SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SECURITY POLICY ALTERNATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000100050089-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 89
• Publication Date: September 7, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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CONF iV~IA i "~..
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Satellite Reconnaissance Security
Policy Alternatives (C)
1. (C) We have reviewed the final issue paper on
Satellite Reconnaissance Security Policy Alternatives and
find the paper basically incorporates the conflicting views
of the differing parties on this matter. It would appear
that probably more weight was given in the editing process
to the State/ACDA position of opting for declassification
of "fact of" without further study.
2. (C) We did note that under the heading IMPLEMEN-
TATION CONSIDERATIONS, the final paper confines those con-
cerns as solely re ated to release of imagery. The point
was made more than once to OSTP that we believed that these
considerations applied to both declassification of "fact of"
and release of imagery, and that the original Work Group
paper had stated it in that fashion. It was our belief
that OSTP had agreed to incorporate that belief into the
paper during a final consultation last week.
3. (U) The paper contains some unfortunate redundancies
which we attribute to hurried editing but, since the paper
is now on the street, it is not worth dwelling on at this
time.
*NSC Review Completed*
OS 8 2471
E2 IMPDE"T
CONFIDENTIAL CL BY-064594
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4. (C) We believe that the points that need to be
addressed during the Space Policy Review Council (SPRC)
meeting include:
a. Declassification of "fact of" solely
for SALT II without proof of capability, i.e.
release of imagery, is an empty shell which will
not convert any Doubting Thomases.
b. The thought of. merely informing the
-Soviets of our declassification intentions as
opposed to entering into consultation with them
strikes us as ill advised in view of past Soviet
concerns. The State Department representative
should be asked to shed light on this problem
as well as advising if there have been any recent
discussions with the USSR in this area. The same
would apply vis-a-vis the allies and the lesser
Developed Countries.
c. Assuming all agree that at least some
imagery must be released to reflect the ability
of the United States to monitor arms verification,
an expression of concern should be made to reflect
Intelligence Community concern about enabling the
USSR to take action to take better protective and
concealment action against observation.
d. We continue to be concerned with the
possible loss of classified information with the
declassification of "fact of." Although the paper
suggests that a security plan to maintain intelligence
discipline, there will remain a body of formerly
cleared people who will react with a variety of
interpretations over the meaning of declassification
of "fact of" and some will undoubtedly believe that
such declassification includes declassification of
"facts about," and this may do serious harm to over-
head collection programs.
CuNFIDENTIAL4J
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fIDEN-
e. Most importantly, we understand there are
political reasons for desiring an immediate decision
to delcassify, followed by development of an imple-
mentation plan. However, we are hard pressed to
understand why any adviser would suggest to the
President that he make a decision without adequate
prior staffing. We would hope that the DCI, or
his representative, would raise that point at the
SPRC and recommend that the suggested two month
study be undertaken prior to a decision to declassify
"fact of."
5. (U) We will continue to follow this issue with interest
as it makes its way toward decision..
cc: D/Security
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
2 DD/A
1 - D/Security
1 - D/Security
1 - OS Registry
1 - SECOM Subj
l - SECOM Chrono
SEC M/WJReilly:efn (7 Sept 78)
Page 3 Retyped:jep (7 Sept 78)
Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security
,,,,INFInENTIAL
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Please LOX one coPY~
Under Secretary of the Air Force
401000 Pentagon
697-8531
D r?ectcr, 3atiDnal Security Agency
9A197 Ft. Meade
688-7111
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
3E258 Pentagon
695L7353
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
6531 New State
632-0342
Deputy Director for Administration
8 CIA Hgtrs.
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
6E60 CIA Hqtrs.
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
irrq rya I;gtrs .
Thanks,
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N%dC 78-5244
..r'
5 SEP 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Under Secretary of the .fir Force
i rect r,, t tiarzal Ses~2ri ty Agency
Director of Intelligence and Research, k
Department of State .
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to, the DU for Collection Tasking
'3irector, De"ease Intelligence Agency
FROM:
Deputy to the DC1 for Resource Management
SUBJECT: Satellite Reconnaissance Security Policy Alternatives (C)
1. (C) An issue paper on this subject is forwarded for your review
and cox ent (see Attachment 12 . It will be the basis for discussion at a
special Space PRC meeting on 13 September.
2. (C) We have participated in the preparation of this paper and
leave s ubirr? tted s td f ~ 1eve? conr+ents orr tNv pre0oas bra f'ts. r u>~Qr,
some of our significant comments have not been incorporated. The comments
we submitted were coordinated with your representative on the fnteffi-
gence Community Civil Space Policy Working Group (see Attachment 2).
3. (C) I would appreciate it if you would provide cue wtth your
formal comments on this I- u e b COU Friday, 8 S ber 1 78. Please
forward these comments to (CHB, Room l telephone
Attachments:
7. Sate77 t to Recorrna tssance Security
Policy Alternatives
it t& l i fence CO t ni ty Civil
Space Policy Working Group
Representatives
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AlT ATICALL'Z VEcLASMlH-LO l
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August 31, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: ' -The Secretary of State
n,e Se xetarg a? Zeiet'se
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
ragrect,zm, office- of SciecLce amd `Cechanlogy Policy
SUBJECT: Space Policy Review Committee Meeting
The attached de -nc-rrt was extracted front the ongoing civilian space- Po-lice
review. Because of its national security elements, declassification &f the
ss azat 3.y i~~~=rg
"fact of" [?,aororecornalssarrce sarellizea W111 ue aiso-053E-6
a Space Policy iieview Committee meeting an September 13, 1913.
Christine Dodson
Staff .Secretary
5rc r =US (,)(2)
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%"P~ N40
A. POLICY -SETTING
When tlse unit~3 ~cates started its space reconnaissance program in the late
1930's and early 1960's, there was considerable uncertainty as to foreign
reaction. The Powers U-2 incident in 1960 emphasized the high potential for a
major confrontation and embarrassment, yet the need for strategic intelligence
was overpowering. The US strategy was Co be as unobtrusive as possible,
keeping the existence of the program covert and avoiding the necessity for
foreign acknowledgment. In concert, the civil space program and benign appli-
cations were emphasized in public and led, over the years, to implicit general
acceptance of remote earth sensing for a variety of purposes.
It is common knowledge that the US,and the USSR use satellite reconnaissance
ronitor}ng techniques. For example, a .recent book by former DCI William
Colby--cleared by the CIA prior to publication--discusses the use of overhead
photography for arms control verification purposes. Secretary of State William
Rogers stated. in 1972 that surveillance sateliltes were one of the means used
to monitor SALT 1. Sack in the mid-296&'s President 3ohnson in a speech in
te.waessee extemporaneously stated that the US used satellite photography to
observe Soviet ICBM deployment. He added that this activity alone justified
the oxj?Y.S?diture: on our space program. Furthermore, President Carter stated
dnr,ag a ~tareh 1977 radio call-ice program that "as you probably know, with
:pace satellite photography we . . guarantee the security of our
PD/NSC-37 revised the security policy for space intelligence activities by
downgrading the fact that the US conducts satellite r>?c >7flaissance fcr inte'LLi-
gence pure uses--wit;gout aisciosLa& the generic tyI. --tn C.Q ISERTI9_i ;VMS)
PD/NSC-37 specifies that the special product controls (over imagery and other
space-derived data) is to be used sparingly by the DCI.
This section examines two possible revisions to the current policy:
F::zal, a simple deClarati?:e declassification only of the fact that satel-
14te p}:ti t.t. ectr:~naissance. is one of the national technical means used by
ere es'S f.--Tr- c ~rif lcst:cra of c~~r~Z3 rice with SJ 7 ana nt.hrz alms c9T~t'to1
agreements.
*On the recent yampiles espionage case--involving alleged sale of sensitive
##'L'i::dW~Ia~N~YJz~ L.,?' t' ~~ r sn~??isYSI n ml tea admit the "fact of" Vhotoreconnaissance
but also facts abour the capabilities of US systems- in orJer tie pros :;ate
Kampiles.
.1. 3CK M.2)
vi .lu..T rfis`fvyt
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 i~Wadqd(FqrtW~ate 2 t i1 : IA E?f'& &1 11 OO6 6656685 1ectively
declassify and"1r_ase photoreconnaissance intigence imagery for,
furthering economic, social, foreign policy, defense, and prllftical
objectives of the US.
OF"
a' T.BC AAeCTSTCp '~ L/fit*tr OF THE "fiTLA C: L
LJ L`~e J+e5J.1 i a i v.T. a~ ?'r 1'1
Benefits and Risks. Claim is made in public forums that the SALT II agreement
now being negotiated is unsound, in part because of public perceptions that the
Soviets cannot be trusted to comply with its terms. Opponents of a SALT agree-
me^,r charge that the S'aviets .ic t: teated Oct AL? I aad brat ene ~S ai
.In. d !quote ;,7111ty ti 2' wzify seas aaFZ7ce W h S LT H. In, snsverirg these -
charges, government spokesman are prohibited from "officially" stating that the
?IS conducts satellite photography to monitor Soviet compliance with SAIX. They
are,.restricted to using the euphemism National Technical Means (NTM) when
describing those elements of our verification capability. Members of Congress
.have been briefed on US monitoring techniques, however, and the fact that ?ATM
includes satellite photography is widely recognized and accepted by the press.
and much of the informed foreign affairs cotmpunity. The; term NTM, however, may
be lost on less-aware segments of the lay public. Direct referral to satellite
photoreconnaissance can alleviate any feeling in the public mind that the
Administration is being evasive and is trying to cover up an inherently weak
case for SALT. This, however, may be inadequate and it may also be necessary
to discuss facts about these capabilities to help allay public concern that we
can adequately verify Soviet compliance with the terms of the agreement.
Freclass lfyirg the "fact of" photo--satellite reconnaissance might enable go' ern-
ment spokesmen to make a more effective case for a SALT 11 agreement. The
tiilit tz sefex tv, sred:!hle inte.iligence capabiiitiea might help allay public
concern that we can adequately verify Soviet compliance with the terms of the
agreement.
There are, owever, risks assrrci eed w1rh t'h ~~sla;sifiesrit of the ""fact
of." , They are.
--- The classification of the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance has served as
the :first line of defense for the security of overhead intelligence
programs. Titter declassification, US agencies and officials could be
and .r ptess'ire, both ler,al f Freedom of information Act (FOIA) ( and other-
t,% prn?t'de eve-t ircteasicng infcttronatioa about t e recactnafssactce
programs, as well as imagery itself, Acknowledgment of imagery could lead
to further prob-ing and speculation about even more 'ensttLve sar_aLL.f tes.
Some agencies believe this pressure may be virtually irresistible and
irreversible. Other agencies believe that the line case be drawn in this
case as in others (e.g., nuclear weapons deployments), especially since
the 'fact of" is already widely 2cnowtt, even if not otEtctallyy acknowledged.
-2.
SECRFS iliii's (B> 2 )
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Even thoQ Ie FOS ~~:sa~t~~ 6~i~/L~e C S PR MOQ5f3'A+E~JOdTrl~l -~mP~i .
cations that t'no Soviets have a similar Capabf 'Tfty. there may be adverse
Soviet reaction to a public statement to the effect that we use Photo-
satellites. Subsequent harmful consequences in various
arms cant: t'l risculzions (e. g. , ASAT, CTS) and other outer-space issues
also could result. At a high level we would need to inform or consult
with the Soviets on the scope of and reasons for any change in US policy
prior to any announcement that might ensue.
There may be adverse reaction in the 1B Outer Space Committee to official
US acknowledgment of its photoreconnaissance activities, particularly on
the part of the developing countries. Some have already e-xpressed concern
that civil remote sensing, activities pose a threat to their military and
economic security. Such acknewledgment could result is increased pressures
for controls on remote sensing from satellites and possibly demands that
"military" satellites be banned. On the other band, the fact is already
widely known, and increased demand for access could likewise result.
Acknowledgment in the context of SALT verification, however, wou24 likely
be applauded by developing countries _
C. ISSUE FG DECTSTOIN ON "FACT OF's
Some believe that, with appropriate preparation, the "fact of" can be declassi_
tied now with real but acceptable risks to intelligence security and to US
foreign and &'mestjc policy. According to this view, we could proceed to
publicly acknowledge that photo-satellite reconnaissance programs are among the
means used by the US to verify Soviet compliance with SALT and other arms
control agreements. They believe there is an obvious, courraonsense value to the
forthright admission of what is already widely known. Furthermore. they
believe that implementation plans should be developed prior to public announce-
ments on this ,utter. Such plans could be prepared within a few weeks and
would include:
. Presidcntial directive that (1) declassi.firatiau of "fact of" is limited
to photorecoirnnissartcc for verification of SALT and other arms control
ac;rea_rttents and that (2) all. data derived from overhead reconnaissance
remain t_ lassified and comp~ttntextted in accordance with existing Videllines.
A security plan to maintain intelligence discipline.
-- A roan of action for informing Congress,, our allies, and the Soviets prior
to a public announcement.
Contingency planning to deal with reactions of other countries and a
thorough set of Q's and Vs.
Others believe that the "fact of" can be declassified but that not enough in
presently known about the near- and long-term impacts on US satellite reconnats-?
sauce and suggest that a study of a few months is required to make the best
M
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 passible, Rehhdm 1aarlid&19TQr,Qt-ffGf!&~ 91RGOOM005 fQrs from
acknowledgement of We "fact of," Without some Pub~Vf use of Information or
imagery fret space reconnaissance, is of limited value. Further, they believe
that prior to a decision on implementation more study is needed over the next
few months. This study would evaluate the ramifications of declassifying the
"fact of" and develop a full and detailed execution plan that would include: a
security plan to 4Lta .CZtain intelligence discipline; a detailed consultation
strategy with the Congress, our allies, the Soviet Union, and members of the UN
Outer Space Cor=irtee; and contingency strategies by responsible agencies. They
also believe that the implementation considerations outlined in the discussion
on declassification of photographic imagery should be taken into account in any
decision on the "fact of" as well. Essentially, under this approach the
decision on declassifIcatIoa of the "'fact of`" In the context of SALT verifica-
tion would be deferred for the few months necessary to complete the more
detailed review.
D. DECLASSIFIC.ATIDN OF PNDTDRECO NAISSA) CE IMAGERY
Any decision to go beyond declassification of the "fact of" and to additionally
include a selective and phased public release of'photoreconnaissance imagery or
information from space reconnaissance increases both risks and benefits. Any
steps taken In this area either measured or decisive would represent a signifi-
cant Administration initiative in space that would have worldwide impact. [
Llniike other mator space initiatives--Fpollo or solar poet satellites---
dec 3.,ssi fi cat S cm would not have a budget impact. It is believed that the risks
and the potential long-tent benefits of such a policy revision warrant a care-
ful ssessme~ t of this possibility before acceptance or rejection. But, of
course, such an assessment would be pursued only if the "fact of" were
declassified.
Br-nefi is ____ it ks. The- broader use of p-r a tly- lc~.salf e data
could well be an efficient meRns of meeting -pertain domestic needs for an
authoritative data base supplementing (ear In some cases replacing) imagery
sources currently available to the private and public sector. For example,
stereoscopic imagery of cartographic quality has already been collected over
much of the world. Its exploitation has been largely limited to government
intelligence and mapping functions. Its value to mineral and petroleum
expl.cration--either in raw image form or as analyzed thematic geological map
g)roducts --is Likely to be hlgb, representing a quantum Increase in the r set cra-
tionn data base.
Other potential economic applications of such data include, land use, disaster
assessment and relief, environmental monitoring, forestry inventories, and crop
productivity. Some of these applications require the repetitive coverage being
offered by civil systems and not envisaged for intelligence systems which might
E,e avaiLib e to the civil car=unity. 5o.-me ci1*11 uses Would benefit from the
availability of a high-quality imagery data base in many instances even if it
were quite old. If a decision were made to do so, much stored imagery could be
Zad'e available today from suer performance reconnaissance systems no longer in
operation as well as currALntly collected imagery.
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SALT :;, f;exibilitt' could be provided in the 1)S innternational affairs by
less-constrained use of remote sensing data. Vexif:abiiitY and verification
could be more credibly demonstrated with the release of imagery or information
derive chart rcm. Peacekeeping possib,lities might include private or }ublIc
release of v=a:sual evidence or information and ana2ysle o"t smpena.Yrr,g cris?a?,
Prosti'e attune, or threaterli.ng situations (weapons shipments, border viola-
tions, nucleaz capabilities); economic development information could be pro-
vided without sr.b erfuge as to data sources.
The risks associated with limited declassification of satellite is agery can be
categorized as follows:
-- Imagery from -"Mteiligence systems provides information on militarily
'` sibs if1ca:t targets such, as airffeLds, missile deployments, etc. With
frequent monitoring, mi'Llrary deployment and levels of military production
can be determined. As these capabilities are appreciated--more directly
relevant to the national interests of the non-major powers--we could
c pret resistance and pressure for restrictions by other countries.
_- S~stb ?istio^ure tz?~sid be Qxpect.ed to beer to questtaes as to the legiti-
macy of military uses of outer space systems. The Outer Space Treaty
reserves the use of space for "peaceful purposes." Some states, such as
.ga r. rr, ~rdva already called for rl rrfiitaxizatirrn of space. The release of
imagery could exacerbate these Derr:ands.
The Soviets have maintained the basis for flexibly distinguishing between
legiti ate and illegitimate remote earth sensing. They recognize a
sanctuary only for "NITh's." Use of cameras in space for other purpnses
{..,1 +.?$. C .a.....+^?~.$. ~'.. _..?"fiJ...2
+......a~+ . they i.a^.tt:?5 pc,ti~.~r f to +r a the
ic+
imsgery surely would stimulate discussion throughout the international
community--nor Just the communist bloc, but the non-alligned countries
as well as our allies--of limitations an remote sensing. The Soviets may
also use the release of imagery to attempt to justify their ASAT activities.
Disclosure of selected imagery provides some information on the design and
capabilities of the imaging system. For film return systems, this may be
more ac!ceprabie, although the i.mplicat1ons could cause adversary nations
to increase concealment measures.
The security ri k in unclassified use of the products of the latest
operacioeal systems would be high. A policy of unclasslfled release of
the most o rrent imagery could not be readily re'ersed. Thus, the e:ctent
to which the decision to declassify satellite imagery would impact on a
later option to provide special security protection for new systems must
be carefully weighed.
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S!;ould the add! r, r,na,+ decision re taken to select vely rele-ase l ~,gery , a
number of additional factors would have to be taken into account in formulating
an :.mpfeanentation, plan. Certain of rhe factor's are summarized b t w.
The USSR. The USSR is sensitive to world opinion about the relative tethno-
2a9ica2 capabilities of the LAS and the Soviet Union. Comparisons between
Soviet and US imagery capabilities produced by US release of imagery, would
toad to cast :ire USSR in an unfavorable light. Second, the Soviets could view
a public policy c;?.ar ,e as casting doubt on their ability to prevent "e-spio^.ae"
from outer space. For internal and international prestige reasons, they might
choose to take a hard line, including a more negative posture in SAT rnegoe.i-
atious, au -merrteri deveiopment of their ASAT systems, and renewed efforts In the
UN 'to estab.)Lisft strinent Limitatir)tls on. the conduct of remote sensing activi-
ties. .'Last, declassification could be viewed as a form of international. "one-
up4manship" by the US, especially in light of current US-USSR tensions. If
imagery release were contemplated, any assessment would have to examine whether
to inform the Soviets 'beforehand of the scope, purposes, and timing of any
release. The Soviets would react more strongly to a 'OS decision to release
imagery than to dec:las sifAcation of the "fact of." High level prior consulta-
tion with the USSR tray be necessary In view of our tacit agreement with them on
photorecornaissance use. hs such, a risk-benefit analysis of declassifying
imagery must take. Soviet reactions into account.
Intelligence Secur4y. The classification of the "fact of" satellite recon-
naiasance has served as the first line of defense for the security of overhead
sssace intelii-t nce programs. After declassification, US agencies and officials
would be under considerable pressure to provide more information. More
imSsortartcly, tui raver, information obtained from photography alone is often
:u higuoius; intelligence judgments are derived from analysis of data from a
variety of sources. We should not compromise other intelligence sources and
afec?t4--kds as a ccsu2c of rel aslag photography. .Fell-thought-out strategies of
Information release and management of requesss are necessary preconditions to
eve*rt take seeps toward declasslflcatioa of Imagery.
T.'i;;1orOr?e- Tnsuea. Ilecisfons on the future organization of the US route
eosins pro ra r wc,tsf c he i pcacted by decisions to zelease pTev-ionslp z l ssifie'd
imaV,ery. If the US sets up a new organization structure for remote sensing
from apace, for c~.asslnle, this could raise issues concerning, the future eana%e-
ment of satellite reconnaissance, particularly if the imagery presently classi.-
fied were (3ecl'ssilied for wider civil application, Selective release of
.im2~geTj would also blur the line B een civilian and military-intelligence
remote sensing. Our heretofore highly touted international policy of open
disseminatior. of remote sensing, data abased on acknowledgment only of MASA,
data) would lose credibility, and new policies would have to be examined.
SFa- .:,T Z,Ms IB j1 )
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 There isAjj'rqYf F ft~~~%e I ls~pa-LA Pe Q~~ 'qQWt under the
FDLA and that, in allT probability, legal proceedings could force disclosures
wt S.'d.~.,'.dzo~? t..E' t e ~