JPRS ID: 10715 WORLDWIDE REPORT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION

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• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: REPORTS

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,lPRS L/ 107 1 5
- 5 August 1982
Worldw;de Re ort
p
NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATit`~N
CFOUO 8/82)

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~TPRS I,/107Z5
~ 5 August 1982
WORLDW I DE REPORT
= NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND ~R4LIFERATION
(FOUO 8,/ 8 2 )
CONTENTS
_ ASIA ~
JAPAN
AEC~s 10-Year Nuclear Power Development Plan
(ASAFII EVEN~NG NEWS, 2 Jul'82) 1
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Enthusiasm for Nuclesr Plants Reportedly Cooled 2
(Nayan Cha?~da; FAR. EASTERI~T ECONQ~fIC REVIEW, 4-10 ~un 82). '
~ LATIN AMERICA
ARGENTINA
Briefs 4
Madero Wants To F~lfill Progran~ ~
- Remarks on Nuclear 5ubs Scored
NEAft EAST AND NORTH AFRICL
IRAQ
Chronology of Developments in Iraqi Nuclear Industry � 5
(JAHRBUCH DER ~UTCMWIftTSCHAF"P, Jan 82)
_ a _ [III - WW - 141 FOUO]
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRTCA
~ NIGER '
Nation Said To Be Fifth World Producer of Uranium
tMamadou Alpha Ba.:ry; JE[JNE AFRIQUE, 19 May 82).......... 10
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FI ~
JAPAN
AEC'S 10-YEAR NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT PLAN
OW031145 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS ia English 2 Jul 82 p 3
[Text] Japan's Atomic Energy Commisaion [AEC] has decided on a 10-year nuclear power
development program aimed at developing fast breeder reactors for practical use around
2010. The AEC. headed by Ichiro Nakagawa, cabinet minister and chief of the Science
and Technology Agency, has compiled the sixth long-term pro~ect after reviewing the present
plan worked out in 1978. Officials said Wedneeday the new program was mapped out in view
of inflated expactationa for etabilized supply of nuclear power.
The new long-term plan, budgeted at 5,400 billion yea (at 1982 prices), estimates
nuclear power is fiscal 1990 at 46 million kilowatt-hours (KWH), rising to 90 million
KWH in fiscal 2000. It recommends that the next-generation fast breeder reactor be
orought into commercial operation by around 2010, and that 3~000 SWU (Separative Work
Unit) tons of enriched urenium be produced domestically annually by around the year 2000.
The AEC also propoaed full utilization of plutonium tt~rough the advanced thermal converter
reactor and the light-water reector by 1990.
It looked forward to private industry's positive collaboration in building and running
these plants~ and suggested that the time has come for Japan to consider exporting nuclear
power technology and related equipment. With these proapecte in mind, the AEC emphasized
the need for the nation to promote a nuclear nonproliferation pclicy.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening Newa 1982
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PEOPLE'S REPUELIC OF CHINA
ENTHUSIASM FOR NUCLEAR PLANTS REPORTEDLY COOLED
HK040937 Hong Kong FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW in Eng~.ish 4-10 Jun 82 pp 12,
13
[Article by Nayan Chanda, Hong Kong]
' [Excerpt] According to uncc+nfirmed reports, French Fo reign Minister Claude
Cheysson is scheduled to visit China in July. But Jobert's comment, if it
is truly reflective of the French Government's policy, would tend to cast
doubt on such a visit. However, since Jobert's unhappy trip to China last
year there fiave been exchanges of military delegations. Last month'. China
signed an agreement ~,rith a Frpnch campany to buy FR 275 million (US$45 mil-
lion) worth of coal mining equipment--the most important deal since the sum-
mer of 1980. But Jobert said that nothing has come out of the Chinese agree-
ment in principle--announced by former President Valery Giscard d'Eetaing
in October 1980 during his visit to China--to b~y? two nuclear power stations
worth Fr8 bilYibn.
China's enthusiasm for nuclear pl.ants has apparently been cooled by lack of
money. The most likely one to go ahead is ~uangdong Province, which would
sell power to Hong Kong's China Light and Power, Sources in Hong Kong suggest
- France's Framatome, which manufactures a preasurised water reactor ~der a
licence from Westinghouse of the United States, is the front runner for the
nuclear engineering part of ~he Guangdong-Hong Kong pro~ect. However, there
is still some way to go before this is finalized, so France is anxious to find
alternative markets if the Guangdong deal does not work out.
The French business comm~ity has shcwn diaenchantment at the low level of
business with China despite good bilateral relatione gince 1964. French ex-
ports tfl China rose by on?y 15 percent last year fro~ 1980, while exports to
Taiwan shot up by 68.8 percent. France has a favorable trade balance with
Taiwan while the opposite is the case with Chin,.
Jobert reflected some of this fr~istration when asked about the development of
French trade with Taiwan. Si~ce French policy for many years has been to have
gooa~political ties with China, Paris has taken care to do nothing to hurt
China's feelings in its dealing with Taiwan, in fact "a little r.~u much" in
Jobert's view. He sAid thst i.f China did nc~t buy the nuclear power stationc~
from France the latter could "sell them elsewhere," implying Taiwan. Informed
sources told the REVIEW that Taiwsn has~ aho~n great ~interest in buying French-
built nuclear power stations if France were to grant, among other things,
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landing rights tn Paris for Taiwan's flag-carrier China Airlines. Asked if
Fraace had consid~red the posaibtlity of selling arms to Taiwan, Jobert at
firatt said: "We do not have a precise policy." But later he corrected him-
self saying: "We are~not especially conceraed with this prospect."
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ARGENTINA
BRIEFS
MADERO WANTS TO F'JLFILL PROGRAM--Buenos Aires, 7 Jul ~D~YeBidentsofethe
officially reported that^Vice Adm Carlos Castro 1"ia~deosedpto President
National Ato,~i.c Energy _.+amission (CNLA), today p p
Reynaldo Bignone the adoption of some econamic measures for continuing
the national nuclear plan without any problems. Today Castro Madero talked
with Bignone for more than 30 minux.es at Cove mment House, explaining to
the chief of state the problems canfronting the CNEA in fulfilling the
current nuclear plan becauae of t~e diff~cult official budget situation.
~ The Fr~jects under constr.uctian whia S~Y~b~eTercerodin Cordoba,rAtuchaf II
funds are the nuclear plants of Emb
in Buer~os Aires and the Arroyito heavy water plant in Neuquen Province, a
piant which is vital for Argentina ~o complete the nuclear fuel p reparation
cycle. [Excerpt] [PY081237 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 1419 (~IT 7 Jul 82.]
REMaRKS ON NUCLEAF SUBS SCORED--Buenos Aires, 5 Jul (DYN)--Referring to the
possibility that the Nati~nal Atomic Energy Commission [CNEAJ could build
~ a nuclear submarine, former CNEA technological manager Jorge Sabato stated
that it would be "the most outrageous shamelessness" of :he military to
"decide for themselves and by themselvea the investment of more mone3?in
armaments." Sabato made these remarks to DY13, referring to remaxks made by
INEA Chairman Carlos Castro Madero, who does not discard the possibility that
Ar;entina could build a nuclea~powered submarine in the near future, since
we have the technical elements to begin the task. Sabato said he had "ro
objection to the accompliahment of feaeibility studies for the conatruction
of a nuclear-powered submarine and that it be done by the CNEA, which hae
great technical competence," but added that "the final decision must be
adoptec~ by a constitutional government." He also expressed his "profownd
concern over the subject itaeZf, because it would seem that Argentin�~ is
withdrawing from its traditional line in matters of nuclear energy, which
~ so far has been used exclusively for peaceful purposes. A nuclear submarine
could be the first step toward the de1�elopment of nuclear weapons," he
stated. As a"final thought" Sabato stated that "the country has much more
- important priorities than nuclear submarines." He cited among other tl~ings
education and housing, and added.that there are "other pr3.c+rities in the very
field of nuclear energy." [Text] [PY080015 Bu~enoa Aires DYN in Spanish
1135 GMT 5 Jul 82]
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iTiAQ
CHRONOT:OGY OF DEVELOP'MEN'PS IN IRAQI NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
Duesseldorf JAHItBUCA DER AUTOMWIRTSCAAFT in German~~an 1982 901 13, pp 174-17~6
[Text] 4 April: IAEO inspections in Iran, Iraq and Pakistan
According to a report of the preaident of the.International Atamic Energy Or-
ganization to the IAEO governora council, the IAEO carried out routine inepec-
tions in the Iraqi nuclear reeearch center in 1981 as We11 as in Iran and in
Pakiatan in October 1980, in each of which "satisfactorq proofa" of the entire
amour.t of nuclear~material were given.
Israel~ Air Attack at ~airak
On Sunday, 7 June 1981, Israeli fightez ~eta (eight F-1S'e from the USA with
six F-15'c ae fighter cover) bombed the Oairak reaearch reactor of the Iraqi
nuclear reaearch center in Tamuz near TaWaitha, approxi~mstely 20 l~an Southweet
Qf Baghdad, which had been built by the French and ~?aa ready to be ueed. The
reactor wae heavily damaged, perhape coinpletely destroyed. Since the core had
not been charged yet, no radioactivitq eecaped.
The planes, which cbviously flew along the Jordanian-Saudi Arabian border, were
neither detected by Iraq nor by the Saudi Arabia-stationed AWACS plane which
patrols the Peraian Gulf, and returned without any losaes. ~ordanian stations
that detected the forma~ion were misled by Arabic radio traffic.
- Lasting newe accounts stating the attack had been on a nuclear power plant are
false. There are no nuclear power planta in Iraq, neither in use nor in the
process of being built or planned. According to information from the IA~~, all
reactor sites in Iraq are located in the research center at Tamuz. Here ther~
are 1) the small research reactor IRT 2000, a swimming-pool type reactor which
was delivered by the Soviet Union and has been in uee aince 1967, arorking With
uranium that has been enriched to 10 perctnt, 36 percent and 80 percent re-
spectively; 2) the nearly completed large Oairak reaearch reactor called Tamuz-1~
a tank-swi~mming pool reactor under conetruction by the French since 1977 and
which, accordfng to IAEO, hae a capacitq of 40 MWth and ehould start working
this year, and, belonging to Tamuz-1, a critical set-up, Tamuz-2, with a 500
kWth capacity'. Both plants ehould be fed uranium that has been eariched with
U235 to 93 percent. In addition to *_hie, there are the respective fuel depots
in Tamuz as well as a laboratorv with hot cells~ del.ivered by the Italia~na.
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Osirak resembles the Oairte reactor which is being operated in tl~e French nu-
clear reseaxch center at 3aclay wfth a capacitq of 70 MWth. According to the
preaent tnformation, the build3ng at Osirak and the inner Wa111ng Were heavily
;iamaged; however, no damages were reported fram Tamuz-2 nor from the depot
of irradiated nuclear fue1.
After the announcesnent of the action which came only after a report on Jordanian
radio on 8 3une 1981, the action was ~uatified by t~ie Teraeli prtme minister
M. Begin by saying that Traq intended to produce atomic bombs with the help of
the Oairak faci?ity which would.be a life-threatening menace for Isra~el. This
statement w~as inatantly rej~ected. The ~AEO pointed out that Iraq had signed
the non-proliferation treaty ia 1970 and ha.d accepted superv ia ion o f a l l i ts
- nuclear-technical work by the IAEO (both of which are not the case for Iarael.
The ~upervision was carried out satisfactorilq with the last inspection having
iaken place in January 1981. In spite of using fuel elements containing highly
enriched uranium, which actually is appro~riate for the production of nuclear
weapons, a swimming-pool reactor would be of little use in the pzoduction of
nuclear material, since the visual supervision of the nucleus of the reactor
is very easy. BPSides that, the plutonium could hardly be concealed because in
the fuel elementa, only very small amounte of plutonium sre produced and a
mantle of breeding elements Mrould be instantlq detectable. Tn addition, the
presence of many technicians of the delivering country would provide additional
safety against any misuse of thc: fissionable material. France points out that
Usirak is auppoaed to have 1G annual working periods of 20 days each, during
which the minimum amount of Pu neceesary for a bamb could not be produced.
France has a~so irradfated the firat fuel elemente before delivery, which
would definitely make misuee of the elements much more problrmat3c.
While according to IAEO information, during the inspection the fuel for the
Tamuz reactors had been found, the French point out that the fuel elements that
had originally been del3vered for the critical aet-up had been returned to
France after the first air attack on the research center which was flown on
30 September 1980 by unidentified aircraft, not causing any major damage, and
that the delivery of the elemente for Tamuz-1 which was planned for this fa11,
tvzd not been completed yet.
The Israeli action has been unanimously condemned worldwide. The Security
Councfl of the UN passed an appropriate resolution which, however, dnes not
contain any sanctions against Israel. ~T.S. President R. Reagan ordered an~o
export ban on four fighter jets that stond ready for delivery to Iarael.
~ chief secretary S. Eklund called the Israeli action an attack on the eontrol
systan of the IAEO. However, the IAEO does not have the power to take any
- steps in case of detection of any violationa of its safety controls. On
~ 12 June 1981 the IAEO governors council passed a resulution which calls on the
IAEO general-confer~nce of next September to consider all the consequences of
the action, including a temporary suapension of Israel's rights as an IAEO
member and to help Iraq overcome the effects of the attack (of the 34 members
of the governore council, Canada and the United States voted against the resolu-
tion and Australia, Sweden aad Switzerlgnd abatained).
6 ~
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In France as well as from the Taraelf oppositton, the action of Begin ie being
criticized rven under cpnatderation of the fa~t that Ierael feele threatened,
_ mainly becauee not all diplomatic poasibilities for meaaurea agafnet thia threat
had been taken. Eapecially since the election of F. Mitterrand as president,
who holds a critfcal v3ew of the deliverq of the Osirak facility, French
measures are to be taken into consideracion. This includes the question of
delivery of fuel elemente with low enrichment. Such elemente ha8 already been
developed under constderatton of the iion-Proliferation treaty by the grench
CEA under tt~e name C,ARAMEL ~rith leas than 10 percent enrichment and had been
tested in Osiris. However, they had be~n re~ected by Traq under referencp to
the specifications of the treaty and their still-lacktng acpertence aad certain
difficulties witr the use of the elements.
The worldwide responae is even in~ensified by the fact that this is the first
military attack on a nuclear facility in the world. The consideration of the
safety aspects of such plants took for granted that, since every country has
_ such plants, and therefore, mu~t expect an appropriate counterattack, such
actions could be considered as highly improbable. However, when Begin gave
the reasons for tl~e date of the (obviously long-planned but delayed) attack,
he especially po3nted out that thP attack had to be carried out before the
plant started work3ng eo that no radioactivity could leak out.
1 August: Osirak still unavailable
On 18 June 1981, earlier than expected, the IAEO senx aupervisors to the Iraqi
nuclear research center at Tamcz where the research reactor Tam~iz-1 (0~'.rak)
had been heavily damaged during t~e Israeli air attack on 7 June 1981, also
during which the French engineer D. Chaussepied from the firm Afr Liqc~ide lost
his life. Since the supervisors were not able to follow the conditions of the
Iraqi authorities who demanded that a bond be signed which freed the Iraqi
Government of any responsibilities for the pereonal safety of the aupervisors,
they were not able, "due to suspicion of unexploded bombs and the extent of the
damage, to get close to the damaged site and to inapect the fuel of the Tamuz
reactora," as IAEO president S. ~klund explai.r.~d on 6 July 1981 before the IAEO
governors council. However, the supervisors ir.s~e::ted the reac~or IRT 2~00
which had not been damaged and the depot of natural and enriched uranium, where
no changes since the last inspection could be notice. On 2 July 1981, the IAEO
president laid off the U.S. IAEO supervisor, R. Richters, without notice on the
grounds of serious violationa in ~onnection with the security of secret informa-
tion that had been obtained by the member countries. Richters, who belonged to
che IAEO since February 1~178 and who had been appointed to the sectio~ South
and 6outheast since 'ih March 1979, but had not been employed in Iraq itself,
offered his resignation to the IAEO from the United States on 18 June 1981,
efFective from 16 June 1981. On 19 June 1981 he appeared before a committee
of the American Congrese and criticized the ~ffectiveness of the IAEO control-
function, especially with respect to Osirak. Already earlier he had written
a secret document about the eafety controls available to the U.S. embasay in
Vienna.
Saudi Arabia announced it was re~dy to finance the re-establishment of the re-
search center and confirmed officially that King Kahled had told the French
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i preaident F. M3tterrand had potnted out that Prance t~ea basically trilling to
provide a ne~r reactor, b-it enly ~f a11 guaranteee agatnet mfsuae for military
purpoaee Frere kept. Ser~ tre queetioa of delivery of lo~-enrtched fuel will
probablq aleo be of importance. In France it is emphaaized that all these
queationa W311 be coneidered only after Traq has made the appropriate requeet,
which it hae not yet done.
1 October: Oairak is to be rebuilt
- A~ announced after talks with the deputy prime minieter of Traq, T. Aziz, in
mid~August in Paris with Preaident P. Mitterrand and eeveral miniatere, France
is willing to organize the reconetruction of the reeearch reactor Tamuz-1
(Osirak) of the Iraqi research centex which had been destroyed during the
Israeli sir attack of 7 June ~981.
Aowever, France demands more far-reaching guaranteee for the exclueively peace-
ful use of the plant than had been incorporated into the original contract.
Negotiations about detaile wtll supposedly be taken up in thz near future.
The sae of low-enriched fuel and an even etronger engagement of the IAEO
- control function ie taken into consideration ae ~ell as the preaence of
_ French specialists in the Iraqi center for a longer period of time than the
planned 10 qears. Saudi Arabia has declared ita willingaese to finance the
reconetructioa.
4 December: IAEO supervieors inspect Tuwaitha
_ As the IAEO announced, two of its supervisors carr3ed out eafety 3nspections
from 15-17 November 1981 in the Iraqi nuclear research center at Tuwaitha near
Baghdad after the Iraqi Government had announced on 9 January 1981 that the
buildings of the Tamuz reactors could be visited again after diaposal of bombs
aad partially damaged sources of radiation. According to the report, no signs
of any violation againet the safety control treaty between Iraq and the IAEO
were found. Zhe material wga in agreement with earlier inspections on 28 and
, 29 June 1480 and on 1~ and 19 January 1981 (after the first sir attack on
3A Sept~mber 1980). Of the 39 hi~hly enriched fuel elementa, one was located
in th~ hr~ll of tr.e reactor, the other 38 were frradiating in the base of the
~ small Tamuz-? reactor which had not been damaged during the air attack on
- 7 June 1981. The directly ad~acent building of the big research reactor
Tamuz-1 (Osirak), however, is heavily.damaged. Also the research reactor
IRT 2000 and the depot for natural and enriched uranium were unchanged. The
supervisors were also asked by the Iraqi authorities to examine the supplies
of Yellow Cake, the delivery of which had been pointed out to the IAEO bp Iraq ,
and rhe ~elivering countries. They will be put ui~der IAEO control before being
used, e.g. chsmicallq cleaned.
2 March: Fuel cycle. Portuguese uranium delivery to Iraq
In 1980 approximately 100 t Ug0$ with a value of about DM 20 mi111on (approxi-
mately $8 million) were delivered from Portugal to Iraq. The delivered amount
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correaponds approximately to one year's production. In 1984 however, a new
uraniem~ factory will be atarted in Alr.n Alente~o which will increase the annual
production to 270 t U30g.. The delivery of uranfum was cosupensation for the
delivery of oil trom iraq wRtch covers 40 percent of the Portugeae demand.
3 May: International treaties
Belgium-Iraqi nuclear treaty.
On the occasion of a visit of the Belgian secretary for foretgn trade in
Baghdad, a treaty between Belgium and Iraq was signed concerning cooperat,ion
in the field of nuclear energy. Zt runs for one year and can be renewed. One
- of the pro~ects is t'ne productfon of uranium from the phoephates of A1-Raim.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 by Handelsblatt GmbH, Duesseldorf. -
9280
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NIGER
NATION S:ID TO BE FIFTH WORLD PRODUCER OF URANNM
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1115, 19 May 82 Pp 47,50
_ [Article by Mamadou Alpha Barry: '"In the Beginning There Was Uranium"
- [TextJ Paris' attention to Niger is not disinterested. Niger, indeed, is the
fifth ranking world producer of a atrategic product: uranium. Although as far
as overall trade is concerned Niger ranka only ~46th as a world supplier of
- k'rance and lOth of Africa and ranks 63rd as France's customer and 13th as
Africa's, it is the rio 1 foreign supplier of uranium (coming before Gabon and �
Canada)--more specifically, in marketable concentrates of about 70 percent
uranium.
Purchases of zhis ore by the French COGEMA [General Company of Nuclear Mater~
ials] rose from 930 tons in 1977 to 1,690 tone in 1981. T~ th3s must be added,
also for 1981, the purchase of 600 tons by the CEA [Atomic Energy Co~ission],
or a total of 7,000 tons for the period under consideration. This represents
a total of 172 billion CFA francs. Niger supplies an equiv8lent of more than
30 percent of French needs in this ore.
Ir is to be noted that since 1979, Franco-Nigerien trade has evolved in favor
of Niger, primarily because of French purchases of uranium. Niger, along with
Gabon, is the only country in the franc zone whose trade balance with France
shows a surplus. In 1981, the sma11 increase {.n the value of Nigerien exports
to France reflected the drop in the price of uranium. The discovery in 1966
of mineable uranium-bearing deposits at the foot of Air Mountain near the
city of Arlit, 950 kilometers northeast of Niamey, was s veritable godsend
for Niger. Vast but sparsely populated (four inhabitants per square kilo-
meter), ravaged by drought and, to top it off, located in the heart of the
continent, more than 1,000 kilometers from any outlet to the sea, this country
is laying a''.1 ita hopes on uranium.
SOMAIR [Air Region Mining CompanyJ, with capital amounting to 4.3 billion CFA
francs, was formed in 19fi8. ~'ra~nce, through COGEMA, claimed the majority of
its shares. When the mine became operaeional in 1971, Niger received a pitiful
1 billion CFA francs as a dividend. Once in power in April 197G, the CMS
[Supreme Military Council] tried to break France's monopoly. The new govern~
ment obtained a substantial increase in its ahare, riaing from 17 to 33 percent.
- It also subscribed to 31 percent of the capital (3.5 billion CFA francs) of
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SOMINAK [Akouta Mining Company] which, in 1978, began mining a depoeit located
10 kilometers from that of Arlit. In 1~76, the military regime al~o set up
ONAREM [National Office of Mineral Reaources], which took over the etate's in-
- terests in both cc~mpanies.
Uranium production increased rapidly: from 410 tons in 1971, it rose td
2,249 tons in 1978 once SOMINAK became aperational. Tt+.e following year, r~iger
went up to fifth ranking in the world wtth production of 3,500 tox~s, coming
after the United States, Canada, Sou~Y? Africa and Namibi~ but ahead of France.
(It is to be noted that this rankiag does not include the USSR, Eaet Europe or
China, where production levels are unknown'.) It is estimated that Niger will
supply 4,860 tona of uranium in 1982.
~ A precious ere, therefare, that has become the primary foreign ~urrency re-
source of the country. Besides its~ share dividends and the sale of atock al-
loted to ONAREM, the atate drawa ro�yalties from produc~ion, customs duties on
exports and a tax on profits. Result: revenuea derived from uranium repre-
sent 30 to 40 percent of the Nigerien budgety fixed at 93.3 billion CFA francs
for 1982. This result is largely due to the rapid rise in the price of uran-
ium following the energy crisis of 1973: 5,000 CFA fraacs a kilogram in 1971,
14,000 CFA francs in 1976 and 24,500 CFA francs in 1980. Eighty percent of ex-
- port re~renues comes from the sale of this product. However, the petroleum
crisis had positive effecta not only on uranium. The drop in economic activ-
ity in the industrialized countriea and ecological demonstrations against all
nuclear plants reaulted in a revision of electro-nuclear programs. This re-
sulte.~ in a sharp drop in the world price of this strategic ore, which fell
to 16,500 CFA francs a kilogram in 1.981. It was only after negotiationa
between Nigerien and French officials and representatives of other partnera
that Niger obtained preferential rates: 20,000 CFA francs a kilogram in 1981
and 24,000 CFA franca in 1982. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that these
_ prices remain lower than the prices 2 years ago. As a result, there was a
cut of 8 billion CFA francs from the 1981 budget and a 9 billion shortage to
be made up compared with revenue estimates for 1982. On the other hand, the
record of SMTT [Tassa-N'Taghalgue Mining Company] for the mining of a third
uranium deposit in the vicinity of Arlit could benefit through more preferentia'!
treatment by the French Government. This company was formed in 1979. Its
capital of 10.5 billion CFA francs is divided three ways, i.e., among ONAREM,
COGEMA and a Kuweiti firm.
With proven reserves of 160,000 tons, Niger could, by 1990, be the no 1
African p~oducer and the fourth world producer, with 8,000 to 11,000 tons of
uranium concentrates. However, given the uaicertainty over prices, it is at the
very least riaky to pro~ect that Niger could derive sufficient revenue from
uranium to bring about a genuine economic take-off.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982.
5671
CSO: 5100/5685 END
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