RESOURCES FOR PERSONNEL SECURITY (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000100060088-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 88
• Publication Date: June 28, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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2 8 JUP1 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Resources for Personnel. Security (U)
1. (C) With the concurrence of the National Foreign
Intelligence Board (NFIB), I have approved issuance of a
directive (DCID 1/16) providing policy and procedures on the
security of foreign intelligence in. automated data processing
(ADP) systems and networks. NFIB discussion of this matter
focused on personnel security considerations bearing on
system access. The Board noted that we do not yet have fully
reliable security software for ADP systems to guard against
unauthorized access to volumes of sensitive data or modifica-
tion of data bases. The consensus was that we can best guard
against these problems by ensuring that persons authorized
access to ADP systems holding sensitive data have had personnel
security investigations sufficient to verify their bona fides
and to provide reasonable assurances of their loyalty and
trustworthiness. The new DCID 1/16 requires persons access-
ing a central computer facility or its terminals when the
system holds sensitive compartmented information to have a
TOP SECRET clearance based on prescribed background investi-
gation requirements set forth in DCID 1/14.
2. (C) I am aware that DCID 1/16 will require Defense
(particularly for the Military Services) to conduct more back-
ground investigations than they do now. I recognize that this
carries resource implications, but I am convinced that the
modest amount involved (roughly $2 million) is marginal when
contrasted to the direct cost benefits of sharing ADP systems
and to the value to national security of maintaining the security
integrity of sensitive intelligence. I therefore seek your
assistance in ensuring that sufficient -resources are made
available to conduct adequate background investigations on 25X1
military personnel and Defense employees who will have access
to sensitive intelligence in ADP systems.
STANSFIELDc,TURNER
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Approved or Release 2006/06/15: CIA-RDP82MOO591 RO
 Approved For Releasej006 kI:-G'I~Aa1R~7M00591 R000
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
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21 June 1975
MEMORANDUM FO1R:
THROUGIII:
fROfl:
SUBJECT:
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the DCI for Support
Robert W. Gambino
Chairman,-DCI Security Committee
Resources for Personnel Security
(U)
. I. (U) Action Requested: Your signature on a proposed
memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on personnel security
resources.
2. (C) Background and Discussion: The NFIB, at its
6 June 1978 meeting, corxsi ered~a~irI-concurred in a revision
of DCID 1/16 to provide policy on security of intelligence
in ADP systems. During Board discussion, General. Aaron spoke
to problems the Military Services would have in meeting the
personnel security requirements the DCID would impose on
those needing access to an ADP system holding compartmented
data. A majority of Board members agreed that the present
lack of ADP hardware and software to block penetration or
data base manipulation in a shared or widely accessed system
needed to be compensated for by maintaining strict standards
of investigation for those permitted system access. DIA and
the Services had asked that the DCID allow much lower personnel
security standards. This was to permit them to comply both
with the DCID's other provisions and with Defense's internal
policy of limiting personnel security investigations in the
interests of cutting costs. The Board noted that the esti-
mated $2 million cited by General Aaron as the extra costs to
Defense of reasonably thorough investigations appeared marginal.
when weighed against the benefits of ADP system sharing and
the risks involved. in permitting superficially cleared people
to access sensitive data in ADP systems. In approving the
DCID, the Acting Chairman directed that a. letter be prepared
to the Secretary of Defense describing the issue and seeking
GU0!F 1UUUT +'L
Approved For Release 2006/06/15: CIA-RDP82MOO591 ROO
 Approved For Relea006/06/15: CIA-RDP82M00591 R0000060088-0
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SUBJECT: Resources or Personnel Security (U)
his cooperation in making adequate resources available to
conduct the necessary investigations on military personnel.
Those resources are not in the NFIP. The attached proposed
memorandum has been coordinated with the Deputy to the DCI
for Resource Management.
3. (U) Recommendation: That you sign the attached
proposed mentora it wii.
Attachment:
Memo to SecDef
Robert IV. Gambino
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