PERSPECTIVE FOR INTELLIGENCE 1975-1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00311R000100130002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82MOO311 R0001 00130002-6
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Perspectives for Intelligence
1975-1980
Secret
July 1974
USIB/IRAC D 22.1/20
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82MOO311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82MOO311 R0001 00130002-6
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 365211
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(2)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82MOO311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/045
IDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
EET
No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE
1975 -1980
Approved For Release 2000/04/: &&-RDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/0 S4 2 -
fiDP82M00311 R0001 00130002-6
No Foreign Dissent
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction ........................ ... 1
Part I-Major World Problems ..... . ........ . ....... . ........ 1
General .......................................................... 1
The USSR .................. .................................... 2
China ............ ...................... .. .................... 2
Western Europe ...... ....................... ....... . ........ 3
Eastern Europe . ................................................. 3
Japan .............................................. ............ 3
New Powers ................................ ..................... 4
The Third World ....................................... ... .... 4
Social Change ....... ......... .. ......... .. ...... .......... 4
The Acceleration of Events ....... .. ........ . ........ ... ... 5
Part II-The Role of Intelligence ........ ....... .. ..... 5
General ............................................. ......... .. 5
The USSR ............... .................................... .. 6
China ........................................................... 6
Europe .............................................. ........... 6
Economics ................ .................................... 7
Other Priorities ................................................ . 7
Part III-Implications for Intelligence Planning ....... . ........ .. .... 8
General .......................................................... 8
Collection vs. Exploitation .............................. ........ 8
Demands vs. Resources ............................................ 9
Technical Systems ................................................ 10
Requirements and Evaluation ...................................... 11
Manpower Implications ...................................... .... 11
Security ................................................... 1.2
Approved For Release 2000/04I: DL DP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/0gp-18R RDP82M0031 18000100130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
Introduction
1. These Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980 are issued by the Director
of Central Intelligence to provide general guidance for planning for all elements
of the Intelligence Community for the next five years. They are particularly
designed to stimulate early action on programs requiring long-term research,
development, or planning-such as complex technical systems, language train-
ing, skills augmentation, etc. They are designed to influence Fiscal Year 1975
decisions whose effects will be felt only after several years. For Fiscal Year 1975,
near-term guidance is provided in the Director's Objectives submitted to the
President, which include both Substantive Objectives (further detailed in Key
Intelligence Questions) and Resource Management Objectives. The Director's
Annual Report to the President on the work of the Intelligence Community will
include comment on steps taken during FY 75 to meet future requirements.
2. These Perspectives open with a general overview of the political, economic
and security environment anticipated during the coming five years (Part 1). This
is followed by an overall statement of the anticipated role of intelligence in these
situations during that period (Part II). Finally, more specific guidance is given
with respect to activities which should be planned or initiated in order to meet
the needs of the period ahead (Part III) .
3. The Perspectives are focused primarily on major national intelligence prob-
lems and guidance. They recognize but do not deal extensively with three addi-
tional categories of important problems:
(a) Continuing lower priority national responsibilities which must be
satisfied with a limited allocation of resources;
(b) Departmental or tactical intelligence support of civilian and mili-
tary elements of the United States Government. This will also require con-
tinuing investment of attention and resources;
(c) Unexpected problems or crises which can pose major political, eco-
nomic or security problems to the United States. To the extent that these
requirements cannot be met by reallocation of resources from less urgent
activities, some reserve capability must be included in planning to meet them.
Part I-Major World Problems
1. General. The balance of power between the US and USSR is unlikely
to change fundamentally. Perception of the balance, however, may change im-
portantly in either Moscow or Washington, or both. Beyond this, many other
nations will play major roles in the international arena. Additional nations possess-
ing nuclear weapons or having significant control over critical economic resources
will be capable of seriously upsetting the international equilibrium. The chang-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04/ 6t4 ,R,DP82M00311 R0001 00130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
ing balance between the world's supply of and demand for natural resources will
strain the world's political, economic, and social instituitions. Thus the US will be
confronted not only with the steady-state Soviet threat to US national interests
but turbulence in other world relationships as well.
2. The USSR. Notwithstanding the probable continuation of detente and an
absence of armed conflict, the USSR will remain the principal adversary of the
US during the next five years. It will regard the US as its major security threat,
and act accordingly. In foreign policy, its continued efforts to expand its inter-
national influence will bring it into conflict with US interests. This will include
political action in Western Europe, the Near East, and South Asia, and, to a some-
what lesser extent, Latin America. In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to
give high priority to the kinds of growth which increase national power and its
projection abroad.
The circumstances which commend detente to the USSR, however, have com-
plicated this picture. These are: the need to control local crises lest they lead to
general war; the burden of the Sino-Soviet conflict; and the desire for economic
and technological assistance from the West. The Soviets will have to deal in the
coming years with a number of dilemmas as they attempt to square traditional
attitudes with the requirements of a detente posture.
These dilemmas may take an acute form in the strategic field. While con-
tinuing to modernize its ground, naval, and tactical air forces, the USSR is vigor-
ously pursuing the opportunities left open by SALT I. Except to the extent re-
strained by arms limitation agreements, the Soviets will make substantial improve-
ments in their missile forces, including MIRVing, improved accuracy, increased
throw-weight, and better survivability. At the same time, they will continue to
maintain and to improve their defenses. They will be working to develop effective
weapons and supporting systems in such areas as ASW, satellites, and lasers. Ex-
pecting strategic equality with the US, the USSR gives indications of angling
further for a measure of strategic superiority, if that can be obtained at reason-
able risk.
Domestically, the pressure for modernizing reforms of the Soviet system, and
particularly its economic administrative structure, will grow. Prolonged detente
may also eventually have some effect on the Communist: Party's ability to wield
its authority effectively in all areas of public life. But these are long-term possi-
bilities, and over the next five years the essentials of the Soviet domestic system
are not likely to be substantially altered.
3. China. Almost certainly, China will undergo a change in leadership. The
succession could see an initial collegial unity followed by an authoritarian, aggres-
sive and xenophobic leader. The initial period could also be followed by frag-
mentation into a variety of contesting military, party, and ;provincial elements. For
planning purposes, however, it would seem most appropriate to assume that the
follow-on leadership in China will maintain the unity and authoritarian discipline
Approved For Release 2000/0541 %1-RDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04/g f Iff DP82MOO311 R0001 00130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
imposed by the Communist Party, that it will be primarily concerned with internal
unity in meeting the social and economic problems within China, and that it will
retain a somewhat paranoid attitude toward the outside world and particular
suspicion of countries on its periphery.
China will continue gradually to develop its strategic forces and will present
a retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. By 1980, it will have the capability of
threatening the United States with a demonstration (or desperation) strike by a
small number of ICBMs and SLBMs. China will maintain large general purpose
forces capable of operations on its periphery but will be unlikely to commit them
in the absence of major provocation or concern.
Internally, China will continue its authoritarian economic programs, which
are likely to keep agriculture abreast of population, to enable industry to ex-
pand capacity and output, and to support an increasingly modern defense estab-
lishment. Internationally, China will endeavor to become the ideological leader
of the Third World. It will participate in aid programs and similar political
gestures with other Third World powers but will not establish substantial au-
thority over Third World countries.
4. Western Europe. Western Europe will continue efforts at integration with
uneven results. The subjective impulse toward unity and the objective factors
working for it will continue to encounter obstacles arising from nationalistic
rivalries, tensions between the concepts of Europeanism and Atlanticism, and
Europe's ultimate dependence on US support against the USSR. New leadership
in the principal West European states promises some change in tactics and
approach to these problems-mostly in ways congenial to the US-but the
fundamental issues will continue to resist quick solution. Europe, and US-Euro-
pean relations, will be particularly vulnerable to economic strains and uncer-
tainties-inflation at home and trade problems with both the advanced states
and the Third World countries supplying raw materials, especially oil.
5. Eastern Europe. While Eastern Europe will continue to be under Soviet
control, recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties with Moscow will compli-
cate the picture. The five-year period could see an explosion from within one
or more East European countries against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would
quickly reestablish its hegemony (by force if necessary), whatever the price
in terms of other policies. Internal discipline may be alleviated somewhat in
these countries so long as they adhere to Soviet guidance in diplomatic and
security matters. Economic relations with the West and with the Third World
will grow in quantity and in independence from Soviet control. The passing
of Tito could open an arena of difficulty and contest over the succession in-
ternally and over the future orientation of Yugoslavia externally.
6. Japan. Japan will continue to play a major economic role and as a par-
ticipant in international economic affairs generally, expanding its contacts and
Approved For Release 2000/04t C 1R- tDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82MOO311 R0001 00130002-6
SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
relations with other countries, including the USSR and China. It will still, how-
ever, place priority on close and cooperative relations with the United States
although, on issues it considers vital to its own well-being, it will be less amenable
to American influence. The internal Japanese scene is not apt to change so sub-
stantially as to affect Japan's role abroad.
7. New Powers. During the coming years, a number of nations will increase
in absolute and relative strength and become at least regional great powers, plus
playing more substantial roles in world international forums. An example is
Brazil, whose economic and political power is increasingly felt in Latin America.
Another is Iran, whose Shah is determined to build that country's relative strength
in the region so as to play a full great power role there, Nigeria and Zaire could
also develop this sort of role in Africa. Aside from these, several nations having
considerable influence within regions will display greater independence from
the close US relationship which has characterized them in the past. This will
be particularly prevalent in the economic field, but it will also occur in various
international relationships. Examples of such powers are Canada, Mexico, Aus-
tralia, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia, plus several South American nations such as
Venezuela, Panama, and Peru.
8. The Third World will present a varity of problems. A number of local
disputes will preoccupy not only the leaders of individual countries but the
international community. Examples are relationships between India and Paki-
stan, between black and white Sub-Sahara Africa, and. within Southern Arabia
and the Persian Gulf. Several existing disputes will continue to be a matter of
concern to the international community and will sow the seeds of potential larger
scale involvement (Arabs and Israel, North and South Vietnam, North and South
Korea, Taiwan and China). A number of Third World countries will become
increasingly antagonistic toward the great powers and their local presence in
the economic, political and cultural spheres, e.g., in Africa, Latin America and
South Asia. In this respect some identity of interest may grow between nations
divided by the Cold War, developing into collaboration against both superpower
complexes, e.g., the Arab nations, the rising black nations of Africa, and the
nations of the Malay Archipelago. Internally, many Third World nations will
suffer serious damage from tribal and regional differences, economic extremism,
and ideological zealots (India, Cambodia, Ethiopia, et al). Some of the Third
World will find an outlet for its frustrations in self-defeating assaults on great
power economic relationships and in hamstringing the effectiveness of a variety of
international forums.
9. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums
in a number of areas. These will stem from increased expectations and a percep-
tion of the growing economic gap between less developed countries (and classes
within countries) and the developed world. Areas particularly susceptible to
this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco,
Approved For Release 2000/04IC -RDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04//1A(~F1p f DP82M00311 R0001 00130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
India, possibly Indonesia, the Philippines, and, in Latin America, Peru, Ecuador
and Bolivia. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by some au-
thoritarian governments, particularly those benefiting from increased oil revenues,
but these will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term
and transferring power to successors. The resulting turbulence can present
temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing differences or to great
powers desirous of extending their influence. Such turbulence will also exist
within advanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional minorities
turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims against more and more deli-
cately tuned and interdependent societies.
10. The acceleration of events will be characteristic of the years ahead.
This will come from improved communication and transportation, sharply re-
ducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international
problems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence and
inflate national or political pride, posing further handicaps to successful ne-
gotiations. There will be a resulting tendency towards shorter attention spans
for individual situations and a need for simultaneous perception and manage-
ment of a multiplicity of international relationships. Many national or interna-
tional institutions are simply not structured to cope with accelerating change.
Such change will occur most conspicuously in the fields of science and technology,
but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological,
industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic impacts.
Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects will be
needed on an increasingly rapid or even immediate basis.
Part II-The Role of Intelligence
1. General. The primary charge on intelligence during these years will be to
provide accurate and pertinent information and assessments with respect to
the increased range of problems requiring US decision. In particular, the need
will be for advance notifications of forthcoming policy problems and, of course,
for tactical early warning as well. These responsibilities will be especially im-
portant in an era of accelerating events so that diplomacy, negotiation, or other
benign initiatives can head off military confrontations between states or other
disruptive events. The acceleration of events and the explosion of information
will also require a major effort by the intelligence community to identify major
policy and negotiating issues, to process raw information into manageable form,
and to devise adequate techniques to identify for consumers the essential ele-
ments of foreign situations, the reliability of our assessments, and the likely
impact of alternative policy decisions. Intelligence will increasingly be expected
to provide assessments of the intentions and likely courses of action of foreign
powers, in addition to their basic capabilities. To do this will require inter-
disciplinary analysis which melds economic, technological, sociological and
cultural factors with political and military data.
Approved For Release 2000/04I : CTATRDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04 ?6J DP82M00311 R0001 00130002-6
ET -
No Foreign Dissem
2. The USSR. The USSR will remain as the major intelligence target. Its
military power, its economic role in the world, and its foreign policies will con-
tinue to pose major problems for American leadership, Intelligence will be ex-
pected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and economic
activity. It must follow Soviet efforts to acquire advanced scientific and tech-
nological assistance and the potential impact on both military and economic
capabilities. It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of Soviet
political dynamics and intentions. These must be supplemented by clear and
accurate forecasts of likely Soviet courses of action in the political, economic,
and military fields. While a small percentage of this material will become avail-
able through open exchange and access, vast fields of highly important informa-
tion will be kept by the Soviets within a closed society, requiring extraordinary
efforts to obtain and understand them. A particular requirement will be ac-
curate and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitation agreements made with
the Soviet Union. In the military field special attention will be focused on Soviet
research and development, in particular with respect to weapons and supporting
systems which could substantially affect the balance of power. These will in-
clude antisubmarine warfare, ballistic missiles, satellites and advanced-tech-
nology systems. Intelligence will be required to identify and maintain a base-line
capability for tactical intelligence coverage, for rapid augmentation in case of
local or general confrontation or conflict. Trends and actions in Soviet leadership
and political doctrine will be a major subject of interest to assist in negotiations
and to warn of undesirable developments ahead. The Soviet role abroad, either
directly through diplomatic means or indirectly through party or subversive
means, will be a matter of particular attention with respect to the turbulence
of the Third World.
3. China. China will continue to be a second but still important intelligence
target. The closed nature of Chinese society will make it difficult to assess any
turmoil within the country or threats China might pose abroad. The latter will
become particularly important as Chinese strategic power grows and comes to in-
clude capabilities against the United States itself. It will also apply to Chinese
political activities and intentions in view of China's influence in the Far East and
ties with and aspirations in the Third World.
4. Europe. Europe's efforts toward cohesion will be a constant and major
intelligence target in view of United States economic and security interests in
the region, and the importance of Europe to the overall relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Intelligence collection in Western
Europe will be in great part a matter of following open political, economic and
military activities. The challenge will lie in pro 5;K@ useful assessments of their
significance and likely future developments.
25X6
Approved For Release 2000/04/ 1 i-kDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04/1W/F-DP82M00311 R0001 00130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
Europe will be a constant collection and assessment target, in order to determine
political developments vis-a-vis the USSR and the military and political strength
the East European nations individually and collectively bring to the Warsaw
Pact.
5. Economics. Economic intelligence will increase in importance world-
wide. This will include economic situations in nations having a major impact
25X6 on the world economy and on relationships with the United States, such as the
Arab oil states, , major suppliers of food
and raw materials, and nations where internal economic chaos can create major
world problems out of sympathy or resonance (e.g., India). Economic intelli-
gence of value to US policy makers is necessarily international in scope, includ-
ing such topics as the activities of multi-national corporations, international de-
velopment programs, regional economic arrangements, and the working of in-
ternational commodity markets. In some cases, nations with close political and
military ,~~ to the United States may become important economic intelligence
targets,
6. ter Priorities. Intelligence will increasingly be expected to warn of and
explain new situations posing problems to American interests. An example will be
to identify the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in Third
World countries, so the component elements of these problems can be isolated,
negotiated about or countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may require in-
tensified efforts on our part to understand and communicate the differences
between societies, cultures, and nation personalities. Intelligence will be called
upon more often to assess the threat of terrorists against US installations and
private enterprises abroad and, beyond that, the risk that some terrorists may
acquire nuclear weapons.
7. A few of the major problems which will be either the subject of dispute
or negotiation, or sometimes both, and consequently will be priority intelligence
requirements, can be listed:
(a) Rates of production, consumption, and pricing of raw materials and
energy sources and international commodity arrangements;
(b) Price and non-price restrictions on international trade, including
transportation and communication services;
(c) The international payments mechanism and the coordination of na-
tional fiscal-monetary policies;
(d) National policies with respect to military sales and foreign business
activity and investment, including policies toward multi-national corpora-
tions;
(e) Arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, and crisis avoidance;
(f) Jurisdiction, exploitation, and relationships in the oceans and on
sea beds.
Approved For Release 2000/04/'1F8K-RDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 20001OAll
R0001 00130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
Part III-Implications for Intelligence Planning
1. General. The prospect is for further reduction of resources through infla-
tion, with a need to cover a greater range of intelligence requirements and an
information explosion. New collection systems must be developed to cope with
technological advances in target entities. Because of the greater increased data
flow expected from collection systems already under development, greater empha-
sis will have to be applied to the development of more sophisticated processing
systems, analysis and dissemination techniques. A third major planning area will
be in the refinement of requirements and evaluation systems to ensure the appli-
cation of available resources to priority needs and the most effective distribution
of intelligence tasks among components of the Community. The Community will
need, finally, a different mix of manpower to meet both the substantive and
technological problems which will be confronting it in future years.
2. Collection vs. Exploitation. Over the past decade, management focus and
the allocation of resources have been directed especially to the application of
advanced technology to the collection and, to a lesser degree, the processing of
intelligence data. This has been highly successful, resulting in major substantive
advances in our knowledge, particularly with regard to the military capabilities
of the Soviet Union. This investment has made a major contribution to the nego-
tiations required for detente. Technological progress will soon reach a point-
insofar as new capabilities in the photo and signal intelligence area are con-
cerned-which will present us with large problems of success.
Within the time frame of this document, an important and pervasive problem
facing the Intelligence Community will be to ensure efficient exploitation of the
enormous amounts of information it will be collecting. Exploitation means not
only sifting, selecting and analyzing the most relevant data, but also the applica-
tion of advanced techniques to transfer that data from collectors to analysts and
the analytical product, in turn, to the ultimate users of intelligence-all in the
most meaningful and useful form we can devise. New styles of using information
and the relationships they can portray may force new styles of policy deliberation
that will differ markedly from those of the past.
Action: Study and planning must be initiated by Intelligence Community
agencies concerning:
(a) The rapid processing of raw information received, including the
selection and discard of non-essential material at the earliest possible time,
identification and accelerated dissemination of critical material, and the re-
duction of manpower and investment devoted to lower priority material;
(b) Development of improved techniques and disciplines of analysis
and production;
(c) Development of improved methods of presentation.
Approved For Release 2000/04F*CBITRDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/0,~tj~j41RDP82M00311 R0001 00130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
3. Demands vs. Resources. Another problem of great magnitude facing the
Community over the next five to ten years will be the changing (and in all prob-
ability increasing) demands for intelligence while available resources for intelli-
gence decrease in real terms.
In the past, the major portion of our intelligence effort has necessarily been
deployed against the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and our other adver-
saries, actual and potential. Even assuming a period of genuine detente, much of
this military focus must be maintained because of the importance of the subject
to national security and the need for information on the quality of potential
enemy weapons systems. It must not only serve to keep us alert militarily, but
also support negotiations and verify arms limitation agreements. At the same
time, the demands for other types of intelligence are growing. The result is a
probable net increase in demand with a new proportionate mix among political,
economic, military and technological target objectives.
This simultaneous shift and increase in requirements are occurring in a period
of serious resource constraints and continuing inflation. Until very recently we
have had the freedom to invest resources in a number of functional areas simul-
taneously without undue difficulty. This is no longer true. We will have to accom-
plish our objectives without the benefit of significantly greater resources. We
must find trade-offs in the systems we use, the areas we cover, and the depth
of the data we seek.
One area which holds promise for greater efficiency is the national/ tactical
interface. Current studies seek to identify ways by which national programs can
better support tactical requirements, and vice versa. As more capable and flexible
systems come into the national inventory, they must be made to serve the needs
of operational forces as well as national-level consumers. Modernized systems and
procedures which, by their design, permit greater mutuality of effort between
national and force support activities should enable trade-offs achieving net re-
source savings.
Another area can be the optimum interrelationship among overt and clan-
destine, and technical and human sources. Costly or risky clandestine techniques
must be employed only if overt sources cannot be successful in obtaining needed
information. The technical can in some cases substitute for human effort, but
certain types of critical intelligence-e.g., about opinions, plans, and decisions-
are best, and sometimes only, collectible by human sources.
We should explore the possibility of greater future reliance on other nations
for intelligence contributions, e.g., in the technical field. At the same time, some
of our most crucial scientific and technical collection systems are located on
friendly foreign soil. We should begin contingency planning in case it is necessary
to relocate or restructure the support of major technical collection resources.
Approved For Release 2000/04/1 :RDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04/Af a - DP82M00311 R0001 00130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
A final area of greater productivity is in better utilization of intelligence.
With due respect for the protection of intelligence sources and methods and na-
tional security information, intelligence can be more broadly disseminated and
sanitized for service to subordinate civil and miltary government elements, the
Congress, the public, and friendly and allied governments.
Action: Study and planning must be initiated by Intelligence Community
agencies to:
(a) Increase flexibility of responses to changes in priorities for intelli-
gence coverage;
(b) Identify areas in which intelligence coverage can be reduced to a
base-line maintenance level, permitting rapid augmentation in case of in-
creased need;
(c) Examine techniques by which national programs can contribute
better to departmental needs and vice versa;
(d) Examine areas subject to overt and human source collection, reduc-
ing the need for clandestine or technical operation;
(e) Develop programs to improve the productivity of intelligence re-
sources in qualitative terms;
(f) Review possibilities of greater foreign contributions to US intelli-
gence, and prepare for contingent changes in present program;
(g) Examine possibilities of increased utilization of intelligence through
sanitization, wider dissemination, etc.;
(h) Examine possibilities of greater utilization of reserve military in-
telligence organizations in performing non-time-sensitive intelligence tasks.
4. Technical Systems. The great accomplishments of present and projected
technical collection systems must not conceal the fact that a major crisis is arising
in the future. This stems in part from the necessity of solving the problems of
processing and presenting the material collected, noted above. Also of great
concern is the pace of technological change, which increases the complexity of
targets at a rapid rate. This poses the danger that present collection systems
will become obsolescent very quickly. Still, the technology of collection and
processing also advances so that new potentials appear at shorter intervals. A
governing restraint on exploiting these new potentials comes from budget and
inflationary pressures. Because of long development and production cycles, the
conflicts among these factors must be resolved at early stages, requiring the
Intelligence Community to study and plan to:
(a) Identify technological trends in target complexes which will close
off access and initiate planning for upgrading current collection and process-
ing systems to assure future coverage;
Approved For Release 2000/0 bTATRDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/0g/ Ekc 4 RDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
(b) Research and develop new techniques of collection and processing
to capitalize on technological change to give access and coverage to new
targets of importance;
(c) Ensure that substantive intelligence need rather than technological
improvement momentum drives investment in upgrading or replacing cur-
rently operating and productive systems.
5. Requirements and Evaluation. Taking advantage of potential trade-offs
will require systematic evaluation of the total effort, and the forging of a much
tighter link between the allocation of resources and the substantive intelligence
result. A start in this direction has been made with the KIQ/KEP, but success
will require an increasing commitment from the entire Community. In particular,
the Community must demonstrate flexibility in reducing at least to a maintenance
level intelligence activities providing only marginal results in the circumstances
of the time.
A key factor in the better evaluation and more efficient use of resources
will be a far better definition of intelligence requirements, both short and long
term (the latter in particular with regard to 'R&D). Today the Community
has a confusing variety of means, methods, vehicles and even language to de-
termine and state requirements. Ways of restructuring the machinery for gen-
erating and communicating requirements must be undertaken on both Com-
munity and departmental levels. Thus study and planning is required to:
(a) Interrelate the procedures at tactical, departmental and national
levels for generating requirements, so as to ensure optimum satisfaction
of each;
(b) Improve communication among intelligence users, producers and
collectors to reduce bureaucratic rigidities and improve the responsiveness
and flexibility of the intelligence machinery at all levels;
(c) Produce periodic evaluations of the products and performance
of the Intelligence Community against current primary or maintenance
level requirements;
(d) Develop orderly procedures for evaluating user satisfaction and
dissatisfaction with intelligence products.
6. Manpower Implications. The future responsibilities of the Intelligence
Community establish new needs for manpower levels, academic and scientific
disciplines and language capabilities. This will be particularly true with respect
to human source collection, where depth of cultural knowledge plus greater
capabilities in scientific and economic disciplines will be needed. The analyst
of the future will have to be comfortable with electronic tools. In our preoccupa-
tion recently with manpower reductions, investment in new talent, training and
career development, and exposure abroad may have suffered. This cannot be
Approved For Release 2000/04 ' VC& DP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04/~ %t- DP82M00311 R0001 00130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
25X6
permitted to continue. In particular, steps are needed to deepen our knowledge
of foreign cultures and thought processes through language fluency and foreign
residence, especially with respect to nations important in political, economic
or military terms (e.g., USSR and Eastern Europe, China, Latin America, Arab
States,_ South and Southeast Asia). We must enhance our ability to do
interpretive, estimative assessments of trends abroad and their effects on US
interests. This is an area where a modest increment of resources, more in salaries
and area studies than in rising manpower totals, can produce large returns.
Collectors and producers must extend their ability to cover both scientific
and liberal arts subjects-intelligence must be equally comfortable in either or
both of the "two cultures." And the Intelligence Community must undertake
affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunity to keep fully in step
with national and government-wide trends.
Advanced information processing and presentation techniques will pose
particular manpower training requirements. Indeed, the Intelligence Community
should be in the forefront in placing new technologies in the service of users.
New methods of analysis, forecasting, coordination and presentation of informa-
tion must be energetically explored and applied where appropriate. Care must
be taken in the application of such new methods and systems to ensure they
are designed for the people who will use them and that adequate training in
their use is active and integral to the process.
The Intelligence Community must study and plan to:
(a) Assure that training and familiarization are undertaken in new
methods of collection, analysis and production, particularly in the use of
new technical capabilities to increase productivity and precision and save
manpower;
(b) Develop selection and training programs in those foreign languages
and cultures which will be important intelligence targets of the particular
agency in the 1975-1980 time frame (especially Russian and Chinese) ;
(c) Ensure the availability of technical and academic talents and ex-
pertise in the subjects which will be of importance in the years 1975-1980,
e.g., economics;
(d) Flexibly reduce manpower commitments to lower priority activities
and reduce (or reorient to new requirements) the persons freed by such
change in priority;
(e) Develop and apply affirmative action plans for equal employment
opportunity.
7. Security. The Intelligence Community must develop a satisfactory resolu-
tion of its needs for the protection of sources and methods and the American
Approved For Release 2000/04fC_BI'RDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/Q 11j f--RDP82M00311 R0001 00130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
public's right to information about its Government's activities. This may require
new legislation, the development of new ways of informing the Congress and the
public of the substantive conclusions of the intelligence process and clear standards
for compliance with the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 11652
(and their exceptions) in the Intelligence Community.
Approved For Release 2000/04/'i8 8K-RDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04gPGftItA f DP82MOO311 R000100130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82MOO311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/045k,IRDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
No Foreign Dissem
Approved For Release 2000/04/*If1-LDP82M00311 R000100130002-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82MOO311 R000100130002-6
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP82MOO311 R000100130002-6