POLICY STATEMENT ON DISCLOSURE AND REPRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE ORIGINATED IN ANOTHER USIB AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000300120022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 8, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DDI Management Staff
ATTENTION : DDI Security Officer
SUBJECT . Policy Statement on Disclosure and Reproduction of
Intelligence Originated in Another USIB Agency
1. This memorandum requests, again, that the proper authority
affirm in writing that CRS is not subject to so much of paragraph 4b of
DCID 1/7, 5 October 1975, as reads:
Classified foreign intelligence documents, even though they bear no
control markings, will not be released in their original form to
third agencies...without permission of the originator.
2. This statement or a statement like it has appeared in previous
versions of DCID 1/7. However, on 25 August 1959, USIB-D-39.4/1 eased
policy to permit an agency to do retrospective search and supply of
documents for a third agency. Other easements of DCID 1/7 were also
provided in the 1959 paper to facilitate document processing of a second
or third agency's materials. The 1959 agreements have been presumed to
remain in force since then and, indeed, the briefings to various parts
of.the DDI by the CIA member of the USIB Security Committee were marked
by statements that such easements were to continue in effect because the
purpose of the 1975 revision of DCID 1/7 was primarily to ease the
third-agency rule.
3. Under the presumed continuation of the 1959 agreements, CRS
regularly conducts retrospective searches of positive foreign intelligence
reports in support of work` being done by various members of USIB. CRS
has extensive holdings of material in library document files, biographic
files and installation files. It-is quite common for CRS, in response
to specific requests, to provide NSA documents to State, State documents
to DoD elements, DoD documents to NSA and everybody's document to such
military commands as SAC. Dissemination controls, of course, are respected
in this process. This is a useful function; the alternative is for SAC,
or whoever, to query each member of USIB for material relative to a
specific topic on a retrospective search. But, not all members of USIB
can do such retrospective searches. The words in the newly revised
DCID 1/7, however, seem to require an end to the service by CRS to the
Community unless the 1959 easements are continued.
is document may bb
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SUBJECT: Policy Statement on Disclosure and Reproduction of
Intelligence Originated in Another USIB Agency
4. In response to my query concerning the continuing validity of
the 1959 easements, B. A. Lowe, Secretary to USIB, forwarded to me a
1 October 1975 memorandum prepared by D. E. Moore, Chairman, Security
Committee. This memorandum talks around the point. It does not say
that the 1959 easements remain valid. Instead, ignoring the language
quoted in paragraph 1 above (paragraph 4b of the revised DCID), Moore
refers to paragraph 3d and the footnote thereto which concerns the
implication of "WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED."
5. I shall accept the 1 October 1975 Moore memorandum as certifi-
cation that the 1959 easements permit CRS to continue to retrospective
search and document recovery for members of the Community but only until
1 January 1976. In the interim, I request such action as is necessary
to reaffirm the continued validity of the 1959 easements without which I
believe that CRS should cease to provide library and retrieval services
involving third agency materials. Such action would be somewhat silly,
but the times suggest that I should abide by all of the rules.
25X1
H. C. NBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service
Attachments:
A - DCID 1/7, 5 Oct 75
B - C/Security Committee memo to ExSec, USIB, 1 Oct 75
C - USIB-D-39.4/1, 25 Aug 75, CONFIDENTIAL
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDI Security Officer
1 - O/DDI
1 - C/ISG/CRS
1 - C/DSG/CRS
2 - OD/CRS
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. DIRECTIVE NO. 1 /71
CONTROL OF DISSEMINATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
(Effective 5 October 1975)
Pursuant to provisions of Subsection 102(d) of the National Security Act of
1947, as amended, and other authorities vested in the Director of Central In-
telligence by the National Security Council, certain controls on dissemination of
foreign intelligence and related material 2 (hereafter referred to as foreign i.n-
telligence) are hereby established and promulgated.
This directive establishes certain common .1 controls-and procedures for the
use and dissemination of foreign intelligence to ensure that, while facilitating
the interchange of information for intelligence purposes, there will be adequate
protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods. This directive restates
applicable portions of National Security Council Directive of 17 May 1972 im-
plementing Executive Order 11652, and prescribes additional controls applicable
to the U. S. foreign intelligence mission.
2. Applicability
The controls and procedures set forth in this Directive shall be uniformly
applied by all member departments and agencies of the intelligence community
in the handling of all materials containing foreign intelligence originated by
the Central Intelligence Agency or by the intelligence components of other
USIB departments or agencies.
3. National Security Council Directive
a. Nati onal Security Council Directive of 17 May 1972 implementing Execu-
tive Order 11652 stipulates that, except as otherwise provided by Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947, classified information or material origi-
nating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other depart-
ment to which it has been made available without the consent of the originat-
ing department. This'restriction on dissemination. is commonly described as
b. The NSC Directive stipulates that the' dissemination of classified infor-
mation, including intelligence andI intelligence information, orally, in writing
or by any other means, shall be limited to those persons whose official duties
or contractual obligations require knowledge or possession thereof. This is
commonly referred to as the "need-to-know" principle.
1 Supersedes DCID 1/7, effective 5 October 1970.
2 For purposes of this directive, "related material" includes: information describing U. S.
foreign intelligence sources and methods, equipment and methodology unique to the- acquisi-
tion or exploitation of foreign intelligence, foreign military hardware obtained for exploitation,
and photography or recordings resulting from U. S. foreign intelligence collection efforts.
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c. The NSC Directive also states that documents or portions of documents
containing TOP SECRET information shall not be reproduced without the
consent of the originating office. All other classified material shall be repro-
duced sparingly and any stated prohibition against reproduction shall be
strictly adhered to.
d. The NSC Directive .further requires that the marking, "WARNING
NOTICE-SENSITIVE 'INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED," be prominently displayed on all information and materials re-
lating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods; and, that materials so
marked will not be disseminated in any ' manner outside authorized channels
without the permission of the originating. department and an assessment by.
the senior intelligence official in the disseminating department as to the po-
01
tential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods
...involved .3 For special purposes, primarily bibliographic notation, communica-
tions, or automatic data .processing, this marking may be abbreviated
WNINTEL.
4. Advance authorization
a. To facilitate the dissemination and different uses made of classified
foreign intelligence within and among USIB departments and agencies, to
assure the timely provision of intelligence to consumers and to handle the
volume of such materials in a practical way, it is necessary to provide con-
trolled relief to the "third agency rule" within the intelligence community in
addition to that provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947.
Accordingly, USIB departments and agencies have been given advance au-
thorization to use each other's classified foreign intelligence in their respective
intelligence documents, publications or other information media, and to dis-
seminate their products to third agencies or foreign governments,4 subject
to limitations and procedures prescribed in this Directive.
b. Classified foreign intelligence documents, even though they bear no con-
trol markings, will not be released in their original form to third agencies or
foreign governments without permission of the originator. Information. con-
tained in classified foreign intelligence documents of another department or
agency may be. extracted or paraphrased and used by the recipient USIB
Agency in classified foreign intelligence reports and released to third agencies,
except as specifically restricted by control markings prescribed in this direc-
tive. For purposes of this authorization, "WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be
considered a restrictive marking.
. 3 Unless otherwise specified by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with USIB
or as agreed to between originating and 'recipient agencies, authorized channels include the
intelligence components of USIB departments and agencies and within each department
and agency (including their contractors and consultants) as determined by the recipient senior
intelligence official.
4 Excepting RESTRICTED DATA and formerly RESTRICTED DATA, which is prohibited
from foreign dissemination under Sections 123 and 144 of Public Law 585, Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended. -
2
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c. Information contained in classified foreign intelligence documents of
another department. or agency not bearing any control markings may be ex-
tracted or paraphrased and used by the recipient USIB Agency in- reports
disseminated to foreign governments provided .4 ....
(1) No reference is made to the source documents upon whieb the re-
leased product is based.
(2) The source and manner of acquisition of the information 1' are, not
revealed.
(3) Foreign release is made through established foreign disclosure clian-
d. Any ' department or agency disseminating foreign intelligence beyond
the departments and agencies of the USIB shall be responsible for ensuring
that recipient departments and. agencies'. understand and agree. to observe
the restrictions prescribed by this directive and maintain ` adequate safeg ards.
e. No release of a classified foreign intelligence document, whether or not
hearing a control marking, shall be made to foreign nationals and immigrant
aliens, including U. S. Government employed, utilized or integrated foreign
nationals and immigrant aliens, without ? the permission of the originating
agency.
5. Additional authorized control markings
a. In addition to the WARNING NOTICE prescribed by NSC Directive
any of the following additional markings may be used on foreign intelligence
whenever, in the opinion of the originating department or agency, extraordi-
nary circumstances related to the intelligence source or methods require more
specific dissemination restrictions. Use of these markings shall be limited to
foreign intelligence, the disclosure of which, could: compromise the status of
collaborating foreign governments or officials or otherwise seriously damage
U. S.. relations with foreign governments; subject U. S. citizens or others to
the possibility of personal danger or incarceration; seriously impair the- con-
timing cooperation. of private individuals providing foreign intelligence; se-
riously affect the continuing viability of vital technical collection programs;
or, result in the possible compromise or loss of some unique foreign intelli-
gence source or method. These control markings will be individually assigned .
at the time of preparation of the completed document and used in conjunc-
tion with classification and other markings required by Executive Order 11652
and the implementing NSC directive. and, unless otherwise indicated in 6a
below, carried forward to any-new format in which that information is in-
.corporated, including oral and visual presentations.
(1) "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CON-
TROLLED BY ORIGINATOR"
This marking shall be used when unique source sensitivity factors, known
to the originator, require strict compliance with third agency rule procedures,
in addition to a continuing knowledge and supervision on the part of the.
originator as to the extent to which the original document and information
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contained therein is disseminated. Documents and' information bearing this
marking will not be disseminated beyond the Headquarters elementsof the
recipient organizations and the information contained therein shall not be
extracted and incorporated into other reports without the permission of and
under conditions prescribed. by the originator. (For special purposes, primarily
bibliographic notation, communications and automatic. data processing,. this
marking may be abbreviated ORCON.)
(2) "USIB DEPARTMENTS ONLY"
Foreign intelligence so marked will not be disseminated to departments
and agencies not represented on the U.S. Intelligence Board without the
permission of the originating agency. Within each USIB department and
agency dissemination shall be as determined by the recipient senior Intel-
ligence official, and may include department or agency contractors and
consultants unless specifically prohibited by addition of the "NOT RELEAS-
ABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS" mark-
ing described below. (For special purposes, primarily bibliographic notation,
communications and automatic data processing, this marking may be abbre-
viated USIBONLY.)
(3) "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/
CONSULTANTS"
Foreign intelligence so marked shall not be disseminated to contractors
- or contractor consultants without the permission of the originating agency.
Examples of when this marking may be used include National Intelligence
Estimates and similar national intelligence reports, and other foreign intel-
ligence, which, if disseminated to consultants or contractors, might seriously
impair the continuing cooperation of contributing private individuals. This
restriction shall not apply to those consultants hired under Civil Service
Commission procedures, or comparable procedures derived from authorities
vested in heads of departments and agencies by law, and who are normally
considered an extension of the office by which they are employed. In apply-
ing this control marking, originators will give consideration to the need. of
USIB member Departments and Agencies to use contractor consultants and
contractors to perform services which cannot be adequately performed by
U. S. Government personnel. (For special purposes, primarily bibliographic
notation, communications, or automatic data processing, this marking may
be abbreviated NOCONTRACT)
(4) "CAUTION-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED"
This marking will be used in conjunction with foreign intelligence obtained
from various sources in the U.S. private business sector, and as the informa-
tion may bear upon proprietary interests of the source, or may otherwise
be used to the source's detriment. Recipients of reports bearing this marking
shall take every reasonable precaution to ensure that the information is not
used to the detriment of the source. This marking may be used ~.1 conjunction
with the "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONSULTANTS"
marking described above. (For special purposes, primarily bibliographic
4
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notation, communication and automatic data processing, this marking may
be abbreviated PROPIN.)
(5) "NOT RELEASABLE-TO FOREIGN NATIONALS"
Foreign Intelligence so marked involves special considerations requiring
that it not be released in any form to foreign governments, foreign nationals
or non-U.S. citizens without the permission : of the, originating agency.
Examples of when this control marking may be used include: the possible
compromise of the status of relations with collaborating foreign governments,
or officials; or jeopardizing the continuing viability of vital technical col-
lection programs. (For special purposes, primarily bibliographic notation,
communications, or automatic data processing, this marking may be abbre.
viated NOFORN.) When the originating agency predetermines that infor-
rnation can be released to a specified foreign government(s) the following
marking may be used: "THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED
FOR RELEASE TO (specified country(s) )." (For special purposes, pri-
marily bibliographic notation, communications, or automatic data process-
ing, this marking may be abbreviated "REL (specified countries).")
6. Procedures governing use of control markings
a. Any recipient desiring to use foreign intelligence in a manner contrary
to the restrictions established by the control markings set forth above shall
obtain the permission of the originating agency. Such permission applies only
to the specific purpose agreed to by the. originator and does not automatically
apply to all recipients of the information as originally disseminated unless the
originating agency removes the control markings for the benefit of the re-
cipients. In those cases where dissemination outside the recipient agency is
desired utilizing lesser or no control markings, the recipient agency should
prepare a sanitized version which may be released with the originator's
permission.
b. Control markings authorized in paragraphs 3d and 5 above, shall be
- C3
displayed prominently on documents, incorporated in the text of communica-
tion messages, and associated with data stored or processed in automatic data
processing systems. Unless the entire document justifies the protection of the
control marking(s), each portion requiring the marking(s) shall, to the extent
feasible, be marked with the appropriate marking abbreviation authorized by
this directive.
c. The standardized restrictions and control markings set forth in this
directive are to be employed uniformly by all departments and agencies in the
intelligence community, thereby assuring like control and restrictions on the
use of foreign intelligence disseminated within the departments and agencies
represented on the USIB.
d. The substance of this directive shall be published in appropriate regula-
tory or notice media of each agency or department, together with appropriate
procedures permitting rapid interagency consultation concerning utilization
of intelligence and information. For this purpose, each USIB agency will
designate a primary referent.
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7. Report of unauthorized disclosure
Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result in
unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the foreign intelligence of another
shall be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence through the USIB
Security Committee
8. Prior restrictions and Markings
Questions With respect to the current application of control markings author-
ized by earlier directives on the dissemination and control of intelligence and
utilized on documents issued prior to the date of this directive should be
referred to the originating agency. These markings are: WARNING NOTICE-
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS' .INVOLVED, CONTROLLED
DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS
ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CONTROL, NO DISSEM ABROAD,
BACKGROUND USE ONLY and NO FOREIGN DISSEM.""
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UNCLASSIFIED
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-I October 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, USIB
SUBJECT . Policy Statement on Disclosure and
Reproduction-of Intelligence Originated in
Another USIB Agency, USIB-D-39.4/1,
dated 25 August 1959
1.' This memorandum is in response to your request for
comments on the question posed by Mr. Harry Eisenbeiss, D/CRS,
concerning whether or not this policy statement -remains operative
despite the revision of DCID 1/7.
2. In regard to paragraph (a) of the :Policy Statement:
"T.h.e only prohibition against a USIB member agency
reproducing for itself foreign intelligence and intelligence information
originally issued by another agency is addressed to that which is
classified. TOP SECRET. Section VI G(4) of the National Security -N
Directive implementing Executive Order 11652 states that documents
containing TOP SECRET information will not be reproduced without
the consent of the originating office. All other classified material
will be reproduced sparingly and any stated prohibition against
reproduction shall be strictly adhered to.
3. In regard to paragraph (b) of the Policy Statement:
Nothing in DCID 1/7 would contravene this paragraph.
In fact, DCIT) 1/7 states that information relating to sensitive sources
and methods shall not be disseminated outside of authorized channels
and defines authorized channels as:
authorized channels include the intelligence
components of USIB departments and agencies and
within each department and agency (including their
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contractors and consultants) as determined by the
recipient senior intelligence official.
4. I might suggest that, since this is a 1959 policy statement
and.a lot has transpired since then, you might like to seek USIB
reaffirmation of this policy. The Security Committee will be glad
to undertake a review of this policy statement and report its
findings to USIB if you so desire.
25X1
Chairman, Security Committee
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 { CONFIDENTIAL
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USIB-D-39. 4/ 1.
25 August 1959
Final - USIB Approved
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Policy Statement on Disclosure and Reproduction of
.Intelligence Originated in Another USIB -Agency
1. Attached is a revision of the "Policy Statement on
'Disclosure and Reproduction of Intelligence Originated in Another
USIB Agency, " which incorporates the amendments proposed by
the Committee on Documentation and circulated previously as
USIB-D-39.4/1, I3-August.
2. Since no Intelligence Board member objected or requested
a Board discussion of this proposed revision, we cons=.d.er that the
Board has concurred in this revised statement. Accordingly, the'
attached paper should be regarded as a USIB-approved statement,
superseding I.AC-D-95/5,' 8 October 1957 (circulated as an attach-
ment to IAC-De.95/6, 23 Octo.~er 1957), and effective as of the
date of this mennorandum. - 1?
Attachment
Executive Secretary
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CONFIDENTIAL
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USIB-D-39.4/1
25 August 1959
Final - USIB Approved
Intelligence Orig=ins ated in Another USIB Agency
Policy Statement on Disclosure and Reproduction of
In order for the member agencies and their analysts to discharge
their responsibilities more effectively, and without intent to limit such
broader authority or responsibility as any may now have under law or
i4SC directive, the United States Intelligence Board is agreed:
a. That each member agency, for purpose of central
processing, may reproduce for itself, foreign
intelligence and intelligence information originally
issued by another.
b. That such reproduction may be performed for another
member agency, and such information disclosed by the
properly accredited analysts of a USIB agency to those
of another engaged in the production of national intel-
ligence if the i.ntelligcnce or information was originally
given general distribution to all USIB member agencies,
or was otherwise generally available to them.
c. That intelligence or information which by reason of
sensitivity bears special classifications or is for
limited distribution, or which bears a special warning
prohibiting re production or disclosure, shall not be
so reproduced or "disclosed.
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 ppr
qmXENR%RR@dWaEV DMAAW"
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
O/DDI
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL F
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