VALIDITY STUDY ON NIE 11-3-57 PROBABLE INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF SOVIET ATTACK ON THE US DATED 18 JUNE 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 12, 1961
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Relea a 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP82M00097R0O 00020007-7
USIB-D-16, 2/44
12 April 1961
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Validity Study on NIE 11-3-57
Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US
dated 18 June 1957
The attached Validity Study of NIE 11 -3-57 was noted by the
Intelligence Board on 6 April 1961 (USIB-M-149, item 20 b. )o
Executive Secretary
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP82M00097R000600020007-7
 Approved For Rel a 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP82M00097R00Q000020007-7
Attachment
USIB-D-16, 2/44
12 April 1961
Validity Study on NIE 11-3-57
Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US
dated 18 June 1957
In the grossest sense, the validity of this estimate cannot be
determined because the USSR did not attack the US. On the other
hand, during the years since 1957, there have been several major
crises in which the Soviets undertook various precautionary military
preparations, and the ability of intelligence to detect and recognize
these preparations proved to be about as predicted in the estimate.
The generalized projection of changes in the warning problem between
1957 and 1960, in paragraphs 47-52, is consistent with information
now at hand, except that Soviet Long Range Aviation has not established
any fairly large-scale pattern of Arctic activities.
The detailed evaluations of the warning which might have been
derived from specific Soviet preparations for attack in 1957, in
paragraphs 29-46, are of course out of date, but their general tenor
was borne out by the subsequent Warning Survey of the Warning
Systems Survey Committee of the USIB. Most important, the analysis
of the nature of the warning problem and the:"factor s