NOTE FOR MR. ROBERT GAMBINO FROM (SANITIZED)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP82M00591R000100050007-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 27, 2006
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 24, 1978
Content Type:
NOTES
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Approved For Release 2006/11/27: CIA-RDP82M00591 R000100050007-0
TOP SECRET
24 October 1978
NOTE FOR Mt. Robert Gambino
1. This isi fourth shot at getting us
to take on clearance accountability. I have discussed with
Ted Shackley on three different occasions our reasons for
not taking over the responsibility for keeping SCI Access
Approval Records.
2. 1 propose that I write a note to Shackley giving
my opinions and conclusions that I will not recommend this
transfer of responsibility. Attached is my note.
3. If this is not acpeptable,'it might lead to a request
to meet with you. Should that happen, let me know and I
will you a few additional groups to counter the best
thatias to offer.
r SECRET
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'WW NWF
TOP SECRET
NOTE FOR Mr. Ted Shackley
RE: Access Approvals
1. I have reviewed and discussed the fourth proposal
to transfer Access Approval responsibilities from CT to
the Security Committee.
2. As I mentioned during previous meetings on this
issue, I see no value to bringing the Security Committee
into this matter at all. Need-to-know continues to be a
command decision. The roles of COMIREX, SIGINT Committee
(and now the NRO) in the tasking and development loop more
adequately address their special competence as to what it
takes to get the job done and what price in the way of
additional access approvals must be paid. Your proposal
continues need-to-know with appropriate authorities and
only adds an additional, unnecessary processing layer on
the system.
3. Your memorandum to the DCI presents misleading
emphasis to the one occasion when he Sp I city Committee 25X1
assisted in staffing a request for ccesses. I
can think of no occasion when all nmittees and
the Special Security Center were involved in processing
requests. The Security Committee has carefully not inter-
ceded in this process.
4. There is no intention of establishing under the
Community Security Group responsibility for a centralized
computerized data base of all SCI approvals. The CSG has
no functional role in this area at this time, and none is
planned for the future. The CIA Special Security Center's
Compartmented Information Branch is the home of the community
service on special access certifications and records. They
handle SPECLE. Any upgrading of this service of common
concern would be located within CIA, not the CSG. Any
effort to upgrade the SPECLE system is years away. Further,
NSA has taken no steps toward inputting their COMINT clearances
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into the SPECLE System and other departments and agencies
are only slowly doing so. Since the only source for
developing figures on access approvals is the SPECLE system,
the incomplete data base we have today would be inappropriate
to use in reporting trends to the DCI.
5. In view of any lack of net gain in either timeliness
or accuracy resulting from transfer of responsibilities for
access approvals, I could neither support the proposal nor
recommend that the Chairman, Security Committee endorse it
to Mr. Blake.
Top SECRET
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