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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070069-4 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY J PRS L/'10623 ~ 29 JuN~ 1982 . - USSR Re ort p - MILITARY AFFAIRS ~ CFOUO 8f 82 ) FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language . sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text) or [ExcerptJ in the first 1 ine of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamfliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenth etical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The conients of this publication in no way represent the poli- - cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQL1IRE THAT DISSEMINATION , OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 _ ?7PRS L/10623 29 June 1982 - USSR REPORT - MILITARY AFFAIRS cFOVO s/s2) CONTENTS GROUND FORCES Excerpts From Book on F`~.ring Against Armored Targets (N. I. Yezhov; BOR~BA S BROI~TIROVANNYMI TSE,LYAMI (METODICHESKOYE POSOBIYE), 1977�������������������������� 1 LOGISTICAL 5ERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS Book on Wartime Transportation Services (FSHEI,UN ZA ESHELON~I, 1981) ..........................e 9 ~ - a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO] FOR O~C[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFF'~CIAL USE ONLY GROUND FORCES EXCERPTS FROM BOOK ON FIRING AGAINST ARMORID~TARGET~ . - Moscow BOR'BA S BRONTROVANNYMI TSELYAMT (MEIODICHESKOYE POSOHIYE~ in Russian 1977 (signed to press 18 Oct 76) pp 1, 78, 77, 3-5, 6-7, 32-33, ~0-51, 65-7a. , [Title page, annotation, table of contents, imtroduction, cfiapte.r excerpts~ and concluslon from b~ok "Combating Ar+ROred Targets ('Niethods Manual}'~, bg N. I. Yezhov, Voyenizdat, 25,000 copies, 78 pages] [Excerpts] Title Page Title: "Hort~.a s $ronirovannymi Tselyami. (Metodichaskoye PosoTiipe~� ~ [Comb.ating Armored Targets (Metfinds Manua.l) ] Author: N. I. Yezfiov Publisher: Order of the Labor Red Sanner Military Publisfiiiig House of. tTie USSR Ministry of Defense (V~yenizdat) Place and Year of Publication: Mosr.oGr, 1~77 Signed to Press: 18 October 1976 _ Copies: 25,000 _ Pages: 78 " Annotation This manual is intended for co~mman~ers o~ subunits in the ground forces. The manual giVes recommendations on th~e organization and metfiods of conducttng training periods with person~nel to teach metTiods of combating tanks, anti- tank weapons, and low-flying fielicopters and airplanes. It also gives recom-- mendations on certain questtons of psp~chologtcal conditioning at tactical - training periods. Table of Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540070069-4 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Chapter 1. Comhating Tanks, In~antry Comhat yehicles, and Armored Personnel Carrier~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . 6 Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . ~ . . 7 Armored Personnel Carriers~ and Infantrp Combat Vefiicles 15 ~ Organization and Conduct of Training Periods To Teacfi. Personnel MetFi~ds of Com~aating Tanks, In~antrp Comfiat Vefitcles, and Armored Personnel Carriers . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . 20 Chapter 2. Combating Antitank Weapons ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . 32 Antitank Guided Missiles Used from Armored Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . 33 Self-Propelled Antitank LaunchQrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Antitank Rocket Launcfi~rs and Grenade Launchers . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Organization and Conduct of Traintng Pextods To Teacfi.Personnel Methods of Combating Antitank Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 _ Chapter 3. Combating Helicopters, Airplanes, and Umnanned Air Attack L' Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~tl ~ Helicopters (Fire Support and Multi~urpose~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Airplanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Or~anization and Conduct of Training Periods To Teacfi_Personnel Metfiods of Combating.Low-Flyiug Aerial Targets . . . . e . . . . . . 62 ~ Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Appendix. Outline Plan for Conducting a Tactical Training Period with the Personnel of a Motorized Rifle Company 72 ~ Introduction In the time that has passed since the end of tfia urar tTie armies of various capi _ talist countries have been equipped ~rith many different types of weapons, mast important of which are tanks,self-propelled guns, infantry comliat vehicles, anti- tank guided missiles launched from armored vefiicles, and low--flying aircraft ~ with armor (fire support airplanes and fielicopters) . Tfiis requires tfiat figTit- ing men in modern warfare exert greater effort aiid skill to repulse.massed attacks by armored vehicles, air strikes, and tfie like under conditions where th.e ~ enemy has used weapons of mass destruction and incendiary sub stances. It is obviou~ tIiat the entire burden of combating tfie enemy~s armored ground 3nd low-flying aerial weapons whicfi. liave not Fieen destroyed Fay our arttllery and aviation will fall mainly on tfie forward suFiunits of the ground forces, motor- - ized rifle, tank, and other sutiuni.ts. Many factors wi11 naturally affect tfie consciousness and psyct~e of figfiti~g men in conditions wfiere large numbers of different armored veliicles are used. We must not exclude any possitiility of temporary stress in the soldiers and tfie appearance of tfie feelings of fear and dissattsfaction in the struggle against a menacing enemy. - To avoid szch negative occurrences in b.attle.or at least td minimize tfie~m, dur-- ing the process of comTat and political training each_commander must system-- atically prepare the men to be ali.le to operate and defeat tfie enemy in tfie most complex situation. 2 FOR O~'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL U'SE ONLY - For example, take fi~.ld training periods ~Ln com~ating tanks~, wfiicfi. are con~ , templated by tfie Combat Training Program for~motorized rifle and otfier suF- units in the topics on tactics. Tfie main purpose.~f tfiese training peri.ods ts not just to teacfi accuracy~and range of grenade tfirowing agatnst moving armored vehicles, but alsa to give tfie soldiers a str~ng will to vic~orp~ at tTie same time. Unfortunately, there are ca"s~es wfiere certain commander~ conduct training pericds - on the same terrain, whtch_has been studted in detail, wi.thout enougfi.simu- lated ob~ects or target equipr~ent. The men ~olve tactical problems tfiat are generally the aame and do not carry.out tfie full series of actions necessary to _ achieve success in battle, but only ~ few of th.e elements. Tn anotfier varia-- tion they will perform all tfie actions, but undex simplified conditions, witfiout the necessary ~fiysical exertion. = To avoid all simplification and indulgence in organt.~ing troop training in met::~3s of comliating armored veTiicles, tfi~ sufiunit commander should strictly fol-- low tfie prinr_iple "Teach tfiat wh~ch is necess~ry tn war.'~ Under the difficult conditioans of contemporary ~aarfare. at:d also in different weather conditions soidiexs shnuld learn to wipe out various armored ground and aerial tatgets suddenly and quickly. Skillful use of. the elemen*_s of danger, risk, and tension during traintng , periods is very important to tzach the figfi ting men fearlessness, courage, and confidence in combating armored equipnent. The.most effective way is for the commander to use automated simulatton equipment, simulators of atomic blasts, artillery shells, and aerip? Tiomlis, and complex obstacles and fiarriers. - Then the actions of the s.ubunit are accompanied by tlie relayed noise of con~ temporary warfare during repeated practice of rolling tanks over soldiers, dis- mounting and assaulting from moving tanks, firing against armored *argets over the heads of the sutiunit and from the f lanks, throwing live grenades against tanka, and the like. When elements of danger and risk are introduced in practical training, safety precautions should be followed stri:ctly to preclude accidents. The commander must take the personal characteristics of fiis men into account when practicing methods of comb.ating a~rmored targets. Tha individual agproacfi should be used for every trainee, watcfiing for correct performarcce of pro- cedures in using the weapons and rememfiering tliat certain mistakes can be - caused by special characteristics of temperament, body fiuild~ and vision~ Thus, ~he soldiers ~,rho are easily distracted sfipuld be given fixed atten-- tion. Tfie co~ander must correct~them more ofte.n~ patiently and persistently teaching the procedure wfiicfi.they do poorly. It is advisaFle to assfgn~well- trained fighting men to such soldiers. Support and correction from a com- rade is sometimes as effective as criticism Fiy the coffinander. Spec~al attention should lie given to those soldiers wfio are passive, tenrative, and lack.conft-- ~ dence in practicing the procedures of comfiating enemy armored equipment. _ Thanks to corlect comfiat training and party political training among tfie f~gTit- ing men, during their time in the serviee tFiey do develop tfie necessary practical - 3 FOR OFF[CIAL U5E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY skills and tFie moral-political and qualities wfiicfi. will fielp them win vtctory in a faceoff wttii ene,.mp armored equipment. Cfiapter 1. Cambating Tanks, Tnfantry ComFiat Vefiicles, and Armored PersonneZ Carriers � ~ The commands of tfie armies of the capitali~t countries conslder tanks~ infantry combat vefiicles, and armored personnel carriers as the main striking force of the ground forces when c~aging combat operations ~rfi~re tFiep use conven- tional weapons or weapons af mass destruction. TFiis is not accidental. Tfi.e tracked and wfieeled armored veTiicles adopted fip tfi,e armfes of the capitalist countries have, in the opinion of fo~eign specialists, tfis necessary mo5ilitp~, armor protection, and firepower. Many vefiicles, especiallp tanks, are equipped with various mechanisms and device.s whicfi. give them a fiigfi. rate of fire, range, armor-piercing ca~aTaility, and precision~wfien firfng botfi.from a spot and on ~ :z move. According to statements fiy foreign military~spec~alists, tfie experience of com-- - bat operations in Southeast Asia and tfie Middle East has sfioran thet close cooperation between tanks and mechanized i:nfantrp is particularly important where troops have higfi mo5ility. As a result of tfiis, tfie commands of th.e capitalist armies are now devoting special attention not only to improving . tanks, but also to 5uilding infantry co~bat vefiicles and tfie furtfier development of armored personnel carriers. In their opinion, broad use of modern armored vehicles increases the tactical mobility of the infantry and enables it to wage combat operations togeth~r witt~.tanks in conventional battle forrnations. There- fore, foreign specialists are taking all possible ste~s to imp;.ove tfie figfi.ting _ and technical characteristics of the armored equipment now av3ilable.. To do this tfie quality of the armor itself is Fieing improved and refinements are Fieing made in the shape of the body and tower of tFie armored ob"ject. Special screen- ing devices and nets are used to protect the body against tTie action of Tiollow - charge shells. In addition, reducing specific pressure, improving the suspen- sion system, and increasing engine power make it possible for combat vefiicles to move across broken terrain at high speed. Mount~ng large-caliber guns wi:tti. good liallistic characteristics, antitank gui.ded missiles, and otfier powerful _ weapons on these vehicles, improving the fire control sqstem, and increasing - the standard ammunition package ena~ile tTiem to wage effecti~e fire against tar- gets from long range.. Every armored vehicle has its own characteristics and distinguisfiing features. To combat them one must nave a good kno~rledge of tfieir fighting cTiaracteristics, tactical-technical specificattc~~, and vulnerafi le points as well as knowing the combat capabilities and methods of using oneTs own fire weapons. The combat characteristics make it possifile to de.termine fiow dangerous and fiow- important an arm~red target is. One can recognize rTie Firand and type of armored oliject by distinguisfiing features sucfi as tfie sfiape of the ::~uzzle firake of tfie cannonr the placement of the e~ection device on it~ and the sfiape of tFie Tiody, tower, and runntng gear. A knowledge of the dimensions of the ~iody (lengtli., width, and fieight) makes it possi~ile to determine tFi~ range to tfie target using , ~ , , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY standard angle-gage instruments pz ava~ZaFi1e-means, and a kno~ledge of the vulneral~le points enai~les a squad (team~ crear~ leader to cfioose tfiQ correct type of weapons and ammunitinn to de.stro~r tfie.. target reliafily-~ We give below tfie combat characteristics and di~tinguisfiing features of tFie principal models of tanks, infantry, vefiicles, and armoxed personnel carriers of the capitalist armiesm Chapter 2. Comt~ating Antitank Fleapons Along witli improving tanlc~, infantry combat vefiicles, and armored personnel carriers the armies of foreign Countries are devoting cons~derable attention to the d~velopment of various antitank raeapons. Tfieix tactical-tecTinical cfiarac-- teristics are Being improved continuously and tTi.e principles of using tfiem in battle are being refined. Tfie number.of antitank weapons, i,z particular self-- propelled weapons based on armored vefiicles, fias begun to increase rapidly in - recent times in the armies of the countries of tfie ~ggressive NATO bloc. The greatest development has occurred with tfie most dangerous antitank weapon , tfie antitank guided missile. In tfie opinion of foreign specialists, it has greater destructive range, better ar~mor piercing capabilitp, and greater accuracy~tfian . the other antitank weapons. It is not accidental that antitank guided missiles occupp tfie leading place ~ among antitank weapons, and to some degree.are.supplanting tFie otTiers. Anti-- tanic guided missile launchers are mounted on various armored vefiicles, persronnel carriers, and tank.s. Tn the U. S. Army, for exam~le, in additton to tTie Sfieridan light tank, a tower with a 152 millimeter gun, a launcfi.e~ for tfie Shillelagh antitank guided missile,ha~ also been mounted on tfie M~60 A2 medium tank. Plans coiitemplate arming several other prospective tanks in tfie armies of the United States, West Germany, and other capitalist countri.e~ with antitank guided missles. Certain classes of helicopters are also heing e.quipped with these weapons be- cause, foreign specialists believe, they can fire at an armored target from a more advantageous angle and destroy it even wfien it is in a trencfi and not visible to ground observers. Rntitank guided missiles, self-propelled antitank guns, and otfier antitank weapons are being supplied not only to motorized infantry, tank, and artille.ry~ - subunits, but also support~.and even rear sutiunits. Tfisy enable the enemp to create a deeply ecfi~loned antitank zone with mutuallp~overlapping sectors of antitank fire botfi on the for~ratd edge and taitfiin tfie deptfi. of tfie Fiattle for- - mations. Combating antitanli weapons, especially antitank guided missiles, will be difficult and tense. This is one of tFie most-important missions~ of a11 sub- units which support the combat actions of tanks, infantrq combat vehicles, armnred personnel carriers, and other com~at e.quipment. To master the methods. of protecting comhat equipment against fire Fiy antitank weapons and to comliat tfiem successfullp, one must have a good knowledge o.~ tfieir combat characteristics, tactical--technical specif ications, strong and weak points, and identif ication signs, and also know the comTiat capabilities and metfiods of 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . use of one~s oam T/0 weap~ns on o~fense and de.~ense. Tn contemporary~fiattle witfi. highly effective means of destructi.on, tfie wixuier ih a duel witFi anti~tank weapons will be tfi.e one who detects. the target and executes aimed fire first. Tfierefore, eki11fu1 reconnaissance by ofiservation and rapid preparat~.on of initi,al firing data are crucial conditions for successfully~ accomplisTiing tiiis mission. TFiere can T~e no question of effec~ively combating antitank meapons if tFue figTiting men are not a~le to detect them quickly Fiy identification s~gns, give correct target indications, and beat tlie enemy in openiazg fire~ We give below the b.asic models of antitank ~eapons of the capitalist armies. Chapter 3. Combating Heli.coptere, Airplanes~ and Unmanned Air Attack Vefiicle.s Antiaircraft artillery is effect~ve and tfle most active ground weapon in combating means of aerial attack. It is able to hit airplanes and fielicoptexs at varfous - altitudes. But it is much more difficult for this art~llery to combat aircraft operating at low altitudes because of tI~ir fiigfi.angular velocities. In view of this, during the war in SoutIieast Asia U. S. aviation mastered cedures for flight by comTiat aircraft and un~anned scout planes at low altitudes. TYte military command of Israel also used airplanes operating at alti.tudes of 30~ 100 meters for reconnaissance and destroytng targets in Egyptian territory. According to the conclusions of foreign sp~cialists, I# an a~rplane f lies to the target at an altitude of 50 meters or le~s this ~ven mintmizes tfie effectiveness ~ of antiaircraft missiles used against it. Rifles can be used extensively to combat enemy aircraft operating at low altttudes. The experience of the Great Patriotic War, as azell as war experience from Korea and Vietnam, testifies to t-his. During t~e Great Patriotic War some 500 atrcraft were shot down with rifles. During th.e wars in Korea and Vietnam fire from rifles, machine guns, and antitank guns made i.t difficult for American pilots ta operate at low altitudes without punishment. Because evQn with the availability of contemporary antiaircraft weapons anti- aircraft missiles, rapid-firing antiaircraft cannons, and machin.e guns tfiE role of the rifle in combating low--flying targets fias not diminislied~ commanders at all levels should devote considerable attention to training men in combating aerial attack weapons fire from T/0 rifle weaponrp~. Special emphasis sfiould Be put on the exceptional importance of psychologically preparing personnel to comfiat low--tlping targets wlien tfiey carry out massed at- tacks. Of course, every fighting man understands that massed aerial attack weapons operating at low altitudes or tree--top level represent the greatest dan- ger on the field of battle. Therefore, wiien training in comFating aerial attack weapons the principal attention must Ue focused on eliminating th3:s so--called fear of aircraf t in the men. To combat airplanes, hel~copters, and unmanned enemy weapons successfully, one must have a good knowledge of tfie nature and procedures of tfi.eir acttons agains~t 6 ~ ? APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500470069-4 FOR OFF[CIAi. USE ONLY ground targets, specifications, and vulnerafile points to tlie fire of rifle~, large-caliber wacfiihe guns, and otfisr weapons, as well as a knowledge of tfi~ combat capaFiili.ties and metfi~ds of using onets own T/0 weapons. to combat aerial targets. Only witfi a knowledge of all tfiis ~-i:ll soldiers, crews, teams, and suTiunit commanders destroy tfi,e aerial enemy~ confidentlp and reliatily. We give below ;.fie basic characteristics of different means of ae.rial attack of the armies of certatn capitalist countries. Conclusions Learning metfiods of combating tanks, antitank weapons, and low-fly3ng fielicopters: and airplanes is just part of tfie large set of troop combat training questions - which are inseparable from the entire process cf training, indoctrination, and military service. It can be seen from the examples of training peri.ods considered above that train-- ing the men in these important matters begins witfi individual training. Then the methods and procedures of comhating armored targets are refined as tfie squad, platoon, and company work together during tactical training periods and exer- cises, as well as in training periods on otfier combat training subjects. Let us - consider fire training. One of its most important missions along witfi tactics is instilling in the men those qualities wfiic~i insure stability of professional skill as military specialists on tha field of battle and allow tfiem to carry out the comliat mission successfully in their designated roles. For example, it - is important for automatic riflemen, machine gunners, ard gun layers to develop the ability to preserve in a complex situation of contemporary warfare the habi.ts acquired during tfie process of peacetime training: firing t~ie regular weapon accurately, the ability to drive back attacks by tanks and infantry combat vehicles, and the ability to combat antitank guided missiles, including those ~mounted on _ helicopters, low-flying airplanes, and unmanned enemy weapons. For this purpose, fire training periods should be us.ed to demonstrate corivinctngly the capabilities of the standard weapons and combat equipment in com~ating ground and aerial armored targets. There should be numerous drills that develop tfie men's actions to the point of automatism, and a situation similar to actual battle must be created for training To do this firing .ranges are usually rigged up with two variations of targets ins.talled at different distances and in different directions and dispersed along the tront and ~n depth. Targets tliat represent armored vehicles, both.painted and camouflaged as an actual combat situation requires, are installed. Tfie target f ield is prepared in secret from _ the trainees, and during firing tfie targets are parttally or completely rearranged. Changes are made in tfie method of simulation or ligiiting of tfie targets, tfie posi-- tion for firing, and so on. To develop psychological stability in tfiQ men, inert grenades are fired at tfie tanks of the comiaat training group moving toward tfis trainee~grenade throwers. In addition, systematic work should b.e done to develop tfie menrs sktlls in iden- tifying dangerous arm~red targets during rifle drills, ftring, and tactical and 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY other fieid training periods. All thsse ~npoxtant questions of training fi.gfiting men in the metfiods~ and procedures of comfiating armored targets can only- fie solved tIirough the joint efforts of commander~, political workers, pa:ty and Komsomol organizations, and teacfiers at militarp s~cfiools. One of the conditions of success in tfiis ~rork i~s raising tfie level of com6at training of subunit commanders, wlin are obliged to constantly refine tfis methods and procedures by wfiicn.figfi.ting men oppose. enemy armored equipment. When or.ganizing training periods one must fiegin from real conditions and con~ struct them with. due regard for the ti~me allocated, tfie availaFiili:ty of pfiysical facilities for training, and tlzs group of trainees. In some cases training periods at the training site are done fiy squads, c,rTiile in others it ortll be the platoon. Where there is additional time it is useful to conduct a second training period in tfie sub~ect as a practice drill. - Work to develop the necessary practical skills in tfi,e men and to instill tfinm = with strong psychological qualities during the process of teaching metFiods of combating armored targets must be combined with purposeful party political work to indoctrinate tfiem in loyalty to tfie militarp oatti and regulations, love of their homeland, and hatred for its enemies. Propaganda for the glorious combat traditions of our Armed Forces and instilling the feeling of civil and military duty greatly facilitates the formation of tfie necessary qualities in the men. Pas.sing on stories of the fieroic deeds ~f Soviet fighting men during the Great Patriotic War should play an important part in this work. ' COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1977 11,176 CSO: 1801/200 8 . , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500074469-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS UDC 355.415.2 BOOK ON WARTTME TR~INSPORTATION SERVTCES Moscow ESHELON ZA ESHELONOM ~n Russian 1981( signed to press 11 Jun 81)pp l, 2, 248 - 3-4, 5-12, 13-17, 73-75; 76--77; 124; 125-~128, 162; 163-164; 208-209; 210-211, _ 233-239; 240-241 [Title page., authors' collective, annotation, table of contents, foreword, intro- ductton and selected excerpts from fiook "Train after Zrain", edited by Lt Gen . Tech Trps A. S. Klemin, Tzdatel*stvo "Voye.nizdat", 30,000 copies, 248 pages] [Excerpts] Title Page jp 1] Title: E~ch~lon za Esfie'lonom jTrain after Train] Signed to nress: 11 Jun 81 Copies: 30,000 Pages: 248 Authors' collective [p 2] " A. V. Dobx.yakov (head), N. V. fiorisov, V. T. Dmitriyev, A. P. Zavadskiy, - M. P. Zaglyadimov, Ye: I. Zimin, A. Z. Kl.imovitskiy, L. A. Korzun (deputy head), Ye. M. Kul~kov, G. G. Moldavanov, K. T. Pavlovich, V. P. Paslikovskiy, N. A. Pozmogov, S. N. RyaBokob.ylko, M. P, ~akovich., N. L. Sokolov, and S. V. Khvos.hchev Annotation [p 2] This book is dedicated to the fieroi.c labor of the personnel of military com- munications agencies, tfie railroad troops, railroad work~rs, and water transportation workers during the Great Patriotic War. Tfie authors here pre- sent in popular form the complex and multifaceted work of the military commu- nicattons agenctes. an3 railroad tronps and sfiow~tTietr working experience in solving military transportation proFilems of planning and carrying out military - shipments by rail and water transportat~on during the war years. The book is tntended for a 6road range of readers. 9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE OhLY 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 - FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY Table of Cor:tents [p 248] ~ Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Introducticn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Military Shipping fi.y Itail Durtng th.e Wzr Y'ears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Railroad and Mil~tary Communi.cattons Troops Engaged in $uiiding and Rebuildin~; Rai;lroad tn tfie Front Region . . . . . . . . . . . 76 The Operation of Railroads in tfi~ Front znd Near Front Zones 125 Military S~iipment T~.y Tnlater~ray~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Air Defense of Railroads and Combat Support for Military Shipping 210 Party Political Work in Tnstitutions and Un~ts of Military Communtcations and Railroad Troops . . . . . . . . . . � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � . 240 Foreword [pp 3-4] - The Soviet Armed Forces, formed lay tfie Communist Party under the direction of Vladimir Ilttcfi.Lenin, have traveled a legendargr patfi.and covered their bat*_le colors with unfading glory. - During the Ctvtl War the young army of the Republic.of Soviets smashed the uni- fied forces of internal counterrevolution and tfie armed intervention of the imperialists. In tfie following years~ tfie Red Arm}p fiad to defend tfie inviola- bility of Soviet border~ more tTian once. The most severe tes�t of our entire people and ou~c Armed Forces was the Great Patriotic War of tlie 3oviet Union against fascist Germa.ny. Responding to the call of tfie Communist Party, tlie Soviet people and the fight- ing men of the army and navy rose up to defend tfieir native land and by their - heroism and selfless: labor secured victory over the liated enemy. = Transportation workers and personnel of th.e military communications servi.ce ax~d railroad troops made a wortfiy contribution to tfie common victory over the enemy. All the operations of the Great Patriotic War o~ere inseparably linked to broad use of all forms of transportatton, witfi movement of enormous masses of per- sonnel and materiel. Tfie organization of mil3:tary shipptng, metfiods of re- _ buildtng communications routes, and tfie organizational structure of military transportation services and troops were steadily improved, from operation to operation. - The further the events of tfiose heroic years are from us in time, the more ap- parent the full significance of tti~.wealtfi of experience accumulated during the Great Patriotic War is to us. Tfiis experience, gatfiered by small pieces, 10 _ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY is teaching new generations the difficult art of defeating a po~erful enemy. It serves as an example of courage and lieroism, of aTsolute devotion to our = native land and to military duty. Books that tell about ths combat experience of the Great Patriotic Ldar have both histurical and practical value. - This tiook, "Tr.ain after Train," is dedicated to the work of transportation work- ers and the personnel of mili.tary communications and railroad troops during the - war. It deals wit~i the questions of prepar~tians for and the work of transpor- tation under wartime condi.tions, organizing and carrying out mass troop trans- fers, liloclcading and reT uilding communications routes, technical coverage for them, and improving the military commun~cations service. The tiook reviews one of tfie k.ey prolilems, insuring continuity of ~militarq siiipping. The book will undoubtedly beinteresting not onlyfor specialists working in organ- ization and support of military shipping, tiut for all officer's and genesals of the Soviet Armed Forces and a firoad range of readers who liave. an interest in questions of preparing and using transportation for military purposes. General of tfie Arury S. Kurkotkin Introduction [pp 5-12] The term "military communi.cations" refers to land, water, and air communica- tions routes that liave heen prepared and equ~pp~d with necessary means for moving troops and performing all types of inilitary shipping in peacetime and war, as well as the military r_�ommunications agencies working on them. The military communications service in Russia or3:ginated in tfie early 17th century. According to the '~Military Charter" of 1716, which was developed by Peter I, tfie job of organizing tfie sfiipment of military cargo for the army and road repair and maintenance was assigned to a military communications service. With the appearance of railroads and tiie electric telegraph, tlie military com- munications service was given tfie ~ob of operating, destroying, and rebuilding railroads and dirt roads and operating waterways and pos~t and telegraph lines. Railroads were used for military purposes in Russia much earlier tlian in the United States and Prussia. Tfie first military shipment was carried out in 1851, when the railroad between Moscow and Saint Peterstiurg was built. - In the spring of 1852 the first statute on Transport of a Military Unit was pub- lished. No other country whicfi fiad railroads had such a statute at that time. The development of railroad Building in Russia in the late 19th Century cre- ated new condittons for moti.ilization and concentration of an army in theaters of military operations. Tfiis was reflected in the 1890 Statute on Field Troop Control, which devoted constderable attention to the mtlitary ~ommunications service. At the start of World War I Russian rail transportation and the military commu- nications service carried out ma~or shipments to mobilize and concentrate troops. 11 FOIi OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OEFICIAL USE ONL~' But failures at the front and enormous devastation in tfie Russian economy - created an exceptionally difficult situation tn transportation. In September 1917 V. I. Lenin wrote as follows: "Russia is tlireatened by an inevitable disaster. Ra.tlroad transportation is�disrupted ~beyond belief and the situa- tion is becoming worse. Tfie railroads will rise up, and shipment of raw materials and coal to tTie factortes will stop. TFie shipment of grain will - stop."1 The campaign to rebuild tfie transportation system began immediately after tlie victory of tfie Great October Socialist Revolution. It took gi- gantic efforts from the Communist Party and tfie young Soviet State to overcome - the paralysis in transportation. V. I. Lenin devoted enormous attention to transportation, emphasizing the spe- cial role of tfie military communications service. He called railroad trans- portation "the key material factor in tfie war.r2 Witfiout railroad transpor- tation, he wrote, ~'Modern warfare is an empty phrase.r3 History has~ demonstrated that tfiQ teachings of the revolutionary leader were entirely correct and timely. ~ The party and the country took all possib.le steps to build up tfieir defense capabilities, increased tfie figfiting strengtfi of tTie Red Army, and improved the work of railroads and waterwaps. On 30 November 1918 tTie Soviet Government instituted martial law in railroad transportation. - A special co~nission of tfie Soviet for Defense of the Republi.c was formed to work out measures related to plann~ng transportation woric. TTie decree of the Soviet for Defense on 11 De.cember 1918 entitled "Putting tfie Work of Railroad Transportation in Order," tfie May 1919 directive of the Central Committee on military unity, and tfie decision:: of tfie 9th Party Congress with respect to - transportation (April 1q20) p1apE:d a large part in this. During the years of Civil War V. I. Lenin worked constantly to improve the work of transportation and support militarq shipping. Speaking at the Plenum of tfie Moscow Soviet on 3 April 1919, V. I. Lenin said: - "We say once again to all comrades more people must be enlisted for work or food and transportation. Transportation work demands tfie greatest intensity. We have to see tfiat workers at every meeting ask tFiemselves how tliey can help transportation.r4 During the process of building tfie Red Armp and Navy tiie military communica- tions service was also formed. Tts jobs were to support military sfiipping, rebuild railroads, and improve transportation work. ~ On 5 March 1918 t~ie Directorate of Military Cotmnunications of tfie f. ormer Head- quarters of the Supreme Command was transferred to the newly--formed Supreme Military Council of tfie Republic, and on 8 May I918 tfie People~s Commissar of Military Affairs by order No 339 estalilistied the all-Russian Main Head- quarters, which also liad a Directorate of Military Communications. These two supreme agencies for management of military communicati.ons in the republic 12 , ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY existed in parallel until 2 Septemfier 1418 mfien tfiey were merged into the Central Directorate of Military Cornmunications under tfie Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Di.rectorates of military communications wer~ set up in tfie fieadquarters of fronts, armies, and military distri_cts; the line military communications agenc;: ~s - directorates of tTis cfiiefs of troop movement anci military com- mandants - were set up on the railraods. During tfie Civil TrIar the militarj~ communications service was given the mission of rebuilding and developing railroads, waterways, fiigfiways, and dirt roads, organizing troop movemerts and freigfit sbipment~ operating the postal and tele- graph servicea (until 10 September 1919), operating motor vehicle columns, managing troop and worker trains, securitp and defense of railroads, and tfie like. . Thousanus of railroad Gzorkers and emploqees, Red Guardsmen~ soldiers, and also former officers in the ~~sarist army who voluntarily ~oined tfie side of the revolution and put tfieir knowledge and experience to work for it became the cadres for the military communications agencies. The party organizatiQns did a great deal of worTc in tfie army and navy military communications units and institutions. They exercised a major influence to indoctrinate personnel in a spi.rit of fioundless devotion to tli` Soviet State, � the Communist Party, and tfie people.. Tfie commissars of tfie military communica- tions units and ins.titutions were old Solsfieviks sucTi as Z. Ya. Litvin-Sedoy, an active participant in tTie revolution of I905 at Krasnaya Presna in Moscow, as well as P. V. Rifie, V. V. Fomin, Ya. A. Remtir, S. Ye. Shchukin, A. F. _ Shishov, L. V. Lemberg, A. Kfi.. Gruzdup, N. P. Sokalov, and others. Many of them were later transferred to command positions in military communications. During the Civil GFar years the volume of military sfiipping by rail was more than 33,000 opera.tional trains and almost 7,000 trains witTi supply cargoes. _ About 25 million men with weapons and equipment were moved by rail. Many units were moved from one front to another between two and itve times in this period.5 All these tfiings made it pos.sible to regroup personnel and equipment in time to deliver devastating blows against the enemy. During the Civil War railr~ad troops rebuilt more than 22,000 kilometers of track and more than 3,000 bridges and repaired 16,500 railroad cars.6 Taking note of the heroic work of the railroad troops, order No 258 of the Revolutionary Military Council of tfi.e Repvblic on 31 January 1921 pointed out that the victoriou:; advance of tTie Red Army was made significantly easier by - the conscious and unselfisfi activity of railroad units to rebu~ld the rail- roads, the vltal arteries of tfie active army.~ _ During the Civil War and suT~sequent years consideraTile attention was devoted to training command personnel for military communications agencies. Special - schools were set up to train ~unior and senior comma~d personnel for the mili- - tary communications service. Special schools to train ~unior and middle-level 13 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY command personnel for the military communications service and courses for instructors to train Red commanders of mflitarp co~unicatidns~ anc~ railroad - troops were set up in TorzTiok in 1918. In 1920 tfieq were reorganized into a ~ single school, whicfi in 1922 was transferred to Petrograd. In 1937 the school was renamed the Leningrad Militarp Communications School imeni M. V. = Frunze. For training senior command personnel in military communications tne Military Engineering Academy in late 1918 se~ up a military roads division, which later became the department of military communtcations and existed until 1925. In 1925 the training of senior personnel began to be done in the military di- vision of the Leningrad Institute of Engineers of Co*nmunications Routes, and after 1932 was trans.ferred to tfie Mtlitary Transportation Academ}~. The first head of this academy was corps commander S. A. Pugacfiev, deputy cfitef of staff of the Worker-Peasant Red Army. After bringing the Civil War to a victorious, conclusion our country tiegan peace- _ ful building. V. I. Lenin and tfi~ Communist Partp considered res.toration and development of transportation to be of paramount importance~ Industriali.zation of tfie country supported teclinical reconstruction of trans- portation, turn promoted accelerated development of industry and agriculture and ar~ increase in tfie country~s defense capability. Between 1921 and 1927 more tfian 6,000 kilometers of new railroads were built, the fleet of steam locomotives and cars was augmented, and ttie average daily ~ load on the rail system increased. The country's transportation s.ystem continued to develop rapidly in the 1930's. - The traffic capacity of tfie most important rail sectors increased and new lines were laid witfi due regard for economic and defens~e needs. It was during these years that K. Ye. Vorsfiilov, speaking from tlie podlum of the 17th party congress in 1934, called railroad transportation the blood brother of the Red Army. Railroad troops and military communi.cations personnel took an active part in liuilding and reconstructing the railroads and performing ma~or overhaul work. - The military communications service continued its development during the years of peaceful tiuilding. In August 1921 a statute was publistied which concen- trated the questions of preparing communications routes, military roads, and the organization of military shipping at tfie Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Headquarters of tfie Worker-Peasant Red Army. ~ In 1925 tfie first Statute on Troop Movements of tfie Worker-Peasant Red Army was publislied, and in 1929 a manual on troop movement by water came out. - Consideratile attention was devoted to the questions of combat and special train- ing for the units and agencies of mis.itary co~nunications. Beginning in 1931 7.L~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070069-4 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY major military transportation exerci~es ~aere field at tfie Central Zone training area and district training areas almost every year. T~se exercises also in- - volved units of military aviation and, tn some cases, airborne units as well. Among those partici:pating in tfiese exercises were K. Ye. Voros~iilov, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, S. S. Kamenev, S. M. Sude~nnyy, ttie chiefs of tfie main and central - directorates of tfie People's Commissariat of Defense, and management personnel of the military communications agencies. The head of the Central Directorate of I~Iil~tary Co~nunications during the Civil War was M. M. Arzfianov, a strong--~rilled and decisive military engineer witfi a great deal of experience working in tr~~nsportation. The heads af military communications of tfie Red Army in tfie 1920~s and 1930's were, in order, V. I. Sergeyev, H. Ye. Barskiy, M. M. O1~sTianskiy, E. F. Agpoga, A. Ye. Kryukov, and N. I. Trubetskoy. Corps commander E. F. Appoga made a particularly important contribution to the development of thQ m~:litary communi.cations serv~ce in tfie 1930`s. He devoted a great deal of effort to improving tfie service and preparing for large-scale military shipping. Under fiis. direction a theoretical investigation of the most important proFilems of preparing and using transportation for military purposes was begun. A number of steps were taken in th~ second fialf of 1940 and until the start of the Great Patriotic War to prepare communications routes and military commu- nications units and agencies for wvrk in wartime. But many of tfi.e planned projects had not been completed fiy June 1941. The Great Patrioti.c War changed txansportation work greatly. The system was transferred to a military footing very~quicklp. Transportation work reached its fiighsst intensity during the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk, during preparation for and conduct of tlie offensive oper- ations in 1944-1945 (Beloruss.ian, East Prussian, Wisla--Oder, and Berlin), and during the operation to crusfi tfie troops of imperialist Japan in 1945. In the course of maneuvering operations transportation moved not only large units, but entire army and front formations. This demonstrates the high level of organization in the work of railroad workers and military communications offi.cer under wartime conditions on rail sectors that had ~just been reTiuilt. In his tiook "Small Land" where he describes tfie events during the transfer of the 18th Army to the Zhitomi.r axis in November 1943, Comrade L. T. Brezhnev remarks on tfie rapid advance of the trains: "Tfie train c,rhich carried the Mili- tary Council, army Iieadquarters, and political department left first. The - trains carrying army units followed after it. Tfiey traveled quickly, stopping only to cliange locomotives."8 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The Central Committee o~ tfie All Union Communist Party (Hols:fievik~, tfie State Committee on Defense, and the mtlitarp command devoted e~ept~onally great at- tention to transportation and military communications. In the first days of the war A. A.Andreyev, secretary of tfie party Central Committee, provided a great deal of fielp ir: tfie military communications work of the General Staff. He solved complex problems and h,elped work out co~neration between the Directorate of Military Communications a.nd governmental bodies in transporta- tion commissariats. Tfie co~ittee fieaded by T. V. Stalin, formed in 1942 under the State Committee for Defen~~ plap~ed a large role in organizing shipping. The service was h.2aded by generals T. V. Koval~ev and V. I. Dmitriyev in 1941- . 1945. Tfie following generals and officers worked knowledgeably in important sectors: S. A. Andreyev, P. A. Sakulin, K. V. Vastl`yev, A. V. Vlasov, S. A. Gasparyan, B. N. Goryainov, M. I. Grisfiin, V. F. DikusTiin, A. V. DoTiryakov, F. I. Zelentsov, I. V. Kargin, T. G. KasFicfieyev-Semin, I. K. Kechedzhi, A. N. Korolev, S. N. Kresik, A. A. Korsfiunov, S. M. Kostikov, A,> G. Mgvdeladze, V. P. Medvedev, G. G. Moldavinov, M. V. OFipden, N. P. Pidorenko~ P. I. Pirogov, K. A. Rassalov, P. I. Rumyantsev, V. V. Stoly~rov, Ye. V. Tulupov, S. V. Khvoshcfiev, A. G. Chernyakov, Ya. I. Slichepennikov, and many others. Generals A. G Chernyakov and S. V. Khvosfi.chev later headed the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the USSR Ministry' of Defense. Military communications officers frequentlyserved not only as organizers of shipping but also as. the actual performers of plans under difficult conditions. More than 7,O~Q persons were awarded arder.s and medals for outstanding per- formance of mfilitary duty, courage, and valor. In the work of reb.uilding railroads tiie most outstanding units of railroad troops were tfiose comrnanded fiy tlie follooring generals and officers: V. A. Golovko, I. A. Prosvirov, P. A. Kafianov, N. V. Sorisov, A. Ye. Kryukov, I. S. ~ hartenev, V. V. Bezvesil'nyy, A. P. S~mirnov, D. A. Lebedev, F. N. Doronin, A. S. Dugin, V. P. Tisson, P. I. Bakarev, A. Ya. Kirichenko, P. I. Korshunov, A. M. I~uznetsov, Sh. N. Zhilzhilasfivtli, D. A. TeryukI~ov, and otfiers. The party and government valued the military feats and laiior valor of railroad troop personnel in tiie Great Patriotic War very liighly: 28 servicemen were given the lofty title of Hero of Socialist Labor and Sgt. V. P. Miroshnichenko was made a Hero of the Soviet Union. P3ore tlian 35,000 servicemen were given orders and medals. The leadership and teachers of the Military Transportation Academy and the Higher School of Milit~ry Communications, wfio trained Tiiglily skilled cadres, made a significant contribution to victory over the enemy. . The State Committee on Defense and tFie Headquarters, Supreme High Command, devoted great attention to planning and using all types of transportation for military purposes. Marshals of tfie S~oviet Union B. M. Sfiaporshnikov and A. M. Vasilevskiy and generals of the army A. T. Antonov, S. M. Shtemenko, A. V. :~;rulev, and N~ F. Vatutin did especially good work in management of military sh~opi:ng and restoration of demolished transportation facilities. 16 r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY With the development of transportation ~i tl~e postwar period tfie military com- munications service was also iinproved. Tfie questi:or.s of military transpor- tation support to operations Tiegan to fie decided in a new way based on tlie experience of the Great Patriotic War, Ma.rshals of tfie Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskip, I~I. V. Zakharov, and I. Kh. Bagramyan and gener.als of tfie Armp S~. S. MaryakTiin and. S. K. Kurkotin devoted constant attention to furtfier development and refinement of transportation sup- port for tfie Soviet Armed Forces in tfie posttvar years. _ The domestic transportation system overall witfistood serious tests. A high level of organization and continuity~ of sfiipping was maintained and tlie system - kept its mob.ility and survtval capaFiility tfirough. tfie joint efforts of. trans- _ portation and military communications agencies. It must be emphasized tfiat cooperation between mzlitary communications personnel and transportacion workers gre~r even stronger durtng the war years. , During tlie Great Patriotic War mili.tary communications agencies carrying out the assignments of the General Staff and headquarters of Rear Services of the Red Army cooperated closely in work ~rith.railroad troops~, the mos:or vehicle road service, and representatives of tfie supplp directorates at tfie front and in the Central Zone. Already tfien tlis ~rar experience had demonstrated that the full volume of military sfiipping can ~e fiandled successfully only with integrated and rational use of all forms of~transportation. The idea of comprehensive preparation and use cf various types of transportation is ncw universally recognized in tfie national economy as well. During the Great Patrioti.c TnIar, tiie country~s transportation sy:~tem, using all forms of transportation, pexformed a volume of sfiipping never before known in history. The railroads alone fiandled 443,213 trains ~about 20 million cars) carrying troops, weapons, comfiat equipment, and s-upplies. Yet in the first days of the war tfie average daily load of troop~ and materiel was about 40 percent of the total load on the entire USSR railroad spstem. It should li.e noted tfiat 95 percent of shipping from tfie deep interior of the = country to the rear Fioundary of tlie fronts was carried liy railroad transpor- tation. Water transportation delivered more than 4 million troops, more than 785,000 wounded and sick, 4,500 tanks, 10,Q00 field pieces, and 21 million tons of materiel. Air transportation carried more tfian 2.7 million persons and more than 300,000 tons of freight. After the Great Patriotic War tliQ workers in all forms of transportation and the military communications service tiad to solve the complex proBlems of restoring _ and tiuilding up tlie capacittes of tTie country's transportation system. By the heroic eff~rtr of the entire Soviet peaple, tfie prewar level of development of - transportaiion was not only restored, Tiut al:~o signtficantly exceeded in a short time. 17 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The development of military co~unications ~�as al~aps dire.ctly dependent on the metliods of waging arar, improvements in tfis transportation spstem, and qualitative and quantitative grov~tfi in transportatton equipment. The proFalems of transportation support to tTie Armed Forces are much more complex today. To solve th.em today requires integrated measures to improve - the~co~tryTs ~et:`S-e transportation spstem, continued development and rapid introduction of new means of transportation, and de�~eloping more powerful means for constrsction and reconstruction of transportation facilities and for the use of automated control sp~tems in transportation. Military communica- tions personnel are working Iiard on tfiese problems in close cooperation with transportation workers. The military communications servi.ce of tfie Armed Forces celebrated its 60th anniversary on 5 Marcti. 1978. In fiis greeting in fionor of the service's 60th anniversary, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, US~R Mintster of Defense, praised tbe ser- vice highly, pointing out tfiat during ths pears of its existence the military communications service fias played a s:igntficant part in supporting the life and activittes of our Armed Forces and raising ~_heir crnnFat readines~. He observed that the personnel of the service today are successfully performing the stepped- up socialist otiligations they~adopted for uninterrupted transportation support to the Sovtet Army and Navy. FOOTNOTES 1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. Sob.r. Socfi.." [Complete Works], Vol 34, p 155. 2. Ibid., Vol 38, p 4Q0. 3. Ibid., Vol 35, p 345. 4. Ibid., Vol 38, pp 248, 249. 5. "Ukhodili na Front Eshelony" jTFie Trains Departed for the Front], Moscow, "Voyeni:zdat", 1974, p 8. 6. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" jSoviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, 1977, Vol 3, p 322. 7. "Zheleznodorozhnyye Voyska s 1851 po 1941 God" [Tfie P.ailroad Troops from - 1851 to 1941], Mos.cow, "Voyenizdat", 1957, p 150. 8. Brezhnev, L. I., "Malaya Zemlya" [Small Land], Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 41. 9 FOR OFFICIAL US1E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070069-4 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ Military Shipptng hy Rail Durtng tfie Fiar Years jpp 13-17] I~uring the prewar five-year plan tFie communist party and Soviet people did a ~ grest deal of work on technical reconstruct~on and development of ratlroad - transportation, equippi:ng it witfi advanced macfiinery, and introducing pro- gressive forms of traction. In a sfiort time a large numher of rail centers and marsfialling yards were fun- damentally r~aconstructed, new~depots~ and car repatr points were built, the track in the primary sectors was overhauled and ligfit rails were replaced with lieavier ones, and new ratlroads were built. By th~ end of 1940 the total lengtfi of tfie rail network reached 106,100 kilom- eters. Tfie average daily load grew to 117,OOQ cars and freight turnover on the railroads~ was 415 billion tons (~85.1 percent of tTie country's total freight - turnover). Tlie fleet of steam locomotives and cars wa~~ improved. It included 28,000 steam locomot~ves~ and aFaout 878,500 railroad cars. Ttie total freight capacity of tfie cars reached 19 million tons. The percentage of four-axle cars increased. Tfie average gross weight of a freigfit train was 1,301 tons, compared to 578 tons in 1913.1 Planned development and reconstruction of railroad transportation made it pos- sible to establis~h a network of main sec:ors with uniformly good technical equipment, figured for a standardized len,Qtfi (120 standard axles) and weight (900 tons) for military trains (the f~gure was S50 tons in 1913). The methods of organizing shipping were improved. A systemwide traffic schedule and unified plan for form~ng tra3:ns were developed. Car flows were or- ganized on tiie basis of tlirougfi shipping, and tecfini:cal planning and integrated development of tfie carrying capac~ty of the ratlroads were introduced. The reconstruction and technical re-eQutpping of railroad transportation fa- cilitated furtfier consolidation af our country~s defense capability. With the start of the war the flows of military trains moving toward the western boundaries of the country and evacuation shipping traveling from threatened re- gions near the front to tfie east increased sharplq. Tfiis demanded hard, un- self ish work, flexiliility and resourcefulness in decision-making, and true labor heroism from railroad workers and the military communications agencies. - Not just at tlie start of the par but througfiout the entire Great Patriotic War the employees of the railroads, military communications agencies, and railroad troops, disregarding ttme and often going witTiout sleep or rest for several days, insured timely loading of troops� and materiel, rapid travel to the front, and _ quick clean-up after enemy aviation attacked railroad transportation facilities. This labor enthusiasm, augmented Fay advances and successes in the development and fundamental re-equipping of transportation, made it possible to emerge from the diff iculties with honor and insure performance of the missions that arose from the demands of tfie Communist Party and S~oviet Government with respect to defense 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070069-4 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY of the socialtst fiomeland. This entfiusiasm o�as ~nvaluafile i:n achieving victory over a powerful and treacfierous enemp. The Great Patriotic tdar confirmed tliis: in full and sfiowed how important rail- road transportati:on and military communications were in supporting the combat operations of the S'oviet Armed Forces, wTio mauled tfie enormous Nazi war machine. . "Without good railroads," Mar SU G. R. Zfiukov wrote, "we would not have been able to carry out the large operational sfiipments tfiat were comparatively fre- quent during tfie war, or even to S~eep up uninterrupted supply of ma.teriel over great distances~.i2 Each operation conducted Fy tfie Soviet Army during the last war deman~ed enor- mous expenditure of personnel and materiel. More tTian 10 million tons of a~u- nition was used during tTie Great Patriotic War, and 16 million tons of fuel and lubricants.3 Tfie expenditure of otTier types of troop materiel also increased imm~asurably. All tTiese tfiings~fiad to fie delivered to the front in a s~eady supply at ttie rigfit time. No one form of transportation, no matter what its capacities, could have tiandled tiiis enormous ~oFi of delivering everything that the troops needed for life and for battle. Tlierefore, all forms of transpor- tation were enlisted to perform tliis~ vast mission. In the troop and army rear areas motor vefiicle transportation was most impor.tant, wfiile in the rear area of the front railroads and motor vefiicle roads were used. Railroad shipping played the most important and decisive role in sFiipping from the rear of the country to tfie tfieater of military operations and sTiipping lietween fronts. During tlie Great Patrioti:c War about 20 million cs,rs (more than 440,000 trains) carrying troops, weapons, equipment, and mat~ri:el--technical supplies ~aere de- livered from the rear of tfie country to the front by rai1.4 During World War I. about 6,000 cars (15~-170 trains) a day traveled on the rail- roads of all the fronts. But during tI~e las-t war up to 6,000 cars were loaded on front roads on snme days:just in preparation for the Kursk operation;s this~is as many as were loaded on all front railroads in World War I. During the Civil War and foreign military intervention between 1918 and 1921, 40,401 troop trains and about 10,000 transports carrying supplies (6,679 trains) with an average of 40 cars in a train were shipped.6 The experience of the last war showed that in the hands of tlie military command railroads were a cructal means. of strategtc maneuvering with personnel and equipment. The transportation link between tfie rear of tlie country and the theater of milttary operations was~accomplished mainly by rail. The Soviet Armed Forces carried aut 55 strategic offensive and defensive opera- tions in the Great Patriottc War. During the period of preparation for each - strategic operation large shipments were carried out to,concentrate and regroup troops, replace personnel losses, and restore stocks of comtiat equipment, wea- pons, ammunttion, and otfier forms of materiel. All ttiis demanded especially = intense work liy railroad transportation and tfie military communicat~ons service. 20 ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Thus, during the period of tlie defensive fiattles: at Moscow in preparation for tfie counteroffensive, 333,SOQ cars carrying troops and-militarp supplies were delivered on the railroads runntng taward Moscoar~.~ Delivering the troops, equipment, ammunition, and otTier military supplies for - the three fronts t~iat participated in the Battle of Stalingrad required about - 250,877 cars.6 During preparation for tTie defensive operation and offensive at Kursk, more than 313,000 cars were deltvered and unloaded under tfie centralized plan alone, while tfie total volume of military sTiipping to support the Battle of Kursk was 467, 255 cars�. 9 The Belorussian operation requ~xed 44C1,000 cars. To support the L~vov--Sandomiercz and Iassy~-Kishinev operations 240,000 cars carrying troops and supplies were s~ipped. During ehe period of preparation for tTie Berlin operation more than 192,000 cars carrying military supplies were delivered to tfie railroads of Poland. Major troop regroupings: ~ere carried out by rail during tfie war. For example, it eook 894 train~ to move the troops of the Don Front from the Stalingrad region to form the Central and Steppe fronts. In the fall of 1943 730 trains were used to move the tr~ops of tfie Hrpansk Front to form tfie 2nd Baltic Front,l0 - an3 506 trains werF required to form tFie 2nd Belorussian Front in the spring of 1944. It took 860 trains to move tfie troops of tTie 4tTi Ukrainian Front from the Crimea in the summer of 1944. Tfie regrouping of troops from tTie west to the Far East in June August 1945 required about 1,700 trains.ll Each strategic regrouping of forces by rail required ma3or organizational- = technical measures to insure continuous performa.nce of these massive troop transfers. = During preparation for operations the agencies of military communications and railroad administration had to cooperate in a precise, operational manner on planning, organization, and conduct of tfie sliipping. Before the start of shipping the large and complex joT of regulating rolling stock would be done to insure an uninterrupted supply of tlie required number of boxcars, flatcars, and steam locomotives to the loading roads. Loading and unloading areas for the trains were prepared in advance. Front rail sectors and loading and unload- ing regions~ had to he gi.ven air cover. To insure secrecy of shipping train loadtng and travel c~as ordinarily done during the hours of darkness:, w~iicti made operating conditions for the ratlroads much more difftcult and requtred s~pecial precision in organtzing train traffic. To avoid complications in tfie operation of the front railroads rigorous checks were establtshed on timely loading of trains and removal of empty trains from the unloading region. 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE aNLY The times allotted to prepare railroad transportation for strategic troop re- groupings were generally verp~ limited. Thsrefore everyth~ng possible was done to see that tfie planning proces~ and ttme reQutred to transmit shipping assign- ments to performers~ took as little time as possible. The method of planning shipping estaTilisfied by tfie Central Directorate of I~Iilitary Communications long before tlie war made it possible to lap out plans for slitpping any volume very quickly. The operational sfiipping plan written at tfie Central Directoratp of Military Communications was transmitted personally to the people's commissar of railroads or G. V. Kovalev, fiis d~puty- in cfiarge of traffic. Before the shipping plan was given to tfie People~s Commissariat of Railroads approximate figures- on the planned shipment were communicated (number of rolling stock by loading roads, tieginning of tfie sfitpment, and its pace). The Central Direc- torate of Military Communications also gave the preliminary order to the chiefs of troop movement on the loading roads and to the.cfiiefs of front and district military communications concerning tfie beginning time and place of shipping for eacfi particular uni.t.. Ttiis kind of preliminary ortentation of the _ People's Commissariat of Railroads and military communications agencies in- sured that shipping would begin at tfie time set Ty the military command. It was very important to have constant ~nformation on progress in loading, train travel, and unloading. Tlie military communications dispatcher service, which was set up during tlie Ci:vil War and later refined, insured precise, operational monitoring of tlie condition of eacli train at any time of the day or night. Reports on operational sliipping were.sufimitted to the Central Directorate of ~ Military Communications and the front directorates~ of military communications twice a day; for especially iinportant trains reports were made four times a day. The positions of trains at the report hours were entered on a map of the rail system, wfii:cfi gave a graphic picture of ttie location of the trains and, if necessary, made it possitile to carry out shipping maneuvers. Soviet troops moved forward to mezt tfie enemy, train after train. ~PP 73-75] During the Great Patrioti.c War tlie S~oviet Armed Forces carried out 55 stra- tegic offensive and defensive operations, each of which required enormous work by the railroads, military communications agencies, railroad troops and specia~ formations of tlie People's Commissariat of Railroads. An enormous amount of work was done liy the Headquarters of Rear Services of the People's Commissariat of Def ense, tlie political agencies, the headquarters of the arms of troops., the Central Directorate of Military Communications, and the _ supply directorates to form and give material-teclin~cal support to reserve units and operational formations. Tliis took place througfiout the war, but especially in the initial period when 291 divi:stons and 94 brigades were transported to the front before 1 Decemlier 1941, cfiiefly tiy railroad. Tfie commands of the mil- itary districts, local party, S~oviet, trade union, and Komsomol organizations, and the military commiss~ariars did a great deal of work to support these forma- tions. The Soviet command used railroad trans~ortation to coacentrate troops during prepc~tration for and conduct of such operations as the Battle of Moscow, the 22 FOR OFFICIAL US~ UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Battle of Stalingrad, the Sattle on tfie Kursic Salient, tfie.operation to break the Leningrad blockade, th2 Belorussiaa, East Prussian, CZisla-�Oder, B'erltn, - anct Far Eastern operations, and manp others~.. In addition to moving troop:~ from deep within tTie countrp, tfie Sovi:et command very often carried out significan~ troop regroupings Tip ratl. For.example, after the fasctst troops were smasfied at gtalingrad (Februarp 1943), the forces of the Don Front, some 900 trains, were moved to tfie central axis. The same year the troops of tfie Hryansk Front mere transferred to the Velikiye Luki region. Tfie shipment of troops bp rail from East Prussia and the region around - Prague to tfie Transbaika.l and tfie Ear East, a distance of 4,000~-12,000 kilom- eters, in tfie summer of 1945 was a verp important and difficult mission. The pace of this sfiipping on t~i.e Transsiberian railroad reacfied as much as 30 troop trains� a day. Tfiis ma~or transportation operati.on was carriea out successfully on the w~iole. - During the Great Patriot3:.c Flar man~~ sh~pping operattons were carried out by com- bined rail, motor vehi.cle, and water transportation. Many divisions,corps, and armies us~ed all forms~ of transportation broadly in different combinations, whicfi greatly speeded up the concentrati:on of forces tn the chosen axis. Tfie Soviet command successfullp.maneuvered witFi.troops which were en route in the trains. ~ _ Operational s:fii:pping was carried out accordi:ng to plans and assignments from mtlitary communications agencies: ~ollowing decis~ions of tiie General Headquarters, wfiile shipping withtn fronts was-done according to decisions of the front head- quarters. Experience with.planning operational sfitpping acquired duxing peace- time was used extensivelp during tfie war. The volume of operational shipping was 244,603 trains, wfiich was 55.2 percent of the total volume.of militarp shipping. Supply shipping occupi.ed a significant place tn the total volume of military shipping, 198,610 trains or 44.8 percent. Military communications personnel Iiad a very active part in organizing the evacu- ~ ation of sick and wounded By rail. A total of 5,338,350 persons (11,863 trains) were evacuated. The military communications servtce always took an active part ir~ evacuation shipping of mili:tary plants~ and storage depots to the rear of the country and helped railroad workers and ~hippers in tfie evacuation. The rapid ~mprovement in technical equipment of tfie army and navy was reflected in support for military shipptng and ~n i.ts volume. Shipments of special and tecfinical troops increa~ed. Tfie need for open rolling stock, especially large- capacity flatcars, increased greatlq.. The presence of fieavy combat equ~pment on the mi.lttary trains.forced the mili- tary communtcat3:ons service and railroad workers to re--equip and prepare the loading and unloading regions. 23 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The pers.onnel of front and ax~my~ mi'J.~tary~ communications agencies taok an - active part in ~zorking out p1an~ to re~tore ~and bloekade~ railroads, provide them witfi. teclinical eqnipment, and �clean up after enemp air attacks in order to get trains moving tfirough. t~is ~ demol~sfied facilities Quicklp. Military communi.cations working togetTier with engineering troops did a great deal of work to conceal troop movements and organize du~y (deceptive) rail sfiipments. FOOTNOTE~ 1. "SSSR i.Zarufiezfinyye ~tranp posle PoFiedy Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy Sotsialist~cfies:koy~ Revolyutsii. ~tatisticfieskiy Sfiornik'~ [The USSR and Foreign Countries after the Victorp of the ~reat October Socialist Revolu- tion. S~tatistics] , Moscoar, t~Statistika", 197Q, pp 105--104. 2. Antinenko, N. A., '~Na Glavnom Napravleniit~ (Tn tlie Main Axis], 2nd ed., Moscow, "Nauka~', 1981, p 1Q. � 3. "Tyl Sovetskiky Vooruzhennykfi.Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne 1941- 1945 gg." [TFie Rear of Sov~et Armed Forces in tfie Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow-, "Voyenizdatt', 1377, p 5. 4. "Voyennyye SooTasi~.cheniya za SQ Let�, j~ifty Years of Military Communica- tions], Moscour, "Voyenizdat'~~ 1q67~ p 63. 5. "Tyl...~' op. cit., p 235. 6. "Voyennyye. Soobsficheniya..." op. cit., p 23. 7. "Tyl..." op. cit., p 230. ~ 8. Ibid., p 232. 9. Ibid., p 121. 10. "Voyennyye Soofisficheniya. op . ci.t pp 48, 43. 11. Ibid., p 49. Railroad and Military Communications Troops Engaged in Building and Rebuilding - Railroad Facilities tn the Front Regton [pp 76-77] There is no otlier cas:e in world fi3:,storq where a country carried on restoration and construction of railroads on sucfi. enormous scale concurrently with ma~or strategic operations,.such as occurred in the USSR during the war. ~ In the prewar period questions of planning and development of the transporta- - tion system in the tfieater of tnilitary operati.ons and preparation for, organi- zation, and implementation of restoration and blockading work on railroad lines 2 , r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY within the People's Commissariat of Defense were dixectly managed t~y the Direc- torate of Military Communications of tfie General Fteadquarters of the Red Army. The headquarters~ of the military d~strict and front fiad divisions of military communications which were directly svbordinate to tlie cfiief of staff. For - r.estoration, construction, operation, blockading, and technical support of -ai1- roads used for military sTiipping tfiere were railroad troops subordinate to the commander of ths dis~trict or front tlirougfi tfie chief of military communications. In additton, in connection witli the broad scope of railroad construction in the country, the Special Corps~ of Railroad Troops of tlie Worker-Peasant Red Army was formed in 1132. Until 1941 3:t worked on reconstruction of existing rail lines and construction of new ones on assigmnent from tfie People~s Commissariat of Railroads. Tlie units� of tfie S~pecial Corps fiad 55,000 men at the start of the war.l The total number of railroad troops at tfie start of the war was 97,100.2 The railroad unit sufiordinate to military dfstricts tiegan to be reorganized in 1941. The districts began forming detactied railroad brigades which included road maintenance battalions, brtdge ~attalions, work mechanization battalions, - op erations battalions, and tfie like. By the start of ttie war 10 of tlie 13 existing railroad brigades were engaged in building railroads in the western fiorder military districts (three in the Western district, four in Kiev d3:s.trtct, and three in the~ Odessa district). To slow down tfie enemy advance, the fighting men of tfie railroad troops and military communications, wlio were retreating togetfier with combat units of the Red Army, took steps to blockade the railroads. Tliey removed technical equip- ment and dug up and mined tracks, bridges, and otfier structures. There were no railroad units on tfie railroads of the Baltic region and many ~ railroad lines of the western oblasts at tTie start of the war, so blockading was done cfiiefly by engineer and rifle units in the regions of their combat operations. Demolition was focal in character and cfiiefly involved blowing up large tiridges. Wbrking engines and most of tfie railroad cars from these lines were withdrawn to the rear. - Planned blockading work began to be done on a line from east of Narva, Velikiye Luki, Orsha, and Mogilev witfi tfi e arrival of railroad units that had been mobilized. - There were many examples. of courage and heroism by personnel of the railroad - troops and military communications doing blockading work during the Great - Patrtotic War. [p 124] During the Great Patriotic War tfie rai.lroad troops and special formations of the People's Commissariat of Railroads plus military communications agencies improved tlie organization of construction and reconstruction work on railroad lines and technical equipping for them. By tTie end of tfie war the level of - technical equipment among railroad troops fiad increased substantially compared = to early 1942: seven times for cranes, eight times for pile drivers, 11 times for moliile power plants, four times for campressors, and five times for saw frames.3 25 - FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Ry early 1944 the numher of rai~road troops Iiad increased to 253,Q~Q, by war's - end it was 272,OOQ.~' All this facili.tated an tiie rate o~ railroad reconstruction. Tlius, wfiereas tfie pace of reconstruction in tfie winter of 1941~ - 1942 was just 3.6 kilometers, 3:n 1943 it was already five kilometers, in 1944 - seven kilometers and in 1945 eiglit kilometers a day. Tn certain operations the rate of reconstruction of railroads reacfied 15-20 kilometers a day and more. Along with increasing the pace of restoration of rail lines the quality of re- - construction work improved. Thus, tlie proportion of restored rail sectors in - USSR territory that received "outstanding" evaluations wfien turned over for use rose from five percent i:n 1943 to 50 percent in 1945.5 During the war years tFie railroad troops and special formations of the People'~ Commissariat of Railroads with.the vigorous Tielp of military communications agencies and the local population, restored and put back in working condition ~ about 120,000 kilometers of railroad track between Decemtier 1941 and war's end. In addition they built and reFuilt 2,756 large and medium sized liridges with a total lengtli of 242q143 running meters, more tfian 13,000 bridges and culverts, 46 tunnels (23,23Q running meters}, 2,348 water supply stations, and more than 729,000 kilometers of railroad communications wire. Railroad units explored and removed mines from more tlian 18a,000 kilometers of railroad track, 19,947 bridges and other manmade structures, and more than 13,000 railroad stations and centers. The combat engineers of the railroad troops disarmed and destroyed more i:han 1,293,600 mines and liigh explos~tve shells, about 60,G00 unexploded aerial bombs, and almost 1 million artillery s:fiells.6 FOOTNOTE~ 1. Kabanov, P. A., "Stal~nyye Peregony" [Steel Runs�], Moscow, "Voyenizdat", - 1973, p 58. 2. "Tyl Sovetskiky Vooruzfiennykh Sil v Velikoy Otecfiestvennoy Voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Rear of the S~oviet Ground Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], p 52. 3. Ibid., pp 242, 243. 4. Terekhin, K. P. et al., "Voiny StalTnykh Magistraley" [Fighting Men of the Steel Roads], p 179. 5. ZHELEZNODOROZHNYY TRANSPORT, 1948, No 7, p 17. 6. "Tyl...," op. cit., p 243. The Operation of Railroads in the Front and tfie Near-Front Zone [pp 125-128] With the start of the Great Patriotic War an extremely difficult situation was _ created in USSR railroad transportation. It was~ a result of the fast-changing operational situation on the fronts, the tncreased volume of military shipping, and the vigorous actions of enemy aviation. - . ~J / APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY During the prewar period the Communi:st Party and Soviet Govermnent had de~oted considerable attention to improving tFie. tecTinical level of tfie railroads and streamlining their work. The fleet of Iocomotives was updated, witfi series E and SU steam locomotives replaced by series FD and SO steam engines which were twice as powerful. Ttxe fleet of four-~axle cars was enlarged, and automatic coupling was~ introduced. Aeavy--duty~ rails were laid on tfie main trunk roads. Major cfianges took place in tFie organization of railroad operations. There was a systemwide train traffic scIiedule and a unitarp plan for forming trains. Cadre training received considerafile attention. Reorganization of the railroad system was accompanied by the development of socialist competition and intro- duction of progressive labor metTiods. All tfiese tfiings created tfie foundation for successful work by the railroads during tfie war pears. Witfi the start of tfie Great Patriotic CJar railroad operating conditions changed abruptly. Tfie flow of trains increased steadily and the routes changed. The volumes and urgency of shipping increased. Tfie administrative boundaries of the operati:ng section~ were altered. Management of operations work was often done by agencies operating temporarily in tfie particular section, unlike the peace- time situatton. Most of tfie railroad workers and mil.itary communications offi- _ cers, especially those called up from tfie reserves, had not fiad the initial - period of experience and were inadequately prepared for work under such condi- tions. In tfie difficult military s.i..cuation military communications agencies became more responsilile not only for organizing and carrying out military shipping, but also for the quality of railroad operations, particularlp in tfie zones of action of the fronts. Military communications personnel took an active part in organiz- ing train traffic on retiuilt railroads. Military communications officers had to be liighly practical, flexible, inventive in decision~making, and firm and persistent in carrying out decis~ions. Tfiis made heightened demands for the level of technical training, organizational capabilities, and moral-volitional quali- ties of military communications~ personnel. _ The war did not change the hasic principles of organizing railroad operations. Centralization of the management of operations work, planning, a high level of labor discipline, and broad initiative fiy railroad workers in local areas to per- - form their production assignments were effective throughout the entire war, both in the rear and on front railroads~. Planning time for railroad techni:cal work changed. Beginning in the second half of 1941 tfie tecfinical plan was compiled semimonthly and T~y 10--day periods, in- stead of montfily. The work indicators of the road were reviewed each month and adjusted depending on tlie situation. Tfie front roads worked on the basis of oper- ational assignments.l On the front railroads, unlike tfie situation with roads in the rear~ work plans began to be compiled at traffic service divisions~ not road administrations. On the basis of the demands of the military commandants of rail sectors and the chiefs of directorates of military restoration work, tFie section chiefs would draw up plans for train and freig~it work over the next 24 hours and give them to 27 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the road management. The road management and the chief of troop movement wrote up a systemwide daily plan.2 The temporary loss of tfi~ Donets Fas~n and failure to restore the T4oscow coal basin completely led to an acute sfiortage of fuel. Fuel pro~lems slowed down the trains at centers and led to a reduction in switcfiing work. It was necessary to resort to extreme measures: to sfiut down tfie steam engines. - The military co~nand helped tfie railroads look for and deliver fuel to coal storage faciltties. Wfien BakTimacTi.and Prilulci stations ran out of coal reserves to supply to steam engines in August 1943, tfie coal was found at an inoperative - sugar plant and delivered to tlie railroad~s storage area by trucks belonging to the front. In ti:Q fall of 1444, on assignment from tlie command of the lst Belorussian front, pers~onnel of railroad and veTiicle troops prepared and deliver- ed 540,000 cubic meters of wood ~or tfie Kovel'skaya and Brest-Litovsk railroads. By decision of the State Committee on Defense coal train traffic was speeded up to overcome fuel difficulties on tfie railroads. The roads established minimum supplies of fuel. S~ome railroads sucFi as the Gor'k.iy, Northern Yaroslavl', and - Octo6er lines were partially switctied to Fieating the locomotives with wood.4 A movement to conserve coal developed on tfie inttiative of the locomotive � engineer.s. Coal suhstitutes hegan to be used, in particular a coal mixture. The normative carrying capacity, esta~lisfied by technical specifications for the first pfiase of restoration, was 12 pairs of trains per day on a single-track line. This goal was not always met. Sometimes tfie traffic capacity of road sectors turned over for operation was just 6-8 pairs of trains. Some rebuilt sectors were not accepted for use because of nu~erous flaws (ttiie second track af tfie sector from ~molensk to Krasnyy Bor in the spring of 1144).5 On occasion a sector that fiad already Tieen adopted for use would be shut down again because of its unsatisf;~.etory condition. For example, two days after com- pletion of restoration of the Zhitomir Korosten' sector traffic had to be stopt~ed to take care of flaws. These cases were minimized where representatives of military communications agencies exercised high standards in accepting rebuilt facilities for permanent use. An exceptionally difficult situation developed on the railroads because of failure to fulfill plans for the regulation of rolling stock. For example, in January 1944 the working fleet of cars on the Southwestern Railroad was three times the estatilished norm. As a result, the speed of travel of military trains declined to 90 kilometers a day, wfiile for supply transports it was much lower. A group of officials~from the Central Directorate of Military Communications and the People~s Commissariat of Railroads was sent out to fix up the situation on the road. Once in the local area tfie commission took steps to speed up train passage through the Kievi center, to encourage restoration work, to intensify unloading work, and so on. The situation was practically identical in April-June 1944 on the Western Railroad. The pace of unloading transports fell behind the pace of their ar- rival at the unloading regions, and the difficulty of forming r_rains from empty cars complying witfi tfie requirements for car selection by type caused 28 FOR OFFICIAL L15E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL ~iJSE ONLY large numbers of empty cars to accumulate.. At tfiis average of 210--295 trains (8,400-14,800 cars) per 1Q-dap~period were. arriying on the road, wfiile 163-235 trains C8,100--12,70~ cars} were released from tfie road. The station tracks were overloaded witfi_empty cars. Tfie road~s. dork began declining. Wliile norms. for operating speed ~vere ma~nly fulfilled (the norm was 24.6 Tcilometers an hour and performance ranged from 22 to 28 kilom- eters an fiour), sector speeds; were regularly below established norms.6 The no-m was ~4.4 kilometers an fiour, fint actual performance was 10.4-12.5 kilom- etrers :~n hour. Thrc~ugfi constant concern on tfie part of party, state, and economic Tiodies so- cialist competition was deVeloped and support provided for all progressive initiatives by railroad workers to overcome tfie problems in work. The Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Sovi:et on 15 April 1943 instituted martial law on railroads was very important for strengthening discipline in transporta- tion and raising tfie preciston of railroad work. All tlie workers and employees of tfie railroa~~ were declared mofiilized for tfie period of the war and assigned to work in transportation. On 25 April 1943 thP Sovnarkom ratified a new Statute on Discipline for Workers and Employees of tTie USSR Railroad Transportation. Extensive party political work to explain tfie new Statute produced positive results very quickly.~ [p 162) Experience the operation of railroads in areas lifierated f rom the enemy, especially abroad, demonstrated thQ great efficiency of assigning mobile forma- tions to the fronts: VEO*s [exFansion unknown]~ steam locomotive columns from the special reserves of the People~s Commissariat of Ra~lroads, and repair trains. Their composition and equipment made it possitile to organize train traffic quickly in sectors whicfi did not fiave operations organizations. The transshipment areas which were organized at points where railroads with dif- ferent track widths intersected played an important part in using Western European railron:~s for military sfiipping. Our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition had high prais.e for our successful use of railroads during the Great Patriotic War, "We should note the outstanding use of railroads by the Russians. Using railroads tfie Russians carried out strategic concentrations and transfers of one or several armies in unbelievably short periods of time. Using railroad transportation tlie Russians were able to stun the German command, because sucfi speed of sTiipment by rail was completely outside their experience.r8 The railroad transportation and military communications agencies successfully handled tfiei: missions of insuring operation of railroacis in the front zone and near tfi~a fronts during the.war years. 29 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOOTNOTES~ 1. Kovalev, I. V,, "Transport v ReshayusFicfiikli_ Operatsipakfi Velikop Otechestvennoy Voynp" [Transportat~on ~n tfis Decisive Operati.ons of the Great Patriotic War], p 13. 2. Povorozlienko, V. V., '~Organizats~a Dvizheniya Poyezdov na Prifrontovykh Dorogakh" [Tfie Organization of Train Traffic on Ratlroads Near the Front], Moscow, "TranszFieldorizdatH, 1943, pp 2Q, 21. 3. Antinenko, N. A., "Na Glavnom Napravlenii," op. cit., p 201. 4. "Uktiodili na Front Eshelonp", op. cit., p 182. 5. "Arkhiv MO" [Archives of tfi.e Min~stry of Defense], Fund 241~ Inventory 2611, File 5, Sfieet 5. - 6. Ibid., File 2Q, Slieet 241. 7. Kuma.nev, G. A., "Na Sluzlib e Fronta i Tyla" [Serving tfie Front and the Rear], p 223. 8. "Voyennyye S~ootislicfieniya za 50 Let", op. cit., pp 58-59. Military Sfiipment by Waterway jpp 163-1C4) Water transportation was used extensiv~ely during the Great Patriotic War for military transport suppart of comfiat operatioris for tran,sporting troops, march replaceme�cs, and military~ supplies from tiiP rear of tfie country, and for medical evacuation. River ship s were used on a firoad scale to organize ferry and liridge crossings in support of operations ~y Soviet troops. In addition, water transportation was used to evacuate tfie sick and wounded, storehouses, industrial enterprises, and population. River and maritime transportation played an important part in maintaining shipping for the cities of Odessa, Sevastopol', Leningrad, Stalingrad, Novorossiysk, and Kercti'. The transportation work of maritime and river transportation workers, navy men, and personnel of the military and naval communications service was performed in a difficult operational situation requiring maximum exertion of efforts of will, initiative, and courage. The planning, organization, and support of military shipping on sea and river lanes during the Great Patriotic War fiad its own ciiaracteristic features in each basin. The maritime and river fleet ~as used most fully tn those cases where water routes were the only means of communication, At the start of the GreaL Patriotic Glar the length of usable internal waterways was 107,300 kilometers. River transportation had 3,494 self-propelled ships and 5,866 non-self-propelled ships. Maritime transportation had also developed. Its fleet consisted of 530 s~liips witli a total load capacit}� of 1.47 million tons, including 89 oil tankers witfi a load capacity of 356,200 tons. 30 !LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504070069-4 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY The Central Commi.ttee of the Communi~t PartZr of thQ S' Union and tfie Soviet Government devoted great attentton to tTie development of marittine and river - transportation. Despite constderatile. upgrading of tfie flee.t, i.t still had ships which were 50 years old and more. Shore facilities developed significantly~ along with the fleet~ River transpor- tation had 5,800 ports and docks:, and new~ ports were Tiuilt. Tlie large ports were equipped with 1,600 uni.ts of cargo-~iandling macfiinery wTiicTi did 47 percent of the loadtng and unloading work.l The port system.of maritime transportation developed significantly. Major ports sucli as Leningrad, R3:ga, Odess~a, Novorossiysk, Baku, Batumi, Arkhangel'sk, Murmansk, Vladivos-tok., and others arere equipped wttTi loading-unloading machinery. But maritime and river transportation Tiad very few ships designed for carryiiig heavy machinery. Tfiere was a sfiortage of movalile equipment to use to adapt freighters for carrying personnel, and tfisre were not enough fieavy-duty cranes to handle tanks at seaports. The line organizations of military communications in water transportation were formed by late 1937 b.y tfie People~s of the Navy. Tfiey were direc- torates of the cfifefs of miliiary transportation service of tfie maritime steam- ship companies sub.ordinate to tFie chief of naval co~unications. Directorates of the cFiiefs of troop movements were not formed on internal water- ways until just before the war, wiien tfiep were established for the following basins: Volga-Kama, WPstern, Moscow~Volga, Nortfiern, and Northwestern. The line agencies of military communications on internal waterways, with the excep- tion of the Nortiiwestern and Amur basins, were included in the composition of the military communicattons agencies of tfie People's Commissariat of Defense, while the two exceptions mentioned above were subordinate to the People's Commissariat of the Navy. The organization of military communications service in water transportation did not meet defense needs. During the war these agencies of military communications were not formed until much later than they were needed (for example on the Dnepr and Don). The Statute on tfie Chief of Troop Movements in Water Transportation was ratified on 9 Octolier 1940, and in early 1942 the Statute on Line Military Communications Agencies and River Trans.portation (for Aartime) was ratified. With the initiation of military operations all work by river transportation to ~ carry out the orders of the Central Directorate of Military Communicatior.s and the Main Naval Headquarters was monitored by the dtrectorates of the chiefs of roop ovements� in the river basins. During the 1942 shipping season there were _ 13 directorates of military commandants of water regions and ports in the central river basin. [pp 208-209] In a short survey it is difficult to cover the full range of work related to - planning, organization, and performance of military shipping by water during 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the last war. gut tfie figures tfiat have fieen g~ven sfiow tfiat the river, lake, and maritime fleets were. verp important in transportation support of maj or operations (in tlie defense. of Odessa and S~e~astopol tTie Battle of Stalingrad, tfie defense of Leningrad, and elsew~i~re), in mass troop transfers - and sliipptng strategic cargo petroleum, and in organizing crossings over major water ways. In the preparatton and ~rork.of tfi~ river, ].ake, and maritime fleets under war- ttme conditions tTiere were Fiatfi.po~itive and negative aspects (lack of pre- - paredness for tiie war in tfie so-called rear steamsfiip companies, failure to adapt the fleet - especiallp repair sfiips, to carry heavy militarq equipment, deciding tfie question of com~at support for troop shipments by water, lack of preparedness to tfie danger of mines, failure to find operational solutions to organizational questions of military communications in water trans- portation, failure to develop steps during prewar times for rebuilding trans- - portation facilities, including tfie organization of sliip fioisting work and so on). All these shortcomings were.overcome for tfie most part during the war. The actual work of military sfiipping was done Tiy tTie personnel of the river and maritime fleets, but siiip personnel fiad a special role. The crews o~ many ships who performed assignments for tFie command demonstrated exceptional diligence, courageousness, fieroism, fearlessness, and devotion to their socialist home- land. The fleet~ and flotillas took on a large sfiare of tfie military labor of supporting and carrying out military sfiipments by water. The personnel of military and naval communications agencies did an enormous amount of work in water trans.portation during tfi.e Great Patriotic War. They were a fairly s.mall detacFiment, for the most part Tiighly skilled specialists in preparation and use of water transportation for military purposes. Tfiey were people who knew mtlttary affatrs, were devoted to tfietr native land, and performed their duty to tfie end lieroically, sometimes giving their lives. Under extremely difficult condi:tions they planned and carried out significant m3:litary shipping by water, participated in restoration of port and dock facilities, ships, and waterways, and solved many problems tliat arose during the Great - Patriotic War. FOOTNOTE~ 1. "Transport i Svyazt SSSR" jUSSR Transportation and Communications], Moscow, "Statizdat", 1957, p 143. Air Defense of Railroads and Combat ~upport for Military Shipping [pp 210-211] During preparation for its: attack on tfie Soviet Union, the Nazi command envi- sioned massed strikes against our country's ~ransportation arteries, especially trunk railroads, as one of the foremost missions. Tlie Barbarossa plan pointed out that Russian railroads and communications routes would have to be cut off or knocked out, dependtng on tfieir significance for tfie operation. 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Railroad transportation found i.tsel~ in a difficult situation as a reault of - the sudden enemy attack. Taking advantage of temporarp atr supremacy, the fascist command tried to paralyze tfi~. work of our railroads in the front zone and near tfie front. On the first day of tfie war enemy aircraft carried out massed attacks on ttie border railroads. Strikes were deliver~d chiefly ~gainst major rail centers, stations, and Fridges. In the following days tfie intensity~and scale of attacks ~y German fascist - aviation on Tiorder railroads grear. During 22 and 23 June 1941 more than 100 railroad structures in tfie western part of tfie country were destroyed by enemy bombing and artillery slielling.l Enemy aviation operated on a Firoad front from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea and subjected railroad to a deptTi of 350-400 kilometers to intensive bomFiing.2 In certain montfis of 1941~more tfian 20 railroads were in the sphere of enemy air action at one time. Between June and Decemfier 1441 fascist aviation carried out 5,939 air attacks against railroads and dropped more tfian 46,OQ0 aerial bom~is.3 _ At the outset of tfie second day of tfie war our country~s air defense was de- . ployed primarily to repuls~e an ae.rial enemy at a deptii of 500-600 kilometers.`' - Units of horder zone air defense ware forced, wfiile protecting targets, to wage battle against advancing enemy ground ~orces at the same time. Antiaircraft artillery was enlisted to repulse tank attack.s, and antiaircraft machine gun units were turned against enemy infantry. Nonetheless, it was possible to pro- - tect most of the important sectors of railroad and fiighway and ma~or bridges and crossings. Tfiey functioned withDUt prolonged interruptions until the Soviet forces had withdrawn from the regions tfiey were defending. The special resolution of tfie State Committee on Defense of 2 September 1941 entitled "Steps Toward Air Defense of Rail Centers, Bridges, and Transports" played an exceptionally important part in improving tTie defense of communica- - tions lines. Tfie resolution outlined specific steps to organize the air defense of key railroad facilities in the Soviet Union. An extensive air defense system including antiaircraft weapons (artillery, machine guns, and antiatrcraft armored tra3:ns), fighter aviation, and anti- aircraft macfiine gun platoons, followed later Tay antiaircraft-mar_hine gun- cannon platoons~, was created to protect railroad sectors, centers, bridges~ tunnels, front regulting stations, supply stations, troop loading and unloading regions, and other important rail facilities agatnst enemy aviation from the first days of tfie war. [pp 233-239] Until the Great Patriotic War railroads o~ere guarded by rifle guards of the People's Commissariats of Railroads and NKVD [People~s Commissariat of Internal _ Affairs] troops. 33 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WitTi the start of tha ~rar tTie pxotection of all key~ railroad �acilities. was - turned over to NKVD troops, w~ich guarded-more.tfian 4,10~ ratlroad trans- portation sites.s In some cases railroad militta was enlisted for security. In leading sectors of tFie fronts~ railroad uni.ts guarded important~manmade atructures until tfie arrivai of NKVD subunits. Railroad facilities in tfie deep rear were guarded Fip the paramilitary guard of tfie People~s Commissariat of Railroads. The number of NKVD units allocated to guard th.e railroads of a front depended ~ on the operational situation, tFie length.of tfie lines, tfie number of sites being guarded, and the number of units availafile to tfie command. Tfie average density of guards was 2-3 persons for two kilometers of track (it is interesting to note tfiat German fascist troops assigned 9-12 persons per one kilometer of track~. The number of railroad si.tes to Fie guarded and tlieir names were determined by the central commission and tfie interdepartmental road commission ~hich included rep- resentatives of tfi~ Peoplets Commissariat of Railroads, milttary communications agencies, tfie NKGB jPeople~s Commissariat of State Security], and NKVD troops assigned to guard tfie particular ob~ects. In the difficult year of 1941 alone NKVD units and subunits guarding and de- fending tiridges and rail sectors wiped out more tfian 26,000 enemy soldiers and officers, 40 aircraft, 150 tanks and armored vefiicles~ and 77 field guns of various cali6ers.6 The territorial and transportation agencies of tfie NKVD and NKGB, tfie border troops, and tfie internal troops of the NKVD of the western districts provided reliable protection and defense for tfie rear of the active Sqviet Army. Tfiere were especially fiot and bloody battles in the first days of the war for laridges and crossings and rail centers and lines in the border regions. The three squads of tfie 8th Security Detachment, headed Fiy Sr Lt P. K. Starovoytov held the railroad tiri.dge across tfie Western Bug F3ver in the Brest region for four fiours. The fascists attacked tlie bridge tfiree times, but each time were rolled back. Thep poured artillerp fire onto the T~order guards from two armored trains that were shooting across the river and they fiurled mortars at them. Then the enemy tanks moved in. Almost all the defenders of the bridge _ perished.~ The battle for tfie railroad hridge across the San River at Peremyshl' was espe- cially bitter and stuFib:orn. Ths firidge was attacked by two enemp companies at the same time, witfi artillery support; the bridge was defended by small groups of Chekists fro~a the tiridge security garrison and border guards headed by deputy chief of tlie 14tfi Security Detacfiment Lt P. Necfiayev. The enemy took no account of losses in fiis attempt to seize the Firidge. The defenders of the bridge fought witfiout fear for their lives. Wfien new groups of border guards _ came up fram the reserves the attacks were driven off.8 3~. ~ , ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504070069-4 FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The fightin~ for the railroad bridge across tflQ Prut Ri.ver in th~ Kagul axis, in the sector of tfie 5th ~ecurity Detacfiment of tfiQ 25tfi. Kagul Sorder Detach-- ment of Moldavia, went on for two days.. On 23 ,Tune 1941 tfie detachment re-- ceived an order to blow up tfie firidge.. It was~ s~.ized and Filown up by a 13-~man ~roup led tiy S~r Lt A. K. Konstantinov, assistant cfiief of staff of the ~iorder comandant~s office. One part of tfiQ group performed tfie ~isston of seizing - the bridge, while t~ie second did tfie demolition work, and tfie tTiird provided comtiat security. While an assault group d~stracted tfie eneiuy tfie combat engineers placed explosives under the ~ridge supports. Tlie explosion rang out. But the bridge was only damaged. On 24 June tfie operation fiad to be repeated with a larger group. Tfie 1i.ridge flew into tfie air at 2200. Our country valued the feat of tfie Kagul soldiers highly. Three of them, in- cluding A. K. Konstantinov, were given tTie title Aero of tfie ~oviet Union and the others who fought in the battle received orders and medals. 9 Fortresses on wheels is wTiat armored trains were called c~uring tfie war. The armored trains of tlie lst Division of NRVD troops assigned to guard especially important railroad structures took part in the fighting at Novograd Volynskiy, Zhitomir, in tfie Selotserkov axis, and many otfier trunk lines of tTie South- western front. Armored train BP-56 especially distingui.sfied itself. It was covering the with- drawal of ourunits in the. Novograd--Volynskiy region and found itself cut off from friendly troops. Fas~cist infantry with artillery and tanks appeared on the railroad crossings along tfie line from Novograd~Volynskiy to Korosten~ on 6 July 1941 and knocked out tfie train~s patfi of withdra.:~l. Tfiere were or~ly two things to do: either blow up tfie train or repair the track under constant enemy fire _ and fight tfirougfi to Kiev. Tfie second plan was adopted. Afte~c repairing the damage and wiping out tlie guns- and armored vehicles tfiat blocked its gath, the armored train hroke tfirough tfie enemy battle formations and arrived in Kiev on 11 July 1941. The armored train was gi.ven the mission of guarding and defending the railroad line from Kiev to Teterev, preventing the German offensive from enveloping the Kiev Fortifted Region. The figfiting men of tlie train together with a ground security detachment discovered and disarmed the fascist spotters who were cor- recting the actions of the German Bombers and tfien repulsed attac~CS by enemy aviation with antiaircraft fire. On 12 July 1941 the train was sent to Borodyanka station (50 kilometers nortliwest of Kiev) with ttie mission of helping our units stop enemy attempts to Gut tfie trunk line from Kiev to Korosten'. Waging battle against enemy artillery and tanks, tfie armored train with tt~e cooperation of infantry and tlie figfiting men of a ra3:lroad battalion thwarted tfie enemy attempt to cut the rail line. On 14 July 1941 BP-56 repulsed several attacks liy fascist aviation in the Borodyanka sector and again fough.t against enemy tanks.l0 At the same time BP-A of the railroad mtlitia in cooperation with fighting men of the destroyer hattalion of the ICiev railroad region and units of the Kiev Fortified Region, ~ieat back attacks by tanks attempting to take Vorzel' station 35 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONZY and damaged the railroad track neax tfiE firi.dge across tfia ~rpen~ River arhere the line of defense ran.ll Armored train No 73 distinguisFied itself on tfi.e to Moscow, It entered the Fiattle against tfie enemy in Helorussia in tfie first days of tfie war, and then later fougfit at Leningrad. Tn August 1941 it defended a sector of the October Railroad 5et,ween Gryady and VolkFiovo stations. On 21 Novemtier 19.41 armored train No 73 arrived to def end the capi.tal. It was assigned to guard and de.fend tfie rail sector from Yakfiroma to Dmitrov. The guns of the train Waged fire against eneTny tanks, field guns, and mortars while its ma.cfiine guns were used against infantry. tfie war armored train No 73 also fougTit at Stalingrad and in th.e liberation of tfie Western Ukraine. Througfiout tfie war in many rail centers, stations, and sectors armored trains were assigned to guard and defend tfiem against ground attacks by the enemy. In the second fialf of 1944 tFie anti.aircraft~macfiine gun--cannon platoons were also assigned to defend trains against attack Fy sabotage gangs. These pla- toons were equipped wi_tfi. macfiine guns. Tnounted on the train for firing at ground targets, automatic weapons, and grenades for tfie f~gfit against tiandits on the L'vov, Kovel~, Kisfiinev,Belostok, and Brest--Litovsk railroads. The personnel of antiaircraft machine gun--cannon platoon No 360, which was es- corting military fiospital train No 1131 wfi.en it was sub~ected to attack by enemy automatic riflemen, demon~trated great lieroism and steadfastness. Despite the fact tFiat the platoon lost almost one-quarter of its personnel, they drove back the enemy riflemen. During tlie summer-fall offensive of 1444 guarding and defending the rear of the active army ~ecame especially important, especially in the western oblasts of the Ukraine, Beloruss~a, and the Haltic region. Nazi agents organized sub- versive activity tiy bourgeois-nationalist gangs in an attempt to disrupt the life that was lieing reorganized in tfie liFerate3 regions. Tlierefore the Soviet command took steps to T~olster the security of the railroads and motor vehicle roads, bridges, communications lines, and other facilities~. The 12th Detached Air Defense Battalion especially distinguished itself in the fight against bandits. It lieat off 16 attacks by them against trains and trans- ports it was escorting on the L''vov Railroad. The battalion killed 72 of the bandits and took 175 prisoner. In the course of tfie entire war the anti- aircraft-machine gun-cannon plaComn repulsed 63 attacks by enemy saboteurs and other groups. With the entry of the Sovi:et Army onto the terrttory of neighboring countries in the second tialf of 1~44 tTie mission of guarding tfie rear took on new, di�- ~ ferent features. On 18 DecemFier 1944 tfie State Committee on Defense adopted the decree entitled "Guarding the Rear and Communications Lines of the Active ~ Red A.rmy in tfi~ Territory of East Prussia, Poland, Czecfioslovakia, Hungary, and ~ Romania." This resolution ordered the People`s Commissariat of Defense to form six divisions of 5,000 men apiece and turn tfiem over to tfie NKVD. Tliree of them - 36 ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500070069-4 _ FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY began performing tlieir missions during tfi~ C~isla--Oder and East Prus~si:an strategic operations in East Prussia, Poland, and Czeclio~lovakia. In tfie second half of February 1945 three more divisions hegan combat activi:ties in Romania and Hungary. Tfiey reliaFily supported the securitp- of tfie front rear and communications lines of tfie active armX.12 - ConGideralile attention was also given to ground secur~.ty and defense of tt~e - railroads of the Far East and tfieix principal sites. Armored trains and anti~ - aircraft armored train~ were used in addi.tion to NKVD uni.ts. Tfie security~ and defense of important sites was assigned to tfie border troops.l3 , Because the NKVD troops did not fiave a trained reserve~ tfie security of _ Manchurian railroads lifierated from the enemy was organized by the front com- mands. To do this eacli army ass.igned rifle uni.ts within its own rear region and their p erformance was monitored by military communications agencies. Tfie 2nd Red Banner Army of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, for example, assigned 400 men to guard railroads at tfie disposal of military communications agencies.l4 According to a decision of the Mili.tary Council of the Front, units of the 215th, 68th, and 97tTi rifle divisions of the Sth.Army of the lst Far Eastern Front were enlisted to guard tfie Kirin Railroad. ' In addition, the cliiefs of army military cornmunications were also given platoons ~ from reserve regiments. They were used to guard and escort trains from army bases to unloading stations. The security of stations, bridges, water pumps, and sectors was provided Tay garrisons. Tfie commanders of large rifle uni.ts distributed units at security sites according to requests from military communi.cations agencies, whicfi moni~ . tored the security of the railroads. - The local populatfon was used to guard little-used railroad sectors in Manchuria. In this case security was organized and monitored by militarp com- munications agencies. Military trains in areas, at loading--unloading stations, and en route provided air defense and ground securi:ty with tfieir own T/0 means. In the final stage of the war a significant share.of tfia National Air Defense Forces, which were deployed in tfie rear of combined arms fronts, were used to cover communications~ routes, al~ove all railroads, at a depth of 300-500 kilometers from tlie front line. For tT~is purpose they assigned 10--34 percent of figliter aviation, 13-54 percent of antiai.rcraft artillery, and 27-60 percent of antiaircraft machine guns.l5 All this led to a decrease in tfie numtier of attacks fiy enemy aviation and a change tn attack tactics. Wtiereas enemy aviation carried out 5,848 air attacks on railroad targets in 1942, in 1~43 th~ figure was 6,915, and in 1944 only 1,161 attacks were made.16 37 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500070069-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Tn the second ~ialf of tfie war the German ~'ascist aviation azas forced to cfiange ~ from daytime attacks to night attacks, and tfi_ey~ directed their eff~rts pri-- - marily against railroad transportati:on targets. L+dfiereas tlie number of n~gfit attacks against railroad targe.ts in 1~.41 t~as 9..5 percent of tfie total number = of attacks, in 1944 tfie proportion of nigfit attacks rose to 85 perce~nt.17 Between 1941 and 19.45 enemy aviatinn made. 14~,863 attacks on USSR railroad targets, with tfie participati.oz of afiout 6~,~QO:aircraft. They dropg~d more - than 243,000 higli-explosive and fragmentation b.omfis and more than 12Q,OQQ incendiary bombs.i$ During the war years: 44 percent of tTie TiomTis dropped on tIie Soviet-German front were used against railroad targets.19 Despite th:Ls, tfis enemy was not able to = disrupt the work of the railroad for any extended period. The average lengtfi of ir~erruptions in train traffic after eacli. �attack. Fiy enemy aviation was about six fiours, and only in isolated cases dtd tlie interruption exceed 24 hours.20 Considerable credit for th~ fact tfiat, despite ~urious attacks ~y enemy avia' tion on the railroads, we did not lose. a single newly formed tank or rifle unit in the entire war, goes to the personnel of the Air Defense Forces.21 Timely and correct organization of air defense of tfia railroads and comFiat sup- port for military rail shipping played an important part during the war years in insuring stable work tiy tfie railroads and uninterrupted performance of large- _ scale military shipping. , FOOTNOTES 1. Kumanev, op. cit., p 64. 2. "Tyl", op. cit., p 227. 3. "Istoriya Velikoy Otecliestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941--1945" - [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941--1945], Vol 2, p 169. 4. "Istoriya Vtoroy Mi.rovoy Voyny 1939--1945" [History of Wbrld War II of 1939- 1945], Vol 4, p 48. 5. "Voyennyye Soobsficheniya za 50 Let�, op. c~t., p 51. 6. "Biblioteka TsUPVOSO MO" jLibrary of the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Mintstry of Def ense], inventory No 6218, sTieet 195. 7. Ibid., sheets 305, 206. 8. Ibid. , slieets 211, 212. 38 - , , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500070069-4 k'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 9. ITiid, , sfieets 214, 215, 216. 10. Ibid., sheets 217, 218, 214. 11. IFiid. , sfieet 21~. 12, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Fefiruary 1275. 13. Vasilevskiy, A.. M. ,"Delo Vsep~ Zfiizni`~ jT~tork ~or a Wlinle Life] , p 527 . 14. GrisF?in, M. I. ,"Voyennyye SoofisTi~fiQniya v Kampanii Sovetskiky Vooruzfiennykh Sil na Dal'nem Vostoke" [Militarp Communications in tfiQ Campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in the.Far East], p 45. 15. "Voyska ProtivovozdushnoX Oborony Stranp" jTfiQ National Air Defense Forces.], p 3280 16. Kumanev, op. cit., pp 25Q~ 3Q1. 17. "Voys.ka Protivovozdushnoy Oborony Strany~', op. cit., p 328. 18. "Voxennyye Soob.shcfisniya za 5Q Let"~ op. cit.~ p 54. 19. "Tyl"..., op. cit., p 227. 20. Ibid. 21. "Sovetskiy ~1 v Velikoy Otecfiestveannop VopneH jTfie Soviet Rear in tfie Great Patriotic WarJ, Mo~cow, T'Mys1T`~, 1974, Fook 2, p 226. Pa~ty Political Work in Tnsti.tutions~and Units of Mil.itarp~ Commnunications and Railroad Troops [pp 24-241] The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, arming tTie 3oviet people witfi a Firoad _ program of struggle against the German fascist aggressors, attacfied great tm~ portance to party political work in the army~and tlie navy. The conditions of the war demanded that party political work be reorgani.zed to conform to the new situation and subordinated to tFi~ primary~ob~ective of - smashing the German fascist aggressors. - The Communist Party attac:hed.enormou~ importance to political and ideologtcal indoctrination of Soviet figFiting men, Propaganda for the ideas of - Leninism and explaining to personnel tfie policy of tfie Cammunist Party~ and the just, liberattng character of the Great Patriotic War plaped an tmportant role in ideological and political indoctrination. Tndoctrinating persannel in the spirit af Soviet patriotism and boundless love for tfieir socialist home~ land tiecame paramount. Revealing the li~e tiating, aggressive essence of fascism and insti].ling S~ovie.t fighting men with burning hatred for the German fascist aggressors glaped a 39 . ~ FOR OFFICIAL ~JSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY large part in the and poli.tical indoctrination of Soviet Army fighting men. One of tFie main areas of party political worF~ ~n tfis S~oviet Army, including th~ insti.tutions and units of m~litarp co~nunications and railroad troops, was the campaign for fiigfi troop figFiting effectiveness, comT~at and special skills, and firm military discipline. Tfiis was ~mportaa.t because~many front and line military commandants~ offices~ on railroads and waterwaps, air defense units of military communications, ra~lroad troops, and special formations of the People's Commissariats of Ratlroads~ ~ere operating under tfie difficult - conditions of a combat situation. The new missions of party poli.tical ~zork. and tfie special features of doing it under wartime conditions demanded tFiat commander~ and party and I~omsomol organt-- zations of military communications agencies and railroad troops search for more effective forms and methods of personnel indoctrination. Mass agitation work became the leading form of political indoctrination of f igfiting men. The principal activities were meetings, political information sessions, discussions, reading of newspapers, reports from tfie Soviet Tnforma-- _ tion Bureau, orders of the Sup~eme Commander, fiulletins, and tfie like. STc~llful use of all the many different forms of party political work was an important condition for successful activity fiy party and Romsomol organi.zations on po-- litical and military indoctrination of Botfi the personnel of military commu- - nications and railroad troops and tfie f~igfiting ~nen being transported Fiy~ rail and water. The institution of military commissars in the ~oviet Artuy and Navy~mas very important. The commi:ssars of the directorate~ of tfi~ chiefs~ of front~milttary communications, air dE~fense units, railroad troops, and tfie directorates of chiefs of troop movements on railroads and in river basis did an enormous _ amount of work on political and military indoctrination of personnel, managed party and Komsomol organizations of the units and institutions, and monitored performance of orders from the command. During the war thei.r main efforts - were concentrated on guaranteeing execution of plans for military sTiipping, achieving a high rate of restoration of railroads and waterways, reliable combat and technical cover for tfiem, disseminating tTie work know how of leading ~ fighting men and workers of rai]. and water transportation, and introducing progressive labor methods in practice. _ COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1981 11,176 CSO: 1801/199 END 40 ' [CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070069-4