JPRS ID: 10674 WORLDWIDE REPORT LAW OF THE SEA

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080048-6 FOR OFFICIAI. USF. ONI.Y . ~ JPRS L/ 10674 21 July 1982 ~l1/orldwide Re ort p ~ LAW OF THE SEA ~FOUO 4/82) Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATiON SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500080048-6 NOTE JPRS publfcat ions contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but als~ from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other charact eristics retained. Headlines, ed itorial reports, and material enclo sed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mstion was summarized oz extracted. ~ Unfamiliar na.mes rendered phonetically or transl iterated are enclosed in p arentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not c lear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattr ibuted parenthetical notes with in the body of an item origina te with the source. Times within 3tems are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way repre sent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government. COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS G04ERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT D ISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTI'.ICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 JPRS L/10674 21 July 1982 WORLDWIDE REPORT - LAW OF THE SEA (FOUO ~4/82) CONTENTS WORLDWIDE AFFAIRS ~MAINICHI~ Views UN Sea Law Lonference Convention ( Editorial;~ MAIIJICHI DAILY iJEWS, 15 May 82 1 NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS Briefs Division of Continental Shelf 3 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA , MAURITIUS , British Sovereignty Over Chagos .Archipelago Disputed (Jonathan M~Haruias AFRIQUE-ASI~, 10 May 82) 1~ USSR Soviet Jurist Discusses Freed om of the Seas (S. A. Gureyev; SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO~ Mar 82).. 9 - a - [III - WW - 136 FOUO] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080048-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WORLDWIDE AFFAIRS 't�tAINICHI' VIEWS UN SEA LAW CONFERENCE CONVENTION OW170949 Tokyo MANICHI DAILY NEWS in English 15 May 82 p 2 [Editorial: "For New acean Order"] (TexC) The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea recently adopted an international convention establishing rules for the use and exploration of the seas and seabed. This is the first step toward establishing order in the oceans under the changed circumstances of the 20th century. 'Clie convention which wound up nearly nine years of hard bargaining since DecemDer, 1973, c~ontains some 320 articles and eight annexes covering, among others, seabed mining and tlie establishment oC a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea limit and a 200-~ile exclusive ~economic zone for coas tal states with the right of innocent passage through territorial scas and narrow straits. It is indeed heartening to note t.hat the convention, although merel} a draft pending the ratification of the countries concerned, received supporting votes from 130 countries ' including Japan, France and almost all Third World nations. The convention is to be signed in Caracas. Venezuela, in December this year, and will most likely go into effect in the latter part of the 1980s. On the other hand, it is regrettable to note that the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea which ortginally sc~ugti* the adoption of ths convention by consent had to make a deci5ton on it by vote. I~oc. countries the United States, Israel, Venezucll and Turkey voted agatnst It, while 17 nations, including the Soviet Union, Britain, West Cermany ~nd several Gastern Guropean countries abstained. The absence of the ~;ao great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, means great problems ahead for the convention. Altiiough the United S tates and the Soviet Union did not vote, it does not mean th~t they will stay out of the convention permanently. The Soviet Union abstained because it felt i~ w~s Uein~; discriminaCed agai.nst cqmpared with tlie United States on the question of. pr~~Coction c~f advance investment in seabed development. Thc Suviet Union, aUout the middle�of thLs April, made a decision on its own devel.opment of scabed resources by a presidium d~cree. The decree is to be abolished if internattonril .i};rec~ment ~n this matter i5 concluded by 1988. Thus, the Soviet Union is likely to take ~~:irt in lhe convention in the future. ~~n tlie othcr hand~ the prospects for U.S. participntion arc rather dim under the present rirrumtitnnces. In the nintli session in 1980, ~ draCt convention was drawn up unofficlally up~~nin~; the way tor er~rly concluston of the conference. However, the tenth session in 1981 :ind the llth sess ion this year encountered rough sailinq mainly because the U.S. tiid~~ chan~ed its posi.ttim and rofu,ed to comp].y with Lhc gcneral trend. ~ ~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 MOR OFFIC'IAI, l1SF. ONI.,Y 'I'I~~~ It~:~~;~m administration which was inaugurated in 1981 made an about-face from the position uf the Carter administration which agreed to a'consensus process at the conference. The new regime demanded that the draft convention, especially with regard to the passage concerning seabed development, should be thoroughly reappraised. Tlie U.S. contended tliat it could not protect its national interesCs or '.hose of private enterprlses, nor could it obtain ratification at the Senate if the proaosed convention were not rewritten. In the llth session, the United States made some concessions Uut eventually it voted ngainst the convention, demanding that its adoption be decided not by consent but by vote. As it opposes the seabed development clause, there is a possibility that the United St:ites may not participate in the convention at all. Tlie United States ut present plays a very important role in development of the seaUed. Its participation is, in a senae, considered essential. Especiully at this time when the worid depends on the United States for seabed development technolosy and necessary capital, its ~bsence is likely to reduce the proposal of seabed development by an international organ to a mere pipe dream and, furthermore, dnm~se the authority of the convention itsclf. The llnited States, too, will suffer a great deal for failing to participate in the con~en- tion. Japan; a leading maritime nation, should call on the United States to exercise its wisdom and take part in the convention. We all have to exert our utmost to make the . proposed convention the constitutian of the sea in the true sense of the term. COPYRIGHT: Mainichi ~aily News [1982] CSO: 5200/2085 2 ' t Or FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500080048-6 INTER-ARAB AFFAIR$ BRIEFS DIVISION OF CONTINENTAL SHELF--Tunisians and Libyans will open talks on the division of the continental shelf at the end of the month of May. But with the three-month deadline to reach an agreement, set by the International Court of Justice (The Hague), expiring on May 24, an extension will certainly be imposed; moreover, such an extensior. was anticipated by the International Court - of Justice. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1115, 19 May 82 p 75] [COPYR~GHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA.1982] CSO: 5200/5007 ~ i ~ ~ . i ~ ~ . I ~ 1 _ 3 ~ ~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONY.Y � ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504080048-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ MAURITIUS ~ BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER CHAGOS AitC~IIPELAGO DISPUTED Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 10 1Nay 82 pp 32-33 [Article by Jonathan M'Haruia: "Negotiationa with a Trap in Them"j [Text] It's not ~ust before the people of Saint-Malo that ~ Great Britain flaunts its old colonial demons. Without mentioning Ireland, there are AtilJ. numerous examples of ~ the "confetti of the Empire" from which a savage beast could emerge. From the Chagos Archipelago, for example, with the acandal of Diego Garcia. The status of the peoples of the Chagos Archipel$go~, expelled from their islands between 1965 and 1973, was the sub~ect of an agreement reached in Port Louis, Mauritius, on 27 March. On this date a multiparty Mauritian , delegation--composed amang others, of political figures, including Paul Berenger, secretary general of the l~i [Mauritian Militant Movement], and representatives of the Chagos Islandera Fraternal Organization [Comite Ilois-OF], led by Minister of Soc~al Security Kailash Purryag--met with a delegation �rom the British Foreign Office, led by Sir Leonard Allinaon, under secretary of state. By the tp;ms of this agreement, the Chagos Island community, members of which have for some years been called "the Palestinians of the Indian Ocean," is to receive $0 million rupees** from the British Government as a"final" settlement and 20 million rupees from the Mauritian Government in the form of land. That is to come into effect in June, af ter the new Mauritian par- liament, elected in the same month, will have approved legislation concerning establishment of a special body created to manage this aum of money. The difficult riegotiations between the two parties--the final phase lasted for a week--were marked by a characteriatic piece of blackmail on the part of the British. The latter included in the agreement a clause under which Mauritius, whatever its new government may be, could no longer claim sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago once the settlement is paid. * The Chagos Archipelago includes, in particular, the island of Diego Garcia. One French Franc equals 1.7 Mauritian rupees. ~t FOR OI~'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY At a certain moment, the british delegation even brought out the point that compensation would not be paid except on condition that this clause was . approved. Faced with the categorical re~ection of this clauae by the Mauritian side and especially by the Chagos Islanders and a refusal to give in to this shameful and typically colonialiat blackmail, the British delega- tion agreed, with London's approval, to separate the two aspects of the din~ute;~that is, Diego Garcia from Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagoa Archipelago and compensation for the Chagos Islanders, toward whom Great Britain, which forced them into exile in 1965, has responsibilitiea and moral obligations. It was a*_ this stage of.the negotiations that Paul Berenger asked the British delegation for a copy of the agreement which it was proposing. At several points the text made mention of the Britiah Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), a colonv created by the British out of Mauritian and Seychelles territories annexed in 1965. Since then, the Seychelles claimed and obtained the return of ti:eir islands. The Mauritian delegation then insisted that the term BIOT be abolished, as its very mention could be interpreted as "de facto" recognition of the ceseion of the Chagos Archipelago. After having brutally announced, and in the purest colonialist spirit, that "you must sign or we will take back the money offered," the Britieh ended up _ by taking out the reference to the BIOT. However, they insisted that it appear at least once, in the absence of which, they alleged, the text of the - agreement would hav~ no validity before the Britieh Parliament.. T~ao Mauritian amendmen~s seekin$ to indure that "this agreement ia without pre3udice to the qses~ion of Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago" were subsequently rejected by the British. It was at this p^int that the latter began to use a shameful and unacceptable procedure in the old tradition of "divide and conquer." Addressing themselves to the representatives of the Chagos Islandera, the British held out to them an offer of 4 mi.llion pounds sterling, in this way going over the heads of the other Mauritian delegates. At the same time the Mauritian Ministry of Justice informed. the delegation that, from its poini of view, the mention of the term BIOT in the agreement did not exclude an eventual Mauritian claim to the Chagos~Archipelago. The Ministry also explained to the Mauritian delegation that there were three stages in the processing of an agreement of thie kind: the delegations initial the agreement; the governments sign it officia:.ly; and it is sub- sequently ratified by the parliaments of the two co~mtries. The Mauritian delegation thus had to choose between initialing the agreement in the light of the advice of the Mauritian Minietry of Justice and then consulting other experts in the f ield of international treaties--particularly . as the agreement could not enter into eff.ect before the electiona scheduled for 11 June--or asking the Bri.tish to leave the draft text on the negotiating table while waiting for experts to examine ~t in detail. Taking into account the impatience and ev~n despair of the Chagos Islandera, which certain parties were beginni:~g to utilize, the Mauritian delegation chose to initial the agreement. 5 FOR OFF7CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY Lastly, to inaure that the agreement, as drafted, woulsl not be pre~udicial to an official demand before some international body and before the inter- national community for the return of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius, the Mt~i, the Chagos Islanders Fraternal Organization, and the organizations supporting the islanders' cause first of all sought the views of an inter- national lawyer, in this case Prof Andre Oraison, and called for an examina- tion of the text by a group of experts from several countriea, meanwhile asking the Mauritian Government to delay the official signature of the agreen.ent . ' Professor ~raison, author of a study on the Chagos Archipelago, in which he supports the view that Mauritius has the ri&ht to claim this archipelago, holds the view that the text of the agreemerit could be interpreted as "de facto" recognition by an independent Mauritius of the cessian of the Chagas " Archipelago during the colonial period. Without the vigilance of the MNIlri, and principally of its secretary general, Paul Berenger, as well as a number of lawyers, would Mauritius have supported a second cession of the Chagos Archipelago, and this time on a permanent basis? This was the more possible, since the Mauritian Government alleged that the use of the term BIOT did not constitute an obatacle to a claim to the Chagos Archipelago. Whatever the case, the British objective was, through this agreement as initially drafted, to permanently "muzzle" a future government formed by the rAtM and the PSM [Mauritian Socialist Party], as the present government never sought ~o challenge the occupation of the CY~agos Archipelago by t"r?e British. It is clear, to the British and, moreover, to the Americans, that the Mi~Ilri and the PSM, in power tomorrow with a solid case and international solidarity already secured, will make the retrocession of the Chagos Archipelago and the dismantling of the base on Diego Garcia real ob~ectives of struggle. People of Saint-Malo? No, from the Chagos Archipelago During the last 17 years the sufferings of 942 families of Chagos Islanders deported to Mauritius by the British have revealed the revolting and anti- patriotic attitude of the government under Prime Minister Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam toward these uprooted people. The present government has never had the interests of the Chagos Islanders at heart. Between 1965, when Great Britain detached the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius at the request of the United States so that a military base might be built there, and 1973, the islanders were forced to move away. In Mauritius there was simply no plan to welcome these "Palestinians of the , Indian Ocean." A study carried out by Herve Sylva, a Mauritian teacher, at the request of the Mauritian delegation, make~ it clear that since they were forced into exile the islanders have been housed ~�::d~r indescribable condi- tions. In the shanty town areas of Port-Louis, Roche-Bois, Cassis and Pointe- aux-Sables, for example, it was noted that up to 31 persons were living in 3 rooms, that 21 other persons lived in 2 rooms, that 14 others were in a 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400504080048-6 FOR OFFIC~AL USE ONLY 1-room efficiency flat, and that 8 families were living in camps set up for cyclone refugees. These figures clearly reflect the situation in which the whole Chagos Islander community lives. There have been many cases of premature death, of suicide and even of insanity. A number of Ch~agos Islanders have been forced into prostitution to support their families, to say nothing of the situation of unemployment which affects many heads of families, with the usual consequences. In 1972, or 7 years after the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago, the British Government granted compensation of 650,000 pounds sterling* for the rehabilitation of the Chagos Is~andera over and above a sum of 3.0 million ~ pounds sterling paid to the Mauritian atate to compensate it for the loss of the archipelago. In view of the "good will" displayed by the qovernment, it was necessary to have several demonstrations sponsored by the Chagoa Islanders Fraternal Organization and a number of hunger strikes before the government of Prime Minister Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam agreed to pay part of this compensatfon to the Chagos Islanders in 1978. A new hunger strike had to be organized in December 1980 to insure that the 582 adults and 727 children, who had received nothing, would also be compen- sated. In view of the indifference displayed by the government eight Chagos ' - Islanders women began a third hunger strike in April 1981. This was the longest (20 days) in the history of the Chagos Islanders movement. An agree- ~ ment put an end to the hunger strike on 11 April 1981. On the one hand it provided for the payment of the second installment of compensation and, on the other hand, for the establishment of a multiparty Mauritian delegation charged with going to London to uegotiate for the payment of 158 million rupees in additional compensation. The London negotiations, held in June and July 1981, were broken off, as we know, by reason of the attitude displayed by Great Britain and the gap between the Mauritian demand (158 million rupees) and the British offer (31 aillion rupees). It should be emphasized that the Mauritian Government, which has the habit of playing on the misery of the people tio make them swallow a long snake, as it were, had previously arranged secretly, and in complicity with Great Britain, for the visit of a British lawyer, Bernard Sheridan, for the purp~se of persuading the Chagos Islanders to accept a sum of 1.25 million pounds sterling in exchange for renouncing any right to return to their native island. It was the P4IM which, in January 1980, denounced this scan~al in which the government of Prime Minister Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam was involved and the purpose of which was to legitimize the abandonment of the Chagos Archipelago to the benefit of Great Britain and the United States, which are using Diego Garcia for military purposes. * In i972 the British Pound was worth 12 F.rench Francs. 7 , , APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500080048-6 Certain members of the government of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, who did not hesitate to claim in parliaIIent and in the press that "Diego Garcia is Brit3.sh," did everything in their power to persuade the Chagos Islanders to renounce their rights to Diego Garcia. These ministers, who are more inclined to defend British interests than those of their own country, exploited the misery ancl despair of the Chagos Islanders by making them believe that the only chance af getting compensation from London was to renounce all their rights to Diego Garcia once and for all. If it has become clear today that Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam was personally and directly responsible for the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritian terrttory in 1965; it is still he and his government who bear the responsibility for the ab~ect misery in which the people exiled from Diego Garcia now live. ~ Even if we consider that financial compensati~n, however substantial it may be, can never make up for the suffering which the Chagos Islander community has endured since 1965, the exiles from the Chagos Archipelago have been supported in their struggle to obtain compensation by the MNA~[ and various uther organizations. The initiative taken by Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam to arrange for a resump- tion of the negotiations in London, after their breakdown in July 1981, can only be interpreted as a rescue operation undertaken in view of the elections in June, in which his government is seriously threatened. COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie 5170 CSO: 5200/5656 ~ ; 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONY.Y ~ USSR SQVIET JURIST DISCUSSi,S FREEUOM OF THE SEAS Moscow SOVETSKUYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO in Russian No 3, Mar 82 pp 104-110 [Article by Docto.r of Legal.Sciences S. A. Gureyev, senior scientist, Institute of _ State and Law, USSR Academ,y of Sciences: "Freedom of thp High Seas"] [Text] The World Ocean now has enormo~is significance to the life of peoples on our planet. It is criss-crossed by marine routes handling cargo equivalent to abou'~ 80 percent of international trade. The ~~Torld Ocean is also a"treasurehouse" of significant living and mineral resources making an important contribution to pro- viding the populations of different cauntries with foodstuffs and their economies with minerals. This is why all states are devoting a great deal of attention to the proceedings of the Third UN Conference, which has the job of developing and adopting a new convention on the law of the sea. The draft convention on the law of the sea, which was drawn up at the conference,* developed the basic principle of international law of the sea--freedom of the high seas. Formation of the Principle of Freedom of the High Seas This principle evolved in the 15th-17th centuries during an acute struggle between the major feudal states of those times--Spain and Portugal, which had divided the seas between themselves on one hand and some states in which the ~ capitalist means of production was undergoing development, mainly England and France, and later on Holland, which argued for recognition of freedom of the seas, on the other ((1),pp 8-24; (2) pp 45-56). The demands for development of worldwide economic ties between states on the basis of international division of labor in the interests of thP bourgeoisie of all countries gradually led to increasingly broader recogni- tiori of the principle of the freedom of the high seas. It was conclusively con- ~ firmed as a conventional norm of international law in the second half of the 18th century ((1), p 16; (3)). As A. L. Kolodkin validly noted, "the principle of free- ~ dom of the high seas arose in the era of capitalism's maturation and rise to the top, in the period of decline of feudal claims to the right of ownership of the se.as, and it was confirmed as a rule of international law as the result of establish- ment of the capitalist means of production, in the period of formation of the world- ' wide market and victory of bourgeois revolutions" (4). *A decision was made at ~he lOth Session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1981) to make the previously developed unofficial text the official draft convention on the law of the sea. FOR OFFICIAL USF. ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ON~.Y The content of the principle of the freedom of the high seas did not remain constant. While in the beginning freedom of navigation and freedom of fishing were inherent elements of this principle which concurrently enjoyed independent significance, in the last third of the 19th century a new element of freedom of the high seas came into being in connection with the development of communication r~sources--the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines. "One of the consequences of the freedom of the high seas," notes D. Kolombos, "is the right of a state to lay submarine tele- graph cables from its own shores to the shores of other states expressing their consent to establish communication" ((2), p.333). The laying of the first cable ~ between Dover and Calais in 1851 and later on of the Atlantic cable between Europe and America necessitated internati~nal legal protection of submarine cables. It was with this purpose that the International Convention on Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables was adopted in 1884. Development of aviation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries served as the cause for formation of the principle of the freedom to fly over the high ~eas. This principle arose out of a conflict between two theories: "freedom of the air- space" ar.d extension of t'~e sovereignty of a state to the airspace above its terri- tory ((`i), pp 51-64). Both conceptions were proposed for discussion during the diplomatic conference held in Paris in 1910. Article 1 of the existing 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation states: "Every state has full and exclusive sovereignty over i:he airspace above its terri- _ tory." The order of granting permission to foreign aircraft to fly over state terri- tory, including territ~rial waters, was also documented in international law of the air. Concurrently with recognition of the principl~ of a state's sovereignty over the airspace located above its territory, "freedom of the airspace" was limited to space located outside the limits of the territories of states, and the principle of freedom to fly over the high seas was confirmed in international law. The principle of freedom of scientific research on the high seas became a conven- tional rule of international law, in my opinion, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Although scientific research on the World Ocean has a distant history, it did not transform into an independent form of man's activities on the seas and oceans until the late 19th century. Circumnavigations of the planet by Russian navigators--I. F. Kruzensht~rn and Yu. F. Lisyanskiy (1803-1806) and F. F. Belings- gauzen and M. P. Lazarev (1819-1821)--laid the basis for fundamental scientific re- search on the World Ocean. But scientific research on the World Ocean began develop- ing especially swiftly followinq World War II, in the era of the scientific-technical revolution. Major scientific research fleets are now appearing in many countries. Research is being conducted in both national and international programs. Not only scientific research vessels but also platforms, buoys, submersibles, oceanic data collection systems and other apparatus are being employed for this purpose. The Soviet Union is making a substantial contribution to scientific research on the World Ocean. A resolution of the UN General Assembly dated 21 December 1968 approved the International Decade of Ocean Research in 1971-1980. In addition to the decisive contribution made by states to the development and con- firmation of the principle of the freedom of the high seas, we should also mention the contribution made by individual scholars as well as by nongovernment and intra- governmental international organizations to development of the concept and content of this principle and to codification of international law pertaining to this area. 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY The content of the principle of the freedom of the high seas is revealed and its basic elements are spelled out in particular in a declaration drawn up by the - Institute of International Law at one of its conferences in (Lozan) in 1927, and in the draft "Laws on Marine Jurisdiction in Peacetime," prepared in 1926 by the ~ International Law Association. Later on the effort to codify international law on the regime of the sea was conducted by the UN Commission on International Law, which prepared drafts placed at the basis of the 1958 Geneva conventions on t~:~ law of the sea. In them, universally recognized principles and rules of the regime of the sea, to include the principle of freedom of the high seas were codified and developed further. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas clearly describes the essence of the principle of the freedom of the high seas: "The high seas being open to al.l nations, no state may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty." Further on the convention indicates the inherent ele~r,ents of the freedom of the high seas, which are organically interrelated and which, in their sum total, make up a single whole ((6), pp 62-68). 1'he freedom of the high seas "comprises, inter aZia: 1) freedom of navigation; 2) freedom of fishing; 3) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 4) freedom to fly over the high seas" ((6), pp 211-230). Thus this list is not exhaustive in nature, as is indicated in another provision of the Geneva c~nvention, according to which: "These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law shall be exer- cised by all states..." (Article 2). They include, for example, the freedom of scientific research on the high seas (7,8). Each of the elements listed here also has independent significance ~s a less-general principle in relation to the more-general--the freedom of the high seas. Thus it was validly noted in the Soviet legal literature that the principle of the freedom to fly in international airspace (this applies to all aircraft above the high seas and to civil aircraft above Antarctica) is one of the fundamental principles of international air law ((5), p 48), which is a subdivision of general international law . The definition of the high seas rest upon, besides their legal characteristics (1--they are not under the sovereignty of any one state; 2--they are open to all states on an equal basis), a geographic characteristic--their location outside the 1~.;,~ts of territorial waters. Influence of the Principl` of Freedqm of the High Seas on Development of Other Principles and Rules Regulating the Regime of the Sea. ~ The principle of innocent passage of foreign vessels through the territorial sea came into being under the influence of the principle of the freedom of the high seas and achieved broad international recognition. Obviously without the right of inno- cent passagc:, all states would in fact be deprived of the possibility of exercising the freedom of navigation and developing normal worldwide economic ties and cooper- ation in other pursuits. The English lawyer J. Brownlee validly noted that from a historical standpoint, the right of innocent passage is associated with the pro- vision that "the maritime regions are in principle the high seas, with some limita- tions in favor of the coastal states." "As a question af policy," he continues, "innocent passage is a sensible form of compromise between the need for marine communication and thz interests of a coastal state" ((9) p 308). 11 - FOR OFFICIAL USE n1NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 FOR OFF'IC1AL USE ONLY The principle of the freedom of the high seas also had an influence on the develop- ment of the freedom of innocent passage of vessels through international straits connecting two parts of the h~.gh seas, and their overflight by aircraft ((10); (11), pp 119-136). From the standpoint of international law, the r~gime of navigati.ng in straits conr~cting two portions of the high seas, in which the princi.ple of the freedom of navigation and the freedom to fly is in effect, canno~t be defined by any principle other than the freedom of passage through them by vessels and flight over them by aircraft. International straits have tremendous significance to development of cooperation between states in foreign economic ties, and to ensuring the security of states. Documentation of the principle of the freedom of passage through such straits in the new convention on the law of the sea, developed at the Third UN Conference, is ~ extremely important for the reason that most states have now expanded their terri- torial waters to the 12-mile limit. Under these conditions many of the most impor- tant straits are within the overlapping territorial waters of coastal states. A balanced and mutually acceptable splution to this important problem was reached in the draft convention on the law of the sea (12). The solution is based on the principle of combining the freedom of passage and the guarantees that states bordering on straits would be able to exercise rights accounting for their interests, thus ensuring both the safety of passage of vessels and flight by aircraft on one hand and the security of coastal states on the other. According to the draft all vessels and aircraft enjoy the right of ~ransit passage through straits utilized for inter.national shipping and connecting one region of the high seas (economic zone) with another region of the high seas (economic zone), and that no obstacles may be placed in the way of such passage. Transit passage is an exercise of freedom of navigation and flight solely with the purpose of continuous and swift transit through a state (articles 37 and 38 of the drafts). There must be no interruptions in transit passage (Article 44). The principle of the freedom of the high seas, which includes the principle of the freedom of navigation, is having an influence on the development of the princi- ple of archipelago passage through marine corridors and of flights through air corri- dors established by an archipelago state in archipelago waters (Clause 2, Article 53 of the draft convention on the law of the sea). Archipelago passage through such corridors is an exercise of the right of normal navigation and flight solely with - the purpose of continuous, swift and Lmhindered transit from one portion of the high seas or economic zone to another portion of the high seas or economic zone. Such marine and air corridors cross archipelago waters and contiguous territorial sea, and they include all normal routes of passage used as routes for international stiipping or flight over archipelago waters (clauses 3, 4 Article 53 of the draft). If an archipelago state does not establish marine or air corridors, the right of archipelago passage through marine corridors may be exercised on routes usually em- ployed by international shipping. There must be no interruptions in archipelago passage (articles 54 and 44 of the draft convention). Nbdern Trends in the Development of the Principle of Freedom of the High Seas The problem of establishing the status of 200-mile economic zones is having a direct influence on development of the principle of the freedom of the high seas today. The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea revealed two opposing positions on this issue. The "territorialist" delegations voted for establishing a 200 nautical 12 FOR OFFIC[AG USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R004500084048-6 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONi.Y milc limit for territorial waters or for bringing the regime of the economic zone as closely as possible in line with ~he regime of territorial waters. They asserted that an economic zone is not a part of the high seas, and that it is a zone sui gener'is, in which the rights of noncoastal states must be clearly restricted only by stricly defined freedoms. Another sizeable group of delegations, including the IISSR, voted in the conference in favor of recognizing the economic zone to be part of the high seas having excep- tions favoring coastal states, ones which would be established by the new conven- tion on the law of the sea (particularly in regard to sovereign rights on living and mineral resources). Inasmuch as this proposal, and others like it, were not reflected in the unofficial summary text to be used in the negotiations, the USSR delegation proposed including, in the draft convention, the provision that no state could subordinate any part of the sea within the limits of the territorial waters to its sovereignty. A similar proposal was made by the "Group of Fifty-Three"-- that is, intracontinental countries enjoying a geographically disadvantageous posi- tion, and almost all sea powers. Despite the fact that the unofficial sumanar~? text for negotiations and the draft convention on the law of the sea do not directly foresee the appropriate provisions,we would have to agree with the West German lawyer G. Jaenicke that following the sixth session of the conference, a balance was reached between the rights of a coastal state and the rights of other states in an economic zone--that is, a certain compromise was reached on the issue of the economic zone's legal status ((13), pp 488-489, 491). Nbreover zhe provisions on the status of the economic zone contained within recent drafts of the convention provide, in my opinion, the grounds for the conclusion that this zone is in fact interpreted as part of the high seas, with some exceptions in favor of the coastal state, as is evidenced by the following facts. According to Article 55 of the draft convention on the law of the sea, an economic zone is a region which is within the limits of the territorial sea and is contiguous to it, and consequently to which the sovereignty of the coastal states does not extend. According to Article 58 of the draft convention, within an economic zone, "all states enjoy the freedoms, indicated in Article 87, of navigation and flight, of laying submarine cables and pipelines and of other forms of uses of the sea which are legal from the point of view of international law, which relate to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of vessels, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and which are compatible with other provisions of this convention." Of interest is the fact that this article contains a reference to Article 87, "The High Seas." Thus the freedoms that are exercised in an economic zone are unambigu- ously qualified as freedoms of the high seas. Jaenicke validly notes that "these freedoms, therefore, apply to the economic zone in the same quality and in the same volume as they apply to the high seas" ((13~, p 490). According to Clause 2, Article 58 of the draft convention, articles 88-115 (that is, all of the basic provisions of Section VII, "The High Seas") and other corresponding norms of inter- national law apply to the economic zone, inasmuch as they are not incompatible with Section V of the draft convention pertaining to the economic zone. Thus Article 89, which states that "No state has the right to purport to subject any part of the high seas to its soveriegnty," also applies to the economic zone. Thus we avoid ~ the danger of "creeping jurisdiction" and gradual transformation of an economic zone into sea space under the sovereignty of a coastal state--that is, into territorial waters ((13), p 491). 13 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY According to the draft convention (Clause 2, Article 56) coastal states exe~- cising their riqhts and performing their responsibilities accurding to the conven- tion in an economic zone must account for the rights and responsibilities of other states in proper fashion. Nor should we fail to note that in distinction from the firet drafts (for example the revised unified text for negotiations (14)), Article 56 of the draft convention on the law of the sea does not establish exclusivc jurisdiction of a coastal state in relation to, for example, scientific research. It simply foresees jurisdiction in relation to scientific research and protection and con.ervation of the marine 2nvironment, and it cites the appropriate provisions of the draft. Article 56 of che draft thus does not have independent significance, and it must be applied to the issue of the extent of a coascal state's jurisdiction over a particular area only in combination with provisions concerned with a parti- cular form of activity in the economic zone. In and of themselves, however, the concepts "sovereign rights," "exclusive jurisdiction" and "jursidiction" do have definite semantic meaning. Thus we could hardly agree with the West German lawyer L. Gundling, who sees only a difference in terms here, and not in meaning. In his opinion, the a_~tinction made in Article 56 of the draft convention between the concepts "sovereign rights" an d"jursidiction" does not exclude the notion that a coastal state also enjoys exclusive rights in relation to scientific research and co:itrol over pollution. In this connection he concludes that. for practical pur- poses the unofficial summary text for ne~3otiations (and consequently the draft conventioii on the law of the sea, which. says the same thing in regard to this issue) did not alter the nature of the rights of a coastal state in comparison with the previous drafts of the convention, and that the compromise represented by the phrase "jurisdiction foreseen in the present convention" is only an apparent com- promise ((15), pp 627,638,639). Let us examine the trends in devel.opment of the basic freedoms of the high seas today. a) Freedom of Navigation and Exclusive Jursidiction of a State Over Vessels Carrying Its Flag The draft convention on the law of the sea affirms the provision according to which both coastal states and states without access to the sea enjoy the freedom of navigation on the high seas, including in economic zones. According to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Hiqh Seas a vessel must sail under the flag of one state only and, save in exceptional cases expressly ~~rovided for in international treaties and in the convention itself, it is subject to its ex- clusive jurisdiction on the high seas. Exceptions to exclusive jurisdiction are, according to the convention, in particular: The right to pursue a foreign merchant vessel for violation of the laws and regulations of a coastal state; intervention in a vessel's acts of piracy and engagement in slave trade. All of these provi- sions have been carried over the draft convention on the law of the sea. Excep- tions to the exclusiv~ ;~~r~sdiction of a state over vessels of its flag on the high seas are esta~iished by all states on a voluntary, mutual and equal basis in the interests of_ developing cooperation between them in various areas, to include in international shipping. It should be noted that additional exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state over vessels of its flag on Lhe high seas, based on the freedom of naviga- tion, are now underqoing formulation ~~r have been form�~.ated. Such exceptions may occur in the following cases: 1) ac;cifiGi;~s leading to pollution of the sea by oil and other harmful substances (see the existing 1969 international convention concerned with intervention on the high seas in cases of accidents leading to ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY pollution by oil, and the 1973 protocol supplementing it); 2) unsanctioned broad- casting from vessels on the high seas (Article 109, aubclause "c", Clause 1, Article 110 of the draft convention on the law of the sea); 3) violations of inter- national rules and standards of preventing pollution, halting pollution and contain- ing pollution by a foreign vessel in an economic zone, as a result of which a coaet~l state may subject such a vessel t~ inspection ancl even initiate pursuit, on the assumption that certain conditions are complied with (Article 220 of the draft con- vention). ~ b) The Freedom to Fly The draft convention on the law of the sea carries over the provisior~ of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas according to which freedom of the high seas includes _ the freedom to fly. This m~ans that every state, be it coastal or noncoastal, has the right to fly its civil and military aircraft over the high sc~as, including economic zones, unhindered. c) The Freedom to Lay Submarine Cables and Pipelines This freedom of the high seas is also included in the list contained in Clause 1, Article 87 of the draft convention. Moreover it is qualified in the article that the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines is enjoyed by a state in com- pliance with the provisions of Section VI, "The Continental Shelf." The reference is primarily to Article 78 of the draft, according to which "the exercise of a coastal state's right in relation to the continental shelf must not infringe upon shipping a:zd other rights and freedoms of other states foreseen by this convention, or cause any unjustified interference in the exercise of these rights." We should consider, furthern?ore, Article 79, which indicates that all states i~:ave the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the contine~ntal shelf in accord- ance with the provisions of this article. Z'hese provisions include: 1) a coastal state may not imped~ the laying or maintenance of cables and pipelines, subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf, exploitation of the natural resources of the latter and prevention, containment and maintenance of control over pollution by pipelines; 2) the route for such pipelines on the continental shelf are determined with the consent of the coastal state. In my opinion this is the point of view from which we should interpret the provision of the draft convention according to which all states enjoy the freedom of laying submarine cables and pipelines in an economic zone (Clause 1, Article 58). Although according to Subclause "a" of Clause 1, Article 56 the regime of the economic znne extends to all natural resources, including nonliving resources on the sea bed and within its subsoil, the actual utilization of mineral resources is governed by the regime of the continental shelf. d) Freedom of Fishing ((16), pp 659-707) Examining the freedom of fishing today, we would first need to note that the action of this freedom is limited only to those areas of the high seas which are within the limits of 200-mile economic zones. In an economic zone, a coastal state enjoys the sovereign rights to explore, exploit and conserve living resources, and t�o con- trol these resources (Subclause "a" of Clause 1, Article 56). 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 ~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Thus regulation of fishing in.economic zones is within the competency of coastal states (articles 61 and 62 of the draft). In this case the quite deliberate use of the term "sovereign rights" in application to living resources means, in my opinion, that a coastal state's rights pertaining to this i~sue are the broadest in compari- son with its other rights in an economic zone. Second, we need to turn attention to the fact that because fishing gear is undergoing significant technical improvement, the responsi.bility of all states to seek ways to cooperate in the conservaLion of the living resources of the high seas is becoming an incrPasingly more important element of the principle of the freedom of fishing on the high seas. Existing in a close mutual relationship, the freedom of fishing and conservation of livinq re- sources are, in my opinion, elements of the single princa..ple of freedom of reason- able and scientifically grounded fishing on the high seas. Conservation of living resources on the high seas beyond the limits of eronomic zones is withi.n the competency of states engaged in fishinq. In this cor~nection we - need to tur:� attention to the statement in Article 87 that all states enjoy the freedom of fishinq in compliance with the conditions spelled out in Section 2. This section, which is titled "Control of the Living Resources of the High Seas ~ and Their Conservation," foresees that: 1) All states have the right to allow their subjects to engage in fishing in the high seas in compliance with a number of con- ditions (Article 16 of the draft); 2) all states implement measures found necessary to conserve the living resources of the high seas, or they cooperate with other states in the implementation of such measures in relation to their subjects. e) Freedom of Scientific Research The principle of the freedom of scientific research was stated for the first time (in universal international conventionsl in the draft convention on the law of the sea among other fundamental principles composing the freedom of the high seas; this is an undoubtable merit of the draft. But at the same time it is important to consider that the action of this principle is limited to those areas of the high seas which are outside the limits of economic zones. In the latter, the coastal state exercises jursidiction in relation to marine scientific research. This jurisdiction is not exclusive for the following reasons. Coastal states exercising their jurisdiction have the right to regulate, grant permission for and conduct marine scientific research within their economic zone and on their continental shelf. Suc:~ research is conducted by other states and competent international organizations with the consent of the coastal state. But under normal ci+-:LL.~nstances the latter gives consent for marine scientific research exclusively for peacpful purposes and to expand scientific knowledge on the marine environment for the good of all mankind. At the same time a coastal state may refuse to give consent to another state or to a competent international organization to con9uct scientific research, at its own discretion and in cases stYictly established by the draft, and particularly if such scientific research has direct significance to the explora- tion and exploitation of living and mineral natural resources by the coastal state. Despite this provision, coastal states cannot refuse to give consent for scientific research projects that are to be conducted on the continental shelf beycnd the 200 nautical mile limit and outside those regions which coastal states may at any time officially declare to be regions of present or future--within reasonable time--exploitation or exploration of the natural resources (Article 246 of the draft convention on the law of the sea). 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Such are the basic trends in development of the principle of the freedom of the high seas today, and of their realization in the draft convention on the law of = the sea. 'Th~ USSR and other socialist countries are making a significant contribution to the proceedings of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. They are deci- sively i:+ favor of preserving the universally recognized principles of the inter- national law of the sea in the new convention, to include the freedom of the high seas and the freedom of passage of marine vessels through international straits joining two portions of the hicrh seas, and of flights over them by aircraft; they are also in favar of a balanced and :Z~atually acceptable solution to the issue as to the status of the economic zone and other fundamental problems of the law of the sea. The freedom of the :~igh se~s h~s exceptional significance to many develop- ing states, which need to expand econ~mic and com~nercial ties with other countries and which are developing their own national merchant tnarines. The freedom of the high seas is a universally recognized imperative principle of modern international law. It is the most important legal means of ensuring peace- ful coexistence among states with different socioeconomic systems, and development and deepening of their cooperation in different areas. _ BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Molodtsov, S. V., "Mezhdunarodno-pravovoy rezhim otkrytogo morya i kontinental'- nogo shel'fa" [The International Legal Regime of the High Seas and the Continental Shelf], Moscow, 1960. 2. Kolombos, D., "Mezhdunarodnoye morskoye pravo" [International Law of the Sea], Moscow, 1975. 3. Kunz, J., "The Changing Law of Nations (Essays on International Law)," Ohio, 1968, p 35. 4. "Sovremenno~e mezhdunarodnoye morskoye pravo. Rezhim vod i dna Mirovoga okeana" (Modern International Law of the Sea. The Regime of the Waters and Floor of the World Oceai~] , Nbscow, 1974, p 26. 5. "Mezhdunarodnoye vozdushnoye pravo" [International Air Law], Book 1, Moscow, 1980. 6. ::�~1.odkin, A. L., "Mirovoy okean. Mezhdunarodno-pravovoy rezhim. Osnovnyye pr~blemy" [~e World Ucean. The International Regime. Basic Problems], Mos ;ow, 1973. ~ 7. Vyso.skiy, A. F., Pravovyye problemy svobody nauchnykh issledovaniy v Mirovom okean~" [Legal Problems in the Freedom of Scientific Research in the World Ocean], Kiev, 1974, p 160. 8. Calfisch, L., and Piccard, J., "The Legal Regime of Marine ScientiEic Research and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, Vol 38, No 3-4, 1978, pp 848-901. - 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 9. Brounli, Ya., "Mezhdunarodnoye pravo" [International Law], Vol 1, Nbscow, 1977. 10. Barabolya, P. D., "Problems of International Straits," in "Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i m~~hdunarodnoye morskoye pravo" [Z'he Soviet State and International Law of the Sea], Moscow, 1977, pp 19-33. 11. Zhudrd, A. K., and Dzhavad, Yu. IQ~.," Morskole pravo" [Law of the Sea), Moscow, 1974. 12. A/Conf. 62/L.78, 28 August 1980. 13. Jaenicke, G., "Die Dritte Seerechtskonferenz der Vereinten Nationen. Grund- problems im Uberblick," ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES. RECHT UND VOLKER~CHT, Vol 38, No 3-4, 1978. 14. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1/Part II, 6 May 1976. 15. Gundling, L., "Die exlusive Wirtshchaftszone," ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, Vol 38, No 3-4, 1978. 16. Wolfrum, R., "Die Fischerei auf Hoher See," ZF.ITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERREQiT, Vol 38~ D;o 3-4, 1978. COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i pravo", 1982 11004 CSO: 5200/1000 END 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080048-6