[LETTER TO MAJOR GENERAL EDWARD B. GILLER, USAF (RET) FROM W. E. COLBY]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000400010045-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 45
• Content Type: LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For ReleMse 2006/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00591 RGQQ400010045-9
Major General Edward B. Giller, USAF (ret. )
Assistant General Manager for National Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545
Thank you for your letter of 24 October providing me
with your comments and concerns on DCID 1/7. Other
USIB members have also identified some problem areas.
I am, therefore, referring your proposal and those of the
other Board members on DCID 1/7 to the Security Committee
for review and resubmission to the Board following consider-
ation of all of the issues which have been raised.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Approved For Release 2006/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00591 R000400010045-9
 Approved For ReleeYse 2006/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00591 RQ 400010045-9
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY CO'sMISSIOsN
WASHfNGTON, D.C. 20545
October 24, 1974
Mr. William E. Colby
Director, Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.
I am writing to express my concern with the proposed DCID 1/7
revising the CONTROLLED DISSEM intelligence caveat to "NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONSULTANTS OR CONTRACTORS". My
concern is that such a caveat will perhaps be interpreted in ;-
.very narrow sense and thus be counterproductive to the use of
the national nuclear laboratories in their intelligence support
.role to the AEC and other USIB agencies.
I don't think it is necessary to make the case for our laboratories'
capabilities to contribute to tJSIB-directed research and development,
the technical requirements on key intelligence questions, and
technical support to US neotiating teams such as SALT II and-
.P
special Executive Branch committees.
I am sure you realize that the laboratories must have timely
access to current data produced by the collection programs of
USIB if they are to continue in this important technical support _ .r
role, and I would appreciate your assistance in this regard.
As early as December 1972 the Department of Justice ruled that
the special and unique relationship of our full-time weapons
laboratory personnel enabled AEC to treat them as if they were
full-time Federal employees for the purposes of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act of 1972. I would therefore urge that
you inform USIB agencies that the provision of DCID 1/7 as
pertains to CONSULTANTS AND CONTRACTORS does not apply
to the AEC national nuclear laboratories when their "need to _
know" has been established.
Sincerely,
Ecclward rs. Ciller
Assistant General 1~Ianager
for National Security
Approved For Release 2006/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00591 R000400010045-9
 Secii.rity Committee
1_O ~Tp0
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
EA/DCI
2
Chairman, USIB
3
Ex. Sec. USIB
I
00'10045-9
Remarks: On 10 October, General Walters, as Acting
Director of Central Intelligence, authorized circulation of
DCID 1/7, "Control of Dissemination of Intelligence, " to
the USIB for consideration. All USIB agency members hav
submitted their concurrence or comments. The NSA,
Treasury and FBI members have concurred.
The Acting CIA member has withheld his concurrence
pending a review by the Security Committee of whether
NOFORN markings should be placed on appropriate USIB
and IRAC documents, review of paragraph 6. a., and
change of WINTEL to WNINTEL [paragraph 4. a. (1)].
The Acting State member concurred, but stated
that certain aspects of the proposed directive present
problems for State and, therefore, requested a review of
the directive in an appropriate forum.
The Acting DIA member, while not identifying any
specific problem, recommended that the subject DCID be
remanded to the Security Committee for staffing and
recommendation to the USIB.
The AEC representative to USIB expressed his
concern with the DCID 1/7 revising the CONTROLLED
DISSEM intelligence caveat to "NOT RELEASABLE TO
CONSULTANTS OR CONTRACTORS." His concern is
that such a caveat will perhaps be interpreted in a very
narrow sense and thus be counterproductive to the use of
the national nuclear laboratories in their intelligence
support role to the AEC .and other USIB agencies. General
Giller' s letter and a draft response is attached.
Because of the above concerns expressed by the USIB
members, it is recommended that DCID 1/7 be referred to
the Security Committee for review and resubmission to the
Board following consideration of these issues. If you
approve this recommendation, please sign the attached
response to General Giller's letter.
SECRET
00591 R00 400010045-9