RESPONSE TO CERTAIN RECOMMENDATION MADE IN A HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF REPORT ENTITLE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCEDURES IN THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000200120033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: January 22, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
22 January 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David McCabe, Chairman
Investigative Standards Working Group
STATINTL FROM:
Lxecu ive Secretary
SIJBJECT: Response to Certain Recommendations
Made in A House Subcommittee
Staff Report Entitled "Security
Clearance Procedures in the Intelligence
Agency"
The Security Committee has authorized the Chairman
to transmit the attached statement to the Subcommittee
on Oversight of the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence.
The Chairman requests that the statement be reviewed
by your working group as expeditiously as possible and
that appropriate recommendations for Intelligence Community
use be submitted to the Security Committee for its considera-
tion and approval. As specifically noted, the working group
should address items two, four, and five of the statement.
In addition, because of its close relationship to the others,
you should review item one from the standpoint of resource
impact and submit recommendations or comments on that matter
also.
STATINTL
Attachment
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - SECOM Subj
- SECOM Chrono
STATINTL SECOM. ;ns (22 Jan 80)
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
10 January 1980
Response to Certain Recommendations Made in
A House Subcommittee Staff Report Entitled.
"Security Clearance Procedures in the
Intelligence Agencies" *
1. Standards for Access to -122 Secret and SCI Should be
Su stantially the Same
The Security Committee concurs with this recommendation.
Given the definitions of the terms Top Secret and Sensitive
Compartmented Information, it is clear that they refer to
matters of the highest sensitivity. It is equally obvious
that the nation's interests require the highest practical de-
gree of assurance that persons given access to such infor-
mation can be depended upon to handle it properly. A Working
Group of the Security Committee currently is completing an
analysis of the effectiveness of the investigative standards
of DCID-1/14. While the study shows that it may be possible
to make some minor reductions in investigative coverage, the
Working Group's preliminary findings clearly indicate that
current standards of DCID-1/14 are both reasonable and. effec-
tive. Moreover, the analysis strongly suggests that the DCID-
1/14 standards should he augmented by certain additional pro-
cedures, such as the use of the polygraph process. The Security
* Published in September 1979 by the Subcommittee on oversight,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of
Representatives.
**See Page 9 for additional comments by DIA.
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Committee recognizes that some agencies face serious resource
problems and would have great difficulty in applying DCID-1/14
standards to Top Secret access investigations, at least in
present numbers and with the current period of time necessary
to complete investigations. Of the possible solutions to these
problems, the reduction of DCID-1/14 standards to the level.
of current Top Secret standards clearly is not in the national
interest. This leads inescapably to the conclusion that
adequate resources must be applied to raising current Top
Secret standards. The Security Committee believes that the
standards of DCID-1/14 are effective and that, barring some
minor revisions, they represent the least we can afford to do
when it comes to highly sensitive information. The costs of
meeting these standards must be accepted as a legitimate cost
of doing business. Any savings should be sought in ways other
than reducing the scope of investigation. The mandatory re-
duction of resources for the Defense Investigative Service in
the past few years led directly to a reduction in standards
of coverage for the Background Investigation that was con-
ducted for Top Secret clearance. The Security Committee
believes the Congress should consider the restoration of the
necessary resources to enable DIS to meet acceptable standards
for the Top Secret clearance.
2. Investigative Reports
The Security Committee strongly endorses the concept of
a positive standard for the granting of access to the most
sensitive information. In this sense, the standard of DCID-1/14,
"The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and
discretion and of unquestioned loyalty...," is of an order
comparable to the standard of E.O. 10450,"... clearly consis-
tent with the interests of national security...:' The concept
clearly anticipates that the decision to grant access shall
be made on the basis of information suggesting positively
.that the individual is reliable. The mere fact that nothing
"adverse" is known about the person, without some affirmative
indication of trustworthiness, is a poor premise upon which
to found a conclusion of such consequence. An inquiry which
results in nothing known about the individual, good or bad,
accomplishes little and gives a false sense of security. It
tells nothing of the person's maturity, judgment, discretion,
acceptance of responsibility or, for that matter, even whether
he is who he says he is.
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It is largely because of the need for positive infor-
mation, which the standards require and logic dictates, that
the Security Committee supports the concept of an investi-
gation of sufficient scope and of such quality as to offer
a reasonable level of assurance of the individual's trust-.
worthiness even under adverse circumstances.
The immediate question here is how detailed a report of
investigation needs to be to permit a reasonable assessment.
It is recognized that the more detailed a report, the more
costly it is to produce and that costs, or more precisely
reduced budgets, are a significant factor to be reckoned
with. We can accept, although not wholeheartedly, the possi-
bility that trained investigators might be relied upon to
perform "first echelon" adjudication, which is what "negative"
or short form reporting amounts to. This practice, however,
can present a number of difficulties while appearing to save
funds. The most serious objection to it is that experience
has more than amply demonstrated the value of full reporting
and especially of positive reporting to the continuing person-
nel security program.
Every security access decision must be an overall common
sense determination based on all available information, both
favorable and unfavorable. The "whole person" must be measured
against both negative and positive standards. Concentration
on the negative aspects alone presents a skewed and unrealistic
portrait of a person. Moreover, positive reporting is ex-
tremely valuable in any reinvestigation or updating program,
and it is indispensable in any serious defensive, counterin-
telligence oriented personnel security effort. Moreover, it
is critical. to any attempt to conduct "post mortems" or
analyses in the wake of serious personnel security failures.
Balancing the obvious value in full. and. positive reporting,
especially in the more sensitive areas, against the marginal
savings of short form or negative reporting, the Security
Committee endorses the recommendation of the House Subcommittee
and will amend DCID-l/14 to require investigative reporting
to include the positive as well as the negative aspects of the
finding of the investigations. *
* See Page 9 for DIA comments.
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3. Conduct a_Stud~ To Validate The Accuracy Of The Pol gra h
The Security Committee believes that the utility of
the polygraph interview as a part of security processing has
been demonstrated by empirical means, supported by the results
from nearly forty-six thousand polygraph examinations con-
ducted by CIA and. NSA in the past five years. These practi-
cal results, plus more than thirty years' experience, make
the use of the polygraph in security screening truly unique
and indispensable. Indeed, the available evidence shows
conclusively that the most revealing source of adverse infor-
mation is a polygraph examination of the person who is apply-
ing for access. We are unable to obtain such complete,
thorough, and detailed information from a background investi-
gation alone. Favorable polygraph test results afford an
important extra measure of security assurance. It should
also be emphasized. that the polygraph develops substantial
positive information, and that the great majority of persons
given the tests are approved for the access for which they
have been processed.
STAT
Polygraph examiners are selected on the basis of their
education, maturity, interviewing skills, intelligence, and
personality. Most are experienced investigators and after
selection attend training courses on polygraph technique
followed by at least six months of internship involving close
supervision. Advanced polygraph training is given annually
which usually consists of a full week of intensive study.
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STAT
The Department of Defense is currently pursuing the
feasibility of conducting additional. research into various
aspects of the polygraph through the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&,E)).
CIA's current research is directed at possible improvements
by the addition of distinctively new classes of sensors.
4. Establish Community-ide Criteria For Use Of The Polygraph
The SECOM has tasked its Investigative Standards Working
Group to consider establishing community-wide criteria for
use of the polygraph in screening applicants for SCI access.
It is envisioned that the Working Group would report its
findings and conclusions to the SECOM by May 1980.
5. There should be a.) more uniform investi aattive procedures
and a central investigating facility for SCI access
investigations
The Security Committee fully supports the desirability
of uniform investigative procedures. Clearly, a central
investigative facility would contribute significantly to a
more uniform procedure. There are substantial reasons to
believe, however, that a central facility may not meet the
needs of the user agencies adequately. As the Subcommittee
report notes, some member agencies currently use their in
vestiga.tors for multiple missions. It might seem to be more
efficient to draw off the investigators to servo in a central
facility devoted exclusively to special background investi-
gations, but that could prove more costly in the long run
if it required the maintenance of a staff to cope with the
remaining missions, particularly those which are subject to
peaks and valleys in demand.
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It should be observed that centralization, even on a
limited scale such as within the Department of Defense, has
not proven to be an unqualified success. Testimony before
the Subcommittee in the recent hearings revealed dissatis-
faction with the quality and timeliness of reporting by the
Defense Investigative Service. It would appear that the
larger such a facility is and the more remote it is from
its clients, the less able it seems to be to respond to
individual agency priorities. Moreover, the larger and more
centrally controlled it is, the more vulnerable it is to
resource cuts imposed without adequate consultation or
input by the user agencies.
The Security Committee will review the central investi-
gative concept to examine costs in resources, in quality, and
timeliness of reporting, impact on related missions, and
alternatives to offset disadvantages. As part of our examina-
tion we will also explore intermediate solutions to the
central problems of quality control and standardizations,
the most promising of which may be central training facilities
for both investigators and adjudicators. This task should be
completed by May 1980.
6. Access to Criminal Justice Records
The Security Committee strongly endorses any efforts to
make this type of information more accessible to the security
clearance process. Studies have indicated that criminal.
history information is the most productive investigative source
of the kind of information we can obtain concerning the charac-
ter and. trustworthiness of applicants for highly sensitive
work. It is very clear that several jurisdictions in the
United States are sharply curtailing our access to this data
and others are beginning to follow suit. This trend, unless
turned around or compensated for by some alternative investi-
gative technique, undoubtedly will have a serious adverse
impact on the intelligence community's ability to select
reliable people for its sensitive positions. The initial
problem concerns how best to resolve the ostensible conflict
between legitimate privacy concerns and the awesome responsi-
bility levied on the security offices of the intelligence
community. Legislation or, at the very least, some expression
of the sense of the Congress seems imperative at this point.
A bill specifically addressing this particular matter and.
narrowly limiting it to security clearances, as distinguished
from suitability for non-sensitive employment, is desirable.
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The Security Committee is aware of the proposed legisla-
tion drafted by the HPSCI on November 5, 1979, generally
endorses its precepts and, urges its passage to permit investi-
gative agencies to have access to certain criminal justice
records that may otherwise be unavailable.
7. Resolve Inconsistencies Between the Attorney General's
Gui.de11 and ommun1tL s E.O. 10450 Nee, s
The SECOM agrees that there are inconsistencies among
E.O. 10450, the Attorney General's Domestic Security Investi-
gations Guidelines, and the 1974 Privacy Act, which preclude
intelligence agencies from obtaining certain information which
could be directly relevant to an individual who has been
nomicated for SCI access.
The standards of E.O. 10450, as well as those of DCITD-1/14,
require that any person granted access to highly sensitive in-
formation must be seen as motivated to use the information in
furtherance of U.S. national objectives and to refrain from
misusing it whether by intent or through negligence. The
SECOM appreciates that in a normal context, many of an indi-
vidual's activities are and must be protected from government
scrutiny, and that the Constitution as well as several Federal
statutes strictly govern such matters. The problem occurs,
however, when a person seeks highly sensitive employment in
order to further some organization's objective to penetrate
the Federal Government or to acquire classified information
for ulterior purposes, particularly with regard to espionage,
subversion, or treason. What normally would be a Constitution-
ally protected activity now becomes an indication of the possi-
bility the individual will violate his trust. Current guide-
lines, however, seem to prohibit the collection or use of
such information with the result that intelligence community
decisions concerning access to highly sensitive information are
made at least partially in the blind.
How to resolve the dilemma is a particularly difficult
prospect. The Current debate concerning the FBI Charter is
probably the best forum for the problem's resolution. The
guidelines offered in E.O. 12036 may also offer a basis for
further study and eventual resolution.
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ADDITIONAL CO?VENTS
1. DCI Security Committee membership is composed of
representatives from the following agencies:
Air Force
Army
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Energy
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Justice Department
National Security Agency
Navy
State Department
Treasury Department
In addition, the following agencies are represented by
observers:
Office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Review)
Office of Internal Security, Drug Enforcement Agency
Office of Investigations and Security, Commerce Department
2. All Security Committee members except DIA concurred
in all seven statements. The DIA member wishes to defer judg-
ment on statements one and two until his agency can evaluate
the impact on DIS resources, results of the inter-agency survey
on personnel investigations, and an OSD-sponsored test program
on a new investigative approach for DIS.
3. A representative of the Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense also responded but declined to contribute
to this response because the House Subcommittee has not
specifically requested such comments.
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APPENDIX
VALIDITY AND TIIE RELEVANT - IRRELEVANT TECHNIQUE
Blum, Richard H. and Osterloh, William "The Polygraph
Examination as a Means for Detecting Truth and Falsehood in
Stories Presented by Police Informants," Journal of
Criminal Law Criminology and Police Sci.ence~(lF(1968) :
Seventeen male and three female informants who had given
information on criminal cases to local or federal agencies
were selected and paid to engage in the experiment. Great
care was taken to protect their identities and the fact that
they were cooperating with the police, as their lives would
otherwise be in danger. Some of the stories that the informants
were to tell the polygraph examiner were true, some were false,
and some were partly true and partly false. The true stories
were those which had been provided to their handler on a previous
occasion which had stood the scrutiny of investigation. A
false story was one jointly invented by the officer and the
informant, but they were compatible with the informant's
ordinary role and opportunities, and contained credible infor-
mation. True stories with false information followed the same
rules as the true story with certain false information added
with the joint agreement of the police officer and his informant.
The false items were credible and compatible with the whole
story, and the false items were important to the investigation,
such as the name of an offender, the place where goods were
hidden or fenced, etc. The story was first written, then
rehearsed with the police handler.
Of nine stories that were all true, the examiner was
correct in his diagnosis of all of them. No true stories were
designated as false or partly false.
Of the eleven stories that were either partly or entirely
incorrect, the examiner was correct in saying that each of these
was either partly or wholly false. None of these were diagnosed
as completely truthful.
10
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In all, there were 106 statements to be checked for
veracity. The examiner made four errors among the seven
subjects who told stories that were only partly true. In two
cases, the examiner made an error in judging a lie as the
truth in one of the five elements of the partly true story.
In one other case, the examiner made two errors among the
five subsets, calling one truthful element deceptive and
one deceptive element truthful. Of the 106 statements, made
by twenty subjects, the examiner was correct in 102 (96.2%).
The technique was relevant-irrelevant.
Gustafson, Lawrence A. and Orne, Martin T. "The Effects
of Task and. Method of Stimulus Presentation on the Detection
of Deception," Journal of Ap lied'Psycho1o y 48 (6) (December
1964): 383-387.
The study was designed to investigate the relative effec-
tiveness of two different polygraph techniques, relevant-
irrelevant and peak of tension. Subjects were given two RI
and. two POT tests. 29 were guilty, and 24 subjects had guilty
knowledge. Only an electrodermal measure was scored for this
research.
The RI method. proved more effective in detection than the
POT method when subjects were trying to deceive as to which
item of information they possessed, in the guilty information
paradigm. There was no significant difference in the effec-
tiveness of the RI method of stimulus presentation between the
guilty person paradigm and the guilty information paradigm.
The POT method proved significantly less effective than the
RI method in the guilty information paradigm, and significantly
less effective in. that paradigm than it was in the guilty
person paradigm. In general, subjects found it easier to
deceive in the guilty information paradigm where they could
attempt to "appear guilty" on a non-critical item, especially
in the peak of tension because they could anticipate the order
of presentation of the items.
Eileen I. Correa and Henry E. Adams "The Validity of the
Pre-employment Polygraph Examination and the Effects of
Motivation." In Press, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia,
1979.
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Forty subjects took pre-employment examinations (RI
technique). Half were to tell the truth, and half were to be
deceptive to three of the nine questions. Recordings included
respiration from a. thermister probe at the nostril, EKG for
heart rate, and electrodermal. A cardi_osphygmograph was not
employed.
The experimenter, in separating the truthful and untruth-
ful subjects was correct in all cases, for 100%. Identification
of lies, by subject, ranged from 68% to 100%. There were no
cases in which a truthful person was called deceptive (false
positives). All of the errors were in failing to identify a
lie.
Lying responses were characterized by significantly
larger increases in conductance in the electrodermal and larger
decreases in heart rate, than the responses to telling the
truth. Respiration showed no significance in these recordings.
An attempt to separate subjects by motivation, offering
half of the group $25.00 if they could. deceive the examiner,
showed no significance.
Edel, Eugene C. and Jacoby, Jacob "Examiner Reliability in
Polygraph Chart Analysis: Identification of Physiological
Responses, "Journal of Applied Psychology 60 (5) (1975): 632-634.
Ten experienced examiners working independently on actual
case charts involving responses to 2,530 questions from 40
polygraph interview cases were examined in detail.
Because each examiner made judgments of reaction or no
reaction to each question, of which there were 2,530, on each of
three channels, he made 7,590 decisions. The channels were
cardiovascular, electrodermal, and. respiratory. The agreement
between the original examiner and a blind rater was 96% for
cardiovascular, 95% electrodermal, and 96% for respiratory
responses. In terms of total agreement between all examiners
who read all of the charts, the agreement was 96% cardivascular,
91% for electrodermal, and 96% for respiratory responses. The
overall percentage of agreement for rater versus rater was 94%,
The technique was relevant-irrelevant. All of the examina-
tions were screening cases. Of the total 22,770 judgments there
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were 21,626 agreements for an overall agreement rate of 95%
including the examiner-rater and rater-rater combinations.
MacNitt, Reginald D. "In Defense of the Electrodermal Re-
sponse and Cardiac Amplitude as Measures of Deception, "Journal.
of Criminal. Law, Criminology and Police Science 33 (1942): 266-275
Professor MacNitt conducted 59 cases with the relevant-
irrelevant (RI) technique that involved employees made available
by the Columbus, Ohio Merchants Audit Bureau. Prior investigative
results were witheld from him. There were employees whose honesty
and integrity were above reproach, employees who had confessed to
stealing goods and money, but were told to lie, and employees
who were suspected of stealing and about whom there was quite a
bit of evidence already in the possession of authorities. The
latter group was expected to lie.
MacNitt said that his results wore "correctly reported...
and checked by confessions or the verifiable records of the
employees, the operator failing only on a few minor details. In
all of these 59 cases, the electrodermal response was the more
accurate of the two employed." The other channel recorded cardiac
rate and amplitude.
Hemsley, Gordon, Heslegrave, Ronald J. and. Furedy, John J.
"Can Deception be Detected When Stimulus Familiarity is Controlled?"
Paper presented. at the annual seminar of the Society for Psycho-
physiological Research, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 18, 1979.
Using a pre-employment test paradigm with relevant-irrelevant
technique, ten male and ten female subjects were divided into two
groups, one which was to be deceptive to some of the 20 items of
biographical information supplied on application forms, and one
group which was to be truthful about all of the biographical
information on the forms. Because the stimulus familiarity was
controlled, with all biographical information known to the subjects
in advance, the issue was whether or not larger ANS responses would
occur to deception alone. Skin conductance response was used to
measure ANS responses.
The skin conductance response was significantly, F=64.1,
greater for deceptive (X = 2.28 ohms) than for honest (X = 1.40
ohms) responses,
Neither an habituation effect nor a sex difference emerged.
The experimenters concluded that the design allows the skin
conductance response to detect, in the laboratory, "pure deception"
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because that emotional arousal associated with question content,
and enhanced stimulus familiarity or signal value associated with
the relevant alternative, have been eliminated as confounding
sources.
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