REVISION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RELEASE AND DISCLOSURE POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000100010060-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: May 23, 1979
• Content Type: MFR

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
23 May 1979
SUBJECT: Revision of National Intelligence
Release and Disclosure Policy
1. By memorandum to the DCI dated 15 May 1979,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, C.W. DUNCAN proposed that
the recommendations made in consequence of a 1978 compre-
hensive review of Defense Department policies and practices
governing the flow of intelligence to NATO were in consonance
with the DCI's recent initiatives involving decompartmenta-
tion (the APEX study) and offered for DCI consideration
a proposal to establish a working committee under the
Policy Review Committee with the charge to develop a wider
national release and disclosure policy.
2. Salient features of the proposed action call for:
? development of a statement of national
interest in improving the controlled flow of
classified information to our allies which
includes:
-4- development of a policy document which
derives.its authority from the NSC,
-a addresses release of both classified
US information and foreign intelligence with
NDPC having policy responsibility for classified
US information and NFIB holding responsibility
for development and promulgation of policy and
procedures for release of intelligence information,
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-? address release and disclosure of all
sensitive compartmented intelligence, currently
regulated by NSCID's as.well as collateral
information,
--? be applicable to all 'Departments and
Agencies of'the Executive Branch,
.-?-- make every effort to separate source
data from substantive intelligence,
-?- simplify release procedures.
3. Objectives in addition to establishing this wider
national. disclosure policy document under the authority of
the SRC include:
? Relief from the widely applied case
by case review process,
? fixing responsibility with all US
collectors of military intelligence for the
identification of non-source revealing sub-
stantive intelligence and, therefore authorized
n o
f
--- ---
o i
In advance
isseminate in support of NATO and other allies, and
? extending authority to sanitize and dis-
closure to key DoD elements responsible for the
analysis and production of all source military
intelligence.
? The key objective is an unencumbered
flow of non-source compromising data to allies
on a timely and accurate basis.
4. The proposal would radically change current authorities
and procedures.
? It would invest in thePolicy Review
Committee a specific charge it does not now
have under E.O. 12036, Sectio 1-2 to address
foreign release policy.
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? It would remove from the NFIB its
charge in E.O. 12036, Section 1-401 to advise
the DCI concerning (d) arrangements with
foreign governments on intelligence matters.
? Delete the authority of the DCI
expressed in Section 1-603 of E.O. 12036 for
"full responsibility for production and
dissemination of national foreign intelligence",
and,.
? in Section 1-601 to formulate policies
concerning intelligence arrangements with
foreign governments and coordinate intelli-
gence relationships between agencies of the
Intelligence Community and the intelligence
or internal security services of foreign govern-
ments,
? infringe upon the authorities of
Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community
to "disseminate intelligence to cooperating
foreign governments under arrangements estab-
lished or agreed to by the DCI"; E.O. 12036,
Section 1-711,
? cancel the DCI's delegation to his
Security Committee to "review ar%d formulate
policies and procedures governing release of
intelligence to foreign governments and inter-
national organizations..." "with respect to
foreign disclosure, ensure that releases are
in consonance with US security policy, should
result in net advantage to the United States
and that the intelligence itself is accorded
a degree of protection equal to that afforded
by the United States...".
5. The DCI requested that I SA/DCI,
convene a small group and consirrese~ ms's
proposal. The group met on 22 May!1979. I offered the
following observations and proposals:
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a. I believe that Secretary Duncan's
proposal may be well taken but raises serious
concerns in addition to administrative charter
issues. Among these are:
(1) A possible misinterpretation
of the DCI's recent initiatives involving
review of our compartmentation programs.
Decompartmentation and sanitization was
not the primary purpose of the DCI's
review. Establishment of reasonable
security through a uniform special
access program over identified sensitive
operational and product intelligence
should not be viewed as concommitant
with an objective of providing an un-
encumbered flow of non-source compromising
data to allies on a timely and accurate
basis.
(2) Concern over the proposal that
all substantive intelligencezincl.uding
all sensitive compartmented intelligence,
should be authorized in advance for
release to:foreign allies as long as
it is judged to be non-source revealing.
This is the very apt~hesis of the recently
expressed DCI desil4 for a negative presump-
tion of release. of intelligence.
(3) The distinctions between military
;intelligence, classified US information and
national foreign intelligence. are unclear.
For example, "all source military intelli-
gence" is mentioned as including SIGINT
and satellite imagery-derived information.
Confusion on these categories offers
potential-for inadvertent release of
sensitive national foreign'intelligence.
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(4) No matter what safeguards or
procedures are established, the extension
of sanitization and disclosure authority
to key DoD elements responsible for the
analysis and production of all-source
military intelligence (including national
foreign intelligence?)-appears to be an
unacceptable delegation of DCI authority
with extreme potential for unauthorized
disclosure.
Our key objective is the
delivery of uncompromised and reliably
secret intelligence to United States
policy makers not to foreign organizations
.or allies.
(6) Consolidation of US policy
authorities, simplification of pro-
cedures for release and disclosure and
military commitments to allies and their
warfighting capabilities are questionable
issues in arriving at a net advantage to
the United States in the release of our
national foreign intelligence.
b. It was suggested that the DCI respond to
Secretary Duncan with a proposal that the matter
be first studied at the NFIB level.
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The study should be conducted
by either the DCI's Security Committee,
augmented as necessary,or by a working
group of NFIB representatives under the
chairmanship of a DCI appointee. The
study should be similar to the 1978
review of DoD policies and practices
governing the flow of military intelli-
gence to NATO but should address the
current mechanism for the release of
national foreign intelligence and propose
recommendations for DCI consideration.
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