JPRS ID: 10642 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080016-1
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• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10642
_ 7 July 1882
- Near East North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 25/82)
~BIS FOR~IGN BROADCAST I(~CFOR~IIIATION SERVICE
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~PRS L/10642
7 July 1982
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA R~PORT
- (F~UO 25/82~
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Libya Cuts Aid to Lebanese National Movement
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 19-25 Feb 82) 1
, OPEC AFFAIRS
_ Recent Downward Trend in Oil Prices Analyzed
_ (Nicola Sarkis; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 12-18 Mar 82) 4
Reasons for Price Decreases
Steps Recommended for OPEC
IRAQ
_ Text of Trade Agreement With USSR
_ (FOREIGN TRADE, May 82) 10
- SUDAN
AAAID Approves Contracts for Agricultural Projects
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 May 82) 13
Progress in R.oad Program Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Apr 82) 14
Briefs
~ Canadians Aid Foxest Pro~ects 16
~ Mining of Chrome Ore ~ 16
New RVI Opened 16
Pegaso Buses Purchased 17
Mixed Floor Production 17
Milk Plant 17
Modernization of Port Sudan 17
' - a - [III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]
= . .
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r~ux ur~r'1(:tAL US~: UNLY
SYRIA
Opposition Abrdad Said to Plan Strategy for Combating Asad Regime
(AL-WATAN A~.-'ARABI, 7-13 May 82) 18
- Covert Activities Conducted Within France Cited
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 30 Apr-6 May 82) 22
= Political Style of President Hafiz al-Asad Examined
- (LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 30 Apr 82) 26
Test of Trade Agreement With USSR
(FOREIGN TRADE, May 82) 31
TUNISIA
Tunisian-Libyan Railway Proposed
(MARCHES TROPICAUY ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jun 82) 33
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" " FOR OFEICIAL USF: ONLY
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
LIBYA CUTS AID TO LEBA.NESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 262, 19-25 Feb 82 p 35
[Text] Beirut. Once again Damascus triecl, through Amal and none other, to
make Yasir 'Arafat understand that it alone poss~sses the key to tranquility
in the parts of Lebanon heavilg populated by Palestinians.... After the last
battles between Amal and the communists and the Palestinians, the Syrian
- authorities advised 'Asim Qansuh to arrange a meeting in his house te put an
end to the fighting between the "Sons of the Unified Rank," and he did so.
The meeting, which was attended by members of. the National Movement and the
Palestine Resistance, confirmed Damascus' desire to keep Amal in the Syrian
orbit and its other desire to brandish the Shi'ah stick in the face of the
Pa~estinians whenever the need to do so dictates.
However, the meeting between Yasir 'Arafat, Muhsin Ibrahim (of the Communist
Workers Party), and Nabih Barr~ (of Amal) in the home of the Lebanese secre-
tary of the ruling party in Damascus was motivated by other factors, most
prominently the continuous Israeli threats of a"preventive war" in the
South. This is not the time to settle domestic accounts. Then there is the
effort being made by the Lebanese government at this stage to enlarge the
area patrolled by the international forces irl the South in order to assure
the further spread of the army in the Palestinian and non-Palestynian areas,
and in effect, bring these measures to the level of military resistance
- proper.... Very crucial issues are at stake, ao partisan bat~les m.ust be
halted until further notice.
' The Libyan Surprise
While AL-MASLAHAH was arranging for Syrian-Lebanese coordination, news from
Tripoli (in Libya) brought by the Libyan Pe~pl~'s Bureau (the Libyan Embassy)
in Beirut indicated that Col M~iammar Qadhdhafi had decided to cut in half aid
for the parties of the Lebanese National Movement, effective the month of
February, although the parties of the National Movement separately, including
the central political council, had not x'eceived any aid from Libya for the
last 3 months. The Libyans ascribed thQ delay in offering the said aid to
the crisis from which the Libyan treasury has been suffering for several
months due to the decline in Libyan oil production.
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Officials of the Libyan People's Bureau on Wednesday, 9 February presented the
national parties with half the amounts allocated to them in the hope that the
situation would improve in the near future and thus permit the "compulsory
deduction" to be canceled.
~ It is worth noting that the amounts received monthly by these parties before
the "deduction" varied from $50,000 to $200,000 according to the degree of
support they showed for Libyan policy. Among the ma~or aid recipients are
the Syrian Nationa? Socialist Party and the Arab Socialist Union. These twn
parties are wholly dependent on Libyan generosity.
The parties of the Nationalist Mavement fear the Libyan decision is the re-
sult of the stand taken by the Libyan leaders to exert pressure on these par-
ties to induce them to take more decisive po~itions in support of Libya
poiitically. The source of their f:.3r is that this aid covered a large part
of the militaiy efforts of these parties which relied from the beginning of
- the events on the principle of "unloading" those elements which demand as
much as thousands of liras monthly. There is no doubt that the Libyan "ra-
tioning" of aid will adversely affect the financing of the parties' "armies"
and then the financing of their information programs (newspapers, magazines,
broadcasts).
Some of the parties which had misgivings 4bout the step taken by the Libyans
were g~nuinely disturbed. Some leaders wondered about the reason for this
Libyan restraint in paying its obligations and whether the step was a reaction
- to the failure of qadhdhafi's endeavor to settle the Lebanese crisis. How~-
ever, Libyan millions are distributecl here and there without limit in most
African countries, with no,results worth mentioning, under the slogan "Aid
for thp Liberation Movements." But other sources in the "national parties"
assert that the Libyan treasury is experiencing a real crisis and that the
, decision to cut aid included the Palestinian Resistance with ail its groups.
~ The Resistance was ~laced in a siruation which dictated this forced deduction.
lran Is the Problem
The same sources add tliat Libya tried in recent months to avert the financial
crisis by obtaining Ara.b loans from some of the Gulf states. It failed to
obtain loans of several billion dollars from the ~mirates, but it succeeded
in Kli-wa i t . ~
However, other sources affirm that ti~e "financial crisis" th~ough which Libya
is passing aiid which has begun to affect its overall relations with the states
and parties and liberation movements was caused not by stagnation in trte Lib-
yan oil market but by the iarge amount of aid that Lib~a has given to Iran
since the beginning of its war with Iraq. This aid has totaled several bil-
lion dollars in loans and arma deals.... There are rumors going around that
Libya bought some gold in the world markets in behalf of Iran to help it
, cover the enormous costs of the war.
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On the other hand, it appears that relations between Libya and the parties of
~ the Lebanese National Movement, especially lay parties like the National So-
cialist Party, the Communist Party, and the Progressive Party, have begun to
go through a difficult stage a~ a result of some of the attitud~s exhibited
by the Libyan leaders, Col Qadhdhafi in particular. 7.'hese stands are adverse-
ly affecting all positions and attitudes and assumptions in Lebanon. Then
too they are fundamentally incompatible with their ideology.
In the course of Col Qadhdhafi`s last visit to Algeria and in the presence of
National Movement party leaders who at one time used to obey official requests
from the A].gerian ~overnment, the Libyan lead~r made a comprehsnsive speech
in which he said: "The Christian Arabs are now call~d upon to determine their
status--either become Muslims or become Jews!" That aroused the resentment
of all those who heard the speech, especially the Christian Nationalist lead-
ers, including In'am Ra'd and Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah. After that Col Qadhdhafi
intentiona.lly mocked the representatives of the Lebanese Nationalist Movement
by proceeding twice to postpone his appointm~nts with them after they waited ~
more than 2 hours each time.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 ALWATAN AL ARABI
5214
CSO: 4404/318
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OPEC AFFAIRS
RECENT DOWNWARD TREND IN OIL PRICES ANALYZED
Reasons for Price Decreases
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 265, 12-18 Mar 82 pp 57-58
' [Article by Dr Nicola Sarkis]
[TextJ "Look for Unemployment and an Economic Recession."
- What Does the Decrease in Oil Prices Mean? What Are the
- Explanations for This Phenomenon? Here We Present an
Analysis by, and an Interview with, the Petroleum
= Expert Dr Nicola Sarki~s Who Answers Various Questions
Which H~ve Been Posed Concerning This Matter.
Perhaps,the most important decrease in prices has been the one on British
oil extracted from the North Sea/M which is called "high-grade type Torties
36.50�." The price per barrel of such oil was $39.25 on 1 January 1981.
- Then the price wPnt down to $36.50 by 1 January 1982, then down to $35 by
8 February 1982, and finally stabilized at the fundamental price of $31 as
of 1 March 1982. Thus its price became $3 less than the marker price of
_ Arabian light crude (which is of a lower grade), which OPEC had set at $34.
But let us go back to very recent times.
When the Iraqi-Iranian war began in Setpember 1980, the Western nations were
afraid that a crisis in their oil supplies would occur. They took rapid
precautionary measures which had the ob3ective, among other tliings, of
providing a permanent reserve stockpile (in ~torage tanks in the West) which
would be the equivalent of from 110 to 120 days of oil consumption. Commen-
taries began to focus on the imminent occurrence of a sharp rise in prices
- as a result of the decrease in volume of exports from both Iraq and Iran.
An increase did occur on 1 January 1981, but it was not so sharp. The
~ increase ranged between 20 percent (Arabian light crude) and 25 percent
(Nigerian crude). Then it was said that this would serve to restore a.
balance in supply and demand and would thus absorb the additional quantities
offered in the free markets. But this balance was not restored.
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Z'he question which suggests itself is: What are the reasons for the decrease
in oil prices for the first time, after prices had always tended to rise?
In other words, if bringing supply in line with demand is what determines the
price, how do we justify the decrease in the price of oil and the existence
~ of a significant oil glut in spite of the continual decrease in oil producti~n?
The fact is that supply decreased, but demand decreased even more. This
decrease in the amount of world oil consumption was the rESUlt of two
principal combined factors, which w~ere:
1. A continuation of the phase of economic recession in the industrial
Western nations, which are the principal consumer nations of oil. The longer
- the recession lasts, the less need there is fo~ energy.
2. Resorting to extensive use of alternative sources of energy~. To this we
must add two other elements, no less important than the two above-mentianed
reasons, which relate to the OPEC nations. Duriiig the last few years therE
has been a production increase in several oil-producing areas of the world
which are outside the scope of OPEC. In addition to this, OPEC, as an
- organization which embraces 13 oil-producing count~-ies, has been unable to
establish a comprehensive plan which takes into consideration the f.actors and
dimensions of the crisis and which constitutes a long-range scientific and
well-planned response [to the crisis].
Let us review these factors.
Unemployment and Inflation
The West~rn industrial nations (the 17 industrially-adv~nce~ Western nltions
embraced by the OECD [Qrganization for Economic Cooperation ai:3 Development])
are suffering from unemployment. Be�~wePn thE years 1970 and 1980 the number
, of persons out of work in those countries doubled. By the middle of 1982
the number of unemployed persons in those countries will be three times what
it was in 1970, that is, within 1 1/2 years (from 1 January 1981 to 30 June
1982) unemployment will have increased as much as it did during all 10 of th~
- previous years (from 1970 to 1980). By 30 June 1982 the number of unemployed
persons wiZl be 28.5 million, and this will. constitute 8 percent of these
countries' labor force. Of this total, 16.5 million persons are in the
countries of Western Europe alone. If we take into considerarion the rate ~
of population increase and improvement in productivity, these nations will
liave to increase their production at a rate of 3 percent per year if they ~
want their total number of unemployed persans not to go beyond the fi~ure
of 28.5 million. The estima~es are that the increase in GNP in these iudus-
trial nations in 1982 will be less than 3 percent. This means that there
will be an increase in the number of unemployed from now till several years
in the future (till 1985) if we accept the hypothesis of the long-term economic
cycle called the Kondratiev Cycle.
One factor which increases the unemployment is the increase in the banks'
interest rates in an attempt to pu~ a stop to inflation. This rate of infla-
tion differs from country to country, in accordance with each country's
economic situation. Among the principal industrial countries, Britair_, Italy,
and France have the highest rates of inflation.
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t.nflation pui.~ a brake on investments and the existence of unemployment
increases the f:tnancial deficit of the public sector. The result of thi:s is
less productic. and therefore there is less need for energy. Is the si~uation,
then, really a bad one? The answer to this is an unequivocal "no." Growth
is slow in comparison with previous times when ~rowth was more rapid and more
obvious. This "weak" growth rppresents a much sounder situation than the
situation in the non-oil-producing nations of the Third World. The reason
that speci~l emphasis is given to the phase of economic recession in the
Western nations is the fact that the West is the main importer and consumer
of oil.
[Insert] Oil Inside and~0utside OPEC
1970: The OPEC nations produce two-chirds of the oil produced in the world.
1974: The OPEC nati.ons produce the lax~gest quantity of oil in their history
(31.4 million ~drrels a day), but the percentage of their production goes
down to 50.6 percent of the world's total production.
1981: ThE OPEC nations produce no more than an average of 22.5 million
barrels a day. Their percentage af production goes down to 42.86 percent
' of the world's groduction.
1982 (first 3~onths): The daily average ~roduction of the OPEC r.ations is
19.8 million barrels, and they produce 41.25 pc:tcent of the world's production.
_ Changes 'n Daily Production Averages
(in millions of barrels)
1974 "1977 1980 1981 1982 (3 months)
OPEC countries 30.7 31.4 27.0 22.5 19.8
Countries outside OPEC 27.4 30.7 32.7 30.U 28.2
Total World production 58.1 62.1 59.7 52.5 48.0
Percentage of production
outside OPEC~ 47.16 49.4 54.77 27.14 58.75
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
Steps Recommended for OPEC
Paris AL-WANTAN AL-' ARABI in Arabic No 265, 12-18 Mar 82 pp 58-59
[Interview with Dr Nicola Sarkis, By Anis Senns: "OPEC Lacks Planning and
Needs to Decrease Production"; date and place of interview not specified]
[T~xt] Dr Nicola Sarkis Is an Economics Expert in Oil
Affairs. For the Last 6 Years He Has Been Head of the
Arab Center for Petroleum Studies in Paris. He Is an
Important Authority Concerning Everything Having to Do
with Arab Oil.
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[Question] Did the crisis in oil prices begin when the marker price (the
Frice of Arabian light crude) went beyond the level of $30 per barrel last
year?
[Answer] It is true that oil prices rose fast between the years 1978 and 1980,
= that is, during the course of about 2 years. The so-called "marker price",
that is, the price of Saudi Arabian light crude oil, rose during this period
. from $12 per barrel to $32 per barrel, and then went up to $34 per barrel in
1981. In other words, the price nearly tripled. But price increases were
even greater for oil from a number of other countries (for example, countries
in North Africa, Nigeria, and the North Sea countries). Certainly these
price increases took place rapidly. Also, another great increase occurred
during the October War of 1973. The price per barrel went up from $1.80 to
$6 and $7, and later on to $12. All of this happened during the course of
2 years. All of this is a fact. But it is also a fact that this increase
was a type of reaction. What I mean by this is that oil prices, for a long
period of time, remained on a very low level and did not increase. This made
the purchase value of oil decrease at a tim~ when the prices of all other
materials, during the quarter century befor: 1973, increased. There were no
increases in oil prices, and in fact there was a decrease in prices during
the late fifties.
Political circumstances which emerged in the Middle East duringlate 1978 and
1979 set the stage for a new jump in prices from $12 per barrel to $34 per
barrel. It would have been better if this had not happened during such a
short periad of time, but rather if the prices had increased gradually and
in a controlled manner, with consideration being given to the inflation which
was taking place in the world and to the pressing and urgent need to develop
b~th new sources of oil and alternative sources of energy to cover the worlci's
energy needs.
OPEC was not able to establish a program Qf controlled price increases because
of the great pressures being exerted by the large industrial nations.
In short, the level of pxices reached in 1981 was not an unreasonable price
le~~el. OPEC is not the only organization which determines oil prices. Prices
are also set by non-OPEC nations such as Mexico, Britain, and even the U.S.
In 1979 and 1980, the U.S. administration was seliing oil produced from
' government-owned areas at prices which were higher than OPEC prices. There
was no justification for these high U.S. prices.
(Question] Is it not true that even the price of Soviet oil went up whenever
OPEC prices went up?
[AnswnrJ Yes, this is true. The point that I am trying to make is that
there are other parties, outside of OPEC, which are pursuing the policy of
setting high prices. As an example of this, let me mention an incident
which occu~red in 1972. On 1 June 1972, when ~raq nationalized the Iraqi
Petroleum Company [IPC], this coincided with the holding of an Arab petroleum
conference in Algeria. I was one of those who participated in the conference.
Another of those invited to the conference was an American whose name was
James Aikens who, at that time, held rhe position of director of the Office
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of Energy in the U.S. State Department and was one of Nixon's advisers on
oil affairs. (Later on he became the U.S. ambassador to 5audi Arabia.) At
- the conference Mr Aikens gave a speech in which he said that oil prices would
go up and that some nations would raise their oil prices from $1.8 per barrel
to $4 and $S per barrel. I persona~ly was astonished to hear this, and all
of the others attezding the conference were astonished to hear this because
at that time nobod,y had even thought of such large increases, but [apparently)
the U.S. Government had been thinking i~1 these terms. The U.~. point of view
was that if it was necessary to devel~p new sources of energy, then it was
necessary for the price of oil to go up. If the pricP of oil remained low,
then there would be no justification for searching for new sources [of oil]
and the U.S. would remain dependent on the oil-exporting nations.
So there is no doubt that the increase in prices is in the interest of oil-
= exporting nations, but it is also not in conflict with the desire on the
part of some of the industrial nations, including the U.S., to raise the
prices of oil. for various reasons of their o~~n.
One interesting fact is that after the years 1973 and 1974 the European
Common Market nations decided to set a minimum price of $7 per barrel for
the importation of oil. This price was three times what the price was
before the 1973 War. Their purpose for doing this was to protect the oil
produced in the North Sea area, which is oil which costs a great deal to
extract. It should be noted--and this is something which is very important--
that the International Energy Organizatic,n, which was basically created in
order to deal with OPEC, has stated that it is alarmed about the current
_ decrease in the price of crude oil which has taken place. The reason for
this organization's alarm is the fact that cheap oil will lead to a
slowdown in efforts to conserve energy and develop alternative sources of
energy.
The Price Can Go Down Even More
[Question] How far will the decrease in prices go? Will the marker price
remain $34 when the price of North Sea oil has gone down to $31 and at a
- time when other nations such as Iran have begun to pursue a policy of
= drastically lowering their prices because o� their urgent need for cash?
[Answer] If the OPEC nations do not reach ar.. agreement, or if some other
~vent does not occur, it will prove to be impossible to ~�aintain current
official prices. As I have aiready said, there are natioi~s which have stated
that they will not adhere to official prices. If no agreement is reached
to undertake a large d,~crease in production, prices could go down to $30 or
even $25 per barrel. In my opinion, it is necessary to decrease production
at least to the point where the glut in the market will be absorbed.
[Question] How large is this glut?
[Answer] In pur~ly mathematical terms this surplus amounts to 2 or 3 million
= barrels per day. But we should not forget that there is also a psychological
aspect to this matter. Right now there is a tendency taward lowering the
prices, [and this means that] ~ne prices actually will decrease.
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[(2uestion] You mentioned that the oil surplus, mathematically speaking, is
from 2 to 3 million barrels per day. The fact is that in the years 1981
and 1982 there was a noticeable decr.ease in OPEC's production. In 1981
the daily average production was 22.5 million barrels. During the first
2 months of 1982 this daily average production did not exceed 19.8 million
- barrels. What this means is that during this short period of time the total
. decrease in production was more tl~an the oil surplus [in the market]. Never-
theless, the price of oil went down. Does this not indicate that there are
other factors at work be~ides the psychological fac*_or? ~
[Answer] Undoubtedly there are. There is the factor of the economic reces-
sion which has been accompaniec? by the development of new sources of oil
and thP development of new alternative sources of energy. ~
[Question] What have been the repercussions of the decrease in prices as
far as the non-oil-producing nations of the Third World are concerned?
[Answer] In the short run the nations of the Third World will benefit from
_ the decrease in oil prices. But cheap oil will curtail programs involving
the search for new sources [of oil] in the nations of the Third World,
especially in Africa. ~ ~
[Question] What should OPEC do if it wants to [successfully] deal with this
matter?
[Answer] OPEC should establish a comprehensive plan (dealing with prices and
production quantities) which takes into consideration the situation which
OPEC's member nations fir_d themselves in, takes into consideration their
need for development, and also takes into consideration the world economy's
need for oil and the given factors of this world economy. Up till now OPEC
has not engaged in any planning which could be called comprehensive planning.
This is regrettable. So far OPEC's role has been restricted to its policy
_ of setting prices, and it has not expanded beyond this framework.
- COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WANTAN AL-'ARABI
9468
CSO: 4404/399
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~ IRAQ
TEXT OF TRADE AGREEMENT WITIi USSR
Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 5, May 82 p 52
[Text] The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Government of the Republic of Iraq,
Inspired by the deslre to consolidate and expand trade
;elations between both countries on the basis of equality and
mutual benefit,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. The trade turnover between the Union of Soviet Socia-
list Republics and the Republtc of Iraq shall be affected on
_ the basis oi Lists � A� and � B~, attached hereto.
2. List � A~ shall include goods designated for export from
the Republlc of Iraq to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
3. List � B� shall include goods desipnated for export from
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Republic of Iraq.
4. Lists � A� and � B* may be amended by agreement be-
tween the Governments of both couniries.
Article 2
Lists � A. and � B� attached to this Agreement, taking into
consideration the amendments which may be introduced therein
subject to Article 1 of this Agreement, shall not be limitative.
Soviet toreign trade organizations, on t~~e one hand, and Iraqi
organizations, physical and legal persons, on the other hand,
may conclude with each other commerctal transactions for the
import and export of goods not included in the said Lists � A�
and � B
A~ticlo 3
The trade turnover between the two countries shall be
effected under this Agreement in accordance with laws ond
rules regulating import and export valid in either country, and
on the basis of contracts.
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. Article 4
Both Governments shall reciprocally grant each other the
most-favoured-natio~ treatment in all matters portafning to trade
between both countries, including customs duties and any other
~harges levied on import and export, and also to rules and
formalities related tbereto.
The provisions of this Article shall not apply ta:
1. Privilegea and facilities which have or mey be extended
by one of the Governments to adiacent countries for the pur-
pose of Facilitating frontier traffic:
_ 2. Privileges and facilities, including customs ones, which
have been extended by one of the GovernmeMs on the basis of
an agreement or understanding on the estabiishment of a free
trade zone or a customs union;
3. Privileges and facllities which the Republi~ of traq has
or may grant to Arab countries;
= 4. Privileges and facilitfes which the Union of Soviet Socia-
list Republics and the Republic of Iraq have granted or shall
grant to one or severel neighbouring countries.
Article 5
Provisions of this Agreement shall not obstruct the rights
of either Government to take measures for prohibiting or limit-
ing the importation and exportation of goods, aimed at ensu�
ring national security, protection of health and life of citizens,
and protection of fauna and flora.
Article 6
All payments to be made between the Union of Sa~iiet Socia-
list Republics and the Republic of Iraq under this Aoreement
shall be effected in any freely convertible currency by agree-
ment between the contracting parties.
Article 7
Representatives of both Governments may meet to work
out annual protocols on trade turnover based on the lists of
goods mentioned in Article ~t of this Agreement, alternately, in
Moscow and Beghdad at mut~ielly agreed dates.
Article 8
Representatives of competent authorities of both countries
shall meet at mutually agreed dates in order to de~ielop trade
between both countries and review the implementation of this
Agreement. '
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Article 9
Both Governments shall render..assistance with regard to
_ participation i~ international trade fairs held in either country
and in the organizatlon of permanent or temporary exhibitions
of one country in the tesritory of the ather in accordance with
the legislation and rules of either country subject to agreements
beriveen the competent suthorities _of both countries.
Subject to laws and rules in force in either country, both
Governments shall permit the importetion or exportation with
the exemptian from the payment of customs duties and any
other taxes and charges of:
articles and equipment required tor holdfng international
fairs and exhibitions;
articles to be used as trade samples provided they are
- not intended for sale;
advertising materials the cost or price of which has no
commercial value;
exhibits prov~ided under re-export conditions unless compe-
tent authorities of both countries a~ree otherwise;
articles, materials, tools, and devices imported for proces-
sing, treatment, use for assembly and{or repair of equipment,
or for construction or other work provided they are re-e,xported.
Article 10
� From the date of this Agreement coming into force the
Trade Agreement signed between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Reoubiics and the Republic of Iraq on October t1, 1953. shall
cease to be valid.
Article 11 .
This Agreement si~all be ratif!~d or approved in accordance
with the legislation of either country. It shall come into force
from the date of exchange of notes confirming the Agreement,
_ and shall be valid for 5 years. It shail be extended for a subse-
quent 5-year period unless one of the Governments informs
the other Government of its iritention to terminate it 3 months
' prior to the expiry of the Agreement.
If one of the Govemments wishes to amend this Agreement,
it shall inform the other Government in writing at least 6
months prior to the dfacussion of such a proposal.
Done at Moscow on June 19, 1981, which corresponds to
17th Shaaban 1401 A. H., in two originals, each in the Russfen
and Arabic languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the Goverrrment of ~ne linion of For the Government of the itepublic
9oviet Socialist Republics of Iraq
- I. T. Grishin Mahdi Muhsen Auda
COPYRIGHT: "Vneshnyaya torgovlya" 1982
English Translation "Foreign Trade" 1982
CSO: 4400/343
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SUDAN
AAAID APPROVES CONTRACTS FOR AGRICULTURAL PROJEC~S
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1205
[Text] Following lengthy negotiations, the Arab Authority for Agricultural
Investment and Development (AAAID), some of whose third development phase
projects we explained in our 9 April 1982 issue (p 960), recently awarded the
first contracts for the realization of projects tncluded in its first inter-
ventionary efforts. The following are especially important: a construction
contract for a starch a~d glucose manufacturing unit awarded ta the Belgian
company Desmet (civil engineering in,sured by Six Conetruct), for an amount of
30 million Sudanese pounde; a construction contract for a dairy entrusted to
Danish Turnkey; a contract for the creation of a poultry farm, to the Dutch
company HVA.
Moreover, the following projects might be included in the AA.AID's realization
pro~ram, following approval by its administrative board: meat packaging
projects--this would involve organizing the livestock markets of Omdurn?an
for tlie preparatio~ and packaging of 10,000 tons of deboned meat for export;
. the growing of rice through irrigati~n from the White Nile at A1-Duwaym; in-
tensive sheep raising for expo~t; the growing of A*abusta coffee in the
South-Sudan; development of the Pengko plain, in the province of Jong?ei.
These five projects should be studied, a~d bids for limited offers from for-
eign consultants should be initiated to this end.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
9927
CSO: 4519/178 ~
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~ SUDAN
PROGRESS IN ROAD PROGRAM REVIEWED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1146
[Text] Many road ~rojects are underway in Sudan and they have reached various
stages. The situation in the ma~or pro~ects can be suffined up based on infor-
mation provided by the French office of economic expansion in Khartown.
- --Streets of Khartoinn. The Roads and Bridges Corporation (RBC) is repairing
one of the city's main arteries, the Sharia E1 Baladya, using its own materials.
There have also been preliminary contacts with the Rom~nian Government to
repair the streets of Ryad, a residential district southeast of the city. The
Italian company Recci is said to have offered to send to Khartoum expatriate
engineers who will work for the RBC supervising and helping with local opera-
tions.
--The Khartoum-Wadi Halfa-Aswan Road. This ma~or road running through Sudan
and Egypt over a distance of more than 1,200 kms had already been given an
allocation of 300 million lire (an Italian gift) destined to finance a feasi-
bility study. However, this stmm is not sufficient. That is why Impresit-
Italconsult-Fi~t, the consulting consortium chosen to conduct the study, did
not pursue th3 ~ project.
The RBC has also approached the Afr3.can Development Bank (ADB) with a request
for funds.
--Umm Ruw+~~~ah-Al-Ubbayyid Road (170 kms) and Dilling-Habilah Road (40 kms).
The firm Arabic Engineering House-Dar E1 Handasa, a Lebanese company, is
conducting a feasibility study funded by the World Bank.
--Kashm A1-Qirbah-New Haifa Road (95 kms). Italconsult and Stripe are con-
ducting a feasibility study financed by the World Bank. The estimated cost
of buildi~g that road is $60 million and is included in the program of
the World Bank. A call for bids will be announced in 1982.
--A1 Fashir-Nyala Road (150 kms). The cons.ulting firm Ilaco (Netherlands) and
the construction comp.any Steveroads (Netherlands) are working on this project
which is financed with a gift of 20 million florins from the Dutch Government.
--Road linking A1-Jayli, Shandi, 'Atbarah and Hayya (450 kms). Feasibility
studies for the 'Atbarah-Hayya section and detailed studies for the Al-Jayli-
'Atbarah section will be financed with bilateral Italian aid.
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--Ktiarctoum-Wad Madani Road (190 kme). ihe Arab Fund is financing a feasibility
study to double the width of the existing road or, as an alternative, to build a
- parallel road of the opposite bank of the Blue Nile. The prequalification list
of the consultants is being drawn up.
--Khartoum-Jabal A1-Awliya Road. The World Bank is reported to have listed
that section in its development program. But first, an ec~~omic study will
have to be made to assess the feasibility of repairing this road.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moureux et Cie Paris 1982
8796
CSO: 4520/173
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SUDAN
BRIEFS
CANADIANS AID F'OREST PROJECTS--Canada is aiding Sudan in several ways. This ~
year it will especially provide $7 million in food aid to import flour, as
well as a$3 million loan to import capital goods. Additionally, within the
framework of its 5-year aid program to ~udan, Canada will finance, for $12 .
- million, the following forest development projer_ts: construction of a produc-
- tion unit for construction wood at A1-Suki (co~t: $3 million); construction
of a sawmill at Subo ($4.7 million); a forest localization study at Kurmuk
and Ingessana ($500,OOU); an inventory of forest resources in the provinces ~
- of Bahr-Al-Ghazal and Buhayrat ($2.5 million); the establishment of a coordi-
nation center at Khartoum to follow the development of these pro3ects. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French Nc 1904, 7 May 82 p 1205]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9927
~ MINING OF CHROME ORE--Chromite is the principal ore exploited in Sudan. 1981
- production is estimated at around 19,000 tons. Sales for 1979-80 and 1980-81
were 19,000 tons and 25,000 tons and brought in a total of $3 million. Japan
was the principal customer (more than 50 percent of the shipme~ts). As for
other ores, it should be noted that the American company Minex is soon to be-
gin experimental extraction of gold from the rubble of an old mine, located
in the Red Sea region, which dates from the time of the Pharaohs. 7.'his same
- company recently signed a contract for tungsten prospecting in the Es
Sabablouga region (Khartoum province). As for the Sudanese Mining Corpora-
tion, it has two projec~s under study: one, in the Khartoum region, involves
- the production of granite granules; the other, in the Port-Sudan region, in-
volves a gypsun crushing unit. Financing would be local. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX EZ' MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1205]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9927
NEW RVI GARAGE OPENED--The Darfur Public Transport Company's garage was open-
ed last 24 March. Built by Renault Vehicules Industriels (RVI), its $4.2
million franc cost was insured under the 1978 French-Sudanese protocol. It
is to be used for the maintenance unit of the corporation's RVI trucks. The
garage is the group's second in Sudan, following that at Wad Madani, which
is used for the maintenance of the bus fleet of the A1-Jazirah Public Trans-
_ port Company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1904, 7 May 82 p 1205] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9927
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I'l:t;ASO AUSFS PURCHASED--In Mnrch, the Kordo�an Company for Trade and ~:ngineer-
Ln}; r.eceived 30 of the 150 Pegaso buses it t~sd purchased from the Enasa Corpo-
ration (Spain). This purchase is financed up to $11.1 million by a Spanish
loan, which also provides for the supplying of spare parts for $1 million and
the construction of workshops for $300,000. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1904, 7 Maq 82 p 1205] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
= Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9927
MIXED FLOOR PRODUCTION--In view of a growing cansumption in Af rica of wheat
flour, which is in short supply there and hard to produce locally, the FAO and
the UNDP jUN Development Program] launched a pro~ect in 1975 to promote African
grains. One of the f acets of that pro3ect was the creation in Shambat (Sudan)
of a Food Research Center with facilities which included a mill and a pilot
baking-oven. Research conducted there resulted in a mixed flour milled f rom
sorghum (durra variety) and wheat and with satisfactory color, nutritional
qualities and taste. The center's bakery produces daily 1,500 loaves of
_ bread and more than 2,000 rolls containing between 15 and 20 percent of sor-
ghum. In Khartoum, a f lour mill has started producing this mixed flour and
it mills between 3 and 5 tons a day. Another mill is under construction in
Wad Madani. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TRC`PICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
- No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1146] [COPYRIGflT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796
MILK PLANT--The Kuku milk plant is a joint venture pro~ect launched in partner-
ship by the Sudanese state company Animal Production Public Corporation (APPC)
with a 37.5 percent share; the Sudan Development Corporation [SDC] with a 37.5
percent share, the Sk~edish company ~lfa-Laval with a 12.5 percent share; and
the Swedish International Development A.gency (SIDA) for the rest. By the mid-
dle of this year, this plant is expected to have a daily output of 60,000
liters of reconstituted pasteurized milk made from powdered milk and butter oil.
The pro3ect is financed by Sudan to the amount of $6 million and by Sweden
which provided $3 million. A production company has been created and will be
given $2.2 million by the SIDA and a$3 million loan by the SDC. The success
of this project depends on the efficiency of its distribution network (compe-
tition from the "donkey man" remains strong although the bacteriological~qual-
ity of their milk is poor) and on whether or not this reconstituted milk
appeals to the consumer. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1146] [COPYRIGHT: Rene More~xx et Cie Paris
1982] 8796
MODERNIZATION OF PORT SUDAN--The International Development Association (IDA),
an affiliate of the World Bank, has extended to Sudan a credit of $25 million
destined to improve the physical handling capacity and the operational effi-
ciency of Port Sudan. The pro~ect is mainly intended to improve the ability
to handle unitized cargo and to prepare Port Sudan to increase the movement of
roll on-roll off containers. Improvements will be introduced in t'he grain
storage and handling facilities and in the communications system of the port.
_ T~iese improvements will enable Port Sudan to meet future requirements mostly by
introducing the unitized cargo method in the e~cisting piers. [Text] [Paris
MARCIiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1146]
jCOPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796 .
CSO: 4520/173
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SYRIA
~
" OPPOSITION ABROAD SAID TO PLAN STRATEG'Y FOR COMBATING ASAD REGIME
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 273, 7-13 May 82 pp 21-22
[Article: "European Security Mobilization to Meet the Possibility of a
Counter-War Breaking Out"]
[Text] Is there a plan being prepared by the Syrian opposition to respond to
the Syrian regime's terror with violence? In other words, is the war of
- liquidation abroad being met with a similar war, launched by elements of the
Syrian opposition trained in this type of operation?
This is a very serious question. It was raised in several secret meetings
of the "War Council" which was formed in Paris the morning after the massacre
aimed at AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI on Rue Marbeuf.
The war council is tasked with countering the acts of violence and terror.
It is composed af Interior Minister Gaston Defferre, General Seaulne, special
chief of staff to the president, Maurice Grimot, the director of the office
of the minister of the interior, Marion E'adir, director general of foreign
security, and Chalet, Direction de La Surveillance de Territofra (internal
security). ~
In order for this council to have a special importance and weight in the cur-
rent circumstances, President Francois Mitterrand decided to chair it himself.
He supervises its operations and discusses its plans and the ways of combat-
ing the terrorism tt~.at has spread its germs to France, which only yesterday
- was nearly isolated from the octopus of international violenc~.
The question currently occupying the war council and the French police and
intelligence organizations is clear and definite: Is the Syrian-Syrian war
of liquidation spreading to France?
_ This main question, for its part, spawns a group of questions that are cur-
rently being discussed in complete secrecy behind the scenes in various
branches of French security.
Eye for an Eye and Tooth for a Tooth
The questions today are searching for definite answers. French authorities
fear an extremist "reaction" from the Syrian opposition. French territory
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(apart from several European cities) would be a bloody stage for this. Among
these questions:
1. Has the Syrian opposition movement, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, re-
cently and secretly made a basic decision to respond to the liquidation with
liquidation abroad?
2. What would prevent such a war between the Syrian regime and the opposition
frum being carried out in Europe?
3. How can this possibility be met?
4. What would be the repercussions of such a war on the future of French-
Arab relations? �
5. Will non-Syrian Arab or foi~~ign elements participate in this "counter-war"
this time, on behalf of the Syrian opposition?
Green Light
Ai.-WATAN AL-'ARABI, relying on reliable security sources, can confirm that
these questions were raised at the highest security levels, not only in~France,
- but also in other European nations, including West Germany, London, Austria
and Spain, by virtue of the coordination and cooperation that exists among ~
European security organizations in terms of combating terrorism. In an at-
tempt to find convincing answers to various questions, the different French
security organizations are today assessing the data and facts that AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI has uncovered.
Secret information has reached these organizations regarding a secret meeting
of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood recently held in a European city, at
which the possibilities of shifting "the battle" abroad, in certain very
extraordinary cases, were discussed. This was in order to respond to inCernal
massacres through "reprisal actions" that would deal with symbols of the Syr-
ian regime or those who collaborate with it who live abroad permanently, or
those who travel between one European city or another.
This information also indicates that the Syrian opposition movement discussed
these possibilj.ties from different angles, especially their pros and cons.
Views were dividecl. There were those who said that "the battle is all one
and cannot be divided. We are involved in a vicious war, in which the regime
uses its airplanes and tanks against defenseless people. Consequently, it
must be kept off balance through swift, tactical operations to paralyze its
ability to move ou~side of the opposition's 'trap.' Foreign violence must be
met with similar violence."
In its analysis, this view relies on a grouo of factors, the most important
being that "foreign actions" will not be the alternative, but rather, they
- will be complementary and integrated with the domestic battle. Moreover, the
general international view puts the Syrian regime in the column of "terrorist
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" nations." The opportunity is now clearly propitious to take field action
abroad, which could prompt the European countries to pursue the "saboteurs
and terrorists" whom Rif'at al-Asad has sent to Europeo This would have
positive repercussions in terms of causing the regime to lose the opportunity
to assassinate the opposttionists, such as haPpened to the martyr Rinan 'Assam
al-'Attar in the German city of Aachen a year ago, to Salah al-Din Bitar and
to one of the Muslim Brotherhood officials recently in Madrid, and so on.
Those who hold this view also say, in ~ustifying reprisal operations, that
- r_he opposition is superior in this field due to several considerations, in-
c:luding the intense training to which the brotherhood is being sub~ected, and
the joining of the "movement" by many youths who lost loved ones in the mas- .
sacres of Tudmur, Aleppo and Hamab., as "kamakazis" seeking martyrdom in order
to save Syria. They also say that the battle with the Syrian regime has
reached the "breakingpoint" and all avenues are open, or rather, that they
must be opened if they are to lead to the salvation or share in hastening its
date.
The Other View
However, this overzealous view is not unanimous. There are those, within the
opposition itself, who do not agree with it. The ~ustifications and pretexts
in this regard are numerous; perhaps the most important are the following:
1. Shifting the battle abroad "will only harm our people abroad, by virtue
_ of the difficulties to which Syrians residing or traveling abroad will be
subjected." The European police will of necessity impose strict controls
over bearers of Syrian passports, and Syrians might be sub~ected to arbitrary
detention both w3thin and outside of airports, and some of them forcibly sent
back to Syria, which might create "resentment" against reprisal operations
abroad.
2. ,The real battle is at home. Anything other than that is just a"skirmish"
whi~:h will not break the regime's neck, bearing in mind that they use up time,
effort and lives that could be used in the hornefront battle.
The fact is that this information that the European security organizations
have gathered has given the "green light" to a broad assessmen.*, of the opposi-
tion's movements and the possibilities of an unstoppable war of liquidation
breaking out.
The Madrid Incident
This has increased the fear that the Syrian opposition has begun intensive
activity recently in a non-European country, in the mi.dst of prophecies that
the opposition has comprehensively assessed the symbols of the Syrian regime
abroad, in terms of financiers, businessmen, 3ournalists, merchants and stu-
dents, and those who cooperate with Syrian Intelligence and informants~. The
incident of the shooting of Y~asan Diyyub, the Syrian "cultural" attache in
Madrid on 27 April, reinforces these fears, or rather, firmly establishes
them. Preliminary investigations in Madrid indicate that persons unknown
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fired several shots at the cultural attache's car, while he was preparing to
enter the garage of the building in which he lived. He returned the fire in
- kind.
Eye witnesses stated that the persons who carried out the operation fled, and
the investigation has not determined their identity.
- This incident, which was the first of its kind, has caused several European
countries to ask: Has the counter-war begun? The most important question
is: Has some political decision been made in this regard?
- The French authorities began at once to study the ~possibilities of this war,
especially since these organizations recently received secret information
indicating that some persor?s identified with the Syrian regime were "threat-
ened." AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has confirmed that so~ne security preparations have
been made in this context. ~
On this premise, these organizations have assessed the Arab establishments
identified with the Syrian regime which could be a"target" for some operation
- or other.
' Search For Intelligence?
The security guard around the Syrian Embassy has also been reinforced, as well
as the Syrian cultural center in Paris and the office of the Syrian news
agency, which is directed by Ghassan al-Rifa'i. The principal operatives
(such as Lt Col Gayyath Anis, nicknamed al-Zabib) requested the increasecl
guard and are, for their part, caking individual precautions.
The dossiers of several Arab and Syrian persons in Faris have begun to be
studied in order to determine their tendencies and leanings, and the possi-
bilities which might be met.
- This inforn?ation is being ~xchanged with non-European security organizations.
Is there a state of security mobilization?
Certainly!
It is also confirmed that the Syrian npposition has not disclosed its inten-
tions. It has i~aued no statement regarding its course of action regarding
these fears, nor has anyone publically taken responsibility for the shooting
~ at the Syrian "diplomat" in Ma.drid. Tho~? are those who say, or rather,
stress what Syrian Intelligence itself i~ '~ehind the circulating of this in-
- formation and the spreading of a climate of alarm in Europe, for the purpose
of prepari:~g for future bloody terrorist operations and pinning the blame on
imperialism, and the Muslim Brotherhood, in a desperate attempt to get rid o.f
the gooc~ "reputation" which pursues members of the regime in circles of world
public opinion.
COPYRIGHT: 1482 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
7005
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SYRIA
COVERT ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED WITHIN FRANC~ C1T~D
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 272, 30 Apr-6 May 82 pp 25-26
[Article: "Syrian Intelligence 'Accomplishments' in Paris"]
[Text] If the French government had charged the Syrian authorities, either
directly or indirectly, with the responsibility for the "Rue Marbeuf" crime,
other various French political and media circles have been perfectly clear
in their accusations against the Syrian authorities, in specifying the Syrian
regime's responsibility for this crime.
The fact is that these accusations do not come forth out of a vacuum, but
rather are generated by numerous precedents on the French scene, which bear
the imprint of R3f'at al-Asad himself, and specifically his intelligence
apparatus belonging to the Defense Companies.
There is no dc~ubt that AL-WATAN AL-�ARABI has had a"lion's share" of this
activity. It has been exposed to three criminal attempts in the last 2 years.
The f irst attempt ~tappened in April 1980, and was aimed at the general super-
visor, Comrade Walid Abu Thahr. It was t~is custom to leave his home in one
of the old suburbs of Paris at exactly 0900 each day. However, contrary to
custom, the morning of that day he delayed leaving for his office at AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI.
By coincidence, his neighbor opened the door of his apart+nent aic ex~ctly 9 am.
He was immediately seized by masked men and beaten about the head with an iron
bar.
When the criminals realized that the victim was a French citizen, they left
him lying on the floor in a pool of blood and fled in an unknown direction.
The police have been unable to apprehend the criminals, nor to determine
their identiCy. However, Comrade Abu Thahr was clear in his accusation that
it was Syrian Intelligence.
Due to the nature of things, the series of crimes did not stop at this. After
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI alone published the story of the assassination of the
- French Ambassador in Beirut, Louis Delamare, and exposed the role of Syrian
Intelligence in the crime, it has received various threats. These threats
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have multiplied, since the French authorities have confirmed AL-WATAN AL-
'ARABI's information regarding the Syrian regime's complicity in the case,
and after other French newspapers (such as LIBERACION) expanded the exposure
of this complicity. Accordingly, the second warning attempt occurred.
The AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI watchman, on the evening of 19 December 1981, discov-
ered an explosive gift on the fourth floor in front of the entrance to our
offices. The authorities were immediately called to defuse the device. If
it had exploded, there would have been many victims.
- As a result of the investigation, it was clear that a person named Mikha'il
"Michelle" Kasuhah, who was described as a diplomat in the Syrian Embassy,
was the o;ie who prepared the explosive device.
Therefore, the French authorities sent a strongly worded letter to the Syrian
government, in which they exposed Kasuhah's complicity in the crime. However,
the Syrian regime has not responded.
The Hamah Massacres
The Syrian authorities believed that this explosive warr.~ing would be suffi-
cient to threaten AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI and to silence it. However, we exposed
the crime and published its details and directly accused Ka.suhah. His pic-
ture was also published on the front page under this headline: "This 'Diplo-
mat' Is Behind the AL-WATAN AL-'ARABT Explosion."
The threats continued against AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, but the editorial direction
continued as before. Then came the massacre in the Syrian city of Hamah.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI was the only Arab magazine to give this event its proper
attention and treatment. In consecutive issues, it devoted important space
- to the popular uprising in Hamah and other 5yrian cities, shedding light on
the number of victims (20,000 killed) and the methods of attacking the civil- .
ians (rape, cutting open pregnant bellies, plunder, intimidation and arrests
without cause). AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI also left room for the opposition to
voice various opinions and political leanings.
However, as is the nature of things, that did not please the Syrian regime.
Accordingly, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI received secret information from Damascus
indicating that s team of Syrian suicide commandos would be going to Paris
to carry out "something" against AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI or its general super-
visor.
The French police confirmed this information for AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI and imme-
diately took precautionary security preparations.
They also undertook secret surveillance of some diplomats from the Syrian Em-
bassy, including someone called Hasan 'Ali (Naval Commander, Acting Military
Attache), and Mikha'il Kasuhah, Che assistant cultural attache, who received
his orders from Lt Col Gayyath Anis in the Embassy, and who sometimes coop-
_ erates with Sabba Nasir, the cultural attache in the Embassy.
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However, the blowing up of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI was not the only "indicator" of
the Syrian Intelligence apparatus in Paris. The secret French investigation
discovered that Hasan 'Ali had been observing the offices of AL-WATAN AL-
'ARABI in Rue Marbeuf from inside a white Mercedes. There was coope~ation
between him and K.asuhah. In a subsequent incident, they participated in the
5yrian demonstration against the regime, which ~ook place on the Boulevard
Saint Germaine Du Paris on 5 March, by both of them acting td break up the
demonstration and beating those that organized it with iron clubs and chains.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI was the only one to publish a picture of Kasuhah, caught
"redhanded."
~ The Accomplishments Are Many
- If we were to take a look behi~d some of the incidents, we would find that
the Syrian regime's imprint is behind the assassination of Salah al-Din Bitar
(July 1980) in Paris. The French organizations have a thick dossier on this
matter.
The F~cts Are Numerous
Hasan 'Ali himself kidnapped the Syrian officer, Earid al-Baridi, from Paris,
~ because he had connections with certain opposition circles, and "sent" him
- to ane of the Damascus prison cells.
The investigation has so far not learned the way in which al-Baridi was gotten
- out of Orly airport.
There are other operations as well in the file of charges, including the mur-
- der of the Syrian student, Zhafir a1-Attasi, by a bomb in his room in Paris,
~ as well as the strangulation of another opposition Syrian student in Stras-
bourg.
Elements from Syrian Intelligence slipped into his bathroom and killed him.
Other student elements in Lyon were directly tasked by Hasan 'Ali to open the
mail boxes of Syrian students living in the city and to steal the letters
that they receive.
The imprint of Syrian Intelligence was very clear in a11 these cases. In
Nancy, another Syrian opposition student was recently stabbed with a dagger.
The perpetrator ~ras not discovered.
- Syrian "Technology" �
The tales of "Syrian students" in France who are with Syrian Intelligence are
numerous and detailed. The Defenae Companies received from Hasan 'Ali a
secret report indicating that the opposition was very active in Syrian stu-
dent circles and that many of them had begun to ~oin the ranks of the opposi-
tion. Conseque~ztly, there is no doubt that surveillance of Syrian student
circles was intensified. Rif'at al-Asad commanded his representative in
Paris (Hasan 'Ali) that measures be taken.
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The Syrians wanted to find an appropriate "channel." The Ministry of Defense
concluded a contract with one of the French institutes to train Syrian stu-
dents on "the most modern technological means." The institute is the Univer-
sity Institute of Technology (IUT) and its headquarters is in the French city
of Saint Denis. Tt has numerous branches in other French cities. The strange
thing is that the Syrian Defense Ministry stipulated to the director of the
institute that this contract be kept secret.
- The French authorities are currently investigating the circumstances of this
contract's signing and the reasons for the director of the institute agreeing
to keep the matter secret, especially since there is no justification for
~eeping it secret so long as it is strictly scientific. However, the matter
does not require a"soothsayer" to discover the circumstances of this agree-
ment. Syrian Intelligence found itself a good "channel" to bring reliable
_ elements, loyal to the regime, into France~ under the guise of "scientific
study." Some of these elements are charged with keeping an eye on Syrian
student movements and to intervene, when necessary, to suppress any opposi-
tion movement. This is exactly what happened in the Boulevard Saint Germaine
demonstration, in which some students from the various branches of this insti-
- tute participated, for the purpose of suppressing the opposition demonstration.
The French Government is currently studying the status of this institute, and
information available to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI confirms the intention to abrogate
the agreement with the Syrian Ministry of Defense, which has so far brought
in about 400 students to study the "technology" of espionage.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
7005
CSO: 4404/469
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SYRIA
POLITICAL STYLE OF PRESIDENT HAFIZ AL-ASAD EXAMINED
Paris~LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 30 Apr 82 pp 38-39
[Article by G. S.: "The A1-Asad System"]
[Text] Disputes between France and Syria exist. There are differences of
- opinion on a distant country in the Near East and different views on the fate
of Lebanon. Iraq, the enemy brother of Syria, purchases a part of its weaponry
in Paris. The Delamare file has not been closed. These disputes do not prevent
the two countries from continuing to maintain civilized relations.
The slide toward a secret war could perfectly well have been avoided if one had
been dealing with a regime other than that which has governed in Damascus for
12 years. President Hafiz al-Asad and his~brother Rif'at built a system which
runs on violence in order to remain in power. Without this fuel, it stops.
When two nations differ as France and Syria do, they have a whole range of
diplomatic procedures, economic sanctions and rhetorical battles with which to
settle their quarrel. Under the al-Asad system, these procedures are deemed too
mild. Moreover, a bomb is persuasive.
Between the ambassadorial dealings and war, the Near East has for some years
concealed a middle path--international terrorism. More than an "energetic pro-
test" and less than landing the marines, commando unit operations constitute a
subtle blend of war and peace.
Syria was not the first to make use thereof. The Palestinians established the
model. The Libyans and the Iraqis took up the model, but the Syrians did not
join in until late. Two different forms of international terrorism can be dis-
tiiiguished. There is top level terrorism, wherein a foreign politician believed
to be irreplaceable is seen as the problem. For example Faysal of Saudi Arabia,
Moussa Sadr, the imam of the Lebanese Shiites, or Kamal Junblat, the Druse
leader. They are eliminated--one less piece on the chessboard.
French School Training
Terrorism by intimidation is no longer popular. I have normal and perfectly
cordial relations with someone. I want something from him. I kill his little
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2-year-old daughter, whom he adores, and I go to present my condolences to him
as a saddened friend. He suspects that I am the assassin but he can do nothing
against me except declare war on me. I can hope he will be mare flexible.
This procedure is not without its efficiency in the emirates of the Persian
Gulf, which are unstable states. Billions of dollars and not a few votes for
the Arab League were won in this fashion. But that the Syrian government could
imagine that what works in the emirates also works with a European country is
definitive proof of the absolute isolation into which it has sunk.
. The coronation of Hafiz al-Asad as head of state in 1971 was regarded as a real
deliverance. He succeeded a team of. frenetic "socialists" which had just barely
spared the shoeshine boys in the wave of nationalizations, which broke off rela-.
tions with the whole world except for the USSR, and suffered plunder by Israel
in ]967. A1-Asad was a moderate: he moved closer to Egypt and then the West,
allowed private enterprise to flourish and agreed to detente in domestic politi-
cal ]ife. The army, instead of decamping at the first shot fired, fought re-
spectably against Israel. For the first time since 1945, Syria enjoyed the
delights of a stable and.almost popular regime.

i But the rejoicing did not last long. Syria soon returned to its swirl of prob-
lems. The country has no fewer than 18 religious communities. The al-Asad
brothers belong to the Alawite sect (10 percent of the population), the poorest
and that most scorned. Hafiz al-Asad remembers the tfine when the sheik of his
village was likely to be stoned if he went down to the city on a prayer day.
For a thousand years, the Alawites have clung to the flank of a chain of moun-
tains, Jebel el-Noussayriya, which drops away sharply into the Mediterranean.
- Grains of sand in a Sunnite ocean, they only came down from their rocky home to
provide the pashas with fresh supplies.
At the origin of the split was a somewhat unorthodox interpretation of the
message of the Koran. Like the Shiites, the Alawites venerate Ali, Mohammed's
son-in-law. To this they add belief in a divine trinity--close to the Christian
- concept--believed to have appeared seven times in three different guises since
time began. Exhausted from scratching a living from arid rock, the Alawites had
little leisure to devote to theological subleties. They do not know a great
deal about their religion. All that they know is that they are the damned of
the earth.
Hafiz al-Asad was born in 1930, during the French mandate, in Kardaha, one of
those mouiitain villages built of dried mud. His father must have been a
notable. because thetr home was a permanent one and the children were sent to
the French school.
While the Sunnites (70 percent of the population) grumbled against and fought
the French, the Alawites, on the contrary, saw colonialism's good aspects. They
enlisted in the small Syrian army commanded by officers from Bordeaux and
Strasbourg to earn a bit of money and to seize the opportunity to abuse the
Sunnites, while the bourgeoisie in Damascus and Aleppo disdained the military,
and sent their sons to study in the faculties of law and medicine.
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At 16, while attendit~g the secondary school in Lattaquie, H'qfiz joined the
_ brand new Baas Party. To the accompaniment of whacks from a'~tu~e~r, he was
taught the prodigious history of Fr~nce and Europe. The Baas ~Pa,~~y't~ught him
that the Arabs too could become a gr~at nation. Their glorious p~~t w,as in no ,
way inferior to that of the greatest ~owers of th~ world. The ren~i~s~nce'would w
come when religious and tribal divisions were elirqinated. United ip s,secular
spirit and justice, the Arabs would raise themselvp$ to the highest peaks. The
horizon for Hafiz opened up. No inevitable force bound the Alawite to his moui~-
tain any longer. The days of contempt were past. To the two of us, Damascus!
Elected president of the students' committee at Lattaquie, and then in 1951
president of the Syrian students' congress, he enrolled in the war college in
Homs. Syria had been independent for 6 years. It had experienced its third coup
d'etat. The Baas Party knew that winning power depended on guns. It urged its
young members to attend officers' school. The Alawites had less hesitation
about enlisting in the military, a habit acquired under the French. Hafiz
emerged as an air force lieutenant. ~
Head of State. ~
It took the Baas Party only a dozen years to iiifiltrate the army sufficiei~tly
and to establish itself in power in 1963. It is still in power. Hafiz al-Asad,
in an advantageous position, quickly rose to general and then commander in
_ chief of the air force. From this strategic position he controlled the country.
- No coup d'etat against him was possible. The tanks and artillery could always
try something, but the air force had the last word.
. ~
~ In order not to lose the ground gained, he needed to surround himself with reli-
able people. The party had divided up intb military, civilian, pro-Egyptian,
pro-Ir.~qi, ]eftist and ^~^d~rate factions. Relying on it was risky. It wa~ only
possible to have confidence in someone of one's own family or tribe. Hafiz
al-Asad then began to establish his Alawit~ nation within the Syrian state. It
very soon became impossible to shake his position. When he was ofiicially
elected president of the republic in 1971, it was only a formality. He had long
sitice had everything nailed down.
Kissinger was to say of him in his memoirs: 01He is probably one of the greatest
chiefs of state I have had occasion to meet." Probably one must ascribe a part
~ of this compliment to diplomatic flattery, but it gives the man his due weight.
To retain power in Damascus for more than 12 years is more than a performance:
it is a miracle--the miracle of the special services and the militia.
~ Hafiz al-Asad did not have evil intentions. He sought to achieve a reconcilia-
tion with his old mentor, Salah Bitar, who along with Michel Aflak founded the
Baas Party, instead of simply throwing him in prison. He talked with him for 4
hours. Without r-eaching any agreement. From his noble position, the president
allowed Salah Sitar to depart for Europe. Where it was necessary to have him
assassinated: the old gentleman continued to criticize the government.
W~~en he sent his army to Lebanon in 1976, Hafiz al-Asad was implementing his
dream as a young militant--to reestablish Greater Syria. Taken separately, each
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country in the Near East is weak and ungoveri~able. An empire extending over the
entire region could put an end to the tribal quarrels and embody a glorious
ambition. Was this not the very essence of Arab nationalism?
- Ne9ther the Lebanese nor the Palestinians could understand this language. One
after the other, the Lebanese clans clashed with the troops of Hafiz al-Asad.
He came as a liberator but was treated like an occupier. Particularly since his
soldiers truly behaved ltke invaders.
A driver stopped at a Syrian barricade in a Beirut street. The sentry on duty
did not even glance at him, but continued to sip his coffee. One had to wait
until he saw fit to make a move. If one asked "May I pass?" he might well
punish the questioner by letting him roast for 3 hours in the blazing sun with
all the windows closed.
Syrian officers engaged in smuggling on a large scale to supply the markets iii
Damascus, still too "socialist" to be supplied in proper fashion. Shipments of
hashish departed for the West, wisely escorted by colonels. Instead of provid-
ii~g security, the Syrians thought themselves clever in letting private armies
multiply. In this they succeeded--causing the development of a Lebanese nation-
al feeling against them which had never before existed. Failure in Lebanon.
In the Baas tradition, al-Asad tried to secularize the country, getting a new
constitution adopted in 1973 which did not specify the religion to which the
chi.ef of state should belong. There were demonstrations in all the towns and up-
risings of Sunnite leaders which forced the president to yield. And to use
machine guns against the rebels. SincE then, religious opposition has been con-
tinuous, and so has repression.
Rei gn of Terror
The government prohibited demonstrations on the birthday of the Prophet. Baas
Party militiamen tore the traditiona~ veils from the faces of women still wear-
ing them in the streets. The Sunnitc:s became enraged and accused al-Asad of.
atheism. The Moslem Brothers headed the rebellion with a staggering degree of
fanaticism. Their willingness to die is greater than the regime's effort to
kill t~hem. They always go out on operations wearing a belt f.ull of grenades.
The troops have orders to take them alive. When a Moslem Brother is cornered,
- he takes the pin from one of the grenades in his arsenal and blows htmself up
along with those seeking to arrest him. When a Moslem Brother is spotted today
he calls out to the policema n: "Come and get me, then!" They form a circle, but
at a distance. And the police summon the army: "We've found a tloslem Brother.
You'll have to arrest him." The army arrives, moves into position and tele-
pho �es the secret service: "We have a package for you." All this time, the
Moslem Brother is laughing a t them. He knows that they will never take him
al ive.
The intelligence service of the regime is frustrated by these fanatics. But its
organization remains intact. It is baaed on Alawite personnel. Seventy percent
of the officers at the army command post belong to the sect or are loyal to it,
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like 50 percent of the troops. But apart from the army, a special force of
50,000 men is almost 100 percent Alawite. It is commanded by the brother of the
president, Rif'at.
From Beirut to Abu Dhabi, the mere mention of Rif'at's name causes terror. It
is known that he is capable of anything, or everything.
Until a few months ago, three of his children attended the small French school
in Damascus (indicating his devotion to our language, which is not unimpor-
tant). They no longer go to classes. Too dangerous. The Moslem Brothers might
kidnap them. The leaders and the whole regime Iive in a constant state of
siege. The president has had a palace-fortress built for himself on a hill in
Damascus, from which he could shell the city, even if the whole of it were to
rise in rebellion. The Alawites will not yield.
Control of a City
The rebellion in Hama a few weeks ago was put down with brutality rare in
modern history. The al-Asad brothers subdued Hama like the Soviets and the
Americans subdued Berlin. Then they forced the survivors to parade in a demon-
stration in support of the government. An astonished Syrian newspaperman re-
marked to a soldier: "There are a l~t of people, after all." "Yes," the other
responded, laughing, "but not as many as we killed." The operation pursued
against Hama was entirely carrfed out by Alawite troops.
If. there has not been a coup d'etat for 12 years, it is because the al-Asad
brothers have invented a new science. In the 1930s, the coup d'etat technique
was discovered. For their part, they have found a technique for preventing
coups d'etat. It is not an exact science. The al-Asad brothers might lose one
- day. No one questions the effects of their fall. It would mean a bloodbath. The
Alawites would be assassinated on every street corner. Tt~ey would have but one
last resort--to retreat with their special forces to Alawite territory.
Everything is ready on the Mediterranean coast of Syria to create an Alawite
state in the event of disaster. Just as the Christians have their redoubt, the
Alawites would have theirs. Which Syria would not recognize. A war would then
be inevitable. Yet another.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "le Nouvel Observateur"
5157
CSO: 4419/18
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SYRIA
TEXT OF TRADE AGREEMENT WITH USSR
Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in Engliah No 5, May 82 p 54
[Text] The Government of the Urtion of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Government of the SyrFan A,rab Ropublic,
Guided by the provisions of the Treaty on Friendship and
Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Syrian Arab RepubFic of October 8, 1980, and the Long-
Term Trade Agreement between the Union of Savtet Socialist
Republics and the Syrian Arab Republic of November 4, 1965,
In connection with the successful lmplementation of the
Agreement on Trade Turnover between the USSR and the SAR
for 197&1980 of January 24, 1976, and
Desiring to promote further development of trade between
the two countries on a iong-term basis,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The trade turnover between the USSR and the SAR in the
period from January 1, 1981, up to December 31, 1985, shall be
effected in accordance with the Iists attached to this Agreement
subject to the provisions of the Long-Term Trade Agreement
and the Payments Agreement between the U~ion of Soviet Sa
cialist Aepublics and the Syrian Arab Republic of November 4,
1965.
The Parties shall undertake the necessary measures for en-
suring the deliveries of goods between both countries in accord-
ance with the above�mentioned Itsts and they shall also strive
to increase the volumes of mutually delivered goods. In this
connection, foreign trade organisations of the USSR and physical
- and ~legal persons of the SAR may also conclude contracts for
delivery of gooda not included into these Itsts or over and
above the quantitEes or amounts indicated therein.
A?ticle 2
The Long-Term Trade Agreement and the Payments Agree-
ment between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
Syrian Arab Republic of November 4. 1965, shall at least be in
torce until December 31, 1985, with their possible turther pro�
longation according to Article 23. Clause 4. and Article 12 of
these Agreements.
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A~tiels 3
To facilitate the implementation of this Agreement both
Partlea ahall, if necesaery, consult one other. For this purpose
- repreaentatlves of both PaKlea ahall meet at the proposel of
either of them at an agreed plece and time.
' A?Ncl~ 1
; Thls Agreement shali bs ~ubject to approvel in accordance
with the constltutiond proceduro of elther country and it shall
come Into force from the date of exch~nge of notes of approval.
~ liowevsr, Iri provialons shall tsmporarlly apply from January
t, 1981.
Done at Moscow on May 28, 1981, in two originals, each in
3 the Ruasian and Arabic lenguagea, both texts being equally
euthant~c.
J
i For the Govern~ent of the Union For the ~overnment of the Syrian
~ of Soviet Socialist Republice Arab Republic
~
~ N. D. Komarav , Mohammed A1-Atrash
~
COPYRIGHT: "Vaeshnyaya torgovlya" 1982
E~ctgl~sh Translation "Fcreign Trade" 1982
,
~ CSO: 4400/343
;
:a
J;
,
.
~;x
?;:a 32
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J
TUNIS 7A
TUNISIAN-LIBYAN RAILWAY PROPOSED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French No 1909, Y1 Jun 82 p 1500
[Text] The bulletin of economic news Hungaro-Press, pub-
lished by the Hungarian Chamber of Co~erce, is publish-
ing the report belaw on the studies of the projected rail
liryk between Gabes, in Tunisi,~,;~nd the Libyan-Egyptian
border. A Hungarian firm was commissioned with these
_ s tud ies .
In North Africa, the countries situated on the coast. of the Mediterranean
should be linked by a transcontinental railway several thousand kilometers in
length. Only the Egyptian section of this line has been built thus far, and
it operates as far as the Libyan border. The line which is to run from Gabes,
in Tunisia, across I,ibya to the Egyptian border has not been built. In 1972,
the Governments of Tunisia and Libya set up a joint commission which in 19?!+
initiated an i~nternational contest for the submission of studies for a
standard-gauge railway between Sfax, Gabes and Tripoli. At the end of this
international contest, the commission charged the Enterprise for the Study of
Roads and Railwaqs (Uvaterv) of Budapest with carrying out the studies. This
line will be about 500 km l~ng. As regards the completion of the Sfax
junction point, an alternate route has been proposed which would permit the
normal flaw of port traffic in keeping with the urban development projects.
This alternative was accepted in agreement with the communal council.
The cross-section of the projected line is expected to feature a 7.20-meter
wide embanl~ent and a 9.20-meter wide cutting. The embankment is surfaced
with a layer of asphalt eight centimeters thick in order to drain off sur-
face water and increase the load capacity of the substructure.
The line fram Sfax to Gabes necessitates the construction of thirty large
_ bridges and 272 smaller bridges of reinforced concrete. The section extend-
- ing frbm Gabes to the border includes 35 large bridges and 184 smaller ones.
From Tripoli to the border and to Tripoli itself, it will be neceasary to tauild
21 causeways, six high-level bridges as well as 50 small reinforced concrete
_ bridges and tubular culverts. The railway bridges, causeways and culverts
which will ~:onnect at the railway line are all standardized structures.
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The line would have 31 stations of which 28 stations will be for passengers
and three stations for cargo. In addition, the studies also include 82
other buildings, corresponding to~41 different models, which will help op-
erate and service the railroad. Uvaterv has afso begun studies for eight
~ underground passages aad water taaera twa sizes to be constructed in
- seven places.
COPYRIGHP: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.
CSO: 4519/212 ~
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080016-1