MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000400120001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1975
• Content Type: REGULATION

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DCID No. 1/14
13 May 1976
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/141
MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
(Effective 13 May 1976)
Pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 11905, Section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947 and National Security Council Directives, the following
minimum personnel security standards, procedures and continuing security programs
are hereby established for all United States Government civilian and military
personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors and other individuals
who require access to Sensitive Compartmented Information2 (hereinafter referred to
as SCI). The standards, procedures and programs established herein are minimum and
the departments and agencies may establish such additional security steps as may be
deemed necessary and appropriate to ensure that effective security is maintained.
Purpose
1. The purpose of this Directive is to enhance the security protection of SCI
through the application of minimum security standards, procedures and continuing
security programs, and to facilitate the security certification process among
Government departments and agencies.
Applicability
2. The provisions of the Directive shall apply to all persons (other than elected
officials of the United States Government, federal judges and those individuals for
whom the DCI makes a specific exception) without regard to civilian or military status,
form of employment, official rank or position or length of service.
3. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria contained herein
and who are, therefore, denied access to SCI shall not, solely, for this reason, be
considered ineligible for access to other classified information. Individuals whose
access to SCI has been authorized as an exception granted in accordance with
paragraph 7 below, shall not, solely for that reason, be considered eligible for access to
other classified information,
'This directive supersedes DCID 1/14 approved 1 July 1968.
2'rhe term "Sensitive Compartmented Information" as used in this Directive is intended to include all
information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present
and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community
systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The term does not include
Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public Laws 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
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4. The granting of access to SCI shall be controlled under the strictest application
of the "need-to-know" principle under procedures prescribed in the several existing
authorities which govern access thereto, and in accordance with the personnel security
standards and procedures set forth in this Directive. All persons accountable under the
authority of this Directive and given access to information (SCI) containing sources or
methods of intelligence shall, as a condition of obtaining access, sign an agreement
that they will not disclose that information to persons not authorized to receive it.
Personnel Security Standards
5. Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis for
access to SCI are as follows:
a. The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion and of
unquestioned loyalty to the United States.
b. Except where there is a compelling need. and a determination has been
made by competent authority as described in paragraph 7 below that every
reasonable assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances the security
risk is negligible:
(I) Both the individual and the members of his or her immediate family
shall be US citizens. For these purposes "immediate family" is defined as
including the individual's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters and children.
(2) The members of the individual's immediate family and persons to
whom he is bound by affection or obligation should neither he subject to
physical, mental or other forms of duress by a foreign power, nor advocate
the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States
or the alteration of the form of Government of the United States by
unconstitutional means.
6. In exceptional cases, the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) of the Intelligence
Community organization, or his designee, may determine that it is necessary or
advisable in the National interest to authorize access to SCI prior to completion of the
fully prescribed investigation. In this situation such investigative checks as are
immediately possible shall be made at once, and should include a personal interview
by trained security or counterintelligence personnel. Access in such cases shall be
strictly controlled, and the fully prescribed investigation and final evaluation shall be
completed at the earliest practicable moment.
Exceptions
7. The exceptions to paragraph 5.b.(1)(2) above may be granted only by the SIO
or his designee, unless such authority has been specifically delegated to the head of an
office of organization as set forth in inter-departmental agreements. All exceptions
granted will be common sense determinations based on all available information, and
shall be recorded by the agency making the exception. In those cases in which the
individual has lived outside of the United States for a substantial period of his life, a
thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of the
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minimum investigative requirements, and judicious review of the information therein
must be made before an exception is considered.
Investigative Requirements
8. The investigation conducted on an individual under consideration for access to
SCI will be thorough and shall be designed to develop information as to whether the
individual clearly meets the above Personnel Security Standards.
9. The investigation shall be accomplished through record checks and personal
interviews of various sources by trained investigative personnel in order to establish
affirmatively to the adjudicating agency complete continuity of identity to include
birth, residences, education, employments and military service. Where the
circumstances of a case indicate, the investigation shall exceed the basic requirements
set out below to ensure that those responsible for adjudicating access eligibility have in
their possession all the relevant facts available.
10. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history statement, fingerprints
of a quality acceptable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a signed release, as
necessary, authorizing custodians of police, credit, education and medical records, to
provide record information to the investigative agency. Photographs of the individual
shall also be obtained where additional corroboration of identity is required.
11. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:
a. Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship.
b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts, and such other National
agencies as are appropriate to the individual's background. An additional check
of Immigration and Naturalization Service records shall be conducted on those
members of the individual's immediate family who are United States citizens
other than by birth or who are resident aliens.
c. A check of appropriate police records covering all areas where the
individual has resided in the US throughout the most recent fifteen (15) years or
since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period.
d. Verification of the individual's financial status and credit habits through
checks of appropriate credit institutions and interviews with knowledgeable
sources covering the most recent five (5) years.
e. Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of all the individual's residences
in excess of six (6) months throughout the most recent five (5) year period. This
coverage shall be expanded where the investigation suggests the existence of some
questionable behavioral pattern.
f. Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen (15) years or since
age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period but in any event the most recent two
years. Personal interviews with supervisors and co-workers at places of
employment covering the past ten (10) years shall be accomplished.
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g. Verification of attendance at institutes of higher learning in all instances
and at the last secondary school attended within the past fifteen (15) years.
Attendance at secondary schools may be verified through qualified collateral
sources. If attendance at educational institutions occurred within the most recent
five(5)years, personal interviews with faculty members or other persons who were
acquainted with the individual during his attendance shall be accomplished.
h. Review of appropriate military records,
i. Interviews with a sufficient number of knowledgeable acquaintances (a
minimum of three developed during the course of the investigation) as necessary
to provide a continuity to the extent practicable, of the individual's activities and
behavioral patterns over the past fifteen years with particular emphasis on the
most recent five years.
j. When employment, education or residence, has occurred overseas (except
for periods of less than five (5) years for personnel on US Government assignment
and less than ninety days for other purposes) during the past fifteen years or since
age eighteen, a check of the records will he made at the Department of State and
other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop sources, generally in
the United States, who knew the individual overseas in order to cover significant
employment, education or residence and to attempt to determine if any lasting
foreign contacts or connections were established during this period. However, in
all cases where an individual has worked or lived outside of the US continuously
for over five years, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period in
his life through the use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as
may be available to the US Government in the foreign country(ies) in which the
individual resided.
k. In those instances in which the individual has immediate family members
or other persons with whom he is bonded by affection or obligation in any of the
situations described in subparagraph 5.b.(2), above, the investigation will include
an interview of the individual by trained security, investigative or counter-
intelligence personnel to ascertain the facts as they may relate to the individual's
access eligibility.
1. In all cases the individual's spouse shall at a minimum be checked through
the subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other National
agencies as appropriate. When conditions indicate, additional investigation shall
be conducted on the spouse of the individual and members of the immediate
family to the extent necessary to permit a determination by the adjudicating
agency that the provisions of paragraph 5, Personnel Security Standards, above,
are met.
in. A personal interview of the individual will be conducted by trained
security, investigative or counterintelligence personnel when necessary to resolve
any significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies developed during the
investigation.
12. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the past five years
which substantially meets the above minimum standards, it may serve as a basis for
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granting access approval provided a review of the personnel and security files does not
reveal substantive changes in the individual's security eligibility. If a previous
investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards or if it is more than
five years old, a current investigation shall be required but may be limited to that
necessary to bring the individual's file up-to-date in accordance with the investigative
requirements set forth in paragraph 11 above, Should new information be developed
during the current investigation which bears unfavorably upon the individual's
activities covered by the previous investigation, the current inquiries shall be expanded
as necessary to develop full details of this new information.
13. Programs shall be instituted requiring the periodic reinvestigation of
personnel provided access to SCI. These reinvestigations will be conducted on a five-
year recurrent basis, but on. a more frequent basis where the individual has shown some
questionable behavioral pattern, his activities are otherwise suspect, or when deemed
necessary by the SIO concerned.3
14. The scope of reinvestigations shall be determined by the SIO concerned based
on such considerations as the potential damage that might result from the individual's
defection or willful compromise of SCI and the availability and probable effectiveness
of other means to continually evaluate factors related to the individual's suitability for
continued access. In all cases, the reinvestigation shall include, as a minimum,
appropriate National agency checks, local agency (including overseas checks where
appropriate), credit checks and a personal discussion with the individual by trained
investigative, security or counterintelligence personnel when necessary to resolve
significant adverse information or inconsistencies.
15. The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on an
individual's loyalty and suitability shall be accomplished under the cognizance of the
SIO concerned by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment and wide experience in
personnel security and/or counterintelligence. When all other information developed
on an individual is favorable, a minor investigative requirement which has not been
met should not preclude favorable adjudication. In all evaluations the protection of
the national interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to
SCI shall be resolved in favor of the national security. The ultimate determination of
whether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the interests of national
security shall be an overall common sense determination based on all available
information.
Continuing Security Programs
16. In order to facilitate the attainment of the highest standard of personnel
security and to augment both the access approval criteria and the investigative
requirements established by this Directive, member departments and agencies shall
institute continuing security programs for all individuals having access to SCI. In
addition to security indoctrinations, these programs shall be tailored to create mutually
supporting procedures under which no issue will escape notice or be left unresolved
which brings into question an individual's loyalty and integrity or suggests the
possibility of his being subject to undue influence or duress through foreign
31n DoD, an S[O may request, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense or his designee, more
frequent reinvestigations under special circumstances.
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relationships or exploitable personal conduct. When an individual is assigned to
perform sensitive compartmented work requiring access to SCI, the SIO for the
department, agency or Government program to which the individual is assigned shall
assume security supervision of that individual throughout the period of his assignment.
17. The continuing security programs shall include the followings:
a. Security education programs to ensure that individuals who are granted
access to SCI are initially indoctrinated and periodically thereafter instructed as
to its unique sensitivity and that they understand their personal responsibility for
its protection. The individual should be instructed that the ultimate responsibility
for maintaining eligibility for continued access to SCI rests with the individual.
Therefore, the individual is encouraged to seek appropriate guidance and
assistance on any personal problem or situation which may have a possible
bearing on his eligibility for continued access to SCI, and security counseling
should be made available. These instructions should be conducted by individuals
having extensive background and experience regarding the nature and special
vulnerabilities of the particular type of compartmented information involved.
b. Security supervisory programs to ensure that supervisory personnel
recognize and discharge their special responsibility in matters pertaining to the
security of SCI, including the eligibility for SCI access. Such programs shall
provide practical guidance as to indicators which may signal matters of security
concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting procedures shall be
disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action
to safeguard the security of the United States as well as to provide all necessary
help to the individual concerned to neutralize his vulnerability.
c. Security Review Programs to ensure that appropriate security authorities
invariably receive and exchange, in a timely manner, all information bearing on
the security posture of persons having access to sensitive information. Personnel
history information shall be kept current. Security and related files shall be kept
under continuing review.
18. Whenever adverse or derogatory information is discovered or inconsistencies
arise which could impact upon an individual's security status, appropriate
investigations shall be conducted on a timely basis. The investigation shall be of
sufficient scope necessary to resolve the specific adverse or derogatory information, or
inconsistency, in question so that a determination can be made as to whether the
individual's continued utilization in activities requiring SCI is clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security.
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Effective Date
19. This Directive supersedes DCID 1/14, 1 July 1968. Existing directives,4
regulations, agreements and such other references governing access to SCI as defined
herein shall be revised accordingly.
4These include pertinent provisions of the Clearance Standards and Investigation and Evaluation sections
of the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations.
GEORGE BUSH
Director of Central Intelligence
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