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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ JPRS L/10705 2 August 1982 = Worldwide Re ort ~ p TERRORI~M CFOUO~ 9/82)~ FBi~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORM~TION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 NOTE JPRS publications concain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are transla~ed; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerptj in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamil.iar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclo:~ed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattr~~-.uted parenthetical notes within the bod;~ of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent ttie poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. ~ COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500094442-5 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/10705 2 August 1982 . WO RLDW I DE REPO RT TERRORISM (FOUO 9/82) CONTENTS NEAR EAST ANT,; NOR~ AFBICA ARMENIAN AFFAIRS Mardiros Jamgotchian: 17-19 December 1981 Geneva ~ (ARMENIA, 1982) 1 LIBYA Government Organ Criticizes Western Obsesaion With Te rrorism (AL-JAMAHIRIYAH, 4 Jun 82) 54 WEST E1J~DPE _ I TALY Brogi Reveals B R Connections With GermQn, Irish Te rroris ts (Franco Coppola; LA REPi~BLICA, 26 May 82)............ 60 Report on Terrorism (RAPPORI~O SUL TERRORISMO, 1981) 64 Jouinal of the Red brigades . , (GIOIII~IALE DELLE BRIGATE R06SE, Dec 81) . . . . . . , . . . . . 118 SPAIN ETA Cammuniques to the Basque People (ZUZEN, Apr 81) ............................:a....:.... 153 -a- [III -H1W-133 FOUO] FOR OFFiCUL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SWE DEN RAF Pronouncemeats (1~BTE: RAF, 1977) 165 ~ - b - i+++OR OFF'[[~,7AL USL ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF'ICiAL USE ONLY ' ARMENIAN AFFAIRS c.. MARDIROS JAMGOTCHIAN: 17-19 DECEMBER ],981 GENEVA Beirut ARI~NIA in French 1982 pp 29-45 [Text] The Palace of Justice in Geneva looked like a temporarily fortif ied camp aet up for a trial on this scale. The searchea and the methodical checking at the E:ntrance to the court showed, if it was still necessary to prc+ve it, that Switzerland is a well organized police stat~:. Following are the notes we took of the trial of Mardiroa Jamgotchian. "Please rise, the court is in session!" It was with these few words that the trial of Mardiros Jamgotchian began on Thursday, 17 December 1981, at 9:00 am. The accused is a combat soldier of the ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia] imprisoned in G~neva since 9 June 1981. Mardiros proudly entered the room. With his arm in the air, he gave the "V for victory siga. Around him a mob of photographers ~ostled each other. Photo- graphic flashguns crackled. The hearing began with the impaaeling of the jury. Out of 40 potential ~urore called by the court, 12 were accepted, plus two potential replacements. The 3ury sat at the lef t hand side ~i= the pre- siding ~udge, facing the prosecutor, Raymond Foes. In the first row of seats was Mardiros. Behind him were his lawyers, Deved~ ian and Bencit, and to their left was the Yergus family attorney, Bonnant. All the major partici- pants were in place. The presiding 3udge, Curtin, eaid: "Mardiros Jamgotchian, you are appearing bef~re the Criminal Court of Geneva. Yo~a are accused of the deliberate hom~cide of Mehmet Yerguz, a T~rkish diF,lomat assigned to the ~rkish Coneulate in Geneva. The proceedinge begin." Lawyer Benoit for the def ense rose and apoke: "Your Honor, prosecutor~ ladies and gentlemen of the ~ury, the remarks which I have to make concern the age of my client." Benoit then explained that in view of the different elements in the file concerning the identity of Mardiros, it appeared that certain contradictions had become evident. fle said: "In fact the attorney general of Lebanon on 7 November 1981 brought to the attention of the Swiss courts information concerning Mardiroe Jamgotchian. He reported the exis- tence of a passport issued on 28 January 1981 indicating 2 July 1958 as his b irthdate. Now the family relationehipa mentioned are incorrect. Moreover, there are differences in the dates and in the given names of some of the 1 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500490002-5 ~ ~ FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY relatives. For ita part the defenae has received a sworn statement from the Patriarcriate of Jerusalem which contradicts the information previously referred to. There is an Armenian t=adition which calls for a child to be presented to the religious suthorities in Jerusalem, like Jesus Christ, 40 days after hia birth. This is accompanio..d by the tatooing of his arm. Now my client bears on his arm the tatooed date of 1964." At this point . Mardiros, who had rolled up his sleeve, raised his arm in the air to show his tatoo. '�Sence," lawyer Benoit continued, "it ia clear that at the time these eventa occurred mq client was not 18 but 17 yea:s old. As a conse- quence, I ask that this trial be referred to a court h$ving ~uriadiction over such matters." The members of the ~ury frowned. They were the~:e to find him guilty and they did not seem prepared to give up this privilege. Lawyer Deved~ iar~ for the defense then roae and said: "I would like to make a comment on the attitude of Mardiros Jamgotchian. Se has stated that he was born on 1958~ Todaq he states that he was not born until 1y64. This ~ ap~arent contradiction ie explained by the fact that during the entire pre- trial hearing period he refused to cooperate with the prosectuion regarding all aspects of his identity, his family relatioae, and hia organization. Moreover, he claim~ to have performed the act of which he is accused. He did not wish to cheapen it by attributing it to a minor. This is an act which h~ accepts full responsibilitq for as the action of an adult who is aware of his obligations. Let us not forget that thia is a matter of a boy who lives in the Middle East and that in Lebbnon at age 17 you are an adult. Aad a 17 _ year old is not too young to fight when you belong to a people euterminated by those executioners who made no distinctioa between children aad adults." Yerguz femily attoraey Bonnaat stood up and said: "I am astoniahed, although I am not too mtch surprised at the attempt made by the defense to raise prejudicial circumatances. During the 6 months of the pre-trial hearings the defense had plenty of time to raise this argument which it now presents to the court for the f irst time. Thie was my first comment. My second com- ment is that the file on the accused gives us the age which Jamgotchiaa him- self gave us. And he confirmed his age to ua on many occasione. The pass- port corroborates his statements. And to end thie atatemeat we have the statement of the ASALA ixself which, aoon after the attack, claimed respon- aibility for it and identified the accuaed. On that occasion aleo thi8 communique mentions the birth date of 1958. I therefore ask the court not to let itself be these last minute statements." Prosecutor Raymond Foex, who is a(living?) caricature of what a prosecutor can be, atood up nervously and said: "This ie a matter of determining what the competent court should be, whether the Criminal Court or the Juvenile Court, which sits behind cloaed doors. All the facts which we have had up to now, whether the atatementa made bq the accused, thoee of his organization, . or thia visa form which he filled out, all indicate 1958 as the birth date for Mardiros Jamgotchian. Attempting to make us believe that it wae out of a desire not to cooperate with the course of juetice is an error, since ev~n to the doctor charged with giving hie expert opinion on him Mardiroa .e 2 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR ORFICIAL USE ONLY Jamgotchian said once again that Y~e was born in 1958. Aa.d now they tell us there is a sworn statement from the Patriarchate of Jerusalem which allegedly Troves that he wae born in 1964! This is false. Tn exhi.bit 249 of the pre- t~ial hearinga, we read: 'In the course of the psychiatYic examination the doctor commented on the tatoo which Jamgotchian had on hi.s arm. The explana- tion that the latter gave is that his tatoo is from the t.ime when he went to live with his grandmother.' There are the facta." Foex's voice became venemous and hissing when he added: "This is a maneuver, a procedure in- tended to sow doubt. In its desperate struggle againet d.emocracy terrorism has recourse to every possible means: threats, bombs, tx�icks. Previously, the anarchist who struggled for his ideas boasted of his acts. Now the terrorist is evasive. That is why I d~n't believe a word. of what they tell us, and I would say that if it were true, arming childrer. would be the supremely shameful act of terrorism!" He sits down white-faced, his thin face angry. Judge Curtin orders the suspenaion of the court session for the consideration of the points raiaed. At 11:00 am the court seasion resumes. Judge Curtin read.s the decision of the 3ury: "In view of the question raiaed regarding the age of Mardiros Jamgotchian, in view of the fact that the revelations mai:e today have n~ other purpose than to make the Criminal court incompetent: to hear this case, in view of the fact that the statement of the Patriarchat:e of Jerusalem does not state that Mardiros Jamgotchian was presented to it 4�0 days af ter his birth, in view of the fact that he has told ua that he ie; the eldest of five children, in view of what he has told us concerning his ].ife~ that is, the succession of events and ~obs he held until 1980, in vie~? of the fact that he then lived for 18 months in a camp of Palestinian refugees, in view conse- quently of all the evidence in the file mentioning the year 1958 as his birth date, in view of the fact that on 12 August 1981, duriag his final interroga- tion, he said he was born on 20 June 1958; for all of thFSe motives, there- fore, the court rejects thess pre~udicial statemente and declares the accused liable to trial in the Criminal Court." A buzz of comment ran through the watching audience composed essentially of Arm~enians, of Swiss, and above all of French citizens. 7'he presiding ~udge then read the charge: "Mardiros Meguerditch Jamgotchian appears today before - the Crimina~ ~ourt charged with having violated the Swisf? Penal Code on 9 June 1981 by deliberately killing a person; by being found in possession of a revolver, a hand grenade and bullets; by receiving instructions while traveling from Beirut to Zurich And then from Zurich to Geneva from a person who designated a trash can where che weapons were hidden; by loading his weapon; by lying in wait for the Turkiah diploma~, following and ahooting him in the back with three bullets; by taking flight, removing hia sweater in the building; and subsequently by not displaying any regret in the course of his interrogation but rather boasting of his act and Raying that he was ready to do it again. Mardiros is there before us, standing straight, with his head erect. We can begin the he~ring of testimony by the witnesses." The usher brings forward the first witness, Inspector R. The presiding ~udge asks the witness: "Your name, given name, age, and occupation, please. Do 3 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, to speak without hatred, fear, and favor. Raise your right hand and say, 'I swear' or 'I promise."' The presiding 3udge will restate this formula many times during the sessions. The first witness says: "I was in my office on 9 June at 6:00 pm when a report reached ma stating that there had been a murder committed on the Boulevard Helvetique. The murderer had been arrested and ~ questioned. The victim of the attack was to die before reaching the hospital. We continued with the interrogation of the attacker. He said he was called Jeannot Krikorian. The following day he was interrogated by Inspector Boukd. The weapon found in his poasession was Belgian made and was part of:a ship- ment of weapons delivered to the Iraqi government. The weapon was loaded and had been fired. In his pockets we found looae cartridges, a magazine for the pistol, and a hand grenade. He stated that he had committed this act for his country." The prosecutor asked: "He gave no indication where he had been staying2" In~~ector R replied: "No. And despite the appeals far info=mation which we put in the press, no one has come foiward to provide information regarding him." The pre~iding ~udge said: "Good, the court thanks you. I wish to read the deposition made by Mardiros Jamgotchian (exhibit 25 in the file of evidence) af ter his interrogation at 6:15 pm: 'I hitchhiked out of Teheran to carry out a mission for the ASALA, of which I am an important official. I crossed the ~wiss border on foot. I arrived in Geneva where, in accordance with the ASALA directives, I went every day at 2:00 pm to the English garden under the Horloge Fleurie. I was greeted by an unknown woman with gray hair, a large bosom,.and a red dresa with large black dots. She said to me in Armenian: 'Good afternoon, Salim' and told me not to look at her. She later pointed to a trash can in which weapons were hidden. I went to get them and when I returned, she had disappeared. I went to the public toilet and shut myself in one of the booth8 to clean the grease off the revolver. During the following days I walked around the city, seeing the sights, and slept outside under the stars. On Friday, 5 June, I went to the Consulate of Turkey at about 4:30 pm. I want to make clear that I was carrying an unloaded piatol. I had no intention to kill anyone, as I had come essentially to look around. My organization had given me the right to choose among possible courses of action: either to go into the Consulate and blow it up or kill a Turkish diplomat. On Friday [5 June] I was in place across from the Conaulate of Turkey. I saw four men come out of it. Tt~ey were speaking ~rkish and had remarked that I wae following them. One of them seemed to be more important than the others. I decided to come back and to kill the largest possible number of Turkish officials. I came back on Monday [8 June]. The Coneulate aeemed to be closed. I learned from a passerby that it was closed becauae of Pentecost. On the following day, Tuesday [9 June], I came back. I had loaded my piatol: 13 rounds in the magazine, 10 rounds in my right hand pocket, and others in my left pocket. I waited in the same place. At 6:00 pm I saw an individual come out of the Consulate. I recognized him as the one who seemed the most 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FUR OFFICIAL USE aNLY . important to me on the previous Fridaq [5 Juae]. AnotheY individual came out after him, and they went down the etreet together and th~n separa~ed at a corner. I followed the first individual on foot. Coming up to a distance of 2 meters from him I fired three shots to his back. I then ran away. I ran and after covering 500 or 600 meters I took cover in an alley. Then Z went up to the second floor of a tauilding and I took off the blue sweater that I had been wearing. Uader it I had another eweater. I went ont onto the street again and bought a package of cigarettes. Then I went into a etore and at the exit I was stopped and questioned bq a policea~an. I surrendered without resiatance because those were the orders of my ozganization. I still had the pistol and the hand grenade on me. Theq put handcuffs on me. I was puahed into a police car. They threw me on the floor of the cAr, and a police dog jumped on me and bit me in the shoulder. When. we arrived at the police atation they pulled me out of the car by the hair and dragged me to the entrance of the police station. I wou~.d like to say that I do not regret this action. I had to do it in the namc of my people."' 1'he monotone voice of the presiding ~udge fell eilent after this reading of the statement, and the voice of the prosecutor was heard: "This act was claimed in the courae of the evening by ASALA (Armeniai? ~ecret Army for the Liberation of Armenia)." Inspector R said: "Yes, and he always stated that he acted alone." Defense attorney Benoit said: "I have to mention the fact that there was no identification of the accused in a lineup. I mean to say~ by that the witnesses did not have to recognize Mardiroa Jamgotchian among four or five other persons." Inspector R said: "The witnesaes were in a state of shock and didn't want to see him again." Lawyer Benoit said: "However, the photographs of Mardiros Jamgctchiaa been made. Were those shown to the witnesses?" Inspector R replied: "The photographs are a polir.e formality." The presiding ~udge said: "In any case the photographs taken could not be shown the same evening to the witnesses. There was a matter of aome delay." Defense attorney said: "But Polaroid photographs wer~ xsQd. Therefore, the question asked by Lawyer Benoit is pertinent!" Pertinent questions were not to the taste cf the presiding ~va~ze, and he brought forwar~ the second witness, a Mr I, and read his dep~b:._ion: "It was after 6:00 pni when I heard pistol shots. I was on my moto,rcycle. I saw a man who was firing on a middle-aged ma.n who fell down. The attacker immedi- ately fled. I started uy motorcycle and tried to follow him. Near the Rue dea Beaux Arts I saw him again. I croesed the atreet and followed hiu:, He was walking quickly but not running. Then I lost sight of him. I then saw some policemen and went over to them." 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500090002-5 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The judge then said: "To the question: 'Do you recogaize the murderer in this photo?' qou replied: 'It's the second from the right. They took me to him. I recognized him from his profile and his clothiag. To be frank, it's more the silhouette that I recogaized. If I had not been confronted with him at the police station, I would not have recognized him.' Yerguz attorney Bonnat said: "~Can you giye us further information, that is, whether he wae alone or not?" ' The witness said: "It was the time when offices were cloeing and therefore . there were maay people. However, I onlq saw one man fire." Defense attorney Deved~ian :ssked: "4lould you recognize him todayY" The witness replied: "No, I can recognize hia silhouette, that's all." - Defense attorney Deved~ian said: "I would like to ask the witness if he saw someone who might have been present at the scene, 2 ar 3 meters from the man - firing the pistol." The witness replied: "I don't recall." It was 12:15 pm when the third witness came to testify, Misa A. In her testimony ahe said: "When I was parking my car in the parking lot, I heard three shots. I saw a man rua across the parking lot, with a large gun ia his hand. I followed him with two people I had met in the parkiag ~ot. We telephoned the police when we saw him enter a store, aad he was then stopped for questioning by a policeman." The preaiding judge said: "You were confronted with him in the court ~f the investigating ~udge. You specif ically recognized him." Miss A replied: "Yes, I would have recognized him among a thousand peo~,le. His face has flashed through my head aad has followed me for monthe and months. I waa nverwhelmed. It's not every day that you hear pistol ehots in the street." She assumed a dramatic air and cluag aervously to the railing in front of her. Defense attorney Deved~ian: "Before the hearing befote the ~udge, which took place 2 weeks after the events, did you see his photograph in the press?" Mise A replied: "Yes." Defense attorney Devedjian said: "That's what I wanted to hear you say. And did you see him run or f ire?" Miss A replied: "Only run." Defense attorney Deved~iat.~ "How far was he from you?" ~ 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF[C~AL UCE ONLY Miss A: "About 30 meters." She clutched her purse, trEm~ling~ and without looking at Mardiros, she left the courtroom, sniffi~egv At 12:40 pm the fourth witness was heard. The prsiding 3~udge read his stata- ment in a monotone: "I was on my motorbika. I heard three pistol ahots. I saw a man fall down and, in front of the wounded man, another individual with a revolver in his hand. He ran away. As he ran, he Tiad 'his pistol in his hand. He had black hair and black eyebrows, which I noticed." This state- ment provoked some reaction in the courtroom because Mardiros ia not any particular "type." With his browish hair, his light eyebrows, and his green eyes, he did not really cnrrespond to the rather fantastic deacription, to say the least, which this witnese gave. The witness continued: "I was confronted with him and I recognized him by his corpulence and his hair. I saw him first through a glass window and then, since it was dark, they opened the door and I saw him, making the 'V for victory' sign." Th:~ prosecutor asked: "You ~ouldn't see other peopl~ ruaning or hiding?" The witness answered: "No." Defense attorney Deved~ia:i asked: "Do you exclude the fact that there might have been other persons at the scene of the attack?" The witness replied: "Beginning with the time when I could'nt see everything, I don't see how I could exclude that possibility." The fifth witness came to the witneRS stand. "I was leaving my office," she ~ said. "When I reached the Avenue Helvetique, I heard ~hree shots. A person ahead of ine was f~lling. The pereon was followed by an armed man who ran away. I should state that I was slightly wounded: I felt a burning sensa- tion on my arm. The bullet must have grazed me. However, in view of the unimportance of the wound, I did not present a complaint. I recognized him at the hearing in the courtroom of tha investigating ~udge b~:cauae he had been pointed out to me at the police station. There they aslsed me if I r~~cognized him. I said I did not. The two men were very close together. The first man turned his back on the man following him. The other continued to follow, holding a pistol. I saw the first man sag forward and fall to the ground. I didn't see other persona at the scene. I ran after the t~igitive and I stopped. I saw a young man on a footbridge and I shouted: 'ti-rest him!' However, he left without underatanding what I said." Yergua attorney Bonnat said: "Can you tell us what you did when you ap- proached the victim?" The witness replied: "He wanted to tell me something. He let out a terrible cry which made such an impression on me." The prosecutor asked: "You are a trained nurse. Couldn't you do anything while you waited for help?" The witness answered: "No, I couldn't do anything for him. I eimply held his head. There w~s a spreading bloodstain on his chest." 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ The prosecutor asked: "Did qou see if there were other people around?" The witness replied: "It seemed to me that there weren't many people around." Defense attorney Devedjian asked: "Can you exclude the poasibilitq that the there were other persons around whom you did not aee?" ~ The witness ~aid: "I don't know. I diaa't see any." Defense attorney Deved~iaa asked: "And this young man to whom you spoke when - you asked him to stop the fugitive, is he one of the witnesses?" The witness replied: "I don't think so. He ran away and disappeared. I don't know anqthing else." - The sixth witnese came to the witness atand and said: "I }~eard three shots. I saw a man fall to the ground. I saw another man run away. He had a pietol in his hand. I di~'�:'t recognize that man because I only saw him from the back. I was st-~uc~: by his haircut, which was very ahort on the back of hia neck." The prosecutor asked: "Was he alane?" The witness answered: "Yes, but in f act I should say that I had my eyes firmly f ixed on him." Defense attorney Deved~ian asked: "Can you exclude the possibility that there were other persons around?" The witness said: "Where I was there was no one else." The court session went on, marked by the fuzzy statements af the witnesses. The usher brought in the seventh witness. The presiding ~udge read the deposition of this witness: "I was driving in my car. I noted a young man who was looking behind him. He fired at a passing person who grappled with him. The first shot went into the man's chest and the second shot in the f ace. At the pc:lice station they presented him to me, saying that he was the wurderer, uut I stated that I had never eeen this young man before." The prosecutor said: "You didn't see other fugitives?" The witness replied: "No." Then followed the testimony of the four policemen who interrogated Mardiros. "It was a customer of a etore standing on the terrace who identified the man whom we were holding." These were also the policemen who coafiscated the gun and the hand grenade which Mardiros was carrying on him. The policemen teatified, one after the other. At 1:30 pm the court aession was suspended. At 3:15 pm the session reaumed with other witnesses being heard. Judge Curtin said: "Mr 0, I will read your deposition: 'I was driving ia my car. 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444544494442-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Siiddenly, I heard three shots, like explosions. I noticed a yo~ing man, his arm held out, a gun in his hand, who was looking at a man who was falling down before him. I pulled my head down out of fear. The young man seemed to be about 18 years old and was d~essed in light blue clothiag. At the police station they showed him to me through a window. He resembled the man I, saw in height. I cannot say whether he was alone or not."~ At 3:35 pm Dr Brunswainer, the ballistics ex~~ert, came to the stand to testi- fy in German on the results of his study concerning the pistol, an FN [Bel- ~ gian-mads] Browning, HP model, and the bullets. Ae gave an impression of ~:.r~rtise in his explanations. Defense attorney Benoit asked: "I would like the expert to say if an such a gun it is possible to take off impressions of the fingerprints and what he thinks of the validity of the Gonzales test?" Dr Brunswainer replied: "I cannot answer that because these questions are out of my area of competence. For the rest I can etate categorically that the cartridge cases certainly come from this ~-an." At 4:20 pm Dr Mayer, an expert in explosivea, came to testify regarding the hand grenade. "It's a Russian type grenade. It weighs 590 grams--530 grams of casing and 60 grams of explosives. It's a fragmentation grenade. This type of grenade can kill over a radiua of 10 meters and wound people over a radius of 100 meters. Mardiros stands up an~ speaks in Armenian. At his side Mr Godel, a Swiss citizen of a respectable age, married to an Armenian woman and a professor of Armenian, translates for him: "The grenade was rea~iy to be used when the Turkish diplomat was killed. I defused it afterward." Mardiros leaned to- ward the expert to explain how he defused it and held out his arm as if to take it. Dr Mayer drew back, as though afraid. There were aome laughs in the courtroom. At 4:50 pm a Turkish colleague of the murdered man came to testify on the stand. He was Sadenin Sendogan, an attache at the Consulate of Turkey under Mehmet Yerguz. It was also Mr Godel who translated the questions and answers in Turkish. Mr Sadenin Sendogan said: "I left my off~;e with the consul and we separated lAter. Then I saw a man lying on the ground. He was dead. I immediately recognized Mehmet Yerguz, the victim. On 5 June, about 6:00 pm, I had left the Consulate in his company without noticing anything in partic- ular." Yerguz `amily attorney Bonnant asked: "Can you tell us something about the personality of Yerguz?" Sadenin Sendogan replied: "He was a man of perfect impartiality. In his position as a secretary of the Consulate he received everyone: Turks, Kurds, Armenians, without distinction." Yerguz family attorney Bonnant said: "Yes, yes, on the whole, he was a good man, a tolerant man. This incident served no one's interest. It had no justification." 9 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540090002-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY The prosacutor asked questions in turn: "Do you know the family of Mehmet Yerguz?" 3adenia Sendogan answered: "Yes, I know them. And I kaow that he t~ad spent his last weekend with his family with their best friends, who are Armeniane.'~ ~ Annoyed and elightlq ironic comments ran through the crowd atteading the session, The word circulated that Talaat also, his beet friend, was an Armenian. The presiding iudge suddenly commented: "I find this laughter which we have ~ust heard quite unacceptable. Let ua not forget that a maa has died, that at this moment there is a woman, a weeping wife, born a Swiss citizen, who could not attend the trial because since these events she has been going through a nervous br~akdowa! And I am going to read to you the letter which she sent to the c~urt to escuse her absence." Arid he read this letter, a real funeral eulogy for the victim. Def ense attorney Devedjian said: "I would like to ask the witneas if he has knowledge of the existence of genocide in Armenia. His answer will be very interesting for me." ~ The witne~s, annoyed, turns toward the lawyer and says with a half smile: "I am 32 years old." I Defense attorne;~ Devedjian responda, dryly and coldly: "That's enough for me. That's all I wanted to hear." The presiding ~udge said: "As far as my memory goes--and, moreover, I was born well after this act of genocide--I have often heard people speak of it, and I recall that when I was a child, I was walking with my mother and we passed a number of Armenian refugees in Geneva, and that left aa impression on me." Def ense attorney Deved~ian said: "That is not the problem. I am not asking you the question but rather a Turkish diplomat. And I note that he daes not want to answer." The prosecutor said: "But this is a question of hietoric culture!" Devedjian said decisevely: "No, simply of human culture. If you ask a young German if he knows of the existence of genocide against the Jews, he would surely not answer: 'I am only 20 years old!' And if he anewered, you would have the right to ask other queationa!" The prosecutor bristled: "But they have not ~uet killed German diplomats on our soill" Defense attorney Deved3ian cut him ahort heatedlq: "But Germany does not deny the existence of genocide against the Jews by the Nazis. Mr Prosecutor, that is the whole difference!" ]A FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 F(IR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It was 5:05 pm. The hearing of trese stormy discussions was auspended for a time. At 5:30 pm the trial reaumed with new witnesses =estifying. A Mr D was on the stand. Mr D said: "I was in m}� taai, atopped at a red light. I heard a series of shots. I saw a crowd farther up the atreet. I didn't ae~ anyoa,e elB~e at the scene." Then came Inspector R. The chairman of the court read some of the s�.atements which Mardiros made and in which the date of 24 April was mentioned. Defense attorney Deved~ian arose and explained: "The date of 24 April is the anniversary of the day the decree was signed by the Turkish minister of the interior, ordering the extermination mf a whole people." The following statementa bq Mardiros Jamgotchian were re~... I acted in the name of my people and I do not regret what I did in any w,sy. Like other members of the ASALA, I only know Alec Yenicomechian and Suzy Mashered~ian by name." The Yerguz family attorney asked the inepector: "Did he speak to you of a second co~ando group?" - Inspector R replied: "No." The prosecutor tumed to Mardiros: "You told the inspector you had been something like a tourist ix~ France. Where, when, and with whom?" Mardiros Jamgotchian replied: "In Paris, and I was there alone in 1977." The prosecutor asked: "So you were 13 years old then, if you are 17 yeare old today, and you went on a trip alone at 13 years of age? Mardiros Jamgotchian answered: "Yes, since I had the necessary permiseion from my parents." The usher brought in another witnesa, Inspector Bouks ~ho, in his testimony, stated that the only assistance which Mardiros Jamgotchian had mentioned was that woman who pointed out the trash can to him. The prosecutor asked: "He also told you that he had been in Paris?" Inspector Bouks replied: "Yes, and he said he wae alone." The prosecutor said: "Alone, Which is, as you will admit, difficult to reconcile with the statement that he ia 17 yeare old. That meana that he ~ was 13 at the time of the visit to Paris." The chairman of the court com- mented ironically: "In f act the accused has learned today that he was 17 years old." [passage missing]"...was in contact with the events which were occurring. He livod for a little less than 2 years in a training camp where he received military, political, and ideological training. Then he was designated for 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - this operation in Switzerland. During the dialogue which we had with him we had the impression that a distant but easy contact �vas posaible. We did not have the impression of encountering a blind fanaticlf~m. There shoae from him a kin~d of f aith, of traaquil determination, a kind of sensitivity and of emotional capacity. He aFp2ared to us like a soldier aware of what he had to do. He was also aware o.f the criticism which we outlined and of the duty which he had to per.form. It ia certain that he obeyed laws other than our la~s, but .ie is not sick. Regarding the danger wii^t~ he could constltute, this cold con~~�ction which he showed made us think of the danger but not of a mental danger: rather of the danger presented by a man who would not respond to the same laws as we do." Yerguz family lawyer Bonnant asked: "Did he express any regrets?" Professor Breneim replied: "No. Se told me of a rather large number of letters which he received from some of his compatriots who spoke of him like a hero, but he told me that he regretted having placed Switzerland in danger. Yerguz attorney Bonnant continued: "Did he raise anq questions about his responsibiliti~:s?" Professor Breneim replied: "No." Yerguz attorney Bonnent asked: "Did he raiae questions about his reepoasi- bilitq for the act of which he ia accueed?" Professor Breneim answered: "No." Yerguz attorney Bonnant asked: "Prof essor, since we have had the opportunity on many occasions to appreciate your seriousness regarding expert paychiatric opinion in other trials, I am astoniahed at the very ahort time in which your work has been accompliahed on thia case. Could this be rather slapdash work?" Professor Breneim replied: "The faur meetings which we had with him were enough to demonstrate that he was not mentally i13.." The sharp voice of the prosecutor was raised: "When you performed this ~ examination, the Cornavin attack [on a Swiss railway station] had already been perpetrated. What did he say about this?" Professor Berneim answered: "He told me that he was executing ~a military type order and that he was obliged to bear the consequences which followed without re~oicing in them." The prosecutor said: "You epeak in your report of a normal mental develop- ment or even beyond?" Proreasor Berneim replied: "yes, he is an intelligent boy. Let's not for- get that his family had lived in a refugee camp, terribly traumatized by 12 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF'ICIAL U~~ ONL'Y their experience~. I could only admire that much more the: courage of this iamily which succeeded, in a situation of eatreme poverty, in establishing a very favarable atmosphere." The prosecutor said: "You mention in your regort that you aotice:~ the tatoo which he has~on his arm and that you asked him what it mexnt. Can you tell us if, as he has alleged, the tatoo was placed there wnen he was a baby?" The expert turned taward Mardiros, looked at the tatoo, and said, "No." The prosecutor exclaimed, addressing himself to the court: "They lied to you!" There was astonishment in the sudience. Since when is the view of an expert in peychiatry a guarantee of truth about a tatoo? Aowever, the proaecutor continued the questioning of the e~pert: "You remarked tliat his personality was more adult than that of orher young men?" Professor Berneim replied: "His d~termination is that of an adult, but his enthusiasm, his devotion to duty are rather ~uveaile. I ~aould like to point out that the terrible experienc~a of this family probably served to maintain the very epecial atmoaphere in which he lived. His mothex gave him a kind of blessing when she learn~sd of his ~oining the ASALA. This is not a trau- matic experience but a kind of reactioa Co a drama." Defense attorney Deved~ ian asked: "The fact that the existence of this drama to destroy a nation has been deni.ed, ien't thia a waq of heightening the reactione of youth?" Professor Beraeim ansvrered: "That is, a natu:al reaction to this drama." He continued: "He acted out of an idealism transmitted to him by his family." The presiding ~udge interrupted him: "Evidently, he only saw one thing: avenging and winning back a fatherland, and that necessarily involved the murder of a Turk on the edge of a aidewalk!" Defense ~ttorney Benoit asked: "Professor Berneim, does my client have the full capa~:ity to understand the implications of the act which he co~o~itted?" The profeasor replied that he did. The presading ~udge asked: "His capacity to orient himself has necessarily been diminished by his f anaticism!" Professor Berneim said: "It is certain that, considering his young age, he was indoctrinated, but that is not an illness." The prosecutor asked: "You have not discerned any trouble in hia conscience?" Professor Berneim replied: "No. Really no trouble, either {.n his sense of righteousnesa, his tranquility, and hie determination. We would be 13 ROR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF'iCIAL USE ONLY accustomed to speak of inental problems in many people. Hie determination inspires a certain kind of esteem and of underetanding. He is not aick." Judge Curtin said: "The court thanks you." This concluded the last witnege presented by the prosecution. Thi,s was the end of what people preeent at the trial almost all felt was the first stage in the presentation of the prosecution case, since the statements of the witnessea (who, moreover, were not the most convincing of witnesses nor particularly in agreement with each other) sought to degrade as much as possible the act by Mardiros, making him appear--except in the case of Professor Berneim--as the worst of ecoun- drels, r~a the most odious of criminals. They did not even hesitate to make improper statements, referring to him on several occasions by his "loutish" appearance. Strongly supported in that direction by the prosecutor (which hardly seems normal) but also by the chairman of the court, whoae openly partial attitude (he had been represented to us as favoring the Armenians.) shocked the sudience on several occasiona. It is curious to see these supporters of the Armenians who only support the Armenians by bemoaning their f ate. The voice of the presiding ~udge was raised once again: "We will now proceed to hearing the defense witnesses. Bring in Mr Beaufort." Defense attorney Benoit asked: "Oa television in 1975 Mr Beaufort inter- viewed an historian of the Armenian genocide, and I would like to know the reactions which this produced among the Turks." Beaufort replied: "Yes, in fact, following thia broadcast I received a complaint f rom the Turkish Embassy criticizing me for spoken of the Armenian queation." Judge Curtin, who during all of the teatimony toyed with hie gavel to occupy himself, took the opportunity to ahow off his knowledge: "I advise all of you to read the book by Mr Pastermadjian, which tells the extraordinary story of the Armenian people, and in which I read the following passage, which shows that the Turks admitted ia 1919 having committed genocide, aad it is not because some of them do not wish to recognize thie fact that this ahould be made into a generality." Defense attorney Deved~ian said: "Thie concerns the official poaition of the Turkish ambassador who thus expreases the viewa of hie government!" He mentioned the latter in which, with regard to the interview, he spoke of a "one-sided broadcast," and of "alleged events without any foundation in fact," etc. Beaufort said: "This concerned an interview in which Jean Marie Carzou discussed the matter of the Armenian genocide. It wae the summary of his book, that ie, of purely historical f acts." Defense attorney Devedjian said: "I would like to say that it is to the honor of Switzerland to have allowed him to speak on the air regarding the Armenian problem, despite the pressure from a foreign government. 14 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The prosecutor comm.~nted apitefully: "All of this doea nat ~ustify the fact that he committed a~~owardly murder against an uaarmed mar.~!" Defense attorney Devediian rose and retorted: "We have alsc been sub~ect to cowardly assassination, believe me!" It was just before 7:00 pm. The trial was suspended until. the following day at 9:00 am. Friday, 18 December 1981, 9:15 am. "Please rise, the cour.t is in aession." The trial resumed with the hearing of defense witnesses. Mrs Suphie Schmidt entered. She looked with sympathy at Mardiros and began ~ier testimony: "I was born in Istanbul. As an eight year old child I saw m~?+ ~ refugeea who passed through our house. They were fleeing fror the Arm~snYan provinces where the massacres had begun. As a young girl I heard tlie story of these families which were victims of the maseacres and of the pc:ople who escaped and went insane. I was epared that because I had the goocl luck to marry a Swiss citizen who wished to save a young Armenian. girl. (hie of my couains saw her mother thrown into a well; gasoline was poured on her and she was set on fire." fler voice broke as she added" "I have one thing to say." She continued, sobbing: "I am proud, proud of being aa Armen:tan. A people was massacred. We had a stainless name. Today I regret that we have come to this!" Then betweea sobs, there followed an exhortation ln German in FThich it turned out that ehe was revolted by the in~ustice done to her people. Her face bathed in tears, she turned toward Mardiros and ~sid, pointing at him: "Look, he doesn't have an assassi.n's face! I leave that to God's judgement!" Overwhelmed, she suddenly lef t the witness chair. The throats of the audience were choked with sympathq. Reverend Yelvad~ian from Marseille came to the witnesa stand. Defense attorney Deved~ian eaid: "Reverend Yelvad~ian has participated in the preparation of a monument to the victims of the genocide in Marseille. I would like him to explain the difficulties that were encountered." Reverend Yelvad~ian replied: "The committee for the coastruction of our monument sought to honor those Armenians who died for France during the world ware. In 1972 it also sought to honor those who died in the genocide in 1915. The ~rkish ambassador opposed this and used all of his influence to prevent the construction of this monument which, moreover~ wae to be built in the private precincts of an Armeaian religioue building. At the time Minister Comiti told me of the comment of the French miniater of foreign affairs, who said, 'I'm not going to have trouble with the Turks because of the Armenians."' Re~verend Yelvad~{^~ then handed to the presiding ~udge a letter from the pref ect of the Department of Bouches du Rhone in which he informed the ~o~ittee that construction of the monument wae prohibited. The chairman of the court read the letter and then commented: "Once again this is a case which shows that the great powers have always engaged in a kind of rivalry to ahow who was more cowardly toward the Armeniana." ' Defense attorney Deved~ian arose and said: "Meanwhile, it is we who are accused of cowardice, Xour Honor!" 15 FOR OFFICIAL U~E l)NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The presiding ~udge said: "There is a question of public order." DefQnse attorney Deved3ian replied: "Agreed, there are some circumstancea." Reve=�end Yelvad3ian then began a long diatribe which just miesed turning out badly: "This is a unique monument in the world when the Armenian genocide perpetrated by the 1~rkish government in 1915 is remembered. Talaat Pasha has hia monument; as long as he has one~ we wtll have ours. You won't see the end of this, everywhere i�.~ Switzerlan~, in France. There will con- - tinue to be bombs; you won't aee the end of this! This 3.s a minister of relig~on who tells you this. I have no hatred against the ~rke, but I would not like to be in the position of the defendere of the niLks at the ~udgment seat of God!" He continued, his face red with anger: "My father was decap- itated, they painted my mother's face. She who was so beautif:tl, se that she wouldn't be raped! History will continue. That generation no 'longer hears us!" Ae shook his fiat menacingly: "When there no longer ace aolu- tions for the wise, it is the madmen who find solutionsl Well, Mardiros Jamgotchian is a madman in a certain way, and there are thousande like that! This ie not vengeance. We demand ~ustice. These aseassins co~3.tted a disgraceful crime: let them admit it! Our cause is just, without any hatred against the Turks, and I pray for the victim of this crime and his family." The prosecutor interrupted him shrrply: "Oh, it's easy to kill and then pray afterwards!" Reverend Yelvad~ian, foaming with rage, shouted; "Shut u~:l I forbid you to speak, you hear! I pray for them and I also pray for ou:: dead!" Mardiros' lawyer made him quiet down, and Reverent Yelvad~ian regretfully gave place to the next witness. The marshall was instructed: "Bring in Reverend Rarnusian." Defense attorney Deved~ian said: "Reverend Karnusian is assigned to the town of Gataadt. Can you explain to us how your compatriots are able to live with this reJection of the Armenian genocide?" Professor Godel translates the question to the minister into Armenian, and the latter replied: "I am a Swiss citizen. And for the last 30 years, as a religious leader twice each week I am confronted with this question. By Armenians residing in Switzerland, but also by others who came more recently, refugees who come in search of assistance, of advice. And when I sek them why they have left their countries, that is, Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, etc, they respond that where they were living they have no aecurity, neither for their lives or their property. They have no future. To understand this situatiun you have to go back into history. Since 1948 the Middle East has been all mixed up, and our young people in particular see no future for themaelvea. In a difficult situation such as has existed in Lebanon, Iran, or elsewhere, they see their future is blocked because they don't have a country to go to. The young people therefore have recourse to measures of violence. The Armenians don't hate the Turks. flowever, the only place where they could settle down would be their own country which hae been taken over by the Turks." 16 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY The prosecutor said: "The Russians also occupy their cou~atry." Reverend Rarnusian said: "I am speaking of the Armenian territory occupied by the Turks." Defense attorney Deved~ian said: "In Soviet Armenia at least they can live. In only one tenth of the hietoric territory of Armenia there is a country in which they can live, despite everything." The minister calmly resumed his statemeat and in a rigorously Swies fashion he nnalqzed t'he situation: "Up ' to now the Turkish government has denied the exiatence of genocide. This fact has traumatized all Armenians, even up to the present. This is not a matter o~ ancient history. This is not politics or propaganda. This is the history of today and of tomorrow. E~rery Armenian is profoundly affected by this situation. The Armenian is ready to pardon the Turks. Christ pardoned his enemies. However, this is on condition that the guilty parties repent - for what they did. The reaponaibility for what happened belongs to the Turkish government. We have lived together for centuries and we are prepared to live again, side by side, aince we are neighbors after all." Reverend Rarnusian stopped for an instant and then continued firmly: "We are ready for discussions, but we axe not prepared to renounce our rights, our land. This may go on for 5, 10, 20 years, but we will not renounce our rights, and the struggle will continue until we have a country that is independent and free, like Switzerland. These young men who take action now--it is the ~rks who force them to use these means, and it is also the great powers who have betrayed the Armenian people. If the Armenians don't draw attention to themselves, who will speak in their place? No one. And it is this silence which provokes these young people and incites them to have recourse to these means. I suffer from the fact that we have reached this point, but I repeat, it is the T~rkish and other governments and even the Russians who, by their silence, force us to have recourse to violence." He ended his atatement: "The Armenian cauae is not aa historical but rather a contemporary question. One day the Armenian queation will be a current problem." The presiding ~udge added: "You have to recognize that throughout their history the Armenian people have been able to depend only on themselves." Reverend Karnusian continued: "I recall the treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, by which the decisions of the treaty of Sevres were re~ected as far as Armenia was concerned. I recall in 1978, at the United Nations, here in Geneva, under the chairmanship of the Turks, the fluman Rights Commission removed all ref erences to its deciaion to mention the Armenian genocide." The presiding judge, who knows his hiatory and wanted to ahow it, again inter- vened: "Wasn't there an earlier betrayal of the Armenian people after the signature of the treaty of Berlin [1885), which had at least given a certain statute to the Armeniane and which wae never applied because of the great powers? Let's rec~ll that this treaty followed maesacres which had taken - place in 1895 [sic], massacres whoae application, because of a defective 17 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and corrupt administration, was turned over to the K~urds. And let's not forget'~the Russians in 1905, who had the Armenians massacred by the Tarters." Reverend Rarnusian said: "Yes, and for mq part I regret that mq country, Switzerland, was where, on two occasions, in Lausanne in 1923 and in Geneva in 1978, the Armeniaa people were buried. Switzerland became the cemetery of the=Armenian people. '1'here is a Chinese proverb which says: 'A man dies . twice: : once ~n his body and the second time ~~hen he is forgotten."' The presidi~g ~udge said sincerely: ''You can be sure that the Armenian people will rise once again." The prosecutor went on the attack and, speaking to Reverend Karnusian, he said: "Do you approve of these attacks?" Reverend Karnusian quickly retorted: "Do you approve of this genocide?" The prosecutor said: "No, but that does not suthorize anyone to come and place bombs and kill people!" Defense attorney Devedjian then replied: "Switzerland wanted to be a wel- coming country. Geneva is an international city which, for many people is , the symbol of an evil policy." The following witness, Mr Hatsakotzian, escaped the genocide of 1915. Also speaking through the interpreter, he said sadly: "In 1915 I was 9 qears old. I was living in Ourfa, 2 recall. I went td visit a neighbor and through the open door I saw two ~rks who were raping our neighbor's wife and her 11 year old daughter. They then killed the whole family. I was hiding, and they didn't see me, or otherwise they would have killed me too. I waated to go : home. In the street I saw an old woman who told me: 'You can't go home." ~ And I then saw the street strewn with corpses. She covered my head with a shawl so that I would not see thie." He atopped out of emotion. His voice trembling, he resumed his testimoay: "Then the deportation took place. I found my mother, but she had f allen ill. She was crying before dying, and . I was also crying." His voice broken with emotion, he said: "That night I dreamed of her. I saw again that scene which I had tried to bury in my ' memory. I recall that we ate grass. I saw three women lyiag under a tree along the road. I wanted to ask them for something to eat. I approached them. They had their abdomens ripped open." Tears fell from the eyes of the wh3te-haired man whose sad testimony overwhelmed the audience. The jurY listened calmly and indifferently to this tragic story. The witaess, over- whelmed by his memories, then described the travels which led him to Switzerland where, in 1957, he obtained Swiss nationality. The preaiding judge said: "The court respectfully bows before your sorrow and your suffering. I recalled yesterday the cynicism of Hitler. I would like to show today the contents of Talaat's telegram sent to the Prefecture of Aleppo on 15 September 1915." fle read it. Defense attorney Deved~ian arose and said: ''I thank you, Your Hoaor, for having read that. Look at the mausoleum of Talaat today in Ankara. Look at 18 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY how that man is remembered today in ~rkey!" Aad he sho~red the ~ury photo- graphs of the mausoleum, the avenues aad the schools bui].t to honor the glory of Talaat Pasha. _ The presiding ~udge said: "Unfortunately, the Nuremberg court does not exist today." Defense attorney Devedjian said: "Attoraeq Wolf is president of the League of the Rights of Man in Belgium and delegate of Belgium to the United Nations on the Human Rights Commission. He has represented his country during the discussion of paragraph 30 at the UN, a paragraph in which two lines men- � tioned the Armenian genocide. ~rkey exerted pressure fur these two lines to be left out. Can you give us this etory ia detail?" Attomey Wolf said: "First of all you have to go back to the beginniag. In 1948 a convention for the repre$sion and condemnation of the crime of , ' genocide was voted on at the UN. It was never applied ur?til 1975 when it was decided to issue a report on the crime of genocide. Already, in 1974, a draft report had been presented. Most of zhe countries were opposed to ~ paragraph 30, and the Human Rights Commission returned tY~e draft text to the sub-committee. There were many debates held on the sub~ act up to 1978. The great powers abstained, considering that it was an error to attack a country like Turkey. I reported on the document which was on hand in the foreign ministries of the great powers and which showed clearly that there had been genocide committed. They simply wiped out history, as if nothing had taken place in 1915." Attorney Wolf paused and then continued: "The matter then went back to the Human Rights Commission. There, three or four countries asked t?~at this paragraph be included. Finally, it was decided once agai.n that it was necessrry to send the draft back to the sub-com~ittee, which refueed to include the two lines on the Armenian genocide." Defense attorney Deved~ian asked him: "Was internatioaal law applied as far as the Armenians are concerned?" , Attorney Wolf replied: "In 1918 there was an Armenian state which lasted for 2 years. Then came the treaty of Sevres which sketched out the frontiera of a substantial Armenian state, thanks to President Wileon. With the coming to power of Kemal Ataturk in 1~rkey, all of this was wiped out, abolished. Today I understand the actions of the Armenian terrorists, but I do not approve of them for all of that. However, let us not forget that there were 1.5 million persons executed, the seizure of a natio.n's territory. And today there is still a form of cultural genocide which is leading to the disappear- ance of architectural and cultural marvels. I note that everywhere I go there is more and more a stste of permanent revolt among the Armenians. The way in whict~ the Armenian people have been treated is quite unthinkable." The prosecutor asked: "Doea that legitimize an aesassination?" Attorney Wal~ replied: "There have been other political aseassins who have been acquitted." , 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ; The prosecutor then asked: "As a lawyer do you appr~ve of these acts?" Attorneq Wolf suswered: "I understand them ~ut I do not approve of them." The trial was suspended for 20 minutes. In the snowy streets outside Attor- ney Wolf, a longtime friend of the Armenians (who, despite his advanced age, was prepared to come to Geneva to give his support to a cause which he valued above all others), walked slowly away. At 11:15 am the trial resumed with the testimc:Ly of ~ean Marie Carzou, an historian of the Armenisn genocide. He said: "The Armenian people have occupied the~r territory for 3,000 years. If there has been a dispersion of these people, it is because there was an act of genocide." There followed a brief historical account, retracing the sufferings experienced by the Armenian people, from the beginnings of their hiatory, continuing through the capture of Ani, and until the 19th century. Carzou said: "The so-called eastern question resulted from the progressive establiahment of the Ottoman Empire and from the resurgence of the national movements of the varioua minority groups (Serbia, Greec~e, Bulgaria) who entered into a struggle again against the Ottoman government. Contrary to the other minorities, the Armenian people remained a"faithful nation" until the middle of the 19th century. Part of the Armenian elite even participated in the Turkiah govern- ment. The Armenian question arose only in terms of claims for reforms and especially in terms of obtaining a statute of relative autonomy. These claims led to the Congress of Berlin in 1878 under which Turkey committed itself to undertake reforms in the Armenian provinces. In 1923 came the treaty of Lausanne wtiich did r~ot include even one word about Armenia. Mean- while, the genocide took place." Jean Marie Carzou, in an analytical and - implacable way, then retraced the different stagEes of the procese of exter- mination of an entire people: "First of all there was the dresa rehersal. You will note later that the massacres and the genocide always took place following a demand for reforms. Following the treaty of Berlin, over a period of a few months (during 1894-1896), there were 300,000 Armenians killeu in various kinds of pogroms with the assistance of the ~rkish army. You have to imagine that with the bugles blowing and with the participation of the whole ~rkish people. That was, therefore, the real response which the ~rkish government made to the demands for reiorms. "Then there was the revolution of the young Turks, preceded by a congress in the course of which all of the forces of opposition to the regime of Abdul Hamid, the red sultan, joined together (T~rka, Jews, Armenians, etc). The announcement of the coup d'etat brought out a great spirit of fraternization. All problems seemed to have been solved. However, in fact the change of regime did not lead to a change in doctrine. "Those who came to power were in fact ultra aationaliete who did not accept the idea that the varioua oppressed minority groups in the Turkish Empire should kick over the traces. They adopted exactly the same state of mind as Abdul Hamid had done. Wasn't it Talaat who said, speaking of the Armenians: 'There is no place here for two peoples"? So it was to be genocide. Thia would be preceded, as in 1895, by a plan for reforms, presented by Rusaia and 20 FOR OFF[CU1L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY England and accepted by the young T~rks. The allied gove~.~nments furthermore obliged Turkey to sign an agreement providing for the sending of international observers to verify the application of the reforms. "In 1914 World War I broke out. Turkey entered the war on the side of ~�r�. ~ Germany. It was not an accidsnt that the genocide took p;.ace in 1915, in the middle of the World War. The Russians were blockaded in the North; the French were blockaded in the South. Communications were c:ut off and the country was closed to foreign observers. However, there ~~ould remain some Germans, since 'l~rkey was allied to Germany. Regarding the genocide properly speaking, the operation was mounted in two phases: "On 2~; April 1915 some 400 Armenian intellectuals were arrested in Constantinopl~: who, for the most part, were shot. Therefore, the Armenian people were first of all deprived of their elite group. It was then time to begin the second phase of the genocide: the displacemnnt of the people, who, according to the authorities, 'were endangering the Turkish Army by the risk of collusiun with the Russian Army.' The men in good health who were in the fully-arme~i battalions of the Armry were transferred to engineer battalions where ~they w~~re disarmed and thei~ shot. There then remained in the provinces the wome~z, the children, a.nd the old men who were to be assembled and deported. T[ze final destination of the d~portation was the deserts of Syria." Jean Marie Carzou then circulated a map and photographs o:f the genocide for the information of the ~ury. He resumed his testimony: "The genocide was carried out by means of this program of deportatioa. In ~ach province it happened in the same way. A decree stated that the Armenians had to leave. They were given 2 hours to prepare themselves, and cnnvoys including up to 3,000 people were set in motion on the roads. Suae of the people were trans- ported by train, but the ma~ority made the trip on foot. The ob~ective, of course, was that these convoys would not reach their destination. Along the road the Armenian people were decimated with an unheard-of violence. The horror involved reached such a level that many of them went mad. Certainly, there was the evidence of those who escaped, but also there was testimony by observers from neutral ar�3 even allied countries. The genocide continued until 1918. Those who were able to reach the end of the road were placed in 'concentration camps.' This was the very term used by a German officer at the time, and which today resounds in our ears. Laws were enacted concerning the property of 'displaced' persons. Other decrees suppressed the Armenian community as such. It was compiste annihilation. Out of more than 2.0 million Armenians there remained no more than 200,000 survivors.. What happened to the others? Did they commit suicide? The kingpin of this exterminating effort was Talaat Pasha who, as minister of the interior, signed the telegrams ordering extermination, which I am going to read to you.`' The presiding ~udge interrupted him: "I read th~m yesterday." Carzou continued: "I will then cite what Talaat said when Morgenthau, then United States ambassador to Z~rkey, tried to dissuade him from undertaking this act of genocide by underlining the economic consequences of this - decision. Talaat replied to him: 'We have estimated that se costing 5 million pounds.' I w3.11 also mention another telegram sent to the Prefecture zi FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY in Aleppo and tn which it is recommended to 'kill all the children of the persons in question because the innocent of today could become the guilty of tomorrow.' Talaat Pasha has never been disavowed by any Z~rkish govern- ment which followed him. Remal Ataturk arranged for the genocide by his re~ection as such of the treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Talaat Pasha is even honored as a national hero, since Ankara has constructed a mausoleum as a monument to his glory. ~en after the Nuremberg trials, what effect would namjng a boulevard after Himmler have in Berlin? - "In ly7Q the United Nations confirmed the denial of the act of genocide by adopting the traditional Turkish thesis on the myth of genocide. L~en today these undeniable f~�:ts are not generally admitted." Then Jean Marie Carzou raised the second question, the censor�shfp of h~.s book. "In 1975 I signed a contract with Hachette concerning a book entitled, '1915: an Example of Genocide.' Here is the printed cover of the book" (he took it out of the file.). "You see there, down below; it has the Hachette mark, And now here is the book as it finally appeared. Look, it is Flammarion which put it out. What happened? Well, one month before it was put in the bookstores I was called to a meeting with Hachette where they explained to me that, following Turkish intervention and in order not to involve the co~ercial interests of the publishing house with Turkey, they could not publish my book. T'iiat is why it was finally published by Fla~arion, which no doubt had fewer co~ercial in~`.erests in Turkey." The presiding ~udge said: "The court thanks you." It was noon when Jean Marie Carzou lef t the courtroom to leave in his place another witness of the genocide, Mr Amalian, who, in great distress af ter having said that his whole f amily in Caesarea had been massacred, was only able to say: "I can tell you that there was genocide. That's all." The session was suspended until 2:30 pm. At 2:45 Mardiros came back into the courtroom and sat three rows of seats in . front of us. The ustier brought in the following witness, an old woman with a scarf tied around her neck who walked with difficulty, assisted by a man of about 40 years of age. This woman who walked like thie and who, throuRh the tears which clouded her eyes, was looking for Mardiros, was his grand~ mother. She saw him in front of her and suddenly she lif ted her arma up to heaven and cried: "Aman Yavrou" (oh, my child) and embraced him strongly against her chest, chanting: "Hissous Chriatos; Hisaous Christos." There were moments the emotional intensity of which ie difficult to describe in writing. The sorrow of this grandmother was ours and, through us, that of all Armenians. She sat down beaide her grandson. Defense attorney Deved~ian asked her to recount her experiences, she who was one of those who escaped the genocide. The grandmother of Mardiros only spoke Turkish. That is why Mr Godel offered his translating services. After an initial attempt his efforts were challenged by Armenians attending the court session. One of them was designated to serve as interpreter for this 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY important testimony. The p,randmother said: "At the.time: of the massacres I was in Adana. My brother had hasi his throat cut before nry eyes and had been buried without any religious ceremony. I wae 10 years ol.d, and my family had all been deported. I saw..." Her voice broke and tY~en continued her slow chant: "I saw 25 members of my family, tied one to the other. They were thrown into the Mourat River at the same time..." Overwhelmed, she stopped. Defense attorney Deved~ian then intervened: "I agree to stopping at this point the account of these events in order not to tortur~~~ this old woman any more, but I would like to ask ~ust one question: 'Did ycu speak of all that to Mardiros?"' Mrs Jamgotchian replied: "I cried and I sang a dirge. ~[e asked ary why I was crying and why I was singing a dirge and I told him arhat I had seen." She left the witness stand and came with difficulty to si.t next to us. Her hands were trembling and she cried sof tly, half in Turki~h, half in Armenian: "Everything has come back suddenly, everything has come back." See waved her hand before her eyes as if to try to chase away these visions which pursued her. She shook our hand strongly, very stY�ongly. How could you fail to have respect for this old woman, suffering from a heart condition, who had swo~n to come to testify at the trial of her grandson, even if she died in the attempt (which almost happened when she descended from the plane). Next was Mardiros' f ather, this man who, 15 minutes before, supporting his ~ mother on her arrival in the courtroom. He testified in Armenian: "We were very poor. We lived in a refugee camp, and it was in this situation that our children were born. I raised him to be a soldier, becRUSe there was no alternattve. In the present situatio.n in Lebanon there is future. The young people want to succeed where we failed." Defense attorney Deved~ian asked tiim: "I would like to ask you a question which I did not ask your mother: why didn.'t ahe epeak in Armenian?" Mr Jamgotchian replied: "In Turkey instruction in Armenian was prohibited. I didn't learn Armenian myself un:il I was 11 years old." The prosecutor interrupted him slyly: "But I saw a broad.caet the other day on television in which the Armenians in Turkey who were talking were freely speaking Armenian." Defense attorney Deved~ian said: "You heard hostages speak, Mr. Prosecutor! I will recall to you the law of 1965 which prohibits teaching their own language to all minority groups." The presiding 3udge said: "Bring in the next witness." An Armenian of Swiss nationality testif ied to how, in his region, all of his family was wiped out with an axe. He continued: ,"Switzerland was or?e of the first countries to take pity on the martyrdom of our people. Our dual identity places us today face to face with the painful problem of the 23 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500490002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Armenian genocide. The youager generation living abroad wants to obtain justice. The memory of the people cannot be erased. One day the Turks will have to open the Armeaian question once again." Then he read the tranecrip- tion of a press conference given by the Union of Armenie~ns of Switzerland in the month of August, from which it turns out that 'the ~ictions of the younger generation have forced us to enamine our conacieaces carefully and . have made us accept the uselesanesa of the diplomatic meaeures which have ' been used up to now." At 3:45 pm the next witness was Jean-Marc Toraniaa. Toranian came into the courtroom, took his oath, and sat down in front of the court. Then we saw Judge Curtin direct carefully-simed questions at him. With his lipa presaed together the presiding ~udge attacked him: "Are you, yes or no, a member of the ASALA?" Toranian replied: "Look, I belong to this group of Armenians." The presiding ~udge, already fluahed with anger, said: "I am not asking qou to.begin the speech you prepared in advance. I have asked you a question! Answer yes or no!" A silence followed. Then Toranian esid: "No, I am no: a member nF ;:ne ASALA.n The presiding 3udge continued: "In October, 1980, a bomb exploded in the Palace of Justice in Geneva. Was it qou who placed that bomb?" Toranian said: "But..." The presiding 3udge said: "Answer yes or no." Toranian said: "No." The presiding judge continued: "And the bomb which exploded this su~er in a department store in Gen~va, did you set off that bomb, yes or no?" Toranian replied: "No." The presiding ~udge asked; "And the bomb which exploded at Cornavin railway station, was it you who set off that bomb?" Toranian answered: "No, and I would like to say that we were the first to denounce theae terrible attacks which do not serve the interesta of the Armenian people." The presiding 3udge continued: "And those attacks which Alec Yenicomechian was preparing againet the Consulate of Turkey?" Toranian said: "Alec Yenicomechian, I believe, was released from detention by a Swiss court, in this very Palace of Justice. Ae is hero of~ the Armenian people, like Mardiroa Jamgotchian." 24 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The presiding ~udge said: "A hero is someone who risks his life for an ideal, not an assassin." Toranian replied: "I am absolutely in agreement with yoti. That is why I have come in the name of the Committee for the Support of Armenian Political Prisoners, in the name of milliors of Armenians, to say that for all of us Mardiros Jamgotchian is a natio~ial hero. This young boy vo].unteered to ~oin the Armenian resistance becausf: the Armenian people are in a hopeless politi- cal situation. That is why the young Armenians, inatead of living a normal life, are forced to give their lives and to eugage in arm.ed resistance. There are witnesses who have come, you recall, to tell us of the gravity of the genocide. I think that it is neceseary to remember that for 60 years the Armenians believed in dialogue. They knocked at the doora of inter- national organizatione, they peacefully appeared before the United Nationa so that th~ truth would simply be told about the genocide and the occupation of our f atherland, so that our people would recover their land." In the courtroom the pens were going full tilt and the ~ournalists were listening carefully to the man they would describe as "the dialectician of violence," having failed to understand what he was talking about. Toranian continued, speaking to the expressionless faces of the ~ury: "Armenian history is a succession of massacres, of abominationa. Many people would have preferred that it had ended in 1915. The Armenian people are now drawing on their last energies. A decimated people is fighting for its existence, and its most devoted elements have constituted themaelves into an Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, of which Mardiros Jamgotchian ie a member. From the moment when the Armenian people have exhausted all their strength to make their cause triumph peacefully, no person has the right to refuse the Armenian people recourse to an armed struggle. Facing us is a fascist state which refused to recognize the genocide of 1915 and which has taken firom us nine tenths of Armenian territory, which has exercised repression against the Kurdish people." The presiding judge interrupted him: "Regarding the Kurds, I would like to say that they participated in the massacres, but it is true that the ~ Turkish state knows how to use others for its dirty work." ' Toranian continued: "We f ace a state which is exercising represaion against ~ the people of Cyprus. My thoughts go to the 4,000 people of the island of , Cyprus who have disappeared, and no one speaka of them any more. I would ' also like to correct a certain number of points. The way in which you asked 1 me the first questions 3uat now favored all kinds of speculations. At ~ present there is a whole effort being made to compare the Armenian reaistance ~ Eo international terrorism, which is plotting to destablize Turkey. Thia is ~ being done to obscure the motives and the profound realitiea of this resistance. The ASALA is based on the history of the Armenian people. ~ Thousands of Armenians throughout the world do not hesttate to state their solidarity with this effort. This is not a minority, like the Red Brigades, ~ which seek to impose a new social order through terror. No one can stop ' the Armenian people from fighting for the liberation of their fatherland. ; We have been driven from our land by the final phase of terroriam: genocide. i Seven million Armeniane are loQking at the Swias people." ~ 25 ~ j FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The presiding ~udge said: "That's not true!" Ara Toranian resumed his statement in a forceful voice: "They are waiting for a measure of 3ustice for Mardiros Jamgotchian. I would also like to explain why the Armenian atruggle is not like classical guerrilla warfare. We have been driven out of our country. There liss the specif ic charac~~r of the Armenian struggle. Scattered here and there they wanted to die fighting. Certainly, they have been welcomed, in France, in Switzerland, but in each of these countries they have paid their tribute: there vere 30,000 Armenians who died for France in the course of World War II and in the French colonial wars. They have done their duty as citizene. However, 'they know their enemies, and they only bear arzns against their enemies. I would like to state that the Armenians have nothing against the lhrkish people but fight against the ~rkish military atate which alao oppreases the Turkish people, since there are 30,000 political prisoners in Z~rkey. This is a struggle which we intend to carry on with the other oppressed peoples � of Turkey. That is why the Armenian reaistance does aot attack the homea of Turkish emigres but rather quite specific targets, the embassies, the diplomats, and...." The prosecutor interrupts him: "And the Palace of Justice." Ara Toranian continued: "Listen, I have not made police inquiries to deter- mine whether, in fact it was Armenians who did these things. We have con- demned them because they harm the Armenian struggle. However, and I hope - you will let me make these distinctions, if it was really Armeniana who set off these bombs, I understand that Armenians have become exasperated, but I con3emn these acts of nehilism. However, I think that you have to distin- guish between ~these actions and those of a resistant ~ho takes=a pisecl~and kills a Turkish diplomat, particularly in Europe, when we know what these Consulates of ~~key in Europe really are. They are actual police bur.eaus, actual military bases, keeping control of all components of the Turkish community. "This wall of silence which has fallen on the Armeniaa problem, this apology for crime at the international level which the denial of the rights of the Armenian people consists of, thie occupation of their hiatorical territory and the denial of the genocide--all of these things have led young Armenians to recourse to armed resistance. And those who support them say out loud that those who have the courage to shoot down a T`urkiah diplomat are the heroes of 1981. I would like to salute the grandeur of aoul of Mardiros Jamgotchian, because I am personally of the view that he did not kill the diplomat in question." To the sneering laugh of the presiding ~udge, Toranian responded: "Whatever the case, he left everything to undertake military action. He lef t his family, his friends, his fiancee. fle left everything for that. This is why he is a hero." Defense attorney Devedjian said: "I wo~~13 like to ask Mr Toranian if the condemnation of these attacks which he has ~ust made is a def inite or demagogic condemnation." 26. FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Ara Toranian replied: I condema these bombs placed in the stations, in the stores, I don't see for a single second how anyone could commit such acts. However, at the same time I understand that certain Armenians may have been puahed into nihilism when they see that it is Armenian resistance fightera who are sitting on the bench of the accused. I condemn them because that only favors the strategy used by all the enemies of the Axmenian people." The presiding ~udge said slyly: "But the ASALA hae alwaqs claimed these attacks." Mardiros stood up. Ae understood that an effort was being made to establish the very opposite of the truth and in his broken Freach he rebelled against it, saying: "It's not the ASALA!" Com~unity attorney Bonnant commented ironically: "I would like to remark that Mardiros Jamgotchian, who pretende not to understand French, has a selective understanding of it." There were murmers of protest in the courtroom. Thea the proaecutor went on to the attack: "It's too easy to say now: 'It's not the ASALA!"' He was supported by the preaiding ~udge: "Not to mention the threats made by Mardiros Jamgotchian himself at the time this case was being prepared for trial." Defense attorney Deved~ian cut in with a mockiag tone in his voice: "To say that there was risk of reprisals. Is that a threat or a forecast of the future?" Ara Toranian picked up the theme: "The ASALA cannot control 7 million Armenians throughout the world. It cannot control these millioas of Armenians for whom it is simply not acceptable thati an Armenian combat soldier should appear on the bench of the accused, while ~rkey has never appeared before any court at all. Today it is a matter of a eingle dead man. Imagine 10 dead, 100 dead, 1,000 dead, 100,000 dead, 1 million dead, 1.5 million dead! You cannot ask a people to commit suicide. You caanot ask a people to give up fighting to defend itself. You cannot kill a people with impunity. The prosecutor, feeling that the situation was getting out of hand, tried to regain control of the hearing. To do this, he tried again to involve Ara Toranian in the attacks committed by the Organization of 9 June and in the threats made by ASALA. For this purpose he waved the aewspaper HAIASTAN, the organ of the ASALA, and ahouted: "Here is the newapaper HAY BAKAR, of which you are the publisherl' Ara Toranian interrupted him: "You are mistaken. You are holding in you hands the newspaper HAIASTAN, the organ of the ASAL~?�" The prosecutor seemed determined to contradict him and then branched off in another direction: "Yes, you are right, let ua admit it. However, in this newspaper there is an article sigaed by you!" .27, . ~I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Ara Toranian replied: "I cannot stop the republicatioa of articles which appeared in HAY BAKAR." The prosecutor continued: "And in this article there are threats--against whom? Against me! I will read part of it: 'Prosecutor Raymond Foex will be the first target.' Did you write that, qes of no?" He was choking with anger. . Ara Toranian rgsponded with some puzzlement: "I dan't see why I would have ~ written that. I would like to see the newspaper." The clerk of the court gave him the newspaper referred to. Somewhat perpl:xed, Ara Toranian looked at it and then commented: "Well now, it is � still incredible. Theq mention my name at the foot of aa article, republished from HAY BAKAR, and then you turn the page and you:reAd, ~n another artic~.e-- not signed, that one, and coming from the ASALA--the linea to which you have 3ust alludedl That's too much. I denounce this shameful proceeding which seeks to establish aa amalgam of truth and falsehood. It's really scandal- ous!" A murmur of disapproval ran through the audience and along the rowe of � ~ournalists. Prosecutor Raymond Foex, unmasked and ridiculed, elumped dowa at his place. Defense attorney Deved3ian intervened: "Mardiros Jamgotchian is not beiag tried for other attacks but only the one of which he is accueed. You d~~n't have to go on endlesaly making reference to the attacke and threats ma~:1e by the Organization of 9 June." The prosecutor replied: "Yee, but from the moment when he himaelf made threats, or as you say so elegantly, 'forecasts of the future..."' Defense attorney Devedjian said: "From reading the newspapers I can also make predictions." Ara Toranian said" "Listen, I can read you some atatements made by ASALA which officially condema these~blind attacks." He had nothing in his hand but turned to the ~ournaliste and called a~ournaliat from the Agence Telegraphique Suiase [Swiss Telegraphic Agency] who recently met representa- tives of ASALA in Beirut. The ~ournaliat, a young woman, was called to testify. The presiding ~udge~said: "Please take the oath to tell the truth." She did so 3nd then said: "ASALA has never claimed these acts. That is all I have to say." She immediately returned to her place. Ara T_:~ranian continued: "I would like to conclude by sayiag that the fact that there have been attacks made does not excuse us from reflecting on the cauaes of these attacks. I think that it ia clegr that Mardiros Jamgotchian joined the ASALA for political reasons. It wae a political choice, because the Armenians are in a dead-end political situation. There is something terrible in violence. I say that to the relativE~ of L..e ~rkieh diplomata 28 FOR 06'FIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY who have been killed. I say that all the more aince we know what it is. We did not invent violence, but we were the first to suffer from it at the beginning of this century. The violence of the ASALA is at least more selective than that which consists in crucifying women and children on the doors of churches. I have nothing else to add." The atmosphere was tense. This aecond day of the trial had been a testing experience, as much for what it brought out in terms of recollectiona of the genocide as for what it represented in terms of justification of Armenian resistance activity. It should be noted that all of the Turkieh ~ournalists and correspondents, who had been in attendance on the first day, were absent and that they were not to appear again until the summing up by the Yerguz attorney. ~ The presiding ~udge, in a silenGe charged with emotion, announced a suspen~ sion of the trial. Before the guards could take Mardiros away, some of us were able to shake his hand. He smiled at us, happilq, naturally. For a little while it was he who strengthened our morale. We went out to relax outside the courtroom. It had snowed the whole day in Geneva. A cold wind chilled us. Nervously, some of us lit cigarettes. We counted the number of friendly faces. We were more and more numerous now, having come essentially from the Rhone River and Alps area and from Paris. Some :Eriends from Ville- franche, feeling an inner anger, told us how, to crosa the Swiss frontier in an auto, they had to "strip," in the literal sense of the term. In Switzer- land, having a name ending with "iaa" is equivalent to having a yellow star on your coat. At 5:00 pm we resumed our places in the large, sustere courtroom. The "accused" was brought in. The arrival of Mardiros in cou�rt was always anticipated with the same anxiety, but his smooth and serene face calmed our apprehensions. Judge Curtin reopened the seesion with the reading of all of the aaewers . which Mardiros Jamgotchian made during the pre-trial hearing. Mardiros' answer to the question about the motive for hia act was as follows: "It was to avenge 1.5 million Armenians. In mq own family seven persons died in the massacres." Then the presiding ~udge read the letter written bq Mardixos dated 12 October 1981 in which he went back on his previous statementa and made mention c,f a companion (whom he was ordered to assist) who was reportedly the person truly responsible for the act. i'he letter said: "This man fired at the Turk. He gave me the gun and I ran away. These are the true facts, and I ask you take note of them." The presiding ~udge then read the first letter by Mardiros, dated 25 Septem- ber 1981, in which he said he was informed about the operation carried out at the Consulate of Z~rkey in Paris and that he said he should say nothing about the exact circumstances of the action carried out on 9 June until the action in Paris took place. Mardiroe stood up and said in Armenian that he 29. FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y would like to speak. He said: "I would like to explain why this action took place in Geneva. It should be said that this is related to Paragraph 30 of the report of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations and the suppression of the reference to the Armenian genocide, carried out at the request of the T~rkish authorities. Furthermore, I would like to say that I did not' resist arrest when I could have used my hand grenade because the orders of my organization were quite clear on the point. We have nothing against the Swiss people. T know that Switzerland, in the course of history has helped the Armenian people and that Switzerland built houses in Lebanon for the Armenian refugees. That's why for me there was no question of doing something against Switzerland. Regarding the assassinated ~rkish diplomat, I would like to say that I had received a photograph of Mehmet Yerguz and that I knew that he was an agent of the T~rkish secret police. I am a soldier; so ~.*as he. Consequently, it is necessary for the ~udgment handed down in this =ase to be ~ust." Mardiros sat dowa. The presiding ,,udge said: "The next person to speak is the Yerguz family attorney, Bonnant." Yerguz family attorney Bonnant atood up. Up to this point he had been rather discreet. However, now he was going :o ~ake hia revenge and began an address which was basically tendentious, alth~ugh well-presented in ite form: "Your Honor, prosecutor, ladies and gentleme.: of the ~ury. In this tribunal I am not the representative of the Ottoman Empire or of its successor, the Z~rkish state. You are not the tribunal of hiatory. Mardiros Jamgotchian does not represent the cause-I believe sacred-of Armenia. I represent here the widow of Mehmet Yerguz, his mother, and his two children. The issue is not to know whether or not there was an Armenian genocide. Armenia is not in question here, and without any particular sense of vanity we can say that Switzerland was one of the few countries which did what was in ite power to help the Armenian people. When I say that there is no particular reason to feal any vanity, this is to say that in fact along the road of misery we have been spared by history. The fact that our territory was chosed for this action, of course, leaves us rather bitter but should leave our ability to reason still intact. Piardiros Jamgotchian is a terrorist. He is an assassin. And it harms the Armenian cause to encourage those who pervert it. But there is something else which saddens me profoundly. Just now a minister of religion has come h,ere to tell ue that you die twice. Well, Mehmet Yerguz has died twice: the firt time, assassinated; and then by the indifference with which his death has been treated. "A criminal proceeding involves the preaentation of aa author of a crime and of a criminal act. It is Mardiros Jamgotchian, the protagonist of this drama, whom we are trying today. Since yesterday I have been watching him. The face of Mardiros Jamgotchian has the handsomeness of youth; he has expres- sions on his face; he knows how to laugh; he has a certain look about him. Whereas death has no face. Mehmet Yerguz only has one face: that which death gave him. A witness, Mrs A, came to tell us yesterday that while she was holding the victim's head he seemed to be trying to say something with- out being able to do so. We don't know what Mehmet Yerguz was thinking in that brief instant when he, saw death coming. There is this matter of ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY forgetting the victim and other, very characteriatic, particular circum- stances. Yesterday you heard a~rkish diplomat who came back from Aakara to make a minor deposition. But I took advantage of it tc~ have him speak of the vict~m. He said very ordinary things, that he was a good man, married~ happy. Recall the sarcastic tremor that ran through the audience. Did you feel, as I did, in an almost palpable way, the re~ectioa uf Yerguz and of his lif e? "And you reacted, Your Honor. You read the letter from M=�s Yerguz to give THIS sudience--Attorney Bonnant pointed his two thumbs betdnd him to desig- nate the public, to whom he turned his back--a lesson in xolerance. Passion is one thing, but I say that this pathological intolerance oaly amouats to a difference of degree between THIS kind of laugh"--he agt~in pointed to the audience--"And HIS act." (He pointed his f inger at Mardiros.) "I could not accept that at the end of this trial there wi.ll be deaths which will be considered just becauae they are the deatha of others. The represen- tative of the Yerguz family must asuure himaelf that the ane who atrikes is puniehed. This dual mission: being here to find Mardiro~ Jamgotchian guilty of murder and making sure that you do not 1et the diacussion get sidetracked, to be used in the service of an act which ie the negation of this cause which the accused considers ~ustified--this dual mission is mine. "First of all, can the crime be related to Mardiros Jamgotchian? Let us re- call the facts. He arrives from Tehran, with a mission and with certain informatian. I would like to pause here to recall the case of the two members of ASALA who were arreated in Geneva and whom the Juvenile Court tried at the beginning of this year with infinite mercy. The inquiry had shown that they had come with a double mission: to en~age in a racket among the Armenians in Switzerland and to prepare an attack aga~nst the Conaulate of T~rkey. I mention this matter ta refer to the continuity of terroriem be- cause it wae this first mission which allowed the ASALA, provided with the ~ information, to eay to Mazdiroa Jamgotchian: 'Go and kill.' The ~udges of the Juvenile Court in January, 1981, showed a senae of inercy which none of them underatood. Touched to the heart by these eveats, the systemn of juetice in our country said to itaelf that it was necessary for Switzerland to under- standing toward the accused. "But what is etrength in terms of ~ustice if it is not firmaess? Our syatem of ~ustice was deceived. By liberating Alec Yenicomechian and Suzy Masheredjian Swiss ~ustice thought that, by paqing a kind of moral debt, the ' terrorists would no longer use our territory for actions of thia kind. Now, ~ 6 months later Jamgotchian comes with a specific misaion: either to kill a ! Turkish diplomat or to blow up the lbrkish Consulate. ~ He chose the first mission, the easier one. And what did he come to kill? ~ He didn't know. Up to this very moment he has never said that a specific ' person had been designated for him to kill. Because that would not be true. Because it is the act of aseassination alone which counta. And because he wanted Geneva to be the platform for this cause which he eupports. During the whole pre-trial examination, how did he describe the choice of his victim? I read from Exhibits 26 and 42: ~'I had the miseion of killing a member of the Turkiah Consulate." No detalls. "It seemed to me that one of the three 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 FOR OF'F7CIAL USE ONLY men was the most important. What does that mean? That means that when they tell you that they want you to kill a representative of the Z~rlcish state, this amounts to giving Jamgotchian a nobility which he did not have, since it was not true, and that he was ready to kill anybody. It is he who has told us this. He chose his own waq of doing it. Can you see a man's diplomatic rank on his face? Of course not! As a conaequence he wae ready to kill, whatever the f ace of the victim. Provided he was Thrkish. He continued, sarcastically: "The importance of this paint has not escaped either the Secret Armenian Army for the Liberation of Armenia or the defense, which calls this army--let us call it that out of a sense of mockery-- 'secret'-it certainly is--but not for the liberation of Armenia since it does not serve this cause by alienating sympathy for it. What did this ASALA say in its firat communique following the action of 9 June? It said that Mehmet was a member of the Ttirkish secret service of of the CIA! That he had been sentenced to ~eath by a people's tribunal. This term has a special resonance to it which Ara Toranian does not appear to attribute to it when he says that the ASALA has nothing in common with the Red Brigadesl And this thesis of Mehmet Yerguz as a secret agent is thia theais which Mardiros Jamgotchian adopts for his own today, for the first time! Because he knows that if there is no relationahip between this man and the act which was comm~itted, there is no longer anything left. That ia why Jamgotchian and his defenders have, little by little, invented a defense, manufacturing even this monstruous statement that Yerguz had something to do with the Armenian problem! "I have heard it said that there are forms of death which are more painful than others. Ara Toranian has told us: 'What is this death, compared to the sufferinge of those nailed to the doors of churchea.' By a kind of general state of confuaioh can you excuse the death of Yerguz because it was quick and not very painful? Was it ~ust because he was a Turk? Mehmet Yerguz died for nothing. He died for having been a Turk, the moat hopeless kind of death that could happen, aince there was no reason for it." There was a brief silence. Then Lawyer Bonnant continued: "As the attorney for the Yerguz family, I have an interest in ensuring that Mardiros Jamgotchian does not dodge the moral responsibility for his act. It is his formal implication in this crime which I am going to prove to you. It is this man who shot, who killed, aad who assassinated another man. This doea not involve a phantom, mythical commando group, as they have tried to make you believe, even though the penalty riaked by the co-author of an act is the same as that for the person also responsible for the act. Why are theae statements made which don't even carry the hope of victory? It is because they cause doubt, a doubt which will have r~n impact on the sentence handed down. Because you will have, to some extent, this idea that things are pre- haps not what they are. That is the maneuver, the possible tactic. If I say that Jamgotchian is guilty of this crime, it is because the pre-trial investigation showed it. Aad this investigation is supported by three pillars of evidence: the testimony, the opinion of a balliatic expert, the admissions made by Mardiros Jamgotchian. 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY "I will begin with the testimony. As luck would have itr on 9 June there were passersby at the scene. Tk~ey were present to aee what happened and courageoua enough to tell what they saw. This is overwh~:lming testimony for Mardiroe Jamgotchian, although there were different ~~ersions of what happened. I will only mention three. This is quite suf~icient. Mr R, who recognized the accused that same evening by his clothingr his hair, his corpulence. Mr Y, who despite the elements of cor-usion involved recognized him formally when confronted with him. But there is more and better testi- mony. Mr Isly, thie man who was on his motorbike aad wha saw the assassin, who saw him run away, who followed him on hie motorbike ~nd who brought him to the attention of the police. That is what you can puL� together simply irom the three witnesses. "I would like to make a remark on courage. The real thing. Not the false courage of assassins. The ordinary courage of the man wY~o sees a drama enacted in front of him. Mr Isly is not a hero. He followed the assassin, knowing that the latter was armed, but he took this risk so that the police, so that the forces of order, a dishonorable word but which is very dear to me, could come and arrest thia msn. I will give you an example, because of the threats which hang over all of you. You know the danger which faces you, which is that of everyone, eince there have been 19 attacks againet Switzer- land. The second pillar oa~which I will rely to base mq~accusatioa is the matter of the weapons. This arsenal was found on this man, which makes poseible the comparison of the marks on the cartridge cases. And it turns out, according to the testimony of the ballistics eupert, that at least one cartridge case came from this magazine and that at leaet one bullet came out of this pistol. "The third pillar is the very admiesions made by Mardiros Jamgotchian. Of course, admissions made by the accused are no longer conaidered the best of proof, because there are circumstaaces in which admissione made are not the reflection of the truth. Admiaeions made bq the accused are the thing most open to challenge but which cease to be open to challenge once you review the very nature of these admissions. They were made spontaneously and not under torture. Let ua recall this communique from ASALA which reported the torture auffered by Jamgotchian and which demanded the intervention of all kinde of international committeea, the Red Cross, Amn~sty International, etc. ASALA already was preparing materials f or a carefully choaen defense, to aow the seeds of doubt. But Mardiros Jamgotchian did not take advantage of thie chance. Nine times he said, 'Yes, it was I,' at the police station and to the investigating ~udge. "I will make special mention of expert testimony. We all know Professor Berneim. He is a man of extraordinary integrity. Ae is a~ust man. Per- haps *his is due to his profession se a doctor which his profession as a man of the law has not succeeded in tempering. And when he faced Mardiros, the accused said the same thing. fle said for the lOth time that he was the one who had committed this act. It ia the lOth time which is worth more than 33 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the others because of the circumstancea in which this admiseion was made. And for these admissions he provided motivea, details which no one could invent! Ae made this admiasion before and after the ASALA communique was issued. When he said: "I will wait for orders" to make this false state- ment of the truth, it was a mistake. ASALA had been saying it for a long time. But the fact is that Mardiros Jamgotchian is probably too satisfied, too happq about what he did. I have seen assaseins, but as for him I have seen him smiling during these two days of the trial. In his owa world he may allow himaelf to do this. In his own world Yerguz was guilty because he was a Z~rk. "This is why I would like to ask you to decide that it was he who killed this man. And that this is clearly a case of aseassination and not of homicide. What makes assassination more serious than homicide are the _ aspects of perversion and premeditation. We know that Jamgotchian had been preparing himself for thie misaion for the past 2 months, that he had gone through psychological and military training, that he had prepared himself to kill, that for 2 months the idea of killing had become his reason for exis- tence. That is perversion of the pureat kind. Rilling Yerguz because he is what he is: a Turk. Because, being a Turk, he has no soul. That is such a derangement of the mind that, if it is not perversity, then perversity exists nowhere else " Af ter this delirious oration Attorney Bonnant continued gravely: "What are the possible estenuating circumstances for thia gravest of crimes which our Penal Code recognizes2 The defeaee is going to invoke the doctrine of limited responsibility. Our code asaumes that people will act in a respon- sible way except when a given act is committed intentionally. The very basie of the law of punishment is that a man is capable of understanding what he does and appreciating the consequences. We are not competent to pass 3udgment on the mental atructure of people. That is why Professor Berneim was charged with making an expert 3udgment. And what did he say? Ae said that the sense of responsibility of Mardiroe Jamgotchian was full and com- plete. And you can believe him all the more since verq often, in other cases, he hae told us something else. "Yeaterdaq the defense tried to draw from him the admiseion that his ~udg- ment was partially false. Aowever, Doctor Berneim continued to say: 'No, there was no change in the conscience of Mardiroa Jamgotchian.' Professor Berneim told us: 'Mardiros Jamgotchian is not a case of pathological f anaticiam. He has a vision of tiis duty as a soldier.' If a false viaion of duty were taken to be an honorable ~otive, that would be a grave matter. Becauae that vision implies that human life has no importance. It happene that in our world, as oppoaed to that of Jamgotchian, the hierarchy of values makes human life particularly esaential. "Moreover, he knows that hierarchy of values and appliea it for himeelf. For example, when he refuaed to take the risk of blowing up the Coasula te because in risking being blowa up with it he made a choice which subsumed a hierarchy of values in life--his life, not that of others! That man repre- . sents a concrete danger for society. It is that man who said in the course 34 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY of the pre-trial examination: 'I do aot regret what I did. I will accept another mission.' At the end of his road, unless prolongE:d detention ahould change him, he will do it again. Virtually, because of hi.s youth, Mardiros Jdmgotchian is the aseassin of tomorrow. "Let us speak of motives. Coming to tell you that his mot:ives were honorable is the last chance for the defense. It will speak to you of hie disinterest- edness and of the Armenian cause. That's where I told yot~ that the discussion was misplaced. You are going to believe, or theq would like to make you believe, that the ~udgment which you will make will concern the honorableness of the Armenian cauae. This Armenian cause is something ~arvelous! But it is the terrorist whom you are passing 3udgment on in this court. They will talk to you of idealism and of passion: everyone has hia own view of both of these. Of idealism you can say that it is a lof tq view of what is good. It is an elevation of the soul, imposaible to diasociate from morality and from respect for written and uawritten laws. The idealiat is the bearer of respect for life. What relationahip ia there between the assassin of Yerguz and idealism? None! None of the Armenian witnesses who t:estified yest~erday in this court, except for Mr" (he consults his notes with a scornful expres- sion) "Mr Toranian, approves violence. Mardiros Jamgotch~an has proved he , has a political commitment. But political commitment is iar from ideslism. It is something quite different. It is the product of a battle which always supposes there is an enemy who muat be elimiaated. At the end of this there is the death of Mehmet Yerguz. If they talk to you of idc~alism, they will have taken the word away from you! "The circumstances under which he was raised make him the bearer of a message ' of vengeance. It's not for all of that that this vengeance becomes some- thing noble. It's a kind of pasaion, no doubt, but repreheasible. And they would like to make you believe that it is hoaorable! I would like to saq that yesterday, at times, I was overwhelmed when the Armenian witnesses came to tell us about the drama of the Armenians. Before all of them we could bow aur heads. To all of them we could say that we uaderstand the Armenian cauae, when it is a single, desperate act of the will to maintain cohesion, when it is a sharp awarenesa of the indescribable cruelty of destiny, when . it brings the hope of land for one's own country. But I~ay to this court that this cause with this nobility will not tolerate the actions committed by Jamgotchian. It is either he or this cause which is rightl "There is no relationship between thia cause and this sardid assaseinationl ~I I saw 3ust now the grandmother of Mardiros Jamgotchian. I eaw his father. I saw their desperate and fraternal embrace. I was moved by it, and nothing I can temper this feeling. At the same time I thought of two cl~ildren who will I never know this kind of embrace and of a mother who weeps for her son. Of the two mothers there is one who weeps over the detention of an assassin and ~ the other over the vi.ctim of assassiaation. The tremor that went through ~ this ~udiance made me say to you that I thought that Mehmet Yerguz had died twice. Let me tell you that it is up to qou to make sure this is not true." Lawyer Bonnant sat down. The heavy silence which has surrounded hie long summiing-up continued to weigh on our heads. After a brief pause the pre- siding judge ordered the session to be reaumed the following morning. The night was a long one. ' 35 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~aturday 19 December 1981 - 9:15 am. The court resumed its session, perhaps a little more solemnly. Mardiros arrived with his calm, handsome face. The members of the jury were seated above us like papacious peeping toms who had no need to hear the prosecutor su~ing-up, as their verdict could be seen in their heartless faces. Prosecutor Raqmond Foex stood up, ad~usted his heavy ahell-ri~ed glasses, took aim, and began his su~ing-up with that yelping voice which made us want to stand in front of him and saq 'Heil Hitler.' P~ even had the lock of unruly, greasy hair which he regularly put back iu place, with a maniacal gesture. ' "Your Honor, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have come here despite the threats and despite the bombs which have gone off right here at the doora of the Palace of Just3,ce. You have been like the witnesses of this event who raa after tha assassin and had him arrested. You have been courageous. The time for inertia has passed, the time for courage has returned. You have come here to render a verdict on a crime co~itted quite near here. On 9 June a man was leaving his office and going home from his ~ob peacefully. but h~ was watched, he was followed, and he was ahot dowa like an animall It was another person who went to knock on his door and who said to his wife: 'Madame, be brave.' Faced with this death, we remembered thousands of dead, millions of dead whose lives were cut short in the conwlsions of war. We could ask ourselves how we ourselves would behave in the atorms of war. All the dead, of all the wars, have a right to our compasaion and to our memory. "Those who come bringing death on our soil know that Swise law prohibits the death penalty. They know that in Switzerland they do not risk being tortured or shot, and that ia why they spread assassinatioas all over Switzerland. "Now it ie a matter of deciding without hatred and without weakness. Mardiros Jamgotchian had the choice between two misaione: blowing up the Turkish Consulate, and perhapa risking blowing up with it, or killing a Turkish diplomat. He chose the latter ob~ective, the easiest and the least dangerous. It is true that Armenia has suffered from unspeakable misfortunes. You know that this was the first Christian state. You know that General Vartan died in the course of heroic resistance against the Persiana in 451; that several centuries later it was Ottoman domination which ended in the massacres of the end of the last century. If it is true that Armenia was invaded, crushed, and cut into pieces, it is nonetheless true that General Antranik scorned those who today take their war onto friendly territory. Jean Marie Carzou, the historian, recognized in thie courtroom that Switzer- land was a friendly country which had done a great deal for the Armenians. "Already, during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid, at the time of the 1895 massacres, a petition was sigaed by 400,000 Swiss to have these massacres in the Middle East brought to an end. It was in Geneva that Armenisn orphanages were establiahed; it was in Switzerland that 700,000 Swias francs were col- lected for these orphans. They have spoken to you of 1915, they have told you of the horror~s of the massacre of the Armenians. But it was still 36 FOR OFFI~AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540090002-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Switzerland which sent a relief column to the scene. And when Armenia was buried in 1923 it was Switzerland again which i~ediately demanded the restoration of the freedom, of the rights, and of the we11-being of the Armenian people. This effort was not successful, but it was repeated. "That is how Switzerland raised its voice in favor of Arm~:nia aad of the Armenians! Switzerland does not have to welcome on ite sail fanaticism, violence, and crime! It is a matter of applying our law. Laws which decided to punish assassination with imprisoament for life. We m~ist apply the laws justly. He who dared to take life iato his own hands muer expect that we will dare to apply the law to him. And the law provides ~that he who inten- tionally kills will be sentenced to at leset 5 years impr:tsonment, If it is proved that the criminal is particularly perverae or dang~rous, he will be sentenced to life imprisonmeat. The man Mardiroa Jamgotchian killed was a peaceful man, who spent the Pentecost holiday with Armeni,in frienda! A~.irk with Armenians! "This was a premeditated act. Premeditation was already there in these ~ camps where they teach people to kill. They teach premeditation of crime, i they teach waiting. Jamgotchian has been prepared for a:Long time. He prowled about the streets, he obaerved, he made himself rsady, he killed. Like a soldier, he says. No! A soldier carries arms openly. He wears a distinctive uniform. The soldier risks his life. It was not a soldier but a peaceful tourist who stepped down from the airplane in Zurich. He spoke of war, but he was the only one to talk of it! That war which was in his pocket in the form of a pietol aad a hand grenade. It was in secret that he waved his weapons and that he opened f ire. Then he threw away the mask of a tourist! What we saw was not the f ace of a aoldier. It was the hideous face of terrorism! "Those who make people suffer are executionere. Thie is not an army but a pack of assassins! They tell us that there was a political motive. Is this an exten~ating circumstance? The political motive does not lessen the criminal character of this act. An assassination remains an assassination. And if a Turk, taking advantage of this trial, should assassinate Jamgotchian, this would still be a political crime but we would pursue him and try him also. Are you really going to say that the act by Mardiros Jamgotchian deserves esteem, compels consideration and reapect, and ia in conformity with the ideas of honor and of dignity? You have aeen that Prof essor Berneim declared him to be normal. Therefore, there is no possible extenuation of - the punishment. You know that he suffered from the consequeaces of the ~ genocide, you know that he was overwhelmed by appalling accounts of these ~ events. You know that even so he was able to live a normal life and you i know that he is animated by fanaticism. I hold it against those who inspired ~ in him these deplorable ideas of hatred and of vengeance. For you know that the genocide of 1915 was only a pretext. ~ "You know that Armenians right here, in Geneva, were held to ransom, you know ~ that there have been.all kinds of attacks} you know after all that thia is a ~ matter of ehaking the West in the interests of I do not know what barbarian ' empire! I present as proof the list of attacke which have taken place aince ' ~ 37 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the release of Alec Yenicomechian and of Suzy Mashered~ian. At the time many people had the infantile hope that they had persuaded Armenian terrorism to let us alone. An error. Lesa than 5 months afterwards an attack took place on 9 June, and the culprit was arrested. Immediately attempts at intimidation began again. ASALA declared that it would atrike, and I quote: 'All those who belong to the camp of our enemy. As long as its interest are a part of imperialist intereats, we will strike Switzerland.' And these threats are being carried out! First it was the Federal Palace, then the Kloten railway station, then the department stores, and on 22 July it was the bomb which exploded in the railway station of Cornavin and which cauaed the death of one pereon, a Swiss citizen, 22 yeare of age and really younger than Jamgotchian here! A young, innocent Swiss citizenl And now there are these threats of other attacksl They say, 'We will strike in the coming weeks!' "Hagop Hagopian boasted in stating.that any sentence of 5, 10, or 15 years' impzisonment for Mardiros Jamgotchian would lead to the same number of years of t.-ouble for Switzerland! That is how they threaten us! The Armenian peopl.e also condemn these attacks. They are trying to convince us by terror, and ~we must resist them. Af ter the threats, after the bombs, they tried yesterday to uae the sof t touch, to tell us that they formally condemned these attacks. "They tried to enclose you in the following equation: if you are for the genocide, you are against Mardiros Jamgotchian; if you are against Mardiros Jamgotchian, you are for the genocide. You have the right to think that the genocide was abominable and at the same time you have the right to condemn an assassin who has become like these Turks whom he deteste, an instrument of death. "You will have the courage to say that Jamgothhian is an assassin and that there are no extenuating circumstances." it~~was 10:.35 am when the prosecutor sat down, his face livid. After a 10-minute pause it was the turn of the defense to sr~eak. Defense attorney Devedjian stood up and said: "Your flonor, Mr Prosecutor, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I have listened very attentively to the attorney for the Yerguz family and to the prosecutor and I heard two main points f rom the prosecution. "The first point is that Mardiros Jamgotchian is only one amall wheel in an overall structure, that he ia a amall wheel in this blind, international structure of terrorism, against which we must defend ourselves to fight against all the rest of it. That ia the reason why they would like you to pronounce the verdict of guilty. "The second point is that the victim is allegedly an anonymous Turk, attacked solely because he was a Turk, and thus a victim of a form of raciem, which would make this act bear no relation to the personal experiences and drama of the accused. 38 FOR OFFlCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY "I will begin with the first main point, that of blind tei�rorism. The court has noted throughout the trial that Turkey ie mobilizing i.ts diplomatic forces throughout the world to hide the least allusion to the Armenian genocide. Even in Switzerland, right here, pressures of this kind exist and are having an effect. I will give you a amall but signifi.cant example: do you know that the Swissair Company not very long ago publj.shed a touriat brochure which was clearly innocent. On the map of Turke;? it had dared to print on the eastern side these two words: 'Armenian plat:esu.' And do you know, Swissair had to give way to Turkieh pressure and ta~:e out this "erroneous" reference! It was people held in YOUR prisonK who spent days and days crossing out the worde 'Armenian plateau' on thousancls and thousanda of copies of the brochure!" He waved a copy of the brochtire involved. "Even the wo::k 'Armenian' is prohibited in YOUR country! In Mar.seille a minister ' of religion has told you how the Turkish ambassador in France returned to Ankara because of a monument to soldiers who died for Fraiice! Just for that! "Jean Marie Carzou has told you that the Hachette publish:tng company gave up publishing hia book in order to preserve its commercial o~itlets in Turkey. Attorney Wolf told you that all of ZLrkey's diplomatic re~ources were mobilized to remove two and one-half lines from an obscure report of the United United Nations Human Rights Commission, and what lines! am going to read ' them to you, as they are so inoffensive: "At the same time we wish to under- line rather substantial documentation concerning the massacre of the Armenians, considered the first act of genocide in the 20�th century." Just for that! And they got it. "So do you imagine for a single instant that, in view of the action of ASALA which awakened the Armenian people, Turkey has sat on its hands, haa done nothing? Do you imagine that the Turkish government cou13 accepr. that and did accept it? You have heard of psychological warfare, of the preasure which a totalitarian state can eaercise. And what totalitaxian atate do we have facing us today? Can you find a worse example? There are 30,000 political prisoners, an opposition that ia muzzled, in prison. Turkey practices torture, and what torturel It is enough to read the report of Amnesty International. And I am not speaking of the people who have been beaten with sticks or have had electric shocks applied to their abdomens or moistened sexual parts. Today, at this moment, at the ti;ne I am speaking to you, hundreds of persons are being tortured in Turkey. Yes, those are anonymous Turks. "In reading the report of Amnesty International I happened on the horrors described by Jean Marie Carzou, 65 years late. These are the same horrors, the same abominations. Among those tortured there were, ~f courae, Armenians like Father Yergatian, and no doubt it touches us still more to know of an Armenian, and a priest furthermore, locked up in a Turkish ~ail. But we should be as much scandalized over all the other victims of that government. And you are not anonymous, when you serve auch a government, when you are a soldier in an army that doea such thinga, such thinga that humanity condemned at the Nuremberg Tribunal. Do you think that a state which did not heaitate to deploy all ita resources to remove two lines from a report, do you think for an instant that it doesn't try to ignore the Armenian claima, that it 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY does not try to destroy the potential for sympathy which exists in oir favor? Because this current of sympathy exists. During the two days~ of this trial the proof was there. People sent us many flowers, uut the;~~ were the flowers you send to a funeral." Instinctively, we looked at the presiding judge. Although he evidently f elt himself under the gaze of many of us, he did not stir. Deved~ian continued "What the Turke want to do is to establish a wall of misunderstanding between you and~us. False communiques, true communiques, false attacks, infiltration, manipu:!ation- we know them all. Are you really sure thgt thie tragic attack at the Cornavin railway station was the work of the Armeniana? Theae attacks do not serve the Armenian cause at all. You always have to sek youraelf: who benefits from this crime? Not us, and the evidence shows it. "Switzerland has always baen more than friendly to the Armenians. The Turks therefore have every reason to build a wall of separation between you and us. You will 3udge Mardiros for a single act. Just one. Not for this whole climate of events, by which they would like to influence you. I have alao been personally threatened with death. Armenians have been attacked in Paris, causing one death. And before the church a bomb was discovered, intended to explode during Mass. "I was threatened because I defend the people, from whom I come. Perhaps something will happen to me. I accept it. Attorney Beaoit knows this also." (Let us recall that Attorney Benoit, Mardiros' other lawyer and who had defended Alec Yenicomechian, was the victim of a dramatic attack at the time of the other trial, which nearly cost him his life. Attorney Benoit, still walks with a cane due to the wounds he suffered last year.) "But we do not agree that they can refuse accepting the reality of our dead. We will cry out this reality perhaps with excessive vehemence, equal to what we have undergone. We know that terrorism is blind. Don't strike blindly. Don't strike un~ustly. Judge with discernment, I beg of you. Search your minds. "The second argument of the Yerguz family attorney is that Mehmet Yerguz was allegedly killed simply becauae he was a Turk. I have already told you that when you are an agent of a state that employs torture, you are not an anonymous Turk. These diplomats are busy making the attitude of their govern- ment look normal. These people are engaged in making torture look nc~rmal. They do what the Nazi ambassadors did during World War II. In Parie in 1938 a young Jew killed a German diplomat. He said: 'I wanted to perfox~m a symbolic act. Don't betray our message.' There is an hiatoric desir~ on the part of oppressed peoples to wish to transmit their message as an oppressed people. ~~3 the act performed by i~iardiros is an act in this tradition. Mehmet Ye~guz was a soldier. A soldier who fights a not very pretty battle. He was killed by a soldier who fights for a cause. Aad if you want to make the balance lean on the aide of horror, it will not lean on our side. "Mr Prosecutor, although you have spoken of the family of Mehmet Yerguz, you have not provided any details about k~is exact functions within the Turkish Consulate. There is no reason to exclude the poasibility that thia man was a secret agent. I would like to say tu you that of all the attacka made againet Turkish diplomata, none has been struck against an anonymoue Turk. 40 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY They are always ambassadors, consuls, vice-coneuls, first secretaries of embassy. They are always people occupying specif ic positions. To say to the Armenians that there could be an:i-Turkish racism is particularly in3urious to us--we who are the first victims of racism. "To this argument I would oppose the claims of the ASALA c:ommando which on last 24 September occupied the Consulate of Turkey in Par::s and which demanded the release from T~rkish prisons of four Armeniati prisoners and also of four Kurdish political prisoners and four Turks. We ~.ow that the solution of the Armenian problem can only emerge from good relations with Turkish and Kurdish democratic forces. And they speak to ua of racism, when the com~ando group of which I speak demanded the release c~f eight Muslims for four Christians. ~hat is the opposite of wiah to attack anonymous Turks. Of course, the fact that he was not an anonymous T~rk does not make it possible to smile at the death of a man. If there was laiighter yesterday it was out of place. "You ask the question why these acts take place in Europe. There is a war between the Turkish government and the ASALA. .Aad:that w~3r spills over into the West. But in Turkey itself there are numerous attack:; in which Armenians have their role. You don't know much about this in Weste~^n countries because Turkish censorship covers it up. Do you think that inforioation is freely available in Turkey? Ask the European ~ournalists what tliey have to do to file reports on Turkey So you think that when something happens on its soil the ltiirkiah government is not going to claim it or try to cover it up. "You said that Mardiros Jamgotchian performed !:�s act here in Geneva because he risked nothing. He risked his life. Just as Yeghi Kechichian r3aked his life. He was shot in Iran in September in aa attempted a~eassination of the Turkish ambassador in Tehran. You ask yourselves why the~e Armenian actions take place here. But that is because it is here that the ~rka are operating. The Armenians fled the genocide. They ceme to Europe, where they became full- fledged citizens. They wanted to speak of their history, of their genocide, of what they had suffered. The ltirks came here to hide this dialogue which might take place between us. Even in exile they continue to pursue us. E~en in exile they still continue to peraecute us. Theq strike at us in exile, and we answer them in exile. It is in Switzerland that they act, and I pre- sent as proof this well-known Article 30 of the Auman Rights Com~ission re- port. Therefore, it is in Switzerland that theq will be struck. I know, and I am beholden to you for it, that for the last 3 days everyone here, including ~he press, has spoken of what the Armenian genocide was. But not everything happens like that, on every occasion, and you have largely made clear all of what you were able to understand yeaterday. "The facts remain, those which are being ~udged today. In the expressiori of Attorney Bonnant the accusation resta on three pillars of evidence. I accept these bases for debate. "First of all the witnesses: I have also heard them. I did not get t;ze same impression from them that you did. The first witnese whom you mentioned, you 41 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY said that he was 20 meters away from the scene, It's a ma~or achievement, you see, to recogaize a face. He said it himself. "I recognized him because he had been presented to me at the police station.' Therefore, he.recognfzed him among four men at the office of the investigating 3udge 2 weeks later because they had previously pointed him out at the police station. That's quite an achievement! You cannot saq that qour witness' statement provides you with a foundation for your accueation. I even wonder what conclusion you can from this kind of testimony! "The second witness whom you take as an example--you see I am sticking only to the witnesses whom you have chosen--is a womaa. She says she was 30 meters from the scene v~ the action. Judge for youraelvee: 30 meters! She says: "I eaw his photograph in the preea." After that ehe recognizee him at the office of the investigating judge. That's also quite an achievement! And whom does she recognize? A man who was running, since o'~e saw ao one else. She recognized him as a runner, but not as someone f iring a gun. She tells you that he is the man who ran. This second witness' testimony, no ~ more than the f irst, does not establish the guilt of Mardiros Jamgotchian. "The third witness says: 'I must say that if I had not seen him at the police station and his photograph in the press, I would not have recognized him.' That's a very honeat witness. In bringing together these three pieces of testimony what makes it possible for you to say that Mardiros was the gunman? "And I will speak to you of thie fourth witness, a woman, who says ahe aaw on the steps a man who looked at her and who ran away. Where is thia man? Where is he, aince he is not one of the witnesses? "From the ~itnesaes whom you mention~d I don't see what you got from them in terms of the accusation of the gunman. All of the witnesses except one say that it is possible that there may have been another man. It's a normal thing that no one paid attention to him, since it was not he who attracted their attention. "The second pillar of evidence presented by the prosecution rests on the weapons used. The ballistics expert declares that the cartridge shells came from the gun found on him. This is not in question. There was no need for a ballistica expertl Regarding the aecond part of this expert testimony, I would underline that when Mardiroa Jamgotchian was arrested he had two magazines on him, the firat one in the gun. The first two cartridge shella came from it. The defense admite it. It is likely that the third cartridge sheYl also came from it. There were therefore three rounds fired. What do tihe police say? Since this gun, which was fired three timea, should no longer contain more than 11 cartridges, Inspector Sautier said that when they went to question him, it turned out that the gun had 14 cartridges in it! There is something wrong in this. The police should agree among themselves. Some manipulationa have taken place! We don't know what happened to the gun. "So out of the three pillara of evidence examined so far, two of them have already crumbled away. - 42 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY "Let's look at the third one. The statements of Mardiros Jamgotchian. It's true. They are incoherent. I agree with you. But what ~:onclusion do you draw from this? Incoherence has never constituted proof uf guilt! "For my part I attach no importance to these statementB. Because he is a soldier and consequently does not collaborate with other ;3uthor3ties, if only because the Turks could have brought civil proceedings ag~3lnst him and obtained access to the file on this case. Theq could hav~a used it, obtained information on him and on his organization. As a result ;ze says anything deliberately. For that reason he attaches no importance to the ASALA communique which revealed the presence of the secoad commando group. There- fore, he is distrustful and does not know if thia is really an ASALA co~unique . "Now when he takes this point of view, he does not take it to escape his responsibilities, since from the point of view of penal l~w, it is almost the same thing. He has no particular intereat in saying ~ahat he said. That will not get him out of ~sil. If he says this, it is because he wante us to reflect. Don't you think he states the contrary of the truth because he is a young man who, up to the present, had a tendency to ~ustify his actions (didn't he say that he was in influential official of ASALA?)? He is young, he ia a child, and therefore when he claims to be the gunman, ask yourselves if this is true! From all that you retain the impreseion that you are swi~ing in contradictions, to aome extent. You have to appreciate the facts in terms of the motive. You will ~udge the facte in terms of the motive. "And what ia the motive? You cannot avoid it. I don't want you to think, as it has been suggested to you, that I want to deviate from this trial into the Armenian question. You have to laok and you have to understand. To understand him� You have to underetand this contiauation of the persecution which even today--including in your country--continues to pureue us. There is also the enormous weight of the genocide. The day before yesterday [17 December], Your flonor, you were good enough to read the telegram from Talaat Pasha. So that you may understand how powerful this traumatic shock is, I am going to read you several other telegrama from the same Talaat Pasha." Attorney Devedjian reada this overwhelming evidence and thea resumes , his summarization: "Today, that continues. Today, in 1981, in Turkey, on , their identity paper is marked: 'Armenian.' That's not for nothing. "When you are an Armenian, you canaot hold certain ~obs. In 1965 there was this law which prohibited instruction in Armenian. This man Talaat is today, in 1981, a national hero in Turkey! With a mausoleum, with avenues, with schools which bear his namel And we don't have the right to have our dead respected, while their executioner ia glorified! What man worthy of the name could accept that? Would you accept that for a eingle instant without being ready for legitimate revolt? "I hope that you understand this well. Thia ia not a matter of vengeance but of elementary ~uatice. It would be easy to stop the tarroriam. It would 43 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY be enough for a Z~rkish government for the first time to say" `It's true. Turkey massacred the Armeniana. We say this the more easily since it was not we who did it. We ask your pardon.' But they have never asked our pardon. Turkeq has always refused to enter into a dialogue. L~ven today, in this place~ ~rkey is not here because it doesn't want to talk to us. Even here, t~ey avoid a dialogue. One word would be enough to stop all that: 'Pardon.' Let them ask pardon; can we agree that theq will not aek pardon?" Defense attorney Devedjian turned toward the Yerguz familq attorneq: "You said that this is not the tribunal of history. But tihis audience, even so, is historic. There were 1.5 mi~lion Armenians killed. Oae Armeaian killed a Turk. He is being tried, Thoae are your laws. I agree. But for our 1.5 million victims no oae has been tried, and that's why we no longer accept that an Armenian be tried today! Do you perceive the irony of history! Simplq ia terms of human justice! The first to be ~udged in thia affair was we Armeniansl This is an extraordinary thing. I would like to say to my ~ colleague representing the Yerguz family ~ust this: you used unfortunate language yesterday. You called for severity for this child. And to do thie you have said exactly the same thing as Talaat Pasha: 'Rill the children because they will be the guilty of tomorrow.` That bowled me over. Liter+ ally bowled me over. But I pardon you." A look at Yerguz family attArney Bonnant showed us that this co~eat had hit ttte mark. But defense attorney Devedj ian had already reaumed his argument: "If you had any doubts on his motives, you have heard the expert witness testify. They have told you that he is a just man. And what did he say? I am sorry, Mr Bonnant, but you cannot draw from thie testimony what you said. The expert said that Mardiros Jamgotchian acted by reaeon of an ideal, that for him defending the Armenian cause was a question of honor. Furthexmore, he described to you the very apecial situation in which Msrdiros Jamgotchian has lived all his life, in a system of naked force, where it is the law of the ~ungle which triumphs, where you kill people like that, for aothing. He has only lived in such an atmosphere, in this universe where only force can protect you. How then could he have assimilated your laws. For qou he is like a Martian. You are not going to ~ udge a Martian by the laws of Earth! "And then look at him. You spoke yesterday of the handsomeness of youth. Nothing has worked for him. He is intelligent, he has a great learning capacity. He has his whole life bsfore him. Even so, you are not going to consider that, at his age, everything is completely loat! Don't forget what the expert said, this ~ust man, on the subject of motives: 'Hie act is the natural prolongation of the denial of the genocide,' and he added: 'The circumstances as a whole which aurround thie act involve in the end a certain form of self-esteem." You are not going to allege perversityl You cannot do so. After all these elements have been available to you. You conclude that he is being ~udged solely for his act and not for another. And that this ie an act of war: the victim was killed like a soldier of an army that waen't very noble. You conclude that the facts are confused and that his exact role is quite difficult to determine. You also conclude that Switzer- land is not hie target. He acted in r_he defenae of peraecuted exiles. 44 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Turkey has provided ample provocation for the attacks of which it is the victim. Aud when it will be enough to say ~yea' to stop these attacks. When Willy Brandt got dowa on his knees at Aschwitz, on that daq the Jewish people could turn the page. The German prime minister grew in stature by this action, and his people grew with him. And what do we demand of Turkey: at least that it will recogaize the horrors of the paet in order to be able to look at the future. "Our relationships with the Turks. although they are complex, have alwaye been relationships as between good neighbors. That is why I say to them: 'Stop the tsrrorism, ask our pardon. You will save many lives. This is not a threat. The in~ustice we have undergoae ie too strong. But if you recognize the genocide, the Armenians will no longer understand why terrorism should continue. Whereas now there is atill the feeling of a atruggle for justice.' That is why I tell you that Mardiros Jamgotchian acted in the service of an ideal. There ia the evidence. You are going to ~udge him. You are going to ~udge us. "I ask you for understanding. I ask you for a~udgment which is not merely approval of the camp of the executionera. You should not, by means of a severe decision, make them believe that they are right and thus encourage them in crimes 100,000 times more terrible thaa that which you are 3udging today. Stay on our side, as you alwaya have: there are so few countries which have been on our side." The atmosphere wae tense. Attorney Deved~ian sat down. We looked at the faces of the ~ury to see if "somehow" they were touched or moved a little bit. Nothing showed under their masks. The session was suspended between noon and 2:45 pm. It was then the turn of def enae attorney Benoit to sum up : "Your Honor, Mr Prosecutor, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I first must bow my head in view of the death of a man. I also muat bow my head before the death of 1.5 million pereons assassinated in 1915 simply because they were Armenians! For me it is an honor to defend a human being who has the � face of a child and is so handsome. For me it is an honor to be able to plead for a country which does not exiat, for a country which has been erased from the map. For me it an honor to defend this cause which I have made into my - own cause! "When they sought to make you believe that there is no relationehip between this act of genocide and this attack, I said no! I think that this people has the fight to regain its country. I think that this people has the right to have militant supporters. One of them is in front of you. What is he accuaed of? Of having sought to rediacover his fatherland whoae children have been massacred. I have aeen Mardiroe Jamgotchian several times in prison. Imagine the solitude of this boy, isolated in hie cell for montha, not speaking our language. I tried to learn to know him despite the barrier of the interpreters. And what I saw is what Profeseor Berneim spoke of: a young a~ult. That means that in our penal code there is a chapter for young adults. 45 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 F'OR ORF[CIAL USE ONLY "But I Would like to say first of all that I wae disappointed in Attorney Bonnant'and in the prosecutor. They have ~ust told you that the act which you are ~udging is the logical conaequence of another trial which was held here at the beginning of last year. They tried to make you believe that too soft a sentence was handed down last December and January. I am the more astonished at this since the ~udgment rendered was honeat and scrupulous. "To return to this trial, they have mentioned to you a Chiaese proverb. There are others, and here is one of them: 'Any despot at all can force his slave to aing hy~ to liberty.' At the time of the genocide there were not 3ust dead people but also slaves. There were four generationa involved. You have heard the religious minister from Marseille speak with a vehemence tempered by his age. My client has the same kind of vehemence. In the arms which permit a people to be recognized there are the laws and there are the arms. They have told you that you are not the tribunal of hietory, but neither are you the tribunal of terrorism, because you don't have the right to be such a tribunal. You are the tribunal which is judging a kid, who after years of martyrdom of his people performed the act which his conscience dictated." "I will read to you an account of the genocide, so that you will understand." Attorney Benoit reada it and then continues: There is the time of the slaves, there is the time of the massacres, there is the time of those who are prepared to be assimilated, and f inally there is the time of those who react to these eventsl I know that the Armenian people have been abandoned by the American Senate. I know that they have been abandoned by the United Nations. And when they have tried all the channels of diplomacy to see that 3ustice ie done, well, they come inevitably t~ extremist solutions. "Think of the FLN [Algerian National Liberation Front]. Wasn't it by means of arms that they obtained their liberty? The Armenians don't have the same chance to have their country, since this was taken away from them! You have heard here a~rkish diplomat 32 years old say that he was 32 in order to avoid expressing a view on the Armenian genocide! Well, I am 34 qears old and I know about the Jewish and Armenian genocides! "You have heard the grandmother of Mardiros Jamgotchian tell you that she told ~her children and grandchildren of the history of the massacres. One thing was not said. One question which she was spared, because on the day before she testif ied this aged person had a heart attack. The queation was this: in your time in Turkey, in your region, isn't it true that any pereon who spoke Armenian had hia tongue cut out? Despite her illness, she came here on behalf of her grandson. "They have also spoken to you of Lebanon. About this Lebanon where~ when you go to school, no one knows if you will ~come back. "Minister Karnusian has described to you the blocked future in front of Armenian youth in the Middle East and who, given the precariouaness of their situation, have decided to fight to reconquer a country. Their country. You know the cynicism which is shown them. 46 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY "What would we have done if Nazi Germany had invaded our c:ountry? Wouldn't there have been among us people willing to take up arms aTid to kill? "It is true that Mardiros Jamgotchian did not experience t:he genocide. But he has the suffering of it in his heart. And the wound w:Cll always bleed. That is why this boy, who needs a country, obeyed an organization. You can ask yourselves why Jamgotchian came here to Geneva. Whom did he come to or who helped him to kill? You have heard Attorney Devedjia~z tell you that Mardiros Jamgotchian came to suppress an enemy agent. Ev:idently, it was not ~ust to kill anyone at all. He had a photograph of this ~~ersonage who was a member of the Turkish police. Therefore, it was someon~a who was a part, as a representative of the T~rkish state, of the effort to d~any the existence of the genocide which led to this extremity and to this act. Mehmet Yerguz was the repreaentative of a state which annihilated hie race +and which continues the repression of his people. "You have heard the numerous examples of sabotage of discussion of the Armenian question, and you have aeen the unpardonable exai~ple of the man who came to say to you: 'I am 32 years old.' How could he d~re to say to you: 'I am 32 years old, and that doen't concern me.' You kno~a Mardiros' per- sonality. You know that he was raised in a refugee camp. You know that he spent more than 18 months in a training camp where he rec~eived training in sports and military sub~ects and where he took history couraes. "This boy was ready to die for the cause of his people. He is also a boy who lives for this cause, who lives quite simply to make one of the greatest genocides which has ever existed in our time fully recognized. Yea, he was absolutely convinced of what he had to do. It is true that I have attacked Professor Berneim to some extent. For an answer which he gave me, saying I think, I am sure that Article 1~. of the Penal Code is applicable to Mardiros Jamgotchian. "It: is for you to decide whether, af ter all the suffering which his people has undergone, he is capable or not of understanding himself in terme of his act. I say: 'No.' I tell you that if we had been exterminated in the same way, we would have reacted as he did. He ia a.kid who acted like a soldier in the service of his cause. Idealism is something which is considered like an extenuating circumstance in Swiss law. My client arrived here obedient to his orders. They told him: 'Go and kill.' It was the Yerguz family lawyer who said that. Mardiros arrived here in a different world, in a i different balance of forces. His world was falaified at its very base by , those who have been accused here during these 3 days, in this courtroom, be- I cauae they refused to recognize the existence of the genocide of 1915. "He is filled with the great valor of the struggle of hia people. Mardiros, whatever his age, was not in a poaition to orient himself, could not orient himself, in terms of his act. Because in this false balance of force there ' is a lessening of the capacity to understand. There will be at least some such diminution. You have the task of deciding whether you should apply Article 11 or not. Let us come to the core of the problem. What.act did he ' 47 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY commit in Geneva? A man is dead. It is not particularly important whether my client was the gunman or not. Or whether he was the one who took the gun and weapons and fled. "However, I ask you to look at the personality of my client. Is he really perversel and immoral, as they would like to make you believe, so that you will find him guilty of murder. Mardiros is neither i~oral nor amoral. As ~ for perversitiea, I'm going to tell you what they are." Defense attorney Benoit then read from a text regarding aeveral examples of crimes already 3udged.and_extracts from the ~udicial reports. All concerned monstruous and premeditated crimes. He stopped and looked at the 3ury gravely: "So do you thiak that, whatever his participa~`ion in this act, he acted without motive, with a mind a vi1e, as insensitive, with this deaire to massacre, such as is described in these trials? Well, I tell you: 'No.' "Jamgotchian's motives were not im~oral and they were not egotistical. This is not the act of a man who had only scorn for human life, but rather a man who gave no thought to his own worth in view of the enormity of the other problem. So, yes, Jamgotchian could be considered dangerous, but not particularly dangerous, as they would like to make you believe. The danger which he presented, therefore, in no way is sufficient to characterize him as an assassin. He is not particularly dangerous, and neither is he particularly perverse. That involvea, therefore, homicide, not murder. What- ever you find, you have the obligation to consider what are the circumatances which could~ extenuate his act. It is true that the political motive is not considered to be an honorable motive. "But it was Professor Berneim who told you" 'He acted out of idealism.' Now idealism can be taken into consideration in Swiss jurisprudence." Def ense attomey Benoit then referred to Orders 64 and 65 of the Swiss Federal _ Council. Then he said: "The Penal Code doea not take into account these possibly extenuating circumstancea which are preaented to you. But look well at Mardiros Jamgotchian. As that woman said to you, this firat defense witness, she said as she looked at thia kid: 'That cannot be an assassinl' "That is why, at the time you raise the queation of whether you have before you a man guilty of murder or homicide, I ask you to answer yes to the question as to whether the motive was honorable. Don't forget that you also have to take into account what happened af ter the act. He had a loaded gun on him. He had a hand grenade on him. He did not fire on thoae who came to arrest him. And if he didn't do this it is because he had no reason to fire at the Swiss, and he said this to you. He simply came to carry out his mission. And nothing else. Yesterday when reference was made to the martyr- dom of the Armenian people, some people wept. And I who have taken up the cause of this people, I who have suffered in my own body, I who nevertheless defend Mardiros--today I give you my tears and I ask you to render a fair verdict." Defense attorney Benoit seemed to be truly moved. He eat down, - overcome by emotion. The faces of the members of the ~ury remained as impenetrable as ever. The preaiding ~udge addresaed Mardiros: "Do you have anything to say before I 48 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY read the certificate of iadictment?" Mr Godel translates the question to Mardiros, who stands up aad says in a clear and firm voice: "What I did here was not directed against the Swiss people nor againsr. the Turkish p~ople, but rather against the Turkish fascist regime. I would like to explain why Switzerland was chosea for this operation. The cancellation of Paragraph 30 of the report concerning the Armeniaa genocide took place here at the United Nations, and at the requeat of Turkey. That is all I have to say.,' The presiding judge said: "Members of the jurq, do you have a question?" One of the ~urors in the first row said: "I would like to know if the accused would be prepared to kill agaia if the ASALA askad him to do so." The answer will be very important. We all hope that Mard3ros understands how much ia involved. Defense attorneq Deved~ian leans tuward Mardiros and whiapers to him several times: "~lotch essE, votch!" (say no, eay no!) Mardiros answers with an assured voice: "No, never." The presiding judge, in a tenae silence, then reads once again the entire indictment. The ~ury retires to consider the questioa. We all know that if the j ury f inds Mardiroe guilty of murder he will be sutomatically sentenced to life imprisonment. A deep tensiox~ fills the courtroom. Threateaing looks are exchanged between Armenian sympathizers of Mardiros and the correspoa- dents of the 1~rkish fascist newspapers such as HURRIYET, TERCUMAN, etc. We leave the courtroom aad pace aervously up and down the lobby of the Palace of Justice. We find ourselves confronted with thia monstruous truth: this is an Armenian soldier who is on the bench of the accused, whereas the Turkish torturers never appeared before anq court at all! It is an aberra- tion of historq. We also face the fact of these cops and these ~ournalists who are discussing a problem which, ae good Swi6s, they will never uader- stand. 5:45: "Gentlemen, the court ie in session." The presiding ~udge eays :"The trial is resumed. I call on the foremaa of the ~ury." The latter, a man of about 40, stands up and says in a moaotonoue voice: "On my honor and my consciencp I read the followiag decisions: "As to the first question, concerning guilt, the jury answers 'yes'; extenuating circumstances, 'no'; "As to the second question, concerning guilt, the 3ury answers 'yes'; exten- uating circumstances, 'no'; Our throats tighten. We begin to clamp our ~aws shut. The foreman of the ~ury continues: "As to the subsidiary question, the ~ury answers 'qea' and a) as to the question as to whether the accused poeseasea all his mental faculties, the ~ury answera 'yes'; 49 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540090002-5 FOR OFF7CIAL USE ONLY b) as to the question as to whether he underatands the implications of his act, the jury answera `no'." The lawyers don't seem to have any reaction. In the crowd attending people - ask for eaplanations, and it is the appearance of things that wins out. The verdict of "guilty" we quite understand: Mardiros has been found guiltq of murder. However, the jury found him only "partly responaible" for his acts. This euplains that the "trial continues." It is a matter now of determining the length of the sentence. The prosecutor stands up again, venom on his tongue: "The nirkieh state could not participate in this trial. Defense attorney Deved~ian reproached the victim, Mehmet Yerguz, with being an agent of the Turkish secret police by saying that in the course of this trial we had naver heard a statement of the real functions of the latter at the Consulate. Mehmet Yerguz, after , having completed his atudies in Iatanbul, was in a training position at the ORTF [French Radio-Television Office] and also with the AFP [Agence Fra~ce Pressej. In 1978 he became a locally engaged secretary of the Consulate of Turkey in Geneva. He was married and had two children aged 5 and 7 years old. "To throw a kind of troubled suspicion on the victim, it was stated that he was allegedly a member of the Turkish secret service. How could I provide you with proof that he was not, since no state in the world thus identifies the functions of these agents. Just now I was at the Turkieh Coneulate and I walked along the street where he was ahot down. Aad I said to myself that a member of the secret service would have paid attention and observed whether he was fol~qwed. I~rthermore, you will recall that Jamgotchian, in the course of the pre-trial examination, never went eo far as to legitimize ~ this act of murder by saying that the victim was a member of the secret service. On the contrary, he always said that he had chosen him out of three men because he had a certain "air" about him. Now, Jamgotchian, you say that the murder involved a certain man whose photograph you had received. This is the final trick. In the same way, when you said today that you would not kill again if you were asked to do so, you have stated the contrary up to nowl "Members of the 3ury, you have followed the summtiing-up, re~ ectiag the pre- sence of extenuating circumatances, and I congratulate you for it, Thue your decision will not aet a precedent. And you are right, for it would be unacceptable to him to avoid hia reeponsibilities by alleging that he obeyed higher orders! "I demand 20 years imprisonment and 15 years of aubsequent explusion from Switzerland." At the requeat of the lawyera the session was suspended. At 6:45 pm defense attorney Benoit stood up to make his final plea: "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have rendered a verdict which allowe you to lessen the penalty which you will give to Mardiroa Jamgotchian. The prosecu- tor has demanded this sentence of 20 years imprieonment, or the maximum which the law providea in this case. He has demanded this sentence from you by speaking only of the personality of the victim. Article 63 of the Penal 50 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY Code provides for what should be taken into account: mot:tves, previous criminal record, personality of the accused. "Regarding his previous criminal record, you know thgt th~a accused has never committed a crime. He is unknown to the police recorde. We have here a f irst first offender who appeara for the first time before a court. That relates to his record. "Regarding his motives, you know what they were. You did not accept his having acted for an honorable motive. You should take in�to account the fact that his motives were neither vile, nor abj ect, nor egoti~3tical, nor appalling. This is because Mardiros Jamgotchian needed t~~ m$ke this geature. It was for himself, for his people that he did it. Mr Prneecutor, you have spoken of a tardy repentance. Repentance is never too late. "The third thing which you should take into account is th~a peraonality of the accused. They have spoken to you of the aituation in Leb,3non. You have to live in I,ebanon to understand what the personal situation3 are. Although I have been invited to go to Lebanon, I never dared to go t'.iere because I was afraid of dying, because people die there every day! His father told us yesterday that he had raised his son like a soldier, but :it is his kid who is there now!" His voice broke at this point. "I ask you to reduce the sentence to the minimum of what you can do. Since you do not know exactly what age my client has, and aince he is 23 years old at the most, since his character development has been gravely affected by the tragedy of his people, and since his syatem of ethics is diff erent from our system. For me, Mardiros is a boy who is not fully aware of the realities, and you have admitted this by applying Article 11. You h~ve before you a repentant boy for whom I demand the application of Articl~e 10." The ~ury retired to deliberate. The presiding ~udge announced: "The session is hereby suspended." What now begins for us; for Mardiros, whom they have take~n away to be alone in his cell; and for all Armenians preaent is hours of interminable waiting during which the speculation flows freely. ~ From 7:30 pm to 10:46 pm. Houra during which we have to ~keep our tempers. Hours to keep the brakes o:~. It ia necessary to say it b~ecauae some might be tempted to believe the contrary. Yes, you have to say it. A trial is not a pleasure party. It is difficult, it tests you. Nerves may crack. And we could only admire Mardiros the more since by his calm appearance he gives us all a lesson in courage, and a strong dose of it at that. Tha lawyers try to reassure us: "The discuaeiona are long. That means that the ~ury has a troubled conscience. That ia good for us." In the courtroom which no one darea to leave all of the views are in agree- ment, At times they are optimiatic: "He will be given an amnesty," "Even if he is given 6 monthe, that is already too much." At timea they take into account the reality of the Swiss mentality: "If he gets 5 years, that 51 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY will be better even so than 20 years, right?" The predictione of the lawyers turn around 10 years. A stretch of 10 years for Mardiros. Our fiets tighten instinctively. We stub out the cigarettes on the floor ae if we were ~tubbing out a Turkish agent or a Swiss cop. Regarding the Swies cops, all of a sudden there are many more of them around. The reinforcements have arrived. They are burly brutes, the equivalent of our CRS [Republican Security Companies--French riot police], who take their places within the courtroom. And then there it is. For the last time, the same ceremony. The members of the court come and take their places. Mardiros arrives, a little tense, but on his youthful features the pride of an Armenian prince. A prince who ie the heroic symbol of a whole youth engaged in t~.a atruggle. The presiding ~udge announces: "The aession is resumed." Everyone site dowa heavily. A whole liat of phrases beginning with "considering that," whose content is more or lese as follows: "Considering that Jamgotchian has committed the most serious crime covered by our Penal Code; "Considering that he premeditated his act for a long time; "Considering that he shot down the victim in cowardly faehion by firing three bullets into his back; "Considering that he was only driven to perform thie act by a dangeroue kind of fanaticism; "Considering that he can be conaidered ta be a dangezous person; "Considering that the fanaticism which drives him has been carefully main- tained; "Considering that those who have acted to influence the soul of Jamgotchian have known how to exploit the undeniable suffering of the Armenian people, which every Armenian today carries in hia heart; "Considering that this fanatic, Jamgotchian, has lost his sense of values; "Considering that it ehould be concluded that he is the victim of thie fanaticism which has made hi~n lose all sense of the real values of the society in which he is developing; "Considering that it must also be ;.aken into consideration that his fanati- cism is exacerbated by the attitude of the ~rkieh state which ia determined not to recognize the fact of the Armenian genocide; "Considering that in Lebanon he lived in an uncontrollable situation for the past 5 yeaxs, where only force prevails; "Considering that he has an excellent previous record; "Considering that he has his whole life bef~re him; "Considering that he could work in the futur,~ for the cause of his people through the use of honorable means; "The court sentences him to 15 yeara imprisonment and 15 years of subsequent expulsion from Switzerland." Despite the stupefaction which overcame us, cries of protest spread t:~rough the courtroom. People said: "Mardiros, we are with you." Mr Godel translated for the accuaed. Mardiros did not wait to learn the sentence. He turned to Attorney Deved~ian and without faltering learned 52 FOIt OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONi~ i~ wtiat the sentence was. He atood up solemnly when Godel, moved by emotion, translated into Armenian for him the phrases beginning with "considering that." Mardiros corrected him when he heard the phrase about "his f anaticism was maintained by those who acted to influence his soul, "he said then, "It's not true. I am not a fanatic. I am convinced of what I am doing." The presiding ~udge announced that the defenae had 5 days to appeal the verdict and the sentence. The trial was over. The etate security police took position so that no one could approach Mardiros, eo t:hat no one could shake his hand. Then there was an explosion of revolt, a scuffle. Fingers were raised throughout the entire courtroom in the "V for victory" sign such as Mardiroa had shown on entering the courtroom. I3efore Mardiroa was led out of the courtroom, people shouted: "Haiastan, flaiastan! (Armenia, Armenia!) Shouts spread through the room, "The Swiss have hearts of stone!" A woman's voice was heard, protestir.g: "We were not terrnrists but we will become terrorists!" The members of the ~ury regarded us in perplexed fashion, appreciating things all of a sudden, at the end af 3 days that it was not an anonymous Armenian who had ~ust been coade�~nned,. We left the court- room, some crying, others shaking their fists at the larg~ number of police- men. The Turkish ~ournalists left by slinking along the walls. Threats and denunciations rained down on them. An old Armenian from Switzerland, passing in front of the Palace of Justice at the moment when we came out learning of the aeatence glven to Mardiros, sighed, and with a geeture covering all of Switzerland said: "I pity them for those 15 years. The Armenians in the course of theix long history have learned that they could more easily count their enemies than their friends. Switzerland, by condemning Mardiros by meane of an unjust aad severe judg- ment, revolting to the Armenian people, has ahown in which camp it is located. And far from putting a brake on this so-called "terroriem" which it seeks to control, it will, on the contrary, breath into the Armenian resistance a new force and determinatian. Facing adversity, f aced with the feeling of undergoing an unapeakable in~uatice, Armenian youth will ~continue to resist, more resolutely than ever. We siacerely hope that Switzerland will not learn at its own expense that you cannot humiliate a people with impunity. Send your messages of aupport to Mardiroe Jamgotchian, Prison de Champ Dollon, Ttionex 1226, Geneve, Suisse. 5170 CSO: 6000/0016 53 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 LIBYA , G~O~JI~~tNMIIdT ORGAN CRITICIZr^S 1~ESTF~N OBSESSION WIT~I TII~RORISM Tripoli AIr-JAMAHIRIYAH in Arabic 4 Jun 82 pp 10, 11 ~Article: "Throw Out Your Arab Agents, But l~lhat about Bader Moinhoff and the Brigac s?"; also published in Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AIQiDAR in Arabic 7 Jun 82 p 3/ . - ~ex] Intsoduction Revolutionary violence is the handmaiden of street action; it is not an alternative to mass movement or a 3ustification for elimineting and emphasizing the absence of it. Revolutionary violence is an expression of a notion uhich serves the broadest group of the masses and is directed at their enemies; it is aimed at institutions which are hostile to th~ people. Revolutionary violence does not ~ust consist of acts of vio- lence Which occur ia isolation from the upbringing of the masses and their acquisition of self confidence. It is always preaeat in every revolutionary movement. ~Throughout history there has been recourse to violence in periods of transition; decisive transi- tions take place only through violence, because the enemy does not give up easily and people with privileges do not abandon their privileges by choice rather, they must . be coerc~d. Revolutionary violence, because of its connection with the masses, is a democratic process, because it is an expression of the interests of the ma~ority. Revolutionary violence therefore is a form of imposition of mass democracy. Violence uhich occurs as an alternative to the masses and takes place i'rom t~he premise of a lack of confidence in the people, in accordaace With the determination that the masses are unable to act, becomes chaos and terrorism. Therefore, true revolutionary violence does not supersede the movement of the masses; it comes about as a consummation of the unremitting process of inculcating consciousness which the masses~ revolutionary and progressive forces carry out. There can be no violence without a historic consciousness _ of the mavement of social development. Therefore the difference between righ~wing anarchical terrorist violence and the violence of revolutionary forces in confrontation with the forces of fascist repression is very clear. One Toward the end of the sixties, the ideas of Herbert Marcuse, which he expressed in his two books '~Love and Civilization~~ and "Toward a New Revolution,~~ ripened in the minds of the minds of the international student generatioa in the quest to establish an ex- tremist consciousness by sabotaging the culture of the dominant civilization with its sxisting economic, political and social iastitutioas, which are founded on a principle o� repression justified in tl~ename of positive legitimate repression to confront un- bridled impulsiveness. ~ - 54 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 By 1968, the dielectic of current historical circumstancea had brought the thesis of rejection to .the point of violence against the forces of repression and a student up- , heaval broke out in various areas of the uorld. In the fire of its acts and ideologi- cal contradictions, it ~uddenly proceeded to look for an alternative which uould accommoda.te its rebelliousness, and, because it consisted of nothin but rejection, it succunbed to~the illusions of the abstract ideas of Herbert ~Marcus~ and Sartre. In the Italian city of Trento, Renato Curcio and Margarita Cagiul, two students in the faculty of social sciences, reached agreement over the idea that the world is a time bomb in a little bouquet of floWers in our bed, in a nearby evening, in the time of childhood, and that if this vile world is to be changed that cannot be done through the program of the social sciences, vhich lack the affectiveness of the trigger of a gun; to the degree that this program establishes an exceptional consciousness which is contrary to its program, it Will transform the existing cultural base through the effectiveness of its perseverant nature, vhich restrains radical change. Renato and Maragarita came to the conclusion that: The alternative is to change the world, which means breaking up i.ts foundations through violence. 'Thus was born the Organization of the Proletarian Left, uhich subsequently became trans- formed into the Red Brigades Organization. This represented the left wing which preaches revolutionary violence as a legitimate meana aimed at moving violence into the interior of the capitalist sta.te and provoking its repressive institutions through a counter- repression uhose slogan is: ~~{~e say that fraudulent democracy in Europe must be compelled to remove its masks by provoking it at all times to exerciae repression under the motive of fear for itself. It is repression alone tha.t uill create consciousness in the ranks of the working class.'~ That violence is justified uhen it is directed against these institutions. It is a reaction. The bomb that bleu up the supermarket in West Germany at the hands of the Bader Meinhof gang was a"practical" expression of the rejection of socialist society, and the attack on the Christian Democratic Party at the hands of the Red Brigades was a re~ection of the ruling bourgeoisie in Italy. The bold actions of the Basque organization in Spain were an urgent revolutionary approach whose purpose aas national liberation corresponding to that of the Irish Liberation Army. On the other hand, we find right ving violence. That is terrorism for the sake of terrorism, and is the black side of revolutionary vio- lence. Its style o� violence reveals its criminal face, which is in collusion with the capitalist state that uses it as a preventive device against revolutionary organizations. In Milan in 1969 the terrorist right ualeashed the massacre of the Agricultural Bank ia ~rhich 16 innocent persons were killed. It provoked labor demonstrations a bomb thrown into an anti-fascist demonstration. Another example is the crimes of the Jewish brigsdes in F~ance rrhich were aimed against the Jews themselves wit,h the aim of gaining the sympathy of the West aad turning the vindictive heritage against the Arabs and the in~ernational left wing organizations that were helping the Arab cause. Therefore we ~ust distinguish between left wing violenc~ and right wing violance, and consequently draw up a neW formulation for its nature. - 55 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540090002-5 'T!~ese movements arose in geographical and ideological env3ronments which had previously vitnessed the emergence of Gramsci and Carrillo who participated to a large extent in the establishment of Eurocommunism, which is based on the ideology of "transormation," as an alternative to revolutionary violence, rrhereby the reform of existing institu- tions would take place through what t,hey call "the movement of internal dialectic,'~ that is, the institutions of the bourgeois class, in the form of the state, the church, the media, the police, the family and the school. This, a.nd not destructa.on or a radi- cal overthrow by means of the impulsive rush tovard change, is the focus of "rgvalution- action." . Thus these left wing movements by virtue of the circumstances of their birth and growth, constituted the historic antithesis which almost declared the total banla~uptcy of the ~aropean communist movement, especially after recent years had witnessed the retreat on the part of many European communist parties from their progressive positions, causing them a].most to change for the sake of taking political power through general electic_:~ find to reduce their relations with the man on the street and their historic forces that is, the workers, because of the secessionist role which extremist materialist nd 7~'rotsk~,~ist currents contined to play Within these parties and successive rifts over many ne~a political and ideological developments, the first of which were the events in Czechoslovakia and the last of which will not be the events in Poland and the increase in undemocratic practices and phenomena in iater:ial organizational relations at various levels uithin these parties. These mov~~ents, through their reliance on violence as a form and instrument o� con- frontation with the institutions of capitalist society and its class interests and policies, tsied to respond to the critical question that the movement of ~uropean and American young people had posed in the middle of the sixties through hippyism. The latter was a manifest,ation of a reaction to the relationa and institutions of bour- geois production, and surrealism and bohemianism came about in reaction to bourgsois culture and arts, pragmatic ob~ective, logical and structural philosophies, neoplato- nic morality, patriarchical �ami].y relationa and sexual feudalism; it stresses "re- jection" i.n its static, nihilist'sense as a position regarding the existing state of affairs, declaring its i.ncapacity for dest,royiag the ~~capitalist institution" which is supported by the power of neclear electronic armies and settling on having its "no" function as the mea.ns for a cultura7. vithdrawal from the era of cybernetics to the era of primitive stone age or ~ungle universalism. They t~ried to offer an alternative ~ which would tranWCend the timidity of the communist elders vis-a-vis '~destruction" and the adolescents' failure and fear of nuclear death. They managed to create a broad dialectical movement in the st,reets and among intellectuals, especially since they di3 not present themselves as part of a vanguard formula superimposed from above: they started with a practical assault, not with intellectusl abstractions or theoretical analysis. Thus the Red 3rigades, Bader Meinhof and even the Red Army in Japan are not an ideolo- gical or historical extension of the Nazism of Hitler or the fascism of Mussolini; . rather, they are, in spite of the conspiracy of silence and the doubts, allegations and belittlement being woven about them, the affspring of their circumstances and con- ditions, the offspring of oppression, exploita.tioa and clerical terrorism. What can be saa.d aaout them can be said about the Corsica Liberation Army, the Irish Republican Army a.nd the Basques. These moveaents are not atudents in the school of Carlos, as bourgeois propaganda tsies to portray them. 56 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 Here is where the question arises: idhy are we taking a position of hostility toward these movements? Why are we, the people of the 3amahiriyah, in agreement.with the Europesa bourgeoigie against this leftist current, with its radical and revolutionary detachments? T~ro The European bourgeoisie, Germany and France. ~ The bourgeoisie of Italy and the capitalism of Britain. These a]1 embrace the capi~ alism of Britain. These all embrace the Arab right, uhich is fleeing from revolution. The hostile Syrian right. The hostile Algerian right. The hostile right in Aden. Then the hoatile Libyan right. So how could it be logical and proper for us ourselves to refuse to recogniae the leftuing youth move~ent ia Europe, whose intenae contradictioas vith capitalist inter- ests (Europeaa and American) are bursting fort~h every day along with the explosions in their economic institutions, military bases ead political symbols, while the E,l~ropean bourgeoisies embrace the Arab right~s publications, its gatherings, ita schemes,~ and its orgaaizations, which are seek3ng to atrike out at the masses' achieve- ments and return to dominate them and steal their saeat and daily bread. How could a plan be presented to Arab nationalist regimes and progressive forces iu this great nation for befriending the bourgeoia Europeea regimes that are in political alliance with the Arab right and are looking after its interests tY~rough their countries aad institutions? How ca.n ue make friends with Italy, which embraces the Libyan bourgeoisie (Arabs and Jews) who have fled from the socialism of the toiling masses? Or Britain, which e~ braces the royalist ministers who are trying to flash the constitution of their great lord in t~he face of t.he authorities of the st,ruggling masses? Or Germany, where, in Bonn and Cologne, there are centers for the gatherings and activ3ties of Moslem Brothers for their trS;n~ 3n terrorist actiai.ties and uhere Sa'id Ramadan resides aad is directing his hostile activity against the masses of Syria and Aden, or F~ance where the Algerian right is present? ' How can this dual relationship and dual vision continue, where their capitals function as sites for the residence of Bakkush, Hawwas, and Bu Ha~ar, the issuance of AIrWATAN ~LIr-'ARABI, SAWT LIBYA and AItDA'WAH, t~he declaration of their statements, and the holding of their press confereaces and are also sites of our embassies and our people's offices and the places where economic contracts are signed with their companies and orgsni.zations, while our capitals have sites of their goverr~meats' embassies and the activity of their companies and organizations, but are not sites of the offices and activities of the Red Brigade, Bader Meinhoff, Basque, Corsican and Irish Revolutionary Army movements, which are d3rected against their vital interests? . 57 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 Three Any objective rea3ing of the nevspapers AI~-ZAHF' AL-AI~iDAR and AL'JAt~IAHIRIYAH W~ en- able any impartial reader to discover that these papers conduct the broadest critical activities, and the door is open to everyone ~to do s], and the examples are many: Attacks against the secretaries because of the existence of some erroneous practices. Criticism of the conduct of the General People's Committee. The exposure and unmasking of and attacks against the new class, With all its civilian and military groups. The demand that the security agencies be dissolved and criticism of their conduct. This is a sample of the practices which we, so far as we l~ow, do not believe coul~ be carried out with this scope and boldness in any other country. The bourgeois papers prohibit attacks on the fouridations of the bourgeois system, and the party papers do not engage in criticism of their pari~ies. However, the revolutionary and mass papers do attack even the behavior of the revolution- ary committees from which these papers are issued, if they renege on their tasks. In addition to this freedom of expression, there is the basic people's conference, where the masses, through the popular authorities, exercise the pouer to make decisions regarding all the nation's assets. Through their conferences, the masses he,ve the power to impose their will and their decisions, because the government is the government of the masses. In spite of the short duration of the experiment, people who honestly follow up on theae conferences through vhich the people exer~ise power directly will observe the growth of political consciousness in deAi~ with the aost delicate, most serious issues which poor people were not even permitted to vhisper about, or get close to, because these delicate issuea were the special concern of the feu and the eli~e, and the general public and the rabble could n.~t approach theml The Revolutionary Command Council's relinquishmdnt of poWer, and its takiag a seat _within the ra.nks of the opposition, has given tremendous opportunities for the broader and deeper pursuit of criticism, free f~om touchiness, fear, terror or surveillance. Indeed, the opposite has happened, and t~hia is for the historical record: there has been an incitement by the revolutionary command of the pursuit of criticism on the ~oroadest scale, and any reader or revolutionary committee member can express his point of view most f~reely. Opposition is carried out domestically, so the pt~ suit of opposition abroad objective- ly becomes ~emocratically unjustified. Through a reviev of the names of the fugitives a.nd their class composition we can understand the other ~ustifications Which prompt them to flee. This flight has no relationship to the interests of the masses. The masses are able to protect their own interests through the popular committees and the possession of power, wealth and weapons, through an awareness of revolutionary power arid their historic leadership, and t~hrough their revolutionary media. 58 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 It is their bourgeois interests that the revolution has st~ruck at, on beha].f of the masses, ridding society of all forms of oppression and exploitation. It is these interests ~lhich nave moved them, even if they have concealed the~ with claims of na- tionalisn and concern for the interests of the masses. Thus it is natural that Westera ~urope should embrace them, not from the political standpoint but by considering them good sons o� the mother vho nursed them and nurtured them in the days of the occupation. It is the local bourgeoisie uhich,has embraced the legitimacy of the European bour- geoisie, which colonized the nation. When the revolution plowed the land of the nation over so that ours could become a new ~ociety without classes, the land was no longer fit for this st~range plant, after i~ had refused to be assimilated and acclimatized and to renew its life on this new land through a new understanding and neW values. The local enemy preferred life in the embrace of its nurse. It will be a short life; the enemy belongs to classes that have collapsed historically, have collapsed socially, and have collapsed morally, oecause they are swimming against the current of life. The democracy which this force is clai.ming to defend is the democracy of its dead class, not the democracy of the living masses. Some day it will find itself as Ahmad al-Qd.ramanli, the former pasha. of ~ipoli, found himself - a.lone, repudiated and despised even by those uho had encouraged him to commit treason. In addition, the puTSUit of democracy in the third uorld is a harsh combative process, a da31y stsuggle against t~he ties of ages steeped in backwardness and oFpression. It is not ~ust a promenade along the water in the publications of the TIMES or a statement made in Hyde Park. It is daily suffering, a stsuggle of words with bullets and pens that nave spesrheads pointed at everything that is vile and corrupt. It can be car- ried out only through true affiliation with the people, by having people cast them- selves into the sea of the revolution, i.n order to wash off the rot of the past and the selfishness of the petty bourgeoisie its small, trival sentiments and row against the current of obsoleteness, tribalism, the bourgeoisie, inherited repressive agencies, back~rard values and a backward culture, casting their poisons into the river in order to offer salvation of vision and a proper approach. The democratic struggle in the th3rd world needs a neu type of inte]lectual, who ca.n t~hrow himself into the embrace of the masses, and go to them in their huts, their factories and their farms, where the sun shines with the uarmth of life and true affiliation; there also will you find generosity and innovation, vithout alienation. Four Finally: If 'r,~rope uants and is azixious to have any relationship other than one of r~gents and espionage, of course, With the Libyan opposition, for instance, as part of ths t'lrab opposition ae, the revolutionary committees, the political and organization- al combative forces of the masses, declare our readiness to deal wit~h it through our progressive ideological cultural vision, the platform of our action, the domestic exarcise of revolutionary practices. w`;11 ~rope be receptive to us? � 11387 CS0 : 6133/23+~1 59 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 ~ ITALY BROGI REVEALS BR CONNECTIONS WITH GERMAN, IRISfl TERAORISTS Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 26 Maq 82 ~ 8 [Art3cle by Franco Coppola] [Text] Disquieting ties with interaational terroriem are revealed at the Moro trial. Brogi, arme supplier to the RB [Red Brigades], spealcs: "We were connected with the RAF [Red Army Faction]. In prisou I saw three repeutant terrorists massacred. Gallinari's "lessons" and the first experiences of the armed struggle. As an Alitalia ateward ~ he brought in from abroad grenade launchers, tear-gas aprays, launching charges for model aircraft, and above ayl sabotage manuals used by the OS Navy and Armq. Rome--Dig and dig, and the international connections of the Red Brigades come out, more disquieting than ever. Above all, with the German RAF. Carlo Brogi, 29 years old, who very receatly repented, was an Alitalia steward and as such as a valuable element for the terrorist organization. fle was used as an arme courier between Rpme and New York and speaks at length about it. Brogi kaows nothing about the Mc~ro operation nor of any other fatal attacks; but thanks to his familiarity with English, he knowa about the rela- tions linking the RB with the RAF, above all in the f ield of mutual assiatance in the arms traff ic. I Carlo Brogi is accused of partic~pating in an armed band and of three crimes (the Tartaglione murder, and the ambushes of the Galloni escort and a mobile~ 1 police squad) in which he probablq had no part. Ee wae interrogated three , times between February 1980 and July 1981 in the ~udicial investigation, and ; he spoke more than anything else sbout his politico-terrorist experience in the ranks of the "Communist Combatant Unite" prior to his entry into the Red ~ Brigades, affirming in connaction with hie activitiee in the RB, that, "The accusatioas are quite unfounded." I~ Three Useless Murders I . ~ First of all, then, Brogi explaias how he suddenly decided to change from a - ~ mere person who had broken away from the organization into someone who had def ected with all its consequencea. "After 26 months in prison I decided ; 60 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 to collaborate. On the other hand, my breaking away from the organization goes back to my first day of imprisonment. But even before that, during the 6 and 1/2 months of being a fugitive from ~ustice, I had already formed such an interition, so much so that at a certain point I gave myself up at the Franco-I"talian border, presenting myself with my papers." "I have~been in prisons all over Italy. In 4 months I saw three barbarous and pointless murders at Cuneo. The victims were Roberto Gatti, a certain Amone,~and Giorgio Soldati, all believed to be informers. Then, here, I heard that the guerrilla-party is discussing the need tc massacre all thosa who have abandoned the armed struggle. I only intended to dissociate myself; but after all I saw and heard I decided to collaborate." Then, Brogi speaks of his pclitical experiences. From 1968 until at least 1976 he was with groups of the extraparliamentary Left, but almost always as a lone wolf; then he j oined the "Communist Combattant Units," carrying out the wounding of Vittorio Morgera, the director of the Po]igraphic; the robbery of the current minister, de Giesi; and a kidnapping that took place in Milan. Brogi was reading Marx, Lenin, Rnsa Luxemburg, and Toni Negri, and was working as a seasonal worker at Alitalia. First, in the summer of 1977; then, from 15 June to 31 October 1978. The second period is important in Brogi's life be- cause it is precisely in June of 1978 that his entry into the RB is dated, probably--even if it costs him something to admit it--because of his work as a steward. He says it was an emotional choice, determined by the desire for co~unism, for equality, for the creation of beautiful things," a choice that "reflected by effusiveness, my wish to do big things; not for having read Lenin.n Br~gi enters the RB along with Norma Andrisni, Arnaldo May, Roberta Cappelli, and Annunciata Francola. There were the f irst meetings with the customary Bruno Seghetti, that tireless recruiter in Rome; and the examination was _ easily passed, although the only credentials consisted of a failed attack on the Comiliter [Regional Territorial Military Command], computer at Piazza Zama. On that occasion, Brogi, May, and others were disguised as Carabinieri and succeeded in penetrating into the premises of the army and in placing ex- plosive charges, but nothing happened. It is now June 1978. Brogi, Andriani, and May are accepted into the RB. Brogi explains: "All that the organization asked for was a pure past of a proletarian communist. A spotless past. Gallinari said to me: 'Any comrade, even Toni Negri, himself, who asked to enter the RB would be accepted; however he would have to follow the usual course, starting at the bottom.'." Brogi's indoctrination was the work of Gallinari himself. They met two or three times before the new recruit was given an assignment from Valerio Morucci. The latter showed Brogi publications with pictures showing parts of weapons. In the United States Brogi was to obtain breech blocks, gun clips, launching charges for model aircraft, grenade launchers,~tear gas sprays and, then, so many books, almost all of them sabotage manuals used by the aavy and the U.S. Army. In about 10 trips Brogi succeeded in bringing into Italy everything that the organization needed. It cost $4,000 in all, about 4 million lire, including Brogi's expenses. 61 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 'Phe second assignment dates from the end of October 1978. Mprucci introduced Brogi to Mario Moretti. The latter gave him an appointment for 1 November in Paris, 3 pm, Cafe de la Paix, Place de 1'Opera. Morucci entrusted him with three falae passports, two with photographs of women, one with a photo of a' man. The veil over international relations was beginning to be torn aside. In Paris Brogi found Moretti and a few hours later, Anna Laura Braghetti also. These two confided to him that these passports were for three comrades of the RAF, a German organization that w~s breaking up, having been decimated by the German police. There had been contacts with the RAF at the RB's very begin- ning. Now they had again formed ties. And here are Moretti's and Braghetti's disclosures about xhe RB's international relations. Contacts had just been resumed for only a verv little while. There had been a couple of ineetings during which Moretti had put a few million into the RAF leaders' pockets, to help that organization, which had been "destroyed by the Gernaan police." Twenty persons remained in the RAIp, which was divided into two squadrons. Brogi said, "My role was to hgve been to travel continuall to maintain contact with the other European organizations, the RAF, but also the IRA and the ETA, that is, the ones that had a nationa~ character and had deep roots in the local proletariat." Thrown Out of the Organization The RAF then suggested that the RB maintain strategic common deposits of arms in Italy. Moretti responded by asking for arms, in parti~:ular a hundred or so submachine guns which could be had for the paltry price of 300,000 lire each. Moretti said that the money paid represented a conr.ribution to demon- strate RB's availability. "And the same for the false passports, too. They asked me to go to Hamburg to bring funds, and to Tel Aviv to deliver explo- sives. But I said no. And I did we11, because on my return to Ttaly I found that Alitalia had not renewed my contract." Brogi stayed for 2 weeks in Paris with Braghetti and with a Roman girl he had known for some time. On orders from Moretti, Braghetti luoked for and found a house, and rented it in Brogi's name. Qn return to Ita:ly, B~ogi was to have brought back with him an "AK-47," which had been used for killiag Schleyer's body guards. Moretti wanted that weapon badly, but Brdgi could not do so. "Then, since there was a network of French elemente providing a hinterland for the ETA and logistical support for the RAF, these were the ones who saw to the clandestine transfer of arms into Italy, which were delivered to the Mara Cagol column. Back in Italy, Brogi was practically thrown out of the RB. He met Gallinari, who made an ugly scene, blaming him for having been fired from Alitalia, for having had a good time in Paris,~for having underatood nothing about the RB. He was demoted from "irregular" to "contact." And to think that with Braghetti only a few hours earlier, equipped with a false document made out to "Ugo Pecchioli," Brogi had rented a post off ine box at M~ontesacro in his name; it was to have served for RAF contacts. "They also blamed me for my relations with the Roman girl." 62 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 At the opea~ag of the hearing, S$lvatoY! Bicciardi, on behalf of the Moretti group, aiad Fraaco Bonisoli, on behalf of the "guerrilla-party," had attempted to commemorate Omberto~Calabiani, "the co~rade fallen in combat," but the 3udge preveated them from doing so. Today, Bmgi is again on stage. : ~ 9772 CSO: 6131/515 ~ 63 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ITALY REPORT ON TERRORISM Milan RAPPORTO SUL ~RI~RISMO: In Italian 1981 pp 49-100 [Text] RAPPORTO SUL TEIt[~RZSMO: The massacres, ambuscades, kidnappings, names of crime organizations, 1969-1980 Preface by Ugo Pecchioli With the collaboration of Giulio Andreotti, Franco Ferrarotti, Nicala Tranfaglia Table of Contents Preface by Ugo Pecchioli RAPPORTO SUL ~RI~I~SM~, edited by Mauro Galleni ' , Note Chapter I: The Dead Comprehensive data ~ The massacrea 1'he forces of public order The victims of ambush 'The magistrates The politicians, ~ournalists, corporation directors and professionals The laborers, other employees and workera The women The militants The persons assassinated by terrorisCa for revenge The terrorists The provinces where mortal crimes were com~itted The terrorist organizations which have com~itted crimea ~ 64 ~ ; FOR OFi~ICIAL l7SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFIC{AL USE ONLY Chapter II: Persons Wounded in Ambush Attacks Page Comprehensive data The politicians Corporation directors and technicians Members of the forces of public order The doctors The journalists The magistrates and university professors Laborers, employees and other workers Terrorist organizations which have ambushed their victims Summary of those killed or wounded in ambush Chapter III: Criminal Assaults on Matter Comprehensive data Various objectives Political and union ob~ectives Police objectives Public and private vehicles destroyed Perpetrators of the crimes Chapter IV: Violent Deeds Comprehensive data Indirect data Persons wounded by violent criminal acts (except those hurt in ambush) Chapter V: Violent and Criminal Acts in the Pro~inces Comprehensive data - Province of Rome ' Milan Turin ~ Naples Bolagna Reggio Calabria Padua Bari Florence Genoa Brescia Palermo Venice Bergamo Trieste Gatania 65 FOR OF6'ICUL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Chapter VI: Criminal Organizations PaBe Comprehensive data Terrorist organizations of the left Brigate rosse (Red Brigades) Prima linea (Front Line) Nuclei armati proletari (Proletarian Armed Nuclei) Terrcrist organizations of the right Nuclei armati rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Armed Nuclei) Ordine nuovo, Ordine nero (New Order, Black Order) Other terrorist organizations of the right Kidnappings Appendix Sununary tables by years or criminal and violent acts in Italy from 1969 to 1980 List of terroris t organizations of the left and number of crimes co~nitted province by province . List of terrorist organizations of the left and number of crimes committed annually List of terroris t organizations of the right and number of ' crimes committed province by province . List of terroris t organizations of~the right and number of crimes committed annually Chronology of episodes in which persons have been killed Names of the victims killed Chronology of episodes in which persons ha~ve been w~unded by ambush Names of the victims wounded Contributions ~ Franco Ferrarotti: "Reflections and data on 12 years of terrorism in Italy (1969-1981)" Notes Nicola Tranfaglia: "The Italian~crisis and the problem of terrorism" Notes ' Giulio Andreotti Comments on terrorism . ~ 66 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y Chapter I: The Dead Comprehensive data In the 12 years studied, the [terrorist] crimes and acts of violence in Italy totalled~-12,690: 7,8.66 against inanimate targets, 4,290 cases of violence, 362 dead and 182 injured in ambuscades (Table 1). The most�startling figure concerns the number of dead--362 persons, or an aver- age of 31 every year. Table 2 lists the number of dead year by year, classified according to their professions or occupations and grouped under 17 categories including the forces of public order; security and other guards, such as the urban police; magistra- tes; ~ournalists; politicians; corporation directors; laborers, employees and other workers; students; university professors, elementary and high school . teachers; doctors and other professionals; private persons; housewives and domestics; section chiefs in industrial plants; retired persons; businessmen, shopkeepers and artisans; agriculturists and pef.sants; and a category including terrorists and other deceased persons whose pr~fessions or occupations are un- known. The highest number of deaths occurred in 1980: 135 killed, 24 in ambush, 85 in the massacre of the Bologna rail~oad station, and 26 in other circumetances. The lowest number of deaths occurred in 1971i six, including one worker, one policeman, one mason, one farm laborer, one bartender and one university stu- dent. Between 1975 and 1980, 270 persons were murdered, or 74.60 percent of the total: 115 by terrorists of the right, 110 by terrorists of the left, 29 in gun battles with the police, 12 in other circumstances and four in terrorist actions com- mitted by unknown individuals. Of the 362 dead, 150 were victims of these massacres: Piazza Fontana, the Italicus express, the station in Bologna, and other such events; 87 were killed in ambush; 125 died in other circumstances involving subversive crimes and acts of violence. ~ As far as it has been gossible to ascertain, the 362 dead are listed according to the circumstances reported in Table 3. The massacres . In the period studied, most of the victims died in 11 massacres: 150, or 41.45 percent of the total, while the wounded numbered 551. These massacres occurred . in Milan (three), Gioia Tauro, Gorizia and Bologna (two), Rome, Frosinone and Genoa, as indicated in Table 4. 67 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The first massacre was committed by Ordine nuovo terrorists against the Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura on Piazza Fontana, Milan. At 4:30 pm on 12 December 1969, a potent bomb exploded under a table in the center oz the bank, which was crowded with clients; 17 persons died and 88 sustained injuries. Ten years l.ater, on 23 February 1979, the Catanzaro tribunal sentenced the perpetrators to life imprisonment--the neofascists Franco Freda, Giovanni Ventura and SID agent Guido Giannettini, subsequently acquitted in their appeal trial (20 March 1981) for lack of sufficient proof. The following year, on 22 July 1970, in Gioia Tauro, about 60 kilometers from Reggio Calabria, the second massacre took place. At 5:10 ~m another fascist bomb exploded at the rail station on the switching tracks, derailing the Sun express train and killing six passengers, five women and o~e man, and wounding 50 others. On 31 May 1972, three carabinieri lost their lives at Peteano, near Gorizia, victims of a dynamite blast planted by the Ordine nuovo: Antonio Ferraro, brigadier, and Donate Poveromo and Franco Do~giovanni, both of the militia. An anonymous telephone call alerted the carabinieri to a 500 (Fiat) abandoned at Peteano with dynamite aboard. The carabinieri rushed to the scene were blown to pieces by the bomb. Aside from the three dead, another two, Lieutenant Francesco Spaziale and Brigadier Giuseppe Zazzaro, were seriously wounded. In September 1980, Giorgio Almirante, national secretary of the MSI-DN, was in- criminated for helping the principal defendant, Carlo Cicuttini, of Friuli, an Ordine nuovo neofascist, to flee. On 17 May 1973, Giancarlo Bertoli perpetrated another massacre in Milan, this time on the anniversary marking the assassination of Commissioner Luigi Cala- bresi, whose memory was being honored in a ceremony held at police headquarters. At the conclusion of the ceremony, as many persons were leaving the building on the Via Fatebenefratelli, Bertoli hurled a hand bomb in their midst, killing four persons: a woman, Gabriella Bortolon, 23, manager of the Diana boutique in Busto Arsizio, and three police agents, Giuseppe Panzin, Felice Bertolazzi and Federico Massarin. The fifth massacre occurred in Brescia on 28 May 1974 during a unitarian demon- stration against fascist violence and terrorism. The explosion of a bomb left in a trash receptacle under a collonade by an Ordine nuovo terrorist, killed eight persons: five teachers, three of them women, and three retired workers. There were 94 wounded. Sixth massacre: on 4 August 1974 at the mouth of the San Benedetto Val di Sambro rail tunnel near Bologna, a charge of dynamite wrecked the Italicus express--another Ordine nuovo crime--provoking the death c+f 12 passengers; eight men and four women, and wounding 105 others. Seventh massacre: on the steep Salita Santa Brigida, a street in Genoa, on 8 June 1976 a BR commando murdered Francesco Coco, attorney general of the Re- public for Genoa, and two men of his escort, carabinieri brigadier Giovanni Saponara and corporal Antioco Dejana. 68 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY Eighth massacre: 16 March 1978, on the Via Fani in Rome, a BR commando kid- napped Aldo Moro, president of the Christian Democratic party, and killed five men of his retinue: carabinieri marshal Oreste Leonardi, corporal Domenico Ricci, Francesco Zizzi, police force brigadier, and police agents Raffaele Iozzino and Giulio Rivera. Ninth massacre: 8 November 1978 in the community of Pa*_rica, a few kilometers from Frosinone. A commando of the Formazioni combattenti communiste (Formations of Communist Cambatants) killed chief attorney of the Republic for Frosinone and two of his aides: driver Luciano Rossi and police agent Giuseppe Pagliei. One of the terrorists, Roberto Capone, 24, geometrist, was wounded in the cross- fire. Capone managed to escape all the same with the members of his commando. He was then found dead on the back seat of a car driven by the fugitives but abandoned about a kilometer from the scene of the ambush; before leaving him behind, the terrorists shot him several times in the neck to prevent him from falling alive into the hands of the police. The lOth massacre occurred on the Via Schievano in Milan on 8 January 1980, when a BR commando killed three agents scouting the Naviglio Grande area: police brigadier Rocco Santoro, corporal Antonio Cestari and the agent Michele Tatulli. The worst massacre was the last, which occurred in Bologna's railroad station . on 2 August 1980, a crime committed by terrorists of the right. At 10:25 am, a powerful bomb set in the second class waiting room demolished a wing of the station and caused the death of 85 persons in addition to 200 wounded. Among ~ the dead were 41 men, 38 women, three girls (3, 7 and 8 years old), two boys and one older girl. For a breakdown of the victims, see Table 5. Table 6 lists the names of the magistrates and police force members killed in the massacres of Peteano, the police headquarters in Milan, Salita Santa Brigida in Genoa, Via Fani in Rome, Patrica near Frosinone, and the Via Schievano in Milan. Of the 362 persons killed in acts of terrorism, 297 were civilians and 65 members of the police forces. Table 7 reports the number of dead year by year, classified as civilians or police force members. The Forces of Public Order During the period under study, 65 members of the state's police bodies were killed; of these, 28 belonged to the Public Security, 22 to the carabinieri, and five were agents of the custodian corps. Of the 38 Public Security dead, six were marshals, five brigadiers, one deputy brigadier, two corporals, 21 patrolmen, three deputy questors and two commis- ioners. Of the same 38, 16 died in ambush, one in other circumstances, seven during subversive violence, three in gun fights with terrorists, 10 in mass- acres--three in the Via Fatebenefratelli, Milan, episode, three in the Via Fani, Rome episode, three in the Via Schievano, Milan, episode, and one in Patrica (Frosinone). 69 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The three fallen deputy questors are: Franceaco Cusano, 51, killed in ambush on 1 September 1976 in Biella (Vercelli) by a BR terrorist during a perquisition in a little-frequented district near the park; Vittorio Padovani, 47, killed in a p,un fight with Walter Alasia when the police broke into the terrorist's home on Via Leonardi 121 in Sesto San Giovanni (Milan); in the same armed battle, on 15 December 1976, Marshal Serfio Bazzega, 32, and Alasia himself died; and Alfredo Albanese, director of DIGOS in Mestre, assassinated on his way to work with seven pistol shots fired by a BR commando. One of the two commissioners murdered was Luigi Calabresi, chief commissioner at police headquarters in Milan; he was the first victim of= a terrorist ambush. This occurred on 17 May 1972 when, struck in the back by a pistol shot from an unknown terrorist, he was finished by a shot in the back of_ his head. He was a prominent figure in the investigation into the Piazza Fontana massacre and the case of two anarchists, Pietro Valpreda and Giuseppe Pinel:li, who died on 15 December 1969 when, under mysterious circumstances, he plunged to his death from the fourth floor of police headquarters in Milan. The other commissioner was the chief of police headquarter's antiterrorist unit in Genoa; this was Antonio Esposito, assassinated on 21 Ju~ze 1978 by the BR, who mowed him down in a bus when he was on his way to work. The 22 carabinieri victims included one general; two lieutenant colonels; three marshals; six brigadiers; one deputy brigadier; six patrolmen; and three carabinieri. Of these, six were killed in ambush, five in encounters with . terrorists, one during subversive violence, three in other circumstances re- lated to terrorism, and seven in massacres (three at Peteqno, two on Via Fani in Rome, two in Genoa). Carabinieri General Enrico Galvaligi, 61, head of the Office for the Coordina- tion of Prisons, was the last member of the police force to be assassinated by the BR during the period under study. This mortal ambush occurred in Rome at 7:15 pm on 31 December 1980, while he and his wife were returning to their home at Via Segato 13, in the Ardeatino quarter. His assailants were two terrorist youths disguised as messengers. The two lieutenant colonels killed in ambush were: Antonio Varisco, 58, assassinated in Rome on 13 July 1979 by a BR commando shortly after 8:30 am on the Lungotevere Arnaldo da Brescia; and Emanuele Tuttobene, killed with his driver Antonio Casu on 25 January 1980 by a Prima linea commando on the Via Riboli, Genoa, as he was returning home from work. Apart from Oreste Leonardi, killed in the Via Fani massacre, the other two carabinieri marshals victimized by terrorists were: Felice Maritano, who lost his life in a gun fight with the BR Roberto Ognibene on 15 October 1974 during an antiterrorist operation at Robbiano de Mediglia (Milan); and Vittorio Battaglin, 44, assassinated 21 November 1979 by the BR while he was taking a coffee in the Da Nino bar in Sampierdarena (Genoa); Mario Tusa, 26, of the carabinieri, was killed with him. Of the five murdered agents of the custodian corpa, four died in ambush and one, Prisco Palumbo, was fatally wounded on 14 December 1976 in Rome during a gun fight with the NAP terrorist Martino Zicchitella, who also died in the fray. 70 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF7CIAL USE ONLY 'l'he BR was responsible for three of the four deaths by ambush in 1978; the first occurred on 11 April in ~urin with the death of Lorenzo Cotugno, agent; the second on 20 April in Milan with the murder of marshal Francesco De Caraldo; the third, 6 June in Udine, when marshal Antonio Santoro died. The fourth hvmicide was committed by Prima linea on 19 January 1979 in Turin with the assassination of custodian agent Giuseppe Lorusso. Traffic police Brigadier Lino Ghedini, 45, was assassinated on 19 February 1977 in Milan by a BR terrorist during a patrol along the road between Milan and Rho. The victims of ambush In the period under study 87 persons, all men, died in ambush. Of these, 28 belonged to the different branches of the police force (17 of the Public Security, seven carabinieri, four custodian agents); nine were magistrates; two journalists; three politicians; eight corporation directors; eight laborers, employees and other workers; one university professor; 13 students; three pro- fessionals; one a factory section chief; seven businessmen, ambulant vendors and shopkeepers; one a security guard; one a private detective; and two drug peddlers. Table 8 shows the number of persons killed in ambush year by year and the pro- fession or occupation of each. The lowest number of ambushed victims (five) is recorded for the years between 1969 and 1974, the highest number (82) between 1975 and 1980. Of these 82 attacks, 77 were directed against single individuals and five against two persons. Of the 87 killed, 44 were assassinated by the BR, 14 by Prima linea, eight by thP Nuclei armati rivoluzionari (Armed Revolutionary Nuclei-NAR), three by unidentified neofascist commandos, and 18 by other terrorist units. The first double assassination was committed on 17 June 1974 in Padua by a BR commando in an attack on the MSI provincial office on the Via Zabarella, kill- ing Giuseppe Mazzola, 60, ex-carabiniere employed by the MSI in Padua, and Graziano Girolucci, 30, salesman for health products. This twin crime was not only the first of many ambuscades recorded in the period under study, but also the first of many murders committed by the BR. The other double homicides by ambush occurred in the following order: In Rome on 7 January 1978, a commando of seven terrorists of the Nuclei armati di contropotere territoriale (Arraed Nuclei of Territorial Counterpower) killed two young MSI students, Franco Bigonzetti, 20, and Francesco Ciavata, 19, out- side the MSI-DN quarters on the Via Acca Larentia in the Tuscolando quarter. In Turin on 15 December 1978 at 5:40 am, two policemen, Salvatore Lanza and Salvatore Porceddu, both 20, were machinegunned by several BR terrorists. The two were sitting in a Fiat S50 police car atationed at the corner of the Via Piercarlo Boggio and the Corso Vittorio Emanuele in front of the New Prison. 71 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OF'F[CIAL USE ONLY In Genoa on 21 November 1979, a BR commando killed carabinieri marshal Vittorio Battaglin, 44, and militiaman Mario Tusa, 26, while they were having a coffee in the Da Nino bar on the Via Giovan Battista Monti in Sampierdarena. On 26 January 1980 in Genoa, shortly before 1:30 pm, a terrorist commando traveling in a Giulia fired a number of shots against a carabinieri "gazelle" vehicle on the Via Riboli in the Albaro quarter. In the ambush, carabinieri lieutenant colonel Emanuele Tuttobene and his driver, the r~oldier Antonio Casu, were slain. Army lieutenant colonel Luigi Ramundo was seriously wounde~i. The crime was ~ claimed by Prima linea, later by the BR in a leaflet found in a trash receptacle near the maritime station (Table 9). The magistrates Nine magistrates were assassinated by ambush in addition to those who died in massacres two. Of the nine, five were victims of the BR (two in 1978, three in 1980); two of Prima linea (one in 1979 and one in 1980); one of Ordine nero in 1976; and one of the NAR in 1980. Most of these assassinations by ambush were recorded in 1980 with five homicides. Another two were comm3.tted in 1978 and one each in 1976 and 1980. On 10 July 1976, one month after the murder of Coco, an Ordine nuovo commando in Rome killed deputy attorney general of the Republic Vittorio Occorsio. This was the first fatal ambush of 15 committed by.terrorist organizations of the right during the period under study. The other magistrates were slain in 1978: on 14 February in Rome, the BR killed Ricardo Palma, of the court of cassation; on 10 October, again in Rome, the BR fatally ambushed cassation magistrate Gerolamo Tartaglione, director general for penal affairs in the Ministry of Grace and Justice. On 29 January of the follow- ing year in Milan, a Prima linea terrorist coimnando assassinated Judge Emilio Alessandrini. ~ In Rome on 12 February 1980, a BR commando at the University of Rome killed Prof Vittorio Bachelet, vice president of the Superior Council of the Magis- tracy and professor of administrative law in the university's school of political science. This crime was followed by another three, committed within three days: on 16 March the BR killed attorney of the Republic Nicola Giacumbi in Salerno; on 18 March in Rome, the BR shot to death the magistrate Girolamo Minervini, counsellor of the court of cassation; and in Milan the next day, a Prima linea commando killed the investigating judge Guido Galli. On 23 June 1980 in Rome, NAR terrorists killed attorney of the Republic Mario Amato, 45. Table 10 lists the names of the magistrates slain in ambush, the dates and places where they died, and the organizations which committed the crimes. 72 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Politicians, journalists, corporation directors and professionals The total number of politicians, ~ournalists, corporation directors and pro- fessionals killed number 36, 17 in ambush, 16 in massacres and three in other circumstances, as shown in Table 11. The three politicians are: Hon Aldo Moro, president of the Christian Democratic Party, assassinated by the BIt 9 March 1978 in Rome. Moro had been kidnapped on 16 March on the Via Fani by a BR armed commando which'killed five men of his retinue by machinegun fire. Af ter 55 days in captivity, Moro was found dead in the trunk of an R4 car, abandoned on the Via Caetani, his body riddled by blasts from a Skorpion machinegun; Enrico Pedenovi, 45, MSI lawyer and provincial counsellor, slain on Piazza Durante, Milan, on 29 April 1976 by a Prima linea commando; and Pino Amato, Neapolitan DC regional budget assessor, murdered on 19 May 1980 in Naples by a BR commando. The BR claimed responsibility for almost all the crimes commvitted against the journalists, corporation directors and professionals killed between 1977 and 1980. On 28 April 1977 in Turin, they killed Fulvio Croce, president of the Turin association of lawyers; on 16 November of the same year, the journalist Carlo Casalegno, assistant director of the daily LA STAMPA; on 21 March 1979 in Cuneo the industrialist Attilio Dutto; in Rome on 29 March the bu3lding con- structor Italo Schettini, DC provincial counsellor; on 21 September 1980 in Venice, Silvio Gori, assistant technical director of the petrochemical works in Marghera; in Milan on 12 November Renato Briano, director of Magneti Marelli; on 28 November, also in Milan, Manfredo Maszanti, director of Falck; and on 1 December in Rome, Giuseppe Furci, health director of Rome's Regina Coeli prison. A prominent corporation director, Paolo Paoletti, was slain in Milan on 5 February 1980 by a Prima linea commando. The same organization was guilty of killing Alfredo Paolella, university professor, in Naples on 11 October 1978. On 28 May 1980 in Milan, a new terrorist unit, Brigata XXVIII marzo (28th.of March Brigade), assassinated Walter Tobagi, journalist on the CORRIERE DELLA SERA. Of the 17 politicians, ~our�nalists, corporation directors, etc killed in ambush, one died in 1976, two in 1977, four in 1978, three in 1979 and seven in 1980. The BR killed 10, Prima linea four,Armed Workers for Communism one, Dante Di Nanni Armed Struggle for Communism one, and Brigata XXVIII marzo one. (See Table 12) The students Sixty students died, or 16.55 percent of the total. Most were university students. Their ages ranged from 14 to 29 (Table 13). Of the 60, 31 died in five cities in the North, 24 in three cities of Central Italy, and five in two cities of the South (Table 14). 73 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Nine were females, six of them victims of the Bologna railroad station massacre, one of the Italcus train massacre. The other two were Jolanda Palladino, 22, who died on 21 June 1975 from burns sustained three days p~reviously when neo- fascists threw an incendiary bomb against several cars driven by PCI militants, who were celebrating their party's electoral success; and Giorgiana Masi, who died on 12 May 1977 in Rome, caught in a battle between police and ex-parlia- mentarian demonstrators on the Garibaldi bridge. The highest number of student deaths (49) occurred between 1975 and 1980; there were 11 student fatalities in the 1969-1974 period. (Tabla 15) The first student victim of violence was Domenico Congredo, 23-qear-old anarchist, who died in Rome on 27 February 1969. Not only the first student victim of violence, Congedo was also the first of numerous persons killed in the period under study. He died in the teachers' training faculty of the University of Rome, occupied by students and a target of fascisffi violence. In an attempt to escape the fascists' assault, Congedo fell out of a window and crashed onto the pavement below. For the circumstances in which the 60 lost their lives, see Table 16. ~ The first of the 15 students killed in ambush was Mario Zicchieri, 16, member of the MSI-DN Youth Front. This mortal incident occurred on 29 October 1975 ~ by a man who fired a sawed-off shotgun in front of the MSI-DN quarters on the Via Erasmo Gattamelata in the Prenestino district of Rome. Investigators believe that the killer was a NAP terrorist. The last was Valerio Verbano, 19, murdered on 22 February 1980 in his home in Montesacro, Rome, by members of the Nuceli armati rivoluzionari (NAR), terrorist organization of the right. Table 17 lists the names of the students fatally attacked in ambush, the dates and places of their death and the names of the guilty terrorist units. Among others who died in violent confrontations with the police were Cesare Pardini, 22, and Franco Serantini, 20, anarchist, both fn Pisa, Pardini on 27 October 1969, struck in the chest by a tear gas bomb during an antifascist demonstration, Serantini on 7 May 1972 in another battle with the police. In Milan on 12 December 1970 Saverio Saltarelli, 22, was killed by a pro~ectile during a clash between police and groups of anarchists taking part in an anti- Franco demonstration to save the lives of young Spanish patriots on trial in Burgos. 'Itao other students died in 1973: Roberto Franceschi, of the extreme left, wounded when a police agent fired at him in front of the Bocconi University (he died in a hospital on 30 March); and Vincenzo Caporale, 19, adherent of the Communist Struggle party, hit full in the chest in a clash between police and members of the Struggle Committees in Naples on 15 February. On 8 September 1974 in Rome, Fabrizio Caruso, 19, member of the Tivoli Prole- tarian Committee was fatally wounded by a bullet fired by a police officer 74 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONI.Y during a violent encounter between police and members of extra-parliamentary units in the San Basilio quarter. 1975: Mikis Mandakas, 21, a Greek student and adherent of FUAN, was killed in Rvme on 28 February by a revolver shot in the neck during a fray between fascists, ~ youths of the extra-parliamentary left and police during a protest demonstration against the trial under way for the arsonists of the disastrous fire in Prima- valle on 12 April 1973, in which two children of the local MSI-DN secretary died; and Sergio Ramelli, 19, died st the Polyclinic Hospital on 29 April after 47 days in the throes of death following violent actions against extremists of the lef t . 1976: among others, Luigi De Rosa, 19, enrolled in the Federation of Young Italian Communists (FGGI), was assassinated on 28 May at Sezze (Latina) by fascist thugs, headed by MSI exponent Sandro Saccucci. 1977: among others, Francesco Lorusso, 25, Lotta continua militant, was killed on 11 March in Bologna by a police agent during violent clashes between police and extremists of the left. Mauro Amati, 21, was killed by a commando of the Unita combattenti comuniste (Unity of Communist Combatants) on 8 July in Rome. Walter Rossi, 28, member of Lotta continua, was dispatched by neofascists on 30 September in the Viale delle Medaglie d'Oro in Rome. On 1 October 1977, serious incidents Broke out in Turin during a demonstration to protest the murder of Walter Rossi. Some 30 youths, who had detached them- selves from the main body of demonstrators, with covered faces burst into the Angelo Azzurro bar on the Via Po, smashed the plate glass windows with iron bars and hurled incendiary bottles into the premises. Aside from the owner, there were two students present: Roberto Crescenzio, worker-student, and Diego Mainardo, both 22. Mainardo was hit in the head, but managed to flee. Crescenzio, with burns on 90 percent of his body, was rushed to the CTO, where he died after several hours. The attack against the Angelo Azzurro was claimed as the respon- sibility of the Squadre proletarie territoriali (Proletarian Territorial Squads). In Bari on 29 November of the same year, a student, Benedetto Petrone, 19, mem- ber of the Ital~an Com~unist Youth Federation, was killed by a neofascist on the Piazza della Preffettura during an uprising of rightists. On 7 January 1978 on the Via Acca Larentia, Rome, the Nuclei armati di contro- potere territoriale murdered two MSI youths, Franco Bigonzetti, 19, and Francesco Ciavatta, 20, outside the MSI-DN quarters. During a riot set off by the rightists as a result of the attack, on the same day another young MSI student, Stefano Recchioni, 20, was mortally wounded by a police bullet. On 19 March 1977 in Milan, in an ambush perpetrated by a terrorist unit of the ~ right named Esercito nazionale rivoluzionario Franco Anselmi (Franco Anselmi National Revolutionary Army), Fausto Tinelli, 19, lost his life. A worker, Lorenzo Iannucci, was assassinated in the same ambush. In Naples on 5 October, a student, Claudio Miccoli, died after a neofascist commando beat him with iron bars . 75 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Ten students met their death in 1979, among them Umberto Giaquinto, 17, killed on 10 January in Rome during clashes between police and neofascists on the Piazza dei Mirti; Stefano Cecchetti, 19, also killed in Rome on the same day by a commando of a leftist organization called Compagni organizzati per il communismo (Comrades Organized for Communism); Emanuele Iurilli, 19, killed by Prima linea in Turin on 19 April; Ciro Principessa, 20, PCI militant knifed by an extremist of the right in front of the PCI section on Via Gabrio Serbelloni in the Rome sector of Torpignattara; Francesco Cecchin, 18, FRG member who, attempting to flee an attack from extremists of the left at Vescovio (Rome), fell off a wal~ and died in a hospital on 10 June; Roberto Cavalla~o, sympathizer with the Gruppo sociale polesano, killed on 9 October in Padua in an ambush of the NAR. Apart from the students who perished in the Bologna station massacre, in 1980 the student victims were: William Maccher, killed in Milan on 7 February; Valerio Verbano, in Rome 22 February; and Martino Traversa, 19, in Bari 11 March, by extremists of the right. Laborers, employees and other workers After the students, the greatest number of persons victimized by terrorism and violence included laborers, employees and other workers, with 56 dead (15.45 percent), 34 killed in massacres, 10 assassinated in ambush, eight by violence and four in other circumstances (Table 18). Of the 17 laborers, five died in the Bologna station massacre, one in the Piazza della Loggia massacre, three in other circumstances, four by violence, and four by ambush. The laborers killed in ambush were: Guido Rossa, 45, union delegate at Italsider, member of the FLM board, and PCI militant, assassinated by a BR commando 24 January 1979 in Genoa while on his way to work; Mario Lupo, 20, knifed to death by neofascists on 25 August 1972 ~n Parma; Sergio Argada, slain by two neofas- cists on 20.October 1974 at Nicotera in the province of Ca.tanzaro; and Lorenzo Iannucci, 19, close to the ultra left, assassinated on 17 March 1980 in Milan by the terrorist organization of the right called Esercito nazionale rivoluzion- - ario, brigate combattenti Franco Anselmi (National Revolutionary Army, Franco Anselmi Combattant Brigades). The first laborer to fall victim to violence was Angelo Campanella, 43, father of seven, chief worker at AMA in Reggio Calabria, who was struck by several bullets fired by three policemen during serious uprisings in Reggio on 17 December 1970. Another laborer, Gianfranco Carminati, 30, PCI militant, died in Milan on 7 January 1971 after long suffering from burns sustained when he helped to ex- tinguish a raging fire set by terrorists in one of Pirelli's factory sections. Fascists murdered another three laborers and two farm hands: Giuseppe Malacaria, 33, mason and PCI militant, killed by a bomb tossed from MSI-DN headquarters at a throng of people dispersing after an antifascist demonstration in Catanzaro on 4 February 1971; Tonino Micciche, 25, Lotta continua militant, killed on 17 76 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000540090002-5 ROR OFFICIAL USE ONLY April 1975 in Turin; PCI militant Pietantonio Castelnuovo, 42, assassinated on S September 1976 in Como; farm laborer pomenico Centola, who died on 24 February 1971 in Foggia during riots provoked by neofascists; and Adriano Salvini, farm laborer, killed in Faenza by a neofascist on 18 July 1973. Another five workers were mortally ambushed during the period under study: Giuseppe Mazzola, 60, employee, killed by the BR on 17 June 1974 in Padua; Luciano Rossi, driver, on 8 November 1978 in the Patrica (Frosinone) ambush mounted by the Formazioni combatt.enti comuniste; Luigi Allegretti, 36, cook, socialist enrolled in the CGIL, killed "by error" on 11 March 1980 in Rome by a commando of the Compagni organizzati per il comunismo (the intended target was Gianfranco Rossi, secretary of the MSI Flaminio section); Angelo Mancia, employed by SECOLO, secretary of the MSI-DN section in Talmenti, killed in Rome on 12 March 1980 by the Compagni organzzati in volante rossa (Comrades Organized in a Red Flying Squad); and Maurizio Di Leo, 34, typographer, likewise assassin- ated "by error" in Rome on 2 September 1980 by the NAR; the designated victim was Michele Concina, a journalist on the daily MESSAGGERO. The percentage of women victimized by terrorism and violence was also high: 57, accounting for 15.75 percent of the total dead (Table 19). Most of these women--51 or 89.50 percent--died in five massacres: 38 in the Bologna station episode on 2 August 1980; five in the Sun express 22 July 1970; four in the Italicus express, 4 August 1974; three in the Piazza della Loggia incident 28 May 1974; and one in the Via Fatebenefratelli massacre 17 May 1973. Other women died in different circumstances, among them: Bianca Daller, 61, teacher, on 16 December 1976 in Bres~ia, in the explosion of a bomb placed on the Piazza Arnaldo by fascist terrorists in an attempt to provoke a massacre; Giorgiana Masi, 19, student, killed by a carbine shot during a manifestation of extra-parliamentarians on the Garibaldi bridge in Rome on 12 May 1977; Gabr~ella Fava, 50, domestic, on 13 March 1979 in Bologna during an attack by the Gatti selvaggi (Wild Cats) against the headquarters of the Press Association; Anna Maria Minci, 45, housewife, killed accidentally on 31 January 1980 by one of numerous revolver shots fired by a carabinieri patrol against two terrorists in flight in the Rome Montesacro quarter; and Iolanda Rozzi, 52, housewife, who died in the San Giovanni Hospital after months of agonizing suffering from burns sustained in an incendiary attempt on her home by the Nuclei proletari combatten- ti (NPC) on 25 February 1980 at Torpignatara in Rome. Aside from the politicians heretofore named, of the 362 dead there were 38 mili- ~ tants of the various parties and movements. Twelve of them were agitating in the PCI, 11 in the MSI-DN, six in Lotta continua, three in the Movimento anarchico, two in the PSI, two in the Movimento studentesco, one in the PCML (Vincenzo Caporali, 19, student, killed in Naples on 21 February 1973) and Jolanda Rozzi of the DC, killed in Rome on 25 February 1980. Of the 12 PCI adherents were four laborers, three students, four retired persons and one teacher (Table 20). Table 21.identifies the PSI militants by name. 77 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500490002-5 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY 'Che th:ee Movimento anarchico dead included two atudenta and one laborer, named in Table 22. The 11 MSI-DN dead included seven students, three emploqees and one messenger. Nine were killed in Rome, one in Padua and one in Milan (T3ble 23). ' The six Lotta continua and two Movimento studentesco militants slain included one laborer and seven students. Three were killed in Milaa, two in Rome, one in Turin, one in Reggio Emilia and one in Bologna (Table 2~{). The persons assassinated by terrorists for revenge In the period under study, a particular characteristic of terrorism is indicated in cases of those extremists of the right and Ieft who were-certainly or most probably assassinated for motives of revenge by persons belonging to subversive groups of the same color. There were nine such victims, seven of them murdered by terrorists of the left (three university students and four prisoners) and three by terrorists of the right. The first to die was a un~.versity student, Alceste Campanile, killed on 13 June 1975 on the banks of the Enza river in Reggio Emilia. The second was Luigi Mascagni, 24, also a university student, form~rly exponent of Lotta continua, slain by pistol shots in the head. His corpse was discovered in Milan's Lambro Park on 1 July 1979. On 17 December 1979, on the Piazza Dalmazia in Rome, a four-man commando of the rig~t led by Ser~io Calore, killed a young passerby, Antonio Leandri, with pistol shots. They had mistaken him for the lawyer Giorgio Arcangeli, notorious in neofascist circles and accused by the NAR of having made possible, through a ruse, the capture of Pierluigi Concutelli, military chief of Ordine nuovo, who murdered Judge Occorsio. In Milan on 7 February 1980, Prima linea assassinared the university student William Waccher, 26, one of the prime witnesses in the case of the "autonomous" rebels of the Collettivo della Barona during the enquiry into the murders of Judge Alessandrini and the goldsmith Torregiani. On 11 September 1980 the corpse of Francesco Mangiamelli, 30, leader of the Terza posizione (Third Position) in Palermo, friend and ri.ght hand aide of the neofascist Concutelli, was found in Tor de' Cenci, Rome, the magistracy attri- buted the murder to Gilberto Cavallini, a terrorist who, together with an accomplice Stefano Soderini, killed Ezio Lucarelli, brigadier of the carabinieri, in a garage at Lambrate, Milan, on 26 November 1980. Four other crimes motivated by revenge were committed in jails during 1980, three by the BR and one by the NAP. The first occurred on 19 June 1980 in Turin when a prisoner, Pasquale Viale, was strangled in his cell in the New Prison. The deed was claimed by the BR during the trial for the murder of Pino Amato in the court of assizes in Naples. 78 FOR OFF7CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONI.Y The second took place on 2~uly 1980 in the Cuneo prison when a common prisoner, Ugo Benazzi, 41, of Turin, had his thr~at cut with a rudimentarq knife, with the approval of the NAP. According to the investigators, the murderer was NAP member Emanuele Attimonelli, for whom a warrant of arrest was issued. The BR committedthe other two murders during the revolt in the Nuoro prison 27 October 1980. The victims, both prisoners, were Biagio Iaquinto and Fran- cesco Zarillo. The terrorists Thirty-seven terrorists, five of them women, were killed during the period under study, 21 in gun battles with the police and 16 in other circumstances: eight blown up by bombs they were assembling for planned crimes, two killed when they were transporting bombs tv the site of proposed crimes, two killed by the premature explosion of bombs in the preparatory stage of cr.imes; two killed by gunshop owners during thefts of arms, and one, Roberto Capone, mur- dered by his own terrorist commando. Of the 37 terrorists, seven belonged to NAP; eight to BR; four to Prima linea; th~ee to Autonomia operaia (Workers Autonomy); two to Ordine nuovo; one to Avanguardia nazionale; one to Gruppi armati proletari (GAP); one to Movimento proletario resistenza offensiva (Proletarian Offensive Resistance Movement); one to Formazioni combattenti comuniste; one to MAR; five to other terrorist ~ organizations on the left, not identified; and three to organizations of the right, likewise unidentified. For their individual professions, see Table 25. Of the five women terrorists, one, Margherita Ca{~ol, 28, had taken a degree in psychology. Anna Maria Mantini, 23, was unemployed; Barbara Azzaroni, 29, was a kingergarten teacher, Anna Maria Ludmann, 33, a schoolteacher, and Maria Antonietta Berna, 21, a student. The average age of the terrorists was 25. The youngest of them--Alfredo Attilio of Naples, Pierluigi Sciotti and Silvio Ferrari--were 19, the oldest was Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 46. Table 26 gives a breakdown of their ages. The first terxorist to die was the publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, founder of GAP. On 15 March 1972 he was blown up by a charge of dynamite he was setting in place under a high tension pylon at Segrate, on th~ periphery of Milan. Other terrorists died when bombs they were assembling, transporting or placing against targets exploded. Among these was Silvio Ferrari, rightist, killed in Brescia on his motorcycle when a bomb he was carrying to the site of a plan- ned crime blew up. On 11 March 1975, Giuseppe Principe Vitaliano, of N~P, was - instantly killed in ilaples by the expZosion of a bomb he was making in an apartment. In Aversa, p'rovince of Caserta, on 30 May 1975 a 22-year-old worker student, Giovanni Taras, also of NAP, was blown up by a bomb he was depositing on the roof of the Aversa insane asylum. ~ 79 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500094442-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In Turin on 4 August 1977, two young terrorists of the left, Attilio Alfredo Di Napoli, 19, student, and Orlando Marin Pinones, 24, a C~hilean expatriate, died in the explosion of a bomb they were handling for a criminal purpose. Almost three months later, again in Turin, another of the left, Rocco Sardone, 22, student, was killed by a bomb he was transporting in a knapsack to the site of a crime. In Catania on 31 December 1977, two terrorist youths of the right, Pierluigi Sciotti, 19, student, and Prospero Condura, 22, electrici~.n, were killed by a bomb they were assembling on the slopes of Mount Etna far a criminal attack. Three young Autonomia operaia terrorists, Angelo Del Saro, 25, laborer, Alberto Graziano, 21, student, and Maria Antonietta Berna, 21, stndent were killed in the explosion of a powerful bomb they were making in an apartment at Thiene (Vicenza) for an intended crime. The first terrorist to die in a clash with police was Giaracarlo Esposito. On 30 May 1974 a carabinieri patrol surrounded a fascist paramilitary camp at Pian di Rascino in the province of Rieti, several terrorists re~acted by attempting to open an escape route, and Esposito, 24, of Avanguardia nazionale, fell in the ensuing gun fight. In Florence on 29 October of the same year, Giuseppe Romeo, 20, and Luca Mantini, 23, NAP terrorists, were killed in an armed conflict with carabinieri during an assault on a bank on the Piazza Leon Battista Alberti. In an armed fight with the kidnappers of the industrialist Vallarino Gancia, subsequently liberated, on �5 June 1975 the carabinieri kiJ.led Margherita Cagol, 28, university graduate in psychology, BR terrorist and wi.fe of Renato Curcio, BR chief. The battle took place in the Spiotta d'Azzello farmstead on the hills of Acqui Terme in the province of Alessandria. In 1976 two different clashes with the police cost the lives of Martino Zicchitella, 40, NAP adherent, killed in Rome on 14 Decemt?er during an ambush - attack on the deputy questor Alfonso Noce; and Walter Alasia, 20, diplomat of the BR, who was killed on 15 December near Milan when police broke into his dwelling at 121 Via Leonardi, in Sesto San Giovanni. In Rome on 1 July 1977, Antonio Lo Muscio, 27, of NAP, wa.~ killed in an armed battle with a carabinieri patrol on the Piazza San Petronio in the center of the city. On 4 May 1978 police killed Roberto Rigobello, 21, bank employee and member of the Movimento proletario di resistenza offensiv~, during a holdup at the Via della Beverata branch of the Banca del Monte di Bologna e Ferrara. Three other terrorists were killed in encounters with the police during 1979. Two of them, Barbara Azzaroni, 29, kindergarten teacher, and Matteo Gaggegi, 23, laborer, were killed on 28 February at the entrance to the bar-restaurant Dell'Angelo, 340 Via Paolo Veronese, in Turin. The third, Roberto Paultasso, 21, was killed on 14 December when, with two accomplices, he was preparing an assault on the gates of the ELCAT metal works on the outskirts of Rivoli (Turin). Finding themselves discovered in possession of dynamite, the three terrorists , opened fire against a police patrol, which responded in kind, killing Paultasso. ~0 F4R OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' In 1980, eight terrorists were slain in clashes with the police. Of these, four died on 28 March in a BR hideout at 12 Via Fracchia in Genoa at the hands of the carabinieri: Anna Maria Ludmann, 33y schoolteacher, Lorenzo Betassa, formerly a worker at Italimpianti, Piero Panciarelli, 25, previously employed by Lancia, and Riccardo Dura, 30, ex-maritime worker. On 13 November 1980, four terrorists affiliated with the BR robbed the Rural . Bank at Civitella Alfedena, near Aquila, of 30 million lire. Shortly there- ' after, ordered to stop at a carabinieri road block near Cassino (Frosinone), they opened f~re and seriously wounded one of the guards. In the ensuing cross- fire, Claudio Pallone, 26, was killed instantly, while two others were badly ~ wounded, Mario Guerra, 25, and Fausto Genoino, 34, who died at the Polyclinic Hospital in-Rome aftez a month-long coma. The last two killed in conflicts with the police were Roberto Serafini, 30, journalist, formerly editor on ROSSO magazine, and Walter Pezzoli, 25, both � killed on 11 December 1980 during an armed fight with the carabinieri in Milan. Another three terrorists died in the following circumstances: Carlo Tognini, 30, bank employee and member of Prima linea, was killed by the proprietor of a gunshop in Varese on 19 July 1977; Franco Anselmi, 22, student and member of Ordine nuovo, was killed on 6 March 1978 in Rome, al:o by a seller of guns; and Roberto Capone, 24, geometrist of the Fronte comunista combattente, was wounded in the terrorist crossfire during the Patrica massacre. His comrades themselves ended his life with pistol shots in the neck to prevent him from falling alive into the hands of the police. Table 27 lists the names of the terrorists slain in clashes with the police and in other circumstances, the dates and places of their deaths, their ages, occupations and titles of the terrorist groups to which they belonged. The provinces in which mortal crimes were committed The provinces which reported deaths caused by criminal actions and violence number 38, 20 in the North, eight in Central Italy and 10 in the South. Nor- thern Italy accounted for 240 dead, or 66.30 percent of the total, including 101 in Belogna (97 in massacres and four in other circumstances); 62 in Milan (21 in massacres, 19 in ambuscades and four in other circumstances); 24 in Turin (14 in ambuscades and 10 in other circumstances); 14 in Genoa (9 in ambuscades and five in other circumstances); 10 in Brescia (eight in massacres and two in other circumstances); and 29 in other provinces, as shown in Table 28. Eight Central Italian provinces ahve recorded deaths resulting from terrorism and violence, with 89 victims (24.60 percent, 67 of them in the capital and 22 in another seven provinces (Table 29). Ten provinces in Southern Italy recorded deaths resulting from terrorism and violence, with 33 victims (9.10 percent). The highest number of deaths occurred in RgggiO Calabria (1~2), followed by Naples (eight) and eight other cities (Table 30). 81 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The terrorist organizations which have committed crimes Of the 362 dead, 104 (28.70 percent of the total) were slain by 22 terrorist groups of the left and 59 (16.30 percent of the total) by aeven terrorist or- ganizations of the right. Six were assassinated by unknow-i persons and two in a dynamite blast set off by terrorists of the Secret Armen:ian Army. Most of the crimes were committed by the Red Brigades, who assassinated 55 persons, 44 of them by ambush, 11 in massacres. Ordine nu~~vo committed 22 homicides, 20 in massacres, one by ambush and another by d~ynamite. Ordine nero: 22 homicides, 20 in massacres and two in other circumstances. Prima linea: 15 assassinations, 14 by ambush. NAR: eight mortal victims, all by ambush. In addition, the Formazioni combattenti comuniste killed four persons, NAP four, Guerriglia comunista (Communist Guerilla Warfare), Neofascist Commandos (uni- dentified) and the Movimento proletario resistenza offensiva, three each. Another 32 persons were murdered by the same number of terrorist groups (32). Table 31 shows the homicides committed annually by terrorist organizations of the left and right, and by unknown persons or groups. Chapter II: Persons Wounded in Ambush Attacks Comprehensive data The number of persons wounded in attacks by ambush was 172, all except one (in 1971) in the years between 1975 and 1980, as seen in Table 33. Of the 172, 147 (85.45 percent of the total) were victims of leftist terrorists, six by rightist, and 19 by unknown persons or groups. The data compiled show that the highest number of victims wounded were corpora- tion directors and entrepreneurs, with 38 wounded; next were political figures with 26; police force members, 22; doctors and other professionals, 22; factory section chiefs, 13; functionaries, 10; ~ournalists, eight; laborers, seven; students and security guards, six in each category; university professors and teachers, four; judges, three; businessmen and persons in retirement, one in each category. Ambushing political figures, corporation directors, police agents and others for the declared purpose of wounding them by gunfire began in 1975. In the previous period from 1969 to 1974 there was only one ambush, on 23 June 1971 in Varese, mounted by unknown persons. Their victim was Enrico Rampini, a unionist who was injured while he was returning home after taking part in a strike, which he had helped to organize. The second ambuscade, this time with incendiary bombs, was carried out on 15 rebruary 1975 near Rome against Franco Galluppi, leader of the PSDI delegation to the Lazio regional council. On his way home with his wife after attending a debate in Fiano on the problem of fascist violence, Galluppi was blocked by four neofascists, who compelled him to atop his car, later threw an incendiary bomb into his home, causing him serious burns. 82 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The politicians The first of numerous armed attacks by ambush againat individuals occurred on 15 May 1975 in Milan when a BR commando invaded the ground floor office at 5 Via Monte di Pieta of a lawyer, Massimo De Carolis, DC group leader in the Milan city council, and wounded him in the leg with a revolver shot. In the period under study, 26 political figures were wounded in attacks by ambush, 18 committed by the Red Brigades, one by Prima linea, five by unknown persons, one by rightists and one by the Communist Group for Territorial Counterpower. Of the 26 politicians hurt, 20 represented the DC, two PCI, one PSDI, one MSI-DN, one PSI, and Bernard Leighton Guzman, formerly president of the Christian Democratic Party in Chile (Table 34). The greatest number of persons wounded by ambush (49, or 28.50 percent of the total) were industrial directors, functionaries, factory section chiefs and security guards in 21 different plants, 19 in the North and two (Alfa Sud and FIAT) in the South (Table 35). CoY~poration director and technicians The highest number of terrorist targets were FIAT directors and technicians. Of the total 49 wounded, 22 were FIAT men: nine directors, seven section chiefs, three officials, one of them at the FIAT plant in Cassino, and three security guards, one in Cassino. FIAT was followed by Alfa Romeo, with six victims: four directors, one of them at Alfa Sud. At the Brera plant in Milan, three persons were wounded, one director and two section chiefs; at Sit-Siemens in Milan, another three, one official and two section chiefs. In Genoa two Ansaldo directors were wounded. One person was wounded in each of another 15 plants (Table 35). For the terrorist groups responsible for the 49 attacks, see Table 36. The first factory director wounded by ambush was Enrico Boffa, 41, head of per- sonnel at the Singer di Leini plant in Turin. Committed by three BR members, the crime occurred at 6:45 pm on 21 October 1975 a moment after Boffa had parked his car in the garage under his home. He was about to lower the shutter when unmasked three men darted out from the shadows, brandishing pistols. Throwing him to the ground, they forced him to kneel and hung a placard around his neck, bearing the message: Brigate rosae. Transform the contractual atruggle into a fight for power to defeat the presidential and corporative aims promoted by Agnelli and Leone, and Berlinguer's historic compromise." Next, they photo- graphed him [wearing the placard] and fired two revolver shots at his legs. The last man wounded in ambush during the period under study was an engineer, Maurizio Caramello, director of Italgrafo, Milan, assailed by ~.~BR..on 11 December 1980. The first section chief of a plant to be ambushed was Giuseppe Borello, of FIAT Mirafiori, wounded in the legs by four pistol shots fired by a BR commando on 13 April 1976; the last in the period under study was Ezio Gavello, FIAT labor- 83 F'OR OFFICIAL t �E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFRICIAL USE ONLY ~tory chief, wounded on 21 December 1979 by the Reparti comunisti d'stacco (Cocmeunist Attack Units). On 26 November 1976 in Cassino (Frosinone), the first of s~:ven company officials was wounded: Rocco Favaloro, attached to the union office at the [FIAT] plant in Cassino, ambushed by unknown persons. The last was Francesco Giacomazzi of Montedison, felled by pistol shots fired by Prima linea on 10 May 1978 on the Piazza Conciliazione in Milan. . The first security guard in a factory was also attacked in 1976: Matteo Palmieri, chief security guard at Marelli. On 2 April, a BR commando broke into the guards' room at Magneti Marelli, attempted to open the safe contain- ing arms, wounded Palieri with several revolver bullets, a~nd fled. The last security guard wounded in ambush during the period under study was Giovanni Pegorin, of Framtek, attacked by the Nuclei comunisti territoriali on 31 January 1980 in Turin. In the same assault, another security guard, Carlo Ala, was killed. Over 50 directors and employees of several important factories were wounded, including the president of Unione petrolifera italiana (Italian Petroleum Union) Giovanni Theodoli by the Formazioni comuniste armate in Rome on 21 April 1976; Vittorio Morgera, director general of Poligrafico dello Stato (State Polygraphic Agency), wounded by the Unita combattenti comuniste in Rome on 29 March 1977; the industrialist Armando Girotto by the Squadre armate proletarie in Milan 31 January 1978; Felice Schiavetti, president of the Unione industriale of Liguria, in Genoa by the BR on 7 April 1978; Mario Astarita, director of the Chemical Bank, in Milan by Prima linea on 11 May 1978; Aldo Ravaioli, president of the Comitato della piccola industria (Committee for Small Industry), in Turin by the BR on 6 July 1978; Fausto Gasparino, deputy director of Intersind, wounded in the legs by the BR in Turin on 7 July 1978; Franco Pilla, president of the Venice Savings Bank, wounded by the Gruppi combattenti per il communismo on 15 December 1978; Piercarlo Andreoletti, Praxi administrator, woun,ded in the legs by Prima linea on 5 October 1979; and Settimio Imperi., building constructor, wounded in Rome on 21 December 1979 by the Movimento comunista rivoluzionario. Members of the Forces of Public Order Apart from the 65 members of the police forces killed in the fight against terrorism and violence, 22 others were wounded in ambush: one in 1975, two in 1976, seven in 1978, 10 in 1979 and two in 1980. For a breakdown by ranks, see Table 37. Of the 22 ambuscades against the police forces, eight were committed by the BR, three by Prima linea, three by NAP, four by unknown persons, two by NAR, one by the Proletari armati per il comunismo, and one by the Roberto Scialobba Antifascist Nucleus. For the cities i_n whicr these 22 crimes occurred see Table 38. The first to be wounded in ambush was Cosimo Vernich, 49, brigadier of the custodian guards at San Vittore prison. The attack was staged at 7:25 am on 84 FOR OFH7CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 7 October 1975 by the Giovanni Taras Armed Nucleus,�a NAP affiliate, wounding their victim in the right thigh with five pistol shots. Table 39 lists the names of the policemen wounded by ambush, their ranks, dates and places of their attacks, and the initisls of the terrorist groups responai- ble for the crimes. The physicians In the period under study, 16 physicians were hurt in ambuscades (15 men and one woman). The first was Luigi Solera, of the FIAT Mirafiori medical section, wounded in the legs by four bullets fired by a BR commando in Turin 17 December . 1975. The second ambush occurred in Pisa on 30 March 1977 against Alberto Mammoli, doctor in the Pisa prison. In the same year, the following sustained wounds: Giuseppe Ghetti, health officer in Seveso (Milan), wounded in the legs on 19 May by a terrorist group which called itself Crnnbattenti per il comuniemo, which then disappeared completely; Giorgio Coda, neuropsychiatrist, and Rober- to Anzalone, president of the Associazione medici mutualisti (Association of Medical Insurers) in Milan. Another five physicians were wounded in 1978, among them a gynecologist, two prison doctors (Milan and Novara) and a chief doctor of INAM (Milan). Six more were wounded in 1979, among them another gynecologist and two other prison doctors (Cremona and Varese). In the period under study, the prison doctors wounded in ambush numbered four. Of the 16 victims, six were wounded in Turin, three in Milan, two in Rome and one each in Seveso, Pisa, Novara, Varese and Naples. Only one doctor was assaulted by the BR, the remaining 15 by terrorist organ- izations listed in Table 40. Table 41 gives the names of the physicians wounded in ambush, the dates and places of the attacks against them and the initials of the criminal groups responsible. The journalists Eight journalists were wounded in ambush. The first was Vittorio Bruno, deputy director of IL SECOLO XIX. On 1 June 1977 in Genoa, a BR command~ stopped him in the street and shot him in the legs. In Milan the following day, shortly after 10 am, a BR comanando ambushed Cilindro (Indro) Montanelli, director of GIORNALE NUOVO. The terrorists waited for him to leave the Hotel Manin, where he lives, to go to his office on the nearby PiaZZa Cavour; when they espied him, they wounded him in a leg. In Rome, 24 hours later (on 3 June) at 10 am, another BR commando unit struck at Emilio Rossi, dire~tor of Telegiornale Uno (Channel One television news), on the Via Teulada, and wounded him seriously in the legs with pistol ahots. 85 FOR OFFICU?L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In 1977 three other journalists were victimized: on 7 July at Albano Terme (Padua), Antonio Garzotto of the GAZZETTINO, hit in the legs by a Fronte comunista combattente commando; in Turin on 18 September, Nino Ferrero, of UNITA, shot in the legs by two terrorists of the Azione ri.voluzionaria (Revolu- tionary Action) as he was on his way home; and on 25 Deceniber in Rome, Roberto Giunto La Spada, of "Radio citta futura," wounded in one a.rm and a hip by two bullets as he was leaving work. The cirme was committed by the Giustizia - nazionale rivoluzionaria (National Revolutionary Justice). In Turin on 24 April 1979, the BR wounded Franco Piccinelli, a RAI editor. One year later, on 7 May in Milan, two youths who claimed to be policemen, entered the home of Guido Passalacqua, ~ournalist on the REPUBBLICA, seized him and fired pistol shots into his leg. The deed was claimed by the Brigata XXVIII marzo. - These eight ~ournalists suffered attacka by ambuah in five cities, victims of five terrorist organizations, four of the left and one of the right (Table 42). Table 43 reports their names, dates and places of each ambush ard the initials of the terrorist groups which comanitted the crimes. Magistrates and university professors In the period under study, two magistrates, a judge, an official of the Ministry of Grace and Justice and four university professars were wounded in ambuscades. One of the magtstrates was Piero Margariti, counsellor at the court of cassa- tion and head of the institutes of prevention and punishment in the Ministry of Grace and Justice. The episode occurred on 28 January 1976 when NAP terrorists fired four pistol shots into Margariti's legs. The other magistrate was Paolino Dell'Anno, target of a NAP attack, fortunately without serious consequences. On 5 May 1976, while he was driving to work in his Fiat 500, he was flanked by a powerful motorcycle, with two youths aboard. One of them fired his pistol repeatedly at the car, but f~iiled to hit Dell'Anno. With several revolver shots, on 12 February 1977 in Rome, the BR wounded Valerio Traversi, functionary in the Ministry of Grace and Justice. In Florence 18 months later--on 15 December 1978--the Squadre rivoluzionarie di combattimento wounded a praetor, Silvio Bozzi. Summarized data on the persons killed or wounded in attacks in ambush The number of persons killed and wounded in attacks by ambush totals 534, of which 362 died in criminal actions and by violence, and 172 were wounded. Forty-three provinces saw persons killed and wounded by aTabush, 23 in the North, nine in Central Italy and 11 in the South. Those which reported dead but no wounded were 23, 12 in the North, three in Cent�ral Italy and eight in the South. Those which reported only wounded by ambush were four, three in the North and one in the South. 86 FOR OF F[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The South claims the lowest number of dead--33, or 9.10 percent of the total. Eleven were wounded in ambush, or 6.40 percent (Table 46). The provinces of Central Italy couated 89 dead, or 24.60 percent of the total, and 44 wounded in ambuah, 25.60 percent of the total (Table 47). The greatest number of dead and wounded were counted in the 23 provinces of the North. The dead were 240, or 66.30 percent of the total, and those wounded in ambush 117, or 68 percent of the total (Table 48). Table 1 Terrorist crimes and acts of violence in Italy between 1969 and 1980 Year Crimes against in- Acts of Number Number of Total animate targets violence of dead ambush victims 1969 208 210 21 439 1970 225 318 11 554 1971 310 515 b 1 832 1972 293 473 10 776 1973 254 383 11 648 1974 323 430 33 786 1975 239 199 21 8 467 1976 481 176 17 11 685 1977 1,338 407 23 38 1,806 1978 1,862 781 38 44 2,125 - 1979 1,766 289 36 48 2,139 1980 567 109 135 22 833 Total 7,866 4,290 362 172 12,690 87 F'OR ORFICUL USL ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFlC1AL USE ONLY Table 2 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total Membera of the 1 1 1 4 4 2 4 6 5 14 11 12 65 police forces Security and 2 Z 1 2 ~ other guards Magistrates 2 3 1 5 11 Journalists 1 1 1 2 Politicians 1 1 1 3 Corporation di- 1 1 3 5 7.0 rectors and entrepreneurs Workers, emplo- 3 2 3 2 1 5 2 1 2 1 1 33 56 yees and other _ salaried persons Students 3 1 1 1 3 2 9 3 6 7 8 16 60 University pro- 5 1 1 5 12 fessors and school teachers Doctors and other 1 2 1 1 4 9 profession~ls Plant section 1 1 2 chief s Functionaries 1 1 Housewives and 5 1 1 17 24 domestics Retirees 6 1 7 14 Buainessmen, 6 1 1 2 2 3 4 19 ehopkeepers, artisans Agriculturists 7 1 � � " � 8 and peasants Others 2 2 1 8 5 2 6 4 7 22 59 Total 21 11 6 10 11 33 21 17 23 38 36 135 362 88 FOR Ot~'FiCU1L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000504090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 3 178 victims of violence and terrorist actions of the right, qf which 135 in massacrea 27 ~n other crimes and cases of violence 16 in ambuscades 119 victims of violence and terrorist actions of the left, of which 70 in ambuscades 34 in other crimes and cases of violence 15 in massacres 39 in clashes with the police, o� which 21 in armed battles with terrorists 18 in cases of violence and other circumstances , 362 total Table 4 The massacres Place Date Number of Wounded dead Milan, Piazza Fontana 12-12-1969 17 88 Gioia Tauro, Sun express train 22- 7-1970 6 50 Gorizia, Peteano 31- 5-1912 3 2 Milan, police headquarters, Via Fatebenefratelli 17- 5-1973 4 12 Bresca~, Piazza della Loggia 28- 5-1974 8 94 Bologna, Italcus express train 4- 8-1974 12 105 Genoa, Salita Santa Brigida (street) 8- 6-1976 3 Rome, Via Fani 16- 3-1978 5 Froainone, Patrica 8-11-1978 4 Milan, Via Schievano 8- 1-1980 3 Bologna, railroad atation 2- 8-].980 85 200 Total 150 551 89 F+OQ OFFlCUL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF[CU1L USE ONLY Table 5 16 housewives 2 clerks (girls) 1 corporation director 8 retirees (men) 2 domestics 1 functionary (INAM) 3 retirees (women) 2 cabdrivers 1 university professor 4 office workers (men) 2 enlisted men 1 plant section chief 9 office workers (women) 1 mason 1 university graduate 8 students (men) 1 mechanic 3 holders of diplomas 7 students (women) 1 rail signalman 3 school children S businessmen 1 electrician 1 salesman 4 railroad workers 1 cook 1 broker 2 magistrates 1 errand boy 1 insurance agent ~7 policemen 5 farmers 1 air force marshal 7 schoolteachers (women) 2 farmers 1 unemployed 2 teachers 1 snerchant 1 office manager 6 workers (men) 1 artisan 1 barber 2 workers (women) 1 trade director 7 others , 1 driver 1 boutique manager (women) Of the 151 victims, 95 were men, 49 women, 3 infant girls, 3 boys, 1 girl The massacres also cost the lives of 11 foreigners: 3 abaard the ItaZicus and 8 in the Bologna station. Among them were 2 women students, 3 men students, 2 grade school pupils, 1 clerk, 1 housewife, and 3 other persons whose occupations are unknown. Table 6 Magistrates and police force members killed in the massacres Name Rank Place and date of death Name of terrorist organization Antonio Ferraro brigadier Peteano 31-5-1972 Ordine nuovo Donato Poveramo carabiniere Peteano 31-5-1972 Ordine nuovo Franco Dongiovanni carabiniere Peteano 31-5-1972 Ordine nuovo Felice Bertolazzi police agent questura (MI) 17-5-1973 Gianfranco Bertoli Federico Massarin police agent questura (MI) I7-5-1973 Gianfranco Bertoli Giuseppe Panzin police agent questura (MI) 17-5-19?3 Gianfranco Bertoli Francesco Coco magistrate Genoa 8-6-1976 Brigate rosse Giovanni Saponara carabinieri Genoa 8-6-1976 Brigate rosse brigadier Antioco De~ana carabinieri Genoa 8-6-1976 Brigate rosse corporal Oreste Leonardi carabinieri via Fani (Roma) 16-3-Z978 Brigate rosse marshal Raffaele Iozzino police agent via Fani (Roma) 16-3-I978 Brigate rosse Domenico Ricci carabinieri via Fani (Roma) 16-3-1978 Brigate roase , corporal Giulio Rivera police agent via Fani (Roma) 16-3-1978 Brigate rosse Francesco Zizzi police via Fani (Roma) 16-3-1978 Brigate rosse brigadier Fedele Calvosa magistrate Patrica (FR) 8-11-1978 Giuseppe Pagliei police agent Patrica (FR) 8-11-1978 Rocco Santoro police vice via Schievano (MI) 8-1-1980 Brigate rosse brigadier Antonio Cestari police corporal via Schievano (MI) 8-]-1980 Brigate rosse Michele Tatulli golice agent via Schievano (MI) 8-]_-1980 Brigate rosse 90 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 I~~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 7 Year Civilians Police Total 1969 20 1 21 - 1970 10 1 11 1971 5 1 6 1972 6 4 10 1973 7 4 11 1974 31 2 33 1975 17 4 21 1976 11 6 17 1977 18 5 23 1978 24 14 38 1979 25 11 36 1980 123 12 135 Total 297 65 362 Table 8 er o ea y am us 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total Police 1 2 1 7 11 6 28 Magistrates 1 2 1 5 9 Journalists 1 1 2 Politicians 1 1 1 3 Corporation - - - 1 3 4 8 directors, entrepreneurs Laborers, 1 2 1 1 3 8 employees, other workera ' University pro- 1 1 fessors, school teachers Students 1 5 5 2 13 Doctors and other 1 1 1 3 professionals 91 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500490002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 8 continued 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total - 1 1 Plant section _ chiefs - 1 3 3 1 Businessmen, - ambulants, shop- keepers, artisans - 1 1 2 Security and ' other guards - 1 1 2 Others - Total 2 3 4 5 24 25 24 87 Table 9 The 87 persons assassinated by ambush 9 magistrates 1 ambulant vendor 1 lawyer 3 businessmen 1 notary 1 salesman 1 university professor 2 ~ournalists 17 members of the police forces 3 laborers 2 deputy questors 1 typographer 1 corporal 1 cook 2 brigadiers 1 doctor 3 marshals 1 messenger 7 police agents 2 clerks 7 carabinieri 1 factory section chief 1 general 3 politicians 2 lieutenant colonels 13 students 1 marshal 6 corporation directors 2 corporals 1 industrialist 1 carabinieri 1 building constructor 4 custodian agents 2 other (drug peddlers) 2 marshals 2 agents 1 security guard 1 private detective 1 goldsmith 1 shopkeeper 92 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 10 Magistrates killed in awbush Name Date Place Terrorist organization Vittorio Occorsio 10- 7-1976 Rome Ordine nuovo Riccardo Palma 14- 2-1978 Rome Brigate rosse Gerolamo Tartaglione 10-10-1978 Rome Brigate rosse Emilio Alessandrini 29- 1-1979 Milan Prima linea Vittorio Bachelet 12- 2-1980 Rome Brigate rosse Nicola Giacumbi 16- 3-1980 Salerno Brigate rosse Girolamo Minervini 18- 3-1980 Rome Brigate rosse Guido Galli 19- 3-1980 Milan Prima linea Mario Ama~o 23- 6-1980 Rome Nuclei armati rivoluz Table 11 ~ killed in killed in killed in other Total ambush massacres circumstances Politicians 3 " 3 Journalists 2 " 2 Businessmen 8 2 10 University instructors 1 11 12 Professionals 3 5 1 9 Total 17 16 3 36 93 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500090002-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Tatile 12 Politicians, journalists, corporation directors, entrepreneurs and professionals kiZled in ambush Name Occupation Place and date Terrorist organit~gtion - of the crime ~ Enrico Pedenovi MSI-DN exponent Milan 29-4-1976 Prima linea ~ ' Fulvio Croce lawyer Turin 28-4-1977 Brigate rosse 1 - Carlo Casalegno 3ournalist Turin 16-11-1977 Brig3te rosse ~ Carmine De Rosa FIAT director Cassino (FR) 4-1-19~'8 Operai armati per il i comunismo I Gianfranco Spighi notary Prato (FI) 7-2-1978 Lot.arm.per il com. Dante di Nanni Aldo Moro DC president Rome 9-5-1978 Brigate rosse Alfredo Paolella university Naples 11-10-1978 Prima linea professor Attilio Dutto industrialist Cuneo 21-3-1979 Brigate rosse Italo Schettini Building Rome 29-3-1979 Brigate rosse constructor Carlo Ghiglieno FIAT director Turin 21-9-1979 Prima linea Silvio Gori Director, Marg- Venice 28-1-1980 Brigate rosse hera Petrochemical Paolo Paoletti ICMESA director Milan 5-2-1980 Prima linea Pino Amato DC exponent Naples 19-5-1980 Brigate rosse Walter Tobagi ~ournalist Milan 28-5-1980 Brig.XXVIII marzo Renato Briano Magneti Marelli Milan 12-11-1980 Brigate rosse director Manfredo Mazzanti director of Milan 28-11-1980 Brigate rosse I Falck I Giuseppe Furci prison health Rome 1-12-1980 Brigate rasse , director Table 13 Ages of students killed 23 from 14 to 19 years 2S from 20 to 23 years 6 from 24 to 26 years 2~ from 27 to 29 years 4 age unknown 94 FOR OFFICIAL U5~ ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 > FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Table 14 Where the students were killed In Northern Italy Central Italy Southern Italy Bologna 15* Rome 20 Naples 3 Milan Pisa Bari 2 Turin Latina Padua Reggio Emilia Total 31 (51.65y) 24 (40X) ~ (8.35X) * including 13 killed in the Bologna station massacre Table 15 Number of students killed from 1'i69 to 1980 _ 1969-1974 1975-1980 Year Number of dead Year Number of dead 1969 3 1975 9 1970 1 1976 3 1971 1 1977 6 1972 1 1978 7 1973 3 1979 8 1974 2 1980 15 Total 11 49 percentage 18.35 81.65 Total 1969 to 1980 60 Table 16 ~ Circwnstances of atudents' deaths 32 through terrorism and violent actions of the right 15 in massacres 6 in ambuscades 11 in other circumstances ' 12 through terrorism and violent actions of the left 7 in ambuscades 5 in other circuanstances 13 in riots and clashes with the police 3 in other circtmmstances or ambushed by unknown persons 95 ' F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 17 Students kil~ed in ambush Name Age Date of death Place Terrorist organizations guilty af the crime Mario Zicchieri 16 29-'10-1975 Rome Nuclei armati proletari Mauro Amati 21 8- 7-1977 Rome Unita combattenti comuniste Franco Bigonzetti 19 7- 1-1978 Rome Nuclei armati di contropotere territoria.le Francesco Ciavatta 20 7- 1-1978 Rome Nuclei armati di contropotere territoria.le Fausto Tinelli 19 17- 3-1978 Milan Ignoti di destra Ivo Zini 24 28- 9-1975 Roffie � Nuclei armati rivoluzionari Claudio Miccoli 21 5-10-1978 Naples Commando fascista Stefano Cecchetti 19 10- 1-1979 Rome Compagni urganizzati per il comunismo Emanuele Jurilli 19 9- 3-1979 Turin Prima linea Ciro Principessa 20 19- 4-1979 Rome Avanguardia na~iondle Luigi Mascagni 24 1- 7-1979 Milan Ignoti Roberto Cavallaro 22 9-10-1979 Padua Nuclei armati rivoluzionari Antonio Leandri 24 1?-12-I'~79 Rome Movimento rivoluzionario popolare William Waccher 26 7- 2-].980 Milan P~ima linea Valeria Verbano 19 22- 2-1980 Rome Nuclei armati rivoluzionari Table 18 Laborers, employees and other workerr~ Occupations killed in killed in killed by killed in Total massac:res ambush violence other cir- ~ cumstances male workers 6 4 4 . ' 3 1~ female workers 2 - - ' 2 male employees 5 2 1. ' 8 female.employees 9 - - ' 9 railroad workers - 1 1 6 ' typographers 1 - - 1 drivers 2 1 - - 3 96 FOR OFF[C[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Table 18 continued ' maeons 1 - - - 1 farm laborers . - - 2 - 2 ~ electricians 1 - - - 1 cooks 1 1 - - 2 i male shop clerks 1 - - ' 1 railroad signalmen 1 - - - 1 mechanics 1 - - - 1 messengers - 1 - - 1 Total 34 10 8 4 56 Tab1e 19 Women killed by terrorism and violence 20 housewives 2 workers 8 school teachers 1 boutique manager 9 students 1 hosiery worker 9 employees 4 domestics 3 retirees Table 20 Names of PCI militants killed in the period 1969-1980 Name Age~ Profession Date of death Place Gianfranco Carminati 30 laborer 7- 1-1971 Milan Euplio Natali 70 rstiree 28- 5-1974 Brescia Alberto Trebedeschi 37 teacher 28- 5-1974 Brescia Vittorio Zamparda 60 retiree 28- 5-1974 Brescia Vittorio Ingria 53 retiree 25- 6-1974 Enna Rodolfo Boschi 22 laborer 18- 4-1975 Florence Gennaro Costantino 62 retiree 16- 5-1975 Naples Luigi De Rosa 19 student 28- 5-1976 Sezze (FR) Pietrantonio Castelnovo 47 laborer 5- 9-1976 Como Benedetto Petrone 19 student 29-11-1977 Bari Guido Rossa 45 laborer 24- 1-1979 Genoa Ciro Principessa 20 student 19- 4-1979 Rome 97 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF'[CIAL USE ONLY Table 21 PSI militants killed in the period 1969-1980 ~ Name Age Profession Date of Death Place _ Giusepp~ Malacaria 33 mason 4- 2-1971 Catanzaro Giuseppe Tavecchia 50 employee 11- 3-1972 Milan Table 22 Mo~emento anarchico victims killed in the period 1969-1980 Name Age Profession Bate of Death Place Domenico Congedo 23 student 27- 2-1969 Rome (,iuseppe Pinelli 41 railroad 15-12-1969 Milan worker Franco Serantini 20 student 7- 5-1972 Pisa Table 23 The 11 members of MSI-DN killed in the period 1969-198Q Name Age Profession Date of Death Place Ugo Venturini 33 laborer 18- 4-1970 Rome Virgilio Mattei 21 student 16- 4-1973 Rome Giuseppe Mazzola 60 employee 17- 6-1974 Padua Sergio Ramelli 19 student 29- 4-1975 Milan Mario Zicchieri 16 student 29-IO-1975 Rome Angelo Pistolesi 31 employee`' 28-12-1977 Rome Franco Bigonzetti 19~ student 7- 1-1978 Rome Francesco Ciavatta 2U student 7- 1-1978 Roma Stefano Recchioni 20 student 7- 1-~1978 Rome ~ Francesco Cecchin ].8 student 20- 5-1979 Rome I Rome ~ Angelo Mancia :27 messenger 12- 3-1980 ; 98 FOR OFF[CIA~ USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OF'FIC[AL USE ONLY Table 24 The six Lotta continua and two moviemento atudentesco militants Name Age Pro�~ssi~n Date of Death Place Lotta continua Tonino Micciche 25 laborer 17- 4-1975 Turin Alceste Campanile 22 student 13- 6-1975 Reggio E. gietro Bruno 18 student 22-11-1975 Rome Francesco Lorusso 25 stt~dent 11- 3-1977 Bologna Walter Rossi 20 student 30- 9-1977 Rome Luigi Mascagni 24 student 1- 7-1979 Milan Student movement Roberto Franceschi 23 student 23- 1-1973 Milan Claudio Varalli 18 student 16- 4-1975 Milan Table 25 The 37 terrorists killed in the period 1969-1980 6 laborers 1 university graduate with degree 1 electrician 2 graduates with diplomas 11 students 3 teachers 1 publisher 3 employees 6 unemployed 1 ~ournalist 2 others Table 26 Number of terrorists killed by age groups 3 age 19 1 age 27 2 age 20 1 age 28 5 age 21 1 age 29 4 age 22 4 age 30 5 age 23 1 age 33 3 age 24 1 age 34 2 age 25 1 age 40 2 age 26 1 age 46 99 FOR OF'F'ICU?L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500490002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 27 How the terrorists died Neme Age Profession Date of Death Place Terrorist Group In clashes with . the police Ivan Boccaccio 21 laborer 6-10-1972 Gorizia 0. Nuovo Giancarlo Esposti 24 unemployed 30- 5-1974 Pian di AN Rascino (RI) Giuseppe Romeo 20 unemployed 29-10-1974 Florence NAP Luca Mantini 23 student 29-10-1974 Florence NAP Margherita Cagol 26 graduate 5- 6-1975 Acqui Terme BR Anna '1a,:ia Mantini 23 unemployed 8- 7-1975 Rome NAP Martino Zicchitella 40 physics 14-12-1976 Rome NAP teacher ; Wal*er Alasia 20 diplomat 15-12-1976 Milan BR " Antouio Lo Muscio 27 unemployed 1- 7-1977 Rome NAP , ~ Roberto Rigobello 21 bank clerk 4- 5-1978 Bologna MPRO + Barbara Azzaroni 29 refugee 28- 2-1979 Turin PL ~ Matteo Gaggegi 23 laborer 28- 2-1979 Turin PL Roberto Pautasso 21 laborer 14-12-1979 ~ur.tii PL Anna Maria Ludmann 33 teacher 28- 3-1980 Genoa BR Lorenzo Betassa 28 laborer 28- 3-1980 Genos BR Piero Panciarelli 25 clerk 28- 3-1980 Genoa. BR Riccardo Dura 30 sailor 28- ~-1980 ~noa BR Claudio Pallone 26 student 13-11-1980 Frosinone Left . Arnaldo Fausto Genoino 34 unemployed 13-11-1980 Frosinone Zeft. ~ (contratt.alla RAI) Roberto Serafini 30 journalist 11-12-1980 Milan BR ~ Walter Pezzoli 23 unemployed 11-12-1980 Milan BR ~ ~i ~ i ~ j 100 ! FOR OFF[CU?L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500090002-5 FOR OFF7CIA1. USE ONLY Tabie 27 continued Na~e Age Profession Date of Death Place Terrorist Group In other . circumstances Giangiacrnno Feltrinelli 46 editor 15- 3-1972 Segrate (MI)GAP Silvio Ferrari 19 student 19- 5-1974 Brescia NAR G. Principe Vitaliano 23 university 11- 3-1975 Naples NAP student ~ ~ Giovanni Taras 22 student 30- 5-1975 Aversa(CE) NAP worker . Carlo Tognini 30 bank clerk 19- 7-1977 Varese PL Attilio Alfredo Di Napoli 19 student 4- 8-1977 Turin Left Orlando Marin Pinones 24 4- 8-1977 Turin Left ~ Rocco Sardone 22 student 30-10-1977 ~rin Left Pierluigi Sciotti 19 student 31-12-1977 Catania Right- Prospero Condura 22 electrician 31-12-1977 Catania Right Francesco Anselmi 22 sxudent 6- 3-1978 Rome O.Nuovo Roberto Capone 24 surveyor 8-11-1978 Frosinone FCC Angelo Del Sarto 25 laborer 12- 4-1979 Thiene (VI) AO Alberto Graziani 21 atu~'ent 12- 4-1979 Thiene (VI) AO Maria Antonietta Berna 21 student 12- 4-1979 Thiene (VI) AO Francesco Mangiamelli 30 ? 11- 9-1980 Rome Right 101 F'OR OFFICU?L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500090002-5 ROR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Table 28 Number of deaths in the provinces of the North Province In massacres Ambush Other cir- Total Percentage cumstances Bologna 97 4 101 27.90 Milan 21 19 22 62 17.10 Turin 14 10 24 6.60 Geno a 9 5 14 3.85 _ Brescia 8 2 10 2.75 Gorizia 3 1 4 1.10 Padua 3 1 4 1.10 Venice 3 1 4 1.10 Vicenza 3 3 0.80 Alessandria 2 2 0.55 Cuneo 1 1 2 0.55 Varese 2 2 0.55 Vercelli 1 1 0.25 Como 1 1 0.25 Bergamo 1 1 0.25 Udine 1 1 0.25 Savona 1 1 0.25 Parma 1 1 0.25 Reggio Emilia 1 1 0.25 Forli 1 1 0.25 Total in 240 the North 129 53 58 percentage 35.65 14.65 16.00 66.30 I 102 . ~ F'OR OI~'I~'[CU?L U~ ONLY ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR O6'F'IC7AL l1SE ONLY Table 29 Number of deaths in the provinces of Central Italy Province In massacres Ambush Other cir- Total Percentage cumstances gD~ 5 32 30 67 18.50 Florence 'Z 4 6 1.65 ' Frosinone ~ 4 1 2 7 1.95 Pisa 3 3 0.80 Viterbo 2 2 0.55 Pistoia 2 2 0.55 Rieti 1 1 0.25 Latina 1 1 0.25 Total 9 35 45 89 Percentage 2.50 9.65 12.45 24.60 ~able 30 Number of deaths in the provinces of the South Province In massacres Ambush Other cir- Total Percentage cumstances Reggio Calabria 6 6 12 3.30 Naples 4 4 8 2.20 Nuoro 2 2 0.55 Catanzaro 1 2 3 0.80 Catania 2 2 0.55 Bari 2 2 . 0.55 Foggia 1 1 0.25 Caserta 1 1 0.25 Salerno 1 1 0.25 Enna 1 1 0.25 Total 6 6 21 33 Percentage 1.65 1.65 5.80 9.10 103 FOR OFFICUL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY Table 31 Names of terrorist organizations of the right and number of persons ' Title 1969 1972 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total Avanguardia nazionale 1 1 Commandi neofascisti 1 1 1 3 Esercito nazionale rivoluzionario brigata Franco Anselmi " 2 2 Movimento rivoluzion- ario popolare 1 1 Nuclei armati rivoluzionari � � � 1 , 2 5 R Ordine nuovo 17 3 1 1 2` Ordine nero 22 " 22 Total 17 4 23 1 1 5 3 5 59 Table 32 Names of terrorist organizations of the left and number of persons killed Title 1969 1972 1974 1975 1Q76 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total Brigate rosse 2 1 6 3 16 11 16 55 Brigate combattenti - 1 1 Brigata XXVIII marzo 1 1 Compagni organizzati per il comunismo 1 1 2 Compagni organizzati in volante rossa 1 1 Formazioni combattenti comuniste 4 4 Gatti selvaggi - 1 1 Guerriglia proletaria 1 1 Guerriglia comunista - 3 3 Lotta armata per il comunismo D. Di Nanni " " 1 1 Mov.prol. resistenza offensiva nucleo antieroina - 3 3 1Q 4 F'OR OF'F[CIAL USL ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICUL llSE ONLY Table 32 continued Title ' 1969 1972 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total Nticlei armati proletari 1 1 1 I 4 Nuclei armati di con- tropotere territoriale ~ 2 ~ 2 Nuclei siwati per il comunismo 1 1 Nuclei comunisti territoriali 1 1 Nuclei proletari combattenti 1 1 Operai armati per il comunismo ~ ~ 1 1 Prima linea 1 � 1 7 6 15 Proletari armati per il comunismo 1 1 Ronde proletarie 1 1 Squadre proletarie - territoriali 1 1 2 Unita combattenti comuniste 1 1 2~ Total 2 2 8 7 32 24 29 104 Ignoti 1 3 1 1 6 Esercito armeno 2 2 Riport~ sigle DESTRA 17 4 23 1 1 5 3 5 59 TOTAL GENERALE 17 5 25 6 9 8 37 28 36 171 105 F'OR OF'F[CIAL U3E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 ROR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~v o w bo n?~ b ty e+ C cn o r c~a c~ hd c, 3K oo ~n b 1D O n rt C fD G a' W ?i O fD p r? rr pf CI O O o P~ R~D O Ou ~ w ~ w w w ~ f~D ~ n ~ e p� f~~ o K~o w K w M c w ~ fD 1~ r'! tA ~ M rt i-h O fD O fp fD M.M fD O rT p OD W?i A fD p W fD fD F~ W ri ~ rl fD ti ~ fD 'd ri F~ ~ rt OI1 F~ !D rf ."S Oo fD O ~C G1 p! ri 0A rt ~'i M M N A F-~ ri rt W p~ OD m GD ~ 1+ aD F+ ~ O Oo fp rf F+ F+~ 01 ~C W . f~D f~D ~'~'i fp ~ I'~ ~C 7~' V f~D O ~ rl fD W _ ~ ~ ~ r a ~v n ~ ~ ~ ~ m m oo a . v, o�� o o m~ a~ a o o ~ ~ co ~ K a~' . ~ ~ O~D f~D n M f~D ~i ~ O 'd ~ ~ fyD r W V 'I~^' V ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ' I W ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ QN 1~ , ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ I I I ~ O ~ ~ ~ 0 I ~ ~ I ~ ' ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ W r i i i i i i i i?-~ i i i i i i ~ a o~ o ~ r 1 1 1 I I I 1 I 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 I I ~o I 1 1 1 t 1 1 I I i 1 I I I I 1 I IV ~ G N I I I 1 1 I I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 I I ~ ~ I I I I I 1 1 I I I I I I ~ 1 I I W ~ ~ I 1 ! I 1 I ~ I I I I I I ~ = I 1 ~ ~ i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i ~ a ~ ~ A 1 1 I I I 1 I 1 1 1 ~ F~'~ w r i ~ i i r ~ i t iv w i i ~ r ~ K o~ u, 'b ~t - r o O~ F-~ I 1 I I 1 I = I N 1--~ N V f9 � F-~ I I I I-+ N I--' I I I N ~ O~ fA O ~ W I-+ O � ni aWO r i i o+ r ~ i r oo v~ i i i ~ ~ r 0 r v~ i r i r w v i n, w v+ i ~ i ~ ~ o~ o ~ r - ~ a~o I i r I n~ o~ N o+ w o u~ i-+ ~ N o ~ ~ O F-r ~O N N W I I I~ I W I I I ~ W N ~ ~ O y O O N tn F-~ F-~ O W N ~ O~ V OD O~ 00 W O~ N ~ O N O O tJ~ V N N W ~ N ~ ~ ~ W ~ - . . . . . . . . . . . . . o\� O O O O V~ O O O ~n O O ~n V~ O O 106 P'OR OFFICIAL U3L ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 ~ FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY - Table 34 _ Political figures wounded in ambuscades Terrorist Br~P - Franco Galluppi PSDI ~15- 2-1975 Rome right Massimo De Carolis DC 15- 5-1975 Milan BR B. Leighton Guzman ex--pres. DC, Chile 6-10-1975 Rome unknown Giancarlo Nicolai DC deputy secretary 22- 6-1977 Pistoria PL Angelo Sibilla DC regional secretary,~ll- 7-1977 Geiioa BR Mario Perlini DC 11- 7-197: Rame BR Ma+�rizio Puddu DC regional deguty secretary 13- 7-1977 Tu~n BR Carlo Arienti DC communal counse~lor 24-10-1977 Milan BR Antonio Cocozzello DC communal 26-10-1977 Turin gR counsellor Publio Fiori DC 2-11-1977 Rome BR Carlo Castellano PCI 17-11-1977 Genoa BR Filippo Peschiera DC 18- 1-1978 Genoa BR - Giovanni Picco DC ex-mayor 24- 3-1978 Turin BR Girolamo Mechelli DC 26- 4-].978 Rome BR Tito Berardini DC sectional 12- 5-1978 Milan unknown secretary Giulio Tognini PSI federation 14- 9-1978 Catania unknown secretary Paolo Signorelli MSI 5- 3-1979 P.ome GCCT Giancarlo Dagnino DC administrative 24- 4-1979 ~nOB BR secretary Enrico Ghio DC 29- 5-1979 Genoa BR Fausto Cuocolo DC 31- 5-1979 Genoa~~. BR Cano Di Graziano DC 19-12-1979 Catania unknown ~ Roberto Garrone PCI 8- 2-1980 Turin unknown Nadir Tedeschi DC 1- 4-1980 Milan BR Iosa Antonio DC 1- 4-1980 Milan BR Eros Robbiani DC sectional 1- 4-1980 Milan BR secretary Domenico Gallucci DC sectional 17- 5-1980 Rome BR secretary � 107 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF7CIAL USE ONLY - Table 35 Factory directors Factory section chiefs FIAT .Turin 9 FIAT Cassino 1 Alfa Romeo Milan 3 FIAT 1~rin 6 Alfa Sud Naples 1 Vanossi Milan 1 Ansaldo Genoa-. 1 Sit-Siemens Milan 2 Singer Turin 1 Alfa Sud Naples 1 Olivetti Turin 1 Breda Milan 2 Philco-Bosch Bergamo 1 Breda Milan 1 OM Milan 1 MGM Turin 1 Manarini Bologn~ 1 Pirelli Milan 1 . Italgrafo Milan 1 Innocenti Leyland Milan 1 24 13 Factory officials Security guards - FIAT Cassino 1 FIAT Cassino 1 FIAT Turin 2 FIAT 1~rin 2 Alfa Romeo Milan 1 Magneti Marelli MI 1 Sit-Siemens Milan 1 Framtek Turin 1 ~ Italsider Genoa 1 Montedison Milan 1 ~ 5 108 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 _ F'OR OFF7CIAL USE ONLY Table 36 Of 49 plant directors and technicians 27 were ambushed by the BR, which injured 13 FIAT directors and technicians, three at Alfa Romeo, two at Sit-Siemens, and one each at Magneti Marelli, ~ Singer, MGM, Pirelli, Italsider, Breda, Ansaldo and Italgrafo 8 were ambushed by Prima linea, injuring four FYAT directors and one at Olivetti in an assault on tl~e Valletta Institute of Corporation Administration on the Via Ventimiglia, Turin, on 11 December 1979, a Praxi director, a section chief at Si.t-Siemens and aa official of Montedison, Milan. 4 by unknown persons 10 by as many terrorist groups, all of the left Table 37 Law enforcement personnel wounded in ambuscades 8 police agents 3 carabin~eri 1 police corporal 1 carabinieri marshal 1 F~lice brigadier 1 deputy questor 7 custodian agents Table 38 Cities in which law enforcement agents were wounded Rome 11 ~ Milan 1 Turin 4 ~ Verona I Naples 1 Catania 1 Cremona 2 Trapani 1 109 F'OR OFF[CIAL USL ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 39 Law enforcement personnel wounded in ambuscades Name Rank Date Place Terrorist group Cosimo Vernich custodian agent 7-10-1975 Milan NAP Antonio Tuzzolino police brigadier 9- 2-1976 Rome NAP Alfonso Noce deputy questor 11-12-1976 Rome NAP Salvatore Pistritto commander, 3- 4-1978 Catania unknown custodian agents Roberto Demartini DIGOS agent 17- 5-1978 1~rin PL Arturo Negro custodian agent 24-10-1978 Verona PAC Antonio Corsini carabiniere 28-10-1978 Rome BR Vincenzo Garofalo police agent 28-10-1978 Rome BR G. Antonio Pellegrini police agent 21-12-1978 Rome BR Giuseppe Rainone police agent 21-12-1978 Rome BR Raffaele Sardiello carabiniere 1- 2-1979 Cremona unknown Camillo Mancini carabiniere 1- 2-1979 Cremona unknown Raffaella Napolitano prison warden 5- 2-1979 Turin PL (woman) Ciro Renzaglia custodian agent 3- 3-1979 Rome NAP Gaetano D'Angiullo custodian agent 9- 3-1979 Turin PL Mario Maiorana carabinieri marshal 15- 3-1979 Trapani BR Giacomo Vegliante custodian agent ~6- 3-1979 Naples BR Vincenzo Annunziata police agent 3- 5-1979 Rome BR Giuseppe Rovito custodian agent 18- 9-1979 Turin unknown Michele Tedesco police corporal 31-10�-1979 Rome BR Giovanni Lorefice ~police agent 28- 5-1980 Rome NAR Antonio Manfreda police agent 28- 5-1980 Rome NAR 110 FOR OFFiCUG USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500490002-5 - FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Table 40 Terrarist groups which wounded 16 doctors 1 by the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) 2 by the Proletari ~:rmati per il comunismo (Armed Proletarians for Commanism) 1 by Prima linea (Front Line) 1 by Combattenti per il comunismo (Fighters for Communism) 1 by the Squadre proletarie di combattimento (Proletarian Combat Squads) 1 by the Reparti comunisti d'attacco (Communist Attack Units) 1 by the Unita combattenti comuniste (Unity of Communist ~ombatants) 1 by the Compagni organizzati in volante rossa (Comrades Organized in a Red Flying Squad) 1 by the Squadre armate proletarie di combattimento (Armed Proletarian Cambat Squads) 1 by the Reparti proletari per 1'esereito di liberazione comunista (Proletarian Units for the Army of Communiat Liberation) 1 by Azione Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Action) Table 41 Doctors wounded in ambuscades Name Profession Date wounded P1ace Terrorist group Luigi Solera FIAT doctor 17-12-1975 Turin~ ' BR Alberto Mammoli prison doctor 30- 3-1977 Pisa ~AR Giuseppe Ghetti Health Office, 19- 5-1977 Seveso(MI) '.CC Seveso Roberto Anzalone President, Associa- 24- 6-1977 Milan PL . tion of Medical Insurers of Milan Giorgio Coda psychiatrist 2-12-1977 Turin SAP Rodolfo Ghio gynecologist 10- 4-1978 Turin_ SAP Giorgio Rossanigo prison doctor 6- 5-1978 Novara PAC in Novara Diego Fava chief doctor, 8- 5-1978 Milan PAC INAM, Milan Giacomo Ferrero doctor 8- 6-1978 ~Turin SAP Mario Marchetti prison doctor, 13-11-1978 Milan RC San Vittore (Milan) Franco Lansardo prison doctor, 15- 1-1979 Varese SAP Varese Mauro Carmignoli doctor 23- 1-1979 Naples UCC Giuseppe Nicolino Nusco doctor 25- 1-1979 Rome COVL Orazio Romano prison doctor, 1- 2-1979 Turin SAPC New Prison Domenica Sartori Nigra doctor 18- 5-1979 Turin gAp Giulio De Fabritis gynecologist 30-11-1979 Rome RPELC 111 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY Table 42 Cities in which eight ~ournalists were ambushed City number of Terrorist organization 3ournalists in3 ured Mi1an 2 Brigate rosse Rome 2 Azione rivoluzionaria Turin 2 Fronte comunista combattente Genoa 1 Brigata XXVIII marzo Padua 1 Giustizia nazionale rivoluzionaria Table 43 Journalists wounded in ambuscades Name Title Date Place Terrorist wounded organiza- tion Vittorio Bruno deputy director, SECOLO XIX 1- 6-1977 Genoa. BR Indro Montanelli director, GIORNALE NUOVO 2- 6-1977 Milan BR Emilio Rossi director, "Telegiornale I" 3- 6-1977 Rome BR Antonio Garzotto editor, GAZZETTINO 7- 7-1977 Padua FCC Nino Ferrero editor, L'UNITA 18- 9-1977 Turin~ AR Roberto Giunto La Spada editor, "Radio 25-12-1977 Rome GNR citta futura"~ Franco Piccinelli editor, RAI 24- 4-1979 Turin BR Guido Passalacqua ~ournalist, LA REPUBBLICA 7- 5-1980 Milan B XXVIII MARZO 112 FOR OFF'[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 44 Terrorist organizations of the left and right which have injured the greateat awaber of persons in ambuscades Terroriat organization Number of persons Percentage ambush~d and wounded Brigate rosse 68. 39.55 Prima linea 23 13.35 Nuclei armati proletari 6 3.50 Squadre armate proletarie 6 3.50 Nuclei armati rivoluzionari 3 1.75 Reparti comunisti d'attacco 3 1.75 Proletari armati per il comunismo 3 1.75 Fronte comunista combattente 3 1.75 Azione rivoluzionaria 2 1.15 Unita combattenti comuniste 2 1.15 Gruppi proletari armati organizzati 2 1.15 Squadre proletarie di combattimento 2 1.15 Total 123 71.50 Table 45 Terrorist organizations of the left which com~itted ambuscades intended to in- ~ure their victims Organizations 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total Azione rivoluzionaria 2 2 Associazione combattenti comunisti 1 1 Brigate rosse 3 2 20 18 15 10 68 ~ Compagni organ. per il comunismo � � 1 " 1 Brigata XXVIII marzo 1 1 Combattenti per il comunismo 1 1 Formazioni comuniste armate 1 1 Fronte comunista combattente 1 1 1 3 Fronte combattente comunista 1 1 Gruppo operaio combat. per il com. 1 1 . Gruppi armati operai 1 � � 1 113 FOR OFF'[CUL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table 45 continued Organizations 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total Gruppi combat. per il / co~unismo 1 ~ Gruppi proletari armati organizzati 2 ~ Guerriglia comunista ~ 1 Gruppo comunista per il contropotere territoriale 1 ~ Lotta armata per il comunismo 1 1 Nucleo antifascista Roberto Scialobba 1 " 1 Nuclei armati proletari 1 4 1 6 Nuclei combattenti per il comunismo 1 1 Nuclei comunisti territoriali 1 1 Nucleo d'assalto per la liberazione territor~ale 1 1 Movimento comunista rivoluzionario -r ~ 1 Potere proletario armato 1 1 Prima linea 3 3 14 2 23 Proletari armati per il comunismo ~ � 3 � 3 Potere comunista 1 � 1 Reparti comunisti d'attacco 1 1 1 3 Reparti proletari per 1'esercito di liberazione comunista 1 1 Ronde proletarie 1 1 Ronde proletarie armate 1 1 Squadre armate proletarie 1 3 2 6 Squadre armate proletarie di combattimento 1 1 Squadre armate operaie 1 1 Squadre proletarie di 2 2 combattimento 114 F'OR OFF[CIAL U3L ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR~ OFFICIAL 'USE ONLY Table 45 continued Organizationa 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total Squadre pfoletarie di combattimento per 1'esercito di liberaz. comunista 1 1 Squadre rivoluz. di combattimento 1 1 2 Total attacks by the left 5 9 33 38 43 18 146 Percentage 2.90 5.?~ 1.9.2Q 22.10 25.00 10.45 84.90 Terrorist organizations of the right which committed ambuscades intended to in- ~ure their victims Organizations 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 198Q Total Giustizia nazionale rivoluzionaria 1 1 Nuclei. armati rivoluZionari 1 2 3 Neof:sscisti rivoluzionari 1 1 Total attacks by the right 1 1 1 2 5 Unidentified 1 3 2 4 5 4 2 21 Total attacks by the left 5 9 33 38 43 18 146 Grand total 1 8 11 38 44 48 22 172 Percentage 0.60 4.65 6.40 22.10 25.60 27.90 12.80 100 115 FOR OFFICUL USL ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Table 46 Victims killed in Southern Italy Southern provinces Number of dead Number of ambushed Total Naples 8 7 15 Reggio Calabria 12 12 Catania 2 3 5 Catanzar~ 3 " 3 Bari 2 " 2 F~~ggia 1 1 Caserta 1 1 Salerno 1 " 1 Enna 1 1 Trapani 1 1 Nuoro 2 2 Total 33 11 44 Percentage 9.10 . 6.40 Table 47 Victims killed in the provinces of Central Italy Provinces Number of dead Number in ambush Total Rome 67 39 106 Florence 6 1 ~ Frosinone ~ 2 9 3 1 4 Pisa Viterbo 2 2 Pistoia 2 1 3 Rieti 1 1 Latina 1 1 Total 89 44 133 Percentage 24.60 25.60 116 FOR OFFICUIL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 . FOR OFFICU?L USE ONLY Table 48 ~ Victims killed in the provinces of Northern Italy Province Dead Wounded in ambush Total Bologna 101 2 103 Milan 62 38 100 Turin 24 48 ~2 Genoa 14 ~ 14 28 Padua 4 7 11 Brescia 10 10 Venice 4 j 5 Gorizia 4 4 Varese 2 2 4 Vicenza 3 3 Alessandria 2 2 Cuneo 2 ~ 2 Bergamo 1 1 2 Cremona 2 2 Udine 1 1 Savona 1 1 Vercelli 1 1 Forli 1 1 Parma 1 1 Reggio Emilia 1 1 Novara 1 1 Como 1 1 Verona � ~ 1 Total 240 117 357 Percentage . 66.30 68.00 COPYRIGHT� Rizzoli IDITORE~ Milan 9653 CSO: 6000/0014 I ~ ~ 117 FOR Oi~F[CIAL USL ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500490002-5 FOR OFFIC[A~. USE ONLY ITALY JOURNAL OF T[iE RED BRIGADES Unknown GIORNALE DELLE BRIGATE ROSSE NO 4 in Italian Dec 81 pp 1-43 [Ztao and a half pages of introduction in script illegible.] [Text] Red Brigades Resolution of thF: Strategic Executive Conmittee December 1981 I. Philosophy of the Party's Establishmen~t II. Analysis of the Cycle and the General Cyclical Policy Program: 1--The [Political] Cycle 2--The Present [Political] Cqcle 3--The Italian Link in the Crisis of the Capitaliatic Meana of Production 4--Spontaneous Strugglea, Renolutionary Mass Movements and Guerrilla Warfare in Establishing the Red Power System S--The General Cyclical Political Program. III. For the Establ3ahment of a Mass Line in the Metropolitan Proletariat Philo- sophy of the Party's Establishment "Whether ob~ective truth is a part of human thought is not a theoretical, but a practical, queation. "It is in practical activity that man muat demonstrate the truth, that is reality and pawer, the earthly character of his thought. The discuesion about, or the nonreality of, a thought that is isolated fram practice is a purely echolaetic question." (1'4ara) "The truth of a fact or of a theory is not determined bq a subjective ~udgment, but from the ob~ective reaulta of social practice. 118 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . "The practical point of view is the primary and fundamental point of view of the dialectical~materialiatic theorq of knuwledge." (Mao) Index From Organization to Partq The Crisis-Restructurization War Movement The Imperialiat State of the Multinationals _ Zhe Worldwide Imperislist Counterrevolution as an Armed Counter- revolution for the Forced Maintenance of the Relationships of Production The Process and Conduct of the War of Transition for Communism The Metropolitan Proletariat The Guerrilla Party of th~ Metropolitan Proletariat The Guerrilla Party and the Defin3tion of Programs The Program of Transition to Communiam Crisis, War, Internationalism From ~rganization to Party After 12 years of armed struggle the relationship between revolution and counter- revolution in Italy is being redefined and tranaformed. A cycle in the history of the Communist Red Brigades Organization is definitinely closed. The leap to party status establlahes here and now the solid and concrete bases for the con- struction of the Fighting Communist Party [Partito Communista Combattente], estab lishes an historical, profound and irreversible break with the past of the Fighting Communist Organization. The only historical continuity possible for the Red Brigades is in the break with the past becaus~ the only strategic pro- - spect is that of being the Metropolitan Froletariat's Guerrill~ Party. "The process of political, planne3 establishment and factory organization of the Fighting Party is not at all linear, evolutionist, dependent upon time. On the contrary, it is a discontinuous, dialectical proceas that is the conscious pro- duct of the political-military vanguard. In the complex phenomena of claea . warfare thia affirme the validity of a strategic perepective and the communist program which it supporta, as well as the adequacy of the organizational inetru- ments necessary to achieve them." [No source given] The moment when the political~military vanguard of the Metropolitan Proletariat establishes the Fighting Communist Party in the etrategic perspective of the trans itinn to communiam is an hiatorical aynthesie, on the higher political level, of the long process of revolutionary conatruction. At the same time it is the means by which its organizational etatua became obsolete: the vanguard consciously brings about the end ~f a political-organizational cycle through rupture because ob~ective and sub~ective conditione are at hand for the leap to party status. 119 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The leap to party status is the point of arrival of a comp:lex process of stra- tegic and organizational redefinition and political strugg:le which began fol- lawing the 1978 Spring Campaign. With that campaign, the ~~rmed Propaganda Phase reached its highest point of maturity and as a consec~uence entered into a state of crisis with the political-organizational concept: that was at the foundation of the Red Brigade Organization, and more gener:illy, of all the Fighting Communist Organizatione. The crisis following [A:!do] Moro was charac- terized by the need for a leap in the leadership-organizat:Con of the masaes on the terrain of the armed struggle, and from that time, the~-e has developed with- in these limits the political battle within the Organization to build a strategic party structure. The first phase of these complex processes is that which, t~eginning with the discussions within the Revolutionary Mass Organ~zations, lE:ads to the definition of an articulated criticism of sub~ectivism in its variant forms. The second phase is that in which, beginning with criticism of subjectivism, t'ne debate began to become focused within the question of the ~~rograms, and its first achievement was the resolution of the DS '80 [expansion unl:nown]. The D'Urso Campaign, translates the political theses of the DS '80 ini:o practical action by the Metropolitan Proletariat on a precise level. It alfao defines and articu- lates the correct mass organization line and irrevocably f:Lxes the substance for action as a party at the crossroads of transition to deplo;~ment in a st�te of civil war. The third phase is that in which the proceas of acting as :i party is translated into the capacity to transfer the strat2gic concepts of thE~ D'Urso Campaign on the various class levels of the Metropolitan Proletariat. The Sprin~-Summer Campaign of 1981 constitutes the highest Fn3nt of party aci:ion because: (a) It affirms the specific ability of the Orsanization to lead the various proletarian strata and therefore the entire metropolitan p~-oletariat; (b) It brings to life the strategic substanc:e of the destruction/c.onstruction dialec- tic which is a distinguishing feature of the move toward wfir and establishes the real bases for a decisive step toward the construction of i:he system of Red Power; (c) Brings out and reinforces--through the politica~ battle within the organization--the revolutionary line of establishment of tt~e fighting party in opposition to the organizational-buresucratic line which--f;ince it does not appreciate the political problems that chara~terize the pre~sent state of af- fairs, is inadequate and--in the final analysis--antagonisi:ic to the historic - task of the leap to party status. The Spring-Summer Campaign of 1981 supports the political clefeat of this line in the Organization and, establishing the sub~ective premie:es for the leap to part;~ status, leads to the completion and concluaion of a cycle in the history of the Communist Red Brigades Fighting Organization. While the revolutionary line of party establiahment contimies, here and now, the Fighting Communist Party advances aad deepena the political battle in dif- ferent ways against the erroneous lines within the Revolutj_~inary Movements and rhe Metropolitan Proletariat to definitively defeat their theoretical and practical premises, and to reinforce and affirm, political unity on the highest levels concerning the strategic prospects for transition to communism. 120 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF1C[AL USE ONLY But the Fighting Co~anunist Party, in its historical form of Guerrilla-Pmrty of the Metropolitan Proletariat, also represents the historical continuity of the Red Brigades Communiat Organization, from which it reaffirms and develops the theoretical-practical points of reference and etrategic prin ciples that were the basis for it from the beginning: --The materialistic conception of history and the dialectical materialiem ela- borated by Marx and Engels in their work of synthesis of the historical experience of the ancient proletariat that developed from the later historical revolution- ary experience: The Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, the Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution; that were reaffirmed and redefined in the imperialist cities by the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism of the Red Brigades which f ind their point of maximum synthesis in the [illegible] and the i:ommunis t . --Democratic Centralism as the method the party uses to resolve internal contra- dictions. Democratic Centralism is at the same time a philosophy, a policy, and an organizational model. On the philosophical level it is a materialistic conception: proletarian dialectic, which is based on the Maoist theory of con- tradiction. On the political level the defense of the Metropolitan Proletariat's interests as a class is urgent. This defense is implemented through specific political lines, that is a complex of dialectical procesaea of transformation synthesized by the slogans "from the masses to the masses" and, "existence in contradiction." On the organizational plane it is a model that antagonistic- ally denies the principles of the capitalist organization of wark, of the large factory, of the multinationalists' imperialist state. It is a model that is created ir. order to give a voice to all members of the Metropolitan Proletariat. The only correct way to resolve the struggle between political lines which is the reflection within the party of the class struggle--a struggle that will exist so long as the opposing classe~ of Democratic Centralism and Bureaucratic Centralism exist--is the method based on the strategic principles of "unity- criticism-unity," and of "struggle-criticism-change." Only the constant and inflexible application of these principles can isolate and defeat the erroneous line and therefore lead to th~ recuperation, reunification and reorganization of the entire party on the correct line. [3 pages missing] 3. The Imperialist State of the Multinationals The state has always been tied to capital through organizational links: It is not only a product of capital, but it is also a producer of capital. Today this [i11_egible] is qualitatively redefined, changing the two interacting terms. By its establishment, the state is present in the heart of the relations of production and re-production. Its role becomes essential for the production and re-production of these relationshipe in the atructural crisis. It must naw ensure the perennial nature of the capitalist relationship and of the underlying relationship of exploitation. The atate appears [illegible] as a"private apparatus" of the dominant faction which is ~eparated from it and is detached 121 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY from "civil society." Even though it is "deduced" from capita' it maintains an attitude that is "external" to capital, since it is thro�zgh its action that there is a passage of the determination and redetermination of the capitalist relations of production and re-production, of respective social relations. By detaching itself from "civil society," it returns to it, permeating it and occupying all its pores; separated from the dominant fracti~n, it changes the latter's exclusive interests into the general intereat. Here the state affirms its absolute sovereignty over accumulation [of wealth] and over slass relation- ships. In the permanent crisis of accumulation of wealth in the phase of imperialist domination, the normal way of life becomes: Destruction of the forces of pro- duction, through the means of production, and re-production in a relationship of total war against the Metropolitan Proletariat. There is no aspect of the economic-social structure that is exempt from state intervention; there is no relationship and/or social relationship that is not permeated by its coercive action. Everywhere the intervention of the state destroys the productive force in order to maintain the power of its domination over capitalist relationships of production, transportation and trade. It is "state violence" that makes possible, and guaranteea the survival of, the accu- mulation of imperialist domination. The imperialist state and the corresponding social relationships which have been in a state of coma as against the emergence of the actual, infinitely richer and qualitatively superior relations, was an outgrowth of war. Now it has becorne the private apparatus of the dominant sector of t_he imperial- ist bourgeoisie and protects the intereats of multinational monopoliatic capital in all regions of economic-social development. It increasingly loses every his- torical legitimacy in setting itself up as the maximum artificer, defender and guarantor of the process of capitalistic self enhancement which today is ex- pressed only as strangulation and destruction of productive forces. The Imperialist State of the Multinationals exists today because of war. In the development of the class war, the state unitea around a single center of gravity and the tendency will be toward the tranaformation into armed bands, as already pointed out by Lenin in his analysis of the forms of state power in prerevolutionary situations. Except that today, the prerevolutionary situation extends over the long term, and is characteriatic of an entire historical phase: the long-term class war. Marx says, "Beyond a certain point, the development of productive forcea becomes an obstacle for capital, that is, the capitalist relationship becomes an obetacle for the development of productive forcea of labor." In the present historical period, that point has been reached; more preciaely, the preaent period is characterized by having reached thie point: Capitel sets itself up in relation- ship to the development of social wealth bq obstructing the development of productive forces. On reaching this historical-social atage, a profound change iii the capitalist economic-social formation takes place because capital must 122 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500490002-5 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY impose mechanisms that diminish production and re--production of added value, and instead etrangle the development of productine forces and social wealth. This development no longer comea about due to the perfecting of property rela- tionships, but by making them superfluous because it ia posed on].y ae the destruction of property relationships in all their possible and necessary forms. Capital, therefore, must prevent this process of being made superfluous and it can do so only by preserving ita "exclusive and general domination," since the social base which supported it is now in a state of crieis. It is precisely the preservation/imposition of "exclusive and general" domina- tion by capital that fixes the lines and substance of the transformatian of the capitalist economic-social atructure in the imperialist system of the multi- nationals, that is, a system in which international monopoliatic capital domi- natea and therefore dominates the fraction of the bourgeoisie that it repre- sents: the imperialist bourgeoisie. In this system all the social regions are simultaneously traversed by the same impulses, motivations, decisions and stra- tegic orders under the domination of the multinational imperialiam. In it all the various regions are violently brought together. Even though theq conaerve a relative independence, they are imperiously subjected to a eingle pressing demand: the forced maintenance of capitaliat relatione of production, transpor- tation and trade. In order to pursue this neceasary--and necesaitated--ob~ec- tive, there is within the Multinational Imperialist State an accelerated ten- dency toWard total integration among all the functions, structures and units of power. 4. The Global Imperialist Counterrevolution as an Armed Counterrevolution for the Forced Maintenance of Relationa of Production The more pressing the imperialist demand of forced m~intenance of capitaYist social relations, the more pressing becomes the process of centrali2ation, administration and integration of strategic decisions whose area of influence becomes increasingly amaller to the point where it is fully identified with the exe cut ive . The centralization of strategic decisions exclusively in the hands of the Execu- tive permits it an unlimited extenaion of power. Not only are they filled, in an integrated way, with cooperative forces that are together political, economic, military, ~uridical, etc., but theq tranemit, apply, put into practice with equal intensity and counterrevolutionary charge in all the regions of the changed eco- nomic and social structure. All this together, explains how the capitaliat economic-socialiat formation has become the state. It is a forced conversion into the state in the eense that the reasona for the forced preserva~ion of imperialist domination impregnate, and aupply the model for, all the social regions. Corresponding to this converaion into the etate is the administration of "civil society." It ia worthwhile here repeating that for Marx, the latter meant bour- , geois society. Therefore, it is understandablQ that in the relatione of powQr among the classes as well as in social relations that, going back to the economic 123 ~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ~?NLY base, these circulate in every region of the capitalist economic, social forma- tion. Making bourgeois society an executive force means that the :;trategic decisione ascribed to the Executive have a total and totalizing spher~~ of application. By making itself the Executive, the power of the Multinational Imperialist State 3s totalized, attempting to reproduce itself infinitely, mo:Lding and remolding all of society according to ita demands for a aurnival that cannot be ne:zied. The political phase "invades" the economic phase; the milit,3ry phase "invades" the political phase; the ~uridical phase "invadea" the ideo:Logical phase, etc., and altogether they invade the apecificity of each, atartin;3 the pr~~cesa anew. The counterrevolution arms itself, and arms all the single Eunction~. and orga- nizations of power of the Multinational Imperialist State. Changes within the capitalist economic-social formation ris~: as high as the unitF of state power, which are profoundly changed. The criaie oE the state in "matu~ce capitalism" corresponds to the crisis in relationships of production: The oae accentuates the other, bringing about and precipitating the general crisis of the imperialist system. In a state of crisis, and in need of redefinition, are the "classical" func- tions of the state: As much that of "ideological collective capitalism" as well as "real capitalism." On the one hand, what the state imposes "collectively" is the general "corporative" interests of. imperialist bourgeoisie. On the other hand--and in powerful contradiction with this--is the essential instrument and the privileged bearer of the partial "corporative" interest of a clearly defined fraction of imperialist bourgeoisie: the state bourgeoisie. On the level of the state for war, new and more damaging contradictions are introverted into the form of the state; new and more acute inter-imperialist contradictiona develop in a procesa of sedimentation. A larger and more fero- cious "struggle behind the scenes," of reciprocal throat-cutting, is opened: the struggle between conaortiums and within the same consortium. Definitively and irreveraibly in a state of crisis is the role of the atate "as mediator of social conflict" which tries to reconcile "irreconcilable class contradictions." In all its aspects, defending "corporative" intereste, it attacks "external realitq," consieting of the economic-social formation and the Metropolitan Proletariat, without reservation and mediation, going beyond all possibility, now made impossible, of reconciliation among the classes. All the aspects of the state now are actively integrated among themselves. The struc- tures of power and the organizations of the imperialist state together consti- tute the "integrated structure" of the armed global counterrevolution which is an emanation of the imperialist global counterrevolution, constituting its ~;pecific aspect in thia phase of the political cycle. ~he obstacle to the development of productive forcea cannot but be atrategically ,r.sde functional by this integrated organism. It is not for this that it con- stitutes an organizational structure with its own limited size. Rather, it translates the level of assemblage and interaction among the varioue units and 124 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500090002-5 F'OR OFF'1CFAL USE ONLY organizations of power in relation to the intervention of the imperialist state in individual economic areas and ~uncturea, in given social regions and against precise and various elass levels. This integrated structure elaborates and translates into practice--on the high- est decision level--the atrategy of division for the achievement of a single strategic ob~ective: the annihilation of the Metropolitan Proletariat. In this sens, it concentrates ita fire against the Metropolitan Proletariat, dividing it. In substance, it concentrates its warfare against the Metropolitan Proletariat, dividing it a..cording to various claes levels. With this, it divides the gene- ral front of war along the dif~~rentiated central fronts. Division is annihilation in action: annihilation in a state of becoming. With the progress of annihilation, the strategy of division always increasingly tends to becon~e directly a strategy of annihilation. The class enemiea' centers of power gravity always increasingly tend to re-form around a single center, con- sidering that the divided fronts of the war tend to be reduced to a single front. Within the real exiatence of this new and complex dialectic, property, qualita- tive forms, laws of movement and reciprocal relations of all the institutions and power organizations of the imperialist state change substantially because they become polea in the proceas of armed counterrevolutionary integration. Cycle follows cycle and in the course of"' the same cycle there is a change in the appearance of the dominant pole. All the poles contribute equally to the ela- boration of counterrevolutionary strategy; a single pole, or some poles, imple- ment--cycle after cycle and in variationa within the same cycle--that strategy decisively. These constitute the pole or the dominant poles in the cycle, of the integrated structure of the armed global counterrevolution. Before cooperating among themaelves, the various poles each bring together the totality of functions carried out within their apecific area of action, each one of which constitutea a homogeneous bloc. All the atructures of pawer and of the Imperialist State Organizations operating in the economic sphere are associated on a new basis and on a higher level of interaction, thus constituting the eco- nomic pole of the integrated structure of the armed global counterrevolution. In like fashion, there will be an asaociation and installation of the military pole, the juridical pole, etc. All the poles, which will be separate and inte- grated with each other, act in a different way on different levels of the inte- grated structure of the armed global counterrevolution. All the poles are integrated o:i all levels, yet are distinct from each other: One pole is always a part of a totality along with the others, and at the same time, is distinct from the others. It is by virtue of this unity/distinction that the imperialist state generalizes war, rooting it in ita totality in every capillary fold of the social fabric, not only to make it amorphous, but in order to bend and subor- dinate it through unlimited war to the needs of the forced maintenance of pro- ductive relationships. The despotic efficiency of added value becomes the mantle of war with whi~h the multinational imperialiet atate eurrounds, suffocates and squashes all of society. 125 FOR OFFICIAL. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5. The Process and Conduct of the ~ransitional War for CoII~unism (1) The Guerrilla Party thafi the Metropolitan Proletariat plane to build is not excluaively a Fight3ng Party. It is not merely the Politic:al Party because in this historical period the center of gravity of the class c:onflict is no longer based in the political terrain but in the social terrain. It is not an exclu- sively Fighting Party because revolutionary class war does not mean either ~ exclusively or predominantly military combat. The military~ is merely a result of the metropolitan war, in which the proletariat and the ~ ourgeoisie take a stand, oppose each other, irreducibly face each other as en.emies: in terms of absolute enmity. War is not a final and extraordinary act of class oppositian, but already from today it is permanently interiorized within the regions of economic-social fonaa- tion, throughout the entire spectrum of class re~ations, ir: the universe of social relationships. In this sense, war is described as permanent total war, a i�adical social revolu- tion, and in this period of history assumes the apecific fc~rm of Class Warfare for the Transition to Cos~anunism. The Class Warfare for the Transition to Communism, or, the dialectic between the imperialist bourgeoisie and the Metropolitan Proletariat, t~etween revolution and counterrevolution, determines and dominates, cycle after cycle, the possible and nece~sary historical forms of the organizations for the conduct of war, the determination of the Red Pawer System. It determines the form of combat in every region of the economic-social formation: In the political, the military, the economic, the ideological. In this sense it is now possible to overcome the classical assumption that con- "war aa an exte:.sio^ of pclitics by :~i~~ ^-nt means," l+Pcp~~ae there is a reversal of the position in the politics~war contradictions since at the present level of the Economic-Social Formation development politics also undergoes qualitative changes. Like all concepta, "politics" and "war" are socially detera~ined. Now it is politics that, changing into "a secondary aspect," operates in a aecond- ary relationship to the general laws imposed by war. But f~bove all, since the character of absolute antagonism has been extended to all ~ocial relationahips, the forms of action too undergo radical changes. Revolutianary politica becomes a simple dimeneion--the distributive dimenaion--of the war between clasaes which, in the metropolitan context, is extended, using all means, to all social relationships. With the historical deaturction of dominant relationships of production, of the corresponding system of power and of the consequent dirision of inen into opposing claseea, there is the preparation and conatruction of communist society, the abolition of classes and therefore the abolltion of war. The Maoist prin- ciple of "making war to prevent a war" finds further and broader confirmation. ~26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (2) "The laws of war are a problem that anyoae who directs a war must study? and resolve." [I~o source given] Revolution is a war to a"final aolution" insofar as it is posed as the his- torical defeat and deetruction of the claas enemy through the violent abolition of productive relationahips. Therefore, the system of revolutionarq war is defined as "a complete closed cir- - cuit," within which revolution operates with its theories and models and does not permit anq escape fram this circuit. The universal exiats in the apecific, or, univereal contradiction exists in epe- cific contradiction. "If this is not clear, it ia impossible to determine the specific essence that distinguishea one thing from the others, to discover the cause or the specific basis of the movement, of the development of things, make distinctions between things." [No source given]. (3) The aim of war is: to exercise political~military power in order to exer- cise social power. Therefore, it is social power that dominates the scenario of war. In revolutionary war, which lives and must live in the imperialist metropolie, the Class War for the Transition to Communiem appropriates all revolutionary knaw- ledge and transforms it into active social power. It is an activity of revolu- tionary power which destroys the enemq~s power, while it builda the Transition to Communism. After having acrutinized the horizens of clase atruggle for a long time, revolu- tionary politica as an activity conforming to the sim-action constantly tending toward revolution, finds itself with the conditions and possibilities of creat- ing new horizons. The real ob~ect of the revolutionary party ie now clasa war for the Transition to Communism. Regardless of how functional, politics no laager exists separate from war. Regardless of how functional, there no longer exists a war that is separate from politics. Now politics and war act, react, interact and cooperate within new forms of existence, dominated by war. The domination of war has nothing to share with militarq domination. Ia fact, the military is merely a specific form of politics, and that is the transitional form of a specific social relationship. The Class War of the metropolia includea the military as one of its aepecta, but cannot be reduced to it. This reduction ia tqpical of militarism. Weapone as well as the techniques of combat are inatrumenta of revolutionary action, instru- ments alongside other instrumente. But the basis for this action muet alwaye be clear, it ie the social content of the change that it seeke. The Guerrilla Party is rather the party of social revolution, of cultural revo- lution, of the Transition to Communiem. 127 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In the imperia7.iat metropolie~ the proletarian revolution is necessarily a social revolution: proletarian ir. the content of ac3entif3c pro~ections of new social relationahips that would break the bourgeoia monopoly of their preaent planning, as much aa in the forme of power of its becoming. In other words, it goes through a11 social relationshipa and it is not content with favoring one, let us say the economic or the political-military. Limita- tions of thia kind, which in any case survive se mortgages of the past on the present, must be energeticallq 17.quidated. The relationships of pawer between the classes caimot be overturned by moving only on the political terrain, on the 1eve1 of military confrontation and least of all on the economic level. The Metropolitan Proletariat must learn to move simultaneously and in different ways on all terrains, within all social rela- tionships. And it is only in order t~ deatroy the syatem of bourgeois political power, firs~ of all its atate, that the Metropolitan Proletariat must in. turn perform poli- tical acts. The political act par excellence, is in fact the overthrow of existing power and the dissolution of old social relationshipe. But such an act is not the soul nor the aim of prolerarian revolution: inatead it is its "inter- nal guise." We affirm that proleta.risn power is political only in its external form, while it is social in its cantent. It is political i.n that it descroys the state; social in that it collectively builds new social relationahipe and a new classless society. (4) There no longer exists an art of war, but the art of aocial war; there no longer exists a plan of war, but the social plan of war; there no longer exists a functional separation between "strategic calculation" and "practical calcula- tion," but both coexist united and distinct at each atage of the evolution of the Class War for Communism. The art of social war leads to aehievement of the Plan of Transition to Commu- nism, around which it revolves according to an iron discipline. In this aense, it is the focus of general direction of revolutionary war. It ie the art of the final defeat of the enemy and of the establishment of transition to communism. The social plan of war organizes within the cycle and within various phases of the cycle, the final defeat in historically poseible and ne:cessary cyclical forms. Furthermore, the social plan of war strategically and tacti.cally weds the final defeat of the enemy on the one hand; and on the other, it keds in poasible forms, that have been prevented by the real domination of capital, the progress of establishment of communist transition. To take the first step means, in a certain sense, to begin to take the last atep. (5) The social plan of war, aside from the conduct of the war, approximatea the absolute form of war. It is integrated along the linea of principal actiona which attack the principal pole of the dominant gravitation centera of the class enemy's power. 128 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF'[CIAL USE ONLY Starting with theae premiaee, it concentratea ita attack to the maximum in as many pr~ncipai actiona as there are dominant poles of the principal centers of gravity. Therefore, it is not Iimi~ed to attacking the heart of the state, but begine to deatroq its vital gangiia. (6) All this is still not enough. Within the social practice based on the disarticulation/destruction/construction dialectic, there is an interaction, a ~oining, of all the elementa that characterize the action of the Guerrilla- Party as tnultidimensional action. The Guerrilla-Party acts along the entire arc of social relationa. Even though it concentrates its fire on practice, in a cyclical process, on the principal pole of the centers of gravity of enemy power, it movea simultaneously and in a differentiated manner on a11 terraina, within all eocial relationships. Even though it has a very clear "main ob~ective," it does not neglect "second- ary ob~ectivea." They are necessarilq complementary to the "principal ob~ec- tive." Theq exist around and within it and in aubstance, they constitute it. It is within this dialectic that the duration and the rhythm of the campaign is established. It is a rhythm that is developed over a long period of time: the time necessary to pursue the principal objective upon which the campaign is founded. The atra- tegic principle ie alive within the foundation of the campaign: "Act as rapidlq as poasible," in the sense of knowing how to identify and attack one of the centers of gravity of the imperialiat pro~ect within the correct diearticulation/ destrucrion/conatruct~ion dialectic. Furthermore: Also alive within the develop- ment of the campaign is the strategic principle: "Act as rapidly as possible" in the sense of knowing how to profit by and deepen--through diverse ob~ectivea-- the contradiction in each of the apherea of social relations, foatering the existence of the correct disarticulation/destruction/construction dialectic each time at its highest point. In this sense the Campaign is like the thousand wavea that intersect, clash, strengthen each other when many stones are thrown into the water rather than the concentric waves of a single atone in the water. To act as rapidly as possible, is to fill quickly the diatance that separates the firat from the last step of war; it is, thus, to take it closer to its abso- lute form, to abaolute revolution, which today is historically possible since it is a revolution that attacks and tranaforms the entire arc of social relatione. Absolute because it def initively closea the book on an entire historical era. The strategic point of view is the long-term c1a88 war for communiem. An immediate prospect that muet immediately translate--in hietorically deter- mined forms--the strategic point of vie~ are the Campaigns of Rapid Decision, both at the moment of their establiehment as well as in the courae of their development. 129 . FOR OFF[CIAL ?~SE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY Concentration/acceleration means Pawer in Being of the metr~~politan proletariat. To exist as power means to make Red Power live, legitimize it, legalize it. To legalize and legitimize Red Power means to make anq form rf pawer "super- fluous," to extinguish it. The only form of historically ~�satified legality is revolutionary legality since it is posed as the abolition of legality. (7) In the imperialist metropolis, the conservation of one's own forces and the annihilation of those of the enemq does not go back to two distinct phasea of the war: firat the defense of strategy; later the countflroffenaive strategq. To preserve in order to annihilate and to annihilate in order to preserve charac- terizes from beginning to end the conduct of war in the imperialist metropolis. In an historical context in which, as Mao said, "The forcea of the reaction are powerful and the forces of the revolution grow gradually" guerrilla warfare is always in a condition of defensive strategq. It lives in a condition of strategic encirclement within the relationship of general power. The strategic counteroffensive meana producing, in a relationship of unfavorable general pawer, special fanorable relationehipa of power. It meana to break through the encirclement, to encircle those who encircle. And further- more: Revolutionary metropolitan war is characterized, on the one hand, by the "lack of a atable front line:" The instability of the lines induces a higher degree of mobility of fighting forces. In this sense, revolutionary war is a war of maneuver. On the other hand, it constantly acquires more favorable power relationships: that is, it acquires and takes a stand on increasingly stable power poaitions. In this sense, revolutionary war ia also a war of position. The war of position here is the equivalent of position of pawer. Maneuver makes the field of battle unlimited; the position confers on the battle- field a character of unlimited stability. In other words, the front lines tend toward stability and the operational directions are stabilized: All the factors of instability are progressively eliminated and brought under control. All this contrib+~tes to the opening of a new and more delicate phase: the civil war deploye.d for communiem. (7) ~As published. Should be "8"]. On theae bases, the connections that tie the forms of war to the lines of war become profound in the imperialist metrapo- lis. The center of war--the imperialist metropolis~-is not only a territory of state in war, but also [the territory of] of the Metropolitan Proletariat under arms. It is a fortress for both. But with one substantial difference: While the imperialist state at war wants to maintain the Metropolitan Proletariat, chained in the fortress in order to defend it, the Metropolitan Proletariat under arms wants to destroy the imperialist state and, therefore, blow up the fortress. 130 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500490002-5 FOR OFF'[CIAL USE ONLY The linea of war are for both internal-external, both moving and confronting each other in the same territory.-~ Interaal 11nes and external lines are length- ened and one penetratea the other. The operationa along internal lines and operationa along external lines take place at the same time and in the same space: A spatial-temporal simultaneity exists between them, qet there is a dialectical distinction. The Metropolitan Proletariat under arms ia within the fortress. It is invisible to the imperialist atate at war and visible to the masaes: One ie the result of the other. ~ Nonetheless, it is revealed to the eqes of the imperialiet state at war, exter- naliz~zg itself as pawer. It externalizes itself in order to attack and destroy the imperialist state at war. To destroq the fortreae means to emerge from the fortress: It meana the Tranaition tb Communism. Having reached this apex, the maximum level of inviaibility coincides with the maximum lenel of externalization and it ia immediately and permanently visible. The sqstem of Red Pvwer becomes viaible because it organizea the transition to communism through Clasa War. The future of the Class War--communism--already exists in the present of the C1ass War. The future of the state is that there will no longer be a state. The future of the Class War is that there will no longer be any war. (8) [9] In the.campaign of rapid decision, the rapid passage is: from invi- sibility to open disclosure [externalization]. The campaigns of rapid decision constitute the "open discloaure of the inviaibility" of Red Pawer. Bq exter- nalizing--that is imposing-~power, they assure victory in the atrategic field as well as in the succeasion of battlea. Through auch campaigna the Metropoli- tan Proletariat under arms ia on the attack in all circumstances and in changing circumstances. There is more. They enliven the ranks of the combatants in function of the en- largement of the theater of war, extending both the direct effects of war-- through the actual defeat of the enemy--and indirect effecta, through dissuasion. The campaigna of rapid decision proceed according to partial battles, revolving around the same baricenter. The unity of the battlea is the unity between prin- cipal actions and secondary actiona. Among principal actions and aecondary actions there is established a necessarq interconnection in perpetual movement, to the extent that during the course of the cycle and in the variation of the cycle, the principal pole of the centera of gravity of enemy claes power ia transformed into eecondary; and vice versa. In fact, the former attack the principal pole; the latter, the aecondary poles ae they become principal polea. The neceaeary two-pronged character of principal actione-secondary actione makes it posaible during the progrese of the War of Transition to Communism to deatroy the principal polea of claea enemy power ae it changee ite appearance: and in its appearance of today and tomorraw. 131 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In the progress toward long-term C1ass War for Communism tt~ere is an expansion of dialectic unity wi~hin the campaigns of rapid decis3on: The principle of open disc7,osure is-increasinglq affirmed on a broader scal~. From the cam- paigns of rapid decision articulated bq partial battles thFre is a passage to eampaigns articulated as large battles. Through the realixation of the princi- ple of open disclosure, therefore, the tenaions and the breadth of the intrinsic consequences of war increasinglq tend to mvoe toward extremes. The development of campaigns as large battlea marks the passage from civil war deployed for commun~sm. (9) [10] Engels says, "The army is the organization that beat represents the state of the future." Let us look at the quality of the imperialiet metropolis. The Red Army is established as the organization of an army on a scale that is broader than the dictatorship of the prc+letariat for commur~ism. It repreaents, better than anq otber orgaaization, class interest and the proletarian state dictatorship's sphere of action. Through the Red Arury the possibility/necessity of imposing%exercising power arises out of the potential of the army of revolutionary power, a multidimen- sional functionality of revolutionary pvwer. Thus, the Re~l Arnry is the organi- zation par excellence of the revolutionarq war. In this se~nse it is the organi- zation best suited to the final solution. Therefore, as Engels said, it is the organization that best represents the state of the future: the atate that abo- lishes itself follcxaing the destruction of the imperialiat state at war. As such, it is the means of edification of the dictatorahip of the proletariat for communism that cannot be eliminated because it eliminates the dictatorship of the proletariat. A system of Red Power which does not adopt this organizatic~n from the beginning, which does not constitute such specific unexcludable organi.sms in possible and necessary forms is not edifiable. The Red Army is also the unexcludable purpose for which, from the beginning, the edification of the system of revolutionary power must tend. The system of revolutionary power in formation, from the beginning to the end, refers back to the formation of the Red Army. In the relationship between revolutionary pcywer, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat in development, and its supreme organ, that ie, the Red Army, the revolutionary policy-war dialectic reaches ita culmination: The revolution- ary power creates its organization, the organization of pawer developa the revo- lutionary power to destroy anq kind of power. (10) [11] In the imperialist metropolis, the Red Army is the organization par excellence for the dissolution of bourgeois pawer as we11 as for the disaolution of any poasible form of power. 132 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In it the Metropolitaa Proletariat under arne is reorganized as a class: The Red Army is the supreme orgaaizatio~ o� the proletarian reorganization. In it exiats the recomposition of all s~cial practices. In it exists the social proletariaa individual who, by tra~sfo~ming a11 of society, tranaforms himself and, therefore, his organa of lc~vwledge/power. The . Red Army is the last remnant of the old society, but also the first organization that constructs th~ new. " Proletarian knowledge, connecting the social projects ia fihe program, is wedded directly to pawer; the exerc3se of power is the exercise of thousands of bits of knowledge in the transition to communism. The unitq of knowledge and pawer is the unity of Social Planning and Social Change. The Red Arm~y is the organization beet suited for such a task of planning/chaage, both in its quallty of organizational totality as we11 as in its real articulations. The Red Armq is the organ of social revolution. And it is the proletarian "No:" armed Erith thousaads of bita of knawledge and thousanda of sources of pawer, organized and recomposed ae the eocial totality that cannot be reduced to imperialiat domination. It is not an "arary," but armed knawledge. It is not the pawer of weapons, but the weapon that, through knowledge~ can, and through power knaws. Marx said, "The merelq political revolution leaves the supports of the house intact." As the supreme organ of aocial revolution,~the Red Armq destr-aqa the supports of the house because it adopts the "point of view of totality." The advance of the Red Armq on unlimited fronts of the class war for co~unism is the advancement from political emancipation to ~ocial emaacipation. 6. The Metropolitan Proletariat The metropolitan proletariat is the result of three interacting forces produced by the crisis: (a) The productian-restructurization which is the new site of the productine base that leads to the continuing disintegration of the working claee, that ia to say, to the reatriction of its produc~ive abilities and to the increase of mar- ginal and/or salaried activitq; (b) The high mobility/circulation of each proletariat among the various patterns that becomes a typifqing and generalized factor of the proletarian condition; (c) The crisis of the influence of bourgeois and reviaionist ideologq, aad par- ticularly of certain mqths such as the ability of capital to ensure gradual and secure progress, the work ethic, etc.; the affirmation of a communiat conscie~nce, which is tranagressive, aad decisively turned taward the future. 133 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It is the irreversible and general character of the crisis that establishes the irreversible and proletarian intereat~-of a11 fihe patterns ~~f the Marginal Pro- letariat, considered as a class - to overturn the present C,apitaliet Means of Production. This does not mean that within the Metropolltan Proletariat production does not ob~ectively maintain the central pos3tion and that therefor~~ the workers engaged in production are entitled to a political centrality and re�~olutionary direc- tion in the process of clasa recomposition. From this it f~llowa that the other proletarian personnel (sidelined, non-productive, etc.), si�nce they are frag- ments of the disintegration of the Working in the proceas of the crisis, do not at all appear as its "external" allies, but rather a.3 an internal atrati- fication of a single class: the Metropolitan Proletariat. Within this framework we believe it would be an error to resort to the revision- ist and Gramscian concept of "hegemony" which presupposes t~e separateness of the Working Class from other proletarians and the sub~ection of the latter to its interests. As Gramsci says, "The fact of hegemony undo~ubtedly presupposes th at the groups upon which hegemony is exercised will have their interests and positions taken into account, and that a certain equilibriixm of compromises wi11 be formed." But this is precisely a compromise, a"mediati~n" between substan- tially different interests. In short, the Working Class is something else: This is precisely what we now deny when we affirm that the :Ketropolitan Prole- tariat is "the unity of the numerous and dominating workers." When we affirm that it includes all the productive workers, manual laborers, the reserve indus- trial army, the proletarized classes and thoae who are beco~ming proletarized and who, for this reason, constitute the very largest ma~ority af our country'a population. In conclusion, the recomposition of the Metropolitan Proletariat within the pat- tern of the metropolitan mass worker cannot take place unleas various strata which compose it deny themselves or do away with their specific characteristics; in like fashion, the working class of this recomposition [illegible] denying itself as a labor force that gives value to capital. The inability to understand the concept of Metropolitan Proletariat leads the comrades to replace it with the category of "people," as a sub~ect of the revo~_.~- tionary process in the cities. This category on the one hand recalls the Th~rd World theory of "popular fronts," and on the other, the well-known Maoist notion. In both cases the word "people" means a mix of different classes whose political unity is determined by the worker hegemony exercised on them through the party of the Working Class. Naw, as we have seen, in the general historical crisie of the Ca~italist Meane of Production, the Metropolitan Proletariat doea not at all envieion itself as a ~ongolomeration of classea, nor is the party the vanguard only of the Working Clase. The process of recomposition of the Metropolitan Proletariat is in fact 3 political re-fusion of various strata into a single class. 134 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL. USE ONLY On the contrary, the concept of "people" alludes to a"mediation" of separate interests of the working class with the specific onea of other clasaes. This is why we believe it is wrong to apeak of a"long-term people's civil war." It is not superfluous to recall that in the imperialist metropolis characterized by the real Somination of capital over labor, and over a11 social relations, the form and content of the proletar3an revolution coincide and become concrete in the social practice of Transition to Co~nunism. On the contrary, in the Bolshevik and Chinese renolutions, precisely because of the non-coincideace of form and content, it was possible to create a111ances of different classes into "popular fronts" under the hegemony of the working claes; that is, it was pos- sible that democratic-bourgeois substance would be perpetuated in proletarian forms. An example of this - the slogan, "The land to the farmers" launched during the 1917 Revolution by the Bolshevik Party which evidently had a democratic bourgeois - character, meant the demand for private property and land ownership. The non-coincidence between form and content of the revolution in Rusaia and in China is explained by the fact that theae revolutionary processea developed in societies characterized by the "formal domination" of capital over labor and over social relationships; that is, characterized by the fact that capital was imposed on productive relatianships, but not yet extended to all social rela- tionships. It is evident in the imperialist metropolis, and therefore also in our country, that to once again propoae, even only tactically, the plans elaborated bq the communist parties in other phases of capitalist development is not only a theore- tical error but leada to the proposal of a revolutionary strategy that is entirely inadequate to the new leveis of the penetration of capital in all social relationships. In fact, it is a matter of leading a revolutionary process that would place the Transition to Communism on the agenda immediately. 7. The Guerrilla Party of the Metropolitan Proletariat (1) In this cycle, the leap to party status is an ob~ective necessity impoaed by the revolution-counterrevolution reiationship. It ie through the leap to party status that the revolutionary solution of total war ia absorbed by the classes of society. This leap is not a willful act of the Fighting Communist Organizatione, but rather the unexcludable breadth of the relationahip that arose historically between revolution and counterrevolution in this cycle. It translates, in the relationahip among the classes, the ob~ective atabilization of that permanent relationahip of absolute enmity that has developed among the classes. In turn, the abaolute enmity is the reflection of the crisis in the Capitalist Method of Production in the phase of the real domination of capital, ~ a phase in which all relations of capitalist production, in order to preserve themselves, produce and reproduce total war againat the Metropolitan Proletariat on all levels of the economic-social formation and in all interstices of social relationships. 135 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500490002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY It is only the party that, in the changed cycle can activate and enlarge the edification of the system of red power. Mexely acting as a party, which was characteristic of the Fighting Co~unist Organizations is n~~ longer sufficient. The epochal leap to communist transition, to the establiahm~ant and the free multilateral development of the communist social individual, demanda the leap to party status: the one is unequivocally and rigorously tied to the other. Without the leap to party status, there can be no establish;nent of a Red Power System, no dictatorship of the proletariat, no trans3t3on t~~ communism. (2) The leap to party status makes it poasible to organize and unfold the aims of the Transition to Communism. Not only that: it activates and develops all its levers and its organizational units. Furthermore: It ~models all its deci- sions. Finally: It recomposes the Metropolitan Proletariat as a social sub~ect of the revolutionary grocess, as a universal class which emancipates all of _ humanity by emancipating itself. To do away with the leap to party status now means liquidating the class war for the transition to communism, liquidating the historical and strRtegic tasks im- posed by eventsat this cycle. To delay the leap to party status to an uncertain and vague future means to fail in its own function as a vanguard and to practice a mass line that hae been his- torically made obsolete, which knows about and speaks of armed propaganda while instead it is a matter of beginning to organize the war of emancipation from capitalist labor. To act as a party in this cycle means to establish the leag to parr_y status, mean~ to become and to be a party. (3) Having identified and indicated the ob~ective need for� the leap to party status does not exhaust the work of establishing the foundations of the party, nor does it throw light on the form that the party historically must take. The form of the revolutionary party is always historically determined and, there- fore, changes with changing historical periods and the corresponding forms and qualities assumed by the revolutionary process. In the final analysis, the form of the party is always dete:rmined by the relation- ship that is established between the relationshi~s of prodt~ction and forces of production since it is this specific relationship which, by regulating produc- tion and re-production of social wealth, regulates and models the progress, the forms and the objectives of revolution. The form of the party must always be measured and developeci in relation to that trend and form and those ob~ectives. It does not predetermine anything, but it is determined. In turn, by complying with theae objective 1awa, interpreting them scient3fically, it models revolutionary strategy, converting it into a program and social pro~ect, into the revolutionary organization of the masaes. 136 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (4) The present historica~. period. in which the dominant relationahips of pro- duction constitute the maximum obstacle to the development of productive forces, is follawed by and must be followed by a perioQ of social revolution. With this the revolutionary process is fundamentallq qualified with a social character. By virtue of the structural antagonism between the relationships of dominant production and productive forces, the revolutionarq proceas leaps over the sphere of the political, immediately taking on the aspects of a social revolu- _ tion. After all, Marx already had written that, "Political intelligence is political intelligence because it thinka within the limits of politics... The more acute it i:;, the livelier it is, the less is it capable of understanding aocial evilse.. The more unilateral, that is to say, therefore, the more perfect political in- telligence is, the more it believes in the omnipotence of will and the more it is blind to the natural and sp3ritual limits of will and the more incapable it is of discovering the source of social evils." And again, "So long as the pro- letarians think in a political form, they see the source of all evil in the will and all the remedies in power and the defeat of a certain form of the state. Political will hides the roota of social poverty, falsifies the understanding of their real aims; their political intelligence deceives their social inetinct." Again re�erring to Marx, it is to be observed that "the common political nature is the nature of the states." The aim [illegible] is the conquest of the state. The maintenance of state power that has been conquered transforms the dominant class inLO a feroci~ue oppreaeor: The atate is always--and it cannot fail to be--the instrument of oppression of one class over the other. (5) The nature of the proletarian revolution in the metropolis is not the con- quest of political power but the resolute defeat of all forms of power and, with this, of all forms of the state. The proletarian social revolution knows that "human life ia more universal than political life," and therefore it can and must diseolve not only the putrified imperialist [illegible2 state but also the march [illegible] capitalist. Communism needs the political act of seizing power, "since it needs destruction and dissolution." However, "where its organizational activity hae begun, where it manifests its aim and its spirit, that is where it establishes ite political image." The proletarian revolution uses politics as an "image" to affirm the social sub- stance of the epochal leap to the real community. When this substance is affirmed, the image itself is put aside and thrown into the dustbin of history. The proletarian social revolution is the death of politics which, as an '.'[ille- gible) totality" at one time dominated the progresa of revolution. That pro- gress however qualified the bourgeois revolution since the bourgeoisie and onlq the bourgeoisie adopted the point of view of the state. The proletarian social revolution breaks deciaively with thie tradition because it adopts the point of view of concrete totality, that is to say, eociety and the eocial sub~ect of universal emancipation of productive forces, beginning with the fundamental force: man. 137 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500490002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (6) "Revolution is not only necessary because the dominati~ig class cannot be defeated in any other way, but also because the clase that defeats it can shake off the old dirt and become capab 1e of establishing a society on new founda- tions only through a revolution." (German ideology). Communism meane establiahing society on a new basis. This leap is the paesage "from the reign of need to the reign of liberty." This leap is the passage frrnn prehistory to a history that is truly and entirely human. The only way to do this is to break the capitalist relationships of production, the corresponding social relationships, the capitalist division of labor, etc. Using the Paris Cammtme as an example, Engels said that the state of dictator- ship of the proletariat was not a state in the real sense of the term but a community, since by abolishing classes and extinguishing itself it reunifies individuals into a real counnunity that is no longer separated from, and above it, as was the state. In the Tranaition to Communism, co~unity means the reunification of all social practices of destruction/construction/reunification of knowledge through power. This reunification runs through a11 the decisions of the Red Syatem of Pc~wer, its agents and its organizations... � To build the Transition to the Communist System also means developing communist social individuals and the practice of knaaledge/power, of destruction/conetruc- tion. Here, on this threshold, the revolutionary procese is carried to its highest expression. After all, Marx himself says, "The antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a war of class against class, a war that, carried to its highest expression, is a total revolution." (7) In the [illegible] of politics [illegible) the complexity [illegible] of the revolutionary process. Therefore, the party cannot be exclusively and predomi- nantly political in form. The "pawer of arms" and their language do not evoke absolute power and the know- ledge/power which reunifies social [illegible] "abaolute power." Therefore, the party cannot adopt an exclusively combatant form. "In the imperialist metropolis the birth of guerrilla warfare is immediately cha- racterized as a political and military dialectical unity. It is n.o longer the "two who become one," but "the one that is divided into two." No longer a party on the one hand and an arnry on the other, but a Guerrilla Party. ...The Guerrilla Party that the Metropolitan Proletariat intends to build is not a simple political party, just as it is not exclusively a fighting party. It is not a simple political party, as for example t~ie Bolshevik Party and the 138 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Communist Chinese Party, because at that time in history the centera of gravity of class conflict was no longer based on the political terrain, but on the social terrain. It is not an excluaively fighting party because the revolu- tionary C1ass War does not--nor does it prevalentlq or exclusivelq-~mean mili- tary combat." These are the bases and the principle of inapiration of the form of the Party in the metrog.,lis. The party assumes the social form of guerrilla warfare, which is social eince it united within itself all social practicea. (8) The Guerrilla Party ie the supreme agent of the invisibility and evocation of the knowledge/pawer of the Metropolitan Proletariat: inviaibility to the enemy and open disclosure against the enemy coexist in it at the highest level of synthesis. This means that the more invisible the party ia and the more it diacloses itself in regard to the Imperialist Global Cotmterrevolution, the more it ia visible and it becomes an inner part of the Metropolitan Proletariat: that is, the more it communicates with the Metropolitan Proletariat. And it co~unicates relation- ships of po~wer, aocial relationships, exercise of knawledge, exercise of power. In this the Guerrilla Part. ie the party of eocial co~munication. That is, it permits aociety to organize, to recompose and to transform the apon- taneity of the metropolitan party into the unity of the many which pulses and is enriched within the Red Power System. In turn this reacts in terme of the party itself and transforms it. The real dialectic intention of knawledge/power _ which is unchaine~t by the dictatorship of the proletariat in construction thus transforms those who transform. Not only that: The more the invisibility/disclosure permits the affirmation of the social substance of Red Pawer, the more the party form becomes visible, and thus, the more visible becomes the form of Transition to Communism. The more visible this transition, the more visible is the transitory character of the Party's need. Just as the dictatorahip of the proletariat is the final form of posaib].e and necessary power, as the Red Army is the final form of the army, so the Guerrilla Party is the final form of the posaible and neceseary party. Once the classes are abolished, the state, the arnry and the party disappear. Social contradictiona will no longer be antagoniatic. Through their solution social men, as Marx has said, affirm their aware and definitive domination over nature and over their own nature. The capacity for en~oyment will mean en~oyment at the highest natural, human and social level. The capacity for en~oyment and to en~oy means the unilateral deve- lopment of human social enjoyments. A human social community for the first time 139 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY will [illegible] the "festival" in the relatioaship of social man-nature. Nature itself wi11 for the first time be completely himman and social. (9) The Guerrilla Party inserts into this epochal frame~aork the disarticulation/ destruction of the imperialist state on the one hand, and on the other, conqueat/ organization of the Metropolitan Party on the terrain of the war of Transition for Communism. There can be no other dialectic of deatruction/conatruction outside this frame- work. It is these epochal sims that render the destruction/conetruction dialectic ob~ ec- tively possible and sub~ectively organizable. In turn, this dialectic pro~ects and constructs, so to speak, the spochal aima in their historically determined form within the concrete present. The Guerrilla Party is at the center of the incessant work of translation of epochal aims into social practices. And vice versa. In this sense, the Guerrilla Party is the "abstract" bearer of the Pr~gram of Transition to Communism as we11 as the cyclical tranalation of it into a General Cyclical Political Program. Its path is from the abstract to the specific. Also belonging to it is the path that, starting from practical application, and con- verting the program into practical application, goea from the epecific to the general. To go from the specific to the general meane atarting from the Iytetropolitan Pro~ letariat to arrive at party atatus. To move from the abstract to the specific means starting with the party and returning to the Metropolitan Proletariat. In this complex and rich dialectic, then, it ie not only true that the Program of Transition to Comanunism, the General G~clical Political Programs, are present, but a further deciaive element is added: the epecific Immediate Program of power, since it refera concretely to the immediatE needs of the Metropolitan Proletariat. The term definition of programs refere to thia complex dialectic and to all its interacting elements. The definition of programs exista in this interaction in continuoue movement. It is to this interaction in the concrete development of the claes war and in its apecific interconnections that there is the insinuation, the movement and transformation of the dynamic among all the expreaeiona of the Red Power Syetem: party, revolutionary mass organizationa, revolutionary masa movemente. Inextricably, the definition of programa refere to the construction of the mass line since the programs can exist only in the concreteneas of the revolutionary theory/practice that organizes and transforms the "spontaneity of the masaea." 140 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The dimension of the programa~--from the general to the cyclical up to ~the imme- diate, is marked by unity. Nonetheless, within it there exists dietinctions. The relationship that links the varioua programs is therefore dielectical, a unity/separateness. This means it is not possible to first define a program and later another and a11 the others. Each program considered singly necessarily refers to all the othera: by iteelf it is incomplete. It is in the definition of programe that each program begina to find its character of mature complete- ness. It begina to find, we said, becauae theq altogether ecal~n and can find only their most mature identitq in the revolutionary struggle." [No open-quote]. It csz be concluded that the definition of programs and their development to maturity [illegible~ identity is�inecribed on the highest level of unity in the theory/practice relationship. The Guerrilla Party and the Definition of Programs [Illegible] The definition of the programs qualifies the essence of the party aad distin- ~ guishes it from other expreasions of the Red Power Sqetem. In this sense, there can be no party without a definition of programs. The definition of programs, furthermore, qualifies and finalizes the relation- ship of the party with the masses. In this sense, there is no Party and defini- tion of programs without a relationship with the masses. This is a relationship of reciprocal model construction starting from the massea [illegible], the party is "modeled" and is finalized as an aware and planned decision of the Red Power System; the masses affected by the aware and planned decisions of the party are "modeled" in the sense that they are reunified, transformed and orga- nized on the revolutionary terrain. This means that the party--the Party-is continually united with the whole--the masses--even while remaining continually separate. The party and the masses together constitute an open totality that is "opened" increasingly, in the sense that each one, moving into the other, changes itself, and therefore the other, and therefore, the total quality of the revolutionary process. This is why a characteristic trait of the party's existence is the definition of programs. This {.a why definition of programe cannot be separate from the development of the mase line, that is, placed outeide (and worse, before) the Partq-Mass relation- ship . The Party-Mass relationshipa cannot escape--as no relationship and determination can ever escape--from the repercuseiona of the hietorically changeable character of all social relationships. The Party~iass relationship, in other words, is itself an historically deteranined relationehip. This means that today, on the one hand, speaking of Party-Maea one muet more pre- cisely speak of the Guerrilla Party-Metropolitan Proletariat relationship; on the 141 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY other hand, that such a re].ationahip is not generically detezinined and finalized by the proapect of organizing the maesea on the revo~utioaa�ry terrain, but more pertinentlq, it is determined and finalized bq the proapect of orgaaiaiag the Me~ropalitan Proletariat on the terrain of the War of Z`ransition to Cammunism. Only the Guerrilla Party can reunifq the Metropolitan Proletariat. Only in the historical era of the Metropolitan Proletariat ~~ould the need for the Guerrilla Party be produced. Without the eatablishment of the Guerrilla Party it is not �poseible to unify the Metropolitan Proletariat. To remain outside of this establishment, not to promote it, not to direct it, not to build it in a leap that redefines the revolutionary aoeial practices, meane to imprecisely refer to the Mztropolitan Proletariat, but more genericallq to thE masses; it means to refer without pertinence to the War of Transitian for Commu- nism but still generically to renolution. In both these cases, not only is there a failure to ~derstand the ob~ective needs and the possible progreas taward the epochal leap to co~aunism, but the very salient characteristics of the eqcle of tranaition are loat. In any case it could not have been otherwise. Definition of the program/conatruction of the mass line meana construction of social unitq (political, military, ideological, etc.) of the Metropolitan Yrole- tariat. The epochal leap to comm~mism depends upon the aocial unitq of the Metropolitan Proletariat. Thie unity, after a11, can exist only if it is pene- trated, aupplied aud molded bq the apochal sociai eubstance of the leap to communiam. The construction of the mass line, therefore, the construction of social unity of the metropolitan party develop like three indivisible links that constitute an indestructible chain: Program of Transition to Communism, General G~?clical Poli- tical Program, Immediate Political Program. Each of these three links is related to the other and each flaws into the other: altogether and separately theq find their identity and their basis for estab- lishment and development in social revolutionary practice. The Guerrilla Party of the Metropolitan Proletariat ie diatinguiehed precisely because of its capacitq to go through each of these links and to recompose them inceasantly in a chain of profoundly united relationehipe. No apace of the "social ~eing"-~within which reside the multiplicity of unitiea that compose the Metropolitan Proletariat and the multidimeneionality of the practicea of knowledge/power that flor from them--ie removed or can be removed from the Guerrilla Party's field of action. The sphere within which the Guerrilla Party moves is the social universe of the ~ ~ unification of all the social practices and all the levels that constitute the Metropolitan Proletariat. In this univeree thers are no space-time diviaiona. 142 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The "before" and the "after," the logic of the two, three... aequence "go to hell," or better, eociai practiee aeade them to hell. Preciselq because of this order of reasons, the Program of Transition to Co~mmu- nism, the Generai Cqclical Political Program, aad the Iimoediate Political Pro- gram are not aeparate from each other. To break the unitq/separateness that links them in space and time is equivalent to bresking the chain and therefore brealcing the totalitq of social revolutionary practice that constitutes the Traa- s itio~a to Communism. But if the Program of Transition to Communism, the General Cqclical Political Program, and the Immediate Political Program always constitute an indivisible unity, a scale of priorities eaists within this historically determined totalitq. The meaning of prioritq is two-pronged. Regarding the foundation and possible developmenta of the strategic tendencies of the Class War for Communism, the Program of Transition to Caum~uniem is central since it is the maximum abatracti~n of the general. Regarding the material implementation of revolutionary social practice, the Imne- diate Political Programs are the nerve centers aince theq are the maximum con- crete expression of the particular. To politically and socially reconnect the Program of Transition to Communism with the I~ediate Political Program within the cycle, is the ~?cific task of the General Cyclical Political Program since it is the cqclic. ~vnthesis between the general abstraction and the concrete expression of the parti~~ilar. Immediate Political Programs are not only reconnected and find their completed identity within the General Cyclical Political Program, but in this theq cyclic- ally bring alive the Transition to Communism in all atrata, and therefore, in the recomposed Metropolitan Proletariat. Even though having been determined by the forms brought about by the transition, only they can supplq these forms and confer upon them their concrete character. The concrete expreseion of the General Cyclical Political Program is here, spe- cifically, the concrete expression of the Program of Transmission to Communism in the cycle. In this way, each Immediate Political Program--even though it is directed taward and built upon a given stratum of classes--refers to all the others: the organi- zation of one stratum of clasees on the terrain of the War of Transition to Communiam for communism takes place in strict unity with a11 the others. This is a 1aw of social revolution in the metropolis. No organization of a stratum of clasees exists outside of the political and aocial recomposition of the Metro- politan Proletariat. Thus, if it is true that without a General Cyclical Political Program there can be no Immediate Political Program, the reverae also is true. Again, the rela- tionship and the dialectic do not tolerate reductionism and diagramatic presen- tation of any kind outside of Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism. 143 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY If the Program of Traasition to Communism refers to the epochal leap of commu- nism, the General Cyclical Political Program refers to the need for analysis of the cycle and haw to bring alive the Transition to Communism within it and with- ing historically determined forms. These requirements not only must contribute to solving the problem of identify- ing the "central target" to be attacked, but also to the ic.entification of "central terrains of struggle" to be used and the social objectives to be achieved. The General Cyclical Political Program is not merely a plan of attack on the heart of the state, but also a program for the development of new rela- tionships of knowledge/power among the classes, with the sim of abolishing and - achieving the social transformation of capitalist society. In short, the General G~ clical Political Program contains-~within the apecific farms of the cqcle and on zhe line of its possible and necessarq progress--an indivisible dialectic between destruction and construction. To favor destruction means to transform the General Cyclica.l Political Program into a military offensive against the apparatus of the imperialist state. ? To favor construction means to transform the General Political Program into vulgar and crude propaganda for a"counterpower" that coexists alongside, and not against, the bourgeoia power. In their turn the Immediate Political Programs refer to the need to start with the immediate needs of the Metropolitan Proletariat. Here some things muat be made clear. Only a purely formal reference to Leniniam can result in the deacrtption of the establishment of Iffinediate Political Programs for the Metropolitan Proletariat as "economism." Today, in fact, "economism" cannot be the "childhood sickness of metropolitanism" as we shall see. Actually, Lenin does not pose the matter in these terms. A:e does not tire of warning of the existence of "spontaneity and spontaneity," urging the party to very carefully consider "the forward progreas made by the movement." Spon- taneity for him, finally, constitutes the "embryonic form of coneciousness." Therefore, to speak with scorn of [Page missing] The immediate political programe do not alone take shape from this dialectic, but the Organizations of Revolutionary Masses are born and develop from it as ia the _ missing determinant of the Red Pdwer Syetem, since Revolutionary Mase Movements and the P~arty whose genesis ie mutually 3nfluenced, are determinanta already in existence. The Revolutionary Mass Organizations constitute the missing link in the Red Pawer System since fihey are not born, nor are they reproduced, spontaneously. Theq are the precise result of a precise dialectic: that between the Party and the Revolutionary Mass Movement. -144�~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY Even when there wi11 be thousande of Revolutionary Maea Organizatione, there- fore, theq continue to take on the character of the miesing link in the revolu- tionarq power aystem. 8. The Program of Traneition to Comm4unism Without a Program of Transition to Com~unism that would explain the social ob- ~ectivea of war, it ie not possible to identify all the proletarian components that are ob~ectively involved in it. This program on the other hand, does not graw out of nothing, but 10 years of proletarian struggle, of practical and radical criticism in the factories and in the capitaliat social formatian, have in verq general terms produced an outline of its essential subatance that ~oe maq summarize as follows: ---Reduction of working hours: Everqone muet work, but work less; massive freeing of time for social action and development of sociai conditions for evolved use of that time; --A new distribution of manual labor and intellectual labor, of studq and work, in each individual and within the span of a lifetime; --Abolition of prinate property, and the restoration of wealth to society; --Overthrow of the exerciae of power and of the planning of collective aims on all levels of social 1ife; --Retraining in production, in the man-aature relationship, on the basis of nalues of use that are collect3vely defined and hiatorically poasible; --A shift in our social development according to the principles of an effective proletarian internationalism. The condition of this program is to do away with capitalist relationships of pro- duction, of production based on the value of trade. Utopia does not enter into it. Here it ie a matter of a program that, as Marx would say, "Does not leave the pillars of the house standing" since its founda- tions have already fully matured. It is a matter of a program constantlq related to the struggles of the more conecious proletarian sub~ecte who violently break with the domineering and conservative tendencies of capitaliet development and clash in anta~onistic ways with the atate. Hawever, it is a matter of a program that seeks its moet mature identity in revo- lutionary struggle. The growth of Red Pawer coincides with this aearch and it ie up to the Party to make itself its promoter. 9. Crisis, War and Proletarian Internationalism (1) The ~aneral 1aw: The crisis of imperialism generates war. 145 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500094442-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY "Soviet reviaioniam and Yankee 3mperialiem which eac3st under the same mantle, have committed so manq crimee that the revolutionarq centers tt?roughout the . world will not permit them to remain uapuaished. "Peoples of all nations ariae. A new historical period of struggle against Yankee imperialism, against Soviet-social imperialism, hae alreadq begun. "If war causes revolution, as we11 as if revolution prevents war, the daye of Yankee imperialism and Soniet revisionism are now numbered. Proletariana of all countries unite." [No source given]. 2. The Four Contradictions flave become Three The foun fundamental contradictions of our time, as theq were explained bq Mao in the 9th and lOth Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party--that is before Teng Chiao Ping developed his bourgeois theory of "Three Worlda"--can be aummarized as follows: --The contradiction between the world proletariat and the world bourgeoisie is the principal one. It goea through all the [illegible] social formations dami- nated by the Capitalist Means of Production, iucluding that of "state monopolq capitalism" (USSR, China, etc.); --The contradiction between the socialist and imperialist nationa, conaidering as "socialist" thos e nations in which the proletarian dictatorehip dominates, and including among the imperialiat nations also those ~ith sts.te capitaliem; --The contradi~tion between oppressed peoples and nations on the one hand, and imperialism on the other; --The contradictions within the imperialist system among states, financial groups, imperialist multinationals. In the past 10 years much water has passed under the bridg~. The cultural revolu- tion, even though temporarily, was defeated and the bourgeais line of Teng won out. It is always difficult to find nations in which the dictatcrship of the proletariat actually dominates. Therefore it seems to us that in the preeent phase the aecand great contradiction in order of importance should be put into last place. Despite this, the contradiction between the world proletariat and the world bour- geoisie has become more acute and more widespread; and as a result of this, the other two referred to are becoming more explosive. This seema to us to be the [illegible] that characterizes the 1980's. Despite those who maintain that the tendency taward war prevaile over the tendency toward revolution, we maintain th~ opposite: Revolution is the foremost tendency in the era of dying imperialiam. 146 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY When we speak of imperialism we refer as much to the movement of private manopo- listic capital ae to that of natione run by state capitalism. "We want to be very exp3.icit concerning this point. Imperialism and social imperialism are two specific variables in the capitalist means of production in thia phase: private capitalism and state capitalism. Theq form aa imperialist system in which there is unity as well as contradiction: Unitq in the Capitaliat Means of Production; contradiction between its forme of geographical and his- torically determined exiatence. "Modern revisionism is the ideological, political, and m8terial expression of a sector of world imperialism; social imperialism, an organic component (and also in contradiction) of the clasa dictatorship of imperialist bourgeoisie." [No source given]. The general law of crisis runs through the entire imperialist sqstem. The main contradiction in this syatem is that between the inultinational monopolis- tic system headed by the United States, and the atate monopolistic sqatem headed by the USSR. 3. Unlike what happened in World War I and World War II, the present one has a triple character: --It is a class war in each sector of imperialism; --It is a war between peoplea and nations oppressed by imperialiam; --It is a war between sectors of imperialism and within each one of them. This is because the export of capital and the "countertendency" of the crisis of overproduction react violently as much within arese that export capital se in areas in which it i_s establish ing ita domination. (a) In the areas that export capital (real domination) the clase war tends to assume the form of a total social war for the traneition to comnunism. (b) In the areas penetrated by internationalized capital, the war tends to assume multiple forms that are defined by the degree of development of productive forces and of social relations within which capitsl has taken root and hae begun [illegible2 to impose itaelf as a relationship. Wars of national liberation) [As published] . (c) Conflicts multiply between states, financial groupa and multinational com- panies within each imperialist sectar. The intertwining of these three characteristics explains the particular form of present war which is a world process, that is simultaneous and interacting, of guerrilla warfare and revolutionary atruggle in the cities, wars of national liberation, n~ultiplication of hotbeda of direct military conflict between the imperialist and the social imperialist sectors. 147. FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY The "tendency toward war" ia not, therefore, an incubation of latent tendencies that are getting ready to explode at an "x momeat" sometime in the future. 4. (Illegible2 of our discussion interest [as published] now is to emphasize the fact that the imperialist sector in which our social formation is placed is also characterized by an unequal development of capital. The political form of this unequal developmeat is that of a system of imperialist states interrelated (on the economic, political and military level) according to a complex hierarchy at the summit of which is the United Statea, or, the moet pawerful capitalist multinational. It must be said, hawever, that there is a contradiction witalin the imperf alist system, but the united intereat of the imperialist bourgeoisie to defend the en- tire arc of exploitation of multinational monopolistic capital dominates in any case. It therefore has established for thia purpose an integrated world Folitical-~mili- tary system devised to intervene as much within each single imperialist state in a counterrevolutionary function as to attack each potential "external eneury." NATO is the heart of this integrated political~military sqstem in Europe and the Mediterranean. 5. The imperialist nations arm themselves for war. NATO is an organization that defends the interests of multinational monopolistic capital and above all the strongest ones: the American multinationals. NATO is not a"defenaive" institution: I� it defends anything, it ia onlq the interests of imperialiat capital. NATO is the nerve center of the imperialist counterrevolution in Europe and the Mediterranean. NATO means domeatic and foreign war. Domestic war: --Promotes the integration of the apparatuses and atandardi.zation of antiguerrilla theory ; --Promotes counterguerrilla warfare through books, mass media, films, etc., for example the libel by [Claire] Sterling ("The Network of Terror") is repeatedly cited by the American Secretary of State Haig and the newspaper woman has been invited to participate in the deliverations of the U.S. Senate Subcom- mission on Terroriam and Security; --It prepares a mass psychology to support the aggreasive policiee of imperialism. 148 FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Foreign war: --Integration of parts oF the national armed forces into aggressive expedition- ary forces; --Installation of misaile bases with nuclear warheads. It is taken for granted that every decision on their "use" must be made solely bq the Americans aince the European governments have no vote in this regard. 6. The deepening of the crisis is the origin of the need for a tighter transla- tional integration of counterrevolutionary and warmongering apparatuses of im- perialist bourg~eoiaie. In this process, which naturally is disturbed by profound contradictions, the apparatuaes of the single atatea undergo 3mportant changes. 6.1. The ideological cement of all of this is the philosophy of the American "New Right" that "thinks" for Reagan a~d is supported by four pillars. --Visceral anti-Communism in the McCarthyite tradition; --The neo-liberalism and the neo~monetarism of Milton Friedman in economics, that redimensiona atate control of the movement of money. --Within the states: cuts in social programs and incresee of military expendi- tures, and strengthening of war industries. On the world scale: See the annual assembly of the International Monetary Fund of October and the Cancun Summit. --The "moral ma~ority," or, the "restoration" after the 1968 [illegible] and the social struggles of the past 10 years. (Law-Order-Family). The new military doctrine syntheaizes the slogan: Amerika Uber Alles: ~America Over A11]. 6.2. This process has developed in specific forms also in our country and was dragged onto the political level by the PSI [Italian Socialist Party], by the Amerikaner Craxi and by the DC [Christian Democratic Party]. . It assumes the following forms: --A dizzying increase in the military dub get (more than double in the paet 2 years) ; --Increase of war industries; --A warmongering policy of government (aee the deciaion to send troope to [ille- gib le--the Siani?] and to inatall misailee with nuclear warheads at Comieo and elsewhere against the Arab and North African peoples); --Integration of the defense ministry and interior ministry within the NATO pro- ~ects. Italy is increasingly becoming the center of imperialist policy in the Mediterranean arc; 149 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY --Corporativization of military personnel; --Rebuilding armed forces within the framework of the "remodernization" of NATO. 7. The intensity of conflict betweea the two poles of the riain contradic*_ion of the imperialist system grows in relation to the fact that Europe is increasinglq in the center of this conflict. That this is so is demonstrated by recent statements by ReaF;an and Haig on tne possibility of a limited nuclear war against Europe. The infamous "Directive 59" approved by Reagan provides for the possibility of a limited war against Europe and the USSR in American interest:s. Haig: "There are things worse than war." Haig: "Among the extraordinary r�~ans contemplated under thE~ NATO Doctrine there is that of the use of an atomic weapon for demotetration pur.poses to make the other side understand the limit of tolerance in the eonvent:Cona1 sector is being overstepped. For Haig, therefore, there are "things worse than" some tene of millions of dead: some tens of millions of unemployed proletarians. The metropolitan proletariat at Rome, London, Brussels, Amsterdam, Bonn, Scandinavia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, has demonstrated its acute awarene:ss of the problem by immediately mobilizing and staging tiie most powerful masa pcili*ical demonatra- tions of the past 10 years. Un11ke demonstrations againat ~he American war of aggression in Vietnam at the end of the 1960's, todaq the m~ss movements identify imperialism as a threatening and aggressine force directly c~riented against the European proletariat. Not overlooked is the inextricable connection between more than 10 million unem- ployed without hope, and destined to i:~crease, who wander tlzrough Europe, and preparations for "an ~tamic solution" of their problem. Thus, if yesterday, aside f rom some rare exceptions like the RAF [probably Red Arnry Faction] such demonstrations were limited to condemning the imperialist aggression of a distant people, today the struggle is begir.uing to prevent the interimperialist war from attacking and deatroqing Europe itaelf, and the idea- force that is beginning to make headway in the awareneas of the masses that only the proletarian revolution can prevent this war. Within these movements, it f_s possible to identify different poaition~ that are the reflection as much of the breadth and heterogeneity of classes of social forces that participate, as of the ideological influence of revisionist propaganda and even of the psychological warfare conduct~d by NATO. It is important to see clearly into the ideological clasa content of the principal positions since the ideological class struggle is a fundamental terrain in the relationship between the party and the mase movement. 150 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY Criticizing the slogane influenced by the bourgeoisie and revisionism is a con- dition for affirming the correct ones that the Metropolitan Proletariat must use as the basis for its efforte. Neo-revisionism. This construct has profound roota even in our own countrq. The proponents of this thesis affirm, more or less explicitly, that the strategic rear guard of revolutionary atruggles developing throughout the world (and there- fore also in Europe) is the so-calied "socialist cam~p," the reason why the stra- tegy of these struggles cannot be measured by anqthing but what carries the USSR and its allies forward on the world level. A shameful, timid variant, is that wh~ch maintains that in any case the principal enemy is American imperialism and that therefore there is nothing wrong in depend- ing upon the USSR to combat it. Neither the former nar the latter understand very we11 that the mythical "social- ist camp in reality is socialist in words only and imperialist in deeds because the dominant means of production, for many years naw, in the USSR as in the nations tied to it, is state capitalism. Pacifist revisionism. Acceptance of NATO and affirmation of ita "defenaive" character (in 1977 Berlinguer described NATO as a defensive alliance; in 1981 the PCI Central Committee, in October, repeated thia concept). Proposal of negotiated progressive diearmament. This thesis is counterrevolution- ary because it accepts for the proletariat a position within the warmongering designs of imperialism and sows the illusion that peace is possible without the destruction of capitalist means of production within its imperialist phase, and that is, of the one and only generator of war. This position ideologically disarms the proletarians and is actively a part of imperialisms' plans. 8. In this context, in order to carry out a vanguard position in the leadership of Transition to Communism the Party [must] affirm three fundamental theses: . --"A great peace can be achieved only after imperiaZism in all its forms is anni- hilated." Mao. --In order to annihilate imperialiem it is necessary to mobilize the proletariat to develop the revolution and transform the interimperialist war into a clasa war. --True internationalism Lenin esys, conaiets of developing the revolutionary struggle in one's own country. In our country, it is the imperialism of American, European, national and multi- national monopolistic capitalism that must be sent to hell together with the imperiallst state which defends ita interests and the aggressive military organi- zations that it has generated. Therefore, it is not a matter of affirming that in the contradiction between the two sectors of imperialism, the one headed by the Yankees is the principal, one 151 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and that headed by the USSR is the "secondary" one, and theTefore, implicitly, if not explicitiy, leaving open the door to fihe neorevision:tst thesis that it is possible to seek the backing of the latter in order to cumbat the former. On the contrarq, the attack against the imperialist atate and the transnational political~military structurea that are part of the imperial:Lst sector in which our revolutionary militancy develops is detertnined exclusively by our position and does not involve an assessment of different dangers for the world prole- tariat posed by the two poles of the imperialist syste~m. This slogan acquires a new meaning in the present conditions of the political- military interaction of atates. In fact, revolutionary action is not limited here to making "insecure" [illegible] "rear guard" of the iinperialist bourgeoisie, but proposes a direct and syatematic disarticulation of the plans and organs of imperialist aggressian. 9. In the crisis of imperialiam every guerrilla who does n~~t act on hearing the order "annihilate imperialism" is inevitably reformiat. The order "annihilate imperialism" is central to the program of Transition to Communism. In fact it is not possible to definitively revolutionize social relations of pro- duction without a definitive defeat of the imperialist syst~~m. Hawever, precisely because of the unequal development of ca~pitalism and the chain of imperialist states, it is possib le to break the weakest link and to es- tablish a process of liberation from capitaliat labor in a local area. Precisely because of thie we speak of "removing the Italian link from the imper- ialiat chain" and establishing the process of transition to communism as an independent and militant path against all imperialism in unity with all militant proletarians and all oppressed nationa. 10. It is neceseary to deal with the problem of unity with all guerrillas who . fight for communism and more in general with those who, eve~n though they do not have a proletarian content, fight against the imperialiat s;ystem. 6034 CSO: 6000/0017 152 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500490002-5 SPAIN _ ETA COMMUIvIQUES TO THE BASQUE PEOPLE Unknown ZUZEN in Spanish April 1981 pp I, II, 1-12 [Text] Actions Against Iberduero S.A. June 1977: Explosion at the nuclear powerplant under construction, Lemoniz 11 June 1977: Blowing up of poles along a stretch of the Madrid power supply line June 1977: Explosion at the electric powerplant at Berango 22 December 1977: Confrontation with the Civil Guard at the Lemoniz Nuclear Powerplant, during which activist Jo~e David Alvarez Pena was wounded; he later died. 19 March 1977: Blowing up of part of the nuclear powerplant, Lemoniz 9 April 1977: Blocving up of four Iberduero power line towers, Gatika 14 June 1979: Bombing of the turbines at the nuclear powerplant, Lemoniz 14 June 1977: Burriing of an Iberduero S.A. truck, Eibar 12 November 1979: Blowing up of essential Iberduero technical components for the Lemoniz Nuclear Powerplant, Santander 3 February 1980: Blowing up of 800 storage batteries deatined for Lemoniz, Gasteiz (SAFT-Iberica) 1 June 1980: Burning of the Iberduero offices, Durango 11 Jul~ 1980: Blowing up of the "Electra" (affiliate of Iberduero) substation, Oyon 7 August 19u0: Burning of the Iberduero S.A. offices, Eibar 29 Au~ust 1980: Burning of Iberduero S.A, offices, Tolosa , 28 Au~ust 1980: Burning of Iberduero S.A. offices, Gernika 153 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 II Septenber 1980: Blowing up of the Iberduero S.A. company store, Bilbzo 12 September 1980: Burning of Iberduero offices, Irun 29 September 1980: Burning of three Iberduero S.A. jeeps, Getxo 1 October 1980: Burning of an Iberduero S.A. tranaformer, Donostia 7 October 1980: Blowing up of an Iberduero S.A. transformer, Santurce 19 November 1980: Blowing up of an Iberduero S.A. substation, Oiartzun 13 Dece~ber 1980: Blowing up of an Iberduero S.A. substation, Lasarte 19 December 1980: Bombing of a Fuerzas Electrica~ de Navarra office, Iruina 22 December 198C: Burning of an Iberduero S.A. substation, Elgoibar 1 January 1981: Blowing up of two Iberduero S.A, substations, Renteria 1 January 1981: Blowing up of the Iberduero S.A. substation at Irun 1 January 1981: Blowing up of the Iberduero S.A. subatation at Oiartzun 5 January 1981: Blowing up of the Iberduero S.A. (Urreta) aubstation at Galdakano 5 January 1981: Blowing up of two Iberduero S.A. substations (Atxukarro and Artunduraga), Basauri 12 January 1981: Blowing up of an Iberduero S.A. substation, Bermeo 19 January 1981: Blowing up of Iberduero S.A. headquarters, Donostia 20 January 1981: Blowing up of an Iberduero S.A, transformer, Usurbil 22 January 1981: Blowing up of an Iberduero S.A. transformer, Urretxua 24 January 1981: Blowing up of the switching center along the Bilbao- Behobia highway at Arizeta, Zarauz 25 January 1981: Blowing up of a traneformer center in the procese of being outfitted, Tolosa 29 January 1981: Bombing of an Iberduero S.A. subatation (activist Rikardo Barros Ferreiro killed), Tudela 29 January 1981: Capture of chief Lemoniz engineer Joae Maria Ryan, Lemoniz 154 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500490002-5 30 January 1981: Blowing up of the Iberduero (Audele) substation, Oiartzun 31 January 1981: Blowing up of the Iberduero S.A. substation, Villabona 31 January 1981: Blowing up of the Iberduero S.A. substation, Mendabia 5 February 1981: Blowing up a power transmission tower, Itxaso 7 February 1981: Execution of Jose Maria Ryan, chief engineer at the Lemoniz Nuclear Powerplant, Bilbao 8 February 1981: Blowing up of an Iberduero S.A. substation, Tolosa 17 February 1981: Blowing up of an Iberduero S.A. transformer, Urnieta 28 February 1981: Blowing up of an Iberduero S.A.substation, Leioa 28 February 1981: Blowing up of Vitoriana de Electricidad, an affiliate of Iberduero S.A., Altube Fa rewe 11: ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty], the Basque Revolutionary Socialist Organization of National Liberation, claims Mario Lavarez Pena as one of its members; this activist was killed accidentally on 17 March when a bomb that he was handling exploded. Once again ETA must mourn the death of an activist, one who fell weapona in hand to secure an independent, reunified and socialist Basque Country with its own language and culture. The loss of Comrade Mario Alvarez was due to an accident, when a bomb that he was putting together went off. On other occasions, torture and confrontations with the enemy have caused dozens of Basque strugglers to be mowed down by those who hold political and military power in Spain and oppress and exploit our working Basque people. Many have given everything, even their own lives, for the Basque Country. This is not the time for weeping or sadness. The struggle for Basque National Liberation demands the efforts of all those of us who sincerely and honestly have an awareness of the p~ople and feel that the only way to democracy and self-government is through force. Unfortunately, however, this path must claim victims, such as Mario, his brother David and other Basque soldiers wrested from the people. ETA joins Mario Alvarez's family and the Basque working people in their sorrow over [his major loss and rendera our comrade the beat tribute that we can Z?ive him, which is to continue our courae, bearing witness to our generosity, until we achieve the objectives for which he gave his life. Farewell Mario 155 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 ETA Communique to the Basque People ETA, the Basque Revolutionary Socialist Organization of National Liberation, rlaims responsibility for the execution of Jose Luis Raimundo Moya, the head of the General Police Corps in the Santiago district, on 5 March in Bilbao. ETA has thus put an end to a life that for 30 years was devoted to repressing, coercing and torturing activists and sympathizers of the Basque National Liberation Movement. Eloquent testimony of Police Chief Raimundo's involvement in political and social efforts can be given by the hundreds of detainees who fell into his hands just because they were regarded as patriotic Basques and because they were struggling for just grievances. They were inaulted, accused and mistreated by the police chief and his aides to obtain information from them or at least to frighten the people in their district. They wanted to portray the torture-caused death of our comrade Joxe Arregi as an isolated, accidental incident. But we know that that is not the case. We know that torture and mistreatment are widespread practices at all police stations and Civil Guard barracks and are part of the system of securing declarations or intimidating the Basque resistance. Therefore, we do not buy the Carrillo-style arguments calling for the firing and sanctioning of those who are proven torturers, and we do not buy them simply because they are false. In the first place, it is impossible to prove something to which there are no witnesses, and as far as we know at this point, what happens in a dungeon remains exclusively between the d~etainee and police officials. So except in cases like that of Joxe Arregi, whose dead body was proof of the ho~:rors that he suffered, recourse to the courts will be useless because ttie officials will refuse to admit anything. Secoadly, talk of firings suggests that any possible candidates for this sanction are a few individuals who have violated the legal code of the police structure itself. In fact, the exact opposite is the case; in other words, it is the very police and executive structure of the system that forces its officials to act in this manner to achieve the proposed end. Thus, ETA will continue to attack all of the State structures that make repression and torture possible in the southern Basque Country and we will basically try to eliminate the police commands and professional torturers who are best known for their odious work. At the same time, we must not forget that this struggle is, above all, one of national liberation and that the underlying sim of our attacks on Spain's repressive corps is their withdrawal from the southern Basque Country, the political grievance set forth in the KAS [Patriotic Socialist Coordination] Tactical Alternative. Separately, ETA also claims responsibility for the blowing up of the Iberduero S.A. transformer center in the Donostia diatrict of Ibaeta on 7 March and the blowing up of two Iberduero S.A. power transmisaion towers carrying energy to France, on 10 March in Aretxabaleta. Both 156 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500090002-5 of these actions were part of our campaign against Iberd�iero under the rallying cry of "Lemoniz Apurtu." $asque Country, 11 March 1981 Gora Euskadi Askatuta Gora Euskadi Sozialista ETA Communique to the Basque People ETA, the Basque Revolutionary Organization of National Liberation, claims responsibility for the 14 March bombings in Getxo and Donostia, respectively, of an apartment building being built for the Civil Guard, of an Iberduero power transformer at Ibaeta and of the Rugby Bar, where drugs are sold and consumed. We also claim responsibility for the bomb that was placed on 12 March in the offices that Mr Arza, the president of the Foral Delegation of Navarre, maintains in Estella. This was done to counter the bossist, anti-Basque policy that the rightwing in Navarre has been pursuing through the Foral Delegation againsr the national and social aspirations of the people of Navarre and the southe~n Basque Country as a whole. Although at first glance it might seem that because of the diversity of our targets our armed actions are not consistent as to their political objectives, the fact is that there is a common thread of political inter- vention running through this aeries of moves. Harassing the Spanish occupation forces in the southern Basque Country; intimidating the bourgeoisie responsible for the construction of the Lemoniz Nuclear Powerplant, which is a threat to the people, and uncovering the network through which the world of drugs has invaded our people are areas of armed intervention that are part of the basic struggle for democracy and the national sovereignty of the Basque working people. ETA is openly opposing those who would illicitly and in Machiavellian fashion impose on the Basque people a model of society that entails such obvious human and political risks as the Lemoniz Nuclear Powerplant or tne spread of drug use in our neighborhoods and towns, and we are doing so as part of the struggle to achieve a democratic break that will bring sweeping changes in our social and national relations with those who have so far denied us our minimum sovereign rights. The Lemoniz Nuclear Powerplant and the so-called "Drug Maffia" are not explicitly set forth as targets in the KAS Tactical Alternative, but they are present implicitly because they represent two clear-cut attacks on the principles and freedoms that are part of the political democracy and self-government proposed in the alternative. We feel that it is absurd to talk about amnesty for prisoners and exiles before having achieved a political syatem that will guarantee their personal security and, more importantly, because these kinds of extreme situations can surely recur. We cannot brag about home rule and democracy 157 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 when da~ly events, such as the buildinb of the Lemoniz plant, show us that instead of moving towards the loosening of bonds, the Basque people are increasingly shackled and dependent on ties that are alien to their own process of home rule development. The EBB [Basque Executive Committee] of the PNV [Basque N~tionalist Party] has charged that our campaign against Lemoniz has worsened unemploy- ment and put thousands of workers who are dependent today on the nuclear powerplant on the street. The leaders of the PNV are groping for arguments every day to refute our reasons for struggling for the people's grievances, and their demagogic, naive efforts have failed. The workers at Lemoniz have been on the verge of unemployment for some time now, and not because of us but becausc ~~ie''e`ocr~'truction work is almost finished. Like so many~other capitalisti'monsters, Lemoniz offered many direct and indirect jobs during its construction, but.the result of all this highly specialized and sophisticated construction work does not provide for any continuing job posts, except for a few technicians and intermediate executive personnel. Therefore, the problem of unemployment and a shortage of jobs cannot be analyzed childishly with arguments that do not make . sense; it can be tackled only on an in-depth basis. This anguishing problem will be resolved only through an economic reconversion prog;::m on a structural basis and within the framework of social and political relations based on a full-fledged statute-governed system and civic normalization. Blaming ETA now for the crises that capitalism has gotten our workers into is a~ absurd as contending that the Spanish State has demonstrated ~ its desire for democracy and for our sutonomy because we still exist. The time has now come for each person to assume his responsibility to the people, without pointing the finger at others. To do otherwise only shows weakness in a bid to justify the lack of desire to struggle for the interests that our people are demanding. To close this communique, ETA feels that it must counter some regrettable. statements by Eurocommunist leader Xabier Markiegi in the wake oi the attack on the Bilbao police station, in which he hinted at alleged differences within ETA, which he described as internal strife, regarding a cease-fire. In such instances of cheap raving and crude lies we usually go by the old ~aying that "the best way to show contempt for something is to ignore it," but in this case we will make an exception. It is to be er.pected that as a counterrevolutionary Mr Markiegui would try to discredit ETA in every possible way, including false rumors about alleged internal dissent. Up to now, when such rumors appeared in the press, we always noted that they came from an official new agency, which in fact was merely pursuing the tactics of confusion employed by S~anish intelli- gance services against ETA. From here on in, Mr Markiegi's precedent is going to make us stop and think, especially when we notice an odd 158 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500090002-5 similarity between this fellow's way of inventing things about ETA and the methods regularly employed by Spanish secret services in the same field of lies and manipulation. We would tell Mr Markiegi these two things: one, that if you play with fire, you cou~d get burned; and two, that you might be imagining the mote in another's eye and not seeing the beam in your own. In case there are any doubts, ETA would like to inform the Basque working people that with regard to both strategy, the tactical alternative and ~t~ort-term political and military policy, there is complete internal unity and identification among the entire activist membership and among all leadership organs. Our path is clear, as is the immediate and future objective for which we are struggling. There will be a cease-fire to the armed struggle only under the conditions that ETA submitted to the Spanish Government almost 4 years ago. Basque Country, 16 March 1981 Gora Euskadi Askatuta Gora Euskadi Sozialista ETA Communique to the Basque People ETA, the Basque Revolutionary Socialist Organization of National Liberation, claims responsibility for blowing up a truck owned by the firm Explosivos Forestales of RENFE [Spanish National Railroads] on 17 March in Iruina. The purpose of this action was to unmask and speak out against the way that the Spanish State, through RENFE, has usurped the communal forests of Quinto Real. Many years ago RENFE obtained from the Spanish State and central government institutions the lease to develop and use the lumber from the Quinto Real forests in railway ties and posts. It is currently not being used for this purpose because the ties and posts are be:~ng made of cement and concrete. Nevertheless, RENFE continues to cut down trees in Quinto Real and sellthem fq'r other purposes, earning sizable profits that the region does not share in at all. But the swindle that RENFE and the Spanish State are pulling on the people of Quinto Real is just a tiny part of the serious problem in this regard. Areas ~uch as Urbasa and Andia, Aralar, Bsrdenas reales, Aezkoa, el Monte de la Cuestion and (~uinto Real are ail rich livestock and forest zones that the oppressive institutionR are plundering from the communal patrimony of the people of N2varre. ETA took action some time ago, during the grassroots rallies for the grievances of the villages of Aezkoa in connection with their foreats, 159 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 and we have just taken action again in the case of Quinto Real. Our objective is to support with every means at our disposal the just demands of the people of Navarre, based on these two matters of principle: 1. An immediate halt to the irrational exploitation of these communal forests, with the felling of theirtrees and the steady impoverishment of their natural riches by the Spanish State and companies like RENFE; 2. The start of a suitable process leading to the return of this co~unal patrimony to its legitimate owners, in other words, the people of Navarre, who should be the sole beneficiaries of its development. In the event that these grievances of the people are not satisfied, ETA cautions that it will continue to militarily harass those directly or indirectly responsirle for the current situation to whatever extent necessary. Gora Euskadi Askatuta Gora Euskadi Sozialista Basque Country, 19 March 1981 ETA ETA Communique to the Basque People ETA, the Basque Revolutionary Socialist Organization of National Liberation, claims responsibility for the executions of Artillery Corps Lt Cols Ramon Romeo Rotaeche and Jose Lu;.s Prieto Garcia on 19 and 21 March in Bilbao and Iruina, respectively. ETA has once again attacked the high commands of the Spanish Armed Forces to defend against the clear-cut aggression that the people of the Basque Country have been suffering at the hands of the political and military power of the Spanish State. At no time did we intend for these actions against the Armed Forces to constitute a provocation for a regression from a political situation that has arbitrarily been called "democratic." The suspicious coup on 23 February and, above all, its negative impact on a judicial and _ legislative overhaul show us quite clearly the policy of a regime that - although on the surface it has altered its methods of oppression, actually continues to be marked by a fascist ideology and by the predominance of the c~e facto military powers inherited from Franco's military dictator- ship. From various political angles we have been described as enemies of democracy and freedoms, when exactly the opposite is the case. If ETA has historically and at present taken up arms, it has done so because of an unacceptable political situation for the Basque people that ruled out these two elementary principles. Thus, the real enemy of democracy is not ETA or armed action, but the reform itself and its own origin and development, which have made a solution consistent with the people's democratic demands impossible. You can- not expect healthy fruit from a sick tree. The only thing to do is 160 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 cut it down and plant a new one. There is no way that ETA wants to see Spanish Armed Forces tanks rolling through the stree~ts of the southern Basque Country or the rest of the State. BTA wants the democratic break to come once and for all and and wants the Basque people to be given back their basic freedoms and to have their legitimate and sovereign rights recognized. It is for these objectives that we ~ire struggling and to attain them we are willing to offer a sincere and lasting cease- fire. If the Spanish Armed Forces and Government do not: ~snderstand what compromise is and cannot accept a framework that ie unfavorable to their interests, then that is their prablem exclusive~ly. What they can be quite sure of is that any solution they decide or~ outside the framework of the armistice alternative offered by the P~itriotic Left is going to cause them serious strategic problems that c:ould plunge the Spanish State and political system into an irreversi_ble crisis. Madrid must make a realistic choice between guns and diplomacy. Today it has come out clearly f~~r the former. But for how lorig? The autarky during the Franco era is unthinkable today given the present demands of the capitalist systzm and the interrelationship of mFirke~s in Europe and throughout the world. The course they have chosen tends r.o leave all political (and, therefore, economic) decision-making power in the hands of the military. Over time and given our acute economic and governmental crisis, this approach ~an only lead to a disaster whose repercussions will aff`ect the entire Spanish State, not just the Basque Country. ETA's program for a break alternative offers a politica]. path to avoid this disaster: a"cease-fire" tied to the five points contained in the KAS Democratzc Al.ternative. We feel that we would all benefit from ~ts acceptance: the Basque working people, in that a series of minimum rights and freedoms that most of them want would be returned to them; the Spanish State, because it would be clearly showing a shift from fascism to democracy and could begin making stable progress towards becoming part of Europe; both of them, in a word, because this would be a way of surmaunting the current bloody confrontations and preventing sacrifices and suffering that no one wants. We are determined to continue strugglin~ for peace, and sooner or later the oligarchy and the Spanish Armed Forces will have to yield if they want to safeguard principles that are not being c{uestioned in the current tactical phase and that, otherwise, run the risk of decaying. Basque Country, 23 March 1981 Lemoniz Apurtu Sir. We are writing to tell you of cer*.ain facts that are vitally important to your person. ; 161 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 The people of the Basque Country have been rallying for about 7 years against the nuclear powerplant that Iberduero S.A. is building at Lemoniz. During this period there has been an uninterrupted series of information meetings, debates, demonstrations, campaigns of civil diso~edience and mass rallies, illustrating the people's firm opposition to this project. Joining the Basque people in their outcry, our organization took up a commitment in practice to help achieve this grievance through revolutionary armed struggle. Because of the authoritarianism and haughty disdain shown by the Board of Directors of Iberduero S.A. and the Spanish Government in connection with the Basque people's justified refusal to mortgage their security ' and their political sovereignty with ~he Lemoniz Nuclear Powerplant, both the grassroots rallies and the ETA armed struggle have been forced into increasing confrontation with those who do not hesitate to employ repression and coercion to crush civil liberties. Thus, tragic developments such as the deaths of David, Gladis, three Lemoniz workers, Rikardo and Ryan are merely consequences of the absurd and irrational palicy imposed by the bourgeoisie represented on the Iberduero S.A. Board of Directors. In our comanunique claiming responsibility for the execution of chief development engineer Mr Ryan, we cautioned that this action "is not - an isolated incident; it marks the beginning of a new front that will affect all of the upper-level executive personnel connected with the Lemoniz Nuclear Powerplant." Therefore, we are addressing you as a person with technical responsibilities in the construction and startup of the powerplant to remind you once agai:~ that we are firmly conunitted to our decision and that the measures we adopt in this regard will be conditio*~ed by ~the approach that Iberduero S.A, and the pertinent agencies of the Spanish Government adopt from here on towards the people's rallying cry "Lemoniz Apurtu." You can rest completely assured that the moves that we are planning to make in this regard have nothing at all to do with the technical services that you are rendering as a professional, but rather and ea~clusively with your involvement in the illegal and unwelcome Lemoniz project. As always, we would like to avoid usina weapons as much as possible in achieving the objectives for which the Basque working people are struggling, but this does not depend exclusively on us; it also depends on how our national and class enemies act towards this grassroots struggle. If Iberduero S.A. has special security services and the backing of the police and even the Armed Forces to carry on its plans, then those of us in the opposition have juat as r.iuch or more rigtrt to avail ourselves of every form of combat at our disposal to defend our interests and prevent the plant from going up. 162 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000500490002-5 There are only two possible paths today: either with the people or against the people. It is now up to you to decide and act accordingly. Rasque Country, 1981 Gora Euskadi Askatuta Gora Euskadi Sozialista Basque Revolutionary Socialist Organization of National Liberation, ETA ETA, the Basque Revolutionary Socialist Organization of National Liberation, claims responsibility for the arrest, interrogation and subsequent execution of drug trafficker and Spanish police collaborator Juan Costas Otamendi (alias Hippy and Juantxo) on 27 March in Tolosa. The Basque people continue to be subjected to an unending drug traffic that affects every segment and level of our society. Political forces and reformist institutions have maintained an odd silence and taken a restrained approach towards this, which is surprising and paradoxical in view of the proven involvement of the Spanish Government in the ways by which the deranged world of drugs has penetrated the southern Basque Country. As an organization that is part of the Basque Social and National Liberation Movement, ETA cannot allow the abuses that have been committed in this area to continue. We are struggling to regain for our people their freedoms and sovereign rights on a political level, but we are also struggling to completely eliminate a model of society in which chaos and degeneracy have been fostered by the capi~alist system. Juan Costas Otamendi had voluntarily and self-interestedly chosen to collaborate with the police in this sophisticated method of repression. He was part of the local drug trafficking and distribution network and at the same time he furnished informa~ion to his police contacts about members, sympathizers and activist~ ^L the Patriotic Left. Juan Costas usually went around armed and had been involved in the clandestine trafficking of weapons earmarked for parapolice elements and fascists. At the outset of his work as a trafficker, Juan Costas went about creating a soft drugs market among youth so that after he gained their confidence he could introduce ather items such as heroin, cocaine, etc...His ciistribution spots were various bars and "putin-clubs" in Tolosa, Andoain, Urnieta and Villabona. From our interrogation of Juan Costas we have obtained a wealth of information that we will use at the appropriate moment. In view of the scant resppnse that our appeals have gotten in certain ~rafficker-police circles, whom we have asked to halt their activities or leave the Basque Country, we in ETA have once again been forced to take action against one of them. We hope that they finally grasp the im;~ortance of taking our warnings seriously and of agreeing to stop what they are doing, even if only to insure their own personal security. 163 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 Otherwise, we will continue to take action by striking at the most significant people in charge and at the intermediaries they employ, until we eradicate once and for all theae ~indesirable elements, who are nothing more than mercenaries in service tn the oppressive Spanish Government. Basque Country, 28 March 1981 8743 CSO: 6000/0026 , 164 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500090002-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY SWEDEN RAF PRONOUNCEMENTS Malmo TEXTE: RAF in German 1977 pp 41-54, 208-231, 312-322, 323-325 [Exc~:n*c; Part VII. Segments on the Pronouncement of RAF Prisoners, January 1976 We do not think much of a proclamation and we are quite certain that it would be meaningless considering the sham publicity of this trial-- of the distorted, corrupt and completely manipulated public which (accord- ing to Wunder) allows observation in this case. It is a problem and also a component of this miserable show, the reason why it is conducted in this building and in Stammheim and not in a city where the legitimate leftwing public can participate--that, essentially, there is nobody here who listens differently to what we say, who does not respond with banal sensationalism, listens with the ear of an informer or the market. Thia market cannot absorb substance, and where the issue is political annihila- tion it c~:,not even accept facts. If the bourgeois public, which is per- mitted tiere or able to observe, still had a controlling function, the trial would 'ue impossible. Its project, according to the politicians, according to the military charac- ter of the trial dramaturgy and the corrupt worm who is in charge-- its pro~ect of imperial self-portrayal, which determines every detail of this pitiful show, is demago gic and it has been developed through the propaganda of 5 years of psychological warfare. We are fighting on a territory which has actually been totally organized through and through and I do not want to liat the details again. In the meantime everybody knows that every illegal means has been used and is still being applied to impair our ability to defend ourselves, because it is identical with the interpretation of the militarized system of 165 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY justice--incapable to be politically articulate in this dispute, which the state must fear because it runs the whole thing. The manner in which it conveys ttie revolutionary character of the dispute, defines the state attempt to settle it, this extraordinarily enorm~us effort of the reactionary mobilization, which~was looking for a way to express itself also architecturally--as counterrevolutionary, as a class struggle. That is the reason why we are here, we are conducting this trial, or we have tried to shaw and interpret its weakness while it is demonstrating its strength, the miserable measure, which it is, and the fact that the state is forced to use all means possible in this instance to take away the legitimacy of four prisoners--Schmidt said it many times. 'I'he argument of a scientific reason for our politics (I believe that we can certainly provide it right now) is an absurdity at this point--our interest can only be one concept--to develop experience and analysis--the legitimate publication of which the federal prosecution cannot prevent after it has been stated here. We decided against a complex presentation, the fundamental concept of revo- lutionary strategy now, at this point in time: and: Prinzing would interrupt us anyway, because it would take too long and because, as far as he is concerned, his job here as a national security judge gives him the right to block political subjects during this trial-- Second--the text will be analyzed--that has been our experience and we are ~ not sure whether we would not provide weapons to the national security organ with the reconstruction of strategic provisions without simultane- ously placing them at the disposal of the organization of revolutionary politics-- Finally--and that is also important--we are only speaking for the prisoners and their discussions as well as for us, we are not speaking for the groups that are fighting illegally. And the following must be said about it: The continuity of the urban guerrillas, the continuity of their revolu- tionary attack is transmitted through their actions, hardly through the proclamations of their prisoners. A complex development of the connection--this claim would already be wrong, because this show is meaningless for the process of development of the urban guerrillas. We also feel that the attempt of a scientific reason presupposes a minimal consensus--the consensus of argumentation. Where it does not exist openly 166 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and brutally, and even if it applies only to Prinzing's :~habby measures intended to prevent this text--it is a contradiction in :Ltself. Without regard to the fact that this court has proved through th~: months that it cannot and will not follow substantial argumentation. The scientific concept of our politics--their theoretica:l basis on the level of the 1970 analysis alone would be totally meanin;;less to this court, it would only be informative for national security analysts--according to evidence th;at has been proven through 5 years of urban guerrillas. In addition, a pronouncement always means that something has to be defended against the brutal machination--by getting involved with it--even if it is a presentation of a confession--it becomes an interactioii and we would have to get involved with this court, this show. That is imp~~ssible--even tactically--and it has become even more impossible durin; these last 3 years. Substantive the show has nothing to do with us. What concerns us are its actions and the possibility to explain them. An~ireas said a lot about that and presumably we will say a great deal mure .~bout the testi- mony--we will see. Now Andreas or we will talk briefly--or relatively briefly according to the _ lines of the discussion--only about two aspects of the matter, since just before the trial Zeis was able to get his hands on the concepts and a - manuscript which is at least theoretically important, and he did not spit them out again: 1. The necessity of our politics from a historic mandata and the process of concrete resistance, which 5 years ago led to the dev~~lopment of the RAF and leads to the development of 2. the possibility as the fragment of the fragment of p.Lanning the revolu- tionary process, anticipating the urban guerrillas as a tactic. Considering the abstraction level which has been achieved in the meantime through Prinzing's narrow-minded, wormlike, savage insistence on norma? criminal proceedings, we have really no other choice but to counter with our abstraction. It is to be clearly understood here th3t it was not our intention from the beginning--in other worda, it was not our plan to con- front this trial with the substance of revolutionary politics--solely by it here like a seminar. We considered one or aeveral brief statements and planned to present the substance in a concrete form while witnesses were called to testify-- So much about our interpretation of the dramaturgy. In the meantime it has become apparent that, first, we will probably not be able to do it, because we are in bad shape, which probably corresponda to Prinzing`s plan, who after all--has been using all means available to fight for our inability to 167 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 NOR OFFICIAL USE OI~LY defend ourselves--and who is still fighting, using--as he calls it-a "final" ruling on the confinement conditions, which is to freeze our condi- tion of`only partial incompetency to stand trial and make things even worse, and second, because he would prevent it directly, by messing up petitions for testimony--as has happened to every petition during the last 6 months--one should take another look at it. In simple ter~ it means that the fact and the conpection of our politics cannot be conveyed through testimony. There- for6!we will try to explain it by actually trying the ritual of a process pronounce~ent--which, however--although fragmentary--using at least the lines of our analysis. Much of what would be important for that purpose-- was acquired by the federal prosecution ~ust befo're the trial." a.. Now the matter is determined by the absurd working conditions and it actually depends on our not being interrupted. If Prinzing should interrupt several times, we will terminate our presentation--because we only have a partial manuscript and, furthermore, we have not been able to talk about this matter for a long time and sometime we will have it published more clearly struc- tured. The whole attempt to make it available here through the minutes--to empha- size it one more time--is definitely due to the international discussion of the militant antirevisionist Left in Europe and not only in Europe. We will ~ show how the encirclement and complete integration of the traditional class organizations of the proletariat into the politics of capital in the FRG is historically postulated and we are trying to show how this process can only be stopped internationally, through the political reconstruction of the proletariat; from the development of capital the strategy of the class. The guerrilla move- ment in the metropolitan areas is the conscious expression, the interpreta- tion, the conscious sub~ective attempt to convey this reconstruction in and from its international dimension. We must, to describe it, to make it comprehensible, also deal with economic categories. No matter how fragmentary and abbreviated, it can only be developed from the concept of the ob~ective trend (not a trend on the con- ceptual level of Schmidt but of Marx--basic plans). Certainly it is unusual and I never heard of it before, the fact that something like that has been tried in a political trial. Nevertheleas, it is not only a reaction to the attempt, the insipid demagogic attempt to deny any politi- cal substance to this trial--to quote Sartre--I believe--the crime is that they want to treat us like criminals--al~hough, naturally, we have to agree 168 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY with it inasmuch as revolutionary politics and not only revolutionaries but any attempt of democratic, social opposition in this stat~e must of neces- sity be criminalized and is criminalized and we have no probleuis with form of resistance which the cl~ss criminal system calls ordinary criminality. Rather, it is a practical attempt to break through the cE~nsorship and the illegalization of our texts; at any rate, what has been ~;aid here so far can be published; although Buback will probably again cocne up with a savage trick, we will try it. (And for that very reason we are not making any concessions to those who are listening here.) It is a fact and I iiave to state it once again briefly--~ae all (and I am referring to the prisoners) are sure that the developmenL- will confirm our analysis and practice, as has been the case during the p~ist 5 years-- We made mistakes, but we would have to say that they were ob~ectively neces- sary, mistakes resulting from the weakness of proletariati politics in the FRG. And--this text--now, however, in reverse--is to foster i~:--in the RAF there is no separation between theorists and practitioners--th~a kind of division of labor, exploitation and hierarchic structure which is projected on us by the psychological warfare. Everything was perfectly ~.lear and everybody understood how the burdens and the problems and the strur_ture of a group, which is organized and fights illegally, are to be handled and deterniined. There has been no change with respect to our assessment ~i55ed on because of his power of anticipation and decis:Lon to keep open the collective process. It is a burden and it is--that _~s the experience-- always the one or they are the ones for whom leadership :Ls not a necessity; only in imperialism there is always the need for dominat:ion. If oi~e wants to cut it short, one will have to say, that in the guerrilla movement leadership is initiative, interaction and alway:a, at every moment, the implementation of the importance of practice, of pol:ttics as proletarian politics, that is the action--against the trend toward tlie reproduction of imperialist structures like domination, schematization, systematic division of labor, competition and the irrational reflexes from i:aolation and fear. _ In the RAF Andreas has this function because he transmit:~ proletarian poli- tics in the RAF--and that is the insurrection--as leader:ahip in the func- tion, practically--to make it superfluous through collec~:ive practice--as the concept of the unique in the gen~~ral, the possible i~i the necessary, the subjective in the objective, theory for practice. It is the reason why Andreas is hated most. They are in~:ent on destroying the new, the new man, the new society, the nucleus of wh:ich is the guerrilla movement in its identity of power, sub~ectivity, learnin~ process, practice. Psychological warfare must personalize ~.~ecause it cannot attack that which constitutes the guerrilla movement--the collective strugr;le from illegality against the state--without propagating the politics of the guerrilla move- ment, its freedom, which is its freedom to fight; it musr_ personalize to present as unfree the central element of the freedom, illegality and i.e. ability to act. But when Herold says "Baaders and Meinhofs," the plural indicates what is to be ccnveyed by using the method of personalization--in other words, they did tiot get across the idea that the action of the guerrilla movement is the af:Eair of individuals. Of course, Herold cannot understand what a collective is, His plural reflects the fact that there are many of us because of ttie ob3ective neces- sity to fight, it is a material necessity. Leadership a:lso means the transmission of the dialectic of possibility and necessi:y, that necessity increases the possibility of having to fight, i.e. to or~~anize, carry out attacks, also the effect increases. Consequently, subjectively leaderahip also has the function of encouragement and it is an element of mobilization. Its function excludes ita institu- tionalization, it depends on the collective interaction of the group as much as the group depends on it-- It excludes all dead and very deadly structures of imperialist bureaucrats, radical-- Applying simple dialectics, just as much as the organization of the military is the embodiment of imperialiat structure, i.e. alienation, in the 171 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~;uerrilla movement, as a military organization of proletarian politics, alienation is necessarily completely abolished; --it has been abolished through the politics--or will be abolished in a continuing process. The politics of the guerrilla movement is the basis for its ability to act-- it is its possibility. But we would say that the counterpropaganda, which personalized Andreas as the embodiment of imperialist structure, collapsed in the meantime. What extensive propaganda is conveying, is the strength of the subjectivity, the strength of proletarian politics--and we know that the name has been representative for rebellion for a long time; the fact that national security propaganda against us used his name as an example for many, an example which Andreas is for us: an example for--as Mao says--"politics is the commander" meaning: proletarian politics, the politics of those who have nothing. The rationality of the statement that the RAF had started politically and was later depoliticized means that the national security organ has not been able to penetrate the RAF, that becr~use of Andreas the RAF always had a revolutionary concept of politics--it is discusaed in Feuerbach's second thes is : "The question whethEr human thinking is capable of ob~ective truth, is not a question of theory but a practical question; in practice man must prove truth, i.e. reality and power, the here and now of this thinking. The dispute over the reality of a manner of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question." Andreas is being persecuted as the embodiment of this kind of politica, because he represents the combination of analysis, collectiviam and action. Revolutionary theory is critical theory. When we formulated it for publi- cation, it was intended as a weapon and it always referred to distinctly outlined problems of the practice of fighting illegally. We have never been interested in a theory which is not related to practice and therefore does not explain our situation and provide the possitaility to change it; it is the kind of theory which is employed in psychological warfare and which made Mahler and me (Ulrike) into RAF theorists, something like columniation or the alienated fabling with Marxist concepts, taking the reception of the Marxiat literature and falsifying it into a dogma--for dogmatic reasons, something that Mahler did in hia writing, "The Armed Struggle in West Europe." The theoretical writings af the RAF were newa- papers and they were concerned with convincing individuals that it was right to support urban guerrillas and the reason for it. We used them as weapons, because everything is a weapon that helpe the armed struggle which is conducted illegally. 172 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500090002-5 FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY Talking about Andreas means talking about us, because wh~an we say that the function of leadership is to make it practically unneces;~ary through collectivism, it means that the guerrilla muvement is an~i must be a politico-military organization, since it is an illegal o~cganization, and that means that everybody becomes leadership, must qualiEy himself to be leadership-- The comprehensive term for it is: To qualify oneself to learu-- to transcend experience, one's own experience as well as the group's, including those of the liberation movements of the Third World, and that everybody qualifies himself to convey experiences. Even learning is only possible in the struggle against the state, against the ~nethod of propa- ganda, lie and dirt, against the structure of imperialist socialization and indoctrination and it is only collectively possible .3nd only with the goal of engaging in armed action. Collective leadership--we are referriag to Gramsci--mean.a that the pro3ect must be understood by everyone in the guerrilla organization to make sure that everybody understands his task during the realizati~~n and execution as a function of the whole-- that the pro3ect leading to an act must reveal the possi~bility of positive and negative consequences, approval and reaction and that it already con- tains the answers within itself, in other words, is opening a field for the organization. It is--a relationship between theory and practice. a.. The concept of personalizing revolutionary politics in psychological war- fare aims at--and the same is true for the propagandist correlation of torture through isolation to desocialize the fighters--depersonalizing the fighters, to take revolutionary action, which is always understood by the masses no matter how it is conveyed--using the depersonalization of the fighters as a means to make them appear like foreign bodies-- Personalization aims at giving the revolutionary state of emergency the _ appearance of a brutal, imperialist everyday occurrence, taking the laten.t hatred of the masses for the state, for state parasitism, for parasitic, all-consuming machines of represaive and ideological state apparatuaea of _ the federal prosecution, the legal system, police, etc. and diverting it to the guerrilla movement. It sims at using the state of emergency in which the people are living to intimidate them, to deter them from using the state of emergency for their own purpose. But because the machine cannot do anything but project, because it is incapable of perceiving any- thing but self-reflection and is incapable of any production other than reproduction, all the things, all the dirt which it raised during the psychological warfare will inevitably come back to it. 173 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Gradually it is being understood that odious are those who come with things to be used as surrogates for ideology and as a replacement for legitimation. In short: Leadership--what it should be, is the concrete concept of the situation and its transcendence: a the goals and their transmission in the structure of the fighting group/ organization. To put it simply: In the necessity (it is the history which produces the concept, and thus it is the history of the group and each individual within its concept: revolutionary struggle)--in the necessity of antagonism, in which we place ourselves, place our politics, willing to fight, in other words, in its power and its complex force for the individual freedom, liberation is possible. and: In this context--psychological warfare, we have to place Wunder's dumb idea that Andreas had never worked in a factory--because he shows how a scien- tific antico~unism usurps history, prejudice, existing structures during psychological warfare to freeze them. The a~ntence is wrong. Andreas learned and understood in the factory, in the street, in jail--another dis- tortion of facts through psychological warfare is the statement that the RAF consists of a group ~f types and women from the upper middle class with bourgeois associations. With respect to sociology, it has to be said that half of us come from proletarian backgrounds--grade school, apprenticeship, factory, home, prison. The.assertion also negates the fact, probably based on ignorance, that at the beginning of the 1960's, when the third real subsumption began, numerous proletarianization and declassification processes took place- During the process of the deindividualization and technocratization of universities, the concentration of the media etc., which were the internal causes for the mobilization at universities beginning with 1966. The external cause was the U.S. war in Vietnam. And it tries to deny the fact tha.t all RAF fighters have been learning and wt~rking on the basic pro3ects of the new Left since Easter 1968. ~ The struggle itself proletarianizes the fighters. Lack of possessions and-- it is the term used by the Korean Party for_the proletarian relationship to the struggle for communism: the dschutsche [~~ing unknown] characterize the proletariat as antagonist of imperialism, i.e. the aub~ect of liberation. It is certainly not a sociological term for proletariat. It does not interest us either. Proletariat is not a term that has its origin in the descendency doctrine of the fascists--it denotes a relation- ship, the relationship between the guerrillas and the people--it denotes the relationship between the proletariat and the imperialist state, defines it as deadly enmity, antagonism, class war. Proletariat is a term that implies war. 174 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Sartre says: "It is true that the proletariat carries within itself tk.e death of the bourgeoisie; it is true that the capitalist system is sh�.ken by structural contradictions; but it does not necessarily imply the ex3.stence of a class consciousness or a class struggle; consciousness and strt.ggle can only exist when somebody is fighting." , But where does Wunder's sentence come from? Doea Wunder think that "work makes free"?--in other words, the concentration camp. 0= is he talking about the Protestant work ethic, well--quote-- "Work as the source of all riches and culture," a statement from the Gotha Program, which was of na use to the old Social Democracy during the time of high unemployment in 1930 other than finally hand over th.e political power which it had already lost a long time ago (because it ne~~er took it away from the Reichswehr [German Arary] Ministry to the fascists--about the mystified concept of work of the Gotha Program Marx made the brief and dry remark: "that in all social a~1d cultural circumstances the man who has no other possessions must be the slave of the other people who made themselves the owners of ob~ective working conditions"-- Marx used this fact to develop the economic necessity and the political right of the workers to leave the factory, tc arn~ themselves and to fight against the state. And we are only referring to Marx because he substan- tiated scientifically the necessity of the insurrection, the class struggle as a class war against the parasitic net of the repressiv~e and ideological apparatuses, against the bourgeois state. The idle talk is only cynical-- considering our unemployment figure of more than 4 percent or more than 1 million people in the FRG and almost 5 million in West Europe. This time the reply by the Social Democrats is their own fascist pro~ect "internal security," the integration of repressive state apparatuses in West Europe and the command of the information monopoly, which is in the hands of the Federal Criminal Police Bureau and the integration of the apparatuses of internal and external security within the framework of NA T0, which means under the command of the Pentagon. (We will come back to that later- concerning the political function of the Social Democracy for U.S. capital, its fascist pro~ect and the institutional strategy of the new fascism.) As little as the legal land is the real land, the real life of the worker ~ is in the factory. Of course, the federal prosecution sympathizes with the enslavement of the factory proletariat, and consequently and quite logically, Wunder makes a fetish out of factory work--as a mask of the parasitic national security machine--because, if the workers would no longer go to the factory, the factory which is under discussion here--labor under the command of capital--the group of masked national security officials that is opposing us would no longer have anything to eat. (And Wunder, an old Social Democrat--an o?d Social Dem~cratic rat--knows that at the end of our struggle there is the liberation from work through the ruination and 175 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE OI~iLY finally dissolution of the repressive and ideological atate apparatusea.) The sub~ect of the insult is only Andreas or we should, please, support the federal prosecution. In the opinion of the federal prosecution, a decent person is a person who supports the federal prosecution--the subjugated sub~ect, the man who exists for the state and who has no inten- tions other than existing for the atate. It is like Andreas said: "The prisoner who has Buback's photograph in his locker is the federal prosecution's ideal citizen." Part XVIII. Protocols Here are the protocols of two of 25 prisoners who made statements about the "structure of the group" in July and August 1976, during the trial in Sta~heim--against the propaganda and the cliches of the psychological war- fare, which were presented at that point in time at the trial by Mueller, the bought witness of the state security organ. Protocol Hilde Testimony by Brigitte Mohnhaupt in Stammheim on 22 July 1976 ...of course, it is nonsense to say: student, becauae the same thing hap- pens and happened~to all of us. The only thing one can say: Nothing of the sort. And the second point is that I will not answer any questions anyway, not here, facing you, facing the court, the federal prosecution. That would be absurd. That is not the way things are. The proper term for the relation- ship between us and the court, the judicial system, the federal prosecution is war, and the most distinct expression of it is the fact that four of us are dead, have been murdered as prisoners. Furthermore, here--on this level there is r.o possibility at all for a discussion. Why we do it a~ all, come here, take part in the trial... Prinzing: No, that is not the sub~ect. The connection... --yes, it is, it is part of it. It is actually the beginning. Now I am going to start with what I want to say here and not liaten to your stupid remarks. The reason why any of us even come here after Ulrike's death is that we feel it is neceasary to make transparent the actual structure of the group through whatever we can say here, in other words, what it actually was and is . 176 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Not this distillate of psychological warfare, which MuelLer described in his testimony, as ha~ been claimed--practically a fascist structure, if we have to call it somethin~, which will be the reason why the e:ztire construction will collapse, thinking that Ulrike would actually have ~~een able to commit suicide. We are not at all concerned with proving how Mueller is .lying or that he is lying. This area: criminality--that is not at all the issue. We are simply concerned with content to present the content of politic.s, the content of _ the structure as it really was. Of course, it is quite ~iifficult r~o do it ~h~~re, but one will have to try by simply describing it. I will do that now: I will start with the gist of Muell~~r's testiuany, what it is aiming at; his statement with respect to the attac'cs, for instance, and his classification--the classification which the national security organ considers necessary to be able to come up with something at all in these trials. Our comment is that the strategic concept which was developed by the RAF 72 has been aimed at the military and political ~;J.S. presence in the FRG and the individual, tactical, operative steps. For that purpose there were the attacks on the CIA headq~iarters in Frankfurt, the attack on the U.S. Army headquarters in Heidelberg a:zd the kidnapping of three city commanders in Berlin. The fact that this dec:ision, this concept was developed during the collective discussion process, :involving everybody who belonged to the RAF organization, i.e. there was a cunsensus that included all groups, all individual units in the cities, and, consequently, everybody had to be clearly conscious of the significanc~:, the function of these attacks. As far as that is concerned, we are all responsible for these attacks on the military presence of the United States in the FRG, i.e. ~ae are all responsi- ble for the attacks, for the attacks on tr.e headquarters. It says everything about the structure. It makes uncann:ily clear what Mueller is trying to do: This nonsense, saying that six people would have been able to do it: carry out all the attacks that �aere made--completely absurd. In connection with the strategic concept is als~~ the project to capture and exchange the allied city commanders--the esc:;lation which it represents and the escalation which was contained in the plan by the reaction; nevertheless, I do not want to talk about that here. There is nothing that can be said about it anyway. 'This decision, the concept of these attacks and our respansibility for them can be explained from a Western component of our own history: the politicization through the mobilization of the student movement as opposi- tion to the Vietnam war. The fact that we simply want to get involved-- considering the necessity and the limitatior. of the Vietnam mobiltzation, its ob,jective limit: what it could achieve and what it could not schieve until it was shattered and integrated. 177 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - One can say: It is this experience of the necessity to get involved in armed struggle--i.e. to reach the level that is appropriate to the situation in which we find ourselves here in the FRG as a U.S. colony, a strategic subcenter of U.S. imperialism--the situation which has been constituted by the RAF; anyway, the entire argumentation which has already been developed in this statement. I do not think that I have to repeat again. Right aow - I am concerned with explaining it from the viewpoint of the group. Something concrete on the city commanders: The material purpose of the kidnapping was to free the prisoners, i.e. to use the kidnapping to bring about an exchange of the prisoners, who at that time had already been arrested and placed in isolation and subjected to physical torture. In other words, it was an ob~ective necessity for the group to free the prisoners. Exchange is the only means. As far as Mueller is concerned, the Berlin city comroanders appear only in a STERN colportage -at least, that is all I know--ic has been completely ~ omitted from the testimony. The simple, well-aimed purpose is to suppress the politics that were made by the RAF 72. It is clear because Berlin was a crucial pro~ect for us and it was also quite difficult to do, in other words, it was difficult from the operational aspect. Three city commanders-- three: i.e. three large commandos were to carry out the plan. The action had already reached the phase of execution, but because of the arrest it could nor_ proceed--Andreas was arrested approximately 2 weeks before it was to be carried out, and consequently a part of the infrastructure naturally collapsed, i.e. we could not know whether it would also affect a part of the infrastructure which was directly intended for the action. In addition, the U.S. city commander was quite heavily guarded, timing and coordination were difficult. Thus, it was no longer possible for us to carry out the action. But the important thing is: It was the pro~ect which with we were occupied, we were involved--particularly Andreas and Gudrun. Because of that, the national security organ will not let Muel?.ar talk about it any longer, ao he can claim that Andreas and Gudrun were ~nvolved in the attacks on the police presidia. That is garbage, nonsense. It has nothing to do with the facts. At that time Andreas and Gudrun were with me in Berlin and that is where we were organizing this thing. His insane construction is that four or five types were supposed to have carried out all of the attacks in the FRG. It should certainly not require any more explanations, because it is clear to everybody how ridiculous it is and how obvious the purpose is. In other words, here is the entire monster: five defendants--and to blame everything on five defendants, now there are only three anyway. It is all the same line. It also makes terribly clear the entire dramaturgy---the line in general which is being 178 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500090002-5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500490002-5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY employed: psychological warfare by the federal prosecut:Con and court--the fact that there are actually no contradictions and, natu~-ally, that there cannot be any at all. What Mueller says about Munich, f