MEMO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000400010038-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: March 31, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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31 March 1975
1. In response to your request I have reviewed the Murphy
Commission annexes to determine whether the references to SIGINT
activities contained therein are unclassified. A case could be made
that said references are indeed classified based on the traditional
application of this subject matter. I would suspect that NSA would
have serious concerns about the judgments by the authors with
regard to cryptanalysis and traffic analysis. Not in the sense that the
authors are correct or incorrect but rather they tend to involve sources
and methods.
2. Having made this case I must confess that under the current
pressures for declassification one would be hard pressed to maintain
a solid front that the passages are in fact classified. I recall that in
consideration of the Forrestal Diaries NSA initially took exception
to references to traffic analysis. These exceptions were later withdrawn.
In addition I believe that Khan's book describes the techniques narrated
by the authors.
3. If the authors are cooperating in this endeavor there are a few
passages they may be willing to delete:
- Intelligence and Policymaking in an Institutional Context,
William J. Barnds, November 1974. "A rapid increase in communications
between headquarters and a fleet at sea could mean an operation was about
to take place. " (page 13). "Interception of these signals- which can sometimes
be done at great distances-- can provide important information on the
characteristics of the weapon. " (page 14).
4. In my review I could not help but observe the extensive reference
to photographic reconnaissance by satellite or in some cases described
as satellite photography. I believe we are confronted here with the question
of "fact of" and whether the Murphy Commission report constitutes official
recognition. In some instances the authors reflect target areas of photographic
satellites such as for agricultural intelligence (page 56 of Issues on
Intelligence Resource Management, Robert M. Macy, November 1974 and
pages 26-27 of Intelligence Support for Foreign Policy in the Future, R. J. Smith,
December 1974). Of considerable concern in this area is that the latter
author also refers to "real time" display of pictures taken by satellite cameras
on page 33. I would leave the judgment on the photographic aspects to the
experts in this area.
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SECRET
J400010038-7
3 April 1975
1. Several of the Murphy Commission Annexes highlight the
security/classification dilemma presented by the November 1973 Presi-
dential decision that "the fact that the United States Government conducts
a photographic satellite reconnaissance program for foreign intelligence
collection be classified SECRET." Despite the D:CI's effort in August 1974
to have that decision reviewed and modified, the "fact of" still remains
technically classified. In the meantime, it is highly questionable whether
the "fact of" would pass current classification criteria tests.
2. The Murphy Commission Annexes contain a number of refer-
ences to "satellite photography" which are generally accurate, consistent
with public knowledge, and in several instances not easily amenable to
substitution of terminology such as "reconnaissance photography" or
"technical reconnaissance." In most cases the texts can be technically
sanitized by substituting the terms "reconnaissance photography",
"overhead", or "technical" for the term "satellite." If this is done the
texts will be technically correct from a security classification point of
view, but will also be made less succinct by the .substitution of a general
term for a specific term -- with little change in n eaning for the average
reader. Listings with required word changes developed jointly with the
Special Security Center, OS, are attached.
3. There are two areas, however, which present more direct
security problems.
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a. Robert Macy's annex on "Issues on Intelligence
Resource Management" discusses in several places the
management arrangements which apply to the satellite recon-
naissance programs. The discussions include descriptions
(without specifics) of the NRP EXCOM d the
While
rucnnicaiiy unc asst ie the discussion is the most extensive
and direct that has appeared at the unclassified level in an
official document. It will invite additional probing and add
to the NRO's problems of maintaining security discipline.
b. R. J. Smith's annex on "Intelligence Support
for Foreign Policy in the Future" contains a reference to
future "real time displays of pictures taken by satellite
cameras . . . " which should be deleted. His discussion
in other sections of the annex concerning the use of photog-
raphy would be unclassified except for the linkage to
satellites and the "fact of" problem.
Approved For Release 2006/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00591 R000400010038-7