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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY JPRS L/10636 6 Ju~Y 1982 Worldwide Re ort p TERRORiSM FOUO 5/82 FBe~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR dFFiCIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500084410-7 . NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarLly from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language s~urces are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. HeadZines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [TextJ or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the . last line of a brief, indicate how the original inforroation was _ processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or na.mes preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but ha~e been supplied as appropris~e in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes withiu the body of an item originate with the source. Times within 3.tems are as given by source. - The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at.tituc~es of the U.S. Government. . ' COPYRIG'~~T LAWS AIdD REGULATIONS GOVFRNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERTALS REPRODUCED HERETN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BF RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYo APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 JPRS L/10636 ~ 6 ~'uly 1982 ~ ~ WORLDWIDE REPORT TERRORISM FOUO .5/82 ~ CONTENTS NEAR EAST AND NORTH Ag'RICA ARMENIAN AFFAIRS Armenian Terrorist Leader Discusses Plans, Contacts (Zaki Shihab; AL-HAWADITH, 12 Feb 82) 1 WEST EUROPE FRANCE . ~ 'Action Direct' Ties Tniith Ecologists, Ultra-Left Prisoners Cited (LE FIGARO, 7 May 82) 11 - Demobilization of JudiGial System, Increased Terrorism Seen (Gerard Nirascou; LE FIGARO, 7 May 82) J3 Defferre On Battle Against International Terroriem (Gaston Defferre Interview; PARIS MATCH, 7 May 82) 19 Changed Style, Future Potential f~r Terrorist Acts (Gerard de Villiers; PARIS MATCH, 7 May 82) 26 Rue Marbeuf Editor on Syrian Terrorist Techniques (Walid Abou Zahr; PARIS MATCH, 7 May 82) 30 National, International Terrorism, Prevention Examined (Antoine Bugev; LATITUDE AUJOURD'HUI, Jun 82) 33 Anarchists Said to Have Varied Ties With Terrorism (Michel Borcier; LATITUDE AUJOURD'HUI, Jun 82) 36 - SPAIN Terrorism in Spain (Ale,jandro Munoz Alonso; EL TERRARISMO EN ESPANA, 1982).... 41 - a - [III - WW - 133 FOUO] FOR OFF[CIAL USL ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444544484414-7 _ . A~iL?N A!lA~B ARI~NIAN T6~lRORIST LEADB~ DISCt1SS~S PLAIiS, CpiTACTS. Londoa At.-HAiiADI1'H in Arabic 12 Feb 82 pp 20-22, 19 !eb 82 p 6 /Article by Zeki Shihsb: "A Secret Arm~nian Armpr Lca~der to AL-BAWADITB: N~ Take Pric~e in SQviet Asvienia but Bimaa It fa~r Ies I~aglig~ace toi+as~ the As~enian Struggle:!'~ - /Tsact/ For more than a monti~~ tha date far the meating i?ith one og Che leaders of tbe Armenian Secrat Asmy for the Liberation of Astioepia knpt ahi~tiag from apecific appointmant� on occuions to poetponam~ents on oti~ar ac~asians. BetMeea thass, the waiting psoces: pervaded the eituation. /lctivity, "'ns the~ say," totaLly doninated ' ths Aa~nian army, and news aboat i~ begaa to appeu �n unuaual waya. Tha front pages of the interuational, Arab and lnc~l prees broaght the reader, Nherevar lu was, the rasult~r of same o~peration or anot~her thgt armba~e of thie ara~q ~arQ cas~y- ing out, in Frar~ce, Switserlaad or othe~ araas of tha aorld. One evening last aeek, AL-Hl?IaADITH ~aa eontacted i~ its ofrice in Beirut bg phona and told that 9.ts corre~spondant w~e to wait, With its photographrr Joseph pakhlah, in the correapondent's hoc~ an tha clunce that oomeane might knock en the door andl take them to one of tha centere tha Armenian Sscrati Aray ~ss ~doptod for head- quart0rs. In fact, as 1800 hours approacbad, ths be3.Y raag a~ad the door opened to " a fairhaired young man, heavpaet and Call, vl~o a~ked for the naa~ss, then proceede~d ' to aay "Are you resdy?" The immedizte snswar Was '~Of couram--Whare to?" Our question went unans~wered: /Out �ront/ wie a car whose general ap~earance wes undistiaguiehed, due to the ad- vent of night, ~aich had begun to fall. Three qouag men Were waiting for ue ia _ addition to the driver. ~le got into tha car, shook hamds with them a~ad introduced oureelves. They asked us to put maaks aa our haads to cover our eyes, and the car � then went off. Where to? We don~t know: ~ After about half an hour, ~he ear ~topped ia fxont of a buildin~g, we got out and we went iato the basement ef the bouae and ~e~�e taken to a roas there. 1 FOR OF'FIS,'IAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 The young companioas apologized for this coaduct and �aid, "You understand the 8ecurity measures; the situatioa demanda ~.ts of us. Ws hope the day will coma When you ~+ill visit us in onr liberated snp ~~~Lic, As~enia:" One of them came forth and introduced us to t1u young Armeniaa Dim~tri Georgiou, whom ttee French authoritiee had racently released after s period of iaprisosuient on the charge of co~itting a"terrorist" act in Franee. Armenian poetere had been put up. Pictu.res of young Atmenian a~en aad women carry- ing out various oparations graced the Walls of tha room, vhich vas 3 maters by 3 meters, and in addition t~ere were colleetione of broc~uraa, a small tape recorder and plain wc~oden chairs. - In a few moments a tall yo~ng Astiseniaa in his thirtiee came in, apeaking brokea non~Lebaneae Arabic. He ahook hsnds with us and apologized for the delay in the meeting. His camrades who vare with us then introduced him: "Comrade Hagop Hagopian (an aYias), one of the Armeaian Arary leadere Who are spread about over the world." We began the conversation. AL-HAWADITtI: Why was your orgariization established? - Hagop Hagopian: The organization of the Asmeniaa Sac~et Army for the Liberation of Armenia was eatablished ae a natural response to the state of revolntionarq apathy that the Armeaian ecene, consisting of the dispossessed Ar~xniaa massea of the whole world, wae auffering frooi. It also came about as a respanse to the national and claas repreasion that ouz people have suffered throughant their time in exile. In order for us to put aa end to th~ee tMO forms of oppresaion, it wss necessary to promote a revolutionary focal pnint that weuld ~ssame the revoluCian- ary taska and hietoric responsibilities of liberaeing the Armeniaa citisen, call- ing for his rights in exile and preparing him to wage hie struggle alongaide othnr struggling peoplea. Therefore the central task of the Armeniaa citizan lies in tha process of struggling to liberate his natioa Ar~nia, which has been usurped by the fascist Turkiah regime. AL-;~AWADIT~i: Therefore your goal may be summarized as-- ~:agop Hagopian: Liberation of Asa~enia, which has been occupied by the 1~rkish re- gime, and the establiehment of a socialiet societq in liberatad Armenia. I pL-HAWADITH: Do you believe that the only meaaa for realfzing the goals are sabotage and terror? Hagop Hagopian: I would l~ke to wara you againet repeating what the Westera media are circulating. Our methods are not deetructive; although our matb~ais are revolu- tionary, they are called destructive. Since you are an Arab journalist, lat me tell qou that the methada of the Palestinian revolution are daatru~tive and those 2 FOR OFFICIwL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 of tho Arab strugglds in the era of the Ottaman, British aad Freach occupakiona were aleo dnstructive. I would like you to correct your question. AL-HAWADITE~: What ie your position on the other Arnenian political parties? Hagop Hagopfans Of courae, our poaition regarding the political partims on the Armenian etage is clear. Th~y ar_e Without a doabt traditional partiee whose role eoded in exile, because they have no programe for this etage of liberatioa of oar occupied territory. Their political progrsm ioa~ si~ly be svn~arized as prsaerv- iag "the Armeniar~eae of the Armeniaae." Th~refore ae founded the Arrenian Secret Army for the Liberatioa oF Armenia as put of a clear program and vision Por liber- ating the occupied laad. We have atayed aWaq fraw these puties becaaae they have growr~ canveational sr+d hava devel~psd relations witb the regimee whasa they are iac:ated. AL-HAWADITH: Se there is no coordination among you? Hagop Hagapians Absolutely not. Absolutely not. AL-HAWADITN: It i8 well knoWn that there ie a big Aroenian comounity in the United Stat~~. Does it git~e you aupport? Are there any tias that bind you to it ia spite of your leftist orientation? Hagop Hagopian: We have relations with our mssees every~+here we are located. 1.aft- i8t--aar organization is not wh:~t the Western press, `rhich Call~ it "the inter- national lefC," claims it ie. Aather, it arises from caa~mitment and close adher- ence to our Armenian masses and defEaeie of theiY iaterests a~d our central cause, be they in tha United States of Anerica, Burope or the Middle Saet. If csr adher- er~ce to the cause a~a~d our dem8ad for onr rights is to be labelled "leftiam," then we are le~eists. AL-HAWAJITii: Where are the Armeniana located in the world? What is your popula- tion and geQgraphical breakdowa? Hagop 4legc~giaus The Armenian masses hava a caacentrated presnnce in the IIaited States of America, where their nua~ber is estimatecl at about 1 millioa. This of course puta the Armenian co~uaity in the Onited States in first place in terms of the number of citizens in foreign countries. Ths Armenian ~oa~nuni~y in Iran ie aecond, t,iat in Ruropa ao a�'~ole third, and then camn the /lrab countries. This is ae far aa th~ cammiuaity in exila goea, Where the ay~prozi~ate aemaber of Armenisn citizena is 4 millirm. Tt~ere are also about 3 million p~aple in the Soviet Repu~blic of Armenia. AL-HAWADITii: ~1hat are the boundaries of the couatry you are calling for? Hagop Aagopi~n: The boundariee of the conatry w~ are calling for are i.n keeping with those endor~ed by the Laueanae aad 3evrea xgremoaenta of 1920; that is, they encompase the following provinces: the Pravince of $rzerum, the Fravince of Ven, the Province of Biklis, the Pcmtinc~ of Kars~ ths Pravincc~ of Ardahan, and Mount Ararat. This map Wae recognized at the time by the 3oviex Union, Xhe IInited 3 FOR OFF iCIAL USE ONLY J APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 States, Brit~in, France, and Turkey itself. However, no party ventured to bring it into being; they proceeded to act in terms of their own intareeta ~nl~, ahich take pleaaure in peop lea' problems. AL-HAWADIT~i: i~hat is yaur positiou oa the Republic of AroeniaZ Do you vieW ft ad an embqdiment of the national aCate you dream of? ~ Hagop Hagopian: We take pride in the Saviet aepublic of Armania, u~d we take pride in the fact that it hae atruggled aad managed to play a grsat role in tha coatext of preserviag and developing Armenian culture, tecbaology, industry, aad so forth. At the same tiu~e, all these resources are mobilized to serve other peoples, be they the other sepublics in the 3oviet Union or the Arab peo~ples and the o~~pressed peoples in Africa, becauae when the Soviet IInion supports tha Palestinian revolu- . tion or the Arab couatries in any manner, the Republic of Armsnis autamatically contributea to that aupport. flere we, as aa As~ooenian secret aray for the libara- tion of ~rmenia, can record our obaervation ou officials in ~he Soviet ~epublic of Armenia, which is that they have abandoned the sone of their countsq vl~o are struggling for the Armeniaa people in e~cile aad do not perform their dnty ta~ard Armenia's central cause. - AL-HAWADITH: Ib that meant as a threat? Hagop Hagopian: No, absolutely not. It is juat naeant to make them bear reaponei- bility and draw their. attention. AL-HAWADITli: What is your poaitioa on the Soviet Uaion? Is your orgeniaation nationaliat cr socialist internationalist? Hagop Hagopian: By determining our political strategy aad political line, aad hy our evaluation of the international stxuggles in the ~or~ld, we inave defined our enamy as the fascist 1~rkieh regime, with all its military and civilian institu- - tione. We also coneider that anyone supporting thfs regime falls iato the cate- gory of enemies. We consider all countriea ia the aocialist world to be tho frisnds . of our people and aur cause, and we consider all revolutionary and liberation move- menta to be atrategic allies of our revolution. AL-HAWADIT~i: Many organizationa have abandoned the ~ethod of revolutionary vio- lence to attain ob~ectives, including the /Palestiae/ Liberation Organizatioa. What ie your opinion on that? - Hagop Hagopian: The Liberation Organization has aot obaadoaed revolutionary vio- lence. Pxoof of that ia the fact that same of the detachmenta that are repre- ~ented in t;~e Liberation Organization still embrace armed conf lict ae a means of struggling for th~e liberation of Palestine and the return of the dispossessed Palestinian people to C:ieir territory. AL-HAWADITH: The Armeninns hava faced aaaay forms of oppression. Why have the - r,etaliatory oparations been restricted to ~rlcey alene? 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444544484414-7 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY Hagap Hagopian: They haven't. Firat, our activity is not retaliatory, as you said. We have defiaed ouz enemy as the f~?scist Turkieh regime, with all itr in- etitutions, aad everyone supporting this regiee~. We have traaelated tbese elogana into action. We have attacked Turkish institutiana, luv~a ~ts~eicic aat at the inati- tutions thati ~re allied with t~is regime aad hava managed to ~aka ~oos paopls neutral. For ezample, 3qitzerland sided with the Turkieh regiae, but recently it took a neutral position, aad we iasued a statemsnt, on Jsauary 1982, reqneatiag all detachm~nts of the Arm~aian revolutian to stvp their military etrilces against Swias inatitutions throughout the w~nrld and inside Svi,tzerlaad as a conseqaence of Switzerland's understanding of the Armenian cause aad ita agreeaent to hold a polit- - ical trial of one of our fighters who ia imprisoned ia its prisons, cansidering our fighting man a political prisoner. I coneider that thia ia a good victos~r in the context of the progress of the Armenian cause. Fraaca haa alao b~ esesptioasl de- cree given tha heroes of the Vaa oper~tion the titla of political prisoners, be- cauae there is no law in Fraace which considers priaon~ra political pereons. It has given them all the righte all political prisoaers enjoy aad it ~+ill hol.d a can- pletely political trial. These ars all tha fruits that pa ue gleaning on behalf of the struggles we are waging. - AL-HAWADITH: Through whom were tha contacts m~da? Hagop Hagopians Ae the French gaverament atated to AI~-HAWADITH magaaine, contact~ are made through ita seni~bn officials. AL-HAWADIT~i: Have you held joiat meetinge with 3wiae officialsY Hagop Hagopians Absolutely aot. AL-HAWADITH: So how did you reach an agreen,ent? Hagop Hagopian: Through intermedie.ries. AL-HpWADITH: What conditions do you impose oa Turkey to make peace? Hagop Hagopian: There wi11 be no peace ~ith Turkey except when c~ur territory is liherated ia? full. AL-HAWADITH: Wbat ie the natur~ of your relationship with the 6rmenian orgaaiza- tion "Orly?" Hagop Hagopian: There is actuallq no relatioaehip. We were taken by surpriae by the Orly organization. However, as you know, contacts have been made bet~een us and we met and we held convers~tiond with the Orly leaders, offering the necesearq support. They really proved their courage when they msnaged to com~pel the Freach goverctment to release the fighting maa Dimitri Georgiou, who is aitting with you. AL-HAWADITH: Is Beirut a ma~or apringboard for your army tc� all areas of the aorld? ~ 5 - FOR OF~r ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540080010-7 FOR O~'FICIAL USE ONLY Hagop Hagopiaa: Beirut, to us, is like the other capitals of countries in the - world, since you know the nature of the coaiQosition of tha Armenisa paople. There- fore one caa say that it ~s not a major springboard. AL-HAWADITH: Are there any relations between you and the Red Brigades, tha Badsr Meinhof Orgauizatioa aad the Japanese Red Armdr? t~agop Hagopian: We have already an~wered this qnestion in previoue statemante to the world pre~e. We have relations with all rsvolutionary detachmsnts that are struggl~ng directly or isdirectly to wrest their peapla'a r3ghta from tl~ colon- ialista. AL-HAWADITH: Do the8e organizations receive training in your ca~ops, fo~r ia~t~oce? Hagop Hagopian: No. They do not need ~o get trained in our amaps. They hav~e everything they aeed. We have no needs but have avnrythi~ag we want. Selationa among ua are equal and revolutioasry. We leara fra~ thair eapsriencea 8nd tLey l~arn from oure. AL-HAWADITH: And you--~here do you get your training? Aagop Hagopian: We get our training in our limited headquutere aad camps. When we say that, you must believe it, because all we need to do i8 Eire pistols, tllrov bombs and set explosivee. We do not need big, extensive c~mspa, becaus0 ~ ua ssot carrying out a etreet of mountain war~ AL-HAWADITN: What is your ca~nnecicioa with the Liberation Orgaaizatio~n? Hagop Hagopian: Belations are good, becau8e they represent the Palestinian peoples' cauae. AL-HAWADITfi: Wlut is the Aro~enian church~s relatioaahip to you? Hagop Hagopian: We take pride in the Armenian church, as they take pride in our sCruggle; here oae cannot distinguiah between the church and revolutionary atruggle. They are carrying out their mLssian of preaerving the holy places aad churches in e~cile, and we are carrying out oux misaiou of regaining our laad aad therefore returning to the land together. We comaple~sat each other, and ther�fore we are not C~nieta. AL-HAWADITH: Do you have Orthodox and Catholica in your ranlca, or ie it restrict,ed to the Orthodox? Hagop Hagopian: Of course we include all groups in our movement. AL-NAWADITH: What are the conditions for memberehip in your organization, as far ae the Armenisae go? Hagop Hagopian: i~a naturally have coaditions. One can discuss same of these but for security ressons we will aot discusa oChers. Same conditions of inembership are: 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY 1. Co~plete aad full readiness to carry out the reaolutians of the political, military ud mase orgaaizatian. 2. The individual must aot have social obligations. 3. He must huve soaoe political awareness. These are just the three conditione that ws re~v~eal. AL-HA1iADITH: How maaq personael do you haveZ Hagop Hagopian: We have partisans in all areas of tt?e world. For ea~a~aple, a~e were surprised to find that orgaaizations of A~menian army partieans and papular a:d political organizations were fQrmed ia moat coua~tries of the world, as is clesrly apparent fram the newspapers theq iasue eado~aing the army's polit~cal platfora. AL-HAiiMITH: Are there n,on-Armeaiaa ~embers in yoar orga~izati~an? Hagap Iiagopiaa: (No aasWer). ~ AL-HAWADITB: What percentage of the arn~nians do you represent? Hagap Sagopian: !?s an Arn~eaiaa armq, on~e can evaluate that from the suppoxt we sa a~atlitary force receive from all Armeniaa circles. AL-HAWADITH: It has been said that you resort to the use of threats againet rich Arm~niaas to fiaance your activity. What is the truth of thie statement? Hagop Hagopian: Western pApers have raised this poiat to alander our movement and therafore create a climate of tension in baurgaois Arn~euiaa circles. AL-HAWADITH: flow do yau vi.ew Shaykh Bashir al-Jumay-yil's negative position re- gardiag your organisation? Hagop Hagopiar?; We do not evaluate Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil on the baei8 of his negative evaluation of our orgaaization, We evalnate Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil fram the perspective or the iaterests of aur Armenian maaaea in oriental areas. Ne re- ject acta of aggreasion againet any Armeniaa citi~ea. When such acte occur, our reaponse is very harsh aad is aimed at the aggreesor in his awn home. We went through a pravocative phaee in the past, but aaw ~re are in a state of armistice. He hae issued ordere that Armeniana are nat to be haraased, aad oar caamitment to the armistice with Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil arises froan the national movement and the resiataace's support for us. In addition, he knowa ~ull Well that we caa shut dawn aad strilce out at the Lebaneae Forcee' offices in all areae of the world. AL-HAWADITH: What ia your plgn of action for the coming etage? Hagop Hagopiaa: The fact is that our program is clear, and that is to coutinue to struggle to make our cause, which bae been eradicated for m~re thaa 50 years, 7 FOR OFFICIAL CSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . atand out, and cocuaquently to realize our goal~ ia cooparatian ~aith thm ~urdish - revolutionarq mavearents, the Arab revolutionary mova~ents sad the Z~rkish democrat- ic political parties. AL-HAWADITH: Can we eoon expect qou to carry out ne~ oparations? _ Hagop Hagopian: Every day th~re is the expectation of new vperations fram us, but ~ of course we will not reveal the nature of our Cargete o~ where thay ara focussed. Note In AL-HAWADI~'s interview with an /lrmeniaa Secret Arqy leader published in the last issue, sane mistakes were made which mucat be corrected. Thsse are: 1. T'he questioa contained in the publiehed teat, phrased "Ara there aan-~~enian _ members ~n you~ organization?" aad the answer ia the fosm of "no aaswer," did not basically appegr in the intervieW; this sub~ect was not broached in my Nay, direct- ly or indirectly. 2. In the aacwer to the queetioa "How do you viaw 3k,aykh Bastiir al-Jumsyyil's neg- ative poaition regarding your orgsnization?" the word "lack" was dropped inadve=t- ently; the paragraph appeared as "arisea from the natiaaal mo~vesent and tba re- sistance's aupport for us" iustead of "ariaes frao the lack." Bnd of nots. - 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 ,r,-" . - ~ , _ a~{. t c " t ' . ~ . ~ . t~ , ~ t,. . . . :~~'R. . 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A f~. t ~ . f/ ,y ~,~y' ~ `n,..~1~.~p`4 S~- . . t 1 4 T, p f''' t ~f ;~t'C' ~~z J~_w � ~,~'L3 w.~ ~ , i- ~ ~ ~ ~i ~ Hagop Hagopian (an alias) replies to AL-H~WADITH's questions. . _ � ~t~`". r ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~r ' ~ ~i ` ~ 1 ~ ` ~i ~ ~ ~ ~t~ F, ;r~~ ~ . 1 d F� t ~ , F ' f , a. � R:+ ~1~: ~~q. ~ ',~~y _ , . _ r_ Dimitri Georgiou was recently released by the French authorities. 11887 CSO: 6133/2604 10 FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500080010-7 FRANCE 'ACTION DIRECT' TIES WITH ECOLOGISTS, 'JLTRA-LEFT PRISU?dERS CIT~D Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 May �32 p 28 [Article by J.-C..R: "Bastions of the Ultra-Left"] [Text] Has the amnesty of 10 May tu~sned the members of the toughest French terrorist group "Action Directe," who have been respcnsible for hola-up rnurders, crimes and attacks with explosives and automatic weapons, into peace- ful squatters? Quite the contrary. On 9 April, the "squats" of the 18th district--oi Goutee-d'Or, Poissoniere house, and Rue de. la Charbonniere--received another visit from the police. However, this time it was r..ot the Special Security Corps or police from the district station. These were inspectors of the ~udicial police. The hideout of "Action Directe," a clandestine terrorist movement, rad ~ust bean surrounded. It was 1730 hours. Three bulletproof vests, a pump.gun, and a pistol were seized, as well as documents and radio equipment in the occupied buildings. A fera hours earlier on the sam.e day, on Rue Borrego in the ~Oth district, a trap laid by the Judicial Police at a garage where a stock of mili~ary weapons was concealed enabled the arrest of Joelle Aubron and Mohand Hamani, both urgently wanted terrorists. The former is suspected also of having opened fire on the police in 1981 during a hold-up aimed at padding the secret funds of "Action Directe." The - latter had already been caught in an antiterrorist sweep in March 1980. He been questioned at a house in Brusc (Var) where members of "Action Directe" and the Italian "Red Brigades" were staying. In fact, after discovery of the - arms cache on 9 April in Rue de la Charbonniere, the Judicial Poliee had expected to capture the main leaders of the hard-core branch ("political- military section") of "Action Dirette," i.e. Jean-March Rouillan, founder . of the movement, and his compani.on Nathalie Mengon, accused of having fired on inspectors of the secret police in 1978. However, taking advantage of a"leak," Menigon and Rouillan escaped in time on 9 April from the "Peasants and Workers Group of the 18th District." Under this deceptive title, the "squats" of the 18th have in reality become the French bastion of anarchism and terrorism. Appealing to different susceptibilities, they draw dissident ecologists~ ultra-Left groups of soldiers and prisoners, etc. 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 Weapon Used in an Assassination "Action Directe" had also secretly brought their immigrant Alerians, Tunisians, and Truks, all preaching Third World revolution and functioning as a support network for various clandestine armed struggle organizations. At the beginning of ~he year, the police thus discovered that people were exchanging more than ideas in these "squats." Molotov cocktaile were seized. Rouillan and Menigon were reportedly questioned on the subject for a few hours then released. Since then, the coooperation between "Action Directe" and international terrorist movements such as the "Lebanese Armed Units'' has been confirmed. One of the automatic weapons in the Rue Borrego arms cache had been used in an anti-Israeli attack in Paris, and the printshop which put out the "Action Directe" leaflets was also printing tne communique of the "Lebanese Armed Units" which was responsible for recent murders of two diplomats, one American, the other Israeli, in France. For the present, the "Actior~ Directe" squatters have only been charged with "residence violation." 9920 CSO: 6131/505 12 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500084410-7 FRANCE DEMOBILIZATION OF JUDICIAL SYSTEM, INGREASED TERP.~RISM SEEN - Parie LE FIGARO in French 7 May 82 p 2 [Article by Gerard Nirascou~ _ [Text] "Insecurity and terrorism don't exist; they are ~.aventions of the - right." How many times did we hear this phrase from the uppoaition prior - to May 19~1? Once in power, the language of the victors hardly chan~ed. For months, fui nearly a year, France was described or depicted as a haven of ~ peace and tranquility iu the middle of a world in crisis by the president of the republic down to the lowest state secretaries, as well as by the prime minister, the minister of the interiox and the mini~ter of justice. Even on 1 A~ri1, right after the attack on the Capitole, in response to a FIGARO editorial w;~ich condemned the government's indifference to tt~e rising crime wav~e and number of attacks, didn't Pierre Mauroy state: "Let's not exaggerate, _ France is no~ Ceetering on the brink of terrorism." ~ The c~ange in tone is quite recent. Gaston Defferre, the first to do so, had, during a harah confrontation with Robert Badinter over the issue of - identity checks, expressed a view which was more in line with the deteriorating situation. Which didn't prevent Francois Mittierrand and Pierre Mauroy from - proclr~iming lou~ly, but not without hesitation and confusion, that the Security and Freedom law would be repealed and that iden~tity checks would be permitted, except in the presence of the courts, only "in certain places and if the threat is immediate." Yt actually took the explosion in Rue Marbeuf, on 22 April, to bring about a change to really new language. The nightmarish vision of ~ a dev~istatF:d c~tree* in central Paris, atained with the blood of.innocent vic- = tims (1 dead and 63 in~ured), definitely swept away all utopian dreams. But between 10 May 1981 and 22 April 1982, the harm had been done. In the frenzy of change and under the leadership of Robert Badinter, the minister of ~us~:ice, who, in this instance, was only implementing the socialist program, a systematic di.smantling of the ~udicial system was begun: the death penalty was abolished, without any replacement penalty being established; the Court of National Security was eliminated, as was the standing tribunal of the armed forces; one of the broad~st amneaties (more than 6,000 prisoners, 9,000 including commutations of sentences) was declared, even for dangerous terrorists; while awaiting its repeal, the Security and Freedom law was drained - of its content by ministerial directivesrconveyed to the public prosecutor,'s 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444544484414-7 office. At the same time, the magistrscy was taken in hand and "purged." A number of inembers of the Magistracy Union, closely associated with the new gr,v.~.~nment and whose Rousseauist and hiananist views have permeated the social- tst b:eviary concerning judicial and penal affairs, were appoin*ed to key posts. During the same peric:~~ the-police force was going through a crisis whose effects are still bei:ig felt today. A witch hunt led to the finger being put on the heads of almost all departments and ma~or services. As for the rank and file, traumatized by an avalanche of official statements in which they were accused of having served as a mil_itia for employera, of being deeply racist and of making promises to the fa.T right, they were even more demobilized as they helpyessly witnessed the establishment of a system in which criminals would systematically en3oy the undersranding and indulgence of 3udges. xhe Campaign Against Terrorism The attack in Rue Marbeuf, coming a few weeks after the attack on the Capitole, after the assassination of an American military attache, Charles Ray, and an Israeli diplomat, Yacov Barsimentov, caused a shock, which was magnified in public opinion by the constant rise of petty and moderately serious crime _ affecting practically every French citizen, whether residing in the city or the country. The best proof of this: Insecurity, which was ranked fourth or fifth among the public's concerns in polls taken a few months ago, is nwnber one today. Francois Mitterrand, the president of the republic, has drawn some conclusions. In his Gueret speech on 2 May, he acknowledged that the problem of insecurity was seiious, "although we must not allow ourselves to become panic-stricken." He appeared even clearer concerning terrorism: "I shall personally see to it that the campaign against terrorism is carried out in an implacable manner, but with respect for basic liberties." This new Cone is also found in the remarks of the prime minister and in those of the minister of the interior. But a change in tone is not enough to formulate a different policy. And that is where the problem lies. A campaign against insecurity and terrorism is not declared by mere speeches. Everything is proceeding as though, although the evil has been re~ngnized, there is a refusal to use effective measurea to achieve reaults. First of all, it is not a question of going back over the destructive measures taken since 1C May, measur.Ps which leave ~udges and police particularly helpless and which constitute an encouragement for crime. And this applies to both simple crimes and terrorism. With regard to terrorism itself, examples abound in which the will to combat it is frustrated in the field by the dominant ideology or, quite simply, by a number of political commitments. In the case of the right of asylum, the government has decided that France would constitute a country of reference. If the aim is noble, the result is disastrous. More than 180,000 refugees have moved to our country today. 14 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 It is ut:realistic or. hypocritical to think that some of them will not engage in politi~al acti�:ism, with all the cons~quences which that may have. Stating, as Gaston Defferre did, that we will not to~erate a single failure of the duty of self-control required of them makes no sense: The police cannot watch over auch a masa of individuals. Wouldn't the problem instead be that of limiting the inf lux of these refugeea? In the case of extradition, France still refuses to sign the Strasbourg conven- tion on terrorism. The reason: It makea no distinction between a political militant and a common-law criminal. Here again, the reasons, however noble they may be, are belied by the facts. It is common knowledge that many Spanish Basques, who have taken refuge in France and whose extradition Madrid loudly demands, continue to fight and to maintain Spanish terrorism because of France's position in this regard. The same is true of some refugse nationals of African and Middle Eastern countries. And what can '~e said about individuals whom the FRG and Italy ask us to extra- dite and who continue, from French territory, clandestine operations againet ~ countries whose democratic nature is difficult to deay? Especially since there exists--all experts make this claim and can prove it--an inte~national terrorist association which could not care leas about borders or ideologies. All terrorist movements help and support each other. Agreeing to accept them on one's soil is the equivalent of encouraging the development of a national terrorism. This is what is currently taking place in France, where three kinds of terrorism coexist and thrive: Basque, Corsican and that of the far left. Is there any need to recall that two CRS [Republican Security Companies (State Mobile Police)] were killed at Saint-Etienne-de-Baigorry by French independence mili- tants closely associated with Spanish Basques? Are we to forget about ths legionnaire killed near Aleria by the FLNC [Corsican National Liberation Front], a Corsican extremist movement whoae ties with certain special services in the Middle East are clear? Ie it pointlesa to note that the Direct Action group has been trying to reestablish itself for eeveral monthA and that it could receive notoriety before long, while bearing in mind the.ties which its membera maintain with members of the Italian Red Brigadea or Gexman Red Army Faction, who have taken refuge in France. The Two Ideologies of the PS Under these circumstances, it is permissible to wonder what could be the out- come of an antiterrorist campaign of a socialist goverrnnent which ia caught up in certain principles which Rre not in keeping with a more and more exacting and ruthless rea?tty. Socialist language concerning terrorism has changed, but concerning crime, the official doctrine reaffirmed by Francois Mitterrand--also in hie Gueret speech--which it was believed had been somewhat modified after ce~tain state- ments by Gaston Defferre, remains unchanged. There is no question of giving the police greater authority and no question of showing sternness toward criminals. It is by changing society that we will put an end to insecurity, which, at leset it is now recognized, is real. 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 The president of the republic stated clearly: "It is through solidarity that we will put an end to crime In an interview with a provincial daily news- paper, the miniater of ~ustice, Robert Badinter, also explained on 2 May: "The security of citizens depends less on repressive legal texts--we have a full arsenal of them--than on the measures implemented to reduce crime. By that I mean that all actions in favor of maintaining security must be con- ceived and carried out with regard for reality, as it exists in this or that city; district or street On the same day, Francois Mitterrand and Robert Badinter reaffirmed in the same terms what the campaign against crime should be. Both statements are in total contradiction to the recent remarks of Gaston Defferre, for whon~ security must be assured at all costs, including by forceful megns. It also seems that it is here, on this iasue, that there are differences and hesitation within the gnvernment after a year of socialist rule. Regarding insecurity-- and even terrorism--there are two opposite ideological factions within the PS: One recommends firmness while the other, more doctrinaire, believee that a change in society can solve all problems. There is hardly any doubt that if insecurity should continue to increase-- which is suggested by all statistics for the first months of the year and barring a suicidal attitude concerning the next municipal elections--the go government will be forced to review its choices. A change of course that would not occur without a confrontation within the Socialist Party. For the time being, after a year in power, we can only note that the battle for security has largely been lost: Crime has risen and terrorism h~s in- creased, while the police are disorganized and the courta are helpless. - Death Penalty Abolished Four fundamental texts have been rescinded or eliminated at the request of the present minister of ~ustice, Robert Badinter. Elimination of the Court of National Security: This was approved on 17 July 1981 by a hand vote of inembers of parliament. From now on, in peacetime, crimes and offenaes against national security will be examined and ~udged by common-law ~urisdictions and according to the regulations of the Penal Procedure Code. When this issue was debated, Robert Badinter told the National Assembly: "rrench ~ustice must be exemplary. But French ~ustice will not be as long as its institutions include this special jurisd~ction, which is open to criticism because of its motivation, is un~ustifiable because of its regula- tions and condemnable for its mistakes." Abolition of the death penalty: This was approved on 18 September 1981 by a vote of 369 to 113 National Assembly members. No substitute penalty has yet been proposed. At the rostrum of the assembly, Robert Badinter stated in particular: "Yn the name of ~hat competence, what diversion is it constantly repeated: 'Think 16 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 of the victims!' W~ think about the vict~ms constantly, but by thus exploiting their misfortune, the aim is to oversensitize, to silence reason in order to maintain the old order of things." Elimination of the Antiviolence Law [against damage to property by demonstrators]: Thia was adopted by National Assembly members on the night of 25 November 1981. This law, mainly included in Article 314 of the Penal Code, established penal and pecuniary liability for perpetrators of violent acts. At the assembly rostrwn, Robert Badinter said that this was "a dangerous text" and condemned "a circumstantial law which had survived the great fear of 1968." - Elimination of the Standing Tribunal of the Armed Forces (TPFA): This was approved on 16 April 1982 by National Assembly members. In an interview with the newspaper LIBERATION, Robert Badinter explaiaed: "The law eliminating the TPFA is an hiatoric text from a symbolic ataadpoiat, since-- like the abolition of the death penalty--it is one of those laws which break with a long past and turn a new page in the history of our system of ~ustice Elimina~ion of the TPFA draws 650 years of French history to a close No more military tribunals and no more military ~udges in France during peacetime Attacks: A Long List ~ver the past 12 months, ~errorist acts have increased in France. But it was during last fall that the phenomenon accelerated sharply. The principal attacks include: 26 October 1981: Ztao bombs, one in Fouquets' restroom and another in front of the Publicis drugstore on the Champs-EJ.ysees. 29 October: A bomb destroyed the Berlitz Cinema on the Boulevard des Italiens: three persons in~ured. 5 November: A bomb exploded in the baggage-claim area of the Lyon railroad station: no casualties. 12 November: Christian Chapman, the American charge d'affaires in Paris, narrowly escaped from a killer who shot at him with a 7.65 [caliber] revolver. Washington accused Libya. 16 November: A bomb destroyed a baggage-claim area in the East railroad station. Three travelers were in~ured. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by - an Armenian terrorist organization, the Orly group. 20 November: A bomb ravaged McDonald's restaurant on Boulevard Saint-Michel, one person in~ured. 20 December: A bomb exploded in the headquarters of a transportation company, Botrans, which specialized in trade with Eastern countries. Signed claim of responsibility: Charles Martel. 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 _ 23 December: "Direct Action" claimed responeibility for four explosions in Paris, one against the licensed Rolls Royce dealership. 18 January 1982: Col Charles Ray, military attache to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, was assassinated in front of his residence by several 7.65 [caliber] bulleta. The Americans accused extremist Palestinian circles. 3 February: Tfao legionnaires were attacked near Aleria, in Corsica.~ Oae, ~ Renato Rossi, was killed and the other wa8 seriously wounded. Several days later, Paris and the province had two sleepless nights: a total of more than 150 exploeions. The Corsican National Liberatioa FYoat (FLNC) claimed respon- sibility for all these operations. 19 March: T~ao CRS on patrol at Saint-Etienne-de-Baigorry, in the French Basque country, were hit with several blasta of machinegun fire. Jacques Bouiller died on the spot, while Bernard Roussaria died several weeks later. The attack was probably made by members of Iparetarrak, the French Basque independence organization. 29 March: Explosion on the Trana-Euro~ Express train, the Capitole, while traveling at 140 km/hour near Limoges. The device, a high-powered bomb, had been placed in the head railroad car. Five persons, including the sister of former Finance Minister Jean-Pierre Fourcade, were killed and 27 others in~ured more or less seriously. No claim of responsibility and no clues as yet for the police. 1 April: The offices of an annex of the Israeli Embassy in Paris, on Boulevard Malesherbes, were machinegunned. The persons responsible, Joelle Aubron and Mohand Hamami, closely associated with the far-left movement "Direct Action," were arrested several days later. 3 April: The second secretary of the Israeli Embassy in Paris, Yacov Barsimantov --probably an agent of Mossad, the Israeli secret service--was ahot down in front of his residence by a young woman with several 7.65 [caliber] bullets. It was proven that this weapon was the same one which was used to kill Charles Ray, the American military attache. 22 April: Explosion of a booby-trapped car at 33 Rue Marbeuf in Paris, in front of the offices of the pro-Iraqi Lebanese newspaper, AL WATAN AL ARABI. A young woman was killed, 63 persons were in~ured and damage was considerable. Interior Minister Gaston Defferre held Syrian services responsible. 11915 CSO: 6131/507 18 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FRANCE - DEFFERKE ON BATTLE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM Paris PARIS MATCH in French 7 Maq 82 pp 30-31 [Interview with Gaston Defferre, minister of etate for interior and decentrali- zation, by Florence Portes; date and place not specified] [Text] [Question] Mr Deff erre, you are acting prime minister, and qou have eaid that France is currently threatened by interaational terrorism. What do you mean exactly? Gaston Defferre: There are two kinds of terroriam: internal terrorism among the French and international terroriam imported from abroad. I would like to remind you that I began by emphasizing that national terrorism in France is clearlq receding. I stress the point because this is due to the policy pur- eued bq the socialiet government since 10 May. That being said, I appeal to the com~on sense and patriotism of all the French, asking them to understand that it is fortunate that a truce has been reached with thoee autonomist move- mente. If the attacks were to resume, civil peace would definitely be compro- raised. [Question] You don't want to be fighting more than one fire during an offen- sive by international terrorism? [Answer] I am not talking about an offensive by internationaZ terrorism. I will aimplq take four examples. That bomb in the Capito]e-~as it an attack by international terrorism? We have no proof that it wae. The tests did not turn up anything. We have the f eeling that it was, however. Then there were the assassinations of an American diplomat and an Ieraeli diplomat: in this case we know that they were foreign in origin. And the attack on M.qrbeuf Street: we know the context--a Lebanese newapaper had received threats from Syrians. We may have other clues tomorrow, But ~or noW, there is every reason to believe that this, too, was an international terroriat attack. [Question] The French have the impression that if international terrorism ia knocking gt our door, it ia becauee the socialist government, with its policy of providing a"land of refuge," has opened the door wide to foreignere. - [Answer] Giscard had to cope with the same problema that we are having. Carlos wae in Paris when he threw a grenafle into a Paris cafe. The Japanese Yukata 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Furuya wae arrested on French eoil. Since 10 Maq 1981, terroriats t~ave not been reentering France as eaeily ae before. i noted during a recent meeting with the ministers of interior from ~ermaay, Auatri.a, Italy, aad S~tzerland that my col~eagues are havfng the same problana that We are. And that amoag all our Weatern countriee, it ie u~elees to trq to decide Which one has the sad honor of being the capital of iaternational terroriem. [Question~ What is qour thinking and that of the government? [Answer] To combat international attacks. There sre several methoda. The one - adopted by the previous government consisted of giviag in to threats. For ex- ample, when Carlos demanded the release of the Japanese'~ukata Furuya, who had been arrested in France, Carlos threw a grenade on St Germain Boulevard, and the reault was 2 dead and 30 wounded. ~io weeks later, the eame group took hostages at France's embassy in The Hague, and Furuqa was released. A eecond example is Abou Daoud, the Palestinian reaponaible for the slaughter at the Munich games. He was arrested on French eoil on 13 January 1977 and released on 17 January. Once again, the government of the time gave in. [Queation] So? [Answer] So the question I am asking ie whether the method that consists of giving in is the right one or whether, on the contrary, aYhile it may seem ef- fective at the moment, it does not pave the way for tragedies later. In other words, releasing people who have committed odious crimes really amounts~to en- couraging them to do it again and to putting ourselves in a eituation where we will give in again. On the other hand, standing up to them may al~o cause ter- rible tragedies at the start, But if, while standing up to them, we also adopt an offensive attitude, we can also strike a f ew blowe of our own against those co~itting the crimes and effective~y deter them from coming to settle their own affairs on our territory. [QuestionJ You are referring here to the case of the friends of Carlos (Bruno Breguet and Magdalena Kopp) who have ~ust been sentenced to prieon. Their attorney Verges predicted that Carlos would demand their release. What has the government decided to do about that? [Answer] On that point, as on the queation of the specific tactics the govern- ~ ment has decided to use to combat international terrorism, I cannot reveal my intentions to you! If I did, the government would lose some of its poesibili- ties for action. "Secrecy in action is essential," General De Gaulle used to say--we won't go all the way back to what Machiavelli said. But secrecy in a fight of this kind is decisive. There is no question of violating it. After all, all the terrarists would have to do is buy a copy of PARIS MATCH tn find out what we intended to do! _ [Question] You have announced, however, that the government would be calm and determined but off ensive. [Answer] In order to understand our analysie of the problem, let us take the example of the incident on Marbeuf Street. First hypotheais: it was a caee of . 20 FOR OFFICIAL US ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY foreignere fighting among themaelves. If they Want to fight ~each other, let them do it somewhere else. The second trypotheeie concerns the queation of whether one of those countries hae enough of a grudge against Fraace to try to take revenge on it and to come strike their blov~ here. [Queetioa] What about the firat [AasWer) That brtnga up the problem of the conditione under Which the right of asylum must be exercieed. The right ot asylum ie a bad~.c principle to which France adheres stronglq. But from now on, it will be limited to what it should be, and as a result, those who benef it from it hane no right to engage in political f ights and even lesa to commit assaults. That is why instructions were issued on 23 Apri1 for all French diplomats abroad to be particularly careful about issuing visas. We are also going to take a census of all foreigners who might be a threat to France's security, including those who might be here officially. Those whom we feel ehould not remain in France will be aeked to leave the territory. [Question] What if you have reason to think that foreigu governments are try- ing to destabilize France? [Ans~er] Let us auppose--and this is our second hypothesie--that certain coun- tries would like to take revenge on France and its policy. I notice that the people who, in general, shed blood and try to impreas public opinion to make a government give in do not rest until they are released after they are arrested. Thank God, France has many possibilitiea for action isf the political and diplo- matic area. But it also has possibilities for fighting in the field. As a re- su1t, there is nothing to indicate that we will come out the losers. I cer- _ tainly do not want ue to be forced into ~aving recourse to violent means or to the resources of international politics, but France has the right to defend it- self, and if need be, it wi11 take the necessary steps, whether theq involve political, diplomatic, or police action. [Question] So is that what you are thinking of when you talk about using the offensive method? [Answer] Listen, I am talking from experience. I know about the underground-- I was in it. I headed a network that had three broadcast links with Great Britain. When the Nazi forces got too close and we were on the point of being caught, we tried not to be arrested. What was true of us is also true of every terrorist in the world. In our case, we mere attacking the occupiers. Today's terrorists are attacking established regimea either because they want the so- ciety that eacists to bollapae, or because theq are anarchists with no purpose other than deatruction, or because they have a grudge against the poiicy of the country targeted. Well, a successful offensive policy "destab311zes," as the saying goes. Today the French Gover~ent has a duty not to be weak. If we organize effective action against the terroriats, we can deal them a aevere blow. 21 FOR QFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Question] You claim that you have not yet chosen either the Giscard-style - def ensive method or the off ensive method, but everything }~ou say indicatea ttiat you have chosen the offensive method. [ArisWPr] Both of them can De employed successfvely or simultaneoualy in dif- fering places, countries, or circumstances. Mitterrand telephoned me eeveral times throughout the day on 22 OctoBer. The next morning, he called me in at 0845 hours to hold a meeting with General Saulnfer, his chief of staff; Marion, who heads the DGSE; Grimaud, mp directeur de cabinet; and Chalet, director of the DST jDirectorate of Territorial Surveillance]. We spent 1.5 hours in his off ice. That ~ust shows how personallq concerned he is about what muat be done to insure t'ne security of the French. [Question] During that meeting, did you determine that the French police t~ave the means for effective and coordinated antiterrorist action? [Answer] I won't make a list of all our services for you. As far as the coor- dination of information is conc erned, we have schedul~d weekly meetings, espe- cially since the first threats by Carlos. After 23 April, it was decided at Francois Mitterrand's request that we would hold daily meetings with all the inte~ligence services in my off ice at the Ministrq of Interior. The basi8 of action--the secret of success-- is first of all to be quic~ly and well informed, and that ie why we have the coordination structure under m~y own responsibility. We will prepare a su~nary report every day and send it to the President. When he considers it necessary, he will call us in for a meeting, as he did this morning. [Qu estion] You talk a lot about Carlos. He in particular seems to worry you. Does anyone know where he is? One day he is said to b e on French soil, the next day he is reported to be in northern Italy, and so on. [Answer] The harmful activity he directs leads him to move about a lot and to make people think he moves about even more. That is one of his w~eapons. He has a greater effect on people's thinkin~ by making them think he is present everywhere, and someday he may succeed in b eing regarded as one of those mythi- - cal people said to have the gif t of ubiquity, being simultaneously in Libya, South Y emen, Syria, France, Belgium, and God knows where elae. [Question] In your opinion, who manipulates Carlos? [Answer] It seems to me that at the start, he was used by cout~tries that did not accept the ideas of a certain aumber of Western nations. [QuestionJ Are you thinking of the USSR? [Answer] I am thii~king of Syria, South Yemen, and Libya (it is not certain whether Libya plays the same role today). The weapons are in fact supplied by the Eastern countries. Those countries, which disagree with our policy and engage in espionnage--and they are not the only ones to do so--have tried to attack our regimes by using their own methods, which are those of terrorism. The result has been the training of a certain number of inen who later, as they 22 ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFIC(AL USE ONLY beca.Re more isnportant th~snselvee, have continued to form groups which are en- feofP~d to their or~gi.nal leaders or which, trapped 6y their role, play it with conviction. That aeems to be the caae with Carloa. They are the most danger- ous ones. [Question] WRp? [Answer] Because when one is a terrorist by connict;.on, one aants to kill and perhaps to die as well. I say perl~aps Be~suse when someone--like Carlos, for example--has Been made a star for several qears bq the media and becomes a kind of personality, it is more diff icult to die. So the individual exposes himself leas. Carlos started out by carrying out orders, but he has now become the No 1 terrorist--the one hunted by every police force in the world. But _ perhaps he still has the will or the ability to carry out "operations" and to risk his neck. It is not imposeible. I tend to believe it. [Question] Do you think that he may carry out his death threats against you? Has he repeated his threats to qou? [Answer] You know, when someone receives a letter like that one, he doesn't need a second one to understand what it means. [Queation] ~o you think he played a part in the attack on Marbeuf Stre~t? [Answer] It ia possible. At this point I cannot eay. [Question] You aeem to be pointing the Syriane in particu~ar. [Answer] I have said that the government had its reasons for acting as it did. As you can imagine, we did not decide lightly to expel those diplomats. [Question] The editor of the Lebanese newepaper said he had warned France that our ambassador in Beirut, Louis Delamare, was going to b e assassinated by the Syrians. We did nothing about it. And our ambassador was assassinated. The editor was also threatened. Why were the Syrian diplomats not exgelled aooner? [Answer] We were quite certain that members of the Syrian F~bassy were going b eyond their role as diplomats, a role that does entitle them to provoke at- tacka. So we knew that they had a grudge against that Lebanese newspaper. The newspaper was therefore being guarded by the police, and so was its editor. That is no doubt the reason why the bomb was placed in a vehf.cle. That type of crime is undetectable. The bomb injured many people, and it undoubtedly would have injured many more if it had been placed in the building, because several victims on tfie various floors were ~n~ured by flying glass. The police did their ~ob, but unfortunatelp, one cannot prevent everything. The case has been referred to the courts, and I cannot say any more about what will be done or diecovered from now on. [Question] If the police did their ~ob, who didn't? The Ministry of ~xternal Relations? 23 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Answer] It didn't have the same grounds that it doea now. Besides, it is not the ~ob of the Ministry oP External Relations to expe]. diplomats. [question] You mentioned the uno~ficial role.that Lit~ya might have play~d--or could have played--in these terrorist acts. But Qadhdhafi's No 2 man, Ma~or - Jalloud, is making an official vis~t to Paris. ~ [Answer] Every opportunity to open the eyes of those governments "should be - taken advantage of. Who knows whether these talks with the Libyan leadera $t this moment will not save us from trouDles to come and whether the Libyans, because of their contacts with other countries having reasons to be intereated in terrorism, will not be useful to us? Tn the fight we are engaged in, all methods must be used. [Question] Let us get back to the means at our. disposal on French soil. It is in the countries whose legal arsenal is weak that terrorism is most developed (Italy). Don't you b elieve in the n~eed to strengthen our [Answer] I don't think so. [Question] I mean--the State Security Court has been abolished. Is it not necessary to...? - [Answer] It would not have added anything to our possibilities for action. [Question] No, but ~estoration of the 12 days of police custody provided by that court would facilitate investigations by the examining magistrate, would ' it not? fAnswer] Listen--48 hours, 5 days, or 10 days of additional police custody do not change anything. A magistrate can very well conduct his investigation with- out preliminary police custody of auch length. And there is no need for emer- gency laws. The important thing--the basis of everything--is the possibility of conducting identity checks, and that is what I have been f ighting for. To keep them. [Question] In what form, so that they will retain all their effectiveness? [Answer] I have been insistent about wanting police officera to b e able to con- duct identity checks in specific places if the security of individuals and prop- erCy is in immediate danger. I am insisting on the identity checks because most of the important arrests we have made were possible because of those checks. We are a socialist government, and everyone knows that we do not want to in- fringe on frzedoms. But freedom depends on security above all elseo [Question] If we want to sum up our talk, can we say that terrorism can be combated through off ensive action combined with calm determination? [Answer] Of course it can be combated in that way! It is whEn one has the political will to insure security and to do everything necessary to tt~at end that one has a clear conscience. Look, if I had started out by bullying the 24 ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY French, and if we had not taken 3,nto account the ~uet demands of som~ of the provincial inha6itaats--such as the Corsicans, the Basquea, and the Bretons-- T wouid feel leas mot~vated than I do now to com~at the forces of terrorism with the utmoat ffrmneas. Tt ~,s preciaely 6ecause a status for Co~aica haa been propoaed that ~ are tak~ng Bteps ta iiisure the development of regional ideas and tt~at the government has the right to be f irm. Becauae France's policq as conducted abroad Dy the pres~.dent of the reput~lic is a juet and balanced policy that does aot seek either to impose itself by force or to dominate weak itatioas--and even less to dra4r advantages from them: It is in the li$ht.of that policy that everyone's duty, and mine in particu~ar, is to set aa ~acample of determination and strength ia the fight against terrorism. COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse SA 11798 CSO: 6131/511 ~ 25 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FRANCE CHANGED STYLE, FUTURE POTENTIAL FOR TERRORIST ACTS Paris PARIS MATCH in French 7 May 82 pp 32-33 [Article by Gerard de Villiers] [Text] Two weeks ago, Gerard de Villiere wrote in these col- umns: "The five who died in theCapitole did so perhaps because of an obscure inter-Arab quarrel. If so, others will follow." Events have.tragically proven him right: the victime (1 dead and 62 wounded) of the boobytrapped Opel that exploded at 0902 hours on Monday moming in front of 33 Marbeuf Street are indeed the victims of a real secret war. A savage war has been declared between the Syrian~secret services on the one hand and their enemies--chiefly France, Iraq, and Israel--on the other. Until the recent past, Arab terrorists operated ia France against non-French targete. Examples: the murder of U.S. Lt Col Charles Raq, the murder of Jacob Abrasimov, adviser at the Israeli Embassy., and the attack on the Israeli trade mission. Over the past few months, however, that "ordinary" terrorism, which auccessive French governments basi~ally tolerated, has been overlaid with a new kind of terroriem, directed this time against the French. Five attacks are in this category. In chronological order, they are as follows: 1. The assassination in Beirut of French Ambassador Delamare. 2. The abortive attack by the two terrorists Bruno Breguet and Magdalena Kopp, who were sentenced on 23 April after an incredible�stroke of luck resulted in - their arrest as they were preparing tQ place a high-powered explosive device in the city ha11. 3. The attack on the Capitole. - 4. The murder in Beirut of Guy Cavallo and his wife. Guy Cavallo was a code clerk at the SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligeace Service] sta- tion in Beirut. 5. The attack on Marbeuf Street. 26 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500084410-7 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY - Those five attacks all have a common denominator. It is almost certain that they were carried out at the request of the Sqrian special services. Why? - For a very eimple reason: France has been trying for several months to strength- en the Libyan Army and pushing for the reconstruction of an independent Lebanon. The Syrians cannot go along with that. They consider any interference in Leba- - nese affairs tn be an act of war. So they react in their own fashion. The first warning was the assassination of Ambassador Delamare, who Was executed bq the Shiite militia under the supervision of Syrian offic~rs. Since that was not enough, the Syrians decided to take the war to France. To do so, they subcontracted with one of the terroriat groups under their influ- ence o~, if one pref ers, sharing their "sensitivity." It seems quite certain that the group they hired is headed bq Carlos, who has worked for them before, who has numerous infrastructures in Europe, and who can ca11 on European ter- rorists (German, Swiss, Italian, or French) to rouad out his troops. That was the case with the firat team sent in to sow terror in France: Brunc~ Breguet and Magdalena Kopp, both already on f ile as dangerous terrorists. By chance, they were arrested. Carlos--and it was he--then had a double prob- len: to get them released and to continue the mission assigned to him by the Syrians. He could send a second team. Or, as ie possible, he could call on French terrorists to do the ~ob. (It must not be forgotten that the weapon used to fire on the Israeli ~ission-- a Sten submachinegun--was discovered in a cache belonging to Action Directe, a movement whose members were all granted amnesty after 10 May.) Carlos may have subcontracted the attack on the Capitol to them. The purpose of that attack was to put presaure on the French Government to free the f irst team--Bruno - Breguet and Magdalena Kopp. The government--to its com~.~~ete credit--did not give in. It took Carloe 2 weeks to organize a new attack, again using a"mixed" Arab-European team. The woman who used false papers fn Yugoslavia to rent the Opel tt~at exp3.oded on Marbeuf Street was not an Arab. On the other hand, a witness saw an Oriental-type man getting out of that car in the middle of the night. That attack killed two birds with one stone. Perpetrated on the day of the trial of the first terror- ist team, it reminded the French Government that the relentless slaughter would continue as long as terroriets convicted in France were not released. At the same time, the boobytrapped car was placed in front of tt?e anti-Syrian news- paper AL WATAN AL ARABI, thue serving as a serious warning to the newepaper. It is worth recalling that the attack on the Saint Germain Drugstore on 5 Sep- tember 1974, which killed 2 and wounded 34, wae committed by Carlos to make France release two Japanese terrorists belonging to his team. The government of the time gave in to the blact~sil. That is where we are today. The attacks are likely to continue for two reasons: Carlos or those acting for the Syrians will do everything possible to free their 3mprisoned accomplices, and the Syri.ans waint France to stop showing an interest in Lebanon. 27 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR O~F[CIAL USE ONLY If we want the blind or isolated killinge to stop, we cannot be content with . fine words and etatements of principle. There are two avenues to be explored. First of all, the infrastructures within the country that benefit the terrorists must be eliminated. That wae the method used by the German BKA [Federal Criminal Police Buresu]. It means putting the terroriste in the position of fish out of water: preventiug them from finding hideouts, false papers, weapons, or logistic support in France. Thie requireg a lot of police work and, above all, political determination. Naturally, the epecial police services can track down clandestina terrorists. But that is not enough if we do not attack what the German terrorists called the "legal people"--meaning sympathizere who provide the underground with val- uable aseistance either knowingly or as a result of manipulation. A few hours after the explosion on Marbeuf Street, attorney Verges, who was the lawyer for Bruno Breguet and Magdalena Kopp, was shouting at the magistrates as follows: "No matter what verdict you render, my clients will be oux of prison within 3 hours, 48 hours, or 3 months, because their friends will not give up." His cynical and ainister rudeness shows that not everyone in France disapproves of the attacks. It is revealing that auch remarks could be made a few hours after the massacre on Marbeuf Street and, especially, that the person tnaking them was not penalized by the court. Extreme leftwing militants also inaulted the court when the sentences were pro- nounced. The police did not check anyone's identify, even though it is among - auch people that the support for the next "teams" sent to kill a few more French people is likely to be found. But it was by beaver-like work to set up files on all leftwing sympathizers with the German terroriets that the BRA was able to avert attacks and dismantle the Baader gang. The French police are capable of doing the same. All they have to do is receive their orders. - That action on the national level is not enough if we do not get to the source of the problem, which lies outside France. And that is the sphere of the DGSE. French counterespionage maintains "totem" relations--that is, reciprocal ex- changes of information with countries abroad. So by cooperating with the Israeli, American, German, Italian, and even some Arab services, it can get a line on the networks and tiny groups and learn the identities of most of the terrorists. At this moment, we might be in a position to reach such an agree- ment. The Syrians and even people like Carlos are vulnerable. All it requires is credibility in deterrence and a pooling of resources. It is possible, and it has been done before. If Carloa disappeared from the French scene for a while, it was not by chance. He was being tracked down himself. What was done before can be done again. The day when the terrorist teams or - those who manipulate them lalow that theq will get tit for tat will be the day when the war ends. Because no one is suicidal. And that includes the Sqrians and Carloa Illich Ramirez. 2R , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444544484414-7 FOR OFF1=.:7AL USE ONLY Terrorism bas never uaderstood any language eacept that of force. If those who govern France do nbt quickly become aware of that, the blind terror will con- tinue, and the blood of inaocent French people will flow agaia. COPYRIGAT: 1981 par Cogedipresse SA 11798 CSO: 613~1511 29 FOR OFFICIAL USE OA1LY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY . FRANCS RUE MARBEUF EDITOR ON SYRIAN TERRORIST TECANIQUES Paris PARIS MATCA in French 7 May 82 pp 32-33 [Interview with Walid Ahou Zahr, editor of AL WATAN AL ARABI, by Patrick Forestier; date and place not specified] [Text] For 6 montha the manag~rs of the weekly AL WATAN AL ARABI had lrnown that an attack on their newspaper was beiag planned. On 19 December 1981, they had diacovered and defused a boobytrapped package before it was too late. After that, 24 bodqguarda kept watch on the buildinig. But Walid Abou Zahr, the publication's editor, explains that the explosion on Marbeuf Street was also aimed at th~ French and France's policy in the Middle East. Aere, for lack of proof, are his innermost comiictions and his as- swnptiona. . PARIS MATCHs Aow was the attack on Marbeuf Street set up? Walid Abou Zahr: A com~ando group arrived from Syria. According to our infor- mation, which is based on sources in Beirut and Syria itself, betweea 100 and 200 peraons have entered France an~1 are scattered among tt?e countrq's chief cities. Those people are divided into several categories. There are thoae who specialize in explosives, others who specialize in assaseinations, and others who are experts in making threats. [Question] Are those commando groupe made up bas~.~allq of Sqrians? [Anawer] No. They are recruited in several countries. Their me~mbers usually use Lebanese passports because it is very easy at present to forge them. The latest wave of Syrians arrived in France 3 or 4 weeks ago. Using the pretext of illness, some are receiving care at hospitals. Others say they are here to preregister at a university to learn French, ar,,~ sti11 others pretend to be merchanta working in the import-export trade who want t:o buq French prodncts. And still others are here as tourists. [Question] Are they in contact with the Syrian Embassq in Paris? [Anewer] No. They do not contact the embasey except as a last resort. There are still several secret services in Syria. There are stx.or seven intelligence 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY centers. Most of the time, the embassy does not know anything about what ia $oing on. [Question] Then do Syriana come directly from Damascus to bring orders to their agents working iu Fr$nce? ~ - [AnewerJ Abaolutely. Theq are separated into several groupa which, ae I said, are acattexed around in several French cities. _ [Question] Why has France become the focus for the inter-Arab atruggle? (Answer] Since 10 May, it has been easier to come to France thau to go to the FRG. Beforer auqbodq could go to Berlin. Now that is over. Also since 10 May, France has been playing a decia ive role in the Mideast crisis. That policq has had certain conaequences. The Syrians are now trying to kill two birds with bne stone. First of all, they want to retal ate for the role be~ng played bq France in Lebaaon, and second, th~y really want to~give the impression that there is an inter-Arab atruggle on French territory. L~t us take the example of the attack oa Marbeuf Street. Our newspape~ opposes the Sprians. They could respond to our arguments with argumenta of Ehe~.r own. We t,ave no ta~ics with which to face the Sqrian regime. We have only'our pens, but they reply with terroriem. But all those operatdona in France are actually aimed more at France than at us. When Ambassador Delamare wae assaseinated in Beirut, tt~at was not. directed against AL WATAN AL ARABI. When the~tw~ French civil servants were aesaseinated a few days ago, again in Beirut, that was not directed agaiast AL WATAN AL ARABI, either. And lastly, ~ihen the French Embasay in Beirut was bomb~d, that, too, was not directed against AI~ WATAN AL ARABI. I think that w~at exieta today is a plan--an anti-French s~rategp. France is the real ta~- get. And you are going to see ot~er operatio~s against France that are aimed at paralyzing its policy in the Middle East. [Question] In your opinion, are the Syrians preparing for more actions? [~nswer] The Syrian services have become experts in explosives. Boobytrapped cars are a Syrian specialty. Since Carlos came on the scene, the Syriana want to go much farther. France is currently a great power. It must try to deter- mine whether, behind all this fuss about CArlos, there ie not a piot to dis~ guise a more complex undertaking simed at destabilization. [Question] But Carlos--what is he doing now? [Answer] The Syrians could easily answer your question. [Question] Getting back to the attack on Marbeuf Street, was there cooperation between French and Syrian terrorists? ~ [Answer] Abeolutely not. For actions that aerious, the Syrians are verq care- ful to maintaia aecrecy. They are afraid that if a European were caught, he would reveal the whole operatioa. [Question] What was the sceaario for the attack ~n Paris? 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE O~VLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540080010-7 r'UK UFMICIAL USE ONLY [Answer] People must have arrived by Waq of Vienna or Amsterdam. They could easily enter Fraace by car. Others p~rhaps came through Switzerland diaguised as businessmen. And the last group came by plane. Entering France is ao prob- lem at all, because those coming here do not carry anq weapons on them. They are given docwaents and weapons after they get here. [Question] Through t~e embassy? [Answer] How do you think it is possible to get 30 or 40 kilograms of explo- eives into France? _ [Question] By diplomatic pouch? [Answer) You have answered the question! [QuestionJ And what do we have to fear now? [Answer] I will let qou in on something. I b elieve that the Syrians are going to try to kidnap the French ambassador in Beirut. And they will trq to ex- change him for the two terroriste who were recently convicted in Paris. I am convinced of it. [QuestionJ Do you have anything to back up your suspicions concerning the Syrian involvement in the incident on Marbeuf Street? [AnswerJ First of all, the arrival of so many of them. Second, the fact that they sent direct threats. They did it openly. Last 19 December, they placed a boobytrapped package in front of the newepaper office. The investigation re- vealed that theq were indeed the ones responsible. The day before the attack, they were furious at French Television 1's coverage of the assassination of Ambassador Delamare. Syrian circles in Damaecus annouaced that that broadcast was going to coat plenty. They clearly said that if French policy continued unchanged, theq would strike in France. If they had placed the bomb on a train, Carlos would have been blamed. By placing it in front of our newapaper office, they in effect signed it. [Question] Is France the target because it maintains good relations with Iraq? [Answer] Yes, no donbfi, but the Syrians are especially furious because France is getting involved in the Lebanese mstter. They consider Lebanon their spe- cial preserve. For them, Lebanon is a sens~tive spot. The Syr.~ians have been looking for a pretext. When President Mitterrand went to Iara,~2, it gave them a good opportunity to say that they opposed his policy. Fr~.atce has now 8ug- ~ gested that the Lebanes e criais be internationalized. The Syrians will never accept that proposal. When Ambassador Delamar~ establishe~l contacts with the supporters of zhat solution, Syria condemned him to death. COPYRIGHT: 1981 Cogedipresse SA 11798 CSO; 6131/511 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFtCIAL USE ONLY FRANCE NATIONAL, ZNTERNA'MONAL TERRORISM STYL$S, PRLV$11TION B~?.rIIlf$D - Paris LATITUDE AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 82 pp 16-18 [Article by Antoine Bugev: "Terrorism The New Mercenaries"] [Text] The Capitole, Rue Marbeuf. The terrorists ha:�e fully achieved their ob~ective: to create a psychoais among a public who had believed France was secure from this kind of attack. After the initial surprise, the political establishment has had to recognize that the terrorist threat is a reality in France. How can we deal with this unnatural calsmity? The current terrorism has its roots in two foreign movemente. In 1962, exactly 20 years ago, the Uruguayan Tumpamaros began to show their face. In 1966, it was the turn of the Black Panthers to intrude on the American scene. Their social origins--they worked through university campuses--as well as the spectacular nature of their operat~.ons--aimed primarily at sensation and at traumatizing the public--made these two groupe the ancestors of modern terroriem. During their 10 years of existence, the Tupamaros used all kinds of terrorist methods: abduction of foreign diplomats for ransom (the Brazilian consul, for example), execution of an American secret agent, and occupation of radio stations to braodcast communiques. Until now the European had felt protected. Their experience in this area~ had been limited to the patriotic terrorism of the liberation wars and the protest movements which emerged out of May 1968 in France. However, the "angry ones" of May were quickly absorbed by a society in full economic expansion. The situation began to deteriorate in the 1970's in the FRG with the Baader gang. It would be 5 years later before the Middle East became an area subject to terrorism. Berne Club Forms of terrorism vary. There are three schools of terrorism: nihilism, the ancestor of violent action; national terrorism; and finally international terrorism. Take note, however, that use of the singular in the latter does not 33 FOR OFFICIAI. USE OIdLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY prove that there is a single headquarters, with a single leader. This inter- national terrorism is currently the most important. It is a product of the national terrorisms which have today lost some momentum thanks to the efforts of the national police. In France, we tried too long to ignore national terrorism. After all, occupying a police station or blowing up a tax collection office is not the stuff of history, whether the culprits are Bretons or Corsicans. Since the main ob,jective of Western ministers of interior is to have declining statistics, they are reluctant to include all terrorist acts. This is why they make some subtle distinctions in categories. We would hope that within their very secretive Berne Club they exchange accurate statistics. The intelligence services have indeed formed a club to meet regularly in Switzer- land to compare their information in the beautiful and quiet town of Berne. This enables a fairly comprehensive approach to the terrorist phenomenon. What do the terrorists want? The human and material assets of the opponent on his own ground are the primary target. This is true from the IRA attacks in London to the Direct Action attacks on banks in France. However, we must not ignore the so-called "external" operations to strike at the adversary outside his own territory, to destroy his interests ~broad. Thus,, the Armenians attack Turkish tourism offices anywhere in the world. Even more elaborate are the attacks on the human and material assets of the adversary's allies. The Rue Marbeuf attack can be assigned to this category. It has yet to be proved that the Syrians were responsible. One of the ob~ec- tives of this kind of attack is to gain an international audience. Such attacks are often the tactic of movement which are numerically or politically weak. The Ba~ques or the Irish, who do not have a recognition problem, carry out their operations in their own country. This is also true of the Red Brigades and the Baader gang. Today, we are seeking more attacks on persons, as o~posed to attacks on property as in the past. The means employed tends to reflect the political nature of the movements because they do not all seek to have the same effect on the public. The extreme Fight deliberately exercizes terror, whereas the extreme Left tries to influence opinion in its favor, what Mao called "being like a fish in the water." On the Right you use a bomb; on the Left, though it is more risky, a revolver is preferred. However, in reality things are not quite that simple. In the complex world _ of terrorism, the Right-Left distinctions are not very meaningful. Each movement will operate where it finds the best conditions. Who would have thought that fascist groups like the Hofmann group in the FRG, Column 88 in the U.K., or the Belgian Rex movement would train in Palestinian camps? Not in just any camp, it is true, but with the Christian Palestinians. Here there are a sociological explanation: European wanting to learn terrorism would rather do so with people who have the same way of life. Areas of conflict appear to be the only places where terrorists have some opportunity of operating undetected. The European police are able to keep in check most of the training camps. Yet, it is acknowledged that Basques train in Lrish camps and vice versa. 34 F'OR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ON1.Y Terrorists and Drop-outs Close cooperation between police and intelligence services has made it possible to eliminate almost all the ma~or national terrorism organizations. The Basder gang, the Japanese Red Army, and more recently the Red Brigades have disappeared from their countries of origin. What have they become? Very simply, today they constitute the core of what is currently called "interna- - tional terrorism." For lack of a cause to defend, they put themselves at the service of whomever presents himsel~. The fact that these drop-outs of various origins find employers is only a reflection of our violent society. There is only a fine distinction among the various terrorisms and ~ournalists often serve as an instrument to convey their own illusions as well as those of their readers. One dangerous simplification is to see international terrorism as a single and unified movement. The public comes to imagine a kind of orchestra conductor working for an evil world power, and feels threatened by a secret force. Another ob~ective of terrorism is to force a government to react, preferably in a violent way, so that the people will be literally trapped between two fires. How can we respond, then? .The French experts on terrorism are effici- ent and have three tools: the intelligence services, which contribute 60 percent of the antiterrorist effort; prevention, 38 percent; and field opera- - tions 2 percent. Recently, the Berne Club has been meeting more frequently: the intelligence services are in th~ forefront of the struggle against inter- national terrorism. The "new mercenaries" have been dispersing their arms caches and hideouts more widely throughout the world to escape detection by the national police forces, and only cooperation among the intelligence services ~ can keep them in check. The response must be primarily a matter of policy, thus it is important not to invent "orchestra conductors" or supermen of the Carlos variety. The very delicate task of prevention can only be carried out by protection of the sensitive points, which are particularly numerous in our high technology societies. In the final analysis, the government's action must be effective. The terrorists never take unreasonable risks. The best evidence of this is that less than 13 percent have been killed while carrying out their operations. It is difficult to predict how international terrorism will evolve. If the number of alienated people continues to 3ncrease, then there is a danger that the phenomenon will increase. The struggle against terrorism will undoubtedly be one of the ma3or concerns of this decade. CUYYRIGHT: Latitude SARL 4th trimestre 1~81- 5J20 CSU: 6131/514 35 FOR OF'F'[C[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500084414-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FRANCE ANARCHISTS SAID TO HAVE VARIED TIES WITH TERRORISM Paris LATITUDE AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 82 pp 23-25 [Article by Michel Borcier: "From the Anarchists' Point of View"] [Text] "Terrorism is not a philosophy but a means. It is not a peculiarity - of anarchists, but the recourse of a11 persecuted minorities." To an old "anar" like Maurice Joyeux, there is nothing taboo about the subject of terrorism. This Septuagenarian Parisian is to some degree the figurehead of the anarchist galley. He became a member of the Anarchist Union at the age of 17, was imprisoned for evading military service during World War II, and at the same time incited two mutinies. Since his release in 1945, he has led the anarcho-syndicalist minority of the Working Force. Though today running in demonstrations with the police on [his] tail," he continues to be one of the sparkplugs of the movement. Like all the anarchists, Maurice Joyeux does not disavow anything from his past. He accepts the e~.ztire history of the libertarians, and specifically the great terrorist wave of 1890-1900. At that time, in France as abroad, anarchism meant the bomb. More than 500 people were victims of attacks: from Empress Sissi to President Sadi Carnot, from Humbert I of Italy to American President McKinley. The slogan in style at the time was: "Make the bourge- oisie give up its ill-gotten gains," "Wage revolution yourself," and "Prop- aganda by deeds," in other words by attack. Bonnot and his group made lib~ral use of it. This marked the triumph of Bakunin's ideas: "The prinary element in a solid construction is to first demolish what already exists." Are the anarchists therefore advocates of violent action? Certainly not, in the first place because of their public image. They believe violent action has harmed them by giving the public a stereotype image of the anarchist as having a dagger in his teeth and a bomb in his bag. The Anarchist� Federation criticizes the fact that too often it gets all the blame for the acts of the libertarians, and it tries to disassociate itself from modern terrorism as "blind and stupid." 1Veither God nor Master However, its position remains ambiguous. For one thing, there are as many opinions as there are anarchists, and as many libertarians on the fringe of the organization as there are in it. The attitudes toward terrorism also 36 ~ FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLII APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFtC1AL USE ONLY - vary: from condeianation to "friendly nonparticipation," and from aympathy to open aupport. An Anarchist Federation leader was definite: "We do not recognize the Jacobin states or the laws based on in~ ustice and inequality as having any legitimacy. We are not illegalists but alegalists. We are ready _ to carry out actions which are outside legality: strikes, factory sit-ina, and--why not--armed insurrections." Maurice Joyeux goes further: "An anarchist resorts to terrorism in order to open a breach, as you do in combat. However, terrorism does not have to be spectacular. It need not publicize itself. He cites the example of Pinelli, an anarchist who was arrested in Italy in 1969. After being taken to the police station, he "fell from the window" and was killed. A year later, the two policemen who had interrogated him were shot. No one ever claimed responsibility for the attack. However, according to Maurice Joyeux, the action had a signature: It was the "anars" who carried it out. In his view, that is the main difference between anarchist terrorism and today's terrorism: One must select the target, and not operate at random, putting bombs in a station or a train. The libertarians do not regard violence as having an exemplary character. They give priority to concrete action through the media, social arena, and daily life. Thus, they are seeking to acquire a better image, while pre- serving their influence. How many of them are there today? A thousand or so active members and a degree of influence over some 100,000 people. It is difficult to tally people who are by definition unclassifiable. There are many coexisting tendencies. There are the anarcho-syndicalists, who favor trade union action and re3ect politics; the Marxist-libertarians who combine socialism and anarcny; and finally all those who regard themselves simply as anarchists. Since "factionalism" is a chronic illness of the libertarians, it is more appropriate to talk about an anarchist sphere of influence rather than an anarchist move- ment. Anarchist Sphere of Influence At its head is a large organization, the Anarchist Federation. Parallel to it _ survive two small splinter organizations. The rest of the sphere of influence is composed of a multitude of autonomous groups focused around a project or a theme, and various anarcho-syndicalist minorities in the various ma~or unions. In 1945, the Anarchist Federation became the successor to the Anarchist Union of the between-the-wars period. It has 400 to 600 members, of whom half are in the Paris area, and it is divided into groups (10 to 20 persons) and links (less than 5 people). It is thus present in almost all regions, having a number of strongholds: Paris and its area, Toulouse, Besancon, Strasbourg, and Brest. It carries out antimilitary and antiparliamentary demonstrations, takes initiatives regarding social issues, distributes antinuclear material, cam- paigns for abstention in presidential elections, and sets the pact for the life of its members. The "anars" also have their own press: LE MONDE LIBERTAIRE, weekly organ of the Anarchist Federation distributed in 30,000 copies, plus a few local publications here and there, GERMINAL in Amiens, LE DRAPEAU NOIR at Besancon, and L'AGITATEUR at Eubenas, in the Cevennes. The They also broadcast over Radio Libertaire. 37 FOR OFFICUIL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The �ederation has to face one problem which is common to many movements: llow to hold onto sympathizers and members? For the Anarchist Federation retaains kind of aieve organization. However, those who have once been anarchists remain receptive to liberatarian ideas; this is demonstrated by the money collected during fund drives. The age distribution is another sub~ect of con- cern. According to one long-time member, "At a recent Anarchist Federation congress it was like being in a nursery. The people were between 18 and 30. The 30-40 age group had completely disappeared. Only a few old people were left." The bulk of the membership is between 25 and 35. They stay an average of about 5 years. Variations In the past, the club-like characteristics of the Anarchist Federation prompted some to leave it. A considerable number chose concret,e action within trade union organizations. The three ma,jor unions--CGT, CFDm, and particularly the Working Force--all have nore or less significant anarcho-syndicalist minorities. There is even an exclusively anarchist union, the National Labor Confedpration [CNT]. However, the CNT is a very small minority organization, except perhaps in a few towns such as Toulouse and Bordeaux. By tradition, there are anar-. chists in the examiners' union and national education wher~ they represent the "emancipated school" view. They have favo~ed sectors such as metallurgy, construction, and transport, but there are significant variations ty regions and from one period to another. Other libertarians resistant to militancy, either within the Anarchist Federatior~ or the trade union movement, should be regarded as being in the anarchist sphere of influence. They are "outside"--which was the title of an anarchist ~ournal of the end of the 19th century published by Zo ~'Axa-~- and get together for a project or mobilize around a specific theme. They establish book shops, printing establishments, or restaurants. These enter- prises are usually operated on a communal pattern and are self-managed. There are examples at Lyon (La Griffe bookshop), at Strasbourg, ;ahere thE:re is influence by the German alte?-r,ative movement, in Paris (PutLe-aux-Caillea community), and also in some rural districts. In Toulouse, the Mecca of French anarchism and birthplace of Direct Action, autonomous groups (in relation to the Anarchist Federation) publish the BASTA and AGORA reviews, which have some readership. Key Issues What are the big causes of the libertarians? Antimilitarism, in all its forms, is ttieir battlehorse: conscientious objection (refusal of military service), service evasion (refusal of the civilian service which is the legal substitute), total evasion (refusal to comply with any formality at all). This is a trad- itlon; however, though all are antimilitarist, some are strongly pacifist, while others do not reject violent action. Louis Lecoin is an example of this nonviolent tendency. Through his activity in the "Committee to Support Con- scientious Objectors"* and a long hunger strike he succeeded in achieving *Wliich included A Breton, A Camus, B Buffet, J Cocteau, J Giono, and Lanza del Vasto. - 38 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500084414-7 :id~~ption on 22 December 1963 of the law granting status to conscientious objectors. All organizations of ob3ectors and evaders have more or less direct relations with the anarchists. An Anarchist Federation representative explained: "They all know that it is the political organization and the bastion on wh~ch they can unquestionably depend to defend them and publicize their views." The ecology movement is also one of their causes. The nuclear opposition movement is the product of a society which has been police-controlled and centralized to excess: the anarchists favor use of the "benign" sources, solar, wind, and others. There is another old theme which is dear to them: federalism, inherited from Proudhon, which brings them close to the regionalist movements. This why they often go to ba~ on the side of the Bretons, Basques, Alsatians, or Occitans. These ideas and others feature within the overall social concept: self-management, decentralization. This is the measure of anarchist influence. Today, the libertarians waver between disenchantment and optimism. "In the course o� activity, you realizethat tracts and.posters are not enough." The speaker, a"youth" who had been in the Anarchist Federation for 5 years, was on duty for a district group between 1900 and 2000 hours over chips and Coca Cola. He approved of some forms of terrorism: "Rue Marbeuf was of no inter- est to me. However, blowing up the drilling equipment on a nuclear plant building site--I am in favor of that." The mood is nevertheless on the side - of optimism. After a year of Socialist government, Ma.urice Joyeux says: "These people want to do without a revolution and they will not succeed. The Socialists are not changing a regime, they are going along with it. And they will be destroyed with it. After that, come the barbarians. And we are the barbarians." 39 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 ' M~JK VMC1l1AL UJ~ UI~ILY ~ J,. .:,d j - ~ ~ ,ri ~t _ r ~i..,- ` ~ 1 ' � _ Y~:.r" ,~e;. pNp _ ~t�~'~ ' , '-1 � ~ . ~ e-1 ~ ~ . H a . ~ ' d :,u+'~r'~ I , , ~ - r1 ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ - v x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . . y-u,.r~ r. U1 '...iii .nr. 47 'l7 . , ,I-f ~ ' ~ ~ ~ _ - Y U I ~ - C: , ` i , �5 - .n� ~ ~~i r--~ ~ ~ f~;, i 1 C''+ O �rl - 1r 1~ Y!i i r_' r r.. a,. .5 ~ A ~ U ' ~ u COPYRIGHT: Latitude SARL 4th trimestre 1981 9920 CSO: 6131/541 40 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OF'~7CIAL USE ONLY SPAIN TERRORISM IN SPAIN Barcelona EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA in Spanish 1982 pp 101-142 [Chapter from book by Ale~andro Munoz Alonao] [Text] Chapter III The Eacalation "A handful of fanatics is sufficient to make us reaiize how dreadfully fragile a democratic society can be when democracy is not prepared to defend itself." Pierre Trudeau, 1970 Summary The strategy of destabilization. The "normalization" of terrorism. Negotiating with ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group]. The provocation o~ the Armed Forces. When ETA acts, GRA~O [F~rst of October Armed Revolutionary G.roup] falls. ETA: kills more to negotiate better. The Strategy of Destabilization ~ On 15 June 1977, the day of the first democratic elections, Spain found itself. - Many things remained in the past. The democratic ~ervor and civic spirit with which Spaniards took to the streets that day to comply with their electoral obligation cauaed many to think that a new era was beginning wherein violence - would no longer have a place in our collective life. Democracy repreaented precisely the end of "institutionalized violence" which was repl.aced by the rule of law. Abu~e of authority or overstepping in the exercise of authority would no longer be fitting. Henceforth the power wonld come from the people, would b~ legit~.mized among the peo~le and would be juati~ied by the people. It would render an accounting to the~people and would be controlled by the people's~ representatives. In shoxt, the state of law ~aas the antithesis of institutionalized violence. As we have obaerved in the prevfous~chapters, during the ~inal years of Franco- ism and the early years o~ the transition, the idea of terrorism as a"response" to the violence o~ thoae in power had cropped up over and over again. With this kfnd of violence gone, terrorism no longer had a reason to exist. When = 41 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY democratic channels for voicing needs, aspirations or expectations are lacking, terrorism appeaxs as a substitute, or abnormal medium for communication. But when those democratic channels are guaranteed for all groups, implementi~g the principle of pluralism, the "raison d'etre" of political violence as a mechnniem for expression disappears. As we shall note upon analyzing the polls, this view, a real "wishful thinking," was held by many Spaniards. But, very soon, events occurred, with their sudden reality, to challenge this exalted notion. The terrorism continued with demo- cracy, and even reached higher levels than at any previous time. During the summer of 1977, ETA maintained the truce, but GRAPO again gave signs of its existence, despite the fact that the organization's most prominent lead- ers had been arrested. On 11 July, two bombs destroyed the premisea of the French cultural delegation in Madrid, wounding three peraons. A week later, a GRAPO commando unit kidnapped the radio brcadcasting technician Mario Frigenti at the SER facilities on the outskirts of Madrid. They were attempting to transmit a message of a"republican" nature via the SER main broadcasting antennas, but they did not achieve their purpose, and the technician was released. On the night o~ 6-7 August, a 19-year old GRAPO mzmber, Luis Torri~os, kept seven hostages �rom the same family in captivity in a house in Madrid. The mediation by Prof Tierno Galvan put an end to the abduction, and the "GRAPO member" surrendered without putting up any resistance. This Luis Torri~os invaded the house wielding a pistol and shouting: "The police are pursuing me, I am from GRAPO." The phrase was to become notorious as an expression of alleged _ popular support, which the strange organization never en~oyed. 'Itao days later, the police announced the capture of another ~ix members of the same terrorist organization, including one of its most prominent leaders, Fernan- do Hierro Chomon, who was accused of having supplied the explosives used in the attack against DIARIO 16 the previous June. He was also considered to have been implicated in the Oriol and Villaescusa kidnappings. We.shall comment later on the circumatances that surrounded these arrests, apparently due to the informa- tion supplied by someone who had infiltrated. But it was not until the end of September that the terrorism, as if emerging from a summertime lethargy, made its bloody presence felt again. On 20 September, a powerful device exploded in the building of the Barcelona magazine, EL PAPUS, killing the doorman of the premises, Juan Penalver, and causing 16 in~uries, several of which were serious. Shortly thereafter, the Triple A claimed respon- sibility fox the attack. In the communique, it accused the magazine of having published articles "which le~t ~ascism debased." Al1 the Barcelona news media held a 24-hour strike in solidarity with EL PAPUS and in protest at what was interpreted as an attack on freedom of speech. A heavily attended demonstration even approached the civil government, demanding the arrest o~ the extreme right wing groups. On Friday, 23 September, the Madrid newspapers also held a much-diacussed strike and a jQ~2.~:~~ ~demcttistration 42 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500084410-7 ' FOR OFF7CIAL USE ONLY paraded through the downtown streets. The Spanish weeklies published a~oint editorial entitled "We defend ~reedom of speech." Like the Catalonian press, they also declared that "The attacks have the common goal of obetructing the democratic process which has begun in our country." "The unpunished action of the uncontrolled groups, the existence of parallel organizations and the brazen operation of extreme right wing grovps with international connections demand from the authorities not only i~nediate action, but also a public expla- nation." A few days later, on 27 September, the Armed Police captain, Florentino Herguedas Carretero, was aesas.sinated in Madrid. Although the assassination was claimed by several unknown organizations, such as OREA (Revolutionary Organization of Antifascist SQain) and the Party for the Liberation of Spain, it was presumed to have possibly been another action by GRAPO. As on so many other occasions, the extreme right wingers took advantage of the assassinated captain's funeral to shout against the government and demand the "Army in ~ower." These firat attacks after the e~.ection~ prompted commentators to think that the goal of the texrorists o~ all stripes was., none other than the destabilization of democracy. Terrorism was no longer viewed as an expression of a desire for greater liberty, hut rather aa a stragegX against the nascent democracy. EL PAIS, which gave a reminder that, with Captain Herguedas, the number of inembers of the �orces o~ public order who had ~allen victim to attacks since the death of Franco totaled 19, noted that "Captain Herguedas' death is an assassination, without any other possible explanation than golitical provocation." (1) According to CAMBIO 16, "The public has been becoming aFtare of thz fact that there may be clearcut connectiona between political individuals identified with the most extxeme Francoist sectoxa and the proliferation of right win~ commando units, uncontrolled groups and certain special aervices which have refused to disappear after 40 years of influence and impunity." It continued thusly: "These groups, which may show up with a right or le~t wing countenance have a plan for political destabi~.ization and ~a~re certain accomp~ices at'che~* disposal in a machinery, that o� the administration, which is not yet used to a situation o~ democratic normality." In the view of CAMBIO 16, it was obvious that "the goal o� the right wing groups of the 'ancien regime' and that of the extreme small groups rising sporadica].ly to the surface is the same: to put an end to democracy." (2) ; Meanwhile, scarcely any progress had been made in the direction of solving the Basque problem. The ETA members "exiled" in foreign territory who had no permis- sion to entex Spain legally broke the ban: On 22 Ju1X, 10 of them were present at a rally held in Durango (Vizcaya). Six days later, in an odd paradox clearly demonstrating the enormous gap separating the legal �rom the real, the "Official State Bulletin" publiahed the decrees on exile. At that time, those "exiled" had ceased to be such, and although one of them was arrested, the othera showed up at another public function, and even went to the graves of the nationalist militants to paX tx'ibute to them. No one doubted the tacit consent of the government. 43 FOR OFFICUI~, USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY During the entire month of August, there was a virtually uninterrupted succes- sion of demons~trations and gatherings in the Basque Country, in solidarity witli "Apala," who had been on a hunger strike since 30 July in the Beaumettea (Marseilles) prison. Ae was protesting his possible turnover to the Spanish Government. Over 300 individuals in the Basque Country atarted a strike in solidarity with the prominent ETA leader. CAMBIO 16 expressed the view that he was becoming "a Basque national hero." Committees on Behalf of "Apala" were created,~and the "March o~ Liberty" itself, which toured the Basque coun- try that summer, turned almost completely into a march on behalf of "Apala." Hundreds of Basques went to France to visit the 3ailed ETA member and to demonstrate before the Court o~ Aix-en-Provence, asking that it not agree to the petition for extradition, the second one made by the Spanish Government within a few weeks. A~ter nearl~? a month of hunger striking, "Apala" appealed to the Basque people, proclaiming: "If France turns me over to Spain, it will only turn over a corpse." (3) _ After 97 days of incarceration and 35 of hunger striking, "Apala" ~aas given a provisional release under court control, without being able to leave the depart- ment of Bouches du Rhone until his extradition procesa was heard on 14 October. Then the French leftist parties voiced opposition to the extradition. Specific- ally, the Socialiats declared: "Our position is the same as that of PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], our fraternal party; in other words, we do not want anything to do with gxoups seeking to destabilize the Spanish situation, but we shall not consent to the granting of his extradition either." (4) For its part, ETA, temporarily inactive, threatened to renew the "armed action" if the request for extradition succeeded. It did not succeed, but ETA resumed its bloody activity. As for "Apala," he fled to "a safe place" before the trial took place. No further news was heard regarding this:prominenr ETA member. until 1980. The other two ma,jor i~sues which produced mobilization and the assumption of positions in the Basque Country during the summer of 1977 were the "uncontrolled" and total amnesty. The name "uncontrolled" was given to the groups of unidenti- fied individuals who mingled with the people maintaining a provocative and� aggressive attitude, particularly on the occasion of the popular festivals in various Basque localities. The civil governors of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa at the time, Salazar-Simp~on and Oyarzabal, respectively, often received comp3afnts, ~ and declared their desire to end that situati~n. But no "uncontrolled" person was ever arrested oz identified. Letamendia, deputy d� Euskadiko Eskerra [Basque Left] representing Guipuzcoa, expressed his conviction that "there are police among the uncontrolled" and that, in any event, "they are acting with the backing of the forces of order." In view of the govexnment's impassiveness, the residents o~ Amorebieta (Vizcaya) proposed to carry out criminal action, forming self-defense pickets that succeed- ed in capturing and identifying some of the uncontrolled. From the documents, notes, weapons and even police badges that were ~ound on them, there was no doubt of the official nature o� those uncontrolled persons who, moreover, were immediately released upon being turned over to the Civil Guard barracks. (5) 44 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Almost as much as during the su~ner of 1976, the amnesty, particularly in the Basque Country, was a mobilizing idea. It was requeated that Parliament pass a total amnesty law that would achieve the release of those arrested for pali- tical reasons who were still in ~ail. But the common prisonera a18o wanted to benefit from the advent of democracy, and so the summer of 1917 was marked by uprisings in the ~ails which, on occasion, caused nearly total destruction of the prison establishments. ' The amnesty was aleo an occasion for confrontations among various Basque poli- tical parties. Specifically, on 8 September, a demonstration was held in San Sebastian which had bePn called by ENV [Basque Nationalist Party] and PSOE to petition ~or amnestX and which was met with a couater-demonstration by the most radicaled "abertzale" [patriotic] sectors. The "exiles" headed by Telesforo Monzon who participated in the demonatration o� the ma3ority parties opted to disappear. That day, there became obvious not only the contradictions existing between the ma~ority parties and those of the "abertzale" left, but also the internal differences amoag the latter themselvee. For example, while the leadership and some militants of EIA [Basque.Revolutionary Party] participat- ed in the demonstration, other milftants of and sympathizers with this party, angry at the leadership'a policy, ~oined the counter-demonstration. Something similar occurred with the ESB [Basque Socialiat Convergence] party. According to Socialist Deputy Mugica, "What happened clearlq indicates that there are two paths. in the Basque Countrp: one being that of the various political forces which agree with the belief that the ob~ectives can only be considered through peaceful means; and the other, that of the fanaticized groups which want to destabilize the country against the desire expresaed by the Basques in the 15 June elections." (6) According to EL PAIS, "The parCies of the 'abertzale' left, defenders of ETA, and proponents of independence, have attempted through maneuvers to downgrade the election results through popular mobilizationa which, supposedly, would cancel them The aggravation and irrationality of the agitators who attempted to break up the demonstration prompts them, through the very dialectics of their hallucination, toward poaitions that are increasingly indistinguishable from the authoritarian, antidemocratic mentality that they are presumably combating." (7) However, it was obvious that extensive sectors of Sasque society still backed ETA in one way or another, although some encouraging signs were beginning to be perceived. CAMBIO 16 wrote: "Fihile in all the mass demonetrationa held in the Basque Country recently, thousands upon thousands of people enthusiastically chanted the ETA slogan, 'herria zurekin' (ETA, the people are with you), the ma~ority parties and large sectore o� the people no longer appear to be in agreement with some of this organization's methods." (8) According to the magazine, "the protest from the ~ublic" was due to the constant series of letters received by Basque tndustrialists asking for the:well-known "revolution- ary tax," and to the exploding o~ premisea to be uaed ~or a school for small ~ children on 12 September, in Eihar, by the ETA military. ETA (m) claimed that the premisea~ were to be used ~or the Armed Police station and barracks, but the mayor of Eib~ar, backed bX�the ree~idents, released a communique reiter~ting that it was a school �or sinall children that was invol.ved, and��that :'any careful observer can ascextain, i~ he examines the buildinge, that they could not serve the purpose that i.s no~r being attempted to ascribe to them, owing to their technical features." (9) 45 FOR OFFICU?L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500080014-7 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY What appeared quite clear was the receptiveness given to the ideas of the "abertzale" left by the Basque youth. Sources close to PCE [Spanish Communist Party] and PSOE, which were suffering personally from this youth deviation _ toWard radical positions, were of the opinion that the "abertzale" parties might well have the support of fram 18 to 20 percent of the Basque population. The great division in varioua nationalist radical parties explained their slight parliamentary tn�luence. One example was the 80,000 daily copies c3rculated by EGIN, spokessnan for the most extreme "abertzale" sector. ~ Moreover, the economic crisis was causing an increase in unemployment especially among the youth. The youth ~oblessness was thereby turning into a source for recruiting ETA militants. The organization offered not only a way of life, but also that entire aura of heroism that had made "Apala" the most popular idol in the Basque Country; and, at the same time, the enormous weight of idealism involved in dedication to a struggle for the people and �or the fut;ure of Euskadi. At the end of the sununer of 1977, after long, detailed negotiations, the merger of the "beretzi" commando units, which had broken off from ETA (p-m) [ETA poli- tical and military), with ETA (m), the most radical but also the smallest . faction o� the terrorist organization, was completed. Affiliated with ETA (m) were so~ne o~ the best known leaders, such as "Argala," "Peixoto," "Trepa" or "Txomin." The "beretzi" contributed the extremely popular "Apala," no less. ~10) From then on, ET'A (p-m) became increasingly dissociated from the ETA (m) propo- sals, condemning its "armed actions" in a tone that would have been totally unheard-of a few weeks earlier. Political events became accelerated during the first 10 days of October. On Monday, 27 September, the Congress.Spokesmen Board included on the agenda a bill from PSOE backed by the Bas~que and Catalonian nationalists and the entire left, on total amnesty. Conceived in a very broad manner, it entailed the release of the members of GRAPO who had kidnapped Oriol and Villaescusa, and the presumed perpetratora of the Atocha slaughter and, what the Army absolutely vetoed, the reinstatement of the U1~ [Military Democratic Union] military. UCD [Democratic Center Union] immediately prepared another bill, and there began difficult negotiations while, in the Basque Country, the Pro-Amneaty promoters were preparing a new week of struggle starting on Tuesday, 4 October. Z~ao days later, on Thursday, 6 October, an agreement was reached wRich established three dates for the amnesty: total, up until 15 December 1976 (the date of the referendum on the Law for Political Reform); for the crimes the purpose of - which was to reestablish democracy or the autonomies, up until 15 June; and 6 October for those same crimes, but with the omission of those involving blood- shed. But before the Cortes approved the amneaty, on 15 October, several far-reaching evente took place. On 5 October, the extreme right wing terrorism showed up again: A device seri- ously damaged the premises of the Sasque nationalist magazine PUNTO Y HORA DE 46 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EUSKALHERRIA, published in Pamplona. As in the recent EL PAPUS case, a tele- phone call claimed the attack ~or the Triple A, although the anonymous spokes- man added: "The a?atter of the name ia the ieast important, because we could aleo have claimed it under the name o~c Spanish-Basque Battlaion or Adolf Hitler Sixth Coaa~ando Unit." As had been suspected, the extreme right used various labele indiscrixninately. On the morning of Saturday, 8 October, when the head of the Vizcaya Chamber of Deputies, Augusto Unzueta Barrenechea, was preparing to remove the sport�clothes for his usual ball game from the trunk of his car in Guernica, he was felled by a machine gun ~ixed by an ETA conm~ando unit which eacaped. The ~two ~ivil guardsmen escorting him, Angel Ribera Navarron and Antonio Hernandez Fernand~z- Segura, also died. It had been a year, almost to the day, 4..October 1976,~'~ since his predecessor in the position, Juan Maria Araluce, had been killed, also the victim of the ETA's hatred. The ETA truce had ended. The bloodiest period of terxorism was about to begin. In fact, during 1978 and 1979, the assassinationa increaaed in an ineane, brutal progression. The next day, Sunday, 9 October, all the large parliamentary parties signed the document which was to be knowa as the "Moncloa Pacts", sxpressing the democratic desire to consolidate the regime of liberties, in the hall Qf columns at Moncloa Palace. On that same Sunday, the police of Alicante amd Valencia besieged a large group of GRAPO members who were in an apartment. A total of 11 men, two women and a three-year old child fell into the hands of the forcea of order. The police had carefully planned the operation several days beforehand, watching the flat where the terrorists who, according to the official report, comprised the GRAPO Executive Committee, were residing. Among thoae arrested was Francisco Brotons Beneyto, who appeared to be the top-ranking leader, and Juan Martin Luna who, according to the of�icial note, "was in control of the commando units." According to the reports from GRAPO itaelf, this blow, the most serious one received by the terrorist organization, was made poasible becauae "a member of the civil guard, "Isaac Fernandez," managed to infiltrate GRAPO through the PCE (r). As everyone knows, both organizations were linked, although GACETA ROJA, the official clandestine organ of PCE (r) did not admit the organic connection between them ~or a long time. The infiltrated individual, "Fernandez," apparent- ly was the cause of the arrest of the five members of the Regional Committee of PCE (r) of Astuxias. Later, he ,joined the commando unit led by Iiierro Chomon. In August 1977, when this commando unit was planning ta steal weapons at the Madrid Mobile Depot, all of ita members, including Hierro Chomon, were arrested _ by the police. One member of the commando unit, Luis Torri3os, was captured in the apartment where he had taken refuge, holding the entire family as hostages, as we explained previously. Only "Isaac Fernandez," precisely, escaped, and this put GRAPO on its guard. It captured him, and aub~ected him to questioning However, after ~umping out~of a first floor window, "Fernandez" managed to escape. Within a~ew minutes, the police arrived at the apartment from which everyone except Luis Alvarez, the presumed executor appointed by "Isaac Fernan- - dez," had fled. On 15 September, GRAPO published a perfectly printed sheet 47 1~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY containing a photograph of "Fernandez" and exposing him as an infiltrated "cop." Months latez, when Cubillo was the victim of an attack, it was learned that "Isaac Fernandez real name was Jose Luis Espinosa Pardo, and that he had berved as liaison for the Aigeria-Cubillo-GRAPO trio. (11) The arrests by the police did not affect the extreme leftist terrorist organiza- " _ tion alone. Following the attack against EL PAPUS, an extensive police operation was put into effect, resulting in the arrest of a large extreme rightist group in Barcelona and Lerida. The most prominent of the 12 persona arreated was Mi.guel Gomez Benet, chief of the Lerida extreme rightiat group, whom we mentioned - in the previoua chapter. This former national councilman of the Movement and lieutenant in the Fxanco Guard was the organizer of the training couraes for fascists which were given in Lerida ProvincP and which constituted a genuine school of terrorism. Among those captured were some well-known fascists respon- sible for many attacks, speci~ically, Juan Jose $osch Tapies, the presumed material perpetratoz of the attack on EL PAPUS. (12) But no one had any illusions. The terrorists' arrests did not mean the end of terrorism. CAMBIO 16 vi~wed it in this fashion: "Fascists of the red stripe or fascists of the blue stripe will continue to kill and will continue to attemgt to restore the iron rule of oppression in this, country. What is probably not imagined is that a cherished and atxong democracy will triumph where the dicta- torship failed. Now the terroris,ta can no longer say that they are defending the people's interests, but rather the infamous intereats of their particular tyranny. They remain alone, they will continue to kill, but sooner or ~ater the weight of the law will fall upon them." (13) Once the truce had been broken by ETA, the attacka continued. On 13 October, - in Villabona (Guipuzcoa), the truck driver Jose Manuel Garro Azpiroz died; and on 17 October, in Lasarte (Guipuzcoa), it was the civil guard, Ildefonso Sanchez Amil, who was the victim of the ETA terrorism. The attacks began to be insigni- ficant, and the press was devoting increasingl~? less~space.and.smaller headlines - to them. On 2 November, it was the Irun}. municipal police sergeant, Jose Diez Fernandez, who was shot to death bp ETA (m) bullets. As on other occasions, the Basque political partiea condemned the attack; as on other occasions, the "abert2ale"" left groups kept a silence; a silence which seemed to many to be concealing connivance and even complicity. A few days later, on 12 November, the armed police chaplain, Jesus Auxelio Aranguas Gutierrez, and the policemen Francisco Munoz Madrid and Jose Cavero Duso were killed in a multiple attack. MPAIAC [Sovereignty and Independence Movement of the Canary Islands] also return- ed to the "armed struggle" to celebrate the 13th anniversary of its founding, as Cubillo announced from its broadcagting station, "The Free Canaries Voice." He also said that "the Guanche [Canary Island] armed�forces will begin the armed struggle until final victoxy or death." A few days earlier, 16 MPAIAC militants had benefited from the amnesty af ter having~.remained in ~ail for a few months. On 15 December, two arnted police agents~.were slightly wounded by shotgun fire from an MPAIAC commando unit. 48 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIA~. USE ONLY There was increasing concern over the terrorist action to destabilize a regime such as the nascent Spaniah democracp, which was experiencing a difficult phase marked by the preconstitutional situation. The need to modernize the battle against terroriam was.felt, and it was then that there began to he talk of creating special commando unita o~ the-German type `vhich had resolved the hi~acking of a German airplane in Mogadiscio (Somalia). In the psychosis over destabilization that was being experienced,~it was feared - in particular that ETA or GR,APO would attempt an aesault upon the king or Pre~i- dent Suarez, which would presumably destroy the complex, difficu~t effort for democratic institutionalization that was being expended. Major alarm was evoked by the fact that a large number of documents, including plans of Moncloa Palace, the president's reaidence for several months, to which he had moved precisely for security reasona, had been seized from the GRAPO members arrested in early October. The plans contained certain innovations (an elevator connect- ed directly with the o~ficial office and his private rooms) that had been com- pleted only a few months earlier. In addition, the discovery of military uniforms and a rifle with a telescopic sight caused the police to conclude that an attack on Suarez was being planned, not the firat one detected by the intel- ligence services. The previous summer, a"gum-2" charge had been discovered in Palma de Mallorca, on the route that the kin~ and the president of the govern- ment were scheduled to take a~ew minutea later. In February 1977, an operation aimed at Suarez' assaasination had been detected; and, inaofar as the king was concerned, in October 1977 MPAIAC had set two small, merely "testimonial" explo- sives on the rout2 that Juan Carlos I was to take on hia official visit to Las Palmas. The same night, from Algiers, Cubillo proudly proclaimed that "the impressive royal aecurity service is powerless against us." When the king and queen paid an official visit to Belgium, from 16 to 19 October, a threatening call was received from the extreme right organization, Black Order, which neces- sitated the rein~orcement of the security measures. On the night o~ 12 November, Moncloa Palace was machine-gunned from a black Chrysler which took the E1 Pardo highway at fu11 speed. Although Suarez himself confirmed the news, the great distance at which the pietol's ~mpty cartridges were found, about 300 meters fxom Moncloa Palace, caused importance to be detracted fxrnn the incident. On th~s occasion, the stringent secu~ity measures surrounding the president were described. (14) The atmosphere of violence was beginning to cause concern. Democracy, backed by the vast ma~orit~ of Spaniards, as proven by the r~sults of the general elections of 15 June, was being hFtrasaed by two radicalized types of extremists who did not understand nor want any language other than that of violence. The incitement to a coup coming from the extreme right ~~s: associated with the praise for ETA that was heard in the Basque provincee. On 13 December, in Salamanca, the New Force leader, Blas Pinar, a great sower o~ discord, asserted: "Violence is not at odda with Chxi.stian sentiments (and~ ltalues such as God and Fatherland must be defending, even with violence." - An attack which evoked particular repudiation was the~one which cost tlie life of Comdr Joaqutn I'maz Martinez, chief of the armed police in Pamplona. In 49 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY this way, ETA (m) took the first step in the strategy for provocation of the Army which was to be carried ouC particularly in the summer o� 1918. An ETA militant, David Alvarez, was seriously wounded. The assassination of commander Imaz was claimed by' ETA (m) iri.~a long._communique� in which it stressed: "We shall continue our military campaign against the police corps which have supported the mflitary dictatorahip in Euskadi until they have been totally expelled from our Basque territory." PSOE or, more accurately, the Socialist Party of Euskadi-P90E, published a manifesto Containing what was possibly the harshest condemnation o~ terrorism to date. The manifesto~-attack- ed the Euskadiko Eskerra memhers o~ parliament (Deputy Letamendia and Senator Bandres) "who, at the time when Mr Imaz was assaesia~ted, at a political rally held in San Sebaetian were chanting from the platform "Gora ETA" and "ETA herria zurekin" (ETA, the people are with you); which appears to mean that EIA and those members of parliament were backing the ETA violent action." The aforementioned tnembera o� parliament, Bandres and Letamendia, issued a public retort in which, among other things, they claimed that the shouting of "ETA herria zurekin", when"chanted en masse represents the people's recogr~ition for a glorious national liberation ~ovement that has been carried out during the past 15 years in Eus.kadi, which transcends the action of partial branches of this organization or concrete action taken by it." (15) DIARIO 16 concluded by saying: "If they confirm their s.upport for the violent action of ETA, their place ought to be outside of the Cortes." (16) In a harah editorial against ETA, EL PAIS made this stateulent: "The Basque members of.parliament must estab- lish their thinking on the future of their people and the ethical and political opinion that they should now have for an 'armed branch' such as ETA Let the representatives ~reely elected by the Basque people clearly define their position on the view that the~ hold of a minority organization which is perse- cuting the independence of Euskadi (with Navarra or without Navarra? with Rio~a or without Rio~a? with the French-Basque provincea or wi~hout them?), based on politico-historical analyses made w~.fh dialectical materials supplied by the Parabellum establiahment." (17) Yet before the year's end, ETA (m) assassinated the Irun councilman Julio Marti- nez Esquerzo (on 17 December). On 20 December, there was an abortive attack on the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant, thereby starting a long campaign that was to last for several yeaxs., with. Iberduero, the company owning the powerplant, as a target. On 30 December, ETA (p-m) stole 300 kilograma of explosives owned by Riottnto Explosives. Also attrilauted to ETA (p:m) was the theft of 264 shot- guns in Elgoibar, 900 kilograms of "gum-2" in Galdacano and 250 kilograms of hydronite tn Gallarta. There was no doubt that ETA (p-m) was also readying to resume the armed struggle. These repeated thefts of explos.ives larought about the dismissal of the civil guard lieutenant colonel in Vizcaya, and an extensive police operation against ETA waa started. The Basque Country was subm~rged in the whirlpool of violence. On 10 December, the last Basque inmate left 3ai1; and on 30 December the Basque Country was granted preautonomy. But, as we have already had occasion to note, the poli- tical_; gains and concessions were not only incapable o~ curbing the terrorist madness, but appeared to act as catalysts for the violence. 50 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1977 ended in this way. The toll of the terrorists was by now imprPSSive: 21 killed by ETA, 10 by GRAPO and seven by the extreme right; in addition to some 30 cou~trymen killed in various types of confrontations with the forces of public order, the last two during December in Malaga and Santa Cruz de Teneri.�e. The 'Normalization' of Terrorism The terroris.t attacks increased so that in 1978 they became a usual '~event." ~ But few weeks did not contrfbute a death to the tragic terrorfst statistics, and if we conaider the attacks of lesser dimensions, the tabulation becomes virtually impossible. The public was beginning to be accustomed to the daily nature of the terroris~, and popular emotion or political tension was heightened only in the ca~se of cer- tain attacks that were particularly significant owing to the status of the - persons who were victims or the number thereof. But the t~rpical attack causing the death of a member o� the forces of public order went unnoticed ar~d becane~ almost a trivial incident. This is proven by the treatment given those attacks by the news media. The establisYuqent of the preautonmaous regime in the S'~ue~~~}t-radsed hopes. Everyone thought that this was the path, but no one shared the opti~smiof;~th~nk- ing that the texrorism would disappear immediately. And longer deadlines were set for the total e~adication of violence. EL PAIS wrote: "It is even likely that the establishiaent of the Basque presutonomous regime itself may be what will prompt the ETA military to mount aome kind of provocation for the purpose of checking the autonomous process, destabilizing the situation in Euskadi and making involution possible in the rest of Spain. Because those activists, who have been definit~vely convexted into common assassins, fear the political,encircle- ment that is. gradually tightening around them more than the police encirclement." EL PAIS predicted that when the democratic regime was fullp eatablished ("voting at the polls for their mayora, deputies and governora"),"ETA militarp will disappear from the scene in Euskadi; ita remains, if there are any, will be what they already are: a gang of gunmen." (18) Despite these predictions, on 9 January the armed policemen-Tomas Garcia Sanchez and Diego Mosquera Mendez were assaasinated in Eibar (Guipuzcoa). At that time, however, the center of graviCy of the antiterrorist battle had moved to Navarr~., which had become highly sensitized since the death of Comdr Imaz. Some police chiefs from outside of Navarra, auch as the Bilbao chief commissioner, Gomez Margar~da, "Conesa's right arn?," and the general deputy director of security and expert on ETA owing to his long stap in the Basque Country, Jose Sainz, parti:cipated tn a spectacular deploXment. Several arreats of presum~d ETA members had taken place early~ in the year, but the culmirtgtirig-point of the operation took place on 11 January when, during the c~su'se of a search of an apparently vacant "sa�e apartment," when the inspectora were on the street, , there was an a~cmed con~rontation in which the policeman Jose Manuel Baena Martin and the ETA members Marinao ~ezez de Vinasper and Ceferino Sarasola Arregui were killed. 51 FOR O.FFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 'fhe ma~ority political parties took advantage of the occasion to reiterate the condemnation of the ETA violence, but the "abertzale" left parties, EIA, LAIA (Basque Workers Revolutionary Party], HASI [Revolutionary ~eople's Socialist Party], the LAB [Basque National Uni.on] trade union federation and other groups accused the "repressive corps" wt,~ap latest act had been "the assassiaation of two ETA (m) militants in the San Jorge district on 11 January." Other extrapar- liamentary groups considered the incident "an inevitable consequence of the police occupation and the systematic campaign of checks, searchesy.aaresr8sand~.~in- _ terrogations which we in Pamplona have suffered since last Saturday and which has culminated in the manhunt and massacre of ETA militants." (19) The battle against ETA was embarking on a new phase typified by increased acti- vity both by the military and the politico-military branch. The latter had undergone a period of recovery after the blows sustained in recent months, both from the police action and the splitting off by "Apala's" special commando unite (bereziak) which, as we already know, had ended up awelling the ranks of the "milis" as the members of ETA (m) were called. There was also talk of a pact = with the government as an explanation �or the truce. The differences s.eparating the two branches of ETA became more distinct than ever. ETA (m) gave absolute priority to the armed struggle, attempting to crea'c~~ a prerevolutionary situation and showing up the contradictions in the - regime which they considered to be pseudo-democratic. They attempted to approach the people over and above the channels opened by the parties, "so that they will accept our action and break off from the conventional democracy." ETA (m) held the view that, "Our people are beginning to understand that the elections were merely a trap to legitimize as democratic a regime which is essentially a military dictatorship." - ETA (p-m) cons.idered itself a coerciye apparatus backing the action of the parties. Armed action is only a supplement to tH.e mass struggle, and hence the action should be selective. In s.hort, only when the mass struggle proves to be incapable of attaining its demands does armed intervention become necessary. E TA (p-m) considered itself a military vanguard of the Basque national and social revolution. ETA (m) was almost unanimously criticized by all the political leaders, includ- ing~� those like Sabino Arana of the Revolutionary Communist League, or Roberto Lerchundi of the Conununist Party, who had been ETA militants at times. Sabino Arana criticized acts such as the deaths of Berezadi, Ibarra or Imaz, which "seemed motivated more by logistical causes:~ (the ~ossibility of a~ch~.eving them) than by political ones." According to Lerchundi, "The ETA activity since the death of Franco has shown solely and constantly antidemocratic features He said: "I claim that ETA is against the interests of Euskadi and against the interests of liberty." In any event, the intention of both branches to continue the struggle prompted almost all the Basque political parties to advocate negotiation. It was claimed that, on other occasions, negotiations had brought results, and the government was attributed the desire to negotiate and the search for qualified spokesmen. 52 = FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It was even learned that there was a co~unique from ETA (m) wherein it set forth a"minimal ceiling" for negotiating with the government, but which, in view of its proposition, made the~negotiations impossible. In fact, besides the traditional issues of total amnes.ty (still) and the "expulsion" of the - repressive corps from the Basque Country, it was requested that the Armed Forces garrisoned in the Basque Country be~ome subordinate to the future Baoque autonomous govexnment. Under these conditiona, it became totally imposaible to discuss negotiations. (20) Moreover, it was obvious that the ETA modus operandi had changed. The civil governor of Navarxa, Ignacio Llano, declared: "Previously, (their) names or personal data (o~ the ETA members) were recorded with the police in one way or another. However, we have now come upon some names unknown to anyone, and some individuals whose relations with ETA were not even suspected from their own friendships or from the persons living with them." (21) They were the "legal commando units" which were very soon to becoiae.w~ll known. The members of these commando units never ceased to lead their normal livea. For example, after carrying out an action over a weekend (the number of attacks made on . Saturday or SundaX is actually very large), they would return iuanediately to their usual activity, making it impossfble for anyone to suspect their status - as ETA militants. The legalization of EIA, a political party which, as we have already explained, had become an emanation from that branch o~ the Sasque organization, could have been interpreted as a gesture by the government toward ETA (p-m). The more - progressive press, in general, received this measure with gratification. '.'The dectsion of the Ministry o~ Interior to legalize EIA, surely the most influen- tial party of the 'abertzale' left, deserves only praise It subseqt~ently stated: "The minority nature o~ a political option cannot serve as an argument to keep it outside o~ the law The independence-oriented principles of the Basque left offer the threefold feature of being impossible to implement, not ~ having the suppoxt o~ its own people and offending the patriotic emotions of many Spaniards (.o.). But they should not be doomed to 111egality on that account On the other hand, what must be demanded of them, and not only in theory but in practice aa well, is the renunciation of the use of violence - and the explicit commitment to cut their ties with the terrorist organizations:' (22) MUNDO DIARIO, also approving the decision, stated: "The only exclusion from legality is caused by the use o� violence, armed struggle or physical aggression to make ~olitical ideas triumph." (23) ETA took another step in ita campaign against the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant by carrying out an attack which failed again and which cost the life of ETA member David Alvarez de Pena. As in the case of the ETA members killed in PampZona, there were demonstrations, of protest and claims that the killed ETA member had the status of a popular hero. The Business Branch of the Bilbao School of Economic Sciences published a communique atating: "We back the ETA's armed action as the only effective expedient for the ~cts that have been - committed." (24) But ETA was not the only protagonist in the terrorism during the early weeks of 1978. Tfao terrortst acts which occurred in Barcelona caused moments of high emotional tension. - 53 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Ttie first one was the burning oi the famous premises of the theater-restaurant Scala on 15 January. The fire that was set totally destroyed the establish- ment and caused the deaths of four work~rs who were inside. Almost i~nediately, the police accused the Anarchists and arrested nine persons with that ideology, who were charged with being a commando unit of the "armed branch" or "military" sector of the CNT [National Confederation of Labor]-FAI [Iberian Anarchist Federation] and of the Libertarian Youth. CNT reacted forcefully, consic}er~,ng itself not only dissociated from the attack, but also the victim of a possible provocation. CAMBIO 16 wrote: "The Anarchist federation, which re~ects all bureaucracy ai7d maintains only a small administrative spstem, covered by volunteers who are not subsidi2~d~, lacks the discipline and control systems which other federations have." Official circles denied CNT's respon- sibility in this regazd, but in ~xeas of the Confederation the possibility that "poorly txained CNT militants with little political capacity may undertake excessive tXpes of action" was admitted as real. (25) A few days later, on 25 January, a horrible crime evoked intense emotion. The former may~or of Barcelona, Joaquin Viola, and his wife were mutilated to death after a commando unit consistin~ of four semi-masked persons, including a woman, violently invaded. their residence at dawn and set a bomb on the chest of Mr Viola, a procedure that had already been used, also in Barcelona, to assassinate Mr Bulto, in May o~ the previous year. The terrorists were still in the house when the device exploded, mutilating the bodies of the Viola couple. The repercussions of this attack were enormous and there was again talk of a desta- bilization of democracy. At the funeral services for the assassinated coupl~a there were again shouts of "Army in power" and "Martin Villa, assassin," along with incessant hailing of Franco. The extreme right circles stressed the far_t that the Bulto assass.ins had benefited from the amnesty and were already released. In the controversy over the issue of public order and democracy, the extreme right sectors blamed the new regime directly. EL ALCAZAR asked: "What is go~ng on in Spain? The answer is simple and hardly complex: Francisco Franco die~ in Spain." And, in the same newspaper, Rafael Garcia Serrano contributed his , solution: "The solution is clear, brothers we must dispense with this democracy before it ruins Spain and buries all of us." (26) EL PAIS appeared to be answering the extreme newspaper when it wrote: "Theae ~ outcries have undoubtedly aroused among the put~lic the impression that the terrorists are attaining some of their goals: nervousness among the political sectors that are nostalgic for Francoism. The recent decline in public order is a disturbing fact which is related to both common criminality and political terrorism. The countries without public liberties do not suffer from this plague, although terrorism and crime are usually practiced in the cabinet , offices and at police stations It noted thereafter: "It is unques- tionably necessary to improve the efficac}~; of the security services in order to maintain thi:s democratic public order, and the law must fall strictly upon those � who violate it." And it cancluded by condemning those who were.engaged in _ "making political demagogy concerning blood which, unfortunately, is now that of all Spaniards." (27) 54 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY This editorial ie of interest because it reflects a clearcut change of attitude, not only by the Madrid newspaper, but also in the overall political atmosphere. There ia an abandonment o~ the idea, so greatly circulated before, that with democracy there can be no terrorism, establiahing preciaelp the oppoeite: It ig in "the countxies, without political libertiea" that there ie no terroriem, although thexe te a"state terroriam." Moving in a realm of similar ideas, MUNDO DIARIO, after criticizing "the anti- democrats (who) have be~n meticulously preparing the list of violent acts so as later to spit them brazenly in the face of democracy (because) in order to sell order, the need for it muat first be created through disorder," ~ concluded: "It ia not democracy that fosters violence, but it does quite the contrary: arbitrating peaceful meana for settling the natural differences that occur within the entire human society." (28) But when confronted with this psychosis of violence, the scientists viewed matters more calmly. When queationed by CE1I~I0 16, the sociclogist Amando de Miguel commented: "I believe that the violence in Spain is very slight. If we compare tt with that o~ other countries, the ratea of violence, both political and criminal, are low." Juan Diez Nicolas, director of the Oenter of Sociological Research, emphasized that, "The increases in vi.olence occur in times of transformation such as the ones that we are experiencing." The psychiatrist Gonzalez Duro noted: "It is not that there is more violence now, buC rather that theze is a different violence." And all three thought that violence had come to be the price o~ liberty. (29) In the realm o~ what we might teim lesaer terrorism, we would have to cite several acts by Cubillo's MPAIAC, ~ahich was again attempting what he called "armed propaganda." In January, two members of MPAIAC forced a Canaries merchant veasel to divert its course to the Algerian port of Oran. The Algerian authorities did not allow the ship to dock in the port, and the hijackers had to reach shore by swimming. On 1 February, on the occasion of the visit paid to the islands by Lt Gen Gutierrez Mellado, firat vice-president of the govern- ment, MPAIAC set a device based on "gu~,-2" in an oil pipeline of the Tenerife Petroleum Refinery. However, Cubillo had nnce..agQ~n ~asti:~.his~a~,~ ~tL~n in Algie~s, thanks to the action taken by the PSOE leader, Felipe Gonzalez, who viaited Algeria as the guest of the k'LN jNational Liberation Front] starting on 27 January. Despite everqthing, Cubi,llo attempted to obtain for his group the status of a"National - Liberation Movement" at the meeting of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] - Liberation Committee which took place at Tripoli on 13 ~ehruary, and at the aubsequent ~intsters' meeting to be held on 20 February. A tzip to Libya by the Count of Barcelona, f~ther of the king, was utilized by the latter to convey a personal message to Qadha~i which convinced the latter to accept the Spanish propoai:tion regarding the Canaries. As had occurred the previous year, the OAU Council of Ministera adopted the proposal o~ the Libexation Committee which, among other things, asked for the consideration o~ the Canaries as. "non-autonomous territory" and suggested a~ 55 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFF7CIAL USE ONLY "special assistance" for the MPAIAC, again proposing the sending of a mission to the Canaries. Also, as in 1977, the Spanish Government reiterated "with the greatest firmneae its total re3ection of proposals, decisions or actions that represent a major distortion of reality and attack the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Spain in an intolerable manner." It was inevitable for Cubillo to consider all this, a victory, with sufficient reason, and to comment, with gratification: "From now on we shall act seriously and on a large scale. - The armed struggle will proliferate because, within a few days, I ahall issue orders to all the commando units to go into immediate action until total liberation is attained." (30) This "serious and grand scale" action iIInnediately had its first result on 8 March, when an armed policeman,.Rafael Valdenebros Sotelo, was killed, the victim of an attack that had occurred a week earlier, when a device set by the MPAIAC at the Bank of Vizcaya, in La Laguna, exploded. Cubillo stated that they did not want the death, and accused the government of being mainly to blame by not yielding to the MPAIAC's claims. "If f.t~'_continues with thia policy, there will continue to be victims on both sides." (31) Shortly thereafter, the MPAIAC attempted to imitate ETA's idea of the "revolu- tionary tax," and sent letters to Canaries ir.dustrialista demanding sums that ranged from 5 to 25 million pesetas. No recipient paid attention to these letters. There was, also the fact that, at this time, the MPAIAC was regarded as dismantled, because no fewer than 24 presumed members of the independence movement had been arrested. (32) Cubillo's euphoria suffered a harsh blow on 5 April, when the Canaries separa- tist leader was stabbed at the doox of his house in Algiers. (31a) As was to be expacted, Cubillo accused the Spanish intelligence services, and PSOE itself, and the Aigerian Government attempted to implicate the Spanish Government in the sinister affair. Concretely, two Spaniards, Jose Luis Cortes and Jose Antonio Alfonso Gonzalez, were accused, and were arrested 6 hours after the assault. Links between the accused and FRAP [People's Action Revolutionary Front] and GRAPO also appeared, and.also with the Spanish secret services, and hence an unimaginable degree of confusion was reachec'. We should add that the seriousness of Cubillo's wounds was not known and, as a result, there - was even doubt as to the reality of the attack. The Algerian Government attempted, on the basis of the attack, to implement a campaign against Spain that was. to have its culmination at Khartoum, on 2 July, when the OAU Conference of Heads of State convened there. In May, when the trial against Cubillo's presumed attackers was held, there appeared as a key element instigating thE attack another Spaniard, Jose Luis Espinosa Pardo, a typical multiQle agent who was not only a friend of Cubillo and Boumedienne himself, but also an individual� who, having infiltrated GRAPO, facilitated the discovery by the Spaniah police of that terrorist organiza- tion's hiding place in Benidorm, as we have already noted. This sub~ect, who had a very long record as a secret agent, had been regarded by the Spaniah services as an Algerian agent and as liaison between Algeria and GRAPO who, among other activit~es,had even been a militant in UGT; something which perhaps 56 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY explains Cubillo's hatred for PSOE. Jose Luis Espinosa, formerly "Isaac Fernandez," was condemned to death for rebellion. Meanwhile, ETA continued its attacka upon the members of the forces of public order which had, moreover, become the immediate target of all the mobilizations of the "abertzale" left. "Let them go!'; and "dissolution of all the repressive corps" were the usual ehouts at all the popular gatherings and the slogans which appeared painted on the wallst of all localities in the Navarra-Basque Country. At the same time, the relatives of the civil guards and armed police suffered an obvious repudiation which forced them to live in a real "ghetto." - ETA completed this action with systematic, regular assassination. On 27 January, in Bilbao, the civil guard sergeant, Antonio Gomez Garcia, and regular member Francisco Rodriguez Garcia were assasainated. On 18 February, in Vi~larreal de Urrechua, the victims o~ fatal attacka were another two civil guardsmen, Antonio Navarro Heras and Manuel Redondo Villegas. On 24 February, in Santurce, it was a municipal policeman, Manuel Lemos Moya, who succumbed to the ETA bullets. On 3 March, in Bilbao, three arnaed policemen, Julian Romero Sierra, Antonio Villa- lobos Rubio and Juan Campos Santos were assassinated simultaneously. ~tao days later, on 5 March, in a macabre escalation of the statiatics on fatalities, - five armed policemen were assassinated ~n Vitoria (Miguel Ro~o Aguilar, Joaquin Ramos Gomez, Jose Vicente de Val del Dio, Armando Doval Gonzalez and Santiago Canto de los Reyes). On 10 March, in Aduna (Guipuzcoa), the retired civil = guard sergeant, Jose Maria Acedo Panizo, was assaesinated. At the same ttme, ETA was carrying out attacks of other tppes, such as those perpetrated agatnst o�fices of Iberduero, a company t4 which it sent an ultima- tum to stpp the work at the LemonYz nuclear pomerplant in 15 daXs or it would blow up the television repeating atation in Palencia, which left northern Spain without television. Other devices destroyed a hlock of houaing under construc- tion in Tolosa (Guipuzcoa) and a football pool sales stand in Galdacano (Vizcaya). As is quite evident, the ETA violence did not only fail to decline, but in fact was on the rise. This was due to a great extent to the fact that the political parties, especially those of the "alaertzale" le~t, had not ended up rejecting terrorism completely. On 30 January, a meeting of the entire Basque left was held in San Sebastian to study a document prepared by ~CE, PSOE, CC00 [Workers Commissions] and UGT, wherein an attempt was made to unify views that would contribute to the pacification of Euskadi. The document called upon "those who engage in armed violence to put down their pistols in a unified and collec- tive fashion, ~nd to uphold their political positions through peaceful, demo- cratic means." Several "abertzale" parties left the meeting, and others remain- ed but did not sign, because, while~ "still in disagreement w3~th ETA's armed - struggle, because they consider it a political mistake at this time, ly~at ;~h~ey refuse to participate in a demand upon ETA to cease its armed struggle." (33) Continuing its action, ETA (m) which had on 16 March assassinated the former mayor of Galdacano, Esteban Belderrain Madariaga, once more on the following day set a device ~n the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant the exploaion of which 57 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY caused the deaths of two workers, the erector, Alb~rto Negro Piguera, and the laborer, Andrea Guerra Peinado. It wae learned that two telephone calls had announced the attack and no attention was paid to them. Confidential sources announced ~hat "CIA was apprised of the attack...(because) hours before the gum-2 that had been set exploded, a call made from the U.S. anaiounced the attack at the Westinghouse firm in Rome,a Lemoniz stockholder." (34) The attack on Lemoniz was an enormous miatake by ETA, because it evoked wide- spread repudiation. "From nationalist sectors which had up until then shown discretion toward the actions o~ the ETA organization to former ETA members now affiliated with EIA, the 'enough' was unanimous." ETA published a communi- que with some stupid arguments ~ustifying its action and, in a violent tone, attacking everyone, including EIA and Senator Bandres who took advantage of the occasion to give a reminder that "EZA resulted from an ETA congress and now also represents a political branch of that organization." Some thought that, with the stupid communique, "ETA became isolated from 90 percent of the Sasque people." (35) The attack on Lemoniz served EL ALCAZAR in driving home its well-known anti- democratic ideas: "A7.1 those who do not dare to confront ETA, wherever they may be, and for whatever reasons, are to blame. Democracy in Spain has failed shamefully agains.t terrorism, not for lack of ineans, but rather because of too much fear." (36) But the terrorism was not upsetting the Basque Country alone. Madrid, too, which had not received any terrorist blows for some time, again saw its streets - blood-stained. GRAPO became reborn again from its sinister ashes, showing an obvious operational capacity despite the fact that its most prominent leaders were in prison. On 10 March, a commando unit consisting of three persons machine- gunned a couple o~ armed policemen, assassinating Agent Felix Garcia Alonso and seriously wounding his companion, Manuel Blazquez Blanco. ABC,wh~oh~ldevated:_ifis 11 March front page to reporting the incident, claimed: "The mere scant worda of condemnation from the political parties are acandalously insufficient. An active commitment to concrete, active, declared bellige~ency has become urgently needed." The attack which had the greatest repercussions at this time was the assassina- tion in Madrid, on 22 March, of Jeaus Haddad, general director of prison insti- tutions, who had held the post for barely 4 months and had ahown signs of being of a reformist bent. A GRAPO commando unit shot him as he was driving in his official car on a Madrid street. The impact grew because, at the same time, it was reported by the Ministry of Interior that GRAPO had prepared a black list of prominent persons whom it intended to eliminate. Some attempted to relate Had'dad's assasination to:the~dea~h;"one week before in the Carabanchel jail, of an Anarchist inmate, vict~m of mistreatment. [dhat was clear was the return of GRAPO to terrorist activities. During April, in Pontevedra, the police succeeded in arresting two members of this terrorist organization who gave clues not only to the Haddad assassins, but also to those responsible for the deaths of Capt Herguedas and the policeman, Felix Garcia Alonso. 58 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY But ETA pursued its insane rate of fatalities until, in May, it reached the horrifying ~igure of 22 assassinations, almost representing one death per day. But let us specify: On 19 March, in Durango (Vizcaya), Dionisio Medina Ozalla, a waiter, was killed. On 25 March, two armed policemen, Rafael Bermudez Serrano. and Rafael Garcia Mayo, were killed in San Sebastian. On 13 April, in Azcoitia (Guipuzcoa), Joae Larranaga Arenas, former chief fo the Movement, was killed. - On 15 April, in Portugalete (Vizcaya), Jesus Lobo Sato, a municipal policeman, was killed. On 16 April, in San Sebastf8n, two armed policemen, Percario Onebra~o Cabrera and Manuel Bre~ana Pequeno, were killed. As we have just _ remarked, May was one of the moat bloody months in the entire history of terrorism. Its 22 deaths were nearly all of inembers of the forces of public order: armed police (four), civil guard (15), countrqmen (three). Among the latter was a woman, Julia Gonzalez Cordoba, who was assassinated in Galdacano (vizcaya). (36a) Negotiating with ETA It was obvious that ETA, especially the military branch, had accelerated the pace _ of its criminal actions. An editorial in CAMBIO 16 signed by Juan Tomas de Salas commented: "A~ter 15 June, ntany thought that ETA would continue killing because that was the only thing it knew how to~'~do,and that it would never give up arms because it had found in them a perfect accommod~tton;.and that it would deny the existence o~ increased liberty in Spain because ETA will op~~r~dge~at~ like a fish in water when the dictatorship is reinatated here." But there were others - who thought that ETA (m), through its action, was attempting to force negotia- tions. "But is also possible and necessary to demonstrate clearly to the Basque public that peace is impossible And this will not ~e demonstrated until all the political efforts have been made on behalf of peace." (37) Hence, the notion of negotiations appeared again. There were increasing numbers of individuals and gro~ps which;were willing to undertake negotiations with ETA to put an end to the insanity of violence. Something similar had already occur- red previously but surely never as in May-June 1978 had the outcry been so - insistent in favor of some type of contact that would make it possible to harbor some hope for a solution to the Basque problem, which had become a cancer threatening to put an end to Spanish democracy. As we have already noted previously, the conditions of ETA (m) (the branch in which the idea of the negotiations was concentrated) were known, and the politi- cians were analyzing them over and over again in a desire to find formulas and mechanisms that would make the contacts viable. According to Jose Maria (Chiqui) Benegas, secretary general of PSE-PSOE and head of the interior affairs entity of the Basque General Council, "ETA's conditions are negotiable," although he admitted that the point relating to the subordination of the Armed Forces quartered in the Basque Country posed serious difficulties. One of the politicians least inclined toward the negotiations was the secretary general of the Coaariunist Paxty of Euskadi, Roberto Lerchundi, who, in addition ' to considering the conditions imposed by ETA (m) unacceptable, expressed the view (and we muat not fail to notQ that he himself was a former ETA member) 59 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY that, "ETA's long history has proven that while one faction bases itself on the purely political game, others continue with arms." (38) In the debate on negotiations with ETA, there was intervention by a prominent apokesamn: the president of the Catalonian Legislative Aasembly, Josep Tarra- dellas, who of�ered his services as a mediator. The old politician said: "There is no other alternative left but talking and more talking. Violence does not lead to anything good. 0~ course I cannot approve of the ETA's methods, but we cannot confine ouraelves solely to sporadic condemnations. There must be talk and negotiation." Tarradellas made a trip to France to meet with Leizaola, and did not hesitate to cite Catalonia as an example. Tarradellas also criticiz- ed the simultaneous existence of two similar organs: the Basque General Council and the Basque government in exile. According to the Catalonian politician, the first atep would be to unite these two entities. Later, there would be discussions with ETA and an attempt made to reach a cease-fire. "I admit that there have been many gestures made on the part of the government to date. There has been amnesty; there has been legalization of the 'abertzale' parties. These are obvious geatures; whexeas there has been no curb on the violence on the part of ETA. But, in spite o� everything, w~e must begin to talk. There is no other recourse." Tarradellas then went on to say: "The attempt will most likely be thwarted and it is true, and I admit it, ETA cannot be reintegrat- ed into a pattern of civilized society. In any event, it must be attempted, because it is ~ust like the patient who is dying and is abandoned by the doctors. Something must alwaqs he done to save him, to cure him." (39) All these attempts came to naught. The Basque General Council even published a note accusing Tarradellas of ined$ling in Basque internal affairs; and the under- secretary of interior, Jesus Sancho Rof, stressed that "there is no dialog possible with ETA," not even by intervening persons, and lent the action taken by Tarradellas a purely personal nature. (40) Moreover, no one (we have already observed that not even Tarradellas himself) had too much confidence in negotiations with ETA. According to EL PAIS, "Mr Tarradellas' initiative, although by no means counterproductive, does not seem too promising." (41) ABC, also criticizing the note from the Basque General Council, remarked that, "Q'Eie Tarradellas initiative destroys nothing and made no commitment," and, a few daya later, asserted: "There cannot be dialog between thoae who are attempting (with greater or lesser success) to make the path of Spanish democracy smooth and those who are attempting to subvert a legal situation by dint of machine guns." (42) EL SOCIALISTA took a poll among politicians of various ideologies (Joaquin SatrustQgui, Alfonso Guerra, Telesforo Monzon, Joan Reventos, Carloa Garaico- echea and Jordi Pu~ol), all o~ whom viewed the contacts as ~easible. Only Roberto Lerchundi, the Basque Communiat leader, thought that, "Negotiation ia a reward to terrorism and assigns ETA as a representative of the interests of Euskadi. Therfore, our position is opposed:to the negotiations." (43) The street riots and incidents continued, in spite of everything, in this atmospherQ o~ negotiation. May was not only the most death-dealing one in the entire history o~ terrorism in the Basque Country alone. It was also abundant 60 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500080014-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY in demonstrations and incidents which quite often used as an excuse the deaths of two ETA members who were gunned down by the civil guard on 11 May in Guernica when they ~umped a checkpoint. The two ETA members lived in Durango, and the riots in that locality were especially violent, to the point of even interrupt- ing the period o~ the Cycling Lap to Spain. Under these circumstances, the problem of the "uncontrolled" recurred. It was known that these groups were made up of extreme right wingers, but also, as was proven bX sufficient evidence, members of the corps of public order. The problem assumed particular virulence in Navarra, where the political parties met with the civil governor, Ignacia del Llano, who admitted his powerlessness against the uncontrolled ones. In Guipuzcoa, nine armed policemen suspected of having cooperated directly or indirectly with the "uncontrolled" were transferred from the Basque Country. But the civil government did not find witnesses who could nor would provide evidence against them. The extreme right appeared fully determined to streas the praiti~e of provocation. This was unquestionably the na~ture of the ant~~rity that New Force San Sebastian, at the Anoeta pelota court, attended by its national leader, Blas Pinar. There ~ras shooting in the vicinity of the pelota court and the police arrested two militants of the neofascist party. - The hopes placed in the negotiations ended on 28 June with the assassination of tize Bilbao ~ournalist Jose Maria Portell, editor of HOJA DEL LUNES,obf;~~Bilbao, and editor in chief of I.~A CACETA DEL NORTE. Portell was precisely someone very familiar with ETA, who was regarded by e~eryone as a negotiator with ETA. Juan Felix Eriz, a close friend of Portell's and, with him, liaison for the establistuuent o� the talks, claimed that Rodolfo Martin Villa had given Portell extensive authority for negotiatfng with ETA. On at least two previous occa- sions: at the time of the Arrasate kidnapping in February 1976, and at the time � that the Suarez government granted amnesty in 1977, Por~ell had negotiated with ETA. His extensive knowledge of the Basque organization had been shown in the two books of which he was the author, "The Men of ETA" and "Amrtesty Obtained." Some of his information obviously came from ETA i~self and, on occasion, he had been accused of being a memher of ETA, or at least appearing as such. Apart from otfier methods for meeting, Portell proposed to make HOJA DE LUNES the platform for the negotiations, giving ETA itself the opportunity to express its own viewa in its pages. Just 2 days be~ore his assasaination, HOJA had . publisY~ed the views of an anonymous group of 42 univeraity membe=s:, who consi- dered the negotiations with ETA "iuYposaible to hold." The death of ~ortell, who was assasainated shortly before 0900 hours when hs was leaving his residence in Por~ugalete, caused widespread shock. The first impressions attributed the attack so some "crazy" commando unit hostile to the idea of negotiations sponsored by the ETA (m) leadership. But a communique from this organization dispelled any doubt, ~usti#ping the crime because Portell was "a specialist i.a poison." At the same time, it threatened ' 61 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500084414-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY "military action," because ETA "lacks the legal capacity for lodging complaints" against CAMBIO 16, DIARIO 16, GACETA DEL NORTE and PENSAMIENTO NAVARRO. _ 2'he Basque political parties, UCD, PSOE and PCE, drafted a~oint comanuniqde which PNV, which was harshlp~ criticized, refused to sign. According to EL PAIS, PNV was becoming a Hamlet, "willing to reject violence in the abstract, but reluctant to assume positions for combating it concretely." (44) CAMBIO 16, in an editorial signed by Juan Tomas de Salas, took a courageoua stand - against the threat, stating that "We shall retain our position until the final hour," and adding: "Personally, I shall ask you ~ust one question: does the armed struggle always require killing tot~ll.y unasmed_citizens behind the back and by aurprise? Even A1 Capone, in his battles, sometimes gave his victims many more chances to de~end themselves on an equal footing. The mytho- logy of the armed struggle vanishes ~rhen the victim is..~either willing nor able to defend himself with the weapons of war." Finally, it also criticized PNV for its "resounding paralXeis" and for not being "on a par with the historic- al circumstances that it was destined to experience." (45) The ~ournalistic status of the victim of this reverberating attack prompted the appearance of a~oint editorial in the Spanish weeklies atating that the ETA arguments in its communique ~zent "directly against the principles of freedom of speech," and accused the Basque organization of "fearful political immaturity" and "irrational hatred for democracy and for coexistence." It concluded by saying: "We shall continue not to d3scredit ETA, but to denounce an organization with a system of values wherein human life does not appear to coun~ at all." During June, the ETA attacks had not been so overwhelming, although the impacC of that on Portell was enormous, (46); but, because of the urgent nature of the matter, despite everything the government adopted a decree-law on excep- tional measures which was approved by the Council of Ministers meeting in special session on precisely 28 June, the same day on which Portell was assas- � sinated. This regulation was to be in effect until the Cortes, after the regulatory dehate, approved a very similar bill sent to the Congress of Depu- ties for normal handling. To some, the latter was a more retrogressive text ' than the decree-la~z passed in August 1975, while Franco was still liv3ng. Essentially, it called for the indefinite extension of holding thase suspected of terrorism, with prior permission from the ~udge. It also called for postal, telegraphic and telephonic intervention carried out by the minister of interior, who would convey it to the ~udge, "giving grounds for the adoption of the measure." At the same time, Martin Villa, after traveling to the Federal Republic of Germany, was briefed on the cyhernetic methods used there to modernize the state's action against the terroriat threat. But in those uses of computer science, some, particularly~ the opposition parties, saw a threat to liberties and hence the criticism was not long in appearing. The violent environment in the Basque Country did not fail to increase as summer arrived and, with it, the popular festivals in cities and towns. The San Fermin festivals that year were eapecially troubled, their highlight being the unfortunate entry of the armed police at the Pamplona bull ring on the 62 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY afternoon of 8 July. Thereafter, a series of incidents occurred in the Navarr~ capital which caused one death, that of German Rodriguez Sanz, a militant in the Trotskyite LKI [Revolutionary Co~tunist League], and aome 150 in~uries. _ From Pamplona, the incidents moved to San Sebastian, which remained at a - standstill and, at one time, isolated ~rom the rest of Spain. Another youth, Jose Ignacio Barandiaran, was killed by the impact from a bullet. Some claimed that it was the police who ~ired, while others said that he was killed from behind and accuaed ETA. There waa no doubt that the action of the forces of public order had been regrettable, and once again the arrest of the provoca- tnrs who vere responsible was requested. The position of certain sectors of these forces was made clear when, on the same 11 July, a company of the armed police entered Renteria (Guipuzcoa) at a mealtime when the atreets were empty of the demonstrators in solidarity with Pamplona and, in an incredible act of vandalism, cauaed destruction in buainesses and other establishments. At the same time, the so-called "antiterrorist" ~rxs~xYt:~m returned to the scene. On 2 July 3n San Juan de Luz, in the French Basque Country, two individuals machine-gunned one of the ETA's historical leaders, Ion Echabe, and his wife, as they were ~ust boarding a car, and the latter was killed in the act. The ETA member was seriously wounded. In this orgy of bloodshed, ETA also; turned against ita own people. On 5 July, in Zarauz, Domingo Merino Arevalo was assassinated. As in the case of Echabe, some thought that the extreme right wing might be involved. ETA (m) tuQk credit for the attack, accusing Merino of b~ing a police confidante and of having uaed the name o~ ETA to extort Basque businessmen and to gn~$r,-the 'abertzale" organizations. Three daya later, on 8 July~, when the Basque chaos caused by the San Fermin events was starting, Javier Jauregui, ~ustice of the peace in the locality and former local councilman o~ the National Movement, was assassinated in Lemona (Vizcaya). In the end, it turned out that ETA (m) which had seemed totally isolated a few weeks earlier, was i~~.nding in the atmosphere of constant chaos and confuefan__ the medium that it needed to continue its violent activities. - The Provocation of the Armed Foxces Up until 1978, both ETA and GRAPO had aimed their action against the forces of public order. The o~ficials who had been victims of attacks performed duties in these police forces, as in the case of Captain Herguedas and Commander Imaz. During the second hal~ of 1975, it was noted how those two terrorist organiza- tions were directing their fire against the Army and, particularly, against the highest ranktng officers and chie~s,. At the beginning of April, CAMBIO 16 published in its section entitled "From a Good Source" a note which read as follows: "Confidential reports in the hands of the police indicate that the ETA terrortat ozganizat~on might start operating outside of the Basque Country. According to these reports, ETA is planning an of�~nsive that would strike at high-ranking military in the Spanish Army." (47) 63 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~ The Spanish secret services even had information to the effect that ETA (m) was starting to store in its arsenals semi-heavy weapons of the bazooka and grenade launcher type. This. information gave the impression that the Basque organization might be planning to establish as future targets civil guard "barracks" or other military installations. It was even thought that ETA (m) might attempt the "seizure" of a small locality so as to remain eatablished in it for a short time. By so doing, it might be trying to take the step toward the really military phase of the armed insurrection that could force the govern- ment to use the Army. In this way, there would be occasion for ETA to use the slogan "military occupation" which the organization's theoreticians had always considered a mobilizing factor of very extensive scope. Strangely enough, ETA (m) wras not the first to take a step in this direction. On 20 June, an ETA (p-m) coam~ando unit attempted to assault the Military Govern- _ ment o� Guipuzcoa in San Sebastian, and even managed to overcome some of the military on guard. The intervention of another officer thwarted the attack which, in any event, was an operation of slight significance possii:l.y intended only to seize weapons. But in was in Madrid on 21 July that the attack which made the fragile struc- tures of the democratic state tremble. On that day, the Congress of Deputies had ~ust ended the diacussion of the Constitution. With the predictable absten- tion of the PNV deputies, its plenum was to approve the constitutional text arduously achieved during the previous months. At 0830 hours in the morning, when he had ~ust boarded tiis official car, Brig Gen Juan Manuel Sanchez-Ramos Izquierdo was shot by machine-gun fire. Killed with him was Lt Col-Aide Jose Antonio Perez Rodriguez. The news fell like a bomb on the deputies who were arriving at Congress to approve the Constitution. It was the first time that an Army general fell victim to a terrorist attack. Since Carrero, the terrnrism had never aimed so high. The plenum devoted much of its morning session to the issue of terrorism which had just dealt its latest blow. All the spokesmen for the various parliamen- tary groups spoke, once again condemning terrorism, and President Suarez himself delivered a speech in which he declared that, "The government will not tolerate extremist reactions. by any means; the government will enact the legal measures that are within its reach for the investigation, prosecution and repression of terrorism." At first, great confusion prevailed regarding which group might be the one responsible for the attack. A strange and unknown group, GAP, and the known but nonetheless strange GRAPO took credit for the attack, but the police suspected that ETA was the perpetrator, as was actually confirmed later. In any event, it was clear that neither the victims aelected nor the time chosen was fortuitous. Quite obviouely there had been a plan, a plan which sought the destabilization of democracy and, at the same time, ~zas intended to provocate the Army. Suarez himself so stated: "Every time we have undertaken a key phase in our democracy, terrorism has appeared in an attempt to destabilize t~e country." 64 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In the view of many, the last resorts in this plan were located beyond our borders, and in this regard there were references to the Soviet KGB. CAI~IO 16 reported that, "A few days ago, Victor Luie, who is regarded ae one of the euperspies of the Soviet organization and one of its most po~erful and influen- tial personages, visited our country." The same magazine added: "Just a few weeks ago, a high-ranking Spanish leader viaiting the USSR, upon meeting with a member of the Central Co~ittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, could not contain his suz~prise when he heard from the mouth of the leading Soviet dignitary the comment that ''we would be willing to help you pacify Euskadi provided we received some compensation The maia 'compensation' was immedia.tely forthcoming: 'Spain's not ~oining NATO."' (48) The Soviet connection ~tas thereby made fully explicit. Over a year later, in November 1979, when the Soviet foreign minister, Andrey Gromyko, visited Madrid, he made an of~er to his Spanish counterpart, Marcelino Oreja, that "if Spain desi,sted from ita plana to ~oin NATO the Soviet Union would be prepared to help combat the most disturbing domestic problem, terrorism. But, according to Spaniah officials, Gromyko also hinted that entry into NATO would leave the young Spanish democracy vulnerable to the depredations of terrorism." (49) This rumor, denied on constant occasions by the Soviets, was nevertheless to have factual conf irmation in the subsequent evolution of terrorism, as we shall have occasion to prove. The other issue that was to be brought up by the attack of 21 July was that of the possible connectiona between ETA and GRAPO; an issue that would never be totally explained but of which rather significant signs were to appear. The Algeria of Baumedienne, Cubillo's protector and, in turn, a friend of GRAPO, might well have been the link between the two terrorist organizations. In this respect, let us nate that "Apala's" presence in Algeria had already been detect- ed (50) and that, at the same time, "among high-ranking government sources there ~ was news of the contacts maintained recently between the two organizations: Specifically, at a meeting of the ETA sta�f in San Juan de Luz consideration was given to the position o� organizing ~ointly with GRAPO a series of actions by both organizations throughout the national territory. However, the American secret services denied this connection when Gutierrez Mellado visited Washing- ton in the aummex of 1978." (51) But perhaps the most important aspect of the attack of 21 July was that of the direct provocation of the Army. Thereafter there would begin an entire series of agreements and concosnitant acts and ob~ectives shared by terrorism and coupism, that will be essential to understand the political evolution in - Spain during the following ~rears. In the su~er,of 1978 coRgiam had not yet manifeated itself, but there were already some very obvious urgings on the part of the extreme right wing news- papers EL ALCAZAR and EL IMPARCIAL, and by the magazine FUERZA NUEVA. With reference to the letter from a military man on active duty published in EL ' IMPARCIAL, CAMBIO 16 stated: "It is, quite certai,nly, the best contribution to an entire plan devised by the civilians to take the military out of their barracks and to set up a new regimP; a plan put into effect months after the death of Generali.simo Franco which, in some of its points, would receive the 65 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - approval of some military commanders disturbed over the current political situation and concerned over the progressive deterioration of public order in the Basque provinces.." (52~ The urging for coupism on the part of the aforementioned media was obvious. On 22 July, EL ALCAZAR, under the headlines "Mourning in rhe..Army, Tension in Spain," published two photographs: of the attacks accompanied by a long article which stated, among other things: "Urgent measures no longer suffice; those authorized to do so must take immediate measures." It was obvious that, to EL ALCAZAR, those "authorized" were not governors whom it described as "shallow, irresponsible politicians." In an article published on the same front page, the editor of the organ of the National Confederation of Combatants declared: "It is now time to put things in their places, a~d for everyone to accept the role that is i:ncumbeni: on him." And, subsequently, lie remarked: ~ "The ills that (Spain) is suffering have only that unequivocal origin: the political inability of ambitious rulers and the old wisdom of the professionals ~ in t^~~rnational aubversion." Despite the fact that it claimed that "the sworda are raised high in our poli- tical group," FUERZA NUEVA denied its inclination toward coupism. "Spain is at a time of ex~reme danger, ready to sound the starting signal. The comment made by a newsman in Congress recently, aloud and looking at his watch ("What time does Pavia arrive?") was neither capricious nor humorous And when = that time comes (and we would not venture to say whether it will be the best) _ we do not know, nor have we done anything to foster it in these pages, despite the fact that we have been claimed~:to have a coupist nature and disposition." (53} In other publications, the tone was equally harsh, although with very notable ideological variations. In its very severe editorial, ABC stated: "We denounce _ the fact that the Chamber of Deputies has remained silent for half an hour, ~ hParing the ~ustifications by a representative of the Iiasque people to the effect that the bombs connected with'ikurrina,' the elimination of the servants of public order b~ gunfire and all the monstrosities ranging from kidnapping to shooting in the neck are logical results of t_:ze insufficient degree of 'democra- _ tization' which should be improved immediately, placing the current assassins in the high-ranking positions of tomorrow.'s autonomous administration. Neither a murmur nor an angry voice interrupted that series of foolish reuiarks It later declared: "Terrorism can succeed only in a state which refused to meet the first of its obligationa: that the citizens can continue to live." It also took the oppoxtunity to note that, "It is also ohvious that the bruta- lity of the so-called 'uncontrolled elements' cannot be put on the same level as the teams of assassin;s supplied with machine guns." (54) At the other extreme of the {deological arc, EGIN, criticizing the Ministry of Interior's decision not to a~:ow the dissemination of the ETA (m) communique claiming the attack in Pi~drid, ~rrote: "At thia point, it is sufficiently clear that ETA military is not only an armed organization seeking to perpetuate the dialectics of the machi~xe guns,. ETA military has stated in various ways what its political alternative �or Euskadi at present is, and what the minimal poirit~; on the basis of which arms, would be unnecessary are." It concluded 66 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY by saying: "To advocate the opportunity for the armed organizations to be - able to explain the motives for their actions is not taking sides with them. It is defending the principle of freedom of speech to tts final consequences and opposing the use of censorship as a mesns of polftfcal action." (55) As might have been imagined, the uneasiness in the Armed Forces was growing. A few days earlier, great shock was cauaed by the comments made, on the occasion of an official visit to Argentina, by Lt Gen Liniers, then Army Chief of Staff, wherein he cited the "legitimacy of the Argentine enterprise in which the people and the Arnry have marched together," and referred to the fact that "Spain and Argentina have alwaXs marched through history by parallel routes." In statementa to LA NACION, Liniers depicted himself as a constitutionalist military man, but it was inevitable that, in the charged Spanish political atmosphere , his speech to Videla should be interpreted as another factor for alarm to a regime which was beginning to find itself beset simultaneously by the blows from terrorism and the current specter of coupism. When ETA Acts, GRAPO Falls One of the most repeated coincidences in the history of terrorism in Spain is that wki~an ETA carries out any of its most spectacular strikes, it is not long before the police action arrests a large number of GRAPO members. The situation is present, with the force of evidence, possibly owing'to the fact that GRAPO's more defective structure makes it more vulnerable at the times when police activity is intensified. Sut there is nothing odd about the f,zct that this strange circumstance has nurtured the doubts of thoae who sus~ect that GRAPO is an artificial structure which takes advantage of the perturbation of. vaguely revolutionary, alienated elements putting them in the service of a destabiliz- ing operation carefully planned by those who hope to win everything by a provoked involution of democracy in Spain. ~ Roberto Conesa who, in early 1977, had become renownad as a result of the fortunate outcome of the Oriol and Villaescusa kidnappings, was responsible for conducting the investigations relatin~ to the latest terrorist attacks, the perpetzators of which were undoubtedly associated with ETA. Conesa did not arrest any ETA members, failing in his investigations, police cordon deployed for several days starting on 21 July -~n the vicinity of Madrid and the towns in the Guardarrama mountains had failed. But very few days thereafter, Conesa announced the arrest of seven GRAPO militants, including the members of the commando unit which had assass,inated Jesus Haddad, general director of prison institutions. At the same time, police sources who accepted the ETA claim for the attack of 21 July as truthful, admitted that GRAPO "could have cooperated in the ass.asainations." No au�ficient explanation was ever given for this hypothesis. The arre~sts of the GRAPO members cited by Conesa had taken place before the 21 July attack, and hence there were some who thought that, "It was obviously a smokescreen to conceal the failure represented bX the capture operation." Conesa was criticized by political leaders of various parties, who reproached him for his "excessive" infiltratians into groups like ~RAPO which, nevertheless, did not impede their terrorist activity. (56) 67 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY Very soon after the assassination of the two Army chiefs, the Congress passed two very important laws associated with the battle against terrorism. The first was the Antiterrorist Law, the so-called law against armed groups, replacing the decree-law which had been passed a month earlier. The second was the Police Law, whereby the "grays," the armed police so closely linked with the former Franco regime, were to be called national police, also changing their uniform so as to achieve a new image that had nothing to do with the ~ast. With the connections between ETA and GRAPO unproven, there was no doubt of the coincidences between the two organizations in their plans and also, on occasion, on the time of perpetrating their attacks. On 28 August, when a month had already elapsed without any death, following the double assassination in Madri~d, four members of the state security forces, as the former forces of public order were called after the passage of the police law, were killed almost simultane- ously in different parts of Spain. In Mondragon, ETA assassinated Aurelio Salgueiro Lopez, a corporal in the intelligence service of the civil guard. Also, in Guipuzcoa, in Irun, ETA killed an intelligence service police inspec- tor, Alfonso Estevas Guilman. That same day, GRAPO kil?ed the civil guardsman Manuel Vazquez Cacharron in Santiago de Compoatela, and the armed policeman Luis Antonio Rodriguez Garcia,in Barcelona. These four simultaneous attacks evaked a violent reaction from the General Police Corps' professional ass,ocintion, which issued a note in which they declared themselves "painfully fed up" and attacked the political parties for their state- ments protesting against the terrorist attacks, which they considered "hollow" and for the sole purpose of "engaging in politics." The Bilbao police profession- al association went even further and, after accusing the whole society of being a"silent accomplice," cited the possibility that the police might reach "a limit situation with unforeseeable conaequences." In view of this tone, some commentaries, such as the 31 August editorial in INFORMACIONES, mentioned the police "ganging together." The response ~rom the more unequivocally democratic press was overwhelming. EL PAIS devoted two consecutive editorials to the issue. In the first one, alluding once again to the Conesa case, it wrote: "Nevertheless, it should be made clear that this is not an attempt to turn Mr Conesa into the scapegoat for the failure of the security services to halt the terrorist offensive and dis- cover its leaderehip centers, its sources of financing and its national and international backers. It is merely the symbol of a certain type of police _ official poorly adapted to the new situation." It concluded by saying: "We citizens are painfully fed up with seeing the officials affiliated with the state payroll, whose members are being assassinated with impunity, incapable of discovering the assassins and maintaining an atmosphere of insecurity in _ the streets." (57) The next day, EL PAIS returned to the issue, criticizing the notes from the aforementioned professional association. It gave a reminder that, "It is an obvious falsehood that the authoritarian regimes are more capable of coping with the terrorist offensive than is a democratic syatem"; and it went on to say that, "The general police corps should be required to renew its work methods 68 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY and to multiply its efforts to locate and arreat those who are threatening not only the lives of public order officials but also those of the rest of the citizens, thanking it when it has complied with this." (58) ~ MUNDO DIARIO agreed, stating that, "To stop thia state of affairs, it seema to us most impoxtant that the police discover and put at the disposal of the ~ustice sys.tem those guilty of the criminal actions that have been committed in our country." (59) ~ CAMBIO 16, in addition to giving an extensive report on the status of the police in which, incidentally, it noted that the a~seo~iatifln which was the author of the notes "has begun to be manipulated, particularly by leading - members of the foxmer sociopolitical brigade, in other words, the Francoist political police," published an editorial signed by Juan Tomas de Salas in the form of a letter to the "Messra integrist police" wherein, among many other things, it stated: "We citizens o~ thia country are painfully fed up with your intolerable attitude of rebellion against the regime whfch, for the first time in our recent hiatory, Gre, an overwhelming majoritp of Spaniards, have selected." It declared: "The magnanimity of the new regime cannot be taken for weakness"; and concluded by saying: "And if you, Mesars integrist police, do not wish to serve the society of the Spanish people on this new ' path that we have undertaken, return the weapons that we have given you and return to private life with your dictatorial nostalgia. If you do not wish to defend us, we shall not ask you for an accounting; we only ask you to resign, so that other better police may occupy your positions and better protect your companions and all of us." In the same iasue, the editor of the magazine, Jose Oneto, stressed the matter, writing:"W~:a~s:s~dly d3;sappat6n~ad by an increasing ineffectiveness in the battle against terrorism and against common crime recalling that, "In 1977 alone, the inveatment program awarded to the Ministry of Interior to operate the general police corps, civil guard and armed police amounted to 12 billion pesetas, almost txiple the amount in 1976, the last year of Francoism." (60) This quadruple simultaneous attack committed when vacations were reaching their end caused many to think that "terrorism, too, summers," as EL PAIS headlined its editorial of 29 August. According to the Ma~rid newspaper, "It would appear as if the terrorista have reached the conclusion that the summer vacations deprived tlieir provocations of the proper reverberation, and decided to suspend their acttvity +sntil the cttizens~ return to normalityr::~nsu~ed a suitable reception for their escalated violence in the seneitivity and fears of the citizenry." In fact, when the vacation period had ended, the tragic monotony of terrorism returned. On 4 September, in Aguinaga (Guipuzcoa), the taxi driver Amancio Barreiro Geus, was assassinated; on 23 September, in Vitoria, it was the turn of the armed policeman Juan Antonio Ferreiro, when he fell into a trap set by telephone, along with his companiona~; and on 25 September, in San Sebastian, the ~uardsmen Lorenzo Soto and Jose Zafra were fatally machine-gunned when they had Pinished making a purchase intended for the civil guard headquarters. On 2 October, forest guardsman Ram3x+v Quintero Avila was assassinated in Lizarza (Guipuzcoa). 69 FOit OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ETA (m)'s deciaion to attack the Army was~confirmed on 3 October, when Corvette Capt Francisco de Asis Liesa Morote, second commander of the Navy in Bilbao, was assassinated in his own residence. In the newapaper reports, this attack eeemed to be connected with a hypothetical arms amuggling. In fact, a feW days earlier, a ship registered in Bilbao, the "Allui," had been stopped by the British police and subsequently released. The vessel was carrying arms bound for Bilbao, but when it reached Spanish ~urisdictional waters, the Navy authorities did not find arms or anything suspicious. A file was opened to investigate the u?atter, and it would appear that Capt Liesa was appointed to draw it uo, although this point was never confirmed by the authorities. On 3 October, when the speculation regarding this affair was occupying extensive news space, Liesa was assassinated by an ETA commando unit which entered his residence and questioned the Navy of�icer before ahooting him in the head, in - the presence of his wife and three seamanship students. ETA took credit for - the attack in a communique, ~usti~~?ing the act "for his repressive action - aimed particularly at preventing ETA from receiving any assistance from abroad by ocean routes." The questions that this incident raised remained unanswered. Starting then, ETA lent its terrorist action a rapid pace. The cold language of statietics reflects the fact of approximately one assassination every two days. In fact, during October there were thirteen fatalities, mainly civil guardsmen (six) and armed policemen (three). In November, another 13 were assassinated: ~our civil guardsmen, one of them retired, two armed police corporals, six countrymen and one magistrate from the Supreme Court, Jose Francisco Mateu Canovas, who was assassinated in Madrid on 13 November. It was the attack upon Mateu that aroused ma~or emotion after the attack upon the military men on 21 July. Mateu had been president of the abolished Court of Public Order, and was considered a harsh man with a definitely Franco- ist profile. His selection as a target gave the impression that the terrorism, in addition to being directed toward the Army, was intended to attack the magistracy, another great national institution. It was clear that there was a well-defined plan to dismantle the state. In the stz~ictly political realm, the Basque problem continued to show a definite- ly negative aspect. All the attempts to have PNV accept the draft Constitutian had failed, despite the first additional provision, the ao-called "privilege" one, wherein xecognition and guarantee "of the hiatorical rights of the privi- leged territories" were accepted. To the nationalists, this principle had been distorted, because in the third paragaph of this regulation the incorporation of these historical rights was made sub~ect to the Statute of Autonomy, which had to be put to a referendum and ratified by the General Cortes. _ EGIN, reflecting the proposals of the radical nationaliats, expressed the view that recognition of the historical rights "would be tF.ttamount to the right to self-determination, in this case translated into the return of our independence and sovereignty to a mere personal link with the King of Spain." As is evident, this is no longer a federal concept but, at the moat, a loose confederalism that would leave Spain reduced to a structure of the British Couunonwealth type wherein a head of state common to two or more states which are fully sovereign and independent in all other respects is maintained only from a purely formal, - symbolic standpoint. 70 - FOIt OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Since this was obviously not the concept called for in the first additional provision, EGIN thought that, "In the end, it is the aubordination of reintegra- tion and updating of the privilege to the Spanish legal order, established uccording to ita principlea and its unified constitution on a higher scale Thu~, the repeal of the laws of 1839 and 187~ does not entail the return of sovere~.gnty, but rather the weaving of a new militarism." EGIN wanted only the first two paragraphs of the first additiunal provision to be accepted "grovided there is a guarantee that there will be no sub~ection of the Basques to state unitarism because to accept the third paragraph could only be regarded as surrender and sub~ection to the constitutional text . and then it would not make aenae to call for ita re~ection." (61) _ In fact, on the issue of the Consti.tution, PNV ended up aligning itself with - the "abertzale" radicals. Possibly to counteract this position which was as extreme as it was immature, PNV called for a demonstration against terrorism on 10 October. In the aummons, it did not cite ETA expressly. The document refe~red to the "new incidents wherein the supreme value of life has been downgraded in a brutal, manner that is incomprehensibZe from our political etandpoint." IL asked "our people to proclaim, publicly and collectively, - their absolute repudiation of terrorism." Although, as the president of PNV, Carlos Garaicoechea, wrote, the summons "was not intended to arouse new antagonism or confrontation," G6.2)reaction from the - "abertzale" leftist parties was negative. HASI deacribed it as "betrayal"; EIA called it "improper and untimely." Letamendia claimed that, "PNV had occasion to demonstrate against terrorism when the police entered the bull ring at Pamplona, or at the time of Barandiaran's death in San Sebastian. It could have called for a demons.tration then, and it did not do s~. Now it is calling one againat ETA and, by extension, against the 'abertzale' left." (63) Some thought that they observed in the PNV initiative an announc~ment of a Copernican shift in this party's attitude toward terrorism. EL PAIS wrote: - "The caution with which PNV has criticized the criminali~y of ETA to date and certain unfortunate statements from some of its leaders concerning the p~litical profit that this violence could bring them, could not help but arouse the suspi:cion that the heirs o� Sabino Arana and Jose Antonio Aguirre were dedicated to the dangerous game of strengthening their negotiating posi- tions with the threatening axgument that peace in the Basque Country would be feasible only if their demands were entirely and completely met." EL PAIS was of the opinion that the calling o~ the demonatration has dispelled the evidence on which that suspicion was based as if by magic." (64) But be.f.ore the demonstration was held on 28 October, the complex Basque political - world underwent many vicissitudes which altered the original positions. The oppoeing attitude of the "abertzales" forced the ever.fluctuating PNV to declare that the demonstration represented "a denunciation o~ terrorism, of ETA, of the extreme right and of the so-called institutional violence." This latter reference meant that UCD would decide not to back the demonstration, while PSOE hesitated. In another co~qunique, PNV went so far as to offer ETA a ~econsiderat3on .of its swmmons, "if the Basque violent groups formally announce the cessation of t:he violent action." Telesforo Monzon, the old 71 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY nationalist who had evolved toward the most radical "abertzale" positions, wrote in EGIN: "Gentlemen, you promise to reconsider your position if ETA pledges to surrender its arms. But, gentlemen, why do you address ETA, and not the Spanish Government? In your ebbs and flows, according to the prevaiYing wind, did you not go so far as to say that the demonstration of 28 October . was directed mainly against the institutionalized terrorism? So, why do you not address"the Spanish institutions, asking them to cease the state terrorism for once and for all, as an essential requisite for your calling off the demonstration? Do you not see that your own contradictions are caught in the web of your own words?" (65) ETA, for its part, during the days preceding the demonstration, unleashed a campaign of intimidation that was reflected in an increase in the attacks and assassinations. (66) The demonstration was finally held on Saturday, 28 Oetob~er, with some 35,000 persons participating. An "abertzale" counter-demonstration was harshly repressed by the police, and there were considerable in~uries. On 30 October, along the line of the attacks against news media, a package-bomb exploded at EL PAIS, very seriously wounding three workers, one of whom, a 19- year old youth, Andres Fraguas, died 2 days later. As in so many other instances, the flood of telephone claims to the attack by groupa with the well-known initials (Triple A, GRAPO, GAS [Trade Union Action Group]) introduced absolute confusion regarding the origin of the criminal act. GRAPO later denied its perpetration, while the Triple A reiterated it. In fact, there was every indi- cation that the extreme right had been responsible for the attack. The reper- cussions in the media were enormous, with a series of condem~ations by political and trade union leaders who viewed in the incident an intention for destabiliza- tion on the very eve of the final voting on the Constitution by the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. ~ The escalation of terrorism in the Basque Country aeriously upset the forces of public order, the prime target of the attacks. The morale of the armed police agents in particular suffered the impact of the situation, and incidents occur- red. On 5 October, a demonstration comprised mainly of wives of the policemen went to the Bilbao civil government, shouting "We do not want medals, we want our husbands." On 14 October, with the emotion aroused by the death of two companiana., the day before in Bilbao itself, aerious incidents took place at - the Basauri barracks on the occasfon of the funerals. The deputy inspector general of the armed police, Timon de Lara, the general director of security, - Mariano Nicolas and the civil governor of Vizcaya, Salazar Simpson, were the ob~ect of insults, and were even pxevented from leaving the barracks. The . incidents ended about 160Q houra, and severe disciplinary measures were imme- diately adopted. At the same time, over 300 married policemen with a year of service in the Basque Country were transferred out of the Basque Country. It was later learned that, a few days earlier, men and women known for their extreme right wing ide~s, had engaged in agitation efforts among the policemen's wives, inciting them against the government and other authorities. ETA: Kills More to Negotiate Better The final quarter of 1978 was a key period in the battle against terrorism. Although the PNV politicians stressed that "a Euskadi in peace is not viable 72 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080010-7 FOR OFF1CiAL USE ONLY if there is no progress toward its self-government," (67) there were increasing numbers of those who did not trust that the so-called "political measures" would serve to curb the terrorism. The very hiatory of the transition was proving exactly the contrary, because the maximalism of ETA and of many other "abertzales" did not consider itself satisfied with formulas which, to them, were merely "halfway measurea." The re~ection of the so-called additional provision for "privilege" which we mentioned previously attested quite clearly to this. Hence, the idea that it was necessary to become used to living with the ETA terrorism became more and more entrenched. At the same time, reports were reaching the information services subordinate to the government citing the imminence of a ma~or ETA offensive. It was a way of expressing the repudiation by the "abertzales" of the constitutional text that was to be put to a referendum in December. But this tactical ob~ective was quite compatible ~ith the ma~or ETA strategy of the time, which ciearly sought to provoke the Army, so as to foster its intervention. It was to be the notorious, feared "Ulsterization." - The ETA (m) staff thought that the involvement of the Armed Forces in the ant.i- - terrorist battle, with the resultant "occupation" of the Basque ~ountry, would automaticall~? improve the position of ETA, "the Basque Armed Forces," as Teles- foro Monzon called the terrorist organization, upon benefiting from the status as a de facto belligerent group with all the elements of prestige that such a situation would entail. Moreover, the militarization of the conflict would mean unlimited expansion of the repreasion which, in turn, would reinforce the ties between ETA and the Basque people. At a time when ETA had already felt popular support weakening on various occasions, this psXchological ob~ ective assumed a completely priority nature. It was, therefore, quite consistent that, in the instructions issued by the ETA (m) leadership to the co~ando units, in addition to the forces of public order, the civil governors, members of the Army and "Hispanists" were cited as targets of the future attacks. In connection with the military elements, they were asked to take into account, "if possible, the higher rank of their members." On the other hand, ETA appeared ready to eliminate the type of armed action based on small commando units, and to approach the tactic of guerrilla warfare, based on larger units and, as we have already noted, on the use of more sophis- ticated weapons. (68) In a way, it in~volved combtning the tactics of the urban guerrillas and the rural guerrillas. It did not appear to be coincidental that, a few we~ks before, the guiding signals had.started appearing unused,something which entai~.ed additional difficulty, except for those ~amiliar with the terrain, such as the ETA members. Imitating the ideas of the Latin American guerrillas, who considered it feas.ible to "liberate" a given locality or area, as in the case of the Uruguayan "Tupamaros." in 1969, when they occupied the city of Pando, ETA (m) proposed, if the occasion ahould arise, to occupy some section of the Basque Country symbolically and as an act of propaganda. (69) But, apart ~rom these militarX or psychological ob,jectives, ETA (m) proposed a political ob~ective: forcing the government to negotiate. ETA thought that the one speaking to the government should not be it, but rather KAS, the ~ 73 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY Socialist "abertzale" coordinating group, whose "alternative" we already know. - Hence, we can note how the issue of negotiations always remained at the top level of attention. And the government itself thought that some type of indirect negotiation might proye beneficial, although at times when terrorism was growing worse, it became very difficult to consider this idea at all use- ful. In this connection, several months later a report was released to the effect that "Rodolfo Martin Villa, miniater of interior, was in Geneva (Switzer- land) last summer (in 1978), traveling incognito, to meet with a delegation from ETA politico-military. The meeting did not take place, because Martin Villa did not receive sufficient guarantees that the meeting would be kept secret." (70) The immediate events confirmed this expansion of ETA (m) activities, reflected in more deaths and an extension of the type of persons selected as victims. On 30 October, ETA shocked its own sympathizers by assassinating Ignacio Olaiz Michelena, a leading Guipuzcoan member of the pro-amnesty negotiating group. His friends first attributed the crime to the extreme right, but an ETA communi- que dispelled all possible doubt. ETA had decided "to execute him af ter 4 months of ineticulous, hazardous investigation" which resulted in his identifi- cation as someone infiltrated by the police, according to the organization. A few days later, on 2 November, two ordinary laborers were assassinated (Juan Cruz Hurtado, a carpenter in Guernica, and Rafael Recaola Landa, a worker in Lezo), whom ETA accused of being "ultrafascists and police confidantes." The same day, a builder, Jose Legasa, was also assassinated for refusing to pay the revolutionarX tax. On 9 November, another worker, Luis Candendo Perez, was assassinated in Anzuola (Guipuzcoa). Candendo was a UCD militant. ~ao years later, the government party was to be one of the priority targets of ETA, especially of the "poli-milis." The extension of its armed action to different sections of the Basque Country was confirmed. Now it was no longer, as in the case of Carrero Blanco, a totally exceptional action, but rather normal action which unquestionably meant that ETA had an infrastructure and some logistical backup in certain sections of Spain. We have already mentioned the assassination of magistrate Mateu in Madrid, on 15 November, the most important action at this final period of ~978. But signs of ETA's presence in other areas were also beginning to appear. The police estimated that the Basque organization owned safe apartments outside of the Basque Country, in Madrid and Barcelona. The death threats ~ signed by ETA which were received in Andalucia by ataout 20 persons, including a considerable number of military, gave reason to think that it also had areas in cities such as Granada, Sevilla and Malaga. If ETA was located in Andalucia, it was admitted that there might possibly be some contact with GRAPO, which was apparently well established there. Conesa's trips to Gosta del Sol were inter- preted in this sense. However, the fact is that the authenticity of theae threats could never be proven, although some months later the presence of ETA (p-m) in Andalucia was confirmed when it unleashed a campaign against tourism. (71) The virulence of the terrorism during this final period of the year, before and after the constitutional referendum held on 6 December, (72) turned the _ 14 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 F'OR OFFICIAL USE QNLY pl~enomenon of violence into a leading element in political life. Stealing the march on the plan of the democratic political parties and trade union federations, New Force and other extreme right groups organized a demonstration "against terrorism and its accomplices" which took place in Madrid on 4 November, with an organization and deployment o~ a paramilitary nature. With the excuse o~ - terrorism, it was actually an attempt to attack democracy and promote a"no" vote in the constitutional referendum. To the extremists, the "accomplices" of terror- ism were, in one way or another, all the democratic politicians. MUNDO DIARIO stated: "This is a despicable attempt to manipulate the antiterrorist sentiments to be monopolized by the extreme right. The presence at the demonstration of people involved in arms tra~ficking, who had to answer for some unexplained activities to the common courts, at least reveals that they are not repelled by violence The extreme right condemns only the violence of those whom it considers its enemies. Its own it calls holy, or gives it the name ot a"crusade." (73) In opposition to these demonstration organized by the extreme right, on 10 Novem- ~ ber another one took place, called by the ma~ority trade union federations, CC00 and UGT, and backed by the political parties. During the following days, there was an inevicable argument as to which of the two demonstrations had been most heavily attended. On 10 November, all over Spain, more than 100 demonstrations were held, promoted by the democratic organizations. _ On 8 and 9 November, in the parliamentary area, the plenum on public order requested by the Popular Alliance~leader, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, took place. For 45 minutes, Fraga delivered a speech replete with statistical data to prove that public order did not exist, because "pulalic order is like health: either one has it or does not have it." Fraga stressed the great disproportion between the figures on those killed b~r terrorists and the terrorists killed. The Alliance leader emphasized: "Out of a total of 36 deaths in 1977, only four were terrorists; and out of 744 ~rounded, three were terrorists. In 1978 (9 months), there were 59 deaths and 627 wounded, but only six and one, respectively were terrorists. It is unnecessary to say who seema to be winning." He quoted a com~entary from LE FIGARO dated 9 October which stated, in connection with the Spanish statistics that, "They refer to the ranks of the "Boy Scouts," the Italian Red Brigades and the assassins of the Baader gang, and prove that assassination has become a basic political argument in post-Franco Spain." He noted that terrorism is an instrument of revolutionary war, citing the supp4rt represented for it by other political acts, including the permission for illegal congresses, such as that of HASI, which was attended by Deputy Letamendia." Of course, this reference evoked a speech by the Basque deputy who, after explaining, raised;.his~fist~ and cried: "Gora Euskadi Askatuta!" and submitted his resignation as a deputy. To a large extent, this was a logical decision, a~ter having left EIA and, there- fore, Euskadiko Eskerra, a coalition with which he had been electea to ~oin HASI and, through it, the Herri Batasuna [Popular Unity] coalition. Martin Villa answered Fraga, to prove that the police action against terrorism and common crime was showing good results. According to Martin Villa, "There is no serious public order situation what does exist is a serious problem of terrorism which emerges from the notion of public order as an extraordinary phenomenon." He continued: "But for many years we have suffered terrorism in Spain: it did not appQar as a result of any weakness, lack of foresight, inhi- bition, leniency or omission by the Suarez govern~ente." After discussing the 75 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY various types of terrorism, he stated: "The real problem at present is ETA which shares the features of revolutionary terrorism and independence-oriented terrorism." All the parliamentary groups participated, expressing opposition to terrorism. The PNV deputy, Jose Angel Cuerda, submitted a plan for the pacification of Euskadi sponsored by his party, and consisting of 15 points, which were a response to the other 15 points contained in Martin Villa's plan. Finally, the Congress passed a declaratory motion in which statements were made condemn- ing violence and claiming its incompatibility with the democratic system. It called upon the government to "adopt all the necessary measures, within the bounds of law, to isolate and eradicate terroriam." Before ending, November 1978 was to witness several incidents of ma~ or signifi- cance: the already mentioned assassination of magistrate Mateu, and the breakup of the military plot that was to be known as "Operation Galaxie," the leading _ members of which were civil guard Lt Col Antonio Te~ero and armed police Capt Ricardo Saenz de Inestrillas. Both had had a long career in the history of coupism against democracy, as un~ortunate as it was incomprehensible. At that time, insufficient stress was placed on the close relationship that exist- ed between terrorism and coupism. It was necessary to wait until 23 February 1981 for this connection to appear with all its evidence. However, the still slight perspective given by ~ust a few years has made us realize how the phenomenon of terrorism nurtures coupism. "Operation Galaxie" was possible ber_ause terrorism had reached its paroxysmal level. Moreover, one need only read the recent history of Argentina and Uruguay, where the immediate.effect of the systematic terrorism of the Montoneros and Tupamaros has been the military coup. On 15 November, a few days before the abortive "Operation Galaxie," an event occurred in Guipuzcoa which had ma~or repercussions. On that day, the head- - quarters of the civil guard of Arechavaleta was machine-gunned from a car. The civil guardsmen came out to pursue it, reaching it at Mondragon, where the attackers attempted to flee on foot, and "without carrying weapons," as was emphasized in a note from the interior advisory board of the Basque General Council. The civil guard's account, on the other hand, described an armed confrontation. The two fugitives were killed by the shots from the civil guard. A third person who remained in the car was wounded. Shortly thereafter, other civil guard members arrived, and apparently fired at their own companions, not recognizing Lhem because they were not in uni~orm. As a result of this shooting, a woman, Mrs Emilia Lassa, who was about 150 meters away,Fras killed, and th~ee other persons were wounded. The presumed ETA members who were killed were Jose Maria lturrioz Garmendia and Roberto Aramburu Uribarren. As a result of these incidents, a protest demonstration was organized. The note from the Basque General Council mentioned previously condemned the action of the civil guard. Alluding to "a public force which ~ires without thinking," it expressed this opinion: "This act must be judged with great calmness, because it is due to one of these two causes: either an irreaponsible lack of reflection, or an even more dangexous attitude: that of a public force acting against a population as an enemy society." 76 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY This note avoked the annoyance of Martin Villa, while the protest demonstration was a cause of further confrontations between the police and the demonstrators. ~'ive days later, when 30 armed policemen were engaged in sports exercises at the Basauri barxacka in Bilbao, they were machine-gunned from the nearby high- way by members o~ ETA stationed at the guardrail. T~ao armed policemen, Benjamin Sanchez and Jose Benito Sanchez, were killed; and 13 other companions were wound- ed. According to EL PAIS, a vicious circle had been established in the Basque Country which was proving difficult to break. "ETA has caught the state and the demo- cratic forces in a difficult dilemma. The desire o~ the government and the parliamenta~Y groups to achieve a political solution for Euskadi has been met from the terrorist side with a criminal offensive against the security corps, whose members have begun to be shot down in ambushes with impunity The final goal of its (terrorism's) direct re~ection of the political solutions is, precisely, to provocate police aczion that will make the possibility of thoae tragic accidents implicit" (a re~erence to the Mondragon incident). (74) The ETA's action multiplied, as if the terrorists were attempting to take their strategy of provocation to its final consequences. ETA (p-m) opened a new front on 27 November, when it kidnapped the representative of the Ministry of Education and Science of Guipuzcoa, Jose Javier Crespo, who was released 2 days later, to the surprise o~ many, in Madrid, in a display of maneuvering capacity. It' had made an unsuccess~ul attempt to kidnap the education represen- tatives in the three Basque provinces and Navarra, as the beginning of a"cultur- al offensive." It involved an attempt to reclaim the Basque people's linguistic and cultural rights, although the police alsn saw in the operation the goal of intimidating the officials assigned to the Basque Country. After assassinating a~anitor, Ale~andro Hernandez Cuesta, in Irun on tl~e last day of November, ETA (m), on the first day of Decemher, in Onate, killed the civil guardsman Manuel Leon Ortega, and at Blast Furnaces of Vizcaya, ~tole 86 million pesetas in one of the most productive holdups in the entire history of the organfzation. On the eve of the constitutional referendum (5 December), ETA assassinated two members of the general police corps, Commissioner Jose Maria Serrata Chivite, and Deputy Commissioner Gabri~l Alonso Perez-Gil, as well as a municipal policeman, Angel Cruz Salcines, in a San Sebasti~n bar. This~was its way of saying "no" to the Constitution which was being voted on the next day. ~ When the referendum was held, there was a large number o~ abstentions, 32.33 percent, which disturbed the politicians, because it was a sign that the so- called "disenchantment" had penetrated certain sectiona of the country. Of the 67.66 percent who voted, only 7.9 percent voted "no" to the constitutional text proposed to them. These were by no means alarming figures ~or the new democratic regime, but the abstention, a third of the voters, was considered very high, and the explanations put ~orth (mistakes in the census, bad weather on 6 December, and lack of interest because it was thought that the Constitution would be approved anyway) did not prove convincing. 77 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In the Basque Country, the abstention was greatest (34.48 percent) in the combined three provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, as were the negative votes (23.31 percent). This meant that only 43.31 percent of the Basques approved the Constitution, which was not exactly a good omen. On the other hand, these results could not cause surprise, given the PNV's abstention ~ campaign and the atmosphere of terror created by ETA. With the Constitution approved, a new phase began 3n the hazardous political life of Spain, ~?fierein terrorism was to continue occupying a preeminent place. It had often been thought that the goal of the terrorists was to prevent arriving at the Constitution. It was immediately realized that the terrorism was continu- - ing and that its virulence might ~eopardize the democracy w?~ose most formidable ~ adversary it was. Despite the menace of "Operation Galaxie," the involutionary coupism had not yet shown its claws. _But the terrorism, no leas potentially involutionary, appeared determined to destroy the efforts to consolidate a _ regime o� liberties. ~ FOOTNOTES l. EL PAIS, 28 September 1977, editorial: "Destabilization Plan." 2. CAMBIO 16, No 304, 9 October 1977, "The Assassins Go Free," p 10. 3. CAMBIO 16, No 300, 11 September 1977, "Hunger for a Hero," pp 13 ff. 4. CAMBIO 16, No 302, 25 September 1977, "'Apala': End of the Hard Times", p 34. 5. CAMBIO~ 16, No 298, 28 August 1977, "Uncontrolled Commando Units: the Ban Is Lifted," pp 24 and 25. 6. CAMBIO 16, No 303, 2 October 1977, "Euskadi: the Dialectics of the Coup," _ pp 27 ff; EL PAIS, 10 September 1977, p 12. 7. EL PAIS, 11 September 1977, editorial: "The Isolation of the Basque Extremists." 8, CAMBIO 16, No 303, 2 Octobex 1977, "ETA: the Discord Grows," p 29. 9. Ibidem. 10. CAMBIO 16, No 307, 30 October 1977, "The Basques of the IRAs," pp 10 ff. 11. CAMBIO 16, No 307, 30 Octotaer 1977, "GRAPO: the Enemy Is FIithin," pp 46 and 47. Espinosa's adventurous history was described by himself in a long interview granted to Jose Diaz Herrera. See CAMBIO 16, No 532, 8 February 1982, "Adventures of an Infiltrated Person," pp 20 ~ff, and No 533, 15 February 1982, "I Announced Carrero's Death," pp 36 ff. 12. CAMBIO 16, No 306, 23 October 1977, "Ultraright: the Gang in Diagrace," pp 38 and 39. 78 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 F'OR OFF7CIAI. USE ONLY 13. CA1~I0 16, No 306, 23 Octoher 1977, editorial: "This Works," p 3. _ 14. CArBTO 16, No 308, 6 November 1977, "GRAPO Final Operation: Attack Aga3nst Suarez," p 19, and No 312, 4 November 1977, "Th3s Is How Suarez Is Protected," pp 37 and 38. 15. DEIA, 29 November 1977, p 4. 16. DIARIO 16, 28 Nove~ber 1977, editorial: "Unworthy Parliamentarians?," p!+. 17. EL PAIS, 29 November 1977, editorial: "A Necessary Assumption of a Position; p 8. 18. EL PAIS, 4 January 1978, editorial: "Peace at the Doors of Eusktidi," p 6. 19. EL PAIS, 13 January 1978, p 13. 20. CAMBIO 16, No 319, 22 January 1978, "ETA: the Dynamite In Its Hands," pp 17 ff, and EL PAIS, 2 February 1978, editorial: "Ultimatum of Peace,t' p 6. 21. EL PAIS, 13 January 1978, p 13. . 22. EL PAIS, 20 January 1978, editorial: "The Legalization of Basque Separatism," p 6. _ 23. MUNDO DIARIO, 20 January 1978, editorial: "Magnanimity of Democracy," p 3. 24. CA1~I0 16, No 321, 29 January 1978, "Ez [le�t?] in Lemoniz," pp 28 and 29. 25. CArIDIO 16, No 321, 29 January 1978, "The Murky Scala Case," p 24. 26. EL ALCAZAR, 26 January 1978. 27. EL PAIS, 26 January 1978, editorial: "Crimes and Puhlic Order," p 6. 28. MUNDO DIARIO, 26 January 1978, editorial: "Whc~m Does Crime Benefit?," p 3. 29. CAMBIO 16, No 322, 5 February 1978, "The P~cice of Liberty," p 18. - 30. CAMBIO 16, No 322, 5 February 1978, "To Win North Africa," p 19; No 323, 12 February 1978, "I~AIAC: the Canary Was Silent," p 26; No 326, 5 March 1978, "Africa Wants the Canaxies: the Moors Are Comingl," pp 22~ff; No 327, 12 Marc.h 1978, "Canaries Adrift," pp 30 and 31. 31. DIARIn 16, 9 March 1978, p 15. 31a.CAMBIO 16, No 333, 23 April 1978, "Once Upon a Time There Was an Attack," ~ pp 34 ff; also see No 334, 30 April 1978, "Spain-Algeria: an Eye For an Eye," pp 24 and 25; No 337, 21 MaX 1978, "Cubillo 'Af~aire': The Man Who Paid Boumedienne," p 34. 32. ABC, 19 April 1978. 79 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500084414-7 FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY 33. EL PAIS, 31 January 1978, p 16, and 2 February 1978, p 7. - 34. CAMBIO 16, No 331, 9 April 1978, "From a Good Sour~e," g 9. 35. CAMBIO 16, No 331, 9 April 1978, "ETA, You Aave Gone Too Far," pp 37 and 38. 36. EL ALCAZAR, 22 March 1978, "They Are All to Blame," p 4. - 36a.The individual list of the dead is as follows: Raul Vesga Alonso, armed policeman, 07-05-78, Vitoria (A:Lava) Antonio Perez Sojo, armed policeman, 07-06-78, Vitoria (Alava) ~ Carlos Gutierrez Gonzalez, armed policeman, 07-05-78, Vitoria (A]_ava) - Francisco Gonzalez Jimenez, armed policeman, 07-05-78, Vitoria ~(Alava) Manuel Lopez Gonzalez, civil guardsman, 09-OS-78, Pamplona (Navarra) Juan Diaz Resano, civil guardsman, 09-05-7~, Pamplona (Navarra) Francisco Lopez Gonzalez, civil guardsman, 09-05-78, Pamplona (Navarra) Agustin Hernandez Martin, civil guardsman, 09-05-78, Pamplona (Navarra) Juan Marcos Gonzalez, civil guardsman, 09-OS-78, S.. Sebast~an (Guipuzcoa) Manuel Inigo Blanco, civil guardsman, 09-05-78, S. Sebastian (Guipuzcoa) Juan Jimenez Bermudez, civil guardsma.n, 09-06-78, S. Sebastian (Guipuzcoa) Jose Amado Juan, civil guardsman, 09-OS-78, S. Sebastian (Guipuzcoa) Jose Barroso Cabrera, civil guardsman, 12-OS-78, S. Sebastian (Guipuzcoa) Manuel Veiga Lopez, civil guardsman, 13-05-78, Galdacano (Vizcaya) Franci~co Lopez Ruiz-Sanchez, civil guardsman, 13-05-78, Galdacano (Vizcaya) Julia Gonzalez Cordoba, their worker, 13-05-78, Galdacano (Vizcaya) Juan Echevarri Echevarri, second lieutenant, civil guard, 17-OS-78, Pamplona Alfredo Aristondo Trincado, member of Franco guard, 18-05-78, Pasajes de S. Juan Jose Maria Merquelanz Sarriegui, taxi driver, 23-05-78, Irun (Guipuzcoa) Rafael Campanario Rivero, civil guardsman, 28-05-78, Tolosa (Guipuzcoa) Francisco Jimenez Pacheco, civil guardsman, 28-05-78, Tolosa (Guipuzcoa) Jose Sanz de ia Fuente--Gomez, civil guardsman, 28-OS-78, Tolosa (Guipuzcoa) 37. CAMBIO 16, No 338, 28 May 1978, editorial: "PNV Does Not Have the Floor," p 21. 38. CAMBIO 16, No 344, 9 July 1978, "ETA: Deaths, Deaths, Deaths...," pp 41 ff. 39. CAMBIO 16, No 338, 28 May 1978, "Jose Maria flenegas: the ETA Conditions Are Negotiable," pp 27 and 28; and "Tarradellas: There Is No Recourse Other Than to Negotiate with ETA," pp 31 and 32. 40. CAI~tBIO 16, No 339, 4 June 1978, "Jesus Sancho Rof, on ETA: Tarradellas Is Negotiating on His Own." ~ 41. EL PAIS, l7 May 1978, editorial: "The Basque Labgrinth," p 6. 42. ABC, ]9 May 1978, editorial:"Underlying Negotiations and Commitments With T'TA, " p 2, and 1 June 1978, editorial: "Impossible Dialog," p 2; ABC stressed that line, 8 June, "In Exchange for Nothing," and 24 June, "Nego- tiate, For What?" 80 ~ y FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540080010-7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 43. EL SOCIALISTA, 28 May 1978, "The Madrid Government Should Negotiate With ETA," p 4. 44. EL PAIS, 29 June 1978, editorial: "Dying in Euskadi," p 8. 45. CAMBIO 16, No 344, 9 July 1978, editorial: "Why Do They Want to Kill Us?," p 11; see also article cited in note 38. 46. The others killed by ETA in June 1978 were: 3 June, Eusebio Sanchez Sanchez, civil guardaman fro~; Baracaldo; 21 June, Antonio Garcia Caballero, municipaZ policeman in Tolosa; 27 June, Francisco Martin Gonzalez, armed police ser- geaat, and Jose Luis Gutierrez Diaz, a policeman from the same corps in San Sebastian. 47. CAMBIO 16, No 330, 2 April 1978, "From a Good Source," p 5. 48. CAMBTO 16, No 347, 30 July 1978, "Conspiracy," pp 14 and 15. 49. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 12 May 1981, "Calvo Sotelo Sees Kremlin's Imprint on Spanish Basque Terrorist Group," by James M. Markham (New York � Times Service). 50. CAMBIO 16. 51. See CAMBIO 16, No and article cited in note 48, and No 349, 13 August 1978, "Two Fronts Against Terrorism," p 19. . 52. CAMBIO 16, No 347, 30 July 1978, "Unrest," pp 16 ff. 53. FUERZA NUEVA, 22 July 1978, editorial: "~he Swords Held High," p 5. 54. ABC, 22 July 1978, editorial, "Bying in Madrid," p 2 55. EGIN, 4 August 1978, p 13. - 56. CAMBIO 16, No 348, 6 August 1978, "Terrorism: Conesa Returns to the Breach," pp 18 and 19. 57. EL PAI~, 30 Au~u~t 1978, editorial: "7:he Responsibility of the Police," p 6. 58. EL PAIS, 31 August 1978, editorial, "Between Fo11y and Threat," p 6. 59. MUNDO DIARIO, 31 August 1978, editorial: "The Responsibiltty of Each," p 3. . 60. CAMBIO 16, No 353, 10 September 1978, editorial: "Messrs Integrist Police," by Juan Totnas de Salas, p 11; and:~'.'~adly Diaappointed," by Jose Oneto, p 13; "The Police Are NoC Operating," pp 14 ff. 61. EGIN, 30 September 1978, editoria~: "The Additional Provision," p 15. 81 FOR CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 - FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY 62. D~IA, 12 October 1978, "The Meaning of an Appeal," by Carlos Garaicoechea. 63. EGIN, 12 October 1978, "Different Reactions to the PNV Proposal." 64. EL PAIS, 12 October 1978, editorial: "The Demons of the Polemic," p 8. 65. EGIN, 26 October 1978, "How HorribleI," by Telesforo Monzon. 66. This is the list of those killed by E~A in October 1978: Ramiro Quintero Avila, forest guardsman, 02-10-78, Lizarza (Guipuzcoa) Francisco de A. Liesa Morote, corvette captain, naval co~ander of the Bilbao Command, 03-10-78, Bilbao Anselmo Vidal Duran, first corporal of the civil guard, 09-10-78, Elgoibar (Guipuzcoa) Angel Pacheco Pala, civil guardsman, 10-10-78, Marquina (Guipuzcoa) - Ramon Muino Fernandez, armed policeman, 13-10-78, Bilbao Elias Garcia Gonzalez, armed policeman, 13-10-78, Bilbao Alberto Villena Castillo, civil guardsman, coast guard specialist, 14-10-78, Lequeito (Vizcaya) Luciano Mata Corral, civil guard sergeant, 22-10-78, Las Arenas, Guecho (Bilbao) L~iis Gancedo Ruiz, civil guardaman, 22-10-78, Guecho (Bilbao) Jose Benito Diaz Garcia, armed policeman, 25-10-78, Bilbao Epifanio Vidal Vazquez, laborer, 25-10-78, Durango (Vizcaya) Andres Silveiro Martin, civil guardsman, 25-10-78, Basauri (Vizcaya) Ignacio Olaiz Michelena, driver, 30-10-78, Andoain (Guipuzcoa) 67. EL PAIS, 28 October 1978, Statements of the PNV President, Carlos Garaico- echea, p 14. 68. CAMBIO 16 published the following item "from a good source" in No 365 (2 December 1978), p 7: "The Baaque armed organization ETA has begun an escala- tion to arm itself to the teeth. Recently, mortars and weaponry with greater offensive capacity must be added to its traditional pistols and machine guns. - civil guard chiefa fear that the mortara may be used to bomb headquarters in the Basque Country, which would cauae situations of incalcu- lable seriousness." 69. CAMBIO 16, No 360, 29 October 1978, "This Is How ETA Will Act," pp 27 ff. 70. CAMBIO 16, 18 March 1979, "From a Good Source," p 5. - 71. CAMBIO 16, No 361, 5 November 1978, "How ETA Is Financed," pp 22 ff, and No 363, "CIA Against ETA," pp 25 and 26. 72. This is the list of those as.sassinated by ETA during the months of November and December, totaling 27: Jose Legasa, builder, 02-11-78, Irun Juan Cruz Hurtado, carpenter, 02-11-7.8, Guernica (Vizcaya) 82 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500084414-7 Rafael Lecaola Landa, laborer, 02-11-78, Lezo (Guipuzcoa) Mariano Criado Rama~o, civil guardsman, 06-11-78, Tolosa (Guipuzcoa) Luis CandPndo Perez, iron and steel worker, 09-11-78, Anzuela (Guipuzcoa) Jose Rodriguez de Lama, civil guardsman, 11-11-78, Villarreal de Urrechua (Guipuzcoa) Leoncio Revilla Alonso, civil guardsman, 11-11-78, Villarreal de Urrechua - (Guipuzcoa) Emilia Larrea, 15-11-78, Mondragon (Guipuzcoa) Jose Francisco Mateu Canoves, magistrate, 16-11-78, Madrid Jose Benito Sanchez Sanchez, armed police corporal, 20-11-78, Basauri (Vizcaya) Ben~amin Sancho Me~ido, armed police cor~ora~., 20-11-78 Basauri (Vizcaya) Elias Elexpe, taxi driver, 25-11-78, Amo~e~i:~eta (V~zcaya) Heliodoro Arriaga Ziaurri, retired civil guardsman, 27-11-78, Villabona (Guipuzcoa) Alejandro Hernandez Cuesta, ~anitor, 30-11-1II, Irun Manuel Leon Ortega, civil, 01-12-7~y Chiate (Guipuzcoa) Jose Maria Serrais Chivite, chie~ of the Renteria police station, 05-12-78, San Sebastian Gabriel Alonso Perez Gil, deputy commissioner o~ the general police corps, 05-12-78, San Sebastian Angel Cruz Salcines, municipal policeman, 05-12-78, San Sebastian Vicente Rubio Ereno, retired military man, 09-12-78, Santurce (V~.zcaya) Saturnino Sola Argaiz, industrialist, 13-12-78, Vitoria Juan Jimenez Gomez, municipal police chief, 13-12-78, Pasa~es (Guipuzcoa) Diego Fernandez Montes, retired infantry colanel, 17-12-78, San Sebastian Joaquin Maria Azaola Martinez, alias "Jokin," draftsman, 19-12-78, Guecho Vizcaya Pedro Garrido Caro, merchant, 23-12-78, San Sebastian _ Jose Maria Arrizabalaga Artocha, chief. of the Traditionalist Youth, 27-12- 78, Ondarroa (Vizcaya) Elisardo Lampil Beluonte, taxi driver, 30-12-78, Yurre (Vizcaya) Jose Luis Vicente Canton, pensioner, 31-12-78, Llodio (Alava) 73. MUNDO DIARIO, 7 November 1978, editorial: "The Challenge of the Extreme Right," p 3. 74. EL PAIS, 17 November 1978, editorial: "Basque Country: the Vicious Circle," p 8. COPYRIGHT: Ale~andro Munoz Alonso, 1982. 2909 CSO: 6000/0020 END 83 FOR OFFlCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080010-7