DRAFT EXECUTIVE ORDER ON PERSONNEL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000100100020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: August 26, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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SECOM-0-272
26 August 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
a rman, ecuri y Committee
SUBJECT Draft Executive Order on Personnel Security
1. This is to alert you to a potential problem which has been
and may again become of direct concern to the DCI.
2. Last fall OMB circulated a draft revision of Executive Order
10450 to establish "suitability requirements for Government employment."
That was the outcome of an effort ("Project-Ten") begun in mid-1974
under the auspices of the Domestic Council's Committee on the Right of
Privacy. The Project Ten task force (from Civil Service, State, Treasury,
Justice, and chaired by Defense) did not provide for Intelligence
Community input to the drafting process. That task force concluded,
reasonably enough, that existing personnel security practices in the
Government vary excessively, and are sometimes insufficient to provide
adequate security assurances. Their draft revision of E.O. 10450,
however, went much too far in trying to prescribe uniformity and provide
for employee and applicant rights of notice, rebuttal, and appeal. The
DCI objected strongly to the draft Order, noting the inadequacy of the
proposed standards for access to sensitive intelligence information and
the apparent conflict between the draft Order and his statutory termination
authority (copy of his memorandum at Attachment A). Shortly after the
DCI letter was sent, OLC contacted the attorney in OMB who was staffing
the proposed Order. He was very unreceptive to OLC's suggestion that a
meeting be arranged to discuss the serious objections to the draft
(Justice as well as DCI), and made it clear that OMB would run the whole
show--considering agency comments and revising the draft as it saw fit.
The OMB General Counsel next wrote the DCI asking for particulars on changes
the Intelligence Community believed needed to make the draft Order accept-
able. The DCI did so (copy at Attachment B); asked that he be kept
informed of future developments in this area; and stated his desire for
Intelligence Community requirements to be reflected fully in the later
draft, or, absent such, that the Community be exempted from the Order's
provisions. Nothing further was heard of this matter for several months.
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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE 0"'Y
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SUBJECT: Draft Executive Order on personnel Security
4
3., In early 1977, the Security Committee, recognizing that we needed
a current evaluation of what personnel security investigative procedures
were necessary and useful, arranged for a pilot study of such among
Community components. The study, done during the March-,May 1977 period,
did not include enough cases to justify final conclusions, but highly
tentative judgments suggest that neither the Community's standards expressed
in DCID 1/14 nor the proposed Order's standards are as closely keyed to
current circumstances as they should be (the DCID seems closer to the mark
than the draft Order). We hope to obtain Security Committee concurrence to
extend the study to obtain enough data to justify arguments for new
personnel security investigative criteria, and to have the study cover all
Community agencies (CIA did not fully participate in the spring study).
We will have to have a comprehensive study and analysis of our own if we
expect to rebut effectively the arguments of Civil Service and Defense on
what is and is not needed in personnel security coverage.
4. The basic issue surfaced again in June 1977 in the PRM-29 exercise
to review and revise the security classification system. The Defense
representative on the PRM-29 Ad Hoc Committee argued that the new Executive
Order on security classification should prescribe uniformity in personnel
security standards. His goal was uniformity at the standards of the draft
revision of E.O. 10450. The PRM-29 Ad Hoc Committee decided against him,
but agreed that the wide disparity in personnel security standards for
access to information of the same classification level was unacceptable.
The report to the SCC on PRM-29 deliberations recommended SCC approval of
expanding the effort to revise E.O. 10450 so as to cover personnel security
for all needing access to classified information--Government employees,
active duty military, and contractor employees. The SCC concurred. We
expected that this expansion of the subject (E.O. 10450 covers only
civilian employees; contractors are covered by E.O. 10865; military per-
sonnel by Defense regulations) would logically entail setting up a new
working group to examine the matter from the new, broader context. So far,
not so. At the 25 August 1977 meeting of the drafting committee for the
new Order on security classification, I I asked about the status
of this matter. Mr. Kienlen, OMB, sat responsible for revising
the E.O. 10450 draft; that he was close to having a finished version, which
would be sent out by OMB for formal comment when completed; and that he had
no plans to set up any meetings to consult with agencies which had concerns
in this area. Mr. Kienlen has no background in intelligence or security.
The bottom line here appears to be that the ongoing approach to revising
the Order on personnel security is likely to give us a new draft not much
more responsive to the Community's needs than was the late 1976 version.
25X1
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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
 -IMINISTRATIVE - INTE~gL ~1 F Ni
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SUBJECT: Draft Executive Order on Personnel Security
5. You may wish to bring this potential problem to the DCIrs 4
attention, and suggest to him that he contact OMB or the NSC informally
on this matter to ask for a more open process involving the Community,
.I am concerned that if the process is not fully responsive to Community
interests and needs, the new Order in personnel security may cloud or
override provisions in E.O. 11905 which give the DCI authority to set
security standards for access to foreign intelligence.
Attachments:
A. Ltr to Hon. Lynn, dated 190ct76
B. Ltr to Hon. Lynn, dated 23Dec76
(w/o enclosures)
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SUBJECT: Draft Executive Order on Personnel Security
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee w/atts.
1 - IC Registry w/o atts.
1 SECOM Subj. File w/atts.
1 - SECOM Chrono Watts.
DCI/IC/SECOM
26Aug77
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~- l'a7f
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
19 OCT 1976
Honorable James T. Lynn, Director
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D. C. 20503
Dear Mr. Lynn:
This is in response to the letter of 6 August 1976, from
your General Counsel, requesting my comments on the proposed
Executive Order entitled "Suitability Requirements for Government
Employment. " A careful review of the draft Order has led me to
conclude that its standards and procedures do not afford adequate
protection to the Government's sensitive foreign intelligence
information or activities.
r
In light of my statutory and executive responsibilities to
protect intelligence sources and methods and analytical procedures,
it is of deep concern to me that only those persons of the highest
degree of loyalty and trustworthiness be granted access to foreign
intelligence data requiring protection. The minimum personnel
security standards and procedures governing access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information are contained in Director of Central
Intelligence Directive No. 1/14, which was issued pursuant to
Executive Order 11905, Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947,
and National Security Council Directives. DCID No. 1/14 applies to all
Government personnel and private individuals requiring access
to such information.
The proposed Order strikes at the heart of the process of pro-
tecting sensitive Government information and by its broad terms clearly
encompasses standards and procedures of crucial importance to the
Intelligence Community. The investigative procedures and the standards
whereby, under this draft Executive Order, an individual would be
granted clearances for access to sensitive information including intelli-
gence sources and methods, fall far short of those which I deem necessary
in light of my statutory and executive responsibilities. Furthermore,
I am concerned that the provisions of the proposed Order related to
purported rights of employees or applicants could be construed to
conflict with my termination authority under Section 102(c)
e m
~~j6-.19.6 ca
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of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This authority
vested in the Director of Central Intelligence reflects the necessity
that he retain flexibility and discretion in protecting sensitive
intelligence information and those positions involving access thereto.
In view of the basic differences between the proposed Order
and the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence,
therefore, I have concluded that the limited exemption provided the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, in Section 3(b) of the draft Order,
must be expanded in order to remove from the terms thereof the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community.
Section 4 of the draft Order also must be amended to make clear that
neither the Director of Central Intelligence nor any of the organizations
of the Intelligence Community, are required to accept or certify security
clearances granted by other Government agencies or departments pursuant
to this Order. I am enclosing with this letter amendatory language
to accomplish these purposes.
I fully recognize that amending this Order as noted above would
result in two standards for granting security clearances in the Govern-
ment. This burden, however, involving as it would some degree of
duplication and added expense, in my view is absolutely necessary if
the terms of this draft Order are implemented in their present form.
My decision in this matter was made only after concerted effort
to accommodate the requirements of the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Intelligence Community to the terms of this draft Order. The
many and substantial differences, however, dictate that this would not
be possible absent a redrafting of the Order to reflect fully the interests
of all agencies and departments affected; representatives of the CIA and
the Intelligence Community Staff were not consulted in the earlier drafting
deliberations. It is my view that the longer term interests of the
Government would best be served if every effort is made to develop
suitability and security requirements that are uniform and acceptable
to all agencies and departments, including the Intelligence Community.
I stand ready to assist in such an effort.
Sincerely,
Geaf-e-3ush
Director
Enclosure
Ws trilbut:i_on:
Orig - Addle
1.-DCi
1-DDCI
1 - C/Review Staff/0p' 1 - OLC Clirono
1 - D/Securi ty
1 - OCC
0LC : RLI3 : ndl
(30 Se
t 1
J 76
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p
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)
2
.1 - hR 1 - D/'CI/ IC
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%W W
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT EXECUTIVE ORDER,
"SUITABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE."
SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
1. Amend Section 3(b) by substituting the following for
the last sentence thereof: "This Order shall not apply to the
Director of Central Intelligence or the organizations constituting
the Intelligence Community as defined by Executive Order 11905. "
2. Amend Section 4 by adding the following sentence at
the end thereof: "Nothing in this Order shall require that the
Director of Central Intelligence or any of the organizations exempt
from this Order by Section 3(b) accept or certify security clearances
granted pursuant to this Order. "
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 1 76
$ 3 DEC V6
Honorable James T. Lynn, Director
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D. C. 20503
Dear Mr. Lynn:
In response to your General Counsel's letter to me of 2 November 1976,
I am enclosing herewith additional material explaining in detail my
opposition to provisions of the proposed Executive order entitled,
"Suitability Requirements for Government Employment, " which was
forwarded to me for comment.
As I indicated in my letter to you of 19 October 1976, I am concerned
that neither the Central Intelligence Agency nor the Intelligence
Community Staff was consulted in the process of drafting this proposed
Executive order. The problems inherent in the document are of such
magnitude that, in my view, the Intelligence Community should be excluded
from its provisions. I appreciate the understanding expressed in
Mr. Nichols' letter and in light ox his request for further assistance
in redrafting this order, .officers-,on my staff have carefully reviewed
the draft order and have identified and explained those provisions which
pose problems for the Government's National Foreign Intelligence
Program, in terms of suitability requirements for Government employ-
ment and, concomitantly, the granting of access to foreign intelligence
related information which it is my statutory responsibility to protect.
In light of the apparently substantial opposition to provisions of this
draft order by other. Executive agencies and departments, and considering
the problems identified by my staff, I must stress that, upon review by
your office of the material enclosed herewith, we be kept informed of
future developments to ensure that the needs and responsibilities of
the Intelligence Community are adequately reflected.
As I indicated in my 19 October letter-, it is my view that our efforts
should be directed toward developing a uniform program for suitability
and security requirements related to Government employment--a single
document that will form the basis for such programs throughout the
Executive Branch. In order to accomplish this, however, the
Executive order must establish clearly that the Director of Central
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Intelligence has the statutory responsibility and authority for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods; it therefore must be
unambiguous in recognizing that the standards for granting access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information and to intelligence sources and
methods are solely the responsibility of the Director of Central 4
Intelligence. To meet both of these objectives, the enclosure proposes
the addition of certain language to Section 4 of the proposed order.
Here and elsewhere, the draft Executive order must recognize that the
field of intelligence is unique and demands the use of certain procedures
not commonly utilized by other Government agencies and departments.
I trust this letter and the enclosed material will be of assistance
to your staff as they begin the process of redrafting this proposed
Executive order. I would only reiterate my concern that the views
and requirements of the Intelligence Community be reflected fully in
this Executive order. Absent this, my view remains that the Intelli-
gence Community must be exempted from the terms of the Executive
order, per the amendment I proposed in the enclosure to my letter
to you of 19 October 1976. It is my continued hope, however, that our
coordinated efforts to resolve the problems posed by the draft order
will result in the development of a program which in its scope and
effect will be most beneficial to the Government as a whole.
Sincerely,
`1s1 George gush
George Bush
Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/encls.
.1 - DCI w/encls.
1 - DDCI w/encls.
1 - ER w/encls.
- IC Staff w/encls.
1 - 0GC w/encls.
1 - OS w/encls.
1 - OLC Subject w/encls.
1 - OLC 0MB Liaison w/encls.
1 - OLC Chrono w/o encls.
OLC:RLB:hms (typed 10 December 1976)
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