This nufierical order dictates authority for political-military - arid organizational leadership, as circumstances require. 3. Evaluation. The entire officers' body will be evaluated on the basis of = the criteria existing in their respective units. To this end, a commission will be appointed on the immediately higher level. The results of this evaluation will dictate rank atid numerical order. 4. Advaticement. The promotion af collaborators and candidates is carried out on the basis of their attitudes and activities within the org3nization, on the - recommendation of their superior officers and with the approval of a higher level, which may be the second officer. Article 4--Organization 1 . Catididates' unit. This is the unit for political-military training ;or the assumption of the tasks of an organi.zation officer. The candidates' utlit is - commanded by an officer of the organization as its political-military leader. _ Each unit is made up of three to five members. _ The following are the f.unctions of each candidate: = a. Political--He must carry out mass political orientation tasks, constantly - strengthen his character as a popular guide in a specific sector, and as such, encoua�age and direct the political-military activity of the masses consistent with the line of the organization. - 23 J FnR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _i b. Military--He must participate in the planning, execution and evaluation of all the military operations assigned to his unit, carrying out therein the _ tasks assigned to him and contributing to the integral capacity of the unit. c. Organizational--He must be an active element in the cohesion of his unit, carryiiig out the leadership tasks assigned to him hy his officer, and ' , basically, he must struggle to encourage mass organizational forms on a broad . politiczl and the military le.�el, as well as new popular self-defense groups. 2. Base Unit--This is the ba=.ic unit of the organization, made up of a minimum of three and a maximum of five officers. A second officer is in command of the - base unit as its political-military leader. He will be chosen by the inter- - mediary leadership and confirmed by the immediately higher level on the basis of his respective evaluation. ~ The functi.ons of each officer are: a. Political=-To carry out, broaden and develop the tasks of leadership and political guidance of the masses, becoming the integral leader of the sector in - which he functions. b. Military--To participate in the planning, execution aiid evaluation of all = the military operations assigned to his unit. In addition to activities on the m^ss ]evel, he may be called upon to carry out military actions of greatex - scope. _ c. Clrganizatienal--To supervise the collaborators' and candidates' units, serv- - ing as the i-egular channel between them and his immediate superior. ' d. Ideological--The officer is trained as a part of the integral cadres, par- - r_icipating in the study aiid deepening of the organizational line. He struggles = to have his daily life reflect his attitude as a conscientious fighter, always placing collective needs above his individual needs. - The functiens of a second officer are: - a. Pelitical--To work to ensure that all the officers in his unit deepen and broaden our political proposal on a mass level, such that each officer becomes = a true director, and to control and direct the political-military work of the of.ficers on the basis of the established plans. b. Military--To propose, plan and direct the execution of the plans and mili- _ tary operations assigned to his unit, guaranteeing the integral nature of the - operations. c. Organizational--He is the axis of the base unit and directly responsLble for the political-military development of its oificers, as well as the regular = channel betwe2n them and the first officer. ; Z' .i 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3. T.ntermediary Leadership�--This level is under the command of a first officer and is made up of three or five second officers. It directs and guides the - tasks of the organization in a column sector, implementing, supervising and - coordinating its task fulfillment. - Functions of the first officer: - He is the regular channel between second officers and the higher officer, being ' in charge of all of the comrades assigned to the sector. He is appointed after _ his evaluation by the head of the region, with confirmation by the higher - command. He guides and directs the implementation of the mass policies, mili- _ t,ary plans and the organizational development of the sector. He makes tactical ~ . decisions within the established plans. 4. Column Leadership--Under the command of a higher officer or the first officer with the best evaluation in the column, such units are made up of - three, four or five first officers heading intermediary leadership units. They implemetit, check on and direct such units, and through them, all of the base - units assigned to them. The higher officers will answer to the regional leader- - ship for the functioning, plan fulfillment, mass work, implementation of opera- tions, intelligence, officer training and everything pertaining to the develop- ment of the personnel under their command. They are the regular channel between the first officers and the highest officer level. They are in direct command of their first axid second officers and are responsible directly to a highest level officer or the cammander of the regional leadership. - 5. Regional Leadership--It is under the command of a highest level officer or the higher officer with the best evaliiation in the region. It alsu includEs three, four or five higher officers in command of columns. The highest level officer proposes, carries out, directs and checks on the tasks of the organization on the national l.evel and in a preestablished area. Highest level officers carry out national plans and are the directors respon- sible for the mass policy, political proposals, military proposals, organiza- tional control and the development of the infrastructure. The highest level - officer or� commander of a regional leadership unit is the regular channel be- tween the higher officers and the high command. _ 6. High Commard. This level is under the command of the highest level officer - with the best evaluation iti the organizati.on, in other words the political-mili- tary commander, and it is made up of the highest level officers. The high - command drafts the policies, the national plans and the specific projects on - the mass movement and internal level. In addition it makes the tactical and situati.onal decisions within the generzl guidelities approved by the national leadership. It drafts thQ financial plans and checks on the expenditures of the organization, as well as its assets and infrastructure. It is in charge of the national newspaper office, appoints the evaluation commissions for the national level, and is responsible for relations with national and ititernational organi- - zaticns. 7. National Leadership--This body is made up of the highest level off.icers and - the higher of.ficers under the command ef the political-military leader of the _ 25 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 - organization. Meeting in national conference, it is the highest authority of the organization. Its functioning is democratic and its duties include discuss- i�g, analyzing in greater depth, correcting and establishing the policies, plans aid proposals on the strategic level of the organization. It approves or rejects the policies implemented by the high command. It also has authority to = evaluate the high command and the higher offfcers, to approve or amend the in- tet-nal regulations and to establish the general guidelines of the arganization on basic issues in the revolutionary process. A conference is convoked by the high command or when the majority of the organi2ation so requests. I: adJition to the national leadership, other members can participate in the = tiational conference if the high command deems their attendance desirable be- - cause of their organizational position, mass work or any other special reason. Article S--General Norms The drafting of the policy expressed in plans, projects and proposals and de- _ cision making are centralized in the high command. There is decentralization among the regional leadership units for implementa- tion. These units in turn adapt their plans to the concrete situation and draft plans for their respective columns. Leadership is centralized and implementa- tioti is decentralized equally from the top downward. The decisions on politi- - cal, organizational and military matters adopted by the high command are bind- - ilig on a3] the officers, just as all decisions adopted by a higher level are = binding on all those under i,*,s jurisdiction. Criticism and self-criticism are included as methods for all tasks, to which end every task, simple er complex, individual or collective, is evaluated, once _ completed, in all its aspects (political, organizational, military and ideologi- = cal), and the immediately nigher body is informed o� the assessment made. Article 6--Officers' Responsibilities 1. To participate actively iti the life of the OPM, adhering to its ideology and its policy aiid strictly observing the internal regulations. In this re- spect, the higher ranks are not excused from absolute adherence. On the con- rrary, the higher the rank, the greater the responsibility. = 2. Te work actively in the assigned body. _ 3. To be available for the fulfillment of tasks, without regard to how agree- able or desirabie they may seem. To utilize criticism and self-criticism as a norm for dealing with problems - aiicl as a me*hod of constant improvement. 5. To raise thP political-military capability of the varieus bodies steadily, as well as that of each of the members. - 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6. To struggle tirelessly for unity of action among all the popular and revolu- - tionary forces in the country and for the elimination of sectarianism, "group- = ism" and dogmatism. 7. To carry out the resolutions adopted by the leadership units and the com- manders. - 8. To respect the hierarchy and regular channels. 9. To maintain absolute secrecy about internal activities and special, indi- - vidual and collective tasks before and after their execution. 10. To keep revolutionary vigilance on a high level against anything threaten- - ing the unity of the organization and the popular movement in general, and also = to remain vigilant against enemy intelligence and infiltration efforts. 11. The conduct of all officers must be concretely seen in their honesty, = truthfulness, self-sacrifice and courage in battle, whatever the field in which they must function, and in fulfillment of all the organizational norms. 12. To exercise vigilance at all times over the integrity of all of the organi- zati.on's members'and sources of information, and also to see to the maintenance and preservation of individual equipment and the means and assets o� the organi- zation. 13. For the safety cf the organization, no member should know or inquire into anything not strictly necessary for his individual work. 14. To participate actively iii the political, military and ideological life of the organization with suggestions, proposals, projects, plans, etc. 15. To encourage a spirit of constant improvement, to take on the leadership work assigned to him and to accept willingly the responsibilities which a promo- tion in hierarchic rank imply. 16. To criticize the behavior of 3ny member of the organization, without re- = gard to his rank, using the proper channels. ' 17. To participate in discussion when his conduct is in question. - 18. To appeal to higher bodies, proceeding to the immediately higher level. _ Arttcle 7--Disciplinary Norm - Although membership is voluntary, once accepted, members are bound by the in- ternal norms. Failure to observe them will lead to the i.mplementation of _ orditiary c,r special steps, as the case may be. These steps have a double purpose: a) educational, not only for the member penalized, but for the organization as a whole and the masses as well. Thus it 27 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE OriLY ~ cioes not suffice to apply penalties mechanically. This step must be given the full educational dimension it merits so that an error committed wi11 be trans- foi�med into a factor to advance the revolutionary process. b) Repressive, an an effort to prevent individual errors from being committed or repeated, by punish- ~ itig the individual or individuals responsible for them, in order thus to safe- guard the organization and the popular movement. ~ ` With ordiiiary genalties, ti,e educational factor takes priority over the repres- ' sive factor, while the punishment factor is the dominant one in special penal- ties. I - S. Ordiiiary penalties. The followittg are justification for ordinary penalties: a. Repeated lapses into sectarianism, dogmatism, "groupism," favoritism or any other deviation which theatens the policy of the organization with regard to the people, the unity of the revolutionary forces or organizational unity. _ b. Interpretation or discussion of our political proposals in improper form, characterized by vanguardism, l.ack of modesty or lack of respect for the popu- lar organizations. c. Disrespect for comrades. ' d. Irresponsible or destructive use of criticism or self-criticism. e. FaIse modesty, expressed in the refusal to assume leadership tasks, disre- _ spect for political-military rank, or any of those attitudes which iri one way or another work toward discouraging the spirit of constant improvement and its - recognition within the hierarchic structures of the OPM. f. Weakness in ccmn,nd. g. Failure tv fulfill tasks. - h. Insubordinati.on (ignoring orders or refusal to carry out tasks). i. Abuse of authority. j. Improper use of the political, organizational or military infrastructure. . k. Failure to carry out disciplinary steps or prohibitions issued for sec,irity _ purpcses. 1. Violation of compartmentalization. m. Verbal liberalism or any action threatening the security of the organiza- tion or any of its members. n. Simple desertion. i ~ 28 -i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - These violations are penalized on the basis of the seriousness of the act conunitted or the omission, ranging from: - a. Warning. ' b. Closed order penalties. c. Surrender of weapons. d. Incarceration. e. Temporary suspension of rank or responsibilities. f. Hierarchic demotion. ~ g. Removal from the respective body. . - h. Supervised exclusion. i. Expulsion. - 2. Special penalties. The following are justification for special penalties: - a. Misuse of the or.ganization's funds or general assets. b. Death of a comrade, with responsibility proven. - c. Crimes against the interests of the people, such as rape, blackmail, extor- - ti on. d. ilse of the organization name to carry out deeds for personal benefit, threatening its prestige and harming the popular interests. e. Aggravated insubordination. - f. Denunciation. g. Aggravated desertion. _ h. Retrayal. - The ordinary penalties specified under letters a, b, c, d, e and g will be determined and applied by the body to which the person being penalized belongs. Hierarchic de-noti.on must be decided by the levels of command which authorized the corresponding ranks, or by higher commands. The ordinary penalties speci- _ Eied in letters h and i will be imposed by the national leadership on the = recommendation of the corresponding regional leadership unit. Special penalties will be discussed and approved by a disciplinary council appointed by the high command. 29 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The implementation of these measures is binding upon all the members of the organization. Article 8--Finances f ~ The finances of the organization are made up of: a. The organizati.on's own finances; b. The ordinary aiid compulsory contributions of each member of the organiza- tian, which will be established by the bodies to which they belong, based on one day's wages; and c. The contributions of collaborators. Article 9--Special Action Sabotage, execution and other special actions are necessary tasks in the devel- - opment of the war, but in view of the political implications they involve they = must be discussed and approved by the high command. The same is true of . actions which because of their national repercussions or intervening forces - threaten the d.evelopment of the organization as a whole. Article 10--Revolutionary Morality All of the candidates and officers of the organization must study and implement - the basi.c concepts of revolutionary morality, which are considered to be: a. Promotirig the spirit of collective work. - b. Fraternity and sol.idarity among comrades, without lapsing into paternalism nr favoritism. c. Mutual respect. - d. Truthfulness with the organization and a self-critical spirit. e. Respect for the beliefs, customs and assets of the people. f. Constant vigilance to prevent vices such as alcoholism, drugs, narcotics and gambling from penetrating the organization. g. Private life consistent with being a true revolutionary. Part VI--Closed Order Drill in the OPM 1. The Gerieral Provisions These regulations contain all of the closed order exercises which should be ' Fracticed both individually and collectively by candidates and officers of the oi-gani zati.en. 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY As a result of the above, practice of the various exercises should be character- ized by discipline, energy, precision and speed. The purpose of closed order training is: a. To train the command personnel to mobilize their units in orderly fashion - and to develop sa.mple formations from which combat maneuvers can be speedily effected. b. To discipline the personnel and inculcate in them habits of precision and speedy reaction to the orders of their commanders. c. To develop a means of promoting morale among the combatants and developing their spirit of cohesion. d. To awaken an awareness in the people that our organization, through its cohesion and discipline, is taking firm steps toward the development of the future army of the people. 2. Commands _ A command is the directly and verbally expressed order of a commander, using words in prescribed succession and requiring immediate execution. Commands are made up of two clearly defined parts: - a. The alerting command, the purpose of which is to warn those who will carry - out the movement or exercise as to what it will be. " b. The executory command, the purpose of which is the execution nf the move- ment or exercise. _ The alerting command should be issued, beginning on one note, more or less, above the tone of voice used in normal conversation. It may have any number of - syllables, and should have an upward stress, such that the final or the penulti- mate and final syllables (if the pronounciation of the word so dictates) are vciced two or three notes above the first. The last syllable of this command should be drawn out. = The executory command should begin at least two notes higher than the final - syllable of the alerting command. This command is typically short, decisive and - energetic, such as to produce immediate execution on the part of those hearing it. - In some commatids, the alerting and executory parts are combined or made up of a single word. _ In such cases, the procedure is to give the name of the unit as the alerting command and to instruct the troops that execution will only begiti when the execueory command is completeci. - 31 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3. Individual Training Without Weapons ' 3.1 Basit Position ; a. Command: Attention...Fire! - b. Description of the exercise: The heels should be as close together as the individual's build allows. 7 2. The f.eet should be positioned at a 45 degree angle. 3. The legs should be straight, without rigidity. 4. Body weight shou�ld rest entirely on the soles of the feet. 5. Hips balanced, trunk straight, chest naturally thrust forward, shoulders slightly to the rear and level. 6. Arms hanging relaxed, elbows slightly bent and a little ferward, with the palms of the hands in contact with the thighs along the trouser seams, with the _ fingers extended and close together. 7. Neck and head held naturally, chin slightly drawn iti, eyes focused straight ahead on a reference point slightly above eye level. ~ c. To assume this position, the left foot is drawn smartly against the right, while the arms simultaneously fall naturally along the legs such that the hands _ touch the thighs. The individual must remain motionless in this position (taken ' from the magazine GUION, Mar-ch 1980). _ Extract from 16 October 1979 speech by Gen Luis Carlos Camacho Leyva, minister of riational defense, to the Chamber of Representatives Subversive Groups Somethirig has been developing which is inherent in the current problem of democracy, i.e., the f.ailure of democracy to defend itself. The result is that _ people talk against against democracy and no one rises up to defend that which we are enjoying. Now paradoxically, we see the communist bench in the congress defendiiig freedom of thought, freedom of opinion and freedom of assembly. This is natural, because they are yearning for what is behind the iron curtain, ' accustomed as they are to being accorded al] these freedoms in those countries' where communism holds sway, and they want them for Colombia as well. And ttiere is a belief that nothing is happeriing here, that we are like madmen, that the government does not know what its obligations are nor have the mili- tary forces any reason to emerge from the barracks, because this is a country l of the Sacred Heart where there is no tieed to adopt exemplary legal measures _nor for the military forces to reduce subversion to impotence either. ' 32 _I FOR QFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - But I am going to take the liberty of rapidly sketching what is happening, be- - cause matters are not what they are sometimes said to be. What then is the reason we are acting in more forceful fashion than we normally should? The fact is that innumerable subversive groups have developed in the country, including - among others tte Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which says in all of its writings ttiat it is the armed branch of the Communist Party of Colombia. I said that innumerable subversive groups have been developing and are precise- - ly the reasons for the unease in the country. It is they which have created the anxiety in the rural and agricultural sector, it is they who have murdered peasants as "stool pigeons," as Representative Cardona said in a famous state- ment, and it is they whose banners with their legend we find above the corpses oE these poor people, uselessly marty*_-ed. It is the Revolutionary A-med Forces, - the Nati.onal Liberation Army and the M-19, it is the Pedro Leon Arboleda or PLA _ Group, the Workers' Self-Def.ense and the Popular United Front for Guerrilla - Action and the Revolutionary Organization of the People--it is these movements, which as Y said before, are disturbing the public peace. Let us see, if only briefly., what is happening with these movements. M-19 - The members of the M-19 undertook distributions of milk and market goods, seizures of buses and speeches at secondary schools, hospitals, etc. However, followitig its failure, after penetrating the North Canton, where the republic war.ehouses were located, we were able to see immediately that this was not the somewhat sympathetic M-19 movement which we gave credit only for speed of = action with a certain ingenuity in order to affect public opinion, but rather that this movement was also engaged in kidnapping. There they held the manager of the Texas Company, Nicolas Escobar Soto, who died the death of a martyr af.ter being held in a cell or "people's prison," as they call it, for more than 6 months, under truly inhuman conditions. I would invite the honorable representatives to go and visit one of these so- - called "people's prisons" which we still have one fine day, in order to learn under what conditions the kidnapped people were and are being martyred. And they were also involved in the kidnapping of. Miguel de German Ribon, and with iniiumerable problems, suffocating infiltrations and, of course, simultaneously etigaging internally i.n innumerable forms of depravation such as homosexuality, prcStitution, switidling, bank robberies, etc. But financing was not going bad- - ly. One of the members, Duplat Sanjuan, received a salary of 50,000 pesas month- ly aiid 40,000 for his expenditures as an agent. We have in our possession the books we seized from the gentlemen in the M-19. What then is their organization? Let us see (see Organizational Chart No 1). The high command of the Bogota region was in turn organized as shown in Organi- - zational Chart No 2. What is shown as gray on this chart has already been cap- tured. We still have to capture the sections with lighter shadiiig, and we will have to do so even if the subversives claim that we are torturing them. 33 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ -I ~ - - - ; Organizational Chart No 1 ~ ~ Plational IRECCION WICIONAI. Political-military _i Leadership ~q POLITICo-WUTAp ` High SuP~ROR Apnaratus I Command -i . REGtpMAL REGONAL WECIONAI. RE610NAL R[GION~L I rOtlll ' B060T� lUCAMM41i11 INA6UE VALLE MEpEI~IN INiE11YED1A MOY1~ YOVII MOVIL r TOVIL~ ir[qONAL BOTICA S/![IINEM TOIIMA CAUCA , COSTA ~ ~~AXL1!L=J Regional = regional Intermedia = ; unit o~i,u~ioa intermediary unit M o v i 1 = m o b i 1 e u n i t Ml11tALDA ' - E"wM. NTEIIM[W I ~AUCA NARINO POPAYAN � _F . ~ And what had these individuals done up to 1978 and the beginning of 1979? ~ Kidnappings ..............e....a....... 7 Robberies 4 = Explosions 47 : Incursions 3 Incendiary bombs 9 Leaflet releases 11 M-19 banner hoistings 2 Vehicles stopped 2 - Total 85 ' But the most serious thing, and that challenged by Representative Cardona, was t}ie removal of weapons from the North Canton. The official figure is 4,303, of which, as I said before, we have recovered 95 percent. But in addition to those recavered, as we will see later on, we have been able to capture other weapons, and perhaps more, speaking potentially. Thi.s group had the capacity to falsify identity cards, drivers licenses, search warrants, customs seals, vehicle ownership and registretion certifi.cates, credit cards, permits to carry weapons and military identification papers. i This group, according to the information we have, was able to obtain illegally, ~ in attacks on banking and credit institutions, a total of 84 million pesos. _ And what has been done? Well, as of the present, from 2 January to 1 October, ! the military forces have arrested 673 individuals, of whom 346 were released on =i ~ 34 ( FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Organizational Chart No 2 Bog,ota Regional Command- - High Command olumn Command Unit . B A~' u /IV ri 1 T 1 ` O N D 0 S (~l'.i ~:i s, F~~~J q O(b 3 4 4 S 4 4 4 5 3 6 3 4~ Candidates' Unit 5 members each Organizational Chart No 3 OIRECCION NACIONAL N a.t i c n a 1 Leadprship High Command qNpp SUPERIOR GuERRILLa MNL cao u ETn * M OVIL obile general s t a f f 3lERR1LLA MOVL aNrioauia M O~.L~ ;oLuMN A (iUERRiLLA EL RRlLLA MO~VIL (#lE1tRILlA M0'VIL SANTANTOLI M A V AL1. E Guerrilla movil = mobile guerrila unit Columna guerrilla movil = L 2 mobile guerrilla toLuaNA column i RRIIA.EAA MOVIL , E9TAD0 MAY011 olumn general COLUMNA COLUMNA s t a f f COMIANDO COMANDO Guerrilla Uillt OUERRILL[NO OU[RRIlLERO ' COMANDO COMANDO COMAN00 tOMANDO AUEItRILlERO GUERRILlERO W[RRIl,~[Iq OUERRILLERO Note; The aboroe chaxt s:fi.ows a,ct:Cvi.ttest in the xural s.ect0r� 35 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED , FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 �I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY = the brigade level and 138 were released by the courts. Arrest warrants were"' i -I issued for 180, of whom 106 have confessed. ~ Therefore thexe remain to be found and brought before the proper authorities ~ 207 individuals for whom the military records show serious charges of involv2- ment in the activities of the M-19. i _ The f.itial results of the operations against the M-19 are as follows: ~ I i Total captured 673 ~ Released by the courts 138 ~ Released on the brigade level.......... 346 = Arrest warrants 180 f In the hands of the court ~ Being detained Executed 9 ; i Total 673 673 i ! ~ Recovery of North Canton Weapons Stolen - Criminals shot 4 Individuals arrested and charged with ~ membership iti the M-19 180 ~ Weapons ~eized from the movement 197 -i Ammunition seized 18.400 ! Radio equipment aid vehicles Seized 137 Automobile plates .................e................. 30 People's jails found................................ 9 . M-19 hoods seized 178 ~ Dental equipment seized 6 I ~ First-aid equipment 38 Workers' Self-Defense Organization (ADO) ~ Now let us look at the so-called Workers' Self-Defense organization (see Organi- zational Chart No 4). The 14 September Command shown on Chart No 4 was that which eliminated the illustri.ous public f.igure Dr Pardo Buelvas, in a manner known to all of us. Let us recall that after the courts tnvesti.gated and sentenced its membars in ~ rar_her spectacular, bold and challenging fashton, two of them escaped from the National Model Prison. I imagine that when they are captured, if they are cap-- - tured. those who warit to say that we are torturing them will immediately raise ~ their voices. This does not matter to us. ~ But what has this group done iii addition to the murder of Pardo Buelvas? Let us ~ see: ~ ~ I i ` . 36 I FOR OFFICIAL tJSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070030-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Organizational Chart No 4 - - ORGANIZACION AUTQDEFENSA O B R t r A~ COMISION iEN7RAL 1 p�