REPORT OF AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR REVIEW OF CERTAIN PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00097R000800110003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 24, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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24 February 1964
Limited Distribution
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT Report of Ad Hoc Committee for Review of
Certain Problems Related to the Central
Intelligence Bulletin
REFERENCE . USIB-M-283, 14 August 196.3, item 8
1. The attached report of the Ad Hoc Committee for Review of
Certain Problems Related to the Central Intelligence Bulletin, prepared
pursuant to the reference, is circulated for information of the USIB.
2. This report is being placed on the agenda for the 26 February
USIB meeting, for noting by the Board.
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Executive Secretary
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14 February 1964'
MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals
SUBJECT : Daily Current Intelligence
Reporting
1. On 14 August 1963 USIB set up an ad hoc
committee to examine certain problems relad
the Central Intelligence Bulletin. A working group
composed o representatives of the Department of
State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
Central Intelligence Agency carried out a detailed
review of these problems. Its report is attached.
2. In summary, the committee has achieved the
following:
a. Formalization of the relationship
between the Central Intelligence Bulletin as
a national-level -publication and ie Defense
Intelligence Summary as a departmental one.
b. A full review of the inter-agency pro-
cedures used in producing the Bulletin.
c. Agreement that the present regular
distribution of high-level current intelligence
publications is too broad, and that certain
measures are to be,implemented to remedy this.
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14 February 1964
Report of, the CIB Working Group
A. INTRODUCTION
1. At its meeting of 14 August 1963, USIB
agreed that "an ad hoc committee consisting of
representatives from CIA, State, and DIA should
review the distribution and security problems
related to the Central Intelligence Bulletin, as
well as any rela ncept ual problems. " The
Acting CIA Member, then designated R. J. Smith, As-
sistant Director, Current Intelligence, CIA, to
convene this committee. State was represented by
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and
Research, and DIA by
Chief, Current Intelligence and Indications center,
DIA.
2. This committee met on 5 September and
agreed:
a. That there were compelling arguments
against renaming the Central Intelligence
Bulletin the National intelligence Bulletin.
b. That there were a number of other
problems connected with the production of
daily current intelligence which required
detailed examination.
c. That a working group consisting of
Mr. Edward L. Davis, INR,
DIA, and Mr. Richard Lehman,? CIA,should carry
out this examination.
3. The working group held a number of meetings
between 10 September and 20 November 1963, on the
following agenda established by its parent committee:
a. Changes in the "legend"* of the
Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB).
*By egen s meant the paragraphs explaining the
publication's purpose which appear inside its front
cover.
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b. Review of procedures in the production
of the CIB.
c. Review of the dissemination of the
CIB and Defense Intelligence Summary (DIS) in
relation o e sensitivityo information
contained therein.
4. The working group's discussions and recom-
mendations on these topics are summarized in Sec-
tions B-D of this report.
B. LEGEND OP THE CIB
5. There were three purposes in amending the
CIB legend. One was to reflect more clearly that
the publication was produced to meet CIA's responsi-
bilities under NSCID #3 for serving the President
and the National Security Council. (DIA had, by
earlier agreement with CIA, changed the corresponding
legend of the Defense Intelligence Summar (DIS) to
indicate its departmental status . r purpose
was to define more accurately the method used for
indicating CIA's sole responsibility for a late item..
The third was to bring the language of the legend
in line with changes which have been made in the
format of the CIB since its establishment in 1958.
6. These considerations apply only to the
first paragraph of the present legend, which reads
as follows: f
"The Daily Brief lof the Central Intelli-
gence Bulletin is pr duced by ire ctor of
ai n e igence in consultation with
representatives of departments and agencies
of the United States Intelligence Board.
Back-up material is produced by CIA with as
much consultation with other departments and
agencies as is practicable. When, because of
the time factor, consultation with the depart-
ment or agency of primary concern is not
practicable, the brief will be produced by
CIA and marked with an asterisk. Intelligence
in this publication is based on all sources,
including COMINT."
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7. The working group recommends that the
following revised first paragraph be adopted:
"The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence to meet his responsibilities for pro-
viding current intelligence bearing on issues
of national security to the President, the
National Security Council, and other senior
government officials. It is produced in
consultation with the Departments of State
and Defense. When, because of the time
factor, adequate consultation with the de-
partment of primary concern is not feasible,
items or portions thereof are produced by
CIA and marked with an asterisk."
PRODUCTION PROCEDURES FOR THE CIB
8. There have been far-reaching changes in
organization, philosophy, and procedure within the
Intelligence Community in the nearly six years since
the CIB began publication in its present form. Pro-
cedures for producing the CIB have evolved to re-
these changes. Furthermore, with accumulated
experience there has grown up a body of doctrine on
CIB production which is not fully understood through-
out the Community. The Working group has devoted
considerable time to an examination of procedures
and the doctrine underlying them.
9, The CIB is produced six days a week by
the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA.
Drafts of proposed items are prepared by OCI ana-
lysts and disseminated electrically to INR and
DIA. At 1515 each day, Sunday through Friday, a
panel chaired by CIA and including representatives
of INR and DIA meets to consider drafts of,all items
available at that time. Following this meeting
there is additional telephonic contact extending
to 1700-1800. At the end of this consultation
process, there exists a text for the following morn-
ing's CIB acceptable to all three agencies, in
which any dissents are indicated. Items prepared
by CIA too late for the completion of this process
are either included with an asterisk to show that
consultation has not taken place or are held over
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for consultation the following day. Such items
may be prepared as late as 0430 on the morning of
publication. Responsibility for the content of
an issue rests with its Panel Chairman, who is-one
of a'group of senior OCI officers rotating in this
role.
10. INR requested CIA to table papers defining
the criteria used by the Panel Chairman in select-
ing items, in deciding whether to run a late item,
and in handling dissents. CIA prepared such papers,
which were then discussed and amended. The Working
Group recommends that these revised papers (Annexes
A-C) be circulated to all personnel of the three
agencies who are concerned with the substantive con-
tent of the CIB. It. notes, however, that they. are
to be considered guidelines for the Panel Chairman
in handling a wide variety.of problems, rather than
rules which can and will be applied rigidly in
every case.
11. The working group has also given consid-
erable attention to the problem of circulating
drafts and raw materials early enough for consulta-
tion. It recognizes that there can be no hard-and-
fast solution, but recommends that:
a. CIA ensure that its producing elements
are generating drafts as soon as possible after
receipt of reportable raw material. (CIA has
done this"O
b. INR and DIA assist in this process by
notifying CIA when they receive raw material
they believe should be treated in the CIB.
(INR has begun to do so.)
c. The three agencies work to ensure the
most rapid possible exchange of reportable
raw material.
d. CIA examinesthe procedures for elec-
trical transmission of. drafts to see where time
could be saved. (CIA has done so and-finds
that, with a few exceptions, drafts are 'trans-
mitted as fast as present arrangements will
permit. It is preparing to make changes in
its own internal communications procedures
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which will reduce average transmission by.per-
haps 15 minutes. It recommends that, as along-
run solution, consideration be given to use of
the enciphered facsimile system now under develop-
ment.)
e. Greater use be made of informal consulta-
tion by telephone, especially, analyst-to-analyst.
.(The group notes that this is a standard practice
both between CIA and DIA, where the gray telephone
system is available, and between CIA and INR. In
the latter case, however, consultation has been
more difficult, since INRQs access to secure
telephones is limited. The group recommends,
nevertheless, that INR analysts make greater use
of the gray phones available to them. In the
longer run, consideration should be given to use
of the oncoming KY-3 system for INR-CIA consulta-
tion on non-SIGINT matters.
12. A number of other problems were also discussed
at lesser length.
a. CIA noted difficulties which had on oc-
casion arisen in attempting to consult with INR
because of lack of coordination within INR or
lack of understanding by INR analysts of the
purpose and philosophy of the CIB. INR has taken
measures to improve this situation,
b. INR asked whether a more systematic way
could be found to cover in the CIB situations which
were potentially dangerous but in which nothing
normally reportable was happening. CIA noted that
purely mechanized systems far doing this had been
tried. unsuccessfully'in the past, but agreed to re-
examine the problem,
D. DISSEMINATION AND SENSITIVITY
13. As of 1 October 1963, the CIB and DIS were
disseminated as follows (for details see Annex D):
a. Within the Washington area, 187 hard
copies of the CIB are circulated outside CIA,
and 209 hard copies of the DIS are circulated
outside DIA, In addition, for speed and con-
venience, the two publications are circulated
electrically to a number of Washington organi-
zations which also receive hard copies. The
CIB has 13 such addressees, the DIS 16.
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b. The hard copies are disseminated as
follows:
White House
State
Defense (except NSA)
Treasury
Justice
CIA
Budget
AEC
USIA
NASA
NSA
NIC
14. These figures understate the true reader-
ship of the two publications. Many copies of each
have several readers. Of necessity, all copies pass
through the hands of information control and clerical
personnel, and teletype copies pass through communi-
cations centers. Finally, it should be noted that
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teletypes normally print out in multiple copies.
On the other hand, many recipients, both in Washington
and in the field, read both publications.
15. Both the CIB & DIS are designed primarily
for a high-level readership, and for this purpose
contain intelligence based on sensitive materials.
At the same time, both are widely used as a daily
current intelligence service for operating officials
at a lower level, both in Washington and to a much
greater extent in the field.*
16. The working group believes that daily
comprehensive current intelligence service is es-
sential for the major Washington agencies involved
in national security and for their missions and
headquarters abroad. Moreover, it believes cen-
tralized production of current intelligence in
Washington is a more efficient and economical
method than decentralized production in the field
of an assortment of daily summaries not backed
by the information flow and analytic resources
available in Washington. However, the present con-
tent of the hard-copy CIB and DIS, while appro-
priate for the use of senior officials is too
sensitive for the working-level current intelli-
gence audience. Specifically, the two publications
contain material based on Department of State
"Limit Distribution" and CIA Clandestine Service
"Background Use Only" cables, both of which are
considered by their originating agencies to be
highly sensitive. (The CIB and DIS also occa-
sionally include other sensitive material, but
only on an ad hoc basis.)
17. Thus the present system results in the
broadcast of sensitive information to a number of
*There certain differences between the hard
copy and cable versions of the two publications.
The CIB cable version which leaves the Washington
area does not contain "No Dissem Abroad" items.
The DIS cable rarely includes sensitive material
and these only upon authorization of the control-
ling agencies.
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consumers who do not need it. At the same time,
the producer of current, intelligence is sometimes
inhibited from giving the most complete policy-
oriented service to his primary high-level con-
sumers by the knowledge that what he writes will
be given a wide circulation.
18. The recommendations which follow are
designed to rectify this situation by making a
distinction between the needs of the senior office
and the working-level official. They will enable
the hard-copy CIB and DIS to be aimed solely at
the high-level audience, while cabled versions,
with sensitive information excluded, will provide
the broader service envisaged above for field con-
sumers.
19. The working group recommends:
a. That material based on the "Limited
Distribution" and "Background Use only" series
not as a rule be used in the cable versions
of the CIB and DIS and that any exception be
negotiated with the controlling agency.
b. That CIA and DIA coordinate to identify,
on an ad hoc basis, any other items of sensi-
tive iieTZigence which should be limited to
hard-copy distribution.
c. That there be no hard-copy distribu-
tion outside the national security policy-
making apparatus. (This should not be inter-
preted as limiting the right of any USIB agency
to disseminate individual items of sensitive
intelligence to officials in Washington or in
the field with an absolute need to know.)
d. That CIA and DIA, with the cooperation
of the other USIB agencies, undertake a sub-
stantial reduction in the number of hard copies
of the CIB and DIS, in the range of 20 to 40
percent if feasible.
e. That a new technical working group be
appointed to coordiante and monitor d. and to
produce a coordinated plan for dissemination
of the CIB and DIS cables to field installations.
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29 October 1963
CIB Working Group Report
Annex A
Criteria for Selection of CIB Items
1. There are three basic criteria which all
CIB items must meet.
a. They must be concerned with national
security. The definition o nat onal security"
used in the US Government is so broad, however,
that the formula gives virtually no guidance to
the selector. It merely requires that an item
present information pertaining to developments
--potential or actual--which impinge fairly di-
rectly on important interests of the US.
b. They must present intelligence. This
means that they must deal primarily with for-
eign actions or policies rather than those of
the US. This distinction is not easy to main-
tain, however, since the conduct of foreign af-
fairs is a continuous process of action and re-
action between the US and other nations. It is
most difficult to discuss a foreign action, for
instance, without relating it--either implicitly
or explicitly--to the US action which stimulated
it.
c. They must be important enough to be
worth the attention of members of the National
ecurity Council. n other words, an item must
eal with a matter which is now or has the po-
tential of becoming the subject of considera-
tion at the Presidential or NSC level. This
criterion is exceptionally difficult to define
further because of the large element of sub-
jective judgment built into it. Furthermore,
the interest of high-level readers will vary
from day to day and individual: to individual.
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2. Beyond these theoretical considerations,
there are also a number of practical ones. The day-
to-day make-up of the CIB is largely determined by
the interplay of the following factors:
a. Degree of government interest. When
the policy-making apparatus has focussed its
attention on a crisis, its appetite for detail
is insatiable. Items are printed in the CIB
which would in normal times never be considered.
On the other hand, lack of high-level interest
in a potentially dangerous situation can often
be a reason for periodically calling attention
to it. Since such situations can remain un-
changed for months, this sometimes requires the
use of a relatively unimportant piece of new
information as a "peg" on which to hang what
is basically a repetitive reminder that the
problem continues to exist.
b. Continuity. CIA must ask itself whether
each piece of raw information records a new de-
velopment or adds detail to one already recorded
in the CIB, and whether it tends to change or to
reinforce assessments already published. When
something is new or when a judgment should be
changed, there is pressure to publish in the CIB.
This is especially true if the direction of events
is running counter to a National Intelligence
Estimate. On the other hand, crises which sim-
mer along for several days with no detectable
change must not be allowed to drop out of sight.
There is a danger that the policy-maker, seeing
no intelligence reporting; might assume that the
situation is improving. Pressure therefore builds
up to report even when no significant information
has been received.
c. Timeliness. Items otherwise important
enough for the CIB may be withheld because the
events they predict are scheduled to occur be-
fore the CIB is distributed or because the gov-
ernment has already reacted to the information.
Items may also be withheld because they are so
long-range that delay for one reason or another
will do no harm.
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d. Open-source Reporting. If incoming raw
intelligence is paralleled by accurate press re-
porting, pressures for CIB publication may be
decreased. On the other hand, if press report-
ing is contradictory, incomplete, or inaccurate,
items of lesser importance may be selected for
CIB treatment in order to clarify situations
for the reader.
e. Length. There are no limits on length
of the CrB, but CIA believes that high-level
readership will be overloaded if the normal CIB
runs much beyond a dozen items a day. Of course,
all items of obvious importance are printed, but
it is also true that an item of marginal impor-
tance is more likely to be printed on a day when
the CIB is short than on one when it is long.
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29 October 1963
CIB Working Group Report
Annex B
Late Items in the CIB
1. The formal basis for use of the asterisk
to denote a late CIB item is contained in the
present legend of the CIB, which states that "When,
because of the time factor, consultation with the
department or agency of primary concern is not prac-
ticable, the brief will be produced by CIA and
marked with an asterisk." When the present CIB was
established in early 1958, this language was in-
serted to provide a way for the CIB to be adjusted
to major late developments. It was believed that
the text of each issue would be virtually complete
by about 1600 each day, when the inter-agency CIB
Panel meeting ended. Substantive disagreements
would also be established by that time and would
be handled by dissents.
2. For this to work as orginally intended,
allowing time for the preparations of drafts by
CIA, for circulation of these drafts, and for con-
sideration of them by other agencies, an issue of
the CIB had to be based largely on material received
in CIA by 1100 the previous day. The intelligence
provided the reader would thus be 24-48 hours old
before he received it.
3. It has become increasingly difficult to
follow this rather deliberate approach. There are
contradictions inherent in any attempt to coordi-
nate, or "consult on" current intelligence, and these
contradictions are sharpened as the requirement for
currency increases. Over the years, the pace of
events has accelerated and the government's reaction
time has been sharply cut. Raw intelligence is col-
lected and transmitted in much greater volume with
much higher speed, requiring a parallel increase in
the speed of processing and delivery to consumers.
The result has been an increasing number of items
on which consultation is not possible and therefore
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an increasing use of the asterisk to denote produc-
tion by CIA alone. This trend has been apparent
even though in practice the consultation process
is often less deliberate and regularly extends well
beyond the Panel meeting into the early evening,
4. The Panel Chairman, under heavy pressure
from the CIB readership for currency, may decide to
include an "asterisked item" in any of the following
circumstances:
a. An item generated by information re-
ceived too late for Panel consideration.
Present practice diflers -from -the original
concept in that items can now be drafted based
on sources received as late as 1500, brought
before the Panel, and afterwards cleared with
INR and DIA. If an item cannot be brought be-
fore the Panel at all, an asterisk is usually
used. However, in the interests of currency,
CIA's standards for the level of urgency and
importance which justifies production of a late
item'have gradually been lowered. Such an
item will usually be prepared if delay until
the next issue of the CIB will substantially
reduce the government's ability to react to
the information therein, if delay will probably
cause the information to be overtaken, or if
the topic of the item is likely to receive
heavy press treatment the following morning.
b. An item brought before the Panel on
schedule, but on which another agency is unable
to consult. This situation arises, or example,
when ,IA-has prepared an item based on source
material which analysts in another agency have
either not yet received or not yet had time to
analyze fully. CIA goes ahead with production
of such items when it believes that a day's
delay for consultation will lessen their useful-
ness to the reader.
c. Portions of an item passed by the
Panel whit are changed or a e y at
night on the ba a later in orma a.on, Such
changes for the sake of accuracy or complete-
ness are almost always factual, and can be
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triggered by receipt of information which
would not justify production of a new late
item.
d. A fast-moving crisis situation. Under
crisis circumstances, sees to prepare CIB
material at the latest possible moment, since
intelligence which is valid in the afternoon
may be out of date the following morning. Con-
sultation, except for informal discussion be-
tween night duty officers, is normally not
feasible on such items. However, their con-
tent is usually of the "classified newspaper"
variety, seeking to give the reader a short
coherent account of what has transpired with
a minimum of interpretation or assessment. It
would theoretically be possible for such items
to be drafted in time for Panel consideration,
with the idea that some portions of them would
stand up twelve hours later. This, however,
is an inefficient use of scarce and--especially
under the circumstances--overworked manpower,
and CIA does not attempt it. On the other
hand, CIA tries to return to a normal reporting
schedule as soon as the situation will permit.
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29 October 1963
CIB Working Group Report
Annex C
Dissents in the CIB
1. Next to accuracy, the most important factor
in the usefulness of current intelligence is timeli-
ness. If timeliness is to be achieved, it is simply
not possible or desirable to indulge in lengthy,
drawn-out sessions for the coordination of inter-
departmental views. The CIB is not the forum in
which to resolve basic differences of views with
respect to the situation in Ruritania. On the other
hand, the existence of basic differences must not
be permitted to block publication of significant cur-
rent intelligence.
2. In general, the nature of current reporting
is such that basic differences on substantive matters
do not often arise. Most CIB reporting deals in a
largely factual way with current developments, which
It interprets or places in the context of other cur-
rent developments or factual reports. Such interpre-
tative analysis is understood to be preliminary and
subject to refinement as further data are received.
While there is room for differences in the selection
of facts and their interpretation, these are seldom
life-and-death matters and in most instances can be
resolved informally by working-level contacts between
the agencies.
3. "Assessments" or projections in the CIB
occur less frequently and are normally short-range.
These are often conveyed more by the factual back-
ground against which a new piece of intelligence is
presented than by a direct statement. While the
chances of dissent are possibly greater when an "as-
sessment" is contained in a CIB item, this is only
likely to occur where a sharp difference exists with-
in the government which has not been resolved by NIE's
or other basic efforts to thrash out the problem.
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4. When such a situation arises, it has been
and remains CIA's policy that a dissent will be
published. CIA further recognizes the right of the
dissenting agency to state its objections in its
own language. It assumes, of course, that dissents
will be written in such a way as to be genuinely
useful to the high-level reader. This means that:
a. Footnotes should take issue with major
.points of substantive interpretation. Ma or
because the hurried policy-maker should no be
distracted from the main point by inter-agency
disagreements over nuances of wording which--
without the dissent--would have no impact on
him either way. The footnote causes him to
stop and look for some implication he has missed.
Substantive because the policy-maker should not
be asked ~Fo referee disagreements over policy or
jurisdiction within the Intelligence Community.
Interpretation because facts (including the fact
of the existence of a report) are ascertainable
or checkable. If challenged on fact by another
agency, CIA will do everything possible to check
it; there should never be a need for dissent.
The validity of a particular report is, however,
a proper subject for dissent.
b. Footnotes should assist the high-level
reader to understand the issue. Thus they must
be addressed to the substance and not directly
or indirectly to the competence or jurisdiction
of the drafter. The consumer is not helped by
a simple statement that one agency or another
takes issue with an item in the CIB, nor is he
usually helped by proposals for alternate lan-
guage. For a dissent to be useful, it must uay
with some degree of specificity why the draft-
ing agency disagrees. It must re Ter specifically
to evidence not contained in the basic item,
perhaps citing examples, or point to alternate
interpretations of evidence.
5. The Panel Chairman, faced with the decision
of another agency to dissent, has three choices: to
print the dissent, to hold the item over, or to with-
draw it. Some of the practical considerations which
influence his decision are:
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a. Timeliness of the information. If delay
will not seriously degrade the use ulness of an
item and if additional consultation or the ex-
pected receipt of clarifying information will
help to resolve a disagreement, holding-over is
desirable,
b. Time available for consultation. If a
dissent is surfaced early enough in the working
day, senior personnel of CIA and the dissenting
agency can override minor disagreements.
c. Wording of the dissent. If a proposed
footnote does not meet the criteria set forth
above, the Chairman must try to persuade the
submitter to change it or must consider delay-
ing publication. When a draft footnote is not
received until well into the evening, his prob-
lem is compounded.
d. Effectiveness of the dissent. The Chair-
man is expected not to block pub lication of op-
posing views if these would be useful to the
reader. Often, however, he will find that the
dissenting views of another agency are well taken,
but that acceptance of them leaves no positive
intelligence to print, e.g. the dissenter makes
a good case that the CIA analyst's evidence does
not support any conclusion.
e,. Importance of the item. If any item is
of marginal importance to beg In with, the Chair-
man may feel that its publication with a dissent
would destroy any usefulness it might have had
to the reader as well as exaggerate its importance.
6. Should another agency submit an item to CIA
for inclusion in the CIB, the considerations above
generally apply. However, CIA cannot itself dissent.
Therefore, should a difference of views exist which
would normally warrant a dissent, it is incumbent on
CIA to publish an item setting forth its views, from
which the other agency can dissent.
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7. Corollary to the right of other agencies
to dissent from CIA's views is the obligation of
those agencies not to block CIB publication of in-
telligence controlled by them, even when they do
not agree with it. Denying clearance of field
cables for use in the CIB for such reasons can re-
sult in the suppression of intelligence.
8. Finally, the application of the footnote
system to current intelligence requires large meas-
ures of goodwill, flexibility, common sense, and
firm supervision in all participating agencies.
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