VALIDITY STUDY ON NIE 32.5-59 THE OUTLOOK FOR AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS DATED 6 OCTOBER 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 29, 1961
• Content Type: NOTES

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USIB -D- 16. 2 / 54
29 December 1961
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Validity Study on NIE 32. 5-59
The Outlook for an Independent. Cyprus
dated 6 October 1959
The following validity study on NIE 32. 5-59 was noted by the
Intelligence Board on 28 December 1961 (USIB-M-192, item 11 b. ).
NIE 32. 5-59, "The Outlook for an Independent Cyprus", dated
6 October 1959, remained generally valid in. its judgments on the
principal trp.nds of Cypriot affairs. It did, however, anticipate
greater Communist influence in the government and greater
obstruction by the former EOKA terrorists to the working of
the government than actually occurred.
SECRET
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USIB-D-16, 2/53
8 December 1961
Validity Study on NIE 93-61
The Outlook for Brazil
dated 8 August 1961
The attached Validity Study on NIE 93-61 was noted by the
Intelligence Board on 7 December 1961 (USIB-M-188, item 1.1:).
Executive Secretary
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USIB -D- 16. 2 / 52
24 November 1961
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
Validity Studies on:
NIE 27.1-58, The Outlook for Spain
dated 20 May 1958
and
NIE 27. 2-59, The Outlook for Portugal
dated 21 July 1959
The attached Validity Studies of NIE 27. 1-58 and NIE 27. 2-59 were
noted by the Intelligence Board on 21 November 1961 (USIB -M-.185,
item 5. c, ),
Executive Secretary
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Attachment
USIB -D-16.2 /52
24 November 1961
Validity Studies on:
NIE 27. 1-58, The Outlook for Spain
dated 20 May 1958
NIE 27. 2 -59, The Outlook for Portugal
dated 21 July 1959
NIE 27. 1-58
This estimate, prepared before the adoption of the stabilization program
in 1959, has proven substantially accurate, although it was slightly over-
pessimistic concerning the Spanish Government's willingness to undertake
economic reforms. The basic judgments, that the regime would survive
while Franco remained politically active, and that US interests would probably
not be adversely affected during the period, have been borne out.
NIE 27.2-59
Although it was prepared before the "Santa Maria affair" and the
outbreak of fighting in Angola, the basic judgments in this estimate have
proved valid.
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USIB-D-16.2/50
12 July 1961
UNITED STATES INT ELLIGE:.NCE BOARD
Validity Study on NIE 55-59
The Outlook for Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim
dated 24 November 1959
The attached Validity Study of NIE 55-59 was noted by the
Intelligence Board on 5 July . 1961 (USIB -M-163, item 9. b. ).
Executive Secretary
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Attachment
USIB-D-16. 2/50
12 July 1961
Validity Study on NIE 55-59
The Outlook for Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim
dated 24 November 1959
The main estimates on Nepalese developments have held up
reasonably well. NIE 55-59 correctly pointed out that the Nepali
Congress Government probably would encounter its most serious
difficulties in its relations with the monarchy, and that in the event
of a showdown Mahendra probably would emerge on top. However,
the showdown came sooner than we anticipated. Most of the assess-
ment on the outlook for Nepal's foreign affairs also proved sound
as long as the Nepali Congress remained in power, but since the
King's coup Nepal has adopted a more cooperative attitude toward
Communist China than was anticipated.
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