BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR AUGUST 7 EXCOM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00531R000800040003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 6, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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iur atlAti
(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
August 6, 1969
SUBJECT: Background Material for August 7 ExCom
I have attached a copy of a revised talkin paper to replace
the one I sent you on August 4 Our reason for
revising the paper was to insure is ere was no misunderstanding
that the issue was one of security and policy implications of SALT
rather than the arms control satellite initiative as several people
have been led to believe.
We have removed the arms control satellite initiative text
from the issue and have appended it as an information paper relating
to the verification of any arms limitation agreement that may be
reached sometime downstream. We are not proposing that it be
addressed as an issue by the ExCom at this time.
I have also attached a copy of this discussion for your use.
NRO 2nd Review Completed
4/3/2007
NRO review(s)
completed.
MORI/CDF Pages
2-15
TOP SECRET
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The Issue
-Should the ExCom encourage an NSAM 156 Committee. consid-
eration of the security and policy implications of SALT with respect
to the NRP.
Background
In early September 1968, the U. S. began preparations to enter
negotiations, with the USSR, aimed toward reaching an agreement
to limit strategic arms. The State Department proposed to enforce
such an agreement by "maximum, or if necessary, exclusive
reliance on national means of verification, meaning all types of
observation satellites, as well as other surveillance activities
'carried out by one side -- either unilaterally or in conjunction with
its allies -- outside the territory or territorial waters of the other
side. "
The problem, as presented by State, was to permit the negotia-
tions to proceed on this basis and at the same time develop a policy
which would maintain U. S.. freedom of action unilaterally to conduct
reconnaissance satellite operations and prevent foreign political
and physical interference with the conduct of these operations.
The essentials of the State proposal were these:
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1. Reclassification of the fact that the U. S. is conducting satellite
reconnaissance from Top Secret
SECRET.
security systems with regard to acquired intelligence, capabilities,
and operations of reconnaissance satellites.
3. Revelation to the Soviets that "national means of verification"
includes the use of reconnaissance satellites.
4. Establishment of a negotiating position based on the assumption
that "one side will not impede the operation of the other's reconnaissance
satellites.
5. Providing NATO general information on the U. S. negotiating
position on verification.
6. Briefing Congress on the U. S. position on verification and
capabilities for verifying the proposed agreement through national means.
7. Maintaining a discreet position in response to press inquiries
and in official public statements, with preparation, to eventually acknowl-
2. Continuation of the,present TALENT-KE.YHOL
edge "maximum reliance on national means of verification" and the
inclusion of the use of satellite photography in such means.
On September 9, State submitted the proposal for NSAM 156
Committee consideration.
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The NRO reacted very quickly to this proposal, meeting with
representatives of the CIA, JCS and NASA to develop opposition to
the basic proposal and to suggest an alternative.
On September 13, 1968, the USIB considered the security aspects
of the State proposal and decided that "there should be no change in
the classification of reconnaissance satellite operations or the in-
formation derived from them at this time. "
On September 16, 1968 the NSAM 156 Committee met, discussed
the matter at some length, and arrived at no specific conclusion.
Those in attendance reported that all parties were to prepare recom-
mended guidelines and furnish them to State.
On September 26, 1968 ACDA issued a proposed guidelines
paper for comment by NSAM 156 Committee members. This paper
was a decided improvement over the earlier (September 9) proposal.
It did not ask for a downgrading of the security surrounding "the fact
of" satellite reconnaissance. It restricted the proposed discussions
"information-gathering" satellites, with no further, definition
authorized. Consultation "with Congress" was changed to "selected
members of Congress" and was to be done on a classified basis.
Constraints were placed on what might eventually be said to the press,
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with the statement for release limited to "the U. S. is prepared to,
'place maximum reliance on national means of verification. "
Although some of the rationale expressed in the paper was objection-
able, the NRO agreed that there had been a general improvement in
concept.
In late.October 1968, the urgency of the negotiations dissipated,
and SALT entered a waiting phase.
On March 6, 1969, the President, in NSSM 28, directed the
preparation of a U. S. position for possible strategic arms limita-
tion talks with the Soviet Union. Alternative options were to be
developed by a steering committee under ACDA chairmanship for
consideration in preparing the U. S. position. The options were to
be accompanied by an evaluation of the strategic balance that would
result, as well as by a discussion of possible Soviet reactions to
each and likely U. S. response. A statement of principles and
objectives was also to be developed for each option, together with
proposed tactics for its use in relation to the proposal.
On May 1, State submitted for NSSM 28 Steering Committee con-
sideration a new paper which set forth the general guidelines for
handling the question of observation satellites in connection with
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SALT. The new paper was practically a word-for-word copy
guidelines paper issued by ACDA on September 26, 1968.
On May 14, NASA formally urged NSSM 28 Committee consid-
eration of a possible new Administration initiative in strategic arms
limitation: bilateral negotiations on verification means to include
the development and utilization of an open satellite system' designed
for the single purpose of verifying U. S. and USSR adherence to
treaty conditions. NASA was emphasizing the potential of this
initiative in:
1. avoiding disclosure of the existence, scope, utility or
sophistication of the present overhead reconnaissance program,
2. minimizing concern over international confrontation on
this issue,
3. providing an important bulwark to the unimpeded continua-
tion of covert intelligence gathering activities,
4. providing a reasonable overt basis for the possible challenges
that might become necessary in the event treaty violations were dis-
cerned through any covert means.
Current Status
At its meeting on May 14, the NSSM 28 Committee approved the
State proposal as a basis for drawing up instructions to the SALT
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delegation and for planning consultations with Congress and our
allies.
The alternative proposal for an Arms Control Satellite initiative
was remanded to the NS.AM 156 Committee for examination at a later
date.
Discussion
It is apparent from our discussion with participants in NSSM 28
activity that the Committee's concern with the basic requirements
of the various U. S. options for SALT has completely overshadowed
its recognition of the profoundly adverse effects that any disclosure
of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program could have on the
security of this nation.
Once taken, the disclosure action is irreversible. No matter
how much the nation might regret its action, its options would be
foreclosed.
Disclosure does not enhance our negotiating position; in fact,
it is counterproductive since our persistence in discussing satellite
reconnaissance surfaces our heavy dependence on it and, by in-
ference, indicates the limitations of our more conventional capabilities.
Disclosure excites curiosity and in negotiations would elicit
a pressure for more and more credibility. The path from a dis-
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low
closure of "the fact of" to total revelation then becomes very short
and swift.
A disclosure of satellite reconnaissance could well prejudice
and even tacitly outlaw other space intelligence techniques as well as
ground collection methods.
Disclosure affords the Soviets the high ground in the challenge
to "continue negotiations or tolerate U. S. espionage" since we are
almost uniquely dependent on satellite reconnaissance for our
intelligence information. and they are not.
Disclosure would inevitably excite Soviet interest in protecting
its sensitive targets. Disclosure would renew their interest in
developing methods -- operational or standby -- of hampering or
incapacitating our operations in a necessarily permissive environ-
ment.
Most nations accept satellite overflight tacitly; they know it is
being done and will not react unless confronted publicly with the
fact. Disclosure is, in effect, a confrontation. It forces each nation
to reassess its attitude toward U. S. satellite reconnaissance in terms
of prestige, sovereignty and popular reaction. It is likely that many
neutrals would be forced by that public reaction to join the hostiles
and to announce that henceforth their nations.would not be overflown.
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The Soviets could easily negotiate on one hand and sponsor a clamor
of protest (in some neutral or non-allied nation) on the other.
Friendly nations would be shocked by the disclosure and would feel
that they had been sold short in negotiations with a common adversary.
While disclosure could result in a possible gain in Congressional
support for arms limitation negotiations because of the specific
assurance regarding a reasonable basic U. S. capability to verify,
it could also become a major political issue, irrespective of timing
or degree of disclosure. It would undoubtedly trigger a clamor
for information on related covert and clandestine operations and an
apprehension and uneasiness over undisclosed aspects of the arms
limitations negotiations.
With the American public, disclosure could develop a knowledge-
able support for U. S. intelligence collection activities or perhaps
create widespread dismay over official. confirmation of an espionage
activity, especially with the well informed, vocal sector'which will
understand the violation of the international intelligence code. Dis-
closure would certainly have a tremendously disruptive effect on the
existing security control systems.
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Recommendation
We need a clear statement of policy which will permit the U. S.
to continue, without foreign political or physical :interference, to
conduct a unilateral satellite reconnaissance operation and at the
same time, enable it to proceed in negotiations with the USSR
toward reaching an agreement to limit strategic arms.
We are recommending, therefore,
a review and consideration
by the NSAM 156 Committee of the security and policy implications
of SALT with respect to the NRP. We would expect such a review
and consideration to provide for U. S. participants, both in prepara-
tory SALT activity and negotiations with the USSR, a clear statement
of U. S. policy on satellite reconnaissance and explicit, guidance as
to how U. S. SALT activity and negotiations must proceed in the
light of this policy.
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Verification and the Arms Control Satellite Initiative
A major problem in preparing a basis for SALT is that of a
credible means for verification of any agreement to limit strategic
arms. There is little question that the U. S. must rely, to some
degree, on the covert satellite reconnaissance program to provide
this means. The concern then centers about any acknowledgement
Ao the Soviets, either publicly or privately, of our reliance on this
means for verification and the attendant requirement to disclose the
existence, status, extent or effectiveness of the covert satellite
reconnaissance program.
An option to develop and employ an overt. arms control satellite
for the single purpose of verifying adherence to the conditions of any
agreement would, if accepted, appear to offer several advantages.
It would not require the revelation of the existence, scope or utility
of our covert program. It could provide a reasonable overt basis
for any necessary challenges on violations discerned through covert
means, and thus provide a strong support to the unimpeded continua-
tion of the covert program. If accepted as a reasonable ,venture in
the SALT arena, it would minimize our concern over international
confrontation on the issue of satellite reconnaissance. Its acceptance
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and application would provide a step forward in increasing the tacit
acceptance of satellite observation as a reasonable governmental
operation. It would underline the U. S. commitment to the peaceful
uses of outer space.
The approach could essentially be one in which the U. S. would
negotiate with the Soviets an Arms Control Satellite to be developed
and operated (1) jointly by the two nations, or (2) bilaterally, like
the US-USSR meteorological satellites, or (3) nationally, with each
nation agreeing to build and operate its own. In each, case, the U. S.
development agency would be NASA.
'The satellite could be defined in terms of whatever emerged
from the negotiations.
By
working in this manner, outside the NRP, ACDA could avoid con-
fronting the Soviets (and the rest of the world) either publicly or
privately with the reality of a major U. S. intelligence, collection
program. Perhaps even more important -- if that is possible --
ACDA could also avoid domestic confrontation with Congress and
the American public. Finally, if the initiative were successful,
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the U. S. would have achieved a measurable step toward legitimatizing
satellite observation at some to-be-negotiated level; if the discussions
failed, they would do so without jeopardizing the NRP.
An Alternative Approach
Discussions concerning the U. S. capability to verify a SALT
agreement have generally led to equating the term "national means
of verification" with the covert satellite reconnaissance program.
It is very likely, however, that the verification of any agreement
would require the use of collection capabilities of the other pro-
grams supporting national intelligence needs, i.e., the CIP, the
CCP and the CIAP. A disclosure of the details, or in some cases
the existence, of any of these activities is of equally significant
concern.
Another option would appear appropriate in light of this concern
that is, a proposal which permits negotiations to proceed without a
definition of "national means of verification." The U. S. delegation
would simply state that the U. S. is prepared to rely on unilateral
verification, capabilities to an extent practicable for 'any specific
strategic arms limitation agreement. The delegation would not be
authorized to elaborate upon the verification capabilities.
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The most significant advantage of this option is that if a limita-
tion agreement could not be reached with the Soviet Union, national
intelligence capabilities would not be disclosed, nor would operations
be impaired. A revelation of the scope, utility or existence of
,covert /clandestine elements of the national intelligence programs
would not be required. This option would not force us to provide a
basis for Soviet or third country challenges of U. S. collection
activities. Such an option should be acceptable to the Soviet Union
for generally the same reasons it is acceptable to the United States;
sensitive and valuable intelligence collection activities remain un-
disclosed and unimpaired.
Initial SALT consultations with the NATO allies and Japan have
been conducted. This option would permit further briefings to our
allies on general verification capabilities until specific limitations
have been negotiated with the Soviet Union. Similarly, specific
verification capabilities probably need not be discussed with the
Senate prior to negotiating a tentative agreement with the Soviet
Union. This would correspond to previous approaches to Senate
consultation (e. g. Outer Space Treaty).
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It must be understood, however, that while this option affords
an excellent position for the initiation of negotiations, it has the
disadvantage of forcing the revelation of some degree of verification
details once an agreement has been reached and is ready for further
NATO consultation and Senate ratification. This advantage is
inherent in any option which does not contain a means of verification
which may be discussed openly.
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