EXECUTIVE ORDER NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND MATERIAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REGULATION

Approved For Relee 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP82M00591 R0 Q030001-4
E )"R A Fl*
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States of America,
and as President of the United States of America, in order
to balance the public interest in access to official
information with the legitimate need to protect information
which should be kept secret in the interest of national
security, it is hereby ordered as follows:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Description
1. Definitions ..........................
2. Original Classification ..............
(a) Classification Requirements.....
(b) Classification Criteria .........
(c) Prohibitions ....................
(d) Classification Authority ........
.(e) Exceptional Cases ...............
(f) Limitations on Authority ........
(g) Identification and Markings.....
3.. Derivative Application of Markings...
4. Declassification .....................
(a) Guidelines ......................
(b) New Material ....................
(c) Old Material ....................
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relawe 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591ROO0600030001-4
(d) Systematic Review ...............
(e) Mandatory Review
(f) Foreign Originated Material.....
(g) Declassification Authority ......
5. Downgrading ..........................
6. Safeguarding .........................
(a) Policy Directives ...............
(b) Secrecy Agreements ..............
(c) Special Access ..................
(d) Historical Researchers and
Former Officials ................
7. Implementation and Review ............
(a) Oversight Office ................
(b) Departmental ....................
8. Administrative Sanctions .............
9. Atomic Energy Material ...............
10. Revocation of Prior Orders ...........
11. Effective Date .......................
Section 1. Definitions.
(a) "Official information or material" means that
information or material which is owned by, produced for
or by, or under the control of the United States Govern-
ment.
(b) "National security" means the foreign policy
or national defense interests of the United States.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relee 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R08iil100030001-4
(c) "Agency" means any independent entity, in-
cluding the Military Departments, within the Executive
Branch.
(d) "Intelligence source" means a person, organ-
ization, or technical means which provides foreign
intelligence or foreign counterintelligence and which,
if its identity or capability is disclosed, is vulnerable
to counteraction that could nullify or significantly
reduce its effectiveness in providing foreign intelli-
gence or foreign counterintelligence to the United States.
An "intelligence source" also means "a person or organ-
ization which provides foreign intelligence or foreign
counterintelligence to the United States only on the
condition that its identity remains undisclosed.
(e) "Intelligence method" means the method which
is used to provide support to an intelligence source or
operation, and which, if disclosed, is vulnerable to
counteraction that could nullify or significantly reduce
its effectiveness in supporting the foreign intelligence
or foreign counterintelligence activities of the United
States, or which would, if disclosed, reasonably lead to
the disclosure of an intelligence source or operation.
(f) "Classified information" is official information
which has been determined by proper authority to require
a degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relwe 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R0bW00030001-4
in the interest of national security and has been
designated, dependent upon its significance to the national
security, with one of the three following authorized
classification designations:
(1) "Top Secret" is the designation which shall be
applied to official information or material the unauthor-
ized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
(2) "Secret" is the designation which shall be
applied to official information or material the unauthor-
ized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
cause serious damage to the national security.
(3) "Confidential" is the designation which shall be
applied to official information or material the unauthor-
ized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
cause significant damage to the national security.
Sec. 2. Original Classification.
(a) Classification Requirements. Official information
or material, hereinafter referred to as information, shall
not be classified unless an original classification authority
determines:
(1) That the information meets one or more of the
criteria set forth in subsection (b) below; and
(2) The disclosure of such information could reason-
ably be expected to cause at least significant damage to
the national security. In the case of information provided
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relee 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R00Q?00030001-4
5
in confidence by a foreign government or international
organization, it is reasonable to expect that the breach of
that confidence could cause significant damage to the
national security.
(b) Classification Criteria. The following,which
apply equally to all three authorized classification
designations, describe information which is classifiable
if its disclosure could reasonably be expected to:
(1) Make the United States or its allies vulnerable
to attack by a foreign power, or weaken the ability of the
United States or its allies to conduct armed operations
or defend themselves, or diminish the effectiveness of the
United States' armed forces; or
(2) Lead to hostile political, economic, or military
action against the United States or its allies by a
foreign power; or
(3) Disclose, or provide a foreign nation with an
insight into, the defense plans or posture of the United
States or its allies; provide a foreign nation with informa-
tion upon which to develop effective countermeasures to
such plans or posture; weaken or nullify the effectiveness
of a United States military, foreign intelligence, or
foreign counterintelligence, plan, operation, project,
or activity; or
(4) Aid a foreign nation to develop, improve, or
refine its military potential; or
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relvse 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591ROW600030001-4
6
(5) Reveal, jeopardize, or compromise an intelli-
gence source or method, an analytical technique for the
interpretation of intelligence data, or a cryptographic
device or system; or
(6) Disclose to other nations or foreign groups
that the United States has, or is capable of obtaining,
certain information or material concerning those nations
or groups without their knowledge or consent; or
(7) Deprive the United States of a scientific,
engineering, technical, economic, or intelligence advantage
directly related to national security; or
(8) Create or increase international tensions; or
otherwise significantly impair our foreign relations; or
(9) Disclose or weaken the position of the United
States or its allies in the discussion, avoidance, or peace-
ful resolution of existing or potential international
differences; or
(10) Disclose plans prepared by, or under discussion
by, officials of the United States to meet contingencies
or situations arising in the course of our foreign relations
or national defense; or
(11) Cause political or economic instability or civil
disorder in a foreign country; or
(12) Disclose the identity of a confidential source
of a United States diplomatic or consular post; or
(13) Disclose information or material provided to the
United States in confidence by a foreign government or
international organization.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For ReleW 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591R00Q000030001-4
c. Prohibitions. Classification of information
is subject to the following prohibitions:
(1) Where there is doubt as to whether certain
information requires any security protection, the
classifying official will strike the balance in favor
of public access to official information and the informa-
tion shall not be classified.
(2) No information may be classified in order to
conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative
error, to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization,
or agency, to restrain competition or independent initiative,
or to prevent or delay for any other reason the release
of information which does not require, in the interest
of national security, the protection authorized by this
Order.
(3) Basic scientific research information may not
be classified, except for Restricted Data within the
meaning of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
(42 U.S.C. 2014(y)), and except for such information
that is directly related to the national security.
(4) Information or material which is not official
information or material may not be classified; thus
information resulting from independent or nongovernmental
research and development shall not be classified unless
it incorporates or reveals classified information to which
the researcher or developer was given prior access or
unless the Government first acquires a proprietary interest
therein.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Releaw 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591 ROOWO030001-4
(5) References to classified documents may not
be a basis for classification unless the reference,
standing alone, would disclose classified information.
(6) Classification shall not be used solely for
the purpose of limiting dissemination of information
which is not classifiable under the provisions of this
Order.
(7) Where there is doubt whether information should
be classified Secret or Too Secret, it shall be classified
Secret. Where there is doubt whether information classi-
fied should be classified Confidential or Secret, it shall
be classified Confidential.
d. Classification Authority.
(1) The authority to originally classify information
"Top Secret" may be exercised only by such officials as
the President by publication in the federal Register
may designate in writing and, subject to the restriction
in paragraph (4) by the heads of the following agencies:
(i) Department of State
(ii) Department of the Treasury
(iii) Department of Defense
Department of the Army
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Rel%pe 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591R06000030001-4
(v) Department of the Navy
(vi) Department of the Air Force
(vii) Department of Justice
(viii) Department of Energy
(ix) U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(x) Central Intelligence Agency
(xi) National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(xii) General Services Administration
(2) The authority to originally classify informa-
tion "Secret" may he exercised, subject to the
restrictions in paragraph (4) only by officials who
have Top Secret classification authority and by the heads
of the following agencies:
(i) Department of Commerce
(ii) Department of Transportation
(iii) Agency for International Development
(iv) Office of the Special Representative for
Trace 'Iegotiatiorns
tv) United States Information Agency
(vi) Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(3) The authority to originally classify information
"Confidential" may be exercised, subject to the restrictions
in paragraph (4), only by officials who have "Top Secret"
or "Secret" classification authority and the heads of the
following agencies:
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Releepe 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591ROO 00030001-4
(i) Department of Labor
(ii) Export-Import Bank of the United States
(iii) Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(4) The heads of agencies specifically named in
paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) may delegate their authority
to originally classify information. Such delegation may
provide for redelegation, except for Top Secret original
classification authority. Officials to whom such authority
is redelegated may not further redelegate it. All dele-
gations shall be in writing, and shall be granted only to
officials by name or title of position held. The number
of officials to whom original classification authority
is delegated shall be restricted to those officials whose
duties and responsibilities necessitate the origination
of classified information on a regular and recurring
basis.
(5) The head of any agency not specifically granted
original classification authority herein may not originally
classify information under this order, unless specifically
authorized in writing by the President. Requests for such
authority shall be directed to the Security Information
Oversight Office, established herein, and shall identify
the positions requiring the authority, the classification
level required and justification for the granting of
such authority.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relee 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R00W0030001-4
Exceptional Cases. In an exceptional case
when a person or agency not authorized to originally
classify originates information which is believed to
require classification, such person or agency shall protect
that information in the manner prescribed by this Order
and implementing directives. The information shall be
promptly transmitted under appropriate safeguards to the
agency having primary interest in the subject matter, or
where such agency cannot be identified, to the Director of
the Security Information Oversight Office, with a request
that a determination be made as to classification.
(f) Limitation on Authority to Provide for the
Duration of Classification.
(1) All original classification authorities, except
as permitted in paragraph (2) shall, at the time of the
original classification determination, set a specific date
or event for automatic declassification of the information.
The date or event shall be as early as the national security
interest will permit; but, in no case shall the date or
event exceed six years from the date of origin of the
information that is classified.
(2) In those cases where there-is a need, directly
related to the national security, to continue classification
beyond six years, only Top Secret classification authorities
or the heads of agencies specifically designated in Sec..2(d)
of this Order may set a later date or event for automatic'
declassification. Alternatively, these authorities may,
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Rele 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591R0Q000030001-4
where declassification guidelines issued by heads of
agencies prescribe a need for review of specified informa-
tion upon its 20th anniversary, set a date for review
of such information consistent with such guidelines.
In either case, these dates or events shall be as early
as the national security interest will permit but in no
case shall exceed 20 years from date of origin of the
information involved. Additionally, for foreign
originated information, as defined in Section 4(f),
those officials may set dates or events for declassifica-
tion or review which shall not exceed thirty years.
Official who authorize the extension beyond six years
must record on the originator's file copy the reasons
for such extension and their identity. The reasons must
be specific and must explain why the classification will
continue to meet the requirements set forth in subsection
2(a) above.
(g) Identification and Markings.
(1) Each classified document shall show on its face:
(i) the identification of the original classification
authority; (ii) the office of origination; (iii) the date
of origination; (iv) the date or event for declassification
or review; and (v) one of the three classification
designations defined herein. No other designations,
e.g., "For Official Use Only," "Limited Official Use,"
shall be used to identify information requiring protection
in the interest of national security, except as otherwise
expressly provided by statute.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Reline 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591R0d00030001-4
(2) Each classified document shall, by marking or
other means, clearly indicate which portions are classi-
fied, at what level, and which portions are not classified,
in order to facilitate excerpting and other uses. Heads
of agencies may, for good cause, seek a waiver of this
marking requirement from the Director of the Security
Information Oversight Office for certain classes of material.
(3) Classified information or material furnished
to the United States by a foreign government or inter-
national organization shall either retain its original
classification or be assigned a United States classification.
In either case, the classification shall assure a degree
of protection equivalent to that required by the govern-
ment or international organization which furnished the
information or material.
(4) Classified documents which contain or reveal
information which the originator has determined should be
subject to special dissemination and reproduction limita-
tions shall be clearly annotated to place the recipient
on notice to restrict dissemination and reproduction. In
such case, the following statement shall be included in
the document or on its cover sheet as a special notation
separate and apart from the security classification marking:
"Reproduction of this document or portions thereof
is prohibited without authorization of the origin-
ating office. Its further dissemination shall be
restricted to those authorized by the addressee.".
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Rel a 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591ROW00030001-4
14
Sec. 3. Derivative Application of Markings. Persons
who only reproduce, extract, summarize, or otherwise use
classified information shall not be given original classifi-
cation authority for the purpose of placing or directing
the placement of derivative classification.markings on new
material if the classification is based solely on such
previously classified source information. Persons who
apply derivative classification markings shall respect
classifications assigned by originators, and shall, to
the maximum extent practicable, verify the current need
for and level of classification of the information or
material prior to applying such markings. They shall also
carry forward to any newly created documents or material
the dates or events assigned by the originator to the
source material for declassification or -review.
Sec. 4. Declassification. Declassification of
classified information shall be given emphasis comparable
to that accorded to classification. The determination
to declassify information shall not be made. on the basis
of the level of classification assigned, but rather on the
the
expected perishability and,loss of/sensitivity of the
information with the passage of time, and with due regard
for the public interest in access to official information.
At the time of review, any determination not to declassify
shall be based on a determination that release of the
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For ReIe a 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R0Q 0030001-4
15
information would be demonstrably harmful to the national
security. Declassification shall be accomplished in
accordance with the following:
(a) Guidelines. Within 180 days after the effective
date of this Order, heads of agencies specifically named
in Section 2(d) of this Order shall, in consultation
with the Archivist of the United States, issue declassifi-
cation guidelines which shall be applicable to 20-year
old information classified under their respective juris-
dictions and for which a prior automatic declassification
date has not been established. These guidelines shall
specifically identify those items or categories of informa-
tion which, because of their probable continuing sensitivity
and importance to the national security interest, cannot be
automatically declassified but must be reviewed to determine
whether there is a need for continued protection beyond
20 years. Information not identified in the guidelines
as requiring review is and shall be automatically declassifi-
fied at the end of 20 full calendar years from its date
of origin. These guidelines shall be authorized for use
by the Archivist of the United States and agencies having
custody of the information covered therein.
(b) New Material. Information, except as provided
in subsection (f), which is classified on or after the
effective date of this order, shall be declassified or
reviewed for declassification in accordance with the dates
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Rel 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591ROGQX0030001-4
16
or events specified by original classification author-
ities pursuant to Section 2(f) of this Order. Information
which is not marked with a date or event for declassifi-
cation or review is automatically declassified six years
after its origination. Information whose classification
classified
is derived from source materia]/ prior to the effective
date of this Order shall carry forward dates or events
for declassification or review shown on the source
material and shall be declassified or reviewed in accord-
ance with subsection (c).
(c) Old Material. Information, except as provided
in subsection (f), which was classified before the effec-
tive date of this Order and already marked with a date or
event which directs declassification in 20 years or less
from the date of its origin shall be declassified in
accordance with such date or event unless, upon review
by officials authorized under Section 4(g) of this Order,
an earlier date for declassification is determined.
Such classified information not so marked is and shall
be, on and after January 1, 1979, automatically declassi-
fied 20 years from the date of its origin unless identified
in the guidelines issued by the heads of agencies under
subsection (a) as requiring review.
(d) Systematic Review. To conserve Government
resources devoted to the systematic review of 20-year
old information and to achieve more effective declassif-
ication, only that information constituting the
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relee 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591R00WO030001-4
permanently valuable records of the Government in
accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2103 shall be so reviewed.
Heads of agencies shall order the review of all security
classified records 20 years old-or older which are
held in storage areas by the agency or in Federal Records
Centers for possible disposal. Records which are found
to be unscheduled for some definite future disposition
shall be scheduled immediately. Permanently valuable
records of the Government shall be systematically reviewed
as they become 20 years old. In the conduct of this
review the declassification guidelines issued by heads
of agencies under subsection (a) shall be applied. Only
the head of an agency designated in Section 2(d) hereof
may authorize the continued classification of information
beyond 20 years. In these cases, a declassification date
shall be determined; or, a date shall be set, not more
than ten years later, for subsequent review in accord
with these procedures established for 20 year old
information. The head of an agency or the Director
of Central Intelligence may seek a waiver of this ten
year limit.
(e) Mandatory Review.
(1) All information classified
under this or prior Orders shall be subject to declassif-
ication review by the originating or responsible agency
upon request of an agency or member of the public, pro-
vided the request describes the material sufficiently
to enable the agency having custody to locate it with a
reasonable amount of effort. The head of each agency
shall designate an office to which requests for mandatory
review for declassification may be directed. After review,
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relowe 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591ROW00030001-4
18
the record or any reasonably segregable portion thereof
which no longer requires protection under this Order
shall be declassified, and released unless withholding
is otherwise determined to be required under applicable
statutes.
(2) Procedural instructions for processing such
requests from the public shall be issued by the Security
Information Oversight Office.
(3) Requests for declassification review submitted
to an agency by employees thereof, shall be considered
in accord with procedures which shall be established
by agency heads. Denials of such requests may be referred
to an agency committee for reconsideration.
(4) Material originated by a President or a
President's White House staff, or material in the
possession and control of the Administrator of
General Services pursuant to Section 2107 or 2107
note of title 44, U.S.C., is exempted from this
review if such material is less than ten years old.
(f) Foreign Originated Information. Classified
information furnished to the United States by a foreign
government, international organization or an official
or representative thereof, or produced by the United States
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Rel a 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591ROQ000030001-4
jointly with a foreign government or international
organization, with the understanding that such info-ation
will be kept in confidence, shall be exempt from the
declassification provisions of Section 4 of this Order.
Such information shall, unless downgraded or declassified
earlier, be reviewed for downgrading and declassification
30 years from date of origin and shall be downgraded and
declassified in accordance with guidelines developed
by heads of agencies in consultation with the Archivist
of the United States and, where appropriate, with the
foreign government or international organization concerned.
(g) Declassification Authority.
The authority to
downgrade and declassify information classified under this
or prior Executive orders shall be exercised as follows:
(1) Classified information may be downgraded or
declassified by the official who authorized the original
classification, by a successor in interest or capacity,
or by a supervisory official of either.
(2) Heads of agencies specifically named in Section 2(d)
shall designate additional officials at the lowest practical
echelons of command and supervision to exercise do-,.,-n-
grading and declassification authority, particularly with
respect to information within their areas of responsibility.
These officials should also be authorized by the head of
the agency to resolve conflicts or doubts regarding
classification.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Rere 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591ROW00030001-4
20
(3) The Director of the Security Information Over-
sight Office may downgrade or declassify information con-
sidered by the Oversight Office in the exercise of its
appellate functions pursuant to Section 7 hereof, and
may downgrade or declassify information in any instance
wherein the Director determines that the continued classifi-
cation would be in violation of this Order. These down-
grading or declassification decisions shall take effect
ten working days after they are made, unless during which
time_the head of the affected agency appeals the decision
to the President through the National Security Council-
(4) In the case of classified information trans-
ferred by or pursuant to statute or Executive order in
conjunction with a transfer of function and not merely
for storage purposes, the receiving agency shall be deemed
to be the originating agency for all purposes under this
Order, including downgrading and declassification_
(5) In the case of classified information not trans-
ferred in accordance with paragraph (4) of this subsection,
but originated in an agency which has since ceased to
exist, each agency in possession shall be deemed to be
the originating agency for all purposes under this Order.
Such information may be downgraded or declassified by
the agency in possession after consulting with any other
agency having an interest in the subject matter.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relearn 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591RO0Q; 00030001-4
(6) Classified information transferred to the
General Services Administration for accession into the
Archives of the United States shall be downgraded and
declassified by the Archivist of the United States in
accordance with this Order, directives issued by Security
Information Oversight Office, and pertinent regulations
and declassification guidelines of the agencies.
(7) After the termination of a Presidential admin-
istration, the Archivist of the United States shall have
the authority to review, downgrade and declassify informa-
tion which was classified by the President, his White
House staff, special committees or commissions appointed
by him or others acting in his behalf when this information
is not part of the records of an agency subject to Federal
records statutes. This authority shall be exercised only
after consultation with the agencies having primary subject
matter interest.
(8) The provisions of this Order relating to the
declassification of national security information shall
apply to agencies which, under the terms of this Order,
do not have current authority to originally classify
information, but which formerly had such authority under
prior Executive orders.
Sec. 5. Downgrading. Information classified under
prior orders and marked for automatic downgrading is
automatically downgraded accordingly. Information
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For RelevA6 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591R00 00030001-4
classified under this or prior orders shall, after
review by the originator or other official authorized
to downgrade or declassify information under this Order,
be assigned a lower degree of protection against unauthor-
ized disclosure than currently provided when such down-
grading will serve a useful purpose. Downgrading action
will be reflected by changing the classification.to a lower
level coupled with a notice of such action to holders of
the information.
Sec. 6. Safeguarding.
(a) Policy Directives. The Director of the Security
Information Oversight Office shall, with the approval of
the National Security Council, issue directives which shall
be binding on all agencies for the protection of classified
information from loss or compromise. Such directives
shall conform to the following policies:
(1) No person shall be given access to classified
information unless such person has been determined to be
trustworthy and unless access to such information is
necessary for the'performance of official duties.
(2) All classified information shall be appropri-
ately and conspicuously marked to put all persons on clear
notice of its classified contents.
(3) Classified information shall be used, processed,
and stored only under conditions which will prevent access
by unauthorized persons.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Ree 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591RD00030001-4
23
(4) Appropriate controls for classified info=at-ion
shall be established and maintained and such information
shall be protected adequately during all transmissions.
(5) Classified information no longer needed in
current working files or for reference or record purposes
shall be destroyed or disposed of in accordance wi-h the
records disposal provisions contained in Chapters 21 and
33 of Title 44 of the United States Code and other p~licable
statutes.
(6) All classified information disseminated outside
the Executive Branch shall be given appropriate protection.
(b) Secrecy Agreements. Heads of agencies may require
the signing. of a secrecy agreement as a precondition of
access to classified information-
The Security
Information Office shall, in coordination with appropriate
agencies, develop a uniform secrecy agreement the
heads of agencies may adopt. Secrecy agreements crrently
in force need not be reexecuted.
(c) Special Access.
(1) The head of an agency specifically named fn
Section 2(d)(1), or the Director of Central Intelligence,
may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this Order,
special requirements with respect to access, distr_bution,
and protection of classified information.
Special access programs may only be created
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Rele 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591RO4gO00030001-4
24
or continued by the head of an agency specifically named
in Section 2(d)(1), or, for matters pertaining to intelli-
gence sources and methods, by the Director of Central
Intelligence, personally and in writing. Such special access
programs shall be created or continued only on the specific
showing that:
(i) Normal safeguarding procedures are not sufficient
to limit need-to-know or access;
(ii) the number of persons who will need access will
be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective
of providing extra protection for the information involved;,and
(iii) the special access controls balance the need to
protect the information against the full spectrum of needs
to use the information.
(2) All such special access programs shall automatically
terminate every three years unless renewed in accordance
with the procedures in this Section.
(3) Heads of agencies, or the Director of Central
Intelligence as applicable, shall within 180 days after
the effective date of this order.
.,,review all existing special
access programs under their jurisdiction and continue
them only subject to the procedures in this section. They
shall also establish and maintain for their areas of
responsibility central listings of all special access programs
continued or created by them. Heads of agencies, the
Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relee 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591R000030001-4
25
Security Information Oversight Office shall have access
to all such lists of special access programs; however,
such right of access may not be delegated.
(d) Historical Researchers and Former Officials.
The requirement in Section 6(a)(1) that access to classi-
fied information be granted only as is necessary for the
performance of one's duties shall not apply to persons
outside the Executive Branch who are engaged in historical
research projects or who have previously occupied policy-
making positions to which they were appointed by the
President; provided, however, that in each case the head
of the agency:
(1) Determines in writing that access is consistent
with the interests of national security;
(2) Takes reasonable action to ensure that properly
classified information is not subject to unauthorized
disclosure; and
(3) With respect to access granted a person by reason
of his having previously occupied a policy-making position,
such access shall be limited to those papers which the
former official originated, reviewed, signed or received,'
while in public office.
(e) Controls on Reproduction and Distribution.
(1) Subject to directives issued by the Director of
the Security Information Oversight Office, the heads of
agencies shall ensure that:
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relewe 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R04D600030001-4
26
(i) Top Secret documents are not reproduced without
the consent of the originating office.
(ii) Secret documents are not reproduced except in
accordance with procedures approved by an appropriate official
who has been designated for that ournose by the agency having
custody of the document.
(iii) No classified document is reproduced if such
reproduction is prohibited by the originator and the
document is so annotated.
(iv) Reproduced copies of classified documents are
subject to the same accountability and controls as the
original.
(v) Records are maintained by the reproducing office
to show the number and distribution of reproduced copies of
Secret and Top Secret documents and those marked in accord with
Section 2(g)(4) restricting reproduction and dissemination.
(2) All classified information shall be appropri-
ately and conspicuously marked to put all persons on clear
notice of its classified contents, and, if appropriate,
marked to show its particular dissemination and repro-
duction restrictions.
Sec. 7. Implementation and Review. Overall respon-
sibility for policy direction of the program established
pursuant to this Order shall rest with the National
Security Council.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Relea a 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000030001-4
(a) Oversight Office.
(1) The Administrator of General Services, subject
to the direction of the President and the National
Security Council, shall be responsible for the imple-
mentation and monitoring of the program established
pursuant to this Order. Such responsibility shall be
performed through a Security Information Oversight office
headed by a full-time Director authorized to maintain
a permanent staff. The Oversight Office shall:
(i) In accordance with procedures to be established
by its Director, oversee agency actions to ensure compli-
ance with the provisions of this Order and implementing
directives.
(:i_) Consider and take action on complaints and
suggestions from persons within and without the Government
with respect to the general administration of the Order,
including appeals from agency denials of requests for
declassification of those classified records de-fined in
Section !(e)(4) which are ten or more years old.
(iii) Develop, in consultation with affected agencies,
directives required for the effective implementation of
this Order.
(iv) Report annually to the President through the
National Security Council on Executive Branch imple-
mentation of the Executive order.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Rele 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R0000030001-4
(v) Have the authority to require of each =_;encv
with original classification authority such reoor_s,
information, and other cooperation as necessary to fulfill
the above responsibilities.
(2) There is also established an Interagency Security
Information Advisory Committee which shall be cared by
the Director of the Oversight Office and shall be cc-:prised
of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense,
Justice, and Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence
the National Security Council staff, and the
Archives and Records Service. The Interdenart-en_a?
Committee shall meet at the call of the Chairman and
shall act in an advisory capacity to him in all matte=s
related to effective implementation of this Order and
implementing directives.
(b) Agencies. To promote the basic purposes of
this Order, the head of each agency originating or :r_dling
classified information shall:
(1) Prior to the effective date of this Order, submit
to the Security Information Oversight Office for approval
a copy of the regulations it proposes to adopt pursuant
to this Order and implementing directives. Subsecuent
changes to agency regulations shall also be for ar ec to
the Oversight Office for approval.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For ReIWe 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591ROW00030001-4
29
(2) Publish in the Federal Register those regulations
or changes thereto which are approved by the Director of
the Security Information Oversight Office and which are
issued in implementation of this Order to the extent that
they affect the general public.
(3) Designate a senior member of the agency staff
who shall conduct an active oversight program and shall
ensure effective compliance with and implementation of
this Order.
(4) Designate a subordinate who shall chair an
agency committee which shall have authority to act on all
suggestions and complaints with respect to the agency's
administration of this Order. This committee also may
be authorized to act upon appeals from denials of declassif
ication requests made pursuant to subsection 4(e).
(5) Establish a continuing program to familiarize
agency personnel and others authorized access to classified
information with the provisions of this Order and imple-
menting directives. There shall also be established
and maintained an active security orientation and education
program for such personnel in order to impress u_on each
individual his or her responsibility for exercising
vigilance and care in complying with the provisions of
this Order.
(6) Ensure the preparation and promulgation of
security classification guidance adequate to facilitate
the identification and uniform classification of
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Rele 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591Rd6500030001-4
information requiring protection under the provisions
of this Order.
(7) Develop and promulgate declassification guide-
lines in accordance with Section 4(a) hereof.
(8) Take necessary action to ensure that:
(i) a demonstrable need for access to classified
information is established prior to the initiation of
administrative clearance procedures, and
(ii) the number of people granted access to classified
information is reduced to and maintained at the minimum,
consistent with operational requirements and needs.
(9) Cause a continuing review of safeguarding
practices and procedures; and, eliminate those which are
found to be duplicative and unnecessary.
(10) Submit to the Security Information Oversight
Office such information or reports as the Director of
the Security Information Oversight Office may find necessary
to carry out the Oversight Office's responsibilities.
Sec. 8. Administrative Sanctions.
(a) Any officer or employee of the United States
who knowingly and. willfully classifies or continues the
classification of information in violation of this Order
or any implementing directive; or knowingly and willfully
and without authorization, discloses classified information; or
compromises classified information -through gross negligence;
or knowingly and willfully violates any other provision
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For ReleWe 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000030001-4
of this Order or implementing directive which the head
of an agency determines to be a serious violation, shall
be subject to appropriate administrative sanctions. In
any case in which the oversight Office finds that unneces-
sary classification or overclassification has occurred it
shall make a report to the head of the agency concerned
so that corrective steps may be taken.
(b) Sanctions may include, but are not limited to,
reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, or other
sanction in accordance with applicable law and agency
regulations.
(c) The head of each agency shall ensure that
appropriate and prompt corrective administrative action
is taken whenever a violation under paragraph (a) occurs.
Additionally, heads of agencies shall immediately inform
the Department of Justice of any case in which a violation
of the criminal law may be involved.
Sec. 9. Atomic Energy Material. Nothing in this
Order shall supersede any requirements related to "Restricted
Data" and material designated as "Formerly Restricted
Data" pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of August 30,
1954, as amended, or the regulations of the Department
of Energy.
Sec. 10. Revocation of Prior Orders. Executive
Order No. 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended by
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Ree 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP82M00591R6f}p500030001-4
32
Executive Orders No. 11714 of April 24, 1973 and No. 11862
of June 11, 1975, and all implementing directives
issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 11652, including
the Directive of May 17, 1972 (3 C.F.R. 1085(1971-75
Comp.)) are revoked.
Sec. 11. Effective Date. This Order shall become
effective on March 1, 1978, except that the functions
of the Security Information Oversight Office shall be
effective immediately and shall be performed in the interim
by the Interagency Classification Review Committee.
1977
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED EXECUTIVE ORDER ON
"NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND MATERIAL"
1. Page 2, Table of Contents. Add under the caption for section 6 a
new sub-caption reading "(e) Controls on Reproduction and Distribution."
REASON: Consistency with the text of the draft Order.
2. Page 3, subsection 1(d). Change to read: "'Intelligence source'
means a person, organization, or technical means which provides or is expected
to provide foreign inteligence or foreign counterintelligence and which, if
its existence, identity or capability is disclosed ..... An 'intelligence
source' also means a person or organization which prev4des has provided, is
providing, or has agreed to provide foreign intelligence.. .only on the condition
that its identity remains undisclosed." REASON: To clarify the definition
so that in case of litigation or dispute it will be clear that sources under
development may be protected by classification; that certain technical sources
which could be lost if tihe:i.r existence was compromised can be protected; and
that sources who cooperate on the basis of confidentiality may be protected
after they have become inactive and before they have started to report, in
addition to while they are active.
3. Page 3, subsection 1(e). Change to read: "'Intelligence method'
means the any method wh4eh4sused to provide support to an intelligence source or
operation,...United States, or which wed could, if disclosed, reasonably be
expected to lead to...." REASON: To ensure that support is understood as
encompassing any and all means, not just material ones; to recognize the
potential, not the certainty, of consequences of disclosure; and to provide
for the application of judgment to such consequences.
4. Page 4, subsection 2(a)(2). Change the first sentence to read: "The
unauthorized disclosure of such information could reasonably be expected to
cause at least significant damage to the national security." REASON: Consis-
tency with the definitions of the three classification levels.
5. Page 5, subsection 2(a)(2). Change the second sentence to read:
"'In the case of information provided in confidence by a foreign government
or international organization, and of information specifically bearing on
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
intelligence sources or intelligence methods, it is reasonable to expect that
the breach of that confidence; or the disclosure in whole or in part of those
sources or methods, could cause at least significant damage to the national
security." REASON: (1) The language in the present draft reflects
decisions that information provided in confidence by a foreign government,
etc., should be treated as classified information, not just classifiable
dependent upon a separate finding that its disclosure would cause a requisite
degree of damage to the national security. Intelligence sources and
intelligence methods are at least as sensitive as foreign, governmental
confidences. Some intelligence sources are foreign governments. The draft
Order defines such sources and methods as being inherently sensitive. As
such, information satisfying those definitions should not have to undergo
a separate test, subject to litigation under the Freedom of Information
Act, of damage to the national security if disclosed. The Order should
therefore assert that both classes of information are classified. (2) The
qualifier "at least" before "significant damage" is needed to allow whatever
classification designation is appropriate to be applied to the information
involved. As written, the classification would be limited to Confidential
(v. section l(f)(3)).
6. Page 5, subsection 2(b)(3). Change lines 3-5 to read: "Provide
a foreign nation with information apes which it could use to develop a feetive
countermeasures to such plans or posture;" REASON: (1) Grammatical;
(2) The qualifier "effective" adds a judgmental consideration essentially
irrelevant to the application of this classification criterion.
7. Page 7, subsection 2(c)(1). Change the opening clause to read:
"Where there is reasonable doubt as to whether certain information requires
any security protection,". REASON: To temper this test so as to avoid the
extreme interpretation that any degree of doubt, no matter how small or un-
reasoned, would preclude classification.
8. Page 8, subsection 2(c)(7). Change to read: "Where there is reasonable
doubt whether information should be classified Secret or Top Secret, it shall
not be classified Top Secret. Where there is reasonable doubt whether infor-
mation e4ass4f4ed should be classified Confidential or Secret, it shall not
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
be classified Secret Genf4dent4a;." REASON: To provide for the exercise of
reasonable judgment in determining classification; and to be consistent with
the prohibitory language in the other parts of subsection 2(c).
9. Page 8, subsection 2(d)(1). Change to read: "The authority to
originally classify information 'Top Secret' may be exercised only by such
officials as the President by publication in the Federal Register may
designate in writing, and;-sabjeet-lra-l;Ise-restricton-n-papagrapl~-~4~ by
the heads of the following agencies, and, subject to'the restrictions in
subsection (4), by such persons as they may designate in Writing:" REASON:
(1) To make clear that persons designated in writing by those officials
named by the President or by agency heads also have proper authority to
classify information. (2) To show that the restriction in subsection (4)
applies to the designation of classifying authorities, not to classifying
actions by heads of agencies.
10. Page 8, subsection 2(d)(1). The language of this subsection, in
order to be consistent with the thrust of the Order in essentially limiting
classifying authority to named departments and agencies, vests specific
classifying authority in the heads of agencies. CIA is one of the agencies
the head of which is granted Top Secret classifying authority. While the
DCI is the statutory head of CIA, it is by no means clear that the language
of this Order would empower him to delegate classifying authority to new
organizations (e.g., NITC) which may be set up under the DCI's control and
direction but administratively separate from CIA. The problem being potential,
no change to the proposed Order is offered; but it should be considered by
the DCI in planning for organizations which support his Community responsibilities.
11. Page 9, subsection 2(d)(2). Change to read: "The authority to
originally classify information 'Secret' may be exercised;-subjeet-to-the-
restriei:4ens-4n-paragraph-k44 only by such officials as the President may
designate in writing, by officials who have Top Secret classification authority,
and by the heads of the following agencies, and, subject to the restrictions
in subsection (4), by such persons as they may designate in writing:"
REASON: (1) To correct the anomaly of not providing for Secret classifying
authority to be exercised by an official designated by the President;
(2) For the same reason given under change 9 above.
3
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
12. Page 9, subsection 2(d)(3). Make the same change as in 11 above,
substituting "Confidential" for "Secret." REASON: Same as in change 11 above.
13. Page 10, subsection 2(d)(4).
a. Change the first sentence to read: "The heads of agencies
specifically named in subsections (1), (2), and (3), and officials designated
by the President, may delegate their authority to originally classify infor-
mation." REASON: To permit officials designated by the President (e.g.,
Dr. Brzezinski) to delegate classifying authority to their subordinates.
b. Delete the third sentence. REASON: The restriction expressed
in the sentence on redelegation of "Secret" and "Confidential" classifying
authority would place an unreasonable administrative burden on large
organizations, especially those with a number of field components having valid
reasons for original classification authority. PRM-29 deliberations surfaced
no instances of abuse of delegation or redelegation of classification authority.
An unsupported assumption that such redelegation might be abused in the future
should not justify prohibitory language in the Order. The possibility of such
abuse should instead be addressed through inspections and monitoring by the
Oversight Office established by the Order.
14. Page 11, subsection 2(f)(1). Replace with the following: "All
original classification authorities shall, at the time of original classi-
fication determinations, set a specific date or event for automatic declassifi-
cation of the information which shall be as early as the national security
interest will permit but shall not exceed six years from the date of origin
of the information that is classified; except" REASON: To state clearly
the obligations of original classification authorities regarding the duration
of classifications, and to express these in a manner which clearly shows that
the following subsection provides for modification. As written in the draft
Order, this subsection does not clearly provide for the extension of classi-
fications beyond six years because the exception clause applies only to
the first sentence, which speaks only the setting of a "specific date or
event for automatic declassification."
15. Pages 11-12, subsection 2(f)(2). Revise to read: "In those cases
where there is a need, directly related to the national security, to continue
classification beyond six years, only Top Secret classification authorities.
4
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
or the heads of agencies specifically designated in section 2(d) of this
Order may set a later date or event for automatic declassification,
Alternatively3-these-aather4ties-fmay;-whey?e-deelass4f+eatfee-9afde~iees
4ssued-hy-heads-ef-ageneies-pwesewibe-a-need-few-feyiew-ef-spee~ffied
4efewoiat4ee-apse-#ts-29th-amw4vewsary-,-set-a-date-few-wev4ew-e?-sash
4nfewaaat4en-eees4stewt-w4th-saeh-ga4de3iwes:--4W-e4ther-eases These dates
or events shall be as early as the national security interest will permit
but 4R-Re-ease shall not exceed 29 twenty years from date of origin of the
information involved. Add4t4eeal4y3-few-?ewe4gm-er4g4nated-4efewFRat4ee3-as
def}ned-}n-seetiee-4kf4;-these-eff4eia4s-may-set-dates-ew-events-few
deelass4fieat4en--ew-wev4ew-wh4eh-shall-net-exeeed-th#wty-years: When those
authorities determine that declassification at or before twenty years from
date of origin would be demonstrably harmful to the national security, they
may instead specify a declassification review at or before the twentieth
anniversary of the information when-it falls within the ambit of declassi-
fication guides issued by heads of agencies under section 4(a) hereof.
Officials who authorize the extension of classification beyond six years
must record on the originator's file copy the reasons for such extension
and their identity. The reasons must be specific and must explain why the
classification will continue to meet the requirements set forth in
subsection 2(a) above. And except" REASON: (1) To place immediately
after the language permitting extended classification the language which
states the limits of such extensions. (2) To delete from this section
for later separate expression in the interests of clarity and completeness
the language necessary to reflect the decision that foreign originated
classified information may retain its classification for thirty years.
(3) To state clearly the sequence of determinations and conditions that
need to be met for classifying officials to specify review for declassifi-
cation vice declassification itself. Further, to include the Attorney
General's test of "demonstrable harm" as an initial judgment determination
in such cases. The language in the present draft on this matter would
invite unthinking specification of a review vice declassification date
whenever the information fell within the ambit of declassification guides
which may well be relatively general in nature. (4) To link together
5
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
the existing two subsections and a new subsection (3) on foreign originated
information.
16. Page 12, add a new subsection 2(f)(3) reading: "(3) In the case of
classified information furnished to the United States by a foreign government,
international organization, or an official or representative thereof, or
produced by the United States pursuant to joint arrangement with a foreign
government or international organization, with the understanding that such
information will be kept in confidence, Top Secret classification authorities
or the heads of agencies specifically designated in section 2(d) of this Order
may continue the classification of such information for thirty years from
date of origin unless the foreign government or international organization
involved specifies or agrees to earlier declassification. Officials who
authorize the extension of classification of foreign originated information
must record on the originator's file copy of the information their identity,
the specific foreign source involved, and reference to this section of this
Order as the reason for extended classification." REASON: (1) To define for-
eign originated classified information where the term is first used (moving the
definition from section 4(f) of the present draft), and to modify that defini-
tion to accommodate a problem NSA would face if the present language was
retained (i.e., "jointly" implies that both parties work in tandem to produce
the information, a situation not always the case). (2) In the interests of
clarity, to state, in a subsection separate from the one bearing on the
extended classification of U.S. originated classified information, the
different rules applicable to foreign originated information (e.g., lack of
need to specify alternative of declassification review, as section 4(f) of
the Order exempts foreign information from automatic declassification).
17. Page 14, section 3. Delete the last sentence. REASON: The
sentence pertains to declassification, which is properly covered in section 4.
Further, this sentence is essentially duplicative of the last sentence in
section 4(b).
18. Page 15, subsection 4(a). Change the second sentence to read:
"These guidelines shall specifically identify those items or categories of
information which ...eannet'may not be automatically declassified...."
REASON: Editorial.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
19. Pages 15-16. Change the second lines of subsections 4(b) and (c)
to make the reference read: "...subsection (f) below...." REASON: To
avoid confusion as to which subsection (f) is meant.
20. Page 17, subsection 4(d).
a. Change the second sentence to read: "Heads of agencies shall
order the review for. possible disposal of all security classified records
29 twenty years old or older which are held in storage areas by the agency
or in Federal Records Centers few-pess464e-d4spesad ." REASON: To remove
an ambiguity.
b. Change the fourth sentence to read: "Permanently valuable
classified records of the Government shall be systematically reviewed as
they become 20 twenty years old." REASON: To clarify the intent of this
requirement, and to ensure that it is not misunderstood as a requirement
to review all agency records for archival value.
c. Replace the last two sentences
(all after the words "in these cases") with the following: "When the head
of an agency authorizes continued classification, a specific declassification
date for the information shall be stated. When the future sensitivity of
the information cannot reasonably be predicted during the twenty-year review,
a date not more than ten years later may be set for a second review in
accordance with the procedures applicable for twenty-year-old information.
A specific declassification date must be set after the second review. The
head of an agency or the Director of Central Intelligence may, for. good
cause, seek from the Director of the Security Information Oversight Office
a waiver of the ten-year limit for second reviews." REASON: (1) To
clarify an ambiguous antecedent in the present language. (2) To state
the conditions which would justify and accompany a second review, and
to avoid confusion, to express such separately from the requirement stated
for the twenty-year review. (3) To state from whom waivers of the ten-year
time limit may be sought.
21. Page 17, subsection 4(e)(l). Revise the first sentence to read:
"All information classified under this or prior Orders, except as noted in
subsection (4) below, shall be subject to...." REASON: To make clear at
the outset of this subsection that there is an exception to its application.
7
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
22. Page 18, subsection 4(e)(1). Change the last sentence to read:
"After review, the record...shall be declassified, and released unless
withholding is otherwise determined to be requ4red sanctioned under applicable
statutes." REASON: Accuracy. Applicable statutes (e.g., Freedom of Infor-
mation Act) do not require the withholding of information; they sanction such
under certain circumstances.
23. Page 18, subsection 4(e)(2). Change to read: "Procedural instruc-
tions for processing such requests ?rem-the-pubT4e shall be issued by the
Security Information Oversight Office." REASON: Accuracy and brevity.
"Such requests" refers to those from both government agencies and the public.
24. Page 18, subsection 4(f). Replace the first sentence with the
following: "Foreign originated classified information, as defined in sub-
section 2(f)(3) above, is exempt from the declassification provisions of
section 4 of this Order." REASON: To delete the definitional language
which would be moved to subsection 2(f) of the Order by change No. 13 above.
25. Page 20, subsection 4(g)(3).
a. Add a new second sentence reading: "The Director shall promptly
notify the head of the agency affected by any such determinations." REASON:
To correct the omission of a requirement for the Director of the Security
Information Oversight Office to notify an agency head whenever he overrides
an agency classification judgment.
b. Change the former second sentence (now the third) to read:
"These downgrading or declassification decisions shall take effect ter
werk4eg thirty days after they are made, unless...." REASON: To provide
sufficient time for the orderly processing of an appeal to the President.
26. Page 20, subsection 4(g)(5). Change the first sentence to read:
"In the case of classified information not transferred in accordance with
paragraph-{44-e#'-tba s subsection (4) above,...." REASON: Clarity.
27. Page 22, subsection 6(a)(2). Change to read: "All classified
information shall be appropriately and conspicuously marked to put all persons
on clear notice of its classified contents, and, if appropriate, marked to show
its particular dissemination and reproduction restrictions." REASON: To
bring together in one place similar requirements now expressed in two places
in the proposed Order. This change would subsume the requirement expressed
8
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
in subsection 6(e)(2) on page 26, which should then be deleted,
28. Pages 24-25, subsection 6(c)(3). Delete the last sentence,
REASON: The requirement therein for heads of all agencies, the DCI, and
the Director of the Security Information Oversight Office to have access
to one another's listings of special access programs authorized by them
serves no clear purpose and violates fundamental "need-to-know" principles.
29. Page 25, subsection 6(d). Change the last part of the lead-in
language to read: "...provided, however, that in each case the head of the
agency having jurisdiction over the information to'which access has been
requested: REASON: To limit authorityto grant access to historical researchers
to those agencies with functional jurisdiction over the information involved,
and thereby obviate the possibility of another agency with custody over copies
of that information granting the requested access on its own.
30. Pages 25-26, subsection 6(e).
a. Delete subsection 6(e)(2), REASON: Stated under change No.
27 above.
b. Renumber the remaining subsections so as to have a lead-in
sentence and five numbered (i.e., (1), etc.) subsections following.
c. Change the new subsection 6(e)(l)--the old 6(e)(1)(i)--to read:
"Top Secret documents are not reproduced without the consent of the originating
office or higher authority." REASON: To provide for a more realistic balance
in the approval mechanism for such reproduction.
d. Change the new subsection 6(e)(5)--the old 6(e)(l)(v)--to read:
"Records are maintained by the reproducing office to show the number and
distribution of reproduced copies of Seeret-aRd Top Secret documents and those
documents marked...." REASON: The imposition of a requirement to keep records
on copies of Secret documents would create a staggering administrative burden
for the Intelligence Community, which needs to reproduce and disseminate
quantities of documentation at that classification level to satisfy the
minimum needs of consumers and producers. Since there has been no showing
that the absence of such a record keeping requirement has contributed to
classification abuses, there is no justification for imposing this burden.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
31. Page 27, subsection 7(a)(1). Change the first.sentence to read
"The Administrator of General Services, subject to the direction of the
President and the National Security. Council, shall be responsible for
monitoring the implementation and-men4ter4 of the program established
pursuant to this Order." REASON: Since implementation of the Order's
provisions is both tasked to the agencies and inherent in their missions,
the Oversight Office can only monitor agency compliance.
32. Page 28, subsection 7(a).(l)(v). Change to read: "Have the authority
to require of each agency with-er4g4eal-e assif#eat4en-authority which
classifies or uses classified information such reports...." REASON: To
provide the Oversight Office with authority to obtain data and cooperation
from agencies which use classified information as well as generate it.
33. Page 28, subsection 7(b)(1). Change to read: "Prior to the
effective date of this Order, submit to the Security Information Oversight
Office few-appreva3 a copy of the regulations it prepeses-te-adept issues
pursuant to this Order and implementing directives. Subsequent changes to
agency regulations shall also be forwarded to the Oversight Office few-approval."
REASON: Given the guidance in the Order and its implementing directive, approval
by an agency head of his agency's implementing regulations should be quite
sufficient to ensure consistency and compliance. Further, since the functions
of the Oversight Office during the period between the signing of the Order
and its effective date are to be performed by the Interagency Classification
Review Committee, it is unrealistic to expect that such committee will have
the time to make meaningful reviews of any proposed regulations it might be
asked to approve.
34. Page 29, subsection 7(b)(2). Change to read: "Publish in the
Federal Register those regulations or changes thereto whMeh-are-appreved-by
teh-94reeter-ef-the-Seeur4ty-ieferfflat4en-9vers4ght-9f?4ee-and which are
issued in implementation of this Order to the extent that they affect the
general public." REASON: Same as the first reason stated under change
No. 33 above.
35. Page 29, subsection 7(b)(3). Revise to read: "Designate a
subordinate seeier-meFAber-ef-the-ageeey-staff who shall conduct an active
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
agency oversight program...." REASON: Conciseness and consistency with
the usage of subsection (4) following.
36. Page 31, subsection 8(c). Change to read: "The head of each agency
shall make provision to ensure that appropriate and prompt corrective admini-
strative action is taken whenever a violation under paragraph (a) occurs7L
Add4t4eea4ly;-heads-ef-ageee4es-sba4l-4fined4ate4y-4e?erm and that the
Department of Justice is notified immediately of any case in which a violation
of the criminal law may be involved." REASON: To obviate the need for heads
of large agencies to become personally involved in the actions required, by
permitting them to approve procedures which would delegate the responsibility.
37. Page 31, section 9. Change to read: "Sec. 9. Atef4e-Energy
Mater4a3 Statutory Requirements. Nothing in this Order shall supersede any_
a. Requirements related to 'Restricted Data' and material designated
as 'Formerly Restricted Data' pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of August 30,
1954, as amended, or the regulations of the Department of Energy.
b. Responsibilities placed on the Director of Central Intelligence
the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, as amended, for protectin c
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."
REASON: The same rationale that supports reference to the Atomic
Energy Act to avoid confusion in the minds of users of this Order as to
what authority takes precedence is equally applicable to a reference to the
DCI's statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods. Since
protective measures in support of that responsibility are considerably
broader than security classifications, it is necessary to include reference
to the statutory provision involved to ensure that users of this Order,
and persons litigating under the Freedom of Information Act, are aware that
the President recognized the continuing responsibility of the DCI in this
regard.
38. Page 32, section 10. Change to read: "Executive Order No. 11652...
and all implementing directives... are revoked upon the effective date of this
Order. REASON: To make clear that the revocation of the existing Order takes
effect when the new Order does, not when the new Order is signed.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4
39. Page 32, section 11. Replace with the following: "This Order
shall become effective on March 1, 1978, except that the provisions of
section 6(a) are effective immediately and the functions assigned therein
to the Security Information Oversight Office shall be performed in the interim
by the Interagency Classification Review Committee." REASON: The only
functions of the Oversight Office which the Interagency Classification Review
Committee can reasonably carry out in the interim period are those in
section 6(a) relative to the development and issuance of implementing
directives for the Order. The assignment of responsibility should be limited
accordingly.
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000500030001-4