SECURITY REVIEW OF HANDLING OF MICROFORMS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000100010051-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: April 5, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Information Handling Committee
Inc/MI 79-08
5 April 1979
MEMO12AN})UM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee
airman, geu-e 111"J"Lc'LLviL
Handling Committee
SUBJECT: Security Review of Handling of Microforms
within the Intelligence Community
1REFERENCE: Memo from Chairman, DCI/IIIC dtd 12 June 1978,
same subject
.1. In accordance with the reference memo, the intelligence
Community agencies (CIA, DIA, NSA, Air Force, Arm),, Navy, and State)
completed phase one of a detailed review by internal agency staffs of
currently practiced security procedures and practices involving micro-
'forms. The review was to determine to what extent the handling of
microforms of intelligence documents met the requirements of Executive
Order 12065, related implementation directives, and the NSC directive
governing classification, declassification, downgrading, and safeguard-
ing of national security information.
2. The reviews dealt with the nature of the medium and the security
aspects involved in the transmission, storage, reproduction, utilization
and destruction of microforms. The findings of the reviews within the
various agencies were nearly in total agreement. The following are the
most serious of the problems for which the working group found no ready
solutions:
a. It was unanimously agreed that the basic security problem
of microforms stems from their Small size and hj_l ree o ta
QW12action. The accidental removal or surreptitious use of
microform documents is and must continue to be a concern to all.
While this fundamental issue should be confronted by the Security
Committee, it should be noted that the underlying problem is not
unique to microforms and any proposed controls should be no more
stringent than those required of rz.thcr sophisticated data handling
stems.
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b. Routine destruction of microforms was also cited as a pro-
blem. The only certain method of destruction for all types of film
is burning. This is effective for small quantities; but since the
film bases have a very high kindling point, destruction requires a
fire that is fueled by a substance other than the film. Thus, large
quantities are difficult to handle. A concomitant problem is the
large volume.of toxic smoke produced by the film itself. Certain
chemicals are effective for destroying images on some types of film
but the working group found that there is no single chemical com-
mercially available which is capable of destroying images on all
types of microfilm (i.e., silver halide, diazo, or vesicular).
Similarly, pulverizers suitable for destroying paper documents are
not considered effective for destruction of microforms, especially
those which have been reduced more than 100 times standard print
size.
c. Nearly all agencies reported difficulty in complying with
accounting procedures for microfiche copies of controlled documents
requiring copy numbers. The use of copy numbers on microfiche
copies of controlled documents involves technical problems, especially
in a high volume production operation. In spite of an extensive
review of commercially available systems, no agency knows of a device
suitable for this application.
3. Other problems include:
a. Ambiguities which exist in current regulations with res
ect
p
to procedures for handling documents. For example, paragraph 4-404
of Executive Order 12065 states "paper copies . . . of TS documents
are subject to copy number and distribution controls." No mention
is made of microfilm versions of paper documents, although it is
assumed that they are expected to be subject to the same kind
of security controls as paper documents.
b. Handling procedures that are either technically infeasible
or extremely costly when applied to microforms. For example, the
requirement to re-mark a document to reflect new downgrading,
declassification, and upgrading instructions. To accomplish this
'would require re-marking the original document, re-filming it,
distributing it to the original addressees with instructions to
destroy the outdated copy along with its reproductions.
_ _ _. ~~ ",~ dv4 1a111 fit VV1G11t5 wttULI1 are i.nnerent in the
handling of microforms, and the lack of known means of dealing with them,
the working group recommends that:
a. The physical security problem cited in subparagraph 2(a),
which concerns the problem of small size and high degree of data
compaction involved in microforms, be considered by they Security
Committee as a matter of priority to develop recommendations for
specific application to the microform environment.
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b. The Security Committee investigate further the security
problems cited in, subparagraphs 2(b) and (c) regarding the de-
struction of inicrofonns and accountability and control procedures
using contractor assistance as necessary.
c. The Security Committee and the IHC work jointly to review
procedures outlined in the various ecurity documents in detail to
clarify.requircments which are meant to apply to microforms as well
as paper documents, as described in subparagraphs 3(a) and (b) of
this memorandum. Where procedures are determined to apply to micro-
forms STAT
as well as paper documents, the two Committees should in each
case provide guidance as to how those requirements should be mot.
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