JPRS ID: 10651 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080025-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 25
• Content Type: REPORTS

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I~()R ()tl~i~lQ'IAI. l!tia; ()NI.Y
JPRS L/ 1065 1
~ 9 July 1982
Ja an Re. ort
p ~
CFOUC 40/~2)
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORiVIATION SERVICE
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-1,
JPRS L/10651 �
9 July 1982
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 40/82)
CON7ENTS
_ POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
Tanaka's Control of 1'olitical Agenda Discuss~d
('1'akehiko Takahashi; MAINI(~iI DAILY NEf~TTS, 16 Jun 82) 1
~ Pape r Urges LDP Housecleaning
_ (Hideo Matsuoka; MAINIQ~I DAILY NEWS, 15 Jun 82) 3
Split in LDP Actions Reported
(MAINI(i~II DAILY NEWS, 15 Jtm 82) 6
I~II LI TARY
Security of Sealane Analyzed
(Hirosato Asonuma; KOKUBO, Jun 82) 7
E C ON OMI C
~conomic Grcxath Rate in Next Ttao Decades
(~lE DA~LY YOMLURI, 12 Jtm 82, MAINIQiI DAILY NLWS,
12 Jun 82) 28
Four Percent Growth Seen '
Growth Rate in Next Ztao Decades
Growtti Target for 1982 Seen Difficult To Attain
( MAINI ixiI DAI LY NEWS , 15 Ju�,i Fi2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Jgpan Records $453 Million Trade Surplus in May
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 11 Jun 82) 31
Wholesale Prices Drop 0.6 Percent in May
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 12 Jun 82) 32
(~iscai 1981 [~VP Posts Lackluster 2.7 Percent Gain
('!lt~ 1)AI I,Y YOt~URI, 12 Jun 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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F(fR OFFi('IA1. USF. ONI.Y
Fi81 Economic Growth Only 2.7 Percent
_ (MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 12 Jun 82) 34
Toyota Motor Number One Earner
(MAINIQiI DAILY NEWS, 10 Jim 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Cars Will Take Zhird of World Sales
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 12 Jun 82) 36
Imports Fell 23.4 Percent in May From 1981
(MAINIQ-II DAILY NEWS, 11 Jim 82) . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Worst Profit Drops Hit Oil Companies
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 10 Jun 82) 38
Steel Pro duction May Fall to 11-Year Law
(MAINI(HI DAILY NEWS, 11 Jun 82) 39
April Plant Expurts 24.5 Percent Less Than 1981
( DAI LY NE4JS , 11 Jun 82 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
- b -
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I~lflt OI~I~!('I.AI, l;tiN: O1i,Y
POLI'I'ICAL 1~ND 'oJCIOLOCICAL
TANAKA'S CONTROL Ol? POLITICAI.� AG~t1DA DISCUSSED
Tokyo MAINICHI DAIL`1 NEWS in English 16 Jun 82 p 2
[From "t~agatacho Doings" column by Takehiko Takahashi]
[Text ) Who is it that is actuaily statement of the verdict is read,
moving Japanese politics? if the same argument is app!ad
Ostensibly it should be Zenko to Tanaka, it will be dlfflcult ior
Suzuki who is the prime Tanaka to avoid a judgment ot.
minister and also president of "guilty." In addition, although
the Liberal-Democratic Party. Hashimoto was granted a three-
But in actuality, this does not year suspended sentence, il is
seem to be the case. Rather, it even said that a suspended
seems that politics is moving sentence will not be glven to
centering on former Prime 'Panaka.
Minister Kakuei Tanaka who is Whuc should he done by
a defendant in the L~ckheed Tanaka to overcome this
trial. disadvantageous envlronment
Lying ahead of T~naka are . ana to continue taiai,;g ~olitical
the prosecution's argument for influence? This is at the root of
punishmenl to be made this Tanaka's p8litical movemenfs
coming autumn and the verdict at the present time.
expected in s~ ring next year. The electfon of the House of
_ These are two mattera that Councillors will be held next
even the bass of the largest LDP year. Simultaneous elections of
faclion c~mnot change. Herein the Nouse of Representatives
lies Tana.ka's distress. and the House of Councillors, as
On June 8, verdicts were in the case of last year, is
handed down on defendants possible. Evea if simultaneous
Tomisaburo Hashimoto and ~ elections do not take place, the
� T a k a y u k i S a t o. S! n c e ~atmosphere will streng~~~en for
Hashimofo tailed to be a dissolut[on of the Hc~~se of
reelected ii~ the last general ReprESentatives after the
eleclion, he is not now a passage of three years irom the
member of the House of previous general election. The
_ Representatives. Nevertheless. possibiltty is strong that there
he still remains an infjuential will be a Lower House election
politician ot the Tanaka faction. next year,
Previously there was a rumor In the case of Tanaka per-
in some qaarters that "Sato will . sonally, if the verdict is
probably be found ~uilty but "~uilty" and, moreovcr, there
Hashimoto is likely to be not is no suspended sentence,
- gailty." c~iticlsm by public opinion will
This did not happen and it become stronger than at
must have been a shack for present. If a geperal electfon is
Tanaka. Moreover, when the held undr,r such circumstances,
1
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F(fR UI~FI('IAI. USN: O!~i.Y
e~�eh if lhc meml~ers of his lhe Komeilo that it would like lo
[ar.tion are elected as betore, see the summoning of Nikaido
_ the vutes cast Cor them are as a wltness to be canceled. lt
like3~ to dwindle conslderably, that is done, the bill for the
This will be a big blow to revision of the Upper House
Tanaka. natlonal constituency will not
For Tanaka, therefore. it be permitted to pass the curcent
would be most desirable for a session.
- general election to be : eld For the Komeito, preventing
before the prosecutioa s
arg~mer~t this autumn and the the Upper House national
court's verdict next spring. For constituency election system
this purpose, a study will start from bein~g revised fs , of tar
being made as to how the ex- ~ greater importance than the
tended Diet session can be summoning of LDP secretary
turned into a dissolution. general as a witness.
If the Upper House national
Proposed Revision constituency election system is
not revised during ttie current
A good tool for this is the Diet session, the political
proposed revislon of the elec- responsibility oi Prime
- tion system of the House of Minister Suzuki will be
Counc~Tlors national con- questloned. Tbis is because
stituency. The deliberatlons despite the extension of the Diet
that will take place on the session by 94 days to approve
recommenr~at#on to be sub- the revision oi the r~ational
mltted by the Second Ad Hoc constituency, it could not be
- Couneil on Admi~istrative done "because of the lack of
- Reform co~ld also provi~E Prime Minister Suzuki's ability
_ material for a L~iet dissolution. in leadership."
The proposed revisian of the ~ IL wlll then become necessary
Upper House national con- t4 choose either the resignation
stituency electic:~ system is of tt:e Suzuki cabinet en bloc or
beir?b opposed the stronge~t by a dissolution af the Lower
the Komeito. If the Hoase House. Since discussions will be
Testimony Law is revised, LDP growing brisk by then over the
Secretary Gene*al Susumu recommendation by the Second
Nikaido could appe~r in the Ad Hoc Council, a Diet
Diet as a witness - this appears dissolution may be selected "ln
to be the condition whereby the ~order to~ ascertain the voice oc
Diet proceedings were ret~rned the people." .
to normalcy. If that is don~, it will be
It is said tt~at ;~ti the exactly in accurda?~ce with
- background of thl~ is a s9g~tal former Prime Minister
given by the Tanaka faction to Tanaka's strate~y.
Ci~PYRIC;fiT: Mainichi Daily News 1982
- C50: 9120/302
- 2
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i~'(f!t (yl~F'1('IA1. Iltil~: ()i~l.l'
,
1'Oi,I'I'ICAL 11NU ;,UCZC~.L~O(:iC1~L
P~1PER URGES LDP HOUSECLEAP3ING
' Tokyo r1AINICHI DAILY PiEWS in English 15 Jun 82 p 2
[Froni "Zooming-In" column by Hideo Matsuoka]
(Text] A look at the verdict passed prosecution. Allegatians by the
on Tomisaburn Hashimoto and defense, as it turned out, did not
Takayuki Sato in the Lockhecd impress the judges at all. ?'hey
payof~ trial convinced me that were completel,~ spurn~d. For
the men on the bench acted instance, concerning the receipt
~ acccrding to common sense. If of money by Hashimoto and
a persoi; holding a public office Sato, the chief judge ruled,
took mo,7ey from a person without the slightest hesitation,
seeking a tavor, it is a case of that the two politicians were
taking a bribe, in our common aware they were being on the
sense. Ti he chief judge fawd the take then.
two guilty according tu common The verdicts show that both
sense. the defendants and their at-
Did we have to see the case torneys ha~ been engaged in
argued for four to five y~ars futile resistance f~r a long time.
only to have these common They mi~ht riave known that
senseverdicts'!Butdemocracy, their eiforts, based on
as we know, is a time- falsehood, w~re of Yittle use, and
_ consumin~ governing proress, might have actually expected
F:ven if there is a foregone the kind of rulings they
conclusior,, a case has to 4e received. But they had the
tried w~ithout a procedural fault. cheek to make light of the trial.
Court proceedings caunot cut Else, they would not have acted
corners. We fretted whi~2 ~nick- the way they did.
skinned politicians told one The judges had no thought of
apparent lie after another in accepting such a slight. They
court, dragging on the tria! were aware of the nation's
almosl intcrminably. Even wrath at the corruption in the
more (retful must have been the political worid. They feared for
jud~es. INe must ~athize the future that Japan would be
with them tor put ~p with facing if such corruption were
what in the Watergu~r language allowed to go unpunished.
might be ca~.led "misstate- Forces representing sound
ments." judgement, including the news
The judges put almost media and other circles, were
' unqualiFied trust in the also pressing for a bouseclean-
prosecutors' records of pretrial ing of the political world. But
questioning ot suspects and these forces lack the authority
testimonies by witnesses for the to enforce such housecleaning.
, 3
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i~~fit c~i~~i~l('IA1. Iltil~: uht.v
- The authorily rested, for one actually do time serves some
- thing, wilh the politicians useful purpose. Kakuei Tanaka
~ themselv~ss, especially the wiU fit into this case. Still on the
Liberal-Democrats. But this loose, he is doing all the damage
party, d~minated by the to the Japanese political
- Tanaka faction with a bulging system. He needs to be put
membership of 109, is clearly behind bars. Ti~ere is little need
moving in a reverse direction. to keep Hashimoto and Sato in
Do we hare to give up hope toEal isolation. Even suspended
for cleaner politics? Do the jail terms will serve the pur-
Japanese not have a self-right- po~, Whether their jail terms
ing capacity? Luckily, we had ~~~nded or not~ they 6ave
~ one more means for rigl~ting the ~n found guilty. Morever, the
, wrong. That is the judicature. If ja~ ~~ms handed out were
this institution, too, went the exactly as asked by the
way of pnlitics, Japan would be prosecution. Th-is fact qives an
ruined as a country before a added weight lo the ver3icts.
nuclear bomb hits it. The The trial of HashimoW and
verdicts of guilt signify the Sato had a minus effect of
rising expectations of the convincing the nation that
Japanese that they now have politicians think nothing of
only the courts to inhibit Iying to save their neck. Such
~ political wantonry, and to distrust in politicians is nothing
preserve social justice and new. Aut, having known that the
morals. two politicians kept lying fnr so
- Public Sentiment many years in court, of all
- places, national distrust in
- It is unimaginable thai this politicians will become so deep-
~ public sentiment had no impact rooted that it cannot be easil;
_ on tne judges. 1 ~an sense the eradicated. If thc two accused
ii�e of the judges as plain human made excuses that they
- beings. The ire is partfy caused receiveci money but only as
by the two defendants' in- poiitical donations, they might
sincerity of trying to call a not have done so much damage
spade a scoop. I~ore funda- to the trustworthiness of
mentally, I think the judges politicians as they have already
wanted to be true to ti~eir re- done. They denied receiving
sponsibilities which the people any money ln the first place.
hoped they would discharge. Even in lying, there is a limi?.,
Both Hashimoto and Sato got and they have apparently gone
a reprieve in the execution of beyond the limit.
lheir jail terms. The suspended A plus effect is that the out-
sentences are a favor to the come of their trial has clearly
detendav~ts from ihe judges. pointed toward the gutlt of
Tf~e suspension means fhe Tanaka. Any logic to clear
detendants should Ue thankFul Tanaka will require over-
~ :~nd bow out oF lhe court without turning a11. the verdicts so far
appealing the verdicts. out on the Lockheed case
Eiashimo!o, already ~ast d e f e n d a n t s. T h i s i s
middle age, may do well fo unimaginable. The guilt of
serve as keeper of the temple Hashimoto and Sato is in-
~ for which he built a huge separable from the guilt of
guddha image. ihe suspended Tanaka. It is as indisputable as
- ver~ict is telling Sato to that Yurakucho station is next
voluntarily retire tro:n the to Tokyo Station.
national legislature and go bacl~ Tanaka is hereby advised to
to the fishing trade. g~ve up his futile fight. It is
There are r.ases in which waste ot both time and tax
letting the convicted detendant money. Why figlit when the
G
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= i~~rk ~,i~i~ic~ini. i;~i~: uti~.v
vcrdicl is as guod as out other is to perceive the dlrec-
- alrcady'! Hc had better be tion ot public opinion and work
prepared to get a guilty v~rdict to help it. For instance, in
in the court of tirst resort, and covering events related to anti-
gear up for an appeal to a nuclear and disarmament
higher court, For the convicted movements, media reports
_ politicians to live with verdicts should not just be statemeats of
= from the court of first resort, or facts. fteaders should be able to
letting them do so, meams the perceive the rep~rters' in-
" beginning ot a housecleaning tentlons through the ~writing.
within the Liberal-Democratic Likewise, reporters should
Pa~y - not tie a!lowed ta report merely
Another problem concerns facts, like robots which are
the so-called "gray politicians" without sentiment, concerning
_ or politicians in the ~`gray the matters of political
zone," meaning politicians housecleaning. Some club
known to have received money members may argue that the
concerning the Lockheed case club is not an institution to
who escaped prosecution eilher make such a resolution. The
because of the remoteness ot representative of IYHK may
_ their involvement or due to the find it inadvisable to join such a
- statute ot limitations. The resolution. Then the ciub may
courYs verdicts on Hashimdto resolve it by majority rule. If
and Sato also named other such an action splits the club, I
pol9ticians who took mone~ in say let it.
the case. One of those named Even if the club boycotts
was Susumu Nikaido, the Nikaido, the party has a deputy
party's secretary general who, sv.cretary generalin the person
: even after hearing his name of Noboru Takeshita. The ap-
mentioned in the Hashimoto- pointment ot : deputy secretary
Sato verdict, still kept denying general may indicate that the
- the alleged receipt ot money. It LDP and the Tanaka faction
is with this liar of a politician had. exFected such a boycott.
that reporters covering the Takeshita belongs to the
- LDP hold pres~~ conferences Tanaka faction as does Nikaido.
several times a week to get Ever, leading figure in t.he
whatever bits or' news the liar Tanaka taction must be seen
_ deigns to impart. Shame on the wifh narrow eyes. But, even if it
media! Members of the is intolerable for the press to
' reporters club at the party put up ~v:th Nikaido, they can
headquarlers shoiild re(use to raa!ce do with Takeshita. Such
hold formal press conferences should be the stand for the
with Nikaido. 7'hey should relay media to take oc~ the "gray"
lheir refusal to Yrime Minister issue.
and Party President Zenko Executives of newspapers
Suzuki as the club's unanimous and ather media must decide
- resolution. their editorial stand a~ regards
the verdicts on Hashimato and
News Media Sato and what is still in store in
the Lockheed trial. They may
News media have two func- well encourage their reporters
tions. One is to repert news as on the LDP beat to boycott
[acls - strai~ht reporting. The Nikaido.
COPYRIGHT: t4ainichi Daily News 1982
CSO: 4120/301
5
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{~~fR (2)
('3)~a~. ~ ii>i:~^, (5)yEn~~u~a (G) yFiKi~r (7) u 1t
~ 1975+'{- 'LtiiJiGIG) IG~,:i{:IY+I :i� II:~,P!If'Lf15: :uI.CiGI
1976# 2G9.'b.d'i(47) If9.71ni''~~ ::~;;;;~;:jl:~'ti917C'a)f ~G,513
1977~ 2ti,x~(t~t) ~r:.ae~r.~n ~C:;~}~jt:~i.a~ire~~i;` 952.ro9
1978~}= ZlS,412f1�_) li:~.:x':1:~1li :i' ;~;;t':;~1:{~.21(?7);ti f~fi7.4G0
1979~ 219,AU9(:a) U z~l.�I~a~s~1 `,i ?5::~~1~~7.Yli;('_n) ! G18,I8G
1980~ 2rtiGV(;w) 3~;,.:Irtl1 I t71.7~A1't+il. GQi,GG 1
(g)
1915$~ 14.2'2(23) 18.'~YJ(~l) 28.~'i3(4G) 61.0T3
1976~ 1~LGG3(:I) 21,Otc(~t) 32.178(451 7I,Ot1
1977~ 1~,~(21) 7J.310(3?) 31.473(47) 7$O60
1978~ 15,901(:l) ^.0.&Si(.'S) 3i~2!p(51) 13,1T8
~979fi ~s,6uc�zU 2~~r,~r7u 3G.zt3(ae) rc.oco
1980~ 1~,C85(z!) :G.tc?(JU 34.Gf7(45) 7Q19{
c~l:~ fi~~i~~rc~.r~t~t. ~s8o.ro~~~,z. Ma: ; s~.osc~r ~.s4sT r,, ^~1F 6 S$
~9~ 8.'L1311 F~'C'~ri7~ ~I:'lWf~~~~T'Lh~~Y21~0~'L~aiil~Y~~L~Tlr~3, ~ili~~~~Tt3.
i~11~.k ~1"ni~i32(~2.6fi47J.Fi C#i11G(1~~W38~o), %~(~1JI1~'i1{~X3'~~13. 2t@~3~387Ti h;/
(~'f~fT1~~K3M1�ri~). ~i#~tT4(~3.387Ti F%T$~7. $1n~J~1f~72�ot~~~~I~f6A~G1(C C~~7~
~i'xl9t'.LT~p~il.T~~3~~) f~x~TM�i~c~#LT~~.3o
- -7i1'~tt{ILto4~Ti3. ~~~~~1.569Tj h% C$7~X~~21io). 9FG~AI~~ij2,6167`j F%
A~j~~'.:i49o) ~t~t3'T4.185J.1 F~. ~~tli~~55�u~Ei~:l~1~'~~!'~u`~it~s'LT~~So ~'~~',o~
~7U';oi~~F3A~~i~'CM`li~c~#LTtr~3 ~ ~ i~fta5,
l.~i~L~ 1~~A7{~.k3'~~13~ ii~T~~~36"uI~L~1~lt~T~~1t~~a
i
Key:
~ 1. Graph 2: Japan's Trade and Transportation Situation (supplied by
Japan Shipowners' Association)
2. (Unit: 1,000 tons, figure enclosed in parentheses is load rate as
a percentage)
3. imports
4. Japanese ships
5. Foreign charter ships
6. Foreign ships
_ 7. total
8. exports
9. (N.B.) Japan's trade volume consisted of imports of 605.64 mi~lion
and exports of 76.49 million tons, for a total of 682.13 million
tons. Next to the U.S., this is the second largest trade amount.
As for imports, transport by Japanese ships is 226,64 million tons
(load rate of 38 percent), transport by foreign charter ships was
233.87 million tons (34 percent), for a total of 433.87 million tons
11
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i
72 percent of all imports are transported by Japanese merchant
marine (controlled and operated by Japanese shipping)
On ~th~ other hand, as for exports, Japanese ships transported
- . 15.69 million tons (21 percent), foreign charter ships, 26.16 mil-
lion tons (34 percent), for a total of 41.85 million tons. 55 pet-
- cent of all exports are transported by Japanese merchant marine.
70 percent of all trade is transported by Japanese shipping. How-
ever, tha~ carried by Japanese :~hips is only 36 percent of all trade.
~ 1 ~ ~ 3 ~ e ~~A'4A'pil~-1890� 7A ~11 C1~Cc ~ ioooG/'r. ~ ~ = p~E~3~~c)
(2) (3)~~ idt3~~Y;
~ t~/~~~r~~i~m~ ~.3,~ c .
~ 5 ) ~ ~'i.'~ ~7 fT11RR i oz ( i i e )
(6) ~ ~.~"t#~f~Yi ~.szs ( zce)
(7) ('I~jd1~1~~~1IT1~;; ~ i.ioc ( tss)
't~1L'.7I~1~ z.a~o U.ees)
~9~ 7 %T~'~}ii ~\\\\~7 1.668 ( 71)
(10) _'~i1l~~1~ a.sie ~~.ooi)
~il~ ~~i~~ ~ i.oe~ ( ~ii)
(12) ~ ~T~ tee ( eeol
(il:) L ~:.i:.~r#JNL~t3E3%k~qt?~r~7t31o0c;/T1;l~o~S~~;T. ~(tt1;~ '�!'u~i~~9~F7:~~i~bv~
(13) r~,3,
2. G/T ~ fi Gross "fonnaRC F%) ~Ai4Z`. f49v)~~i#i'{-t'. 100~L7i7 ~f - h(2.83m~)
. ~1 bi~l.lt~i~F:i~~~~, ~N3v~~~~*''i'~!!l~I7~1~P~t#3~iui:.f~t~#t~ fl7#~bf~
� ~ft3t~1a1~~R~~t,, ~1:xtftrro~~rT~~~�~f~~-c~~3o ~i:, it6i4'~r~~f~~;. n~w=
1~end Wcight Tonntikc(1~&1~(~T[I~Fi) ~i~xCfSL111~#L3~i~, ~.#tf3x~1}a~1~1~1~~
' ~l�II~11~1F1.-ro~T,
Key:
1. Graph 3: Japan's Merchant Marine Tonnage beginning with July 1890
(Unit: 1,000 gross tonnage; number of ships enclosed in parentheses)
2. bulk carriers
3. tankers
4. oil and dry cargo ships
5. special ore ships
6. scatter-loaded ships
7. automobile ships
8. other special use ships
9. container ships
10. general cargo ships
11. passenger ships
12. other
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13e N.B. 1. The figures indicated above are steel vessels of more than
100 GT flying the Japanese flag and exclude fishing and government
ships. 2. GT is an abbreviattion for gross tonnage and is the total
- ~ capacity of the ship. Tonnage is measured as 100 cubic feet (2.83
cubic meters) equals 1 ton. It is used in comparing the size and
shipping capacity of a merchant ship and is the basis of calculation
for regulation and registration tas, and pilot fees. Likewise, dead
, weight tonn~ge is often used with merr_hant ships and expresses the
carrying capacity of a ship.
Likewise, fo; your informatior., Diagram 1 illustrates the transportation
- situation of Japan's resource imports. When the export shipping network is
considered in connection with this, it can be understood that the sealanes
supporting Japan's economy are extremely large scale. Compared to the ad-
vanced nations of the West, the transport distance is very great and taking
iron ore as an example, the average distance is 12,000 kilometers, and con-
tainer ships carrying export products travel 18,000 kilometers across the
Pacific Ocean to New York. (Data from Japan Shipowners' Association)
' In this way, maintenance of the stability and security of sealanes of large
distances is an important condition a.nsuring the maintenance and development
, of Japan's national life and economy.
In order to solve the problem of the sealanes security when the world is at
peace, it is sufficient to consider policies limited mainly to economic se-
A curity, contemplating the stable security of the function of the resources
cycle. There are various risks related to the sealanes in this case but
we should calculate solely the economic side.
' ~
However, at the prese~t time, concerning the problem of resources and ship-
ping, we have been uhable to resolve the problem simply with economic theo-
ries and the rationale of econa~ics: The oil shock of 1973 taught us that.
In short, this says C.he locus of vhis problem is not only the economic situa-
tion of the supply and demand of resources. Likewise, even though it was
localized, we tasted the bitterness of transportation being impeded by the
blow from the Iran-Iraq war.
The origin of the oil shock was the fourth Mideast war and the Arab oil prod-
ucing countries of OPEC, using oil as a strategic weapon, pushed for the
withdrawal of Israeli traops. This pointe~d out that the supply of resources
is linked with internatior.al politics and military pr~blems. The Suez Canal
- was closed and shipping was influenced in no small way. This was new to our
memory.
Moreover, the matter I would like to take not of is that the sealanes which
are vitally connected w~th Japan's economy have several choke points. As
. illustrated in Diagram 1, the choke points are Hormuz Strait, Malacca-Singa-
pore Strait, Lonbok Strait, Panama Canal, Suez Canal and the open sea route
around the southern tip of Africa. These are easily controlled by the coun-
tries along the coasts of these choke points.
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Key:
' 1. Diagram 1: Import Amount and Transportation Routes of Principal
Import Products by Region (Data from Ministry of Transport)
' 2. Suez Canal
3. Hormuz Strait
4. Maldive Islands
5. Malacca-Singapore Strait
6. Sundi.a Strait
7. In~?anesia
8. Lonbun Strait
9. Panama Canal
10. Explanatory Notes
11, crude oil
~ 12. coal
13. iron ore
14. grain
15. 100 million tons - crude oil
, 16. 25 million tons - coal
17. 5 million tans - grain
18. 50 million tons - iron ore
When the situation is viewed i'n roughly this way, it is very clear that Japan's
sEalanes are vulnerable. This is the reason why an extenaive, diverse risk
management is necessary to res~?ve the risk of international tension.
General Statement on Crisis Management tn Shipping
In considering crisis management in shipping, we need to examine the risks
related to the sealanes. Even in a time of peace, there are diverse risks.
Some of the risks are a supply suspension in countrie3 supplying resaarces,
economic blockade, damage from the development of a crisis in the loading
ports or transit ports, obstruction of *.he loading of commodities, navigation
:~QUlations in the choke point areas of the sea routes. We must also consi-
der that if an international dispute occurs, the disputing countries may ex-
propriate ships and the shipping supply and demand wi11 become tight. Also,
= if ~here are dangerous ocean areas, we will be obliged to take roundabout
routes.
Concerning these risks which would impede the resources cycle, we must not
simply rhink that we can solve them merely by maintaining and ensurin~g ship-
ping streng~h. If we are challenged by a military war which destroys sea
transportation (guerre de course), the situation will be even graver.
Concerning shipping risk management in a case in which military risks do not
have to be considered, considerable research is already being done in terms
, of shipping ad~r,inistration and several countermeasures have been set forth.
Namely, these are, along with planning the ultra-automation and modernization
of the merchant marine, ensuring excellent crews by planning a rational work=
ing system for the crews, and besides working out a favorable tax system for
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5hipping businesses, planning the improvement of license standards for planned
shipbuilding, and improvir.g and strengthening the requirements for ship con-
struction. That is tn say, plant the quantitative and qualitative buildup of
Japan's ships.
Likewise, from the stand~oint of putting importance on the international con-
nection shipping has, ti~~ promotion of international cooperation has special
- emphasis. Such things ca:~ be listed as technological cooperation and finan-
cial cooperation related to preparation of a disaster prevention system in
order to secure stab le navigation conditions in the Malacca-Singapore Strait.
- As for the problem of ensuring the atability and security of the sealanes,
as referred to earlier, given that a sealane network has been spread out,
a resolution of the issue is doubtful without an international cooperation sy-
stem. Even though the sea control of the sea areas around Japan is in satis-
factory condtion and we endeavor to ensure the security of 1,000 nautical
miles of sealanes, which has recently become an outstanding issue between
Japan and the U.S., ensuring the security of the sealanes connected ta them
- in areas of the sea ~eyond tY~em will not be successful without the cooperation
of the various related co�nt~-ies.
In "Present Situation of Jap~~n's Marine Transportation" published in 1981 (by
Ministry of Transport, Shipping Bureau), it is reported that: "In order to
provide for the stab ility oc Japan's national economy, it is necessary to en-
deavor to secure the mari*.-~e transportation routes of important resources and
such by establishing stable, friendly reations with the various countries by
means of promoting economic and technological cooperation." At the same time,
- it was stated that since international conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq war,
exert an influence on Japan's shipping, it is necessary to immediately ad-
vance an investigation of an information communication system in order to
ensure the security of Japan's merchant marine in times of emergencies, mak-
ing the most of this current expeerience.
Namely, although not a critical case in which Japan must exercise protection
- of navigation (defense of the sealanes), a case in which shipping is impeded
by an international militaYy ~ispute is already a reality. Looked at from a
global perspective, this ki~1d of risk cannot be kept from occurri_ng even in
an environment which can be described as "peaceful."
Since last year, the Transportation Policy Deliberative Council, an advisory
- hody of the Ministry of Transport, was allowed to start "comprehensive secur-
ity sectional meetings" and deliberated countermeasures to secure stability
of marine transportaion; a proposal was made regarding risk calculation and
risk management policies. It is a sarcastic way of saying it but perhaps it
may be estimated fo r the present that Japan ~tas gradually made a start toward
being a mature sea power. iiowever, what I would like to emphasize here is
that, although an amplification of what has already been stated, the problem
of ensuring t~1e security of the sealanes is precisely an economic, political
issue (eco-politico-military issue), and the question of resources is not
sepc~r~ted from it. Its military correspondence cannot be excluded. Indded
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it must be founded on the philosophy and science of a sea power. It goes with-
out saying that it is not subsumed merely in one administrative agency.
In other words, it must be said that shipping crisis management is both in
name and in reality an extremely high level priority project within a compre-
hensive security.
~ Shipping Crisis Control in World War II
1. Shipping Regulations
In considering Japan's shipping cris~.s control, the actual past record must
be consulted heavily. In these paragraphs, I would quite simply like to trace
how Japan's shipping crisis control was carried out in World War II. The key-
points can be narrowed down to how were shipping regulations carried out and
in what way were ships protected.
After the start of the China Incident, Japan's shipping went through several
stages and the form ~f shipping regulations changed.. Eventually, it progressed
to a form of centralized management by the government according to the "Wartime
Shipping~Regulations Act."
Before World War II, Japan has a merchant marine of approximately 638 million
tons and boasted of being the world's third largest shipping nation. Merchant
ships wh3.ch ~ust before the outbreak of the war were the target of the "guerre
de course" by Allied submarines, were attacked by aircraft and were expropri-
_ ated by the army and navy, and were engaged in strategic transport suffered
a death blow in naval battles. At the end of the war, shipping had declined
to about 1.4 million tons. Furthermore, since unnavigabie ships amoun~ing to
- 500,000 tons were included in this, ships capable of working were barely a
pitiful 900,000 gross tons. And almost all of them were inferior ships de-
signated for war and hastily constructed during the war, and besides these,
there were superannuated, inefficient ships.
And when changes in the shipping regulation system are pursued, they followed ~
a very complicated course. The shipping businesses' ordinary practice is to
carry out activities of free competition with the pursuit of profit as the
motive. That is, respecting the "principle of free shipping" and Japan's
shipping prior to the war was just that. Consequently, even t'nough they re-
ceived government assistance, their disposition was one of dislike for strong
government interference.
However, with the outbreak of the China Incident as the occasion, government
interference was expected from the general state of affairs in shipping enter-
prises and given .the environment of the enactment of the National Mobilization
Decree. Then because of their intent to try to somehow avoid such a turn of
events, they independently created a system of self-governing regulations.
This was in Juiy 1938.
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I~Y)IZ UI~I~ICIAI, USI~: ONL,Y
In September 1938, the government enacted the "Temporary Shipping Regulations
ACt," and since this law w3s made in order to regulate general transportation
on the seas, faced with the international crisis of the China Incident, it
was a law.which tried to Execute regulations for the protection of ships,
assignment of ships, shipping charges, charter fees, shipbuilding, crews and
ship equipment. Howev~r, the framework of the aforementioned shipping enter-
prises' self governing re.gulations was maintained to the utmost and so the
exercise of this 1aw was shelved
Nevertheless, the China Incident lasted a long period of time, and along with
the increase in transport of important merchandise'(staple products), Japan
was afflicted with a lack of ships. And with this, strong regulations finally
became necessary. In September 1939, under such circumstance, the structure
(according to a government and private sector cooperative formula of shipping
regulations which included distribution of ships) was made. However, the sit-
uation of the world's shipping abruptly became constrained due to the outbreak
of war in F.urope, and the management of the situation was difficult simply
with regulations which had advanced by then from self-governing regulations
to comprehensive shipping regulations due to government and private sector
cooperation. And so a switch to stronger government regulations could not be
avoided.
In February 1~40, because the "Temporary Ship Control Act" was insufficient,
the "Shipping Regulations Act" was enacted and promulgated. Its content
prescribed a shift to a shipbuilding license system, government order for the
acceleration of ship repairs, and a government order for the loan ~nd commis-
' sion of ships for the promotion of efficent operation of ships and a license
system for foreign charter ships. Also included were clauses limiting or for-
bidding navigation in dangerous areas and the transport of war contraband.
In September of the same year, the "Shipping Regulations National Policy Pros-
pectus" was decided at a cabinet conference, and furthermore, in August 1941,
"Wartime Shipping Control Prospectus" was decided at a cabinet meeting. The
prospectus was made with the aim of placing ships, crews and shipbuilding
under government control in order to plan for the centralized management of
all Japanese ships, the establishment of battle preparedness of crews and the
~ rapid and broad expansion of ships in anticipation of successful operation of
wartime shipping. As for theformat of governmen~t control, a special organiza-
- tion was set up based on the mobilization decree and it was allowed to adminis-
ter control of ships, ::rew control and shipl~u~ ld~:ig ~_ontro.:..
- 'I'he reason why such a prospectus was decided at a cabinet meeting was that
it was not possible to force ships to sail in dangerous waters with the
regulations in existence until then. That is, since the ships belonged to
private enterprises, even though the shipowners consented, it was anticipated
that the crews would refuse to sail and there was the fear that ship assign-
ment would be impossible.
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Using this p~-ospectus as the pattern, the "Wartime Shipping Control Act" and
rhe "Wartime Shipping Control Act Regulations" were enacted and promulgated
in March 1942. Before that~ with the outbreak of tiie Pacific War as the oc-

y casion, the Ministry of Communications, Shipping Control Bureau, which had
directed shipping administration until then, was abolished and the Maritime
Bureau was set up as an extra-ministerial bureau and a wartime m~ritime af-
fairs administrative structure was prepared and built up.
The "WartimP ~hipping.Control Act" was a law which had a:c its ob3ective cen-
tralized control over all of Japan's privately used ships and set up a system
to assign ships and transportation based completely on government intentions.
According to this law, the guvernment acquired the right to use the ships and
was allowed to control the Ieasing of these ships to a special organization,
the "Ship Control Organization."
The Ship Control Organization started in April 1942 and this organization was
set up with the ob~ectives of allowing the strong national purpose to permeate
shipping operations, allowing centralized operations of all ships and to cause
an epochal improvement i:. serv3ce eff iciency in order to plan the successful
execution of shipmer.~ of. goods for transport use and private use in time of
war. And at thP same t_~ime, in cases where the government made reparations
to the tradP-rs for daTnages occurring during the war, the Ship Control Organi-
zation r2ceived these reparations in place of the various shipping companies.
After the start of World War II, a major problem for the war leadership was how
to keep the transport of goods and strategic transport going. Ships, divided
into three categories of army, navy and private use were each managed with a
different purpose, but with the progress of the war si'tuation, the tendency
developed to manage the ships under one purpose as a nation. After the fall
of 1942, despite the fact that this problem was argued over and over between
the army and navy, agreement on a general outline remained unsettled because
of opposition to itemized discusssions.
However, with the worsening of the war situation, it was not permissible to
leave the situation as it was and in March of the'~year the war ended, the de-
cision was made for centralized managen,ent of the country's ships and harbors
by the supreme war leadership council. An inspector general's office was
created in Imperial Headquarters; and it was comprised of a number of people
from the Ministry of the Army, the Ministry of the Navy, the Ministry of
Munitions, tlie Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Civilian
Merchant Marine Committee.
Accompanying the progress of the war situation, unless th~y somehow set up
a centr.alized management of ships and harbors, the war leadership, of course,
would have been faced with crises in the national life and the nation-'s eco-
nomic activity. Nowever, this centralized management structure was created
at a time when the sea routes from the suth had already beez cut and sea trar,s-
port was impeded because the inland harbors and waterways were being bombed
and were mined against submarines. Creation of this special structure was
unable to satisfactorily increase effectiveness.
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Yasuji Watanabe, navy commander who staffed the. marine transportation inspector
general's office at that time, made the following reflections after the war,
and although the reflections are quite co~onplace, they touch the very core.
"I'ondering over the drastic, basic wartime thinking, unhampered by law or the
established system in tim~:~ of peace, and adapting to the situation, I think it
was the best policy, being able to move one right after the other from a peace
time system to a war preparation time system and then a wartime system."
2. Protection of Ships
It may be said the policy on crisis control ior shipping up until World War II
did not provide concrete policies which worked for the safety of long-distance
marine transportation extending over a long period of time. Meanwhile, ~-*eak
consideration was given to protection of shipping within the shipping strate-
gic plans. Consequent~'y, the truth of the matter is that Japan rushed head-
long into war with the U.S. with insufficient feeling of urgency about protec-
tion of marine transport. ~
That was expressed quite well in terms of both organization and system and
military preparedness. The departments with the main responsibility for the
protection of marine transport were very weak, and it was not enought that
during the period from 1940 to 1941 four coastal defense ships, worthy of
being prototypes, were specially built.
In March of the year hostilities began, a law was enacted---the "Ship Protec-
tion Act"---which can be considered to have a deep relationship with today's
security of the sealane~. The navy at that time felt it was necessary to
make operation regulations and escort of ships inseparable. They insisted
on incorporating articles relating to ship operations regulations in this
' law, but the shipping enterprises, fearing that having such articles would
increase r_he difficulty of operating, appealed to the Diet to limit the navy's
directive authority to a minimum. As a result, the navy's intent was not
sufficiently incorporated and was limited to being able to provide a minimum
of articles necessary for sea route direction and formation navigation.
On the one hand, even in the ideas of shipping strategy and tactics, protec-
tion of ships was considered a matter of secondary importance. Military units
with responsibility for convoys of ships between Moji and Singapore and Yoko-
hama and Truk were first organized in April 1942, and the implementation of
convoys was started immediately. However, that does not mean these units
assigned powerful vessels.
Nevertheless, accompanying the changes in the later war situation, escort
forces were built and diversion of ships from strategic units took place,
and improvement of the organization and escort system was made. With the
urgency of the situation, the demand for safe navigation of ships, whether
one or many, strengthened, and the Marine Protection Supreme Command was
set up, making protection of ships its central idea. But that actually oc-
curred two years after the start of the war.
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Looking back at World War II, while it can be fully understood i-hat military
forces for the protection of ships were inadequate from the very beginning,
the navy's primary tactical purpose was a sharp decrease in enemy fleets.
And it ~annot be denied that the protection of sea transport, which was sim-
ple and never very splendid, was a matter of secondary importance.
The issue of marine transportation and protection of ships in time of war
causes contradiction in all respects. Namely, how does one deal with the
question of safety and the question of shipping efficiency.
- In the above paragraphs, I have tried to take up the question of regulation
of shipging and protection of ships during World War II, but in 1941, Vice-
admiral Narumi Inoue of the Naval Air Command (later admiral) made an appeal
- when he wrote "New War Preparations Planning Theory." In that, Inoue ~ook
up the importance of preserving the sea transport routes and emphasized the
necessity of providing military force for the necessary protection of ships,
but because there was no sense of urgency about cris9.s control of shipping
in Japan at that time, it is regrettable that this appeal was not given life.
After the war, Admiral Inoue recalled that "it would have been better had I
proposed it and had it put into practice at least two or three years earlier;
it was already too late the year the war started." That is impressive.
Approach to Security of Sealanes
I have already stated that since last year there has been a noticea hle call
for defense of the sealanes in the IJ.S. demand for an increase in Japan's
defense obligations. This is th~. special feature of the resolution submitted
by Representative Findley, Republican Party, and 20 other legislators. The
resolution is the "resolution on ensuring the security of the sealanes."
Its main purport is that since there has been a further buildup of the Soviet
capability threatening the security of the sealanes and free navigation in
the Indian and Pacific Oceans, due to the remark.able increase in Soviet naval
and air power in those areas, it is necessary for the U.S., Australia, Japan,
New Zealand and the ASEAN nations to cooperate and strengthen the security
of the sealanes in those areas. And it requests that, especially with regard
to Japan, there should be a great improvement in the sealane defense capabili-
ty for Japan's security, by improving the capability in such areas as mine-
laying, air defense and anti-submarine defense. Likewise, in order to facili-
tate Japan-U.S. mutual tactics, there must be efforts to standardize and con-
solidate information gathering, communication and logistic weapons systems.
Furthermore, it proclaims that the U.S., Japan, Australia and New Zealand must
continuously give support to the ASEAN nations which occupy an important posi-
tion regarding the (maintenance of the security of) sealanes which run ~rom
the Indian Ocean across the Pacific Ocean.
I do not think that .Japan has the definitive, absolute expertise concerning
the security of the sealanes. However, to the extent one looks at the content
of the resolution in the U.S. legislature described above, in reality, it
I
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can be considered as coming c1osE ta what Japan should he ~o~isidering. This
is my frank feQ.ling.
A~ I have already mentioned when presenting the present situation of Japan's
shipping, the sealane network necessary for Japan covers an extremely wide
are~. It goes withaut saying that international coaperation is necpssary to
_ ensure the security of these sealanes.
It is thought that the "International Treaty on Ma.rine Search anrl Rescue (SAR
Treaty) will perhaps produce mutual cooperation on an internati.onal basis
regarding disasters and shipwrecks in time of peace. This treaty was adopted
in April 1979. Its purpose is to create a global sea disaster rescue system
by having coastal countries mutually cooperate and share the responsibility
� for search and rescue in set areas of the oceans in order to promptly and
effectively rescue people in disasters on the seas.
The content of this treaty is as follows: 1. Coastal countries will determine
_ search and rescue areas under an agreement with neighboring countries and will
bear the responsi.bility for search and rescue activities within that area.
2. In order to do so, coastal countries will provide the necessary organiza-
tion, system and facilities in order to suitably and sufficiently carry out
search and rescue activities. 3. They will maintain a cooperative system
with neighboring countries. 4. They will provide a system sharing needed
information, such as introduction of a ship locating and reporting system
useful in making the search and rescue activities prompt and effective.
Regarding this treaty, it is necessary for Japan as a sea power to ratify it
as quickly as possible and become a treaty countr3~.
- In considering countermeasures for ensuring the safety of the sealanes, we
must always grasp as a nation in a focused manner the movement of ships which
are the object to be protected. Likewise, concerning the risks which hinder
the safety of the sealanes, it is necessary to understand the present situation
as much as possible. In particular, it is necessary to endeavor to always
understand the "position and military force" of submarines and the like which
- attempt to militarily challenge the sealanes.
We wilt have the key to ensuring the safety of the sealanes only aftec there
has been a continuous accumulation of such efforts. Preparation of an inform-
ation system is one of the first things which must be considered a priority.
A condition for the international treay a~liance and a milepost for solving
the problem is that the Maritime Safety Agency continues to promote a plan
establishing an "ocean information system." It is hoped that this system
will prepare an "ocean information center" and will set up a coummunication
system whereby co~unication is possible with ships in distant locations,
and will form an international information network sucti as the U.S. ship
locating and reporting information system (amber system) or the ship locating
reporting system of thE Philippines, Indonesia and India. An outline of the
wide area patrol system and ocean information system of the Maritime Safety
Agency are shown in Diagrams 2 and 3.
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Key:
1. Diagram 2: Wide Range Patrol System of the Maritimz Safety Agency
(provided by Ministry of Transport)
2. North America
3. 1,200 nautical miles
4. 500 nautical miles
S. Chitose
6. Japan Sea
7. North America
8. Sea area east of Honshu
9. Haneda
- 10. Hachijojima
11. East China Sea
12. forward disposition of ships
_ 13. Naha
14. Ogasawara
15. Iwojima
16. Nanchojima
17. Okinotorishima
18. South America ~
19. Middle and Near East, Southeast Asia
20. Australia
21. N.B.
22. area intended for wide range patrol
23. major transportation routes
24. helicopter carrying patrol ships' usual area of dispositon
25. In these four areas, situations will be dealt with by six already
prepared or being prepared helicopter carrying patrol ships.
26. In these four areas, situations will be tackled with new reinforcement.
of seven helicopter carrying patrol ships.
27. patrol zone for which new large scale aircraft are anticipated
(1,200 nautical miles)
28. patrol zone for large scale aircraft (YS-11) (500 nautical miles)
Likewise, concerning the movements of aircraft, warships and submarines which
form the plan for a guerre de course, infomation gathering, together with
the Maritime Defense Force's surveillance system and sensor system, can be
expected to be effective.
- 1'he areas and the ships which are the target of the ocean information system
can be considered as follows: ocean liners and open seas fishing ships in the
waters near .Tapan (the area encompassed within 160 degrees longitude east
121 degrees lon~itude east, 57 degrees lat.itude north and 17 degrees latitude
north), as well as long-distance passenger ships and ships carrying dangerous
articles, and Japan's open seas fishing vessels and ocean liners which sail
ttie sealanes in transport of resources.
23
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FOK UFFICIAL USis ONLY
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. (2H~--- k'_'~AtiPb4 (YS-11) cnofYJl~c~ (~OOikilf'~)
24
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I~C)R 01~ FT C1AL IISi: UNI.Y
.
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Key:
1. Diagram 3: Outline of "Ocean Information System" of Maritime Safety
Agency (provided by Ministry of Transport)
2. Ocean Information Center
3, iishing vessels
4. foreign fishing vessels
5. helicopter carrying patrol shins
6. cargo ships
_ 7. foreign ocean research vessels
8, shipwrecks
9. tanker fires
10. N.i3. This system will be applied to various functions such as l. de-
ciding the search area and possible ships for rescue in case of the
occurrence of a sea disaster; 2. executing effective supervision
25
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and control of foreign fishing ves.sels, ~oreign ocean research ves-
sels and suspicious ships; 3. providing navigation safety informa-
tion for ships which it is feared are approaching dangerous waters.
Also, what I would like to emphasize at this time is that the Ocean Informa-
tion Center of the Maritime Safety Agency and the central couanand organiza-
tion of the Defense Agency, and the command, control, communication and in-
formation (C3I) system of the self-defense f leet and air squadrons must be
kep`t in close contact. In short, it is very important as a country to es-
tablish a total information system to ensure the security of the sealanes.
It is also important to maintain sub-spotting planes, anti-submarine ships
and patrol boats. And I think what should be given attention is the establish-
ment of a soft, intensive sealane security system. For this, preparation of
a diversified anti-submarine detection system, of course, and preparation of
a system of data analysis, verification, evaluation and storage and a command/
control system must be hastened. If not, no matter how many P3C's and naval
vessels are completed, it will never work effectively.
A situation in which the safety of the sealanes is impeded cannot be simply
specified. What can be said with certainty is that a plan has been drawn up
in which the freedom of the seas of the Western nations is challenged, ~iven
the dramatic buildup of Soviet naval power (including the naval air force)
the change in the strategic map due to the Soviet navy's use of bases in Viet-
nam and the advance of Soviet naval power into the Indian Ocean.
As has already been stated, preparation of an information system in order to
ensure the security of the sealanes is urgent, and I want to consider the point
that the development of Soviet naval power has several weaknesses. Namely,
there are the choke points, which cannot avoid access to the sealanes by the
Soviet naval power. It goes without saying that one of these weakenesses is
Japan's three straits. The foremost problem is Tsushima Strait. I think the
detection system at this choke point or a checking system must be investigated
and prepared. Likewise, special consideration is desired concerning the de-
fense of important harbors, which are the terminals of these sealanes.
Postscript �
If the political situation in Japan's trading partners is unstable, there
will be a lack of stability in the resources cycle. Good examples of that
are energy resources and scarce metal resources. On zhe basis of such a
situation, reserves countermeasures were set up in Japan in the past from
an economic viewpoint. Certainly, reserve stores give a kind of flexibility
to policies on resources and shipping policies, and are effective as temporary
substitute measures.
Recently, it has been said that in the U.S. policy on reserves, items and
an~ounts are cedided on the basis of an exclusively strategic point of view
and the position of ensuring security. Let this be a lesson to us.
~ 26
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In short, a pZan should he developed ~n Japan concerning reserves of import-
ant resources which can withstand an interruption o~ shipping over a long
Period of. time. giving sufficient consideration to cfianges in the military
environment in the future. And countermeasures must be devised from the view
point of ensuring a comprehesive safety, including, of course, granting of
strong bases for reserves. We must make preparations to be able to decrease
as much as possible reliance on shipping at the outset of a military crisig.
As always, preparing for international tenstion and international disputes
in regions supplying resources, we must plan a diversification of supplier
areas, the econamization of resources consumption, substitution of other
resources and sufficient transportation means. It is necessary to improve
the rate of food self-support. Ensurinq sufficient transportation means is
a matter which must not be forgotten in the security of the sealanes. In
short, to make a long story short, it is the equipping of Japanese ships.
Preparation of ships for the future will not be limited only to ensuring a
se~ number; an important issue is qualitative changes which can be seen to
ensure ships suitable for transportation such as transport of liquefied
natural gas, coal and liquefied petroleum gas. Preparation of ships
must also be considered. .
Likewise, the issue of ensuring qualified crews must not be forgotten. Then
it is also necessary to modernize the crew system in order to arrange for a
job environment in which t:~e crews can sufficiently demonstrate their abili-
ties.
Finally, what we have to consider is the question of what degree of the flow
of ships must be maintained to be regarded as keeping the security of the
sealanes.
According to a newspaper report, it is said that at a cabinet meeting 4t1 23
April,,the go~rer.nment decided to conclude countermeasures on the basis of
ideas from the ministries involved, conerning the defense of the sealanes
and the import of food and petroleum resources in time of emergency. In
this manuscript, I have pointed. out that the issue of sealane security is an
eco-politico-military issue, and i feel deeply that the government leaders
have finally opened their eyes to sea power.
In a way, there is the fear that the security of the sealanes will lack a
finishin~ touch unless there is a system which puts ships and crews under
~o:~ernment control in line with the national benefit in times of emer~ency.
At such a time, I hope that people related to the security of the sealanes
in tlte government will observe in practice the control system of a country
wh.ich has ship operations regulations system, such as the U.S. and the NATO
_ countries, and along with that, examining the historical facts of Japan's
shipping regulations and ship protection during World War II, will prepare
countermeasures.
COPYRIC,HT: Asagumo Shimbunsha
9400
CSO: 4105/131
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I~OR O1~1~1('IA1. Util? ONI.Y
ECONOMIC
ECONOMIC GROP]TH RATE IN NEXT TWO DECADES
Four Percent Growth Seen
Tokyo TfiE DAILY YOMIURI in English 12 Jun 82 p 1
[Text] A n.inel ot economic Another reason is that � people in nrimary indus- .
advisers to the prlme min- the savings rate--the pro- try will be hz'.ved to 5
ister pro~ec!ed Fridny Ja- portion of take-i~ome in- percent, t,hose in secondary
pan can ac�lticre an infln- come put into savings ac- inclustry will drop to 33 per-
tion-adjusteci ~vera;:e eco- counts-will decliae at a cent from 35 per,.ent while
nomic ~ro~~th rate ot slower pace than in other those iii tertiary industry
around 4 percent a year in industrial countries, lrom such as services cvill rise to
the iiext l,wo decades, a 1~J.4 percent in 198U to 16-17 62 perceut from 55 percent.
- rate slightly hi~~her than percent in 2000 offering
what is g~enerzlly belleved capltal enou~h 'or invest~ Wholesale Priees Dip
possible in other industrial ments to sustain !he 4 per- Japan's wholesale prices
democracies. cent growth rate, it said. recorded the Srst month-
- The projection was con- "The wor~d economy in to-month decline in flve
tained in a report pub- the 1980s is in an ad~ust- months in May, reflecting
:!~*:^w by the Economic ment period to establish a dr~ps in the prices of both
Council which discussed in new order," *he repo*t said. expoi ~ ~ommodities and im-
the past year what Japan "If it ovprcomes energy, ported goods as u result of
would look like in the year population and other prob- the yen's appreciAtion Sn the
2000. lems, the ?QaOs will be pe- month, the Bank of J1pun
The report, t(tled "Japan riod of mul~:ipolarized stabi- Annouuced Friday.
in 20O0." was based on llty" where maJor economic ~he cenl,ral bniil- s.iid the
earlier recommendations blocs such a.C Ja.pan, North Mny wl~ol~sale price iiidex
from six subcommittes. America and Western Eu- stood at 135.8 :?~ainst 100 in
But i! dropped some of rope will enjoy relattve 1~75. up 1.3 percrl,t Prom a
them, including controver- stabflity. year earlier but down 0.6
slal proposalti c:zlling for Based +~r. that assump- percent from Apr:l.
tlie acceptanr.e of foreign tlon, the renort said that: The bnnk said the prices
a�orkerti and the libera.liza- �,TKp,in ~ill zeco:int for 12 op imported goods such as
tiou of Lhc i:irm producc percrnt. c~f t,he world'~ crude oil und raw sugar,
m:irket. ;.;ross n:i~i~~nu! Procli~c+ decreased 2.1 percent from
G~~vernment� otflC~1I5 suid ~GNPi iu ~~;~0, up [rom th^ previous month, due to
Ll~~ repurt H~ill, provide "lm- percenL at ~;re seiit, a 3.'l percent rise in the
~rt:~nt (~:1t1" Cor drawing � Japan's }~o~~ulation � wil! yen's exchange rate in the
up J;~pan's ecouomic pol- peak at 130 miilion in month.
icics, includin~ a new ftve- 2008, with n�ie out of every It said the yen's value
year economic plun to be 6.4 persons _i~ed 65 or older Stood at 237.09 to the dol-
drafted by the counci] in compared R'.tin one of every lar in May on the average
the months ahcad. 11 currentl~;, aqlinst 244.97 in April.
The 4 perce?it ~cowt.h rnte ~ It will be Possit~le to es- The wholesule prices of
wiil be possible b~cluse. fo: i,ablisli prices on ctome5- ex ort commodities like
une~ t.hinF:�. Ju}~un Is expcct.- tic farin prodttce campara- n
c