JPRS ID: 10611 KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070057-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 57
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS V10611 .
24 JuNE 1982
Korean Affai rs Re ort
p
(FOUO 5/82)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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F'OR OFFICIAL L ,
JPRS L/10611
24 June 1982
= KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT
cr~avo ~/s2)
_ CONTEP~TS
SOUTH ROREA
FOREIGN RELATIONS
South Korea's Economy, Activity in Africa, Reviewed
(MARC~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 Apr 82) 1
NORTH ROItEA
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
. 'MAINICHI' Views DPRK Situation, Succesaion Issue
(Editorial; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 22 Apr 82) 11
~ FOREIGN RELATIONS
DPRK Canceling Invitationa to Japatiese
(MAINICKI SHIMBiTN, 17 May 82) 13
_ a _ [III - ASIA - 109 FOUO]
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' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONt_Y

~ S, KOREA/FOREIGN REi.ATIONS
SOUTH KORFA'S ECONOMY, ACTIVTTY Ti AFRICA, REV~FTED
Paris MARCE~S TROPICAUX ET MEDTTERRA?~IEENS in French No 1899, 2 apr 92 pp 892-
395
[Te{t] UatLl 1~79, South Korea experienced spectacular ~conomic developmenr:
the GNP increased by 3n average of 10 percent a year fram :C.970 to 1980, and
sume targets or t he 1377-1981 Five-Year Plan were achiev~.d in 2 years. That
country had thus became a genuine modern industrial power, making effective
use of its labor, and having s good supervisory staff. Hawever, in t979 ar~~l
~~articularly in 1980, Korea's grvwth slowed because of numerous economic and
politicsl diEficuities. In 1980, for the first tim~, it had a ne gative rate
of economic growth: 5.7 percenC. This situation did not continue, hawever,
because South Korea changed its policy, and the positive results of the re-
iorms 3ppeared in 1981. It is estimated that the rata of grawth in the GNP
will be 7.1 percent in 1981. Meseaver, inflation stabilized in 1981.
French-Korean trade relations have been characterized bq major contracts.
However, indications are that the development of Karean industry will con-
vinc;: that country to handle the aupervision of projects itself, and tl:at the
- majur projects will gradually give waq to individual sales of capftal go~ds.
In order to develop a better understanding of Korea and of French opportun-
ities for trade with K,orea, the French Center for Foreign Trade on 18 March
organized an information day in Parip led by Jean-Marc Bernard, commercial
counse lor in the Freach Embassy in Seoul.
F~r our part, in order to provide information on Korea's economic relations
with Africa, we are presenting a previously unptiblished survey to inform both
Africa and Europe about what Korea exports and obtains, and by whaC means, in
an increasing mmmber of African cowntries, and to explain the features of
South Korean development.
:~11 ~i South K,orea's ~olicy is motivated 'oy two main ~nnsiderations: to
counter everywhere tt;+~ Offorts of :lorth Korea, and to develop e~ports at a11
cos ts .
The Seou1 government certainly could not ~ignore ~he c~fri.can continent, and
over some 15 years of enterprising efforts it has built up a remarkable posi-
tion. It has developed ~nterests which, though not yet subs_antial, neverthe-
less occupy a not ins~gnificant place in K+orea's policy, cconomy, and pianning.
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The South IGorean Economy: Grc,wth and Vitality
. By way of introduction, it should be recalled that the country's economy has
- st~awn astounding growth and vitality during the past 25 years. The following
are tt~e main statistics .
, In 1953, just prior to the w;r that 3evastated it, South Korea was in a sCate
of absolute poverty, rahich wa~? even more disturbing since the southern part
of the pe~insula is devoid of any significant natural wealth, and particu-
. larly any energy resources.
With an area nf 98,807 sq l~, comparitble to the Nethetlaads, Iceland, and
Portugal, South Korea today has a population of 38 million, or 384 per sq km,
ma.king it one of the most dEnsely popi.lated countries in the world. The
' grawth rate is 1.6 percent. The urbar. population now tata ls 57.2 peraent of
the total, with 42.8 percent atill in the rural areas. The city of Seoul
alone has 8.5 million people, or 22.36 percent of the total population.
T~~e working population is about 14.5 million, of whom 34.2 percent are in
agriculture, 21.3 percent in mining and industry, and 44.5 percent in ser-
vices and other activities relating to industry as well as in the tertiary
sector as a whole. One should also be aware that Korean emigration is signifi-
~ cant: 700,000 Koreans Iive in Japan, and 650,000 fn the United States--this
Eigur~ will probably exceed a million at the end of the century.
The population is rela tively young: 59 percent of Koreans are under 15. The
, people are active, enterprising, and accustomed to hardahip. Theix exception-
al dynamism is in fact the only real resource of South Korea, a preeminently
hurr.an resource.
,
Using 1953, the end of the war, as the zero index--the atandard of living at
that time being comparable.to that of Chad--Korea today (1981) has a GNP
estimated at U.S. $61 billion ($1 ~ 710 won; Fr 1- 120 won), or a per capital
annual income of $1,63 6. It was $532 in 1975, and so it has more than tripled
ir 6 years. It will probably be $1,870 at the end of 1982 ($280 in China;
$140 in Mali) .1
- In 1981, exports tota led $21 billion and imports $26.3 bill~on (mor~ than
d.ouble the trade of the.PRC).2 This campares with exports worth $6 billion
in 1975 and $1 billion in 1970. The rate of grawth of the economy was 7
percent in 1981, campared to 14.2 percent in 1976, 10.5 percent in 1977, and
11.6 percent in L978.
Korea's main trading partners are the iJnited Sta~es and Japan. In 1981, 26.5
percent of Korean exports went to the United States, and 16.4 percent to Japan.
~ In the same year, 26.3 ~rcent of imports came from Japan, and 21.9 percent
~ Erom the United States.
In more general categories (I981), 31 percent of Korean ~xports went to Asian
countries (of this, 16.4 percent to Japan), 28.8 percent ta North America (of
which 26.5 percent went to the United States), 16.2 percent to Europe, of which
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12.8 percent went to the Cotrmunity cauntries (~.7 percent to France), 15.3 per-
cent to the Middle East, 3.2 percent to Latin Annerica, 2.8 percent, $580 mil-
lion, to Africa, and 1.7 percent to Oceania.
In 1981 there was a significant rate of inerease in expoxts to the Latin
American countries, +64.2 pei~cent; to Oce~nia, ~+27.5 percent; to Africa, ~
-~26.9 percent; to the Middle E'ast, +26.2 percent; to North America, +2~.1
percent; to Asia, +15.6 percen,t; and to Europe, +8.9 percent (EEC, {'1.6
percent).
These exports in 1981 included: textile products, 29.5 percent, $6.186 bil-
Lion; metallurgical products, 11.2 pe rcent, $2.343 billion; electronic pro-
ducts, 10.6 percent, $2.219 billion; naval construction, 6.7 percent, $1.404
billion; various mc:tallurgical products, including machine tools, 4.7 percent,
$981 millioc; chemical products, 2.3 percent, $605 million; tires, 2.2 per-
cent, $459 million; sea products (fisheries), 2 pErcent, $428 million; and
plywood, 1.9 percent, $3 93 million.
There was significant progreas in 198]. compared to 1980 iu naval construc-
tion, +127.4 percent. Textile industry exports also increased by 23.4 percent.
One no,:eworthy aspect af Korean exports was the construction yards, public
works, and buildings in the Middle Fast, Libya, ~nd Nigeria, which in 19~1
earned $3.5 billion in foreign cur~ency.
~ The structure of the Korean economy is ex~remely concentrated, to the degree
that 6~1.2 percent of the exports in 1981 came from 50 au~jor companies. The
- principal exporters, ~.n crder of imp~~rtance, are: Daewoo, which exported
$1.9~'+ hillion in 1981; Hyundai, $1.722 billion; Samsung, $1.607 billion;
Kukje Corporation, $846 million; Hyosung, $786 million; Ssangyong, $758 mil-
Lion; Bando Sangsa, $622 million; Sunkyong, $585 million; Tongkook, $300
million; and Hanil Synthetic, $226 million.3 �
These are wh~t in Korea is called the General Trading Corapanies--or chaebol
in Korean--groups aith diversified activities, l,ike the Japanese zaibatsu but
with the important ciifference that the Kore2.n chaebol does not include a bank
in the group. The banking system in Korea is very dependent on the state,
which virtually controls credit ar~d exercises a strong state-control type of
role with respect to companies. The Korean econamy can thus be defined as a
liberal economy closeiy confined by the state administration.
South Korean Presence in Afz-;.ca ~
The following is a review of the varioua aspects of the South Korean presence ,
in r_he continent.
A) Political
Until 1975, South Korea's foreign po 1;.^y toward Africa was based to s ane de-
gr~e on reaction to North Korea's initiativea. Seoul tri.ed to counter
Pyongyang's broad efforts to pecietrate tn~ African states. Its efforts
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consisted mainly of developing policy explanations; specifically, demon-
strating that North Korea's nonalignment was false, and affirming South
Korea's views on reunification.
The year 1975 marlced a change in South Korean diplomacy taward Africa, a
_ policy which had previously been relatively passive. It took the form, on
Che administrative level, of division of the Europe-Africa-Middle East Of-
fice of the Foreign Affairs Miniatry in Seoul into three separate area re-
sponsibilities, one of them being Africa, which usually is headed by a high
. French-speaking offi~cial.
. In a,ddition to the political aspect already cited, there was also an in-
. creased awareness of the economic factors specific to Africa: the assurance
of a supply of raw materials from a continent richly endowed with them, and
- the development of exports. Thus, Seoul gradually became knawledgeable about
- Africa, exploring its markets and asaigning it a growing importance.
Since 197i, Korea has been engaged in a put~lic relations eampaign which has
- not lagged. Korean miziisters have visited Black Africa, and many prominent
Africans have been r~ceived officially and given VIP treatment in Seoul.
Prominent examples include visits by Ser.~egalese Presid~~t Senghor in May
~979, the Equatorial Guinea foreign mi~~ater ia 1980, and ~he foreiga min-
; is ters of Liberi~, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Niger in 1981.
Also, several Korean leaders have visited Africa. Ia November and December
1980, Foreign Affairs Minister Shinyong Lho was received in Gabon, Ivory
Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Ghana, and Gambia.
In January 1y81, Minister of Science and Technology Lee Chung-oh visited
Central AErica, Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, and Sierra Leone.
In April, Minister of Transportation Yoon Ja Joong was :,eceived in Liberia and
Nigeria. In May, Minister of Home Affairs Suh Chung H-.aa visited D~ibouti.
Iri :Iovember and December, No Tae Woo, minister of state for national security
and foreign affairs, paid a visit Co Nigeria and Upper Volta. In November,
Chun Myung Kee, minister of health and social affaira, went to Swaziland,
5o tswana, Lesotho, Malawi, and Kenya.
Suuth Korea currently has 32 embaseies on the African continent, 3 0 of which
are in Black Afri::a .
In North Africa: Egypt (diplamatic relations at embassy level establiahed
� in December 1981), Libya (December 1980), Morocco (July 1962), and Tunisia
(March 1969).
' In subSaharan Africa, S~uth Korea is represented in the fallowing councries
(in alphabetical order ~ac:cor~ing to the French spelling]): Botswana (April
1968), Cameroor. (August 1961), Central Africa (September 1963), Comoros ~
(february 1979), Ivory Coast (July 1961), Djibouti (December 1977), Ethiopia
(December 1963), Gabon (4ctober 1962), Gambia (April 1965), Gharis (November
1977), Guinea (January 1978), Equatorial Guinea (September 1979), Upg~er Volta
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(April 1962), Kenya (February 1964), Lesotho (December 1966), Liberia
(.Tanuary 1964), Madagascar (June 1962), Malawi (March 1965), MauriLius (July
- 1971), Mauritania (November 1978), Niger (July 1961), Nigeria (Februar}i
1980), Uganda (March 1963), Rwanda (March 1963), Senegal (October 1962),
Sierra Leone (June 1962), Sudan (April 1977), Swaziland (November 1968),
Chad (Augus t 1961) , and Zaire (Apri 1 1963 ).4
Note : ~
1. There are per~aanent resident South Korean ambassadors only in the follaw-
ing countries: Camero~n, Central Africa, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Gaban,
Ghana, Upper Volta, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Uganda, and Senegal.
' 2. Only Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Kenya, Lesotho, I~alawi, Morocco, and Swazi-
land recognize only the Republic of Korea, having refused to accept represen-
tacives from North Kor~a. The latter is, hcwever, represented in 45 other
African countries.
- Only one Black African ambassador is resident in Seoul, that of Gabon. Most
- of the other African ambassadors accredited in Korea reside in Tokyo or in
Washington.
B) Technical Assistance
Korea's technical assistance to Africa is still at a modest level. It is
based on a number of agreements with African states.
Technical cooperation agreements: Central African Republic, May 1973; Gabon,
- July 1975; Djibouti, Febru~ry 1979; Senegal, April 1979; Zaire, November
1981.
Economic and trade agreements: Niger, December 1969; Central African Repub-
lic, May 1973; Zaire, Novea~ber 1973; Senegal, April 1975; Cameroon, December
1975 and August 1977; Chad, November 1977; Sierra Leone, May 1978; Upper
- Volta, November 1978; Cameroon, May 1979; and Liberia, May 1981.
Fishing agreements were signed with Gambia in July 1976. Othe�rs are ready
= for signing with Mauritania and Morncco.
South Korea has also received a considerable number of trainees during the
period 1963 to 1981: 165 from 23 African countries. There are currently 24
in Korea for training who arrived during 1981: 6 from Ethiopia, 1 from '
: Liberia, 1 from Sierra Leone, 1 from Cameroon, 1 from Ghana, 9 from Nigeria,
1 from Mauritius, 1 from Senegal, 2 from Tanzania, and 1 from ~lalawi. From
_ 1963 to 1980, 29 Kenyans received training in ~orea. '
Buring the same period, 1963-1981, Korea sent 22 experts to seven black
- AFrican countries, in particular Caneroon, mainly for agr~culture and fish-
eries.
~
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South K.orean invastments in Africa have also remained at a relatively modest
leve 1. At the end of 1981, they totaled U.S. $7,582,Ot~0--$6,945,000 in
- Gabon, $543,000 in Ni3eria, $69,000 in the Ivory Coast, and $25,OOU in
Senegal.
Cxport credits to .`.acilitate purchaee of Korean producta were larger. ~ihey
- . reached $145,502,000: $1~0,534,000 ta Nigeria, $39,424,000 *_o ~ a~~a,
$2,008,000 to Kenya (apprwed in 1979), $1,881,OOd to Liberia (1981),
~$767,000 to Gabon (1.976), and $288,000 to Kenya (1977).
C) Grs3e
Korea's trade with Africa also ranka rather modestly, but: is making steady
progress.
In 1980, the total of exports to the whole continent was $772.8 million, or
4.4 percent of total South Korean exports ($17.5 billion for the same year).
In 1976, this figure had been $208 million, or 2.6 percent of total exporta;
in 1977 $291 million, (2.9 percent); in 1978 $315.4 million (2.5 percent);
and in 1979 $523 .9 million (3 .4 percent) .
Exports to the countries of Black Africa alone were $457 million (2.6 per-
cent of the total) in 1980, but $580 million (2.8 percent) in 19~1, or an
increase of 26.9 percent.
- South Korean imports from Africa are considerably smaller. The trade balance
favors Korea. In 1976, these importa totaled $75.9 million (0.8 percent of
to;.a1 imports); in 1977, $98.5 million (0.7 percent); in 1978, $43.4 million
(0.3 pc~rcent); in 1979, $116.2 million (1 percent); and in 1980, $171.5 mil-
- liori (O.g percent).
Kor~a's main partners in sub-Saharan Africa in 1980 wer e: Nigeria receiving
$124.5 million in South Korean exports (boats, electronic equipment), but
Kurea importing only $1 million (leather); Liberia, $198.5 million of expor.ts
(boats, tires) and $49.5 million of imports; then, in order of importance:
Kenys, $ L'1.7 million in exports, $17.5 million in imports; the Ivory Coast,
$7.2 million in e:cports (textiles, vehicles), $2.25 million in imports
(cotfee, cocoa); Ethiopia (purchase of coffee); Tanzania (purchase of copper);
An~o?a, Gabon, Uganda, etc.
It can be seen that Korea's trade with sub-Saharan Africa has thus far been
mainly �~rith English-speaking countries--particularly Ni3eria, which is the
~ focus of attention of Korean businessmen.
,
1:xpurts of South Korean products are facilitated by the important role played
' by KOTRA (Korean 'Trade Promotion Corporation). This public organization,
c:stablished in 1962, and analogous to the French Center for Foreign Trade, has
permanent representations throughout the world. In Africa, KOTRA has offices
in Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, rhrocco, Nigeria, Senegal,
Swaziland, and Zaire.
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Also, KOTRA organizes nvmerous fairs abroad. These have included fairs in
Tripoli and Cairo in March 1976, in Casablanca in April-May 1976, and in
Kinshasa in July 1976. There are similar activities almost annually in a
considerable number of African capitals, including Tripoli, Nairobi, and
Dakar.
Every year KOTRA also organizes export sales promotion events in Seoul--for
- example, the Seoul Trade Show.
Finally, the following companies, General Trading Companies, are represented
and are very active in the listed countries:
--Nigeria: Daewoo, Hyundai, Bando, Samsung, Hanbaek, Haiti, and Hyoaung.
--Ghana: Dongwon, Sajo (fisheries), Haechang.
--Kenya: Daewoo, Sunkyung, Hyundai.
--Gabon: Ssanyong (cement plants).
--Liberia: Keumbo (tires).
--Guinea: Daeho, Wonyang (fisheries).
--Ethiopia: Daewoo.
It is worth mentioning the Korean constructioa companies (public works and
construction), which have achieved remarkable results in the past few years
in the Middle East ($12 billion in contracts in 1981; $3.5 billion in reentry
of foreign currency)--~we mentioned thie previously--and which now have estab-
lished themselves in Africa, obtaining numerous contracts, specifically in
Libya and Nigeria.
--Libya: In 1981, there were 8,000 South Koreans5 working on or for construc-
tion yards mainly of the vaewoo gro~ip.6 This figure should double during 1982
because of the numerous important contracts signed. The main ones are as fol-
lows: Brak-Shwarif road, $117 million; Socna-Shwarif road, $119 million;
Ghadames airport, $62.5 million; a development of 7,000 dwellings, $347
million; 2,500 schools in Tripol~.tania, $526.5 million; development of Ras
Lanut port, $295 million; and the Misurata steel complex, $ L30 million.
Contracts completed by South~Korean companies in Libya total $109 million,
and those now underway $2.708 billion. Hayang Company obtained $250 million
in contracts in 1980. Its goal for 1981 is $850 million.
In Nigeria, Hayang Construction is building 240 apartments in Sokoto and a
I~otel for $168 million. It has a total of $178 mi~lion in contracts thus far.
Daewoo Company has reportedly signed a major contract worth $1.4 billion.
The South Ko rean construction companies are also beginning to establish them-
, selves in Kenya, Sudan, and Mfauritania. In Mauritania, Tai Han company has
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ubtained two contracts: one for $12,135,000 for houaing construction, and the
other very recently worth $3.1 million.
Taehwa has contracted for $21,470,000 of work in Malawi, and Kyungnam Company
Lor $10.5 million in Cameroon.
. However, in spite of the re.aarkable performdnce of the Korean economy over the
past 20 years, it cannot be overlooked that aince 1980 it has been encounter-
ing serious difficulties whose causes are both structural and the result of
� c ircums tances .
After the assassination of President Pak Chong-hui in October 1979, the year
1980 witnessed serious political unrest, with riots in Kwangju and the re-
pression which followed. Since then, order has been rEestiabliahed, and the
new President of the Republic, Chuti Doo Hwan, elected to the highest office
on 25 February 1980 and the representative of the army's aspirations, is firmly
maintaining it. It is true that 1980 was a bad year economically, with a
negative growth rate of -6.2 percent, and that 1981 did not live up to the
announced promises.
C~rtainly exports, at almost $21 billion, have reached a very high level, but
un the other hand the balance of payments has shawn one of the largest deficits
ever recorded ($5.3 billion). The domestic ma.rket has shvwn a slight weaken-
ing. Thus, inflation has slowed--one of the rarp positive indicators that
one can find: at the end of the year it is expected to be 12 percent, compared
to 34-4'+ percent in 1980 and at the beginning of 1981. It is nevertheless true
tt~at since 1980, and throughout 1981, the staadard of Living of salary workers
- has declined. Public officials admit it. This decline in the purchasing
power of the majority of people is not likely to stimulate the dcymestic market
or ease the concern about an econamic crisis, which is already admitted. Un-
employment, though not hzgh, is increasing and must be takea into consider-
ation. According to official statistics, it has risen to 5.2 percent of the
active labor force (15 million).
In sunanary, the climate of confidence necessary for a recovery has not been
established. Investment is more and more limited. Investment in factories
and equipment dropped 2.4 percent follawing the decline of 24.6 percent in
1980. The statistics shaw that, in general, investment (domestic fixed in-
vestment) declined by 12 percent in 1980 and 5.2 percent in 1981--or 17 per-
cent in 2 years. The difficult situation in the public works and construc-
tion sector in Korea itself illustrates these difficulties. The difficulties
i~ave.an even greater impact since large sectors of Korean industry, whose
' staEfs are often insufficiently trained, are using outdated technology, re-
sulting in a sometimes ques tionable production quality.
' ~ixtt~ major companies have announ~ced that their annual r~eports will reveal ser-
ious deficits. It is tr+se that the banks have received government instruc-
tions to limir the damage by granting moratoritmme on payment of interest due.
Nonetheless, the financial situation of most of them pointa to serious cash-
flow difficulties.
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- State currency reserves have decreased by 7.7 percent, and the foreign debt
V~as increased. An unofficial es timate puts the debt at $38 billion (57.8
~ percent of the GNP), which means a debt service rate of 17 percent, consider-
- ably higher than official estimates, and makes unrealistic the government's
objective bringing this rate down to 11 perceat before the end of the
Fifth Plan 1982-1987. The rise in zhe dollar and in American interest
rates has significantly increa~ed the burdea of this debt, both for the public
and private sectors, and th~ere is no reason to expect a marked improvement in
the near future. '
Thus the Korean econamy, though it is not really on the brink of a general
crisis, and though it is able to point to certain strong features (public
works in foreign markets, shipyards, and electronics industry), can in fact be
seen t~ be in a clear recession. This was recognized by the riew deputy
prime minister for planning, Kim Joon Sung, when he said on 7 January 1982
_ that he "would try to bring the economy of the country out of the long tun-
nel of the recession in which it has found itself."
In reality, it is a crisis of grvwth. Korea, which in 25 years has passed
from the ~tage of poverty to bec ane one of the developed countries, no~w faces
the problems which confront industrialized nations.
It is reasonable to believe that the extraordinary qualities of courage and
dynamism which the South Koreans have shown thus far will again be demon-
strated, and that the current criais will ultimately be overcome.
Whatever the case, Korea's deve lopment in these past two decades is an ex-
ample for all developing countries. Zt shvws that human qualities--in a
country lacking natural wealth, small in area, with severe climatic conditions,
and moreover with the need to make a considerable defense effort to face the
North Korean threat (37 percent of the budget, 6 percent of the GNP goes to
:he army)--can prevail over the most difficult conditions.
Work, 3er_~.rmination, a sense of nationality and the general interest, and
respect Eor the administration are the real factors in development. This is
tt~e lesson that South Korea's recent history offers to the world.
French-South Korean Economic Cooperation AgreemenC
The Erench JOURNAL OFFICIEL of 3 March 1982 published the text of the 5-year
economic cooperation agreement between France and the Republic of Korea,
signed in Seoul on 4 April 1981 and effective the same date. The docianent
lists in an appendix the sectors must involved in economic cooperation:
agriculture, animal=raising, and agrofood industry; chemical industry; energy,
- new forms of energy, and energy conservation; civil engineering; mechanical
and electrical engineering; metallurgical and steel industries; tourism,
audiovisual techniques; telecaimmunications; and transport.
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FOQTNOTES
1. The World Bank gave the figure $1,500 as the GNP per capita.of South .
- 1Corea at the end of 1979. For :Tu=th Korea (120,500 sq 1~, 18 million
peo~le) the World Bank gave for the same year the figure $1,130 For GNP
per capita.
2. However, the trade balance shawed a$5.3 billion deficit in 19g1. This
was due to imports from Japan: $6.3 billion compared to $3.4 billion
, in exports; and to fuel imports: $6.9 billion. The "invisible" bal- �
ance was also in def.icit by $2 billion. By comparison, Taiwan's ex-
~ ports in 1981 totaled $22.6 billion, Hong Kong $21.7 billion, and
Singapor~: $20.9 billion.
3. Howev~r, special mention should be made of small and med ium enterprises,
�ahich total 27,455 out of a total of 28,809 campanies in Korea. These
. employ 43 percent of th~ work force (909,000) of Korean industrial and
commercial enterprises. Production by small and meditmm enterprises in ~
1978 totaled $12.2 billion out of $38.3 billion, or 3 1.9 percent of
total industrial production. In 1979, they contri~buted 35.1 percent of
total lCorean exports.
4. The Republic of Korea does not have diplomatic relations with South Africa.
5. ~Corea� Air Lines serves Libya once a week with a Seoul-Bahrain-Tripoli
route.
6. The Huundai, Samsung, Hayang, and Yuwon groups also cooperate in Libya.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
9920
C50: ~+719/-337
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_ N. KOREA/POI.ITICS AND GOVERNMENT
'MAINICHI'VIEWS DPRK SITUATION, SUCCESSION ISSUE
OW230925 Tokyo MAINICHI bAILY NEWS in English 22 Apr 82 p 2
[Editorial: "North Korean Situation"]
[Text] The DPRK (North Korea) decided, at its Supreme People's Assembly
[SPA], on the new lineup of its government leaders including President
Kim I1-song who was reelected. President Kim delivered an address out-
lining the country's internal and external poli~ies on April 14. It is
significant to note that President Kim attached special importance to
economic construction, especially the achievement of t~e food production
- target.
Rim's address is believed to have disclosed the actual conditions of
North Korea today and its future course. Attention was focused on the
SPA which strangely failed to mention Kim Chong-il, the son of Kim I1-song,
- while announcing the lineup of the government leaders. Earlier, it had
been rumored that Kim Chong-il would be elected vice president, but he
was given no government post. Moreover, the Assemblq ended in one day.
No names were announced for the hame minisCer and the defense minister.
Considering the way the lineup was announced, speculation ran h3gh ~hat
the internal North Korean politics must have been harassed by serious
domestic strife. President Kim, in his policy speech made at the joint
session of the KWP and the SPA the same day, declared that promotion of
socialiam is impossible without economic construction and that the
material and technological~foundations of communism and socialism mnst
be further strengthened for that purpose. He then called on the nation
- to redouble its efforts to realize the production targets of fishery and
agricultural products. It was a far cry from his past speeches which gave
top priority to industry.
North Korea officially announced that the 1979 food production was 9 million
tons and that the 1980 production reached the level of 1979. The official
report also declared that the year 1981 was a bumper qear, but failed to
announce the exact f igures. Hence, it was speculated that North Korea
might have failed to realize its target in 1981 due to cold weather damage.
~ .
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- hUK UhN7C:lAL U,~: UNLY
Against such a stringent background, the country had to export rice for the
purchase of necessary items including oil, thus wrecking the domestic food ~
supply system. Kim's unusual stress on stepping up agricultural production
- and the abstract official statement on the 1981 food production suggest
that the country is in a tight fix as far as the food situation is concerned.
Great people's halls have been constructed at various places in North
Korea to celebrate the 70th birthday of Kim I1-song. The Koresn president,
however, made no mention of the halls in his policy speech.
A report has it that an excessive amount of capital, mater~ials and manpower
has been used for the construction of the memorial halls, and that this
resulted in applying additional pressure on other fields of economic
activities. The same source added that the excessive manner of constructing
such structures gave rise to great dissatisfaction among the masses. The
- president's son Kim Chong-il has led the campaign to build the memorial
halls.
A top ranking North Korean leader told Japanese reporters that Kim Chong-il
has been quite active as an assistant to the president, adding that the son
is regarded as a successor to Kim I1-song not because he is the president`s
son but because hP possesses excellent leadership and personality in his
own right. The.speculated shift of power, however, has caused criticism
at home and abroad as a kind of hereditary succession.
President Kim also touched in his spe~ech on the independent and peaceful
unif ication of North and South Korea whi.le, at the same time, calling for
the withdrawal of the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea. The ratio of
defense spending in the total expenditures somewhat decreased compared
with that of last year, but it is still a high 14.5 percent.
It may be important to push through mechanization of agriculture and promote
reclamation and exploitation for increased food production, but we believe
that what is more important is the effort to ensure stability in the Korean
Peninsula. We urge North Korea to open the way for a def inite North-South
- dialogue.
~ ~OPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News, 1982
CSO: 4120/280
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N. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS
� DPRK CANCELING INVITATIONS TO JAPANESE
OW200901 Tokyo MAINICAI SHIMBUN in 3apanese 17 May 82 morning edition p 2
[Text] Since early May the DPRR (North Korea) has one after another been
canceling its invitations to Japanese groups of various circles. Events
marking the 70th birthday of President Kim I1-song were held on 15 April
and more and more Japanese groups were visitiug North Korea than usual.
The cancelations have given rise to speculation among those concerned
that "something must be happening in Pyongyang now."
A group of the Liberal Democratic Party's Afro-Asian Affairs Research
Council, which was scheduled to visit Pyongyang during *he ~~ries of
holidays in May, was the first to have its invitation canceled by North
Rorea. On the eve of its scheduled departure in late April, the group,
headed by Mitsuharu Amano, was informed by the General Associatian af
Korean Residents in Japan [Chongnyon] of the North Korean Government's
wish to "postpone the visit." The reason cited by Chongnyon was: "After
attending the festivities celebrating President Rim I1-song's birthday,
many of the guests from various countries have been staying in Pyongyang
and, therefore, it will be impossible extend a proper reception to your
group."
The Afro-Asian Affairs Research Council gave up its plan to send a mission
to North Korea but citing "delegation head Amano's i11 health" as the
reason. The council accepted Pyongyang's request that they do not reveal
the fact that it was North Korea which re3ected the visit.
On 10 Maq the North Korean side notified Kono, acting head of the New
Liberal Club [NLC], that it was canceling its invitation to him "due to
domestic circumstances." Kono had planned to visit North Korea on 20 May
to keep his party's ties with the two Roreas in balance following NLC
~ representative Tagawa's visit to South Rorea on 10 May.
In the nonpoli.tical field, a group from physical education circles scheduled
to leave for North Korea in late May and led by Hisata Yamaguchi, director
of the athletics association, and a mission of five mayors from the
Higashikatsura area in Chiba Prefecture, including the mayors of Matsudo
and Kashiwa, had their invitations canceled on the eve of their departure. .
In either case, the groups received cables shortly before the scheduled
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Nl)K UNrII.IAL U,N UlVLY
departure dates saying "We cannot accept you due to circumstances." When
they asked the officials concerned for explanations, the only reply they
got was: "We are also declining all other proposed visits."
This flurry of moves shown by the North Korean~side has given rise to the
speculation that "something unusual must be going on there." ~i'he reasons
the LDP and other related sources have given for this conclusion are as
follows:
_ 1) A Supreme People's Assembly [SPA] session, which opened on 5 April,
closed after 1 day, which is unusual in view of the fact that usually it
- lasts for 4 to 5 days;
2) At the SPA session, Secretary Kim Chong-il, President Kim T1-song's
first son and virtually the No. 2 man in North Korea, failed to get elected
to a key post in the state organization; also, the met}~od of succession
frc~m Kil Il-song to Kim Chong-il was not made clear; and,
3) In the state organizational reshuffle, the names of two important
; cabinet members--the defense and interior ministers--were not announced
on the same day, possibly indicating that a large-scale reshuffle is in
progress in the defense and police organizations.
The Foreign Ministry, however, is skeptical of this view. It says that,
if something unusual is taking place in North Korea now, it should have
captured the attention of ordinary travelers and North Korea should have
canceled invit~tions not only to Japanese groups but also to other foreign
groups; but there are no indications that North Korea is doing so. It
~ adds that a visit by a delegation of the Japan-North Korea Trade Associa-
tion planned for 16 May for the purpose Qf holding business talks is likely
to be carried out as scheduled; and that the canceled invitations have been
limited to those extended to groups planning to visit North Korea for
friendship purposes.
On this basis, the Foreign Ministry says, "It is not right to take the
cancelations as an expression of displea~ure at Japan's refusal to grant
an entry visa to SPA Deputy Hyon Chun-kuk in connection with the scheduled
visit to Japan by a delegation of North Korean fisheries negotiators,
which he was supposed to head."
Meanwhile, since Japan refused to grant an entry visa to Hyon Chun-kuk,
North Korea has been accepting visits by a number of Japanese groups; there-
fore, the Foreign Ministry's interpretation does not fully explain the
situation.
Meanwhile, it should be noted that the cancelations came at a time when
the Japan-South Korea talks on economic cooperation involving an amount of
$6 :~illion are deadlocked. It is not clear whether this has something to
do with the cancelations but it appears almost certain that the North Korean
Government's action has some complicated background. Officials concerned
are likely to continue efforts for aome time to resolve this puzzle.
~ COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1982
CSO: 4105/122 END
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