POST-MORTEM ON NIE 10-63, 'BLOC ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00097R000600010020-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: April 9, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
USIB-D-15. 2/92
Final
USIB -Approved
9 April 1963
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63, "Bloc Economic
and Military Assistance Programs"
REFERENCE e USIB -D-15.2 /92, 15 January 1963
1, USIB, on 8 April 1963, approved the subject Post-Mortem
as circulated in the reference.
USIB Action Requested-,
2. In accordance with Part II of that Post-Mortem (copy attached)
USIB members are requested to take such action as they deem appropriate
to remedy the deficiencies noted therein. 25X1
Executive Secretar
tate Dept. review complete
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
~y /~ downgrading and
EI 9 , T decla'0060010020-3
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SECRET
Attachment
USIB-D-15. 2/92
Final
USIB -Approved
9 April 1963
Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63
Bloc Economic and Military Assistance Programs
I. Findings
During the preparation of this estimate there appeared a number of
areas in which more information would have been useful.
We have little precise information concerning how the Soviets now
view the short term and the longer term goals and objectives of their aid
programs. More information would be useful on the respects in which the
Bloc countries consider the aid programs successful and the degree to which
there is internal opposition to the aid programs.
More information would be useful on the impact of the programs in
the recipient countries, including effects on the fortunes of local
Communist parties.
More information is needed on military contracts, deliveries, and
payment terms. With respect to both military and economic aid, there is
a need for more precise information concerning drawings on credits, repay-
ment, and numbers of bloc technicians in recipient countries.
More information would be useful on programs for training students
from underdeveloped areas in Bloc countries.
USIB members are requested to take such action as they deem
appropriate to remedy these deficiencies.
SECRET
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SECRET
USIB -D -15. 2 /92
15 January 1963
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63
REFERENCE o USIB -M-251, 9 January 1963, item 6.b.
1. On 10 January 1963, USIB, through procedure indicated in
the referenced minute, approved NIE 10-63, "Bloc Economic and
Military Assistance Programs". Inasmuch, however, as the Intelligence
Board did not at that time act specifically on the Post-Mortem to that
paper, such action is requested below.
USIB Action Requested:
2. USIB members are requested to consider the attached Post-
Mortem on NIE 10-63, as developed by the Board of National Estimates
and the USIB representatives, and advise the Secretariat by close of
business 21 January of either their concurrence in or other views on
that document.
Executive Secreta y
Attachment
Record of action attached. Also see USIB -D-15. 2 /92, Final
SECRET
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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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SECRET ?
Attachment
USIB-D-15. 2 /92
15 January 1963
Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63
Bloc Economic and Military Assistance Pro rams
I. Findings
During the preparation of this estimate there appeared a number
of areas in which more information would have been useful.
We have little precise information concerning how the Soviets now
view the short term and the longer term goals and objectives of their aid
programs. More information would be useful on the respects in which the
Bloc countries consider the aid programs successful and the degree to which
there is internal opposition to the aid programs.
More information would be useful on the impact of the programs in
the recipient countries, including effects on the fortunes of local
Communist parties.
More information is needed on military contracts, deliveries, and
payment terms. With respect to both military and economic aid, there is a
need for more precise information concerning drawings on credits, repay-
ment, and numbers of bloc technicians in recipient countries.
More information would be useful on programs for training students
from uderdeveloped areas in Bloc countries.
Revised Draft of 8 January 1963,
SECRET
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Nw~ SECRET w
Attachment
USIB -D-15. 2 /92
15 January 1963
II. Action
USIB members are requested to take such action as they deem
appropriate to remedy these deficiencies.
Revised Draft of 8 January 1963
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 SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIF TION TOP AND BO O
UNCLASSIFIED C IDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
I
Ex. Dir. /CIA
2
EA/DCI
s
Chairman, USIB.
4
ExSec/USIB
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
& 2
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
E, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Acting ExSec/USIB
2 Apr 63
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
t 77-)
A'V 4vQ8 or eft blbb~i0511$ : i, RI 2MO@ 7RO 6OOo1002a-
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UNCLASSIFIED C NFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
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NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
DD /I
2
Ex. Dir. /CIA
3
DDCI
4
EA/DCI
5
Chairman, USLB
6
Ex. Sec. / USIB
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
5
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
&3
CONCURRENCE
&
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Concur in, and recommend that Chairman,
USIBy approve the attached, Post-Mortem to NIE
10-63:
~41IL6 _3
ay S. Cli e Date
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Marshall S. Carter Date
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Approve, subject to concurrence of other
USIB members:
John A. McCone Date
Chairman, USIB
HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
E, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Ex. Sec. /USIB
18 Jan 63
D CONFIDENTIAL
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M NO. revious e it o (40) I,,
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
2 April 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, USIB
SUBJECT USIB Action on Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63,
"Bloc Economic and Military Assistance Programs"
REFERENCE : USIB-D-15.2/92, 15 January 1963 (copy attached)
1. A request for action by the Chairman, USIB, is contained in para-
graph 4 below.
2. As of 1 April 1963, all other Intelligence Board members had
advised the Secretariat of their concurrence in the Post-Mortem on NIE
Owhich was submitted in the reference for USIB telephone action.
The FBI abstained from action on this matter.
3. Initially, as indicated in Tab A, the State Department raised some
objection to this Post-Mortem but on 1 April, with reference to Mr. Kent's
comments regarding the objection in Tab B, State withdrew from its position
and concurred in the Post-Mortem as written.
4. Approval of the Chairman, USIB, is required and requested hereby
to complete Board action on the subject paper.
Approve the Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63,
as.subritted in USIB-D-15.2/92:
Acting Executive Secretary
y J~~ /9
Date
Excluded or r i;n^'ic
downgrading and
declassification
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
22 March 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR : Thomas Hughes, Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State
SUBJECT Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63
REFERENCE Roger Hilsman's Memorandum of
1 February 1963
1. I have always understood that a post-mortem on an NIE was
to be a statement by those who participated in the preparation of the
estimate on the adequacy of the intelligence available. It would point
out those areas, general or specific, where there were significant gaps
whose filling would have permitted a better estimate. I have not
considered that it should serve as a list of requirements for collection
or an indication of priorities. While it would be futile to mention matters
on which intelligence clearly could not be obtained, it has not seemed to
me that inclusion of an item iddicated the likelihood that the gap could be
filled. Inclusion simply puts us on record as being aware that the gap
exists. Other established channels exist for the levying of detailed
requirements and the establishment of priorities for collection. The
last sentence in the post-mortem states that it is left to the individual
USIB members to determine what action is appropriate to remedy the
deficiencies.
2. I believe that the post-mortem draft, which was approved by all
the representatives during coordination and which has been concurred in
by all members of USIB except the Department of State, accurately
reflects the main intelligence gaps which were encountered in the prep-
aration of NIE 10-63. It does not seem to me to include matters on which
it is clearly impossible to obtain intelligence.
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3. With respect to the first substantive paragraph of the Post-
Mortem (Soviet goals, objectives and evaluation), I believe both sentences
should be taken together. Any information as to how the Soviets view
the results of their programs would throw light on their :present objectives
and the likelihood and scope of new programs. It seems to me not un-
reasonable to believe that information along these lines could be obtained,
including indications of whether there is internal Soviet opposition at a
time when there are strains in certain sectors of the Soviet economy.
4. As to the impact of programs, we have extensive contacts in
recipient countries, both in official and unofficial circles, and reactions
of such people to Bloc aid programs should not be difficult to obtain. We
should also be able to obtain some information on the effects of the aid
programs on the positions or fortunes of local Communist parties at
least to the extent of ascertaining whether the position of local communists
is enhanced as a result of Bloc programs.
5. Our economists inform us that, though we have considerable
information on certain aid programs, we still have a continuing need
for details on many contracts and deliveries e. g. prices, quality data,
delivery times etc. Our information is, of course, better on certain
countries than on others. In the sphere of military aid, both the Bloc
and the recipient countries attempt to keep most aspects of these
programs secret. Such information as we have on the details on
military contracts has been obtained by clandestine means, and there
are still large areas in which we have little or no precise information.
/S/ Sherman Kent
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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C
0
P
Y
February 1, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Sherman Kent, Chairman,
Board of National Estimates,
Central Intelligence Agency.
SUBJECT Post-Mortem on NIE 10-63
Since we participated in the preparation of this Post-Mortem we
have had some second thoughts, which I set forth for you here.
I appreciate the need for exact information on the broad subject
of the Soviet economic effort, but I wonder whether the Post-Mortem
fully balances this need against the danger of suggesting to readers that
the information of this quality can be got. After all, we certainly would
be correct in saying that we need the most accurate and detailed informa-
tion on Russian war plans, but we should be most incorrect in suggesting
that there is some systematic way in which we can obtain it.
In this sense the idea that we shall have "precise" information
concerning the Soviet view of the goals and objectives of their aid program
will whet appetites which I believe there is no way to satisfy with
information at a degree of specificity which would amount to precision.
Judgments on these subjective matters can be formed only by extra-
polating evidence which is itself circumstantial and indirect -- indeed,
it is these very judgments which the NIE process is designed to produce.
In short, the answers to these questions will be estimative judgments
based upon observation of what the Russians actually are doing, failing
to do, or ceasing to do; the answers will too seldom be found in specific
information or data that exactly apply to the questions.
I don't suppose the Post-Mortem will reach many unprofessional
hands, but it seems to me a pity to run the danger of misleading any
reader. And even professionals might benefit from a more meaningful
statement of what it is we think can be- collected--which is not information
about views, but information about actions which. can be interpreted to
reflect views.
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Much the same can be said about the second item. Indeed, since we
are so unsure about the impact of our own aid programs, why should we
expect solid information about the impact of other people's programs?
Again it seems to me that the points made here are estimative points,
not collection points. We should indeed be interested in evidence that the
programs were aimed in specific ways at affecting local parties -- for
instance, through the transfer of funds, or the obtaining of government
jobs for party members, or to meet needs expressed by the parties
themselves. But when it comes to the "fortune of the party" we will
always have to rely on overall estimative judgment. I should fear that
to register our requirement on this level of estimative generality might
obscure the point that we want detail on communications and transactions
between Bloc officials and local party personalities. Of such details we
are certainly not-:receiving enough.
Our information on contracts and deliveries and credits seems to me
to be pretty rich. It fills a fairly hefty bi-weekly publication. Of course,
there are obscure corners, but I should seriously question whether the
returns to be expected would justify much greater effort than we now expend
in this area. I could not myself give high priority to additional collection
effort on these questions.
The last item on training programs hits a bell. I believe there is
indeed a possibility of usefully increasing our information concerning the
selection of students, the treatment of students, and the reactions of
students in Bloc training programs.
My suggestion is that the Post-Mortem disassociate the concept of
precise information from the generalizations at which we aim, and that
it be recast to indicate the specifics, or at least illustrative items, which
we think collectors might actually go after.
/S/ Roger Hilsman
Director
INR: AEvans : th:1 / 31/ 63
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