JPRS ID: 10676 JAPAN REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500080050-3
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 95
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 50
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10676
22 July 1982
Ja an Re ort
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JPRS L/10676
i
~ 22 July 1982
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 44/82)
CONTENTS
POLITICAI, AND SOCIOLOGICAL
_ iComei Party's Position Discussed
(Kazuhiro Kobayashi; TdKYO SHIMBUN, 3 Jun 82) 1
. 'AKAHATA' Carries JCP Message to SFRY Congress
~ (~KAHATA, 26 Jun 82) 4
'AKAHATA' Rejects 'TASS' Reportage on Sofia Meeting
(AKAHATA, 22 Jun 82) 7
MILITAKl'
~ Japan's Future Proposals for Disarmament Discussed
(Tetsuya Endo; CHUO KORON, Jul 82.) 10
I ECONOMTC
Recuzring Profit in the First Quarter in 1982 Reported
(NIHON YFIZAI SHIMBUN, 30 May 82) 19
Economic Prosn~c~s Reported
(Variotis sources, various dates) 22
~ No Stimulus Until Fall
rew Choices for Plannero
Growth Rate May Fall, by Koji Takada
Strategies for Revenue Shor~tfall t7iscussed
(Various sources, various da~es) 25
Government Revenue Sourcea, Plans
Another Bond Issue Likely
~ - a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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Japan Urged To Foster Industrial Cooperation
(DAILY YOMIURI, 23 Jun 82) 36
MITt's ~conomic Support on Depressed Industries Examined
(Various sources, varioua dates) 37
New Structural Recession T.aw .
- Irou-Steel Industries Reconstruction
- Public Works Projects in 1983 Discussed
(Various ~ources, 31 May 82) 41
Public Works Funds Increase
Public Works Budget ,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Restructuring of Science and Technology Council Debated
(NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, various dates) ~5
Reorganization This Fall
Reinforcement of Its Function
MITI Surprised by Criticism of 64K Ram Exports to United States
(K. Komabashi, T. Ikui; SHUI~AN TOYO KEIZAI, 6 Mar 82) 49
FY82 Government Projects on Electronics Listed
(NIKKEI ELECTRONICS, various datea) 55
NTT's Information Network System Project Described
� (Kazuhisa Maeno; EKONOMISTO, 27 Apr 82) 70
NTT's Plans To Latinch CS-3, BS-3 Discussed
. (Various so~srces, various datea) 78
CS-3 Project
U.S. Satel~ite as Launcher
Research, Development of Solar Battery Updated
- (Various sources, various dates) 83
Improved Silicon Cell Efficiency
High-Speed Solar Cell Ma.nufacture
Spectral Division Solar Battery
~ Radio-Wave Absorbeizt Ferrite Developed
(SHtTICAN SHINCHO, 25 May 82) 90
- b -
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POLITICAT, AND SOCIOLOGICAI,
~
K0~'~'IEZ PARTY ~ S POSITION D2SCUSSE~G
. Tokyo TOKYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 3�7une 82 p 2
_ [Article by reporter Kazuhiro Kobayashi, "Komei's Lonely Struggle.")
[Text] Komei Party's resistance continues in the form
of boycotts of conferences for heads of ruling and
opposition parties and absences from the House of

~ Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee which has
been discussing three treaties on arms reduct:ion. The
Komei Party cannot agree to the normalization of the
Diet which will likely lead to passage of the bill
to revise the Public Office Election Law, which the
~ Komei Party strongly objects. This is the reason for
its boycatts. I have explored the background and
~ purpose of the tough line asserted by the Komei Party.
The Komei Party's Anti-Aiet P~licy C'ommittee discussed the handling of the
- three treaties on arms reduction in the morning of 2 June. About 20 Diet
members, alm~st double the ordinary attendance, were at the meeting. "Don't
agree to normalization of the Diet platted in collusion with the LDP
and tr,e S..cialist Party." "Even if the three treaties come to the House
of Councilors, we should boycott discussions." Tough opinions were
_ presented one after another. Then, they decided noC to attend the Foreign
~ Affairs Com~ittee and the Diet session held that day.
Return of "Good Underatanding"
Ordinarily, there were always some memt~ers in the Komei Party who possess
~ commonsense and would say, "In ord~r to promote arms reduction, we should
attend the committee meeting." On that day, however, there was no member
who voiced an opinion like that.
'I't~e Komei Party has firmly decided to object to the bill to alter the
Public Office Election Law intended to revise the nationwide district of the
l~ouse of Councilors. "We will prevent the bill from passing to the utmost
of the party's pewer," said Chairman Takeiri. The Komei Party�s reasons
are: (1) that the questionable constitutionality of a bill which does not
,
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allow an individual to run for a nationwide seat in the House of Councilors;
(2) that the bill is a product of the interests ~nd policies of large
_ parties and is intended to benefit them; and (3) that the bill can be
considered as the first step toward a small electoral district system.
- Therei~ore, the Komei Party cannot accept a long e:ttension of the session to
facilitate passage of the bill to revise the Public Office Election Law,
and consequently cannot accep~ normalizatioi: of the Diet whict~ would promote
- discussion of the bill.
A Decrease of T~ao Seats If the Bill Is Passed

-1
The reason the Komei Party strongly objecCs to the bill is that, if passed,
the Komei Party is certain to lose seats. This is the common view shared
- by the anti-election policy committee officials of other parties. When
the seat allocation system proposed by the LDP and the Socialist Party is
applied to the nationwide district ballots of the previous election, the
Komei Party clearly declines in seats from nine to seven.
- Moreover, there is a view that "the Komei Party seems to be expressing a
- f ighting attitude toward the decisive political battle of '83" (a leading
member of the LDP). As if to confirm this view, the opinion is he3rd within
the Komei Party that it has become "too understanding recently," i.ncluding
- its shift of position on the national security and defense policies to a
_ realistic line at the end of last year. Therefore, the Kamei Party needs to
strengthen i~s checking function as an opposition party.
There is another incident. At a Komei Party's meeting discussing about the
~ extension of the current session, one leading member made the following
speech: "Whenever there is a trouble in the Diet, the relationship between
- our party and the Tanaka faction is mentioned. Let's ob~ect firmly to the
extension of the session which has been primarily planned by the Tanaka
faction. This is the best chance to prove that our relationship with the
Tanaka faction is just a rumor with no basis." Then, he received the
_ enthusiastic applausE from young and middle-standing members. From this
perspective one can believe that the Komei Party's resistance is a way to
divorce itself fr~m the Tanaka faction.
Isolation Increases
Nevertheless, the Komei Party cannot stay asleep during 94 days of the
rem~ining Diet seasion. Even within the Socialist Party with whom the
Komei Party joined to opgose the extension, voices are heard to the effect
that "we cannet g~ along with the Komei Party forever." The Komei Party's
isolation is gradually increasing within the opposition parties.
The Komei Party is also aware of this. Chairman Okubo of the Komei Party's
_ Anti-Diet Policy Committee said: "The opening of the Budget Committee
~ after the return of Prime Minister Suzuki may become a chance for normali2a-
~ tion of tne Diet." He intends to requ~st an extension of one week in each
house once the Budget Committee is opened. �Mr Okubo also said "Since many
I
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~ problems have piled up, the Budget Cotmnittee needs to have time for discussion
until the end of June." He judges that the reopening of discussion on the
~ bill to revise the Public Office Election Law wili be considerably delayed.
Frankly speaking, it is a headache for the Komei Party how to set up a
~ strategy to cope with the situation unti7. the end of the session on 21
; August.
~
' COPYRIGHT: Chu-Nichi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha 1982
; 9896
~ CSO: 4105i132
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'AKAHATA' CARRIES JCP MESSAGE TO SFRY CONGRESS
OW010203 Tokyo AKAHATA in Japanese 26 Jun 82 p 7
[Text of JCP Central Committee's message of greetings to the 12th C~ngress of
the League of Co~nunists of Yugoslavia]
[Text] Dear comrades: The JCP Central Committee hereby extends heartfelt
congratulations and solidar.i~y to you on the o~ccasion of the opening ~f the
12th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia jLCY]. Your congress
opens at a time when warld capitalism faces its overall, ever-increasing cri--
sis, a nuclear arms race between rival military blocs is endlessly escalating,
the danger of an out6reak of nuclear war is mounting, and movement, opposing
nuclear war, seeking a total ban on nuclear weapons and extensive disarmament
if gaining unprecedented momentum across the world.
We hope that your congress will score a new ~uccess in resolving various pend-
ing, urgent issues in a satisfactory way, in expediting the construction of a
socialist society in a manner suitable to the specific conditions of y~ur
country, and in contributing to the development of a joint struggle of ar~ti-
imperialist forces of the world to promote peace and social progress.
The JCP and the LCY are working under different conditions, with the former
struggling as a party in a highly developed capitalist nation subordinate
- to the United States and the latter acting as a party in a socialist nation.
Hawever, since early days both parties have unyieldingly struggled against
outside inter~erence and pressure and developed their friendship and cooperation
by firmly maintaining their independent stances, observing the principl~.a of
independence, equal rights, and noninterferences in each ather's internal af-
fairs, and respecting mutual positions. In this respect, the talks between
JCP Presidium President Kenj~ Miyamoto and President Josep Brozovitch Tito
in 1978 were of epochal significance. We believe that the jo~nt statement
issued on that occasion has been of great significance, not only in relations
between our two parties but also has had great international significance as
proved by later developmentsr
Comrades~ The world imp~rialist and reactionary ruling circles today tend
more to seek a way out the capitalist crisis through large-scale arms expan-
sion, aggression and war. While pushing a large-scale military buildup, the
~
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U.S. imperialists regard the strengthening of their military blocs for aggres-
sive purposes as an important pillar of their "policy of strength" and press-
. . ing Japan and other allies to strengthen arrangements for joint combat operations
under the le adership of U.~. forces, and to step up armament. The Reagan
~ administration has embarked upon a new arms race, with nuclear weapons as its
~ core, by pushing ahead with a concept of limited nuclear war. This move, in
~ particular, is confronting all peoples with the danger of a nuclear war. How
~ to prevent the implementaticn of this dar.~erous concept and haw to realize an
~ all-out ban on nuclear weapons are matters of life and death to all peoples.
Under the Japan-U.S. military alliance, whych makes Japan subservient to the
United States, the Japanese reactionary ruling circles and the L~.beral Demo-
cratic Party jLDP] government are hastening the pace of arms buildup and
_ Japan's militarization while, in fact, approving Reagan's limited nuclear
war plan and the aoriversi~on of Japan intp~~a nunlear base to implement that plan.
They are playing an active role as a U.S. ally in the economic,political and
military fiElds. To this end, the Japanese Go~~?rnment is drastically reducing
state expenditure for the people's livelihood and welfare under the pretext
of an "administrative rpf.orm." By stepping up their reactionary offensive,
- Japan's reactionary circles and the LDP have turned the middle-of-the-road
political pa~ties into government parties and are now concentrating their at-
tack on our party. Hawever, this kind of LDP government policy is drawing
criticism from broad segments of working people in all strata.
~ Ttiese circumstances roake it all the more imperative to step up the struggle
to scrap the Japan-U.S. alliance, build an independent, neutral and nonaligned
_ Japan, codify the "three nonnuclear principles" of not possess ing, not manu-
facturing and not bringing in nuclear weapons, effect a change in the govern-
~ ment's econoinic policy in the direction of defending the working people's
livelihood and rights, check the reactionary tendency in politics, and pro-
tect the people's democratic rights and freedo~n. In this struggle, the JCP
has a still greater role to play.
In the midst of the intensifying reactionary offensive and the quickening tempo
, of. the move to the right of the centrist parties, the JCP has stood fir~ in
i the face of stormy anticommunist attacks and has actively participated in the
"National Council for Peace, Democracy and Reformist Union" movement in order
to open the way to bringing all ~ reform~.st forces together. Noted person:~ges
and socialist party members have also taken part in this movement. Today, a
year after its inauguration, about 4.1 million members, including individuals
and organizations, are participating in the movement. The prospect of union
for the reformist forces in Japan largely depend~ on the development of this
movement.
With its 60th founding anniversary coming on 15 July and with its 16th congress
slated for late July, our party is actively tackling various immediate problems.
At the same time, it is stepping up its drive to increase party ranks and
supporters--the motive force of political refortn--and striving to sca1Q
a new peak in party construction.
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Comrades,
_ Today, when the world is at the crossroads of war an~ peace, the progressive
forees of the world are faced with the serious task of waging struggle
to prevent nuclear war, effecting a total ban on nuclear weapons, realizing
a drastic disarmament, putting an end to the arms race centered around nuclear
weapons, dissolving opposing mili~ary blocs serving as a tool to infringe
on other nations' sovereignty, and realizing the withdrawal of foreign troops
and the removal of foreign military bases. Particularly, a total ban on
nuclear weapons is a cerntral task in eliminating the danger of a nuclear war
and insuring the pre~ervation of the human race. Our party strongly urges
that this task be made the foremost task for world peace and that international
solidarity action be launched to carry it out instead of pushing it into the
background under all kinds of pretests or making it a goal for the distant
future.
In connection with the issue of woild peace, we are compelled to point out, in
particular, that, as developments in Afghanistan and Poland indicate, another
nation's right to self-determination is being violated by a socialist country,
which should be a champion of peace and national self-determination, and this
violation stands in the way of the struggle of anti-imperialist democratic
forces. The struggle to oppose this kind of serious error coffinitted by big-
power chauvinism and hegemonism and resolutely defend th e~�~right to national
self-determination has become very important to the cause of world peace and
the social progress of all peoples.
The Nonaligned Movement, which has developed into a powerful force in world
politics, has an increasingly gre8t role to play. We expect ~he Nonaligned
Movement to make fresh successes. While strengthening the ties with this ~ove-
- ment, our party will continue to move vigorously forward toward scuttling the
Japan-U.S. military alliance and building a nuclear-free, nonaligned neutral
Japan.
The JCP w~ll continue to fight resolutely for the strict implementation of the
publicly recognized norms of the world communist movement and do its utmost to
promote cooperation and solidarity in common tasks.
We earnestly hope that the friendly relationship and solidaiity between the
~ JCP and the LCY will develop further in accordance with publicly recognized
norms.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Ktosanto Chuo Iinkai 1982 nen
~ CSO: 4120/332
.
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAI,
i ~
~
I
_ ;
'AKAHATA' REJEC`tS 'TASS' REPORTAGE ON SOFIA MEETING
~ OW250245 Tokyo AKAHATA in Japanese 22 Jun 82 p 2
[Unattrib uted article: "Contravention of the Princip~e of Equality and False
~ Reporting--Issues Involving the International Conference in Commemoration of
Dimitrov's Bi~th Anniversary"]
[Text] An international theoretical conference was held in Sofia 15 to 17
, June under the sponsorship of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] to mark the
100th anniversary of Georgi Dimitrov's birth. Attending from the JCP were:
' Hidesato Numata, advisor to the JCP Central Comcnittee; Tomokazu Shirai, member
of the JCP Central Committee; and Hideo Sakamoto, member of the JCP Interna-
tional Affairs Committee. They carried a message from Sanz~ Nosaka, chairman
of the JCP Central Committee.
Chairman Nosaka's message was read at the opening plenary session by senior
delegate Numata. In the message, Chairman Nosaka recalled vivid memories of
Demitrov with whom he shared Comintern activities. He also referred to Stalin's
errors and the significance of the Comintern's dissolution and stressed the
importance of the task of overcoming big-power chauvinism. He expressed the
JGP's determination to contribute to the struggle against nuclear war and for
a total ban on nucelar weapons.
To our regret, however, two strange things occurred in connection with the
conference, raising the question of whether the meeting measured up to stand-
ards as an international one. One event was that only the CPSU delegate had
ttie privilege of delivering a long speech. The other was that after the
conference ended, the Soviet media reported an "appeal" allegedly adopted at
the conference, although no such appeal was actually adopted.
When the JCP Central Committee received an invitation ~o attend this confer-
ence, it sent an inquiry to the BCP, the sponsor, asking these questions:
1) Will all parties present be treated equally? And will there be a keynote
~peech? 2) Will a joint document, such as a resolution or declaration, be
adopted?
Ttie BCP replied that there ~aould be no keynote report, that the Bulgarian dele-
~;ate, as sponsor of the conference, might be the first to address the meeting,
~ .
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l~i~t all delegations would be treated equally, that the duration of each dele-
gation's speech would be limited to 10 minutes. The reply also said that no
resolution or declaration, now any other joint documents would be adopted and
that each participant would express only his view.. The JCP decided to attend
the meeting only after it received this reply.
But what actually happened at the meeting was that CPSU delegate Pc~noma.rev,
candidate member of the CPSU Politburo, spoke for as long as 55 minutes at
the r,utset while all other dele~ates were permitted to speak for only 10 to
15 minutes. At the end of the meeting, BCP Secretary General Zhivkov spoke
for about 1 hours .
Ponomarev paid tribute to the line of the 26th CPSU Congress and the present
Soviet foreign policy. It is apparent from the length and nature of this speech
that is was treated like a"keynote report" for all intents and purposes. JCP
senior delegate Numa.ta made a presentation to the sponsor, regretting the way
the conference proceeded in violation of the principle o~ equality. Further-
more, the JCP Central Committee made a presentation to the BCP Central Com-
mittee through the Bulgarian Embassy in Tokyo expressing sharp regret at "this
extremely perfidious attitude which runs counter to the formal promise and
good faith between the two parties."
The other strange thing is that TASS and other Soviet media reportea as if the
conference had adopted an "appeal's calling upon the people of all countries
to support GeneralSecretary Brezhnev's statement pledging that the USSR will
not be the first to use nuclear weapons .
The 18 June TASS dispatch from Sofia quoted this ~~3nnoui~~ as saying: "We,
deZegates of 140 communist parties, revolutionary democratic parties and in-
ternational democratic organizations participating in this theoreticaZ confer-
ence, hereby call upon all nations to support the Soviet initiative and the
statement by Leonid Brezhnev, leader of the CPSU and the Soviet state, obli-
gating the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons."
Another TASS dispatch reporting BCP Secretary General Zhivkov's concluding
speech, as we11 as a 19 June report of PRAVDA, the CPSU organ, said that the
- aforementioned "appeal" was "approved unanimously" by the participants during
the Zhivkov speech.
These reports are sheer fabrications. It is a common sense that a normal
procedure for adopting some formal document at any conference requires a draft
- to be formally introduced, followed by deliberation and voting.
The three-man JCP delegation attended the conference fm~
beginning to end.
- Particularly on the final day, they never left their seats from the beginning
of the Zhivkov speech to the closing of the cnnference. No such "appeal" was
introduced and deliberated upon. Now was any vote taken.
In his speech as a BCP 3elegate, Secretary General Zhivkov praised the Soviet
- foreign policy, including the Soviet pledge not to be the first to use nuclear
weapons, but this praise was not introduced as an "appeal," nor was it adopted
as such.
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_ Yet Soviet news media went so far as to concoct what they call an"appeal,"
and have pu}~licized it. They even quoted the "appeal" as saying "We, the
delegates of 140 communist parties...participating in this theoretical con-
ference...," thur; giving the false impression that all the parti:cipants, in-
cluding the JCP delegation, actually adopted the "appeal." Their reports are
- an utter distortion of the facts.
~
As for the Soviet stanc: on nuclear weapons, up to the year before last, the
Soviet Union maintai~ed an attitude of opposing the UN resolution calling
f.or the promotion of an agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons. Our
party criticized this attitude in letters to the CPSU and by other means.
= Mea~while, the Soviet Union at last came out in support of this resolution
during last year's UN General Assemb 1y session. Viewed against this back-
groi.md, the latest Brezhnev statement pledging not to be the first to use nu-
clear weapons--though it contains no ne*a proposal-deserv~s attention, although
it only proposes a partial measure which socialist countries regard as a mini-
mum requirement in light of the fact that the United States stubbornly re-
jects even a ban on first nuclear strikes, not to mention a tot~l ban on the
use of nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, as repeatedly pointed out by our party, at a tim~ when lethal
~ nuclear weapons capable of killing all mankind several times over are threat-
ening man's very survival, a partial measure which does not openly and squarely
call for an all-out ban on nuclear weapons cannot measure up to the demand~of
the hUndreds of millions of people the world over. The signatures of tens of
millions of Japanese submitted to the UN Special Session on Disarmament call
for "top priority to be given to a total ban on nuclear weapons."
~ Therefore, it is not right to ask the world to evaluate the Brezhnev proposal,
` whi.ch does not regard a total ban as an urgent task, as if it were something
~ supreme, and even less so to fabricate a story that an "appeal" calling for
such an appraisal was actually adopted with the support of ma.ny parties. Such
behavior is not only unbefitt:ing a socialist country but also cannot be con-
doned from the point of view of general canons of inte~national behavior.
These issues involving the Scfria conference have brought into relief the pic-
ture of the followers of big-power hegemonism who are trying to seize every
opportunity to impose the line of regarding the Soviet Union as the center of
cc~mmunism upon the world communist movement. Even so, the deception, which is
real.ly a poor one- and very easi'ly disproved, casts doubt on the moral fiber and
discernment of those involved.
COI'YRIGHT: Nihon Ktosanto Chuo Iinkai 1982 nen
CSO: 4120/332
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MILITARY
JAPAN'S FUTURE PROPOSALS FOR DISARMAMENT DISCUSSED
Tokyo CHUO KORON in Japanese July 82 pp 90-96
~rticle by Tetsuya Endo, Deputy Director-General for the UN Affairs, Mini-
_ stry of Foreign Affairs: "Four Proposals That Japan Should Make._7
[Text,~ Introduction
The Second United Nations General Assembly Session on Disarmament will be
held at UN Headquarters from 7 June until 9 July; and Japan's Prime Minister
Suzuki will attend and give a general address on 9 June. Since the First
UN General Assembly Special Session on Di~armament was held in May and June
1978, it was exactly four years ago.
During this period of time, tension has heightened in various areas of the
world, such as the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979,
the Iran-Iraq dispute, the strained conditions in Poland in 1981, and the re-
cent Falkland Islands dispute; detente between East and West has greatly re-
ceded and the international situation has undergone an increase in violence.
There is the view that the world situation has turned in the direction of mil-
itary expansion rather than disarmament.
Because of such a state of affairs, it has been asked by some with a feeling
of powerlessness regarding the disarmament issue what in the world was the
meaning of the First General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament and
won`t this second session on disarmament end in the same way as the first?
However, the road to disarmament is a long, thorny one; disarmament is not
something which can be realized in a day and a night; it is not something
which can be solved simply because one or two UN sessions on disarmament are
held. Rather, given this kind of violent international state of affairs,
~ disarmament is a topic which is even more poignant and to which even more
effort can be devoted. This present disarmament conference should be taken
as the "second milepost" (the first session on disarmament was the first mile-
post), and although we should restrain from putting too great an expectation
on this session, we should not look at it nihilistically. Rather, it is im-
portant how this occasion of 157 UN member nations meeting together in one
~ hall and of the world's top leaders gathered togetfier is used to promote dis-
armament.
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Cn Japan, Europe and the U.S., the concexn of the people toward the discon-
tinuance of nuclear weapons, disarmament and this second special session on
disarmament has recently grown tremendously, and comparF~d to the first special
session on disarmament four years ago, has risen inarkedly. The background
and action format af citizen level concern in the disarmament issue differs
' depending on country and region, but it seems that what they have in commort
~ is an earnest dpsire that a nuclear disaster must be prevented, based'on the
! fear that perhaps the earth and mank~nd will be destroyed by the rapid devel-
opment of nuclear arms.
~
At the time of the Second UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament
whicti will open under such circumstances, I would like to state below my own
views concerning why disarmament is necessary, why disarmament is difficult,
the course of disarmament until now, the manner of advancing realiatic disarma-
. ment and Japan's basic posture toward this conference. (This does not repre-
sent the government's opinion)
Why Disarmament Now?
It seems that unfortunately the history of �ankind for the most part has been
a history of bloody combat and war, rather than a history of peace, but even
so, it is a fact that the search for peace and efforts at disarmament as the
principal means to peace have always continued, no matter how slim. Along
with the fact that the method of combat has gradually become brutal due to
the advances in military technology and has gone f�~om being a fight between
soldiers to one involving civilians indiscriminately, the cry for disarmament
has become more earnest. Reflecting on World War I, the Geneva agreement
~ on the prohibition of the use of poisonous gas and bacteriological weapons,
~
' concluded in 1925, distinguishes the pros and cons of disarmament, and the
London and Washington naval disarmament treaties from the 1920's through
~ the 1930's were examples of this.
. However, the reason why disarmament is being demanded even more earnestly now
is the atomic bombs which appeared at the end of World War II and the rapid
development of nuclear arms. It is said that at present nuclear warheads
in excess of one million of the Hii~shizna-type bombs are stockpiled on the
earth. Furthermore, not only does the qLantity continue to increase, but the
deveZopment of missiles, the transport means of nuclear weapons, is rapidly
pro~.ressin~ and their flight distance is increasing and their strike precision
' is surprisingly accurate. These nuclear weapons have already reached an
enormous number which can be called overkill; and once nuclear war occurs,
tYiere is the danger it will develop into a tragic situation involving all of
mankind.
F~irthermore, fr.om the economic perspective, expenditures for military arms
~re in the astronomical figures. At present, when the definition of what
are the military expenditures has not been established internationally, the
world's military expenditures cannot be calculated accurately, but according
to estimates by the group of experts commissioned by the UN, it is said that
the sum e~ore r.t::~r, r~~;cr~~s 5U0 billion dollars annually. According to another
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view, it is said to have reached 600 billion dollars. It can be calculated
that this is equivalent to about 6 percent of tfie entire world's total prod-
uction. In terms of human resources directly involved in the military, it is
said that aC present the regular armies are at a level of approximately 25
million soldiers, and about 40 million when reserve troops are included.
Naturally, military expenditures enrich the arms industry and industries re-
lated to arms. Although the effect that the development of military technolo-
gy is useful in improving the uJ.tramodern technology of industry, the prob-
lem in macroeconomics is that military expenditures disregard the prir.ciples
of market economy and divert limited human resources and natural resources to
nonproductive fields of the military. Moreover, looking at the past 20 years,
military expenditures have steadily increased at about the rat3o of a sub-
stantial 3 percent annually.
Recently, such arms have become extremely expensive economically; and more
- than anything else, there is the fearsome danger they are tied to the destruc-
tion of this planet and all of mankind. Consequently, it can be said that
the significance and necessity of disarmament are extremely great.
Long, Steep Road to Disarmament
Disarmament is mankind's common desire, and despite the fact that its neces-
= sity is fully realized, the fact that the increase in armaments between var-
ious countries of the world, starting with the U.S. and USSR, has continued
as ever is a contradiction of this desire. However, there are inevitable
causes for this which cannot help but exist under present international re-
lations.
International society at present consists of a gathering of sovereign nations
and is in a situation where each nation has to guarantee its uwn security
independently or in cooperation with other friendly nations so that there
are no superpowers above these sovereign nations with the power to coerce
or police. In short, the guarantee of security for each nation is eventually
entrusted to the national defense efforts and military power. An actual prob-
lem often seen in today's world is the example where an armed force dispute
occurs because, even though one nation wants peace, it is threatened, or in-
- vaded or intervention takes place by another nation with superior strength.
At the end of World War II, the United Nations was established after reflection
upon the fact that war must not be repeated again, and the lof ty ideal of pre-
serving world peace was displayed by each nation. However, the UN is not a
structure ir. which the UN possesses military forces in order to preserve in-
ternational peace and security and guarantees security in place of each coun-
try. After all, sovereign nations are obliged to preserve their own security
on their own.
- mhe problem of disarmament which regulates, limits and curtails armaments is
a life and death problem directly concerned with the security of one's own
country, no matter what country. Fioreover, guaranteeing security is a re-
quirement of sovereignty for sovereign nations.
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Certainly, it is not possible to guarantee the sa,fety of a country simply with
~ armaments. Stability of. tfie country's econom}r, government and society~and the
rnaintenance of good international relations through diplomatic efforts are in-
disFensable requir~ments for security. However, it is not possible to substi-
tutc the functions of deterrence and defense which onZy military power has with
means other than military power. In this sense, iC can be said that disarma-
ment and security, first of all, are two sides of the same coin. This is the
~ difficulty in disarma.ment. In a~tu~lly advancing disarmament, it is necessary
- to increase each country's perceptio:~ of security by disarmament measures, or
; at least work so as not to damage the perception of security. The fact 3s
. that dis (31) i.~4~~,~. �~uiu,:~~ (27) z.esx z,s~s ~3 ~
~~(1 ~ D~f 'j:' I f iF~ bH' ~I;il ;~`,~1:.~J 1.5H'.i 1.398 ~~37~ .',.r. ~ 7 F v- 7~ Ikl ~~l!
~21~ D I.Y*~I'~ihlll~~61F'~I~il~t~1l:7i~ :35.5 :i14 I ,~,~~i~.f;.;. -~:t~P~~1'"_�1f'I
(,'7? ~ D ri 1 1 c i~~~ 4q'i:Uil ~~:.ll:'.'9 ~]L2 391 1i1.3
v
~23 -,�I+~I~~L'~fi4,?�Ii~a!: ! iii~k'C~'I!Iti:~N!�~~?:In6::" 'L~65H 'L.GZQ
(;tl~~l~~iii'~~'I'.r:;~~IC?�l~i I (2(~~ni~~i'r u y
; 2r , .f_ 7 � �;-:.d,~;tl ~~26 ~I~i~l`. ~i 'l'L'L 19Ei S:i-i~~ ~n
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;
~
! Key:
1. Item
i 2. Office in Charge
3. Type
E 4. FY81
~ 5. FY82
6. Remarks
7. Promotion for the development of basic technologies for the next gen-
eration of computers
8. Basic software technology
9. New ;~eripheral terminal device technology.
10. R&D un fifth generation computer
11. R&D on high-speed computing system for sc~ence and technology
i 12. RbD on basie technologies for the next generation of industry
13. R&D on new fut~ction elements
~ 14. Development of instrumentation and control system for topical appli-
; cation
; 15. Development of complex production system for ultrahigh-performance
, laser application
16. Automatic sewing and ma.nufacturing system
17. Development of solar energy technology
18. R&D on solar photoelectric generation
19. Aid fund for R&D on important technology
20. Important technology R&D theines
, 21. Untrod, innovative technology R&D themes
22. Energy conservation technology R&D themes
; 23. Promotion of software-related technology
j 24. Advanced information processing countermeasure
~ 25. Development of health-care network system
2 6 . MIT I
27. Assistance fund
28. FY
~ 29. Sum total
~ 30. Request base
i 31. Industrial Science and Tectmology Agency
~ 32. Large-scale project
33. Sunshine project
~ 34. Brandnew
~ 35. Starting in FY74
36. Including special account...
37. Total number of object themes related to electronics granted in FY81:
24.
38. Information Frocessing promotion Business Association.
Note to Table: The name of and budget for the ma.jor electronics projects and
the projected duration of the budget are shown. Some budgets with a known
, sum may be without a theme. Some budgets shown may not be used exclusively
on electronics projects. Budgets which are not knawn are not shown. (The
~ same rule also will apply to tables in later installments.)
~ 60
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(26 Apr 82 pp 229-233 ]
[Part II: "Defense Agency: Missiles Are the Focus of R&D"]
[Text] The Defense Agency's 1982 budget is 2,586.1 billion yen. This is an
increase of 7.8 percent compared with the 1981 budget of 2.4 trillion yen.
The preferential treatment the Defense Agency budget has received is quite
conspicuous against the background of the relatively sma.ll increase of 6.2
percent for the regular account as a whole. Its proportion to the gross
national product has been raised to 0.93 percent (from 0.90 percent in 1980
and 0.91 percent in 1981). With regard to R&D, the budget of the Technical
Research Headquarters increased to 35,618 million yen, 12.3 percent over
that of the previous year.
R&D on missiles, including a new surface-to-ship missile (SSM), an intermedi-
ate-range antitank missile, and the former portable surface-to-air missile,
constitutes the focus of R&D activities for this year. There are also a
number of items related to land-based weapons, including the first trial-
construction of a new tank and a new automatic antiaircraft cannon. R&D
begun last year on a medium training plane (MTX), an improved-capacity mobil-
ity vehicle (CCV), and a high-speed homing torpedo will continue to be carried
out this year.
As for business and procurement, the suppliers of "Badge X," involving a total
budget of more than 200 billion yen, will be determined.
s Development of Surface-to-Ship Missile To Begin
Table 1 shaws the details (centered around R&D) of the defense-related 1982
budget. The Defense Agency's Technical Research Headquarters will initiate
four new development projects. They are the surface-to-ship missile, the
medium-range antitank missile, the new tank, and the new automatic anti-
aircraft cannon. Research and trial construction of these items have been
under way, carried out by the relevant manufacturers such as Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, but activities will be conducted in
earnest starting in 1982. These projects are expected to last 5 years or so.
The R&D cost of some of these items may well exceed 20 billion yen, showing
that they are very large-scale R&D projects.
The surface-to-ship missile, to be used from land to launch counterattacks
against invading ships, will be developed on the basis of the air-to-�ship
missile (ASM1). It has a long range, 120-130 km, so it can be launched from
a mountain cove several tens of kilometers inland fran the coast. The missile
will fly, avoiding obstacles, toward the target, the ship. Even if a multiple
number of missiles are launched simultaneously, these missiles can be made to
detect and select different targets, so the missiles will noC be concentrated
on the same ship. This type of "random target selection forma.t" is said to
be incorporated into the system. The Defense Agency is putting extra effort
into the R&D of this missile as defensive equipment appropriate for Japan's
defense-only defense objective.
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i
~ ~ The Defense Agency's Technical Research Headquarters plans to carry out tli~~
first trial construction of the surface-to-ship missile over a period of 3
~ years, 1982-1984; the second trial construction in 1985; and technical ex-
periments in 1986; its development is to be finished in 1987o The total
development cost is estima.ted to be approximately 20 billion yen; the 1982
budget is approximately 5 billion yen. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which
was the ma.jor contractor for the ASM1, is again the major contractor for
f this missile. Mitsubishi Electric is in charge of the construction of the
guidance device; Nissan Motors, the auxiliary propulsion device; and Nippon
Oils and Fats, the propellant.
The Defense Agency's procurement plan after campletion of the development of
the surface-to-ship missile has not yet been decided. However, its unit price
will certainly exceed that of the ASM1 (120-130 million yen), so an order
amounting to several tens of hillions of yen can be expected.
The medium-range antitank missile (ATM) is a missile for attacking tanks; its
range is 1.5-2 km. The ma.jor contractor is Kawasaki Heavy Industries. A
number of other firms, including Nippon Electric, will participate in the
. trial construction of various camponents. The first trial construction is
to be carried out over a period of 2 years starting in 1982 (with a budget
~ of 500 million yen), and its development is to be completed in 1986. The
total cost is expected to be approximately 7 billion yen.
The medium-range ATM has a range of 1.5-2 lan; it uses a"laser homing" format
for aiming. A laser light is directed onto the tank, and the missile traces
' the reflected light. This antitank missile follows after the wire system
"Type 79 antiship, antitank missile" (range, approximately 4 km), and a
~ higher hit rate with high accuracy is to be achieved.
~ The new tanks are scheduled to be formalized (formally adopted into the
troops) in 1988, so they are called Type 88 tanks. They will replace the
Type 74 tanks, which are the newest tanks today, and become the main force
after the latter half of the 1980's. According to the development plan, the
first trial construction is to be conducted in 1982-1984 and the second trial
construction in 1985-86. The new tanks will have improved firepower and
motive power and improved performance through use of computerized FCS (fire
control system), campared with the Type 74 tanks. As part of the 1982 budget,
the Defense Agency requested 7 billion yen to cover the entire first trial-
construction cost, but only 1.3 billion yen of that portion was approved for
1982-83. The total development cost is expected to reach 20 billion yen.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is the major contractor.
The new automatic antiaircraft cannon consists of a 35-mm antiaircraft can-
non .mounted on the chassis of a Type 74 tank, with emphasis on automation and
conservation of power. Its development cost of 3 billion yen for a period of
2 years, 1982-83, has been appropriated. It is to undergo trial construction
, in 1982-83; various tests are to be carried o=.c~. in 1984; and it is to be
tormalized in 1985. The Japan Steel Works will have responsibility for the
cannon, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for the chassis, and Mitsubishi Electric
~ for the FCS.
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Medium Training Plane for the Next Period To Enter Into Partial Trial Construc-
tion
The medium trai?iing planes (MfX) for the ~ext period, whose development was
started in 1981, are the training planes which will replace the T-1 and T-33
in use today. Their development will continue until 1987, at a cost of ap-
proxima.tely 37 biilion yen (1980 cost). Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Fuji
Heavy Industries, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries competed vigorously to
become the major contrac~tor, and Kawasaki Heavy Industries was the winner.
_ Division of the pxoduction work is as follows: Kawasaki will be in charge
of the construction of the forward fuselage, the control room, and the final
assembly; Mitsubishi, the midsection of the fuselage and part of the tail
wing; and Fuji, the main wing. The engine is expected to be the F3 engine
being developed by the Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries. Partial trial
construction will be begun in 1982, and the first flight is targeted for 1984.
In addition, research and trial construction of an improved-capa.city mobility
- vehicle (CCV) is also under way, with the first flight planned for 1983. The
research and trial construction of a portable surface-to-air missile (SAM) is
also being carried out under a 3-year plan which started in 1981. This
missile is characterized by its image homing device using CCD (charge coupled
device) and infrared-ray homing. Toshiba has the ma.in responsibility for its
development. In addition, the development of IR-CCD as a semiconductor
sensor for military applications will be undertaken in earnest. This sensor
is scheduled to be installed on the domestically manufactured missile in.early
1985. Its 1981 budget is approximatel y 800 million yen.
As for procurement :nd business, the ma.jor concerns for 1982 include the
selection oi a major contractor for the construction of an automatic air-
defense warning control system (Badge X). The ma.jor contractor will be de-
cided this su~er, based on estimates submitted by Fujitss, Hitachi Works,
and Nippon Electric, and development will be implemented in 1983-87. Total
cost is expected to reach 250-300 billion yen.
The aircraft includes 23 F15 fighters, 7 P3C antisubmarine patrol planes, and
12 AH-IS antitank helicopters--all very expensive craft. Electronic parts
produced in Japan will positively be adopted on the F15 and P3C ordered in
1982. According to the predictions by the machinery manufacturers, some 400
billion of the approximately 2 trillion yen in orders for F 15 and P3C after
1982, wil,l be spent on machinery, and 30-50 billion yen will be spent on
parts. Orders for metal film resistors, connectors, transformers, and con-
denser~s, in particular, are expected to increase appreciably.
Science and Technology Agency, Ministry of Educati m: N-.II Rocket-Launching
Projects Brewing �
Tn the budgets of the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Edu-
cation, activities related to space development occupy the largest part in the
field of electronics. The sum of the space-related budgets of these two or-
ganizations is 100.6 billion yen, an increase of 2.7 percent over fiscal 1981.
The total budget for space development, including all other agencies and
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~ ministries, is 108.5 billion yen; this is an increase of 303 percent over the
~ year before. A small increase of 2-3 percent has continued for the past 2 or
3 years. The fiscal 1982 limit for national treasury futuxe obligation au-
thority is 67.6 billion yen.
Other newly budgeted major projects include the development of a geostationary
meteorological satellite (GMS-3) and research on the next generations of com-
~ munications satellite technology. The budget comes to 601 billion yen and 20
! million yen, respectively (Table 2). The GiNS-3 follows the GMS-2 (Himawari
F No 2), which was launched by the domestically ma.nufactured N-II rocket on
~ 11 August 1981. The GMS-2 was the first practical satellite which was suc-
; cessfully lat~nched by a domestically produced rocket. The scheduled time of
~ launching for the GMS-3 is the summer of 1984. The major contr.actor for the
GMS-3 is Nippon E lectric.
Launching of the next-generation communications satellite, the CS-3, is ex-
pected sometime af.ter 1987. The rocket that is to be used to launch this
; satellite is the H-I rocket, which is bigger than the N-II rocket that 1_aunched
a satellite weighing 350 kg. Th~ H-I rocket will launch a satellite weighing
, . 550 kg.
; Fresh courage probably has resulted from the successful launching of the GMS-2,
~ and plans are brewing for the launching of satellites by means of the N-II
rocket. According to National Space Development Agency plans, after the
CS-2a is launched in the winter of 1982 (January-February 1983), the CS-2b
will be launnhed in the summer of 1983 (August-September 1983); a No 2 broad-
cast satellite (BS-2a) in the winter of 1984; the GMS-3 in the summer of 1984;
; a No 2 broadcast satellite (BS-2b) in the summer of 1985; and a No 1 marine
observation satellite (MOS-1) in the summer of 1986.
+
~ The performance characteristics of the CS-2 communications satellite are
similar to those of the experimental. communications satellite (CS) "Sakura"
launched by NASA in December 1977. Its ma.in objectivPs include ensuring com-
: munications in times of emergency and disaster and mainta~ning communications
with the offshore islands. Its ma.jor contractor is Mitsubishi Electric.
The broadcast satellite BS-2's performance characteristics are similar to
those of today's experimental broadcast satellite (BS) "Yuri." Its major
- contractor is Toshiba. For the next brQadcast satellite, the BS-3, a budget
of 210 hillion yen has been appropriated by the Radio Regulatory Bureau of
~ the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Launching of the BS-3 is schedu-
' led for February 1989.
_ The marine observation satellite MOS-1 is to ma.intain surveillance of the ocean
surface, mainly of its color and temper~ture, in order to understand the con-
ditions of ocean pollution and to detect the changing of the tides and the red
tide. Its major contractor is Nippon Electric.
~ Besides the CS-2a, an experimental technology satellite, the ETS-III, is
~ scheduled to be launched in 1982. The launch is scheduled for this summer.
(
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With regard to the new H-I rocket, the development of its ground tester and
two-stage tester will be starte-i in 1982. The H-I rocket was originally a
three-stage rocket; however, the experiment will be carried out with two
stages. Launching is scheduled for the winter of 19850
The Ministry of Education has a plan to launch a number of science satellites:
No 8 will be launched in the winter of 1982; No 9 in the winter of 1983~; No
- 10 in the summer of 1985; and No 11 in the summer of 1986o The rocket used
to launch these satellites will be the M rocket, which is smaller than the
N-I rocket.
Specified Research Settled Upon
In the Ministry of Education's budget for electronics, aside from the space
projects, the specified research projects are relatively large in scale.
These are allocated from th~ scientific research fund. The 1982 scientific
research fund amounts to 38 billion yen, an increase of 6.1 percent over that
of the previous year. Of this figure, 30.1 billion yen has been allocated to
n
the "advancement of superior research projects. Specific research is further
broken off from it. Specific research projects usually last 3 years, and the
budget per project over the 3-year period comes to around 600-700 million yen.
- There are eight new specified research projec:ts starting out th is year, as
well as 14 ongoing projects. The themes of the new research projects start-
ing this year have been decided on, but their bud.get scale has not yet been
determined. Themes rei_ated to electronics include "microstructure electronics"
and "research on functional ceramics."
"Microstructure electronics" has nicroworking technology and micro devices
as its objectives. "Research on functional ceramics" includes research on
sensors of environment, heat, pressure, and light, plus research on materials
for these sensors.
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~ Table 1. The Defense Agency Budget (unit: million yen)
i
~
~ ~'c 1 1~4i;i~l I'~IIl: I~~ : luu I'I ~
I
~ flC ~ All 1~ , 7 I~ {~~~I"~' i .
f~ ~u~ri
~ 7 ~ ( a ) 61f'~ � ('~13~ 11~7i~
- ~ �i~i~kbif'~I~I~t'i4'� ~32~ I~/ii:irii'~'~? 13.'l7ti 14,799 'L'L.G�I'' ~ ~3>
` U�k~.~,~alXil4~1,~: I%Jii9(~i`~~~ 1.0'L'L 1.483 5.9:i1 t~x�J~::R+aiMt, t'
/
' 10~ D'~L' i~k'Ek;ilklf~ fli(9i~i`1~~ 1.440 1.339 3.6:i~ ~-Y~~ f�I~fc (
~ i c ab -9fi Y.\~~
11 D'k2;~ �'I~~b~il4~lf:f: I~lil~?i~i`~4A~ 9~i-7 1,14'l 3.~141i 1'~~4k~~: ~{35)
~`Z C9:'4L' ~'~'~Cl~:l~)1i: I%lif~7l~l`~f4~ 1.134 1.'L26 I.MI11 i~5i+~'t-: i'!'fH.}lir.i ~3~.
. , D91~'^:~14~1(:r ~%//l~f~l~~~~` ~~.;~y ~~)~i li.~~i!I ~~~~�'1'iF'{:ii'~~~i Y~J~~
(14)n~ ~~ss~ � ~;~~1~
15 "ti i~n ~t:'1i
- 16 D~~~~~1 ~~/jR7f'~'~1~(~) ~0~~ I~Ci 4~i.~Llt~
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