REVISION OF DCID 1/7, 'CONTROL OF DISSEMINATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000400010025-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: March 27, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCII) 1/7 Working Group
SUBSEC'I' Revision of DOID 1/7, "Control of
Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence"
REFERENCE Memorandum to Chairman, Security
Committee, t1SIB from ILIA Member,
Security Committee (tJ-48, 911/DS-6)
dated 18 March 1975, subject as above
1. In the referent memorandum the DIA member of the USIB
Security Committee recommends that the control markings EXTRAC-.
TION OR PARAPHRASING OF ,INFORIATION IN THIS DOCUMENT
PROHIBITED, DI EM WITHIN USA ONLY, and NOT RELEASEABLE
TO CONSULTANTS OR CONTRACTORS be deleted from the draft
DCID 1/7. On behald of the Directorate of operations I wish to
place before your Working Group the reasons militating against
accepting this recommendation.
2. At a time when the ability of the United States Government
to maintain any information in confidence. is being questioned by
sources and by governments throughout the world any effort to reduce
or eliminate any protective devices available to us is unthinkable.
These controls are devices to reduce the risks of unauthorized
disclosure. They are provided so that those aware of the vulner-
ability of a source can take reasonable actions to protect him and
the United States' continuing access to the information he produces.
It is not possible for someone not in direct contact with the source
to know the nature of the hazard or extent of damage which would
result from an unauthorized disclosure of information he has
produced. Protection of the information is an integral part of the
protection of the source. The existence of agreed upon dissemina-
tion controls permits the originator of a report to match the controls
on the report to the risks the source is undergoing when his informa-
tion is disseminated to the intelligence community.
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3. The publication of a USIB document in unclassified form
which announces that the intelligence community has no way of
restricting the dissemination of information beyond denying it to
foreign nationals would have a direct and immediate effect on
intelligence available to the United States. At the present time we
receive some information from the British on the condition that it
not be disseminated outside the United States. If the USIB directive
does not provide the means to honor this condition we can anticipate
that this kind of Information will no longer be forthcoming from the
British. We can also anticipate that other sources will react in
similar fashion.
4. Following are comments on the DIA member's objections
to the proposed dissemination controls:
a. NO EXTRACT
(1) "Obtaining permission to use a number
of such documents in an intelligence product
and markings restricting its subsequent use by
recipients would create an administrative
nightmare.
Comment: Paragraph 6d of the draft DCID
requires the establishment of procedures in
each agency to permit rapid interagency con-
sultation concerning the utilization of intelliw
gence and information. In the case of the
Directorate of Operations a reports clearance
office. has long existed to handle requests
arising from the current DCID 1/7 and it
has not created an administrative nightmare.
This clearance service is provided twenty-four
hours a day seven days a week. During three
days this past week twelve DIA requests to use
information in the DIN were answered with an
average time of twenty-six minutes from
request to response. The. longest time required
in this sample was one hour and fifty minutes.
On occasion responses may take much longer
but such instances are exceptions.
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(2) "Another serious problem with this
marking Is failure to recognize the "need to
know" principle. "
Comment: The "need to know" principle is
Intended as a restriction on the spread of
classified information and a reason for selec-
tive dissemination. Unrestricted use of
intelligence information in other agency's
publications does not appear to result in very
selective dissemination. It should be noted
that the DI14 Summary standard cable address
list includes some six hundred addressees
throughout the world. This statement does
not recognize that the originator of the infor-
mation may already have provided it to the
most interested customers in the U. S. and
abroad.
b. DISS W'M IN USA ONLY
Comment: The DIA statement on this control
implies that the appearance of this control necessarily
dent's information to need to know customers outside
the United States. This is not the case. Original
dissemination of the information by the originator
can include overseas customers and authorization to
disseminate the information to customers not included
in the original, .dissemination can be obtained from the
originator. The purpose of the control is so that
overseas distribution is made with the knowledge and
ermission of the on inator.
c, NO CONTRACTOR
Comment: The usefulness of contractors to.
departments and agencies in the performance of their
functions is not in question. It was recognized-
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when the USIB Policy on Release of Intelligence to
Contractors (USIB-D-71.8/2, 2 April 1070) was
promulgated. This policy statement also affects
the release of intelligence to consultants. The
control does not mean that consultants or con-
tractors can never have access to information
marked NO CONTRACTOR. It does mean that
the originator must be informed and concur in
the release of such information. It is also pos-
sible to obtain blanket authorization for a certain
contractor to have access to reports carrying the
NO CONTRACTOR control. With respect to release
of information to reservists there is little to add
that the Chief.. DOD has not already said. A com-
ment contained In a memorandum to me from the
Director of Naval Intelligence on a declassification
Incident illustrates the reason for our desire to
be able to deny some information to reservists.
"Naval History manpower shortages led to the use
of reservists on active duty for training to perform
the review. Their inexperience, coupled with the
inadequate guidance, resulted in the entire "package"
of report, source identification, and evaluation
being declassified on 9 March 1973, and provided
to the rec.*uestor. " A copy of the DNI memorandum
was sent to the Chairman, USIB Security Committee
on 12 March 1975.
5. It is interesting to note that in his final paragraph the
DIA member recognizes the necessity for some form of dissemina-
tion control. "Reports of such a sensitivity to require additional
markings should be placed in the "EYES ONLY" or other specified
limited distribution categories. " I wonder if the DI:1 member
considered the consequences of his proposal with respect to its
effect on the responsibility of the DIA Director for Intelligence
to produce intelligence and on his own interpretation of "need to
know. " The draft DCID 1/7, "Control of Dissemination of Intel-
ligence, " is an attempt to specify limits on the dissemination of
intelligence for the Intelligence community "while facilitating the
interchange of information for intelligence purposes. "
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