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September 8, 1980
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? I," ?I(1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Lir] ? Intelligence China's Defense Policy and Armed Forces N10104311 Intelligence Estimate TOP Ali 1 I 480 .S'ept too copy Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 NIE 13-4-80 CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMED FORCES Information as Alai& as of 9 September I9S0 11 AS ILISed ill Iht preparation (4 this Estimate 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top,5?et THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organization of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Notional Security Agency. Also Participating: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army The Director of Nava! Intelligence, Deportment of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Deportment of the Air Force The Director of Intelligence, Hoodquortert, Morino Corps li joapetrir 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secre Page 25X1 25X1 CONTENTS KEY JUDGMENTS 1 25X1 I. CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY Current Defense Policy 1-3 Threat Perception and Foreign Policy 1-3 Decisionmak ing 1-5 Defense Modernization and Economics 1-7 Economic Policies and the Defense :_;ector 1-7 Modernization of the Defense Industries 1-8 Impediments to Defense Modernization 1-10 Appraisal of Defense Caps 1-10 Foreign Technical Assistance I-10 Military Doctrine, Strategy, and War-Fighting Capabiltiy 1-13 Doctrine 1-13 Strategy 1-14 War-Fighting Capability 1-15 Outlook 1-20 H. CHINA'S MILITARY FORCES A. Strategic Attack 11-3 Current Forces 11-3 25X1 Bombers 11-11 gy 1 25X1 Programs 11-14 Current Systems 11-14 SLIM Program 11-16 Space Systems 11-17 Prospects 11-18 Force Projections 11-10 1 mplications 11-20 Capabilities Against the USSR 11-20 Capability Against die United States 11-20 B Strategic Defense 11-20 25X1 25X1 1 rends and I)evelopments 11-2.4 Prospects 11-25 ill Top Secret 25X1 25X1 fi Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Page C. General Purpose Forces 11-26 25X1 Tactical Nuclear Programs 11-29 Ground Forces 11-30 Organization, Composition, and Disposition 11-30 Military Equipment 11-31 Capabilities and Limitations 11-31 Trends and Prospects 1143 Tactical Air Forces 11-34 Organization, Composition, and Disposition 11-34 Equipment and Armament 11-35 Capabilities and Limitations 11-36 Trends and Prospects 11-37 Naval Forces 11-38 Organization, Composition, and Disposition 11-38 Equipment and Armament 11-38 Capabilities and Limitations 11-39 Trends and Prospects 11-41 ANNEX: Sino-Soviet Military Situation A-1 iv Top Swot 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 KEY JUDGMENTS China has the full range of military forces befitting a major power: the largest standing army in the world; a small strategic nuclear strike force; a large coastal defense navy moving gradually toward the open ocean; and large and growing air and air defense forces. Nevertheless, China's military forces and defense establishment are severely handi- capped by an outdated technological and industrial base, which pro- duces weapon systems roughly a generation behind those of modern Western and Soviet forces. Chinese defense policy will continue to emphasize maintenance of conventional and nuclear forces sufficient to deter attack from any quarter, or to deny an attacker success in the event deterrence fails. We believe that, in the event of a Soviet counterforce nuclear attack, sufficient Chinese ballistic missiles would survive to deliver a small but destructive retaliatory strike. While we cannot be confident, we believe this constitutes a credible deterrent to a Soviet attack. Fur- thermore, we estimate that Chinese general purpose forces have !w- imps an even chance of stalemating a conventional Soviet invasion somewhere short of Beijing. We believe, however, that the Chinese would probably be unable to halt a large-scale Soviet invasion supported by extensive use of nuclear weapons. China views Vietnam both as a surrogate for Moscow in Southeast Asia and as a rival in its own right for influence in the area. China has "reserved the right" to teach Mimi a "second lesson" and has in- creased its strength in the border area sharply over the prewar level, but considerable reinforcements would be required for a major conflict with Vietvain. Beijing treats Taiwan essentially as a political and juridical ques- tion and does not appear to anticipate hostilities there in the near fu- ture. In any event, China is not capable at present of a successful amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The leadership recognizes China's inferiority in modern weapons relative to its main adversaries and has set comprehensive moderniza- tion of its obsolescent forces as one of its key goals. I however, among its goals for modernization--of agricidture, industry, science and tech- Top/Vet 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Too Secret nology, and defense?defense clearly has the lowest priority. There is a broad consensus within the Chinese leadership that the civilian econo- my must be further developed as a prerequisite to effective military modernization. Thus, significant improvement of China's military forces will de- pend on political stability and the commitment to modernization, the availability of foreign technology, and the avoidance of a costly conflict with the USSR or Vietnam. We estimate that some progress will be made, especially in the late 1980s. ? China's strategic missile force will grow slowly during the decade, but a couple of full-range ICBMs that can reach all of the continental United States will be operational within .he next year or two. ? China will launch additional nuclear-powered submarines during the decade, and probably will have one or more oper- ational SSBN/S1,13M units by the late 1980s. ? A Spey-engined Chinese combat aircraft will become oper- qtional sometime after 1985. NIereover, there are a number of critical gaps in China's capabili- ties that will receive early attention and some remedy through introduc- tion of new technology and equipment, some perhaps acquired from foreign sources. Among the pr i Wins are: ? The need for good antitank guided missiles and low-altitude air defense weapons, particularly surface-to- air missiles. ? Serious de;Iciencies in battlefield mobility and tactical communications. ? The inability to design and develop modern airframes and engines for combat aircraft. ? Acute logistical deficiencies in a wartime enviromnept. China's in doctrine--people's war under modern condi- tions"?is for China realistic and practical as a defense against the USSR, and is likely to change only slightly in the nest I() years. Tlw Chinese will continue to rely on massive population, vast territory, aml defense in depth to counter Soviet advantages in technology, new weapons will only gradually be introduced into the forces. In sum, the Chinese perceive the USSR as a long-term threat and appear to believe that their current and future military capabilities and warming relathuis wit II the West will offer eiumgli of a deterrent to keep the I. at hay for die foreseeable future. 2 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 R Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 THE ESTIMATE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 ., Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 - Top Secret Section 1 CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY 1-1 Top Sure, 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secr%t Vi'ar ft nor condo( red in a seas 'Afferent front this In fly part Te4 Me future war apainit sapiession, for esomple The largit of titled. the orate of dr and even the method of fighting ere nest to so Wer moo duds and odic a nvoilicr of fur probternr in fight of nett condition. oho miltiary think' ng mail tally r iris the dieing fng ronthrionr I/ tie /reel and rommoa okodern oar in the way or corn rod ndr?rf ? we, du01002 lw 19Vh and 1940e. or are hound to meet ii fil s 'Si rrhuff and toilet e If 11.11i1 deice the mode, tisation of our national dr. frnte will intaristis vow a deep point revolution in OW emir whip We will haira poortful fighilng lorre when moll err w eapon h combined with own who hare advanced modern 0011/Ifiry 1140404 To nbastrr advanced modern PM/flew 0?1001 MN. wa oiw,i CTMIkflf Marriron tertintrrn Moo Zedong /Proughi irh the rotor of .extern itaffort and 0.r/him-ally nolie pro& :mit regarding Or Ikernit and P00$0,10-e cJ luitlina a MOO/. I amp and launching a people's hat tact ,y,dv condrionvi 1-2 Top Secret ht. Nt ChG0/ 4N Minittrr of Ilefente ()aortal 1979 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret 1. CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY Current Defense Policy 1 The hnulainctital ()Wet Use of (lie defense ',olio of the People's Itemilyfic of China is the maintenance and improserlient of forces capable of ensuring MA- liOnal agdinSt j1r 5 Ster11,11 threat 11ie (:hi? nese atoned Ii 11(15--collet tis els kilos% n as the Penille'S Lilwration Arms I?ate al ii tasked vs it); bolst( C- lug putplic seem-its IPoli(e) force. to defend the regime against a ri internal ducal 2 To achiese the first goal. Beijing seeks to estab- lish fortes suit fiticials strong to deter a nuclear or consentional MIA on China from aro quarter, Bre. ognifing its strategic inferiority relatise to its main ad? sersaries, (ilium has sct comprehensise moderniration of its olysoleseent hr. s as one of its kes goals There is a broad coorkensus ssithin the Chinese leadership, Inks es cc that the cis ilian econoriss must be further des eloped 'white effectise toilitars incslerniiation tall be Allies ec f :otiselptentis. the mi:itars moderni/a? lion Program has a !inset priority and is proceeding at a gradual pace. :3 To athiese its internal set (ails obiectise lkiji ng has sought to maintain a politicalls ass are. los al, and obedient roil it ars. a rid has disperse(' it thrthighout the cciuntry so that it cart reatt rink kls to local lroulyle plilitical stabilits has returned to China follossing the disruntise CnItural licsolution. and the parts ap- paratus has regained its administratise control of the couhtts. the internal scourits dimension of tlw Pi..1's mission has diminished considerahls Threat Perception and Foreign Policy .1101(pngli its military forces are the ultimate ensurer c of China's seciirity. the leadership regards the management )1 (iiirta's foreign illations. particularly Its relations ss jib the sliperpcmers, as crucial to prole( ting national securits. Beijing has pursued an ac? (kr and nexilde foreign 'Yolks since the earls I 970s. emphasiiing a pragmatic pursuit of conirlon interests ss itir va dons tither on mlries oeuxcsed to Sos let domina- tion In general beijing has songht common diplo- matic around ssith others bv stressing opposition to Sos ict -csparisionisni..? 5 China has perceised the Sos let Ciao') as the "chief elleins''' Sitar a Mlles II hIrder clashes }why een the km countries iii 19(0 'those incichnts, folio% itig Sos let 111115e5 intil Cie( 110S1n1, alda (tie int-sinus year. brought about a Ittorottnil slung(' in Chinese &hirw 1,4 Ili( and gas e strong Impetus to trends alreads na? scent in foreign policlo% Askinialledanient of a Sos let militars threat precipitated the "turn to the Wuyt." and lay Is-hind a decision to retleplos substantial forces to strengthen the northern horde! and to create a more realistic strategic reser se in central (ultra It also led Reijing to begin examining the problems of modernizing China's militats forces 6 The Sino-Sos lel conflict is deepls' rooted in bin- damental geopolitical tis Jr' The Chinese base re- cently been prepared to acknola ledge that ideological Issues are now largely irrelevant Nor have inch% iclual personalities been decisive. The conflict has deepened since the political demise of 'artistic:hey and has sir-- ? is ed the death of 1Iao undiminished in the end, the Chinese ins asion of Vietnam in February 1979 plunged Sino-Sosiet relations to their !Mk est point in sears. hi April 1950, the 1950 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance betsseen the tsso countries lapsed. Talks on the troublesome border questions and on larger iyolitival issues have proved barren and. as of mid- 1950 still %sere in %Mild suspension International riyalry beNeeri the IS% 0 has !Peen intense for Must rut the oak' No decades 7. China's leaders s iew the continuing presence and buildup of Sos let forces along the border arid in Mon- golia as esidence of a serious, long- term Sos let threat to China's national security. While they may oserstate the numbers of SOS let troops for political effect, there Is no doubt that the Chinese are extremely concerned alyout the potential for a Soski ins asion. They do not, hossever, appear to believe that Sos let forces are rxiised for an attack in the near future. This belief probably is as reinforced hy the tic's ki decision not to disturb the ',order equilibrium in response to Chha's invasion of Vietnam. While increased Chinese defen- sise preparations. including some cis ilian evacuation. %s ere observed in the border areas at the time of the invasion. Chinese leaders seemed to enjoy (basting 1-3 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Too Secret attention to the failure of the S4f% lets t respond China has been consistently careful, bosses er, to :non! pros oking the Sos lets iiy dire( tly threatening lx.'hasior Iii the sensiii11` border area itself, S ,thhough Chinese leaders usually dewribe the Sos let threat in terms of a consentional attack against Chinese terribly, they are aware of the danger posed 10) Sos let strategic forces China has long pursued des elopment of its own nuclear arsenal. although its goal appears Ignited to the creation of a credible deterrent, a force sufficient to inflict unacceptahle damage on any ask ersary. 9 To a lesser extern, (Adria also perceises a political threat to its security from the Soviets, asserting on occasion that the USSH has "meddled- in Chivese Ii rnal political affairs?a charge it has not clearly documented SOS CI subs ersion of Chinese minor- ities?siich as Mongols, Karakhs, and l'ighurs who live along the Sino-Sos let lxirder?remains a cfninnuing concern as well 10. Although the threat to China's territorial integ- rity is central to Beijing's understanding of its military problems, the leadership %Jews the threat from Mos- cow in much broader terms, and remains adamantly opposed to Sosiet efforts to espand its influence abroad?particularly in areas contiguous to China Thus the Chinese leadership has siewed ith grossing dismay 505 1(1 projection of influence to South and Southeast Asia Its response to ekelliS in Indochina and Afghanistan must he %levied in the light of grave con- cerns about Sos let attempts to isolate China in Asia. (nen to encircle China will) a ring of hostile states In short. China %Sews the Sos let Union as a strategic ads ersary. against which it must marshal comitersail? ing political and military forces whereser these can be promoted China's foreign policy, as a result, seeks mutual support and assistance from countries 001P considered China's enemies 11. China no longer appears to slew the United States as a direct threat. In fact, Beijing considers its gross ins: relationship with the United States as a factor contributing to China's Set beta lice US power constitutes a major counterweight to Sin id power' Since the normalilation of US-Chinese relations in early 1979, security considerations have continued to play. an important role in the expanding relationship. SOMC ChillteW leaders, however. view the United States as a superpower In retreat, and fear Washington wlii not prose sufficiently resolute In opposlig, the USSR They are converned that China ilia',' eventually be left alone to face Sink.' pressure, liefore and military moderniration has prepared it to meet the challenge, 12 To forestall that eventuality, the Chinese base been trsing to -buy time for their Wan prepaiations by encouraging the United Slates and NATO to main- tain strong forces against the Soviet threat, and by repeatedly entreating the West not to concede any. advantages In the USSR through arms control or other detente-related agreements. China also hopes to secure military assistance (torn the advanced industrial states, including the United States. 13 Beijing does not appear to consider Taiwan a national security issue, treating it essentially as a politi- cal and juridical question. Since the normalitation of relations with the United Stales, Chinese leaders base Insisted that differences %s it!' Taiwan can and should be settled peaceably, although they have not re- nounced the use of force. While it maintaIns signifi- cant military forces in the Fuzhou Military Region op - penile Taiwan, lkijing does not appear to anticipate hostilities there in the near future. China views Vietnam?its most immediate en- emy after the Sos let Union-1)0th as a surrogate for Moscow in Southeast Asia and as a rival in its own tight for influence in the area. Soviet-Vietnamese collaboration and evident Vietnamese ambitions in Indochina led to rapid cooling of Sino-Vietnamese relations after Hanoi's takeover of the south in 1975, but Vietnam's improved ties to the Sos let Union prob- ably were primary. Concern about Soviet as well as 1'ietnamese intentions also underlay Beijing's decision to support the Vol Pot regime in Kampuchea. Estab- lishment of treaty relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union was a crucial turning point. leading China to begin improvement of its military rxtsture near the Vietnamese herder. Hanoi's subsequent Inva- sion of Kampuchea served both to espand Soviet in- fluence and to damage China's credibility as a !tower capable of defending its own interests; hence. Beijing's attack on Vietnam. The attack was also intended as a lesson for the West on the need to stand up aglinct -hegemonism." 15. The results of the war base not lessened Beijing's concern about the threat to its interests in Southeast Asia from Sos let involvement and A.ietnam- ese ambitions While it does not We an aggrecCi VP Viet- 1-4 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Too Soctat main as a threat to Chinese territory, China finds worrisome the hummed Sos let access to Vietnanwse military. facilities As a result of continuing tensions. China has "resersed the tight- to teach Damn a "sec- (Ind lesson To this raid, 1I .A strength in the border area has nutcase(' sharply mer the prewar lescl, and logistics and communications networks opposite Viet? nam base beell upgraded China has also used a sari. ety of p(ilitical, dinlomatic, and etaincinic pressures I() keen Vietnam on the defensise and to influence Its piilicies Negotiations to settle the border (titian(' 'lase been fruitless, and Sino-Vietnamese hostilits re- mains at a high les el In aii esent IleUl rig must re- main Jett to the possibilits of a coordir ames Sosiet? Vietnamese 'Millar.; attack 16 Although its lx)rder problem with India remains unsettled, China does not s iew Italia as a credible threat to its territorial integrity. Again, it is the close Indian relationshin ssith the timid Union that is troublesome. 'Jelling appears to beliese this relatilin- ship is less encompassing than that between NIoseow and Hanoi and it has attempted to nudge India into a more "neutral- stance. 17 At least since 197:3 China has siewed Japan as a potential bulwark against the So% let Union and has encouraged a close security relationship between Tokso and Washington The considerations that base led China ?) seer a harmonious relationship with the United States also apply to Japan Beijing has encour- aged JA pan to augment its own military forces and ss mild slew a modest increase in Japanese military power with equanimits ?so long as Japanese (.5se- curity ties remain strong Indications that Japan was pursuing an independent military clause might cause concern among one Chinese leaders, how eser. IS. In contrast to Vietnam. (:hina perceives no threat from North Korea; its relations with Pyonstaang arc currently warmer than North Korean relations with Mow. China is anxious to maintain this status, however, and would regard a growth of Soviet influ- erwe at Chinese expense a serious additional threat to its security. China remains concerned about a possible outbreak of hostilities between Noith and South Korea and continues to diwourage Pyongsang from initiating military action 19. China tends to siew countries farther afield less in terms of a direct threat to itself than as factors in the international balance As already noted. in the larger sense China attempts to keep this balance from SVI hieing against it and in favor of the USSR primarily through diplomatic, rather than military, means China appears to believe that, to the degree Moscow Is preoccunied elsewhere, It will be less capable of apphing military anti diplomatic PreSSUre against (;hinj Decisionmoking 20. Chinese defense policy is formulated in a highly. politicited at by the regime's inns' senior leaders. The supreme military authority, the Military Commission, is an organ of the Chinese Columnist l'arty's Central Committee and is dominated by its cisilian party members. Crucial military policy de- cisions in the context of other policy questions are dealt with by the Politburo, the pinnacle of Chinese decisionmaking authority. 21. Although personal and 'mky differences mist among the members of the current Politburo, Ills gen- erally more cohesive, less ideologically oriented, and more concerned with practical raamomic goals than any in two decades. 22. The military retains an important voice in Chi- nese decisionmaking, although its influence has de- clined since the Cultural Resolution. At the height of the Cidtural Bevolution?w hen party and govermnent organs were airtually not functioning?the l'I.A as- sumed countrywide administrati.'e duties unprece- dented in a Communist country. As Defense Minister Lin Mao had been designated Mao's heir, the military enjoyed enormous influence in political affairs. Since the fall of Lin in 1971, however, the party leadership has sought to reduce the influence of the PI.A In local and national level (le(isionmaking?an effort slowed by continued factionalism and political disorder throughout the country, sithich necessitated an active role for military leaders at all levels Since the death of Mao and the purge of his radical supporters in 1976, the party's efforts have been more successful, in part because the internal security situation no longer re- quired as much active military participation in the management of everyday affairs. Lven before the de- mise of at many l'I.A officers holding bobs in gov- ernment ministries and pros incial bureaucracies were being replaced by civilians and transferred to strictly military posts, arid this trend has continued. 2:3. As a result, direct military influence in the political arena appears to have declined considerably. Several key positions in the military hierarchy are held by civilians, most notably the Chairman and the Sec- retary General of the Military Commission and the 1.5 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 To Secret 1)itet tor of the General Political Ih-partinerit in atldI? tion, militats members of the Politburo embods saricis of I (a( kgrollillk Jilt! competing Interests. .1 iril? 5%111(-11 (41)%t Ill i% Iii. adoption of a unified stance on some issues Personal risali ies and generational till- ferent es also dilute the potential 41 14.4. tiseness of PI.A14114" Aloreou.r, til4Kt t uncut$ %cum III 1)(' .11.14.1X..11('S Of noldar$ "profe.sionalism.- a tradition that Is skeptical of estessise military inter? (creme in (is ilian (let isionmakin)L 2 1 'The It has suffered little in the past three sears from the purge of the leftist radicals. who did riot enjos widespread ssinpallis in the armed forces at any rate Vivre hase been numerous dismissals. derni)liiins. and transfers of militars leaders at all les- els in the past three sears, but no hroad at on the PI. itself, as there was after the fall of Lin Mao 1 he parts has tome mit of it Nay to as oid the appear- ance of an antimilitars campaign and has mit pressed as hard for a "rectification- of the militars? leadership as it ha% in the losser les els of the partyusd1. Oserall parts relations base returned largels to pre- Cultural Resolution norms and now appear relatisely stable. 2,5 It is in this contest that issues a major itlnYor- lance to the military establishment are diwuss.ed and decided The qualitatise improvement of China's largely obsolescent militars forces now is widely rev- ogniled as an urgent. although clearly subordinate. priority if China ic to ablest, its ambitious economic and political goals in a ssorld ens ironment generalls perceise(1 I)) the Chinese a% hostile China has ern- barked on 3 far?reaching program of national t-co- mimic (1e4.4-101)111prd known as the "Four \loth-r tiita- tions--agricultore. industrs. science anti technologl, and national defense?to bring the nation into the modern world \loremer, there appears to be ss %mead ide- consensus within including the rnilitars. that tooth needs to he done in deseloping the cis ilian economs before ef fedi% e military moderniiation can be accomplished Ct mnsequentls. altholigh comprehen- sise force modernilation. particidarls in comentional w (-avows. is a key compinent of current defense polics significant change in rnilitars capabilities, :Ode% ed through the introduction of nets weapons. Is still sears assas 26 Areal of Potential Friction. There are seseral areas of ptdential friction between the PI .A and the party. and within both the military and the party, al- though, -in contrast to 197 I ?there are no indication% of dislosalty of the PLA to the regime ? The low priority of military modernitatIon, 1VIiile military leaders accept the logic of Ch;na's economic deselopriwet tdans. a number untler? staridaltly lust- (-si)1ew-ell concern ;lipoid the slow iwe of Progress Some II .A leaders 11113V also be ctinterned that long-term prospects for coin- prehtlisise moderniration of the military suf- fered a setback following the nild? 979 decision Iii "correct imbalanws" in the etuonomie ss stem by decreasing insestment in heasy industry, especially steel ? Import of foreign military technology. Although cis ilian and military leaders appear to agree that fort ism technology is essential to the is et a I I moth-rid/anon process. few ilidroflani military-related purchases have been made. 1)e- spite the large number of high-les el military trips It, assess and discuss purchase of foreign weapons and technology, limbo-tars and political con- straints have limited purchases, crating uncer- tainly and frustration among military planners and tedmology specialists ? The February 1979 Vietnam war. Although official statements have declared that the PIA performed well in Vietnam, the IASIle of the Army's performance in that campaign continues to be questioned by some of China's leaders. Friction developed when some leaders ques- tioned the wisdom of attacking Vietnam, and others demanded an evplanation of the high costs PIA weaknesses and shortcomings ss hi( 11 became ohs ions (hiring the campaign continue to fowl the debates ? The aging military leadership. Many of China's key military leaders are in their late sivties and scvent;es?veterans of the Long March anti anti- Japanew war?and have been at the top levels of the militars hierarchy for 30 years or more. The technical espertise of some is questionable, bid they are skilled at political infighting, using "old boy networks- to ensure their political suit- sisal This situation has produced at the higher levels a conservative. factionaliml, stagnant mill- tars bureaucracy dominated bv generals ? The rise of new military leaders. Younger, better educated speciatiqs base risen sicnilv in 1-6 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 lop Stye 25X1 25X1 the hierartl though their piipi Is for past three sears the to%toloitionats approac li of the he tio11 44'111 improtell ss ith the re- tort emphasis el profestrtonal espeitity !tots. u%er, new intelsers Ice 1?.1111110i Ii IJ elllehle a% IhI4 a?$4111tIVII leader% Ile1elep 1444 e%%lelialklii in their set% icy arms and compete for ilre scarce resources accorded to militars modernitation ? 1 he social impact of economic modernitation, While rtostostniting the need for itioderniioatioon the change% it s% ill 1,111112, the PI, Vs 'Hp lead- ership maintains a consertatity approach to questions tof social change and galoilits. It has tlwrefore e? pressed growing concern alit out the tlet iimo t,f "resolutionary" the flab/anon- of social and economic policies the slight increase hi urban disorder. and the growth of western t oiltural influence that hase accom- panied moderniration Itecause the palls It ill% 0(11 NI thew filleAtitife.. (lie PIA (11111(1 be illra%% II 01111 pOilliCal eofitrovers$ Defense Modernization ond Economics 27 The Chinese can puxhice the bill range of haste. although largely obsolescent. weapons for all sets ices of the PIA Oser the sears. the defense indus- tries hase !limed out a %side %antis of sseapons. including small arms, artillers anti tanks, fighters anti bombers. surface ships and diesel attack submarines. anti strategic missiles and nuclear weapons indeed, even though some %%capons base been pnxhiced in large mimbers, at mans. of China's defense plants there appears to be considerable unused production capacitv While Chinese engineers are capable of corn mu or making pontotspes of mans weapons de- tigni, shifting to series production of high-INhnohogv items is often besond their capability. For example. new engines for air or nasal use apparently present serious problems Clearly thew are areas where the Chinese require faith massive infusions of ?Vestern technologY Economic Policies and the Defense Sector 2$ The deselopment of a modern defclow estab- lishment is a fundamental objet tise in China's pursuit of economic mudernitation The relatisell loss 1111(1- q1 courentls accorded military mod/ITU/anon reflects tht leadership's recognition that fundamental weak- nesse in the pattern arid rate of economic des clop- merit 111110 be remedied before a ssstematic upgrading of defense capabilities can be undertaken Over the (Ishii) in remeds log these fundamental economic weaknesses has led to signifi 'ant downgrading it; the priorities assigned to defense and a bother SIhlNtrtII nation of militars industrial. scientific. and technical actisits tots-1%111mi authorits. 29 In ear i$ 11)71), after se?rral toplesel meetings. the pails decreed a three?$Var program of "wadinct. meld' anti remedial action Son%es Mid 1111eAlgati(Pli% of domestic economic conditions and production tkts- sibilitles dining 1117$ resealed to the leadership Ilw sleigh and extent of China's economic problems Simi- larly exPorstire to the des eloped world through the large number of delegation% sent alitooad and enter.. tinned in (:Iiina during 1977 anti 197S. reinforced Ik?iiintes perception that the gap in deselopment be- tween thitI3 and the indoistrialiwil nations was iniR Ii %cider than had beton assumed ily December the new leaders had alsti conclutleti that Ilw Chinew Coln- 1111111M Path ss as riot oriented toward goals of yew nomic modetnitation and could not be depended iipon to be responsise to their orders. At the same limy the) concluded that other important institutional changes were neeessarv?iti legal ss stems, education. and cultural polics--(1111(111rent with etconoinic nitKlernitatitm. economic :30. The midrib ing theme of Chi policy since earls 1979 is the interrelationship of con- sumer 1Ielfare. economic productisity. anti political stability. The major premise is that existing stocks of Chinese capital anti labor are capable of higher k's els of product is its.. To gain the increawd pridoictis its the leadership is making major changes in economic policies?increasing material incentoses and lit rice in- comes in agriculture and intinsti installing new ss- (ems (4 rewards and penalties for performance by in- dis idual managers mid economic entities. and experimenting ssith new forms of more efficient industrial organi7ation. :31. It) effect. the regime is making an unprece- dented appeal to the self-interest of the ( htinese yowl- lation. The leadership has already begun to grapple As it h the problem of managing and meeting consumer demand fur tnore and better qualits goods and serv- ices. The growth of consumer especiations is now a major problem for the gosernment and will remain so for sears to come. Political stabilits enters the rela- tionship between constimer welfare and prodoictis because the leaders Ix lieve that their grasp on power and the twormanence of their policies depends on dem- 1-7 Top Secret 25X1 1117 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Sever oristrating that modernization is in the best interest td most Chinese. In the absence of improsernetits iii consumer %sulfate, prodlic tis it v) ill remain loss and the potentials for political disrupt:on. as .sell as the tradeiship's sulnerahilits to challenges born ss ithin Ilw party, %sill increase. 12 Itesource allocation Vi a% also shifted by the leatl. ership to suppoit the new policy course. Insestment in Ilea% y industry, patticularls- and steel, ss as cut back ss bile allocation% to agriculture, light industry, and the Iiiiilding materials industry ss etc increased. While maintaining interest in acquiring 'Nordin' equip- ment and technology, and continuing to solicit and fe- uds(' Icing-lerm credits to Pas for such imnortc, the leadership suspended or postponed a number of planned purchases from abrumad At the same time, the domestic construction program ss as cut back to con- centrate resources urn thow nrojects sshich %ere most to ease longstanding constraints urn industrial production?electric power, coal, building materials, and transportation. Poorly planned projects arid those requiting long leadtimes %sere eliminated. .13. Short-Term Prentice's. It is apparent that the leadership s ill not be able to complete its "readjust- ment" in the planned three. ear periuxl. The new policy still has trot been completely accepted ssithin the party, in part because the changes are such radical departures from the policies or the Maoist era and in part because of general bureaucratic resistance to change. Also. uhile the new incentives policies have taken hold arid are (rising new impetus to production in agricultnre, the changes in industrial incenthes and organizational policies are being implemented only ciciss lv and base not so far stimulated industrial out- put. Finally, three to use sears %sill be reunited to complete new construction in the bottleneck areas of Chinese industry; hence the present constraints in en- ergy, raw materials, and transportation probably u ill riot be loosened wild sometime beyond I 9S1. :31. Trends in 1)efente Spending. China clearly continues to subordinate defence 'modernization to the needs Of economic development A comparison of in- dews of defense procurement illustrates the relatise priorities given to defence and nondefense sectors over the last decade. Before 1972 the gross th of estimated defence procurement briefly exceeded that of indus- trial production: since 1972. industrial production has generally continued an upward trend ss 111k defence procurement has been relatively constant (we figure I- 1). initial decline in defense pow InrInelli in 1972, cshicli :diet led all the sersices uif l'I.A influence ssithin the higher levels of the Wallin' follouing Iliair's abortise (1)111) against Man betkr.a and 'Ann Frilai in late 1971 undoubtedly ss as a factor.' Tech- nological difficulties Iii do eloping replacement %% yap- ons, relative NA Maction ssith existing lesels of obsoles- cent euriripment, and Ow struggle over the succession to Mao probably limited subwquerit gruuth More- user, the defense procurement level attained in 1071 probably ss as not sustainable over the long let in Thus, %sidle ()serail defense spending (u Melt includes operat. ing costs as %% ell as procurement) probably row in 1979 as a result of the action against Vietnam and increases in border c'Pferise. %se expect that Chinese polies mill continue to bold military spending in check until user- all economic modernization is more assured. 30 The present resource commitment to defense is sufficient to support selective and gradual military modernization For the time !icing, force restructuring and increasing military professionalism probably mill be emphasized. Such improvements demand few financial resources and are prerequisites for assimilat- ing more modern equipment. Spending near the cur- rent level also ss ill permit selectise acquisition of for- eign defense technology, including small quantities of %%capons The Chinese assessment of the l'I.A's experi- ence in Vietnam uill help focus the selection of SOnle foreign acquisitions. 37. Further in the Wine, if the paee of economic advance increases. more resources likely would be made available for defense. (Mouth of defence spend- ing mas begin to approximate that of the genera) economy after a sufficient industrial and technological trace has been created A change from a pattern of selective modernization to a comprehensive program, however, would derwnd on the achievement of sus- tained economic advances for a decade on more. Modernization of the Defense industries 3S. The fluctuation in Chinese economic mod- ernization policies over the past 18 months has left the defence modernization effort in 3 qate of flu 1s, When the new leadership took is er in 197e). chinew military planners moved quickly to implement a The Air Voter. %Nth it at deeply in?ohed in the coup, suffered dramatically Al, Force procurement dropped etriecially tharnh. a %ideprpad !rave of kir rorce officert occurred. and militan, aircraft %u-re grounded for mon, than a month 1-8 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Syr* Figure 1.1 Indexes of Industrlal Production and Defense Procurement in China, 1966-79 Ind.': itd$.100 - 12$ ? ! 11165 6/ ""'"'?"' lassitied 611 /1 Industriel Production Defense Procurement 1 I 1 ?L 1 /3 25 7/ 25 broad mode/filiation program and to enlarge the mili- tary machine-kidding Imhof-les?aircraft, missile and aerospace. to:clear. land armaments, shipbuilding, and electronic's The Chinese began to expand more than 50 major military industrial facilities, made sweeping changes in the military scientific and technological structure, resumed testing a variety of weapons (after a hiatus of up to six years), and launched a massive program to study a broad smtrum of foreign military technology and equipment. 39. The magnitude of the military industrial mod- erni,ation effort, and the potentially disruptive effect of the program on other modernintion goals, appar- ently was not immediately understood by the lead- ership in Beibng because of the general lack of plan ning and ccpordinaVon of China's overall moderni7a- lion activities In February 1974, however. Premier Ilua Guofeng in his report to the Fifth National People's Congress, called for -integrating military with nonmilitary enterprises and peacetime produc- lion with preparedness against war.- This formulation suggested that some military production and research and development should 1)e devoted to nonmilitary purposes Subsequently, military industrial expansion declined, stronger civilian control was established within the military Industrial bureaucracy, and a larger share of existing industrial capacity Was de& cated to nonmilitary industrial production. 40. Further restrictions on the scope and pace of China's military industrial moderni7ation effort began to emerge in early 1979. Preceding the shift to a three-year period of readjustment, criticism surfaced over the lack of good judgment and coordination in the importation of technology and equipment, includ- ing imports with military application. A dramatic il- lustration of the falloff in Chinese interest in purchas- ing foreign military equipment and technology is the marked decline of high-level technical and industrial delegations going to and from China through 1979. Senior Chinese officials have commented that -mod- 1-9 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 IIDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret eini/ation of the economy must slime before mod- cull/Alton of the !Millais II Trends In (7onstrirefion. There ss as a large and esperisise louildtip oF (tunas defense industries during the late 19(olls anti early 1970k. hut vonie time before i97(i Beijing aPpatently decided to reorder loritorities and sdec thely untlo nett culitluation Ililiolograiik 1)1 near!) 100 defense 'plants and shipsards shims that since 197(1 ( :Mita has been expanding esisting facilities rather than building hies% plants Expansion In progress 'ric teased from about 10 projects itu 1976 to more than 50 lis the end of I 97$ 12 Fisture 1-2 illustrates the trends in military- industrial ((instruction since 19(gi As the aggregate t inst. illustrates. construction increased steadily from 1966 until 1971-72 and then started to d'.cline The thow 'maul :rend ss as wsersed In 1976, as elm' !ISOM at existing plants begat) to increase. largely in Indus- tries that supporl the strategic weapons sector. then gradualls les cling off In 197$ The rate of expansion ay:lateral y declined again in 1979 es identls reflecting both the completion Of ongoing projetiS MAI Stronger ((introit on nett etrialition Impediments to Defense Modernization 13 Chinese militars oicicials has e noted rematedis that many foreign militars forces--especialls those of the Iii ted States and the USSII?are far ahead of the 1'1.1 NI finologicalls The (Chinese also recogni7e that the technological gap is ss idening and that -catching op ss ill, their potential risals it unlikels for the foreseeable future The prin(ipal c(mstraintstu I tr.( li- mological modetriiiation of the 1)I..1 are inefficient imlustrial adm;roistraiion and management. ss eak- ?sestet in key areas such a; metallurgy and l electronics. absence of a broad low of ss ell-trained engineers and technicians. and outmoded mat hiners and test II iiii.orrit f I Years still lie required to riodate the luck doisiriesill- liii ss lilt ii the material moderiiiration of the 1'1,1 depends In general. most IT leaders beliese that new ?$1,11)011S Illtittlatd$ !MO COM(' primarily from a more ails ant ed (.1iinew industrial haw nri keeping ss ith the principle of ;elf-reliance). and con- sequentls 111(1 haw agreed ss ith is ilian economic planners that improsements in the oserall indoistrial haw 11111A take precedence twer inilitars eqnipment net ,ds 15 ()serail industrial performance? creclitalole iii terms of ()serail output?has moeseri Llectric is arid raw materials, particular's' from liw extrav- tise industrs, are chronlealls in short suppis. Building materials, cement. finished steel, and (other keviva (trials are not produced in quantities sufficient for capital constructil,11; regular Import of these commod- ities has been required in recent years I AMIttlatltlitug emphasis ort stibnite of produesion. Inappropriate pricing. anti inadequate attention to matching output to the needs of consumers has meant that much tel what is prodiurd is of h quality or is stored loecause it is of little lust' In general, China's industry. muskies cords opportunities for espanded emplos merit and embodier les els of technologs. that with fess exceptions range from 10 to 30 years behind those of industry In die din clollod (IMO rieS 25X1 2 Foreign Technical Assistance 17 China's military machine-building industrs. re- lies (in Sos iet design and manufacturing practices of the 1950s. arid the need for 13'estern design technology am! manufacturing expertise is enormous Since 1976. China has engaged in a massise effort to moderni7e its militars machine-building industrs. los struising 11'esterri experience and thus skip intermediate staes oF des elopment China's interest in arid needs for modern militars equipment appear to coser the entire military tetlmological spectrum from hasic materials to CfMlillel(' ccedlirK111 S$SICIDS (41* figure I-3) The basic nee& technologies "midi at electronic ma- terials and equipment, machine took chemicalc. and special metals Weapon sidossstem technolcraies which (annese industrial arid technical delegations have stir- %eyed. studied or negotiated for, include a !goad 1-10 Top Secret 5X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret Figure 1.3 Chinese Interest In Western Military Tichnology and Equipment, 1971-711 Malor Weapon Systems Technologies lai S Site S Aircraft Armaments Intermediate Technologies Land Armaments Naval /similes & Aerospace Aviation Basic Technologies Electronic Materials & Equipment Machine toes &Equipment Electronics _ . Chemicals Ceramics Special Metals I-12 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 lop Sec(' range of equipment design and manufacturing pros, ewes Specific {tartest% not mil% include tonsentional armaments, but technologies with application iti nu- t liar %%catmint and ballistic missile deselopment. test? Mg. and manufacture vs poring the period 196-79, about 5.000 mili? lats. let !mica!, an'! 4011%1041 'm144111(1 traseled to and from (loam to inseslIgate or discuss 11'estern mill? tars ectillimi.ult and manufacturing know ?boss or to talk about Chinese purchases cif these technologies '1 lie grealct ProPortion of this has el imx tined in 197S. %% lien (11111,15 interest In foreign military teclinolog$ ss a% at its ticak I) Current illiCteSi appears to 1c411% basic anti intermediate tethriologies that has P cis ilian as well as militars applic.ition Groups of PIA officers and rep- tesentatise% of military inlitsttial ministries routine's ha '.e been dikPalched to ?Veslero /anart, and the United States to ins estigate kk'esteris state-of-the art industrial prcresses and to negotiate for equipment and technology. Many foreign armament expetts and retired military txusorinel hate been ins Red to vresent seminart on t elfin% military industrial topics 50 \lost studs groups base focused on airs tail and engine tet , but tonsiderablY attention has been paid to land atinaments?especiall$ aritiarmor weap- ons and antiaircraft artillers, electronics and precision instruments. and special metals tet !mobilo. These con- tacts ha se enabled the Chinese to obtxin free tech- rollout and ads ice about adsancell weapons, vast amounts of tedinical literature, and in some cases training hr production engineers and technic jails 51 1 he ( Itinese base stated that !hes %%is!, to ob- tain prodiktion technologs and 1k-tilting arrange- ments rather than large quantities of finished items. but. with the notable exception of the Spes jet aircraft engine deal r l'171, no major purchaes base been concluded I it experience s% lib the Spel, the chintese trial come to anon-date the difficulties of absorbing ads anced foreign technologies into their ss eak tet hnical kV' and thus concluded that (Abatis- tis e stud% is required before making a purc base Nego- tiations for 110T antitank missile arid Harrier V, ST01. air( raft production technologs. quite actise throughout 197S. shot ed cmisiderably in 1979, in path 19S0 China indicated it had less interest in the Har- rier. These des elopment% may reflect (:hinese concern over costs arid the reali7ation that mor^ basic problems of technology and training have yet to be overcome. They mas also reflect serious (:hirtese problems in deselfiPitIA coordinated plans for %visible future needt, bc cis ll and military. Military Doctrine, Strategy, and War?Fighting Capability Doctrine 52 China's defense policy emphasires the tualnle- name cif large forees?the People's Liberation Arms?to deter a nuclear or coos tuitional attack on China from any minter. If deterrence fails, Chinese hums are deplmeti to contain and defeat an attacker heft re key industrial and population centers could be reached, or before the political objectises of an attacker could be athlete(' China's defense policy is based M. the islception of military inferiority In mod. (Ili VirdiX)11% relathe to its Main adversaries, and the recognition that its forces are latterly obsolescent. On the other hand, China has demographic anti geographic assets: a ',ovulation larger (and more easily mohilized) than the combined tropulations of NATO and the Warsaw Paul; the world's largest stand- ing army; and extensive and defensible terrain. More- over, the current leadership has demonstrated that it s% ill commit forms for lirniteil offensive operations to support its national security goals. .53 To implement its defense polio', China's basic military doctrine. "People's 1'at Under Nloderr (:on. (Mimic." ss as announc,N1 in August 1977. This doctrine is art outgrost th of Mao Zedong's concept of "People's War," which was formulated during the 1930s and 1910s when (:ommitnist forces fought the Nationalists and the Japanese. "People's %Var.' invols et the mo- bilintion of the entire nation for the mat effort. it recogni7es that destruction of enemy forces is more important than seiii rig or bolding territory and that the principles of surprise. economy of force, maneu- ver, and mass must be incorporated into tactical plan- ning "People's War" also posits that an inferior force van defeat a technologically superior force if it can inaltell?ef and fight on favorable terrain, wear down and disperse the superior force over time, and even- tually rnobilife enough manpower to overwhelm the enemy. "People's 11'ar" includes all means of armed struggle from guerrilla warfare through use of nuclear weapcins. 51. "People's %Var.' stresses the orga nilat ion of Chi- lieSe forces in accordance ssith the "Three-in-One" principle. The military is composed of main, regional for local), and militia forces. Each has a separate and 1.13 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret rolv, but all three ale coordinated in a single effort lis the commander "People's War- lia% the added dimension of depending Ill the t is dim nom. lace, under the leadership of the parts, for production Of militars good% aml a% au I hiaiutihlu simpls of militars retruit% 35 The ef incept of "People's War Under fioclerri Contlitiont- changes the emphasis. hut not the soli. Marne. c1Nlao's original thesit The Sos let Union still has the ailtantaget of mobilits and firepower, and the Chinese will continue to 'els n their sad t lettings and !Inge and eatils rimbiliml population at the pri? mats assets for defeatin an ins ation "Under Moiler? Conditions- stresses the n-etl for gradual changes in force structure. %%capons. and tactical doctrine to meet an int teasing!) sophisticated timid threat. Induttrial and let linological moderni/ation mer the IWO seseral decades will gradual!) make the net essary weapons and eqiiipment available. 56. As they contemplate possible war ssith the Sosiet Union, the Chinese military leaders beliese that the ads?ntages that arise from China's great lettinrs. are enhanced by the fact that the Sos lets appear or- ganited for a relatively short war Through an ability to (rade space for tirne the Chinese appear to beliese they can deny the So% lets the early sictory which they think Sod lel doctrine requires This abilit, both deters a timid attack and complicate% So% iet planning 57. Although the Chinese hase des eloped doctrine and strategy appropriate to their forces in king and the potential enemies the s face, they are netertheles% showing great interest in foreign military to( !tine and siralegs Dclegationt (loin the PI.1 Academy of Mill- tars St lent(' toured the United kingdom and Turkel to study methods of teaching doctrine and strategs. and the Chinese base hosted groups from the star col- leges of Canada, the United Kingdom, France. West Gerro:inv and the United States Although the Chinese are interested in the principles of organiiation am! operation of ca tonic West European armies, the PEA is also interested in learning (torn these contacts what thes. can of Sosiet doctrine and strategy. The Chinese are probably gain- ing saturable insights into the organiiation and (I- nabilities of Soc let forces from the Europeans, along cc ith an understanding of European Plans to defeat those forces. Stratogy 55. China's militar y strategy is essentially &fetish It has a small but credible deterrent force of strategic nuclear missiles that mould make any attack our China a risky and potentially costly prospect. It% conventional foal.% are deplosed according to strategies rangi ug From a sqcuist defense along the coast and south? ern Imuder to a defense in depth in the ind northeast In the Urumqi Military Iligion in the north- west. HA forces are thinly deplosed and probabh VI territory inure readily. 39. Slain force units are trained and equipped to fight a clinventional war in any part of Chit, or at short distances bound China's borders. Regional forces augment main forces, and they often man (Red defensise ()millions within compact geographical areas. Militia units are trained and equipped to defend their immediate locale and to reinforce and support re- gional or main force units as the need arises, The mi. lit ia together with stay-behind or los passed units of main or regnmal forces, would be espected to fight it guerrillas in territory occupied b, an invader. All three tspes of forces are trained to w.e available weap- onry and to rely upon manpower and terrain as their primary means of resistance. 60. The Chinese armed forces cc ill not, for the Foreseeable future, he suitably armed and organimd to discard the -People's War" concept and adopt a new strategic doctrine that would permit defense near all of China's borders instead of strategic withdrawal. Until such a chan,ce can be accomplished, we believe Chinese strategy will continue to require trading space for time, with the resulting loss of some key areas of the country. There are, however, indications that this policy is controversial withi u the Chinese military. Some military thinking app irently advocates a more Forward defense?especipdy in the northeast? presumably to avoid the psychological and economic costs of allow ing deep penetrations. This thinking re- flects grossing concern over the PLA's inability to re- act to a variety of lionited-objective Soviet attacks, such as a strike at the Daqing oilfields. Such an al. (crow strategy ohs mushy would require a more rapid modernitation of the Chinese armed forces than the leadership now appears to contemplate. Indeed we do not see any consincing signs this point of sic st. is prevailing in leadership circles. 61. The PIA is currently deployed to confront the Soviets in the north with successively larger and better equipped ii nits Lightly armed and dispersed border 1-14 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 7X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Too Secret 11111'11M 1111I3k 11111liti MVO MIrtiein In 1111113,41 lin the kntile (Ott %. and int het casnallies to the degree. possible Better armed regional forces would light from well-ptcpared, positions along likels asion lollies, attempting fut? ther to t kennel the enemy into terrain fascainet de- fense Relatisels mobile and well-aimed main forces would teinfiate tegiowal troops on the encurs's main ases of ads anco, meet ans locakihrouglis, and delis or cicsirlos +items bows as dies were able l'here would be :mounting guerrilla resistance within ou- t onkel areas to %11`.11011 ?Inflicting casual- ties. hindering suppb, efforts, and bother t lianneling ceuerns mos curtails 62 China.% preimrations before its attat koitiViet- nam in 10-19 (ss hid] inelgutled pre parations atid detritus .oents in anticipation of a possible Sosict iators attack on ( hina) seise its some insight into Chi- nese strategic planning for a eons entional war ye Ulu the USSR Large numbers of oh ilians were mac uated (tom ter ritot s along the Sos let and Alongolian borders So one ( luiiuer main force units were depl I Ars ed north- ward from garrison areas in southern Slanchuria. but all major units remained well back from the bore kr. a deplosment pattern that would base required Sosiet forces to adsance relatis els deep's Into China to en- tage signifit'atit Chinese trcrop concentrations 63 .1 kes element of Chinese strategs for reinforc- ing threatened areas is the central resets(' of the l'1,?, hicateel in central and eastern China, primains in the ?Viihati Slilitars [legion Forces there base reads ac- cess to China's Mail) lines of communications and are no it immediatels threatened lus ans enems The Wu- han Mil has China's coils airborne forces. an arms !hat eould deplosed relutisels (mulch Nine in. faiths and two armored clisUions are also located there. Ind the s could be deployed in an dire( tion I s rail, pros iding a measure of needed fletibiliis to Chinese military planners l'nits from Wuhan partici paled in the Sino-Vietnamese war of February 1979 and. if a Sosiet invasion shoirld calm% central resets e units so mild be (lentos ed north as reinforcements In addition to furnishing troops. the central resets e areas prolmbly would be used to operate training centers for !WV% te(ruits and as main logistic bases for frontline forces War-Fighting Capability Geostranhv. le-el of warfare, and the military capabilities of neighboring states determine potential strategy and pros ide a measure of Chinese soar-fight- ing capabilities 61 A Sitio-S(04H Nuclear %Var. Chitt,t's mu goo, to emote the slurs is 311116 i If its strategic missile hate! Is the key to its nuclear elute, tent strategy' China's lids. %Ile force is small and tee linically inferior to those of the United States and the l'5511, and Beijing continues to emplkwirc. its -no first use" polio. !hostler, China has 3 credible Wiiiii31(00 4:3113hilitio. indenting medium and intermediateratig( ballistic missiles (AIIIIINIs and IIIIINIs) that can hit targets in 1113111 parts of the I:5511 and through. out Asia The Susie! Union could not be cettaia of eliminating the whole force in a first strike. and would hasp tot espect lot suffer some retaliatory damage after launching a nuclear at- tack on China In the near future China prolialrly will deploy a hill-range ICITAI and, some- what later, a submarine-launched ballistic missile tSLII\ I a These advancvs ss ill immerse China's nuclear capability, 66. The remainder of the PLA is ponds organireal, equipped, and trained to conduct effective operations in a nuclear ens irotiment If deterrence failed, China's nuclear war-fighting capability w mild be no match for that of the Sos let Union 117. So let doctrine contemplates rates of advance of up to 120 kilometers per day in a nuclear ens I- tenement, and China's lack tat tical mobility could Prose costly tinder stub conditions If dispersed. Chi- nese formations would be slow in reacting to Sosiet breakthroughs; if massed, Chinese forces so mild be- come ideal nuclear targets 6S Air and naval forces would suffer from similar disadvantages. Dispersed and hardened air facilities could prolong the life of those forces only temporarily, Individual naval units could continue to fight, lout co- ordinated large-scale nasal operations %i mild be almost ir yossible Neither could offer effectise resistance for morc than a short time. 1.15 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret 69. The Chinese also would be extreme's' vulner- able to a large-scale chemical or biological warfare at- tack. They lack mcxlern equipment to cope with such an attack, and the PIA receives only the most rudi- mentary training in unit or individual protective prac- tices 70. A Sino-Soviet Conventional War. A limited Soviet incursion into China could be carried out with forces currently stationed in the border regions with considerable chance of success. However, a major So- viet conventional invasion aimed at seizing Beijing probably would require at least 80 divisions, about double the size of the current force. Despite the prob- ability of sizable losses and acute logistic problems, we believe the PLA has perhaps an even chance of stale- mating such an attack short of its objective. 71. Geography and deployment of PLA forces in th? border regions suggest that the Chinese intend to sh fend key territory from th,t? Shenyang Military Re- gion in tlw northeast to the Gansu corridor in the Lanzhou MR in western China. Moreover, China is strengthening its forces in the westernmost Urumqi MR. All across the front, invading Soviet forces would meet mounting resistance as they pushed deeper into 72 IIalf of the Soy iet forces along the (iiiiiese bor- der are deployed opposite the Shenyang MR and north of Beijing (see figure objectises of a So% iet campaign in the east prohahlysstihl ins oheuYerritti- ning I leilongiiang and Jilin Pros intes in northern and central Shensang \lit, and then torairiiiing southward illY1ard the cities of Sliensang and ileijing Concurrent attacks could he launched into Beijing \Ill from Mon- golia Stiff Chint?se resistance (wild be espected from regional forces in strong defensise complexes in iiioiuniijuiuusareas \lain force armies located to the le.11 ale prep 'red to react to ellettlY' incursions if the Soy jets were to irreak through Ilw mountains, poor defensise terrain and ineffectise a;r support %,0111(1 m.1101141 (,,mplicate finAller defense efforts As sosiet fortes ailsanced r int() C.11111.1, they %%Wild again encounter Ira teasing resisiani from the bulk of China's reinforced ground and air units, and would be farther from needed supplies and reinforce- ments. Concurrently, Chinese defenses probably would be able to deny a major port or beachhead to Soviet naval forces. 73. The Chinese intend to provide air defense and ground attack support to their army. Over the bat- llefiekl, it is unlikely that the Chinese could prevent Soviet tactical aircraft from effectively supporting Soviet ground forces. Chinese air defenses would be somewhat more effective against Soviet interdiction; this effectiveness would increase with the depth of Soviet attacks. 74, Although lacking a close-air-support capability in the Western sense, the Chinese probably intend to conduct ground attack in the battle area and inter- diction against Soviet supply lines. Ground attack op- erations would be costly because of Soviet air- and ground-based Par defenses and difficult because of deficiencies In Chinese ground attack aircraft. These operations probably would not be effective. Interdic- tion attacks probably would be more successful, but heavy Chinese losses would occur. It is unlikely that Chinese air attacks would seriously hinder Soviet re- supply efforts. 75. The Chinese Air Force is marked by obsolescent aircraft and armament, an unsophisticated ground- based air defense system, and inefficient command and control. However, most of China's combat air- fields are located more than 300 kilometers (200 miles) from the northern border, affording some protection from surprise attack -6d increasing the available re- action time for Chinese fighters. In addition, China's large inventory of aircraft and numerous hardened storage facililk?s wonld enable at least some Air Force units to stirs tVe es ell sustained attacks Thus, even after gaining air superiority the Sosiets probahly %% mild face sporadic, limited Chinew air operations loser the battlefield. 7ti. Tiw Soviets mild Lunt ii operations into north- west China in isolation or coineident with all attack in the northeast. Defense of the t'ruinqi and Lanzhou !slits in the west would be almcd at tlen$ hat Soviets aeeeYY ti) tent 77. Chinese guerrilla fortes prohabls would play a significant role in a Sino-Sosiet vonseotional war, and 1,5?00111 1)0Se a major rear area security problem for tl. SoviciS. InIetti'. lion of supply routes and hit-and-run Atm Its iiptin waking units would require the Stis lets 1.16 fop Sure, 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 V Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret to use more troops and would make permanent oc- cupation of Chinese territory costly, 78. A War in Southeast Asia. Chinese forces in the Guangzhou and Kunming NI Rs adjacent to Viet- nam, Laos, and Burma could launch large in op- erations across China's borders. The invasion of Viet- nam in February 1979 is a measure of China's war- fighting capability in the south.' During four months of preparation, China increased its strength near the border from 50,000 to 500,000 troops and from :300 to 900 comkt aircraft; it integrated main lnd local forces, with militia units in sup9orting roles, into the operation The PLA built a 5:1 advantage in ground troops and pursued its military objectives cautiously and conservatively. Even so, the rate and depth of the 11 .A advance were reduced by rugged terrain and tenacious Vietnamese defense, but perhaps even more by poiitical limitations and cautious tactics. 79. Since the conflict, Vietnam has more titan dou- bled its ground forces north of Hanoi to more than 250,(tX). Most Chinese main force units have returned to their home garrisons, and as a result about equal numbers of Chinese and Vietnamese forces are now in the border area. Moreover, the Soviets have deliv- ered large quantities of combat aircraft, tanks, ships, and other military equipment to 17ietnam since the WM% 80. If China were to launch another attack against Vietnam, considerable augmentation of Chinese forces would again be required, especially for an advance deeper than in February 1079. A campaign to reach !fano' and the Red River delta would require stock- piling additional supplies near the Aletriamese border to compensate for the limited capacity of the trans- portation sy stem iii the area. China could penetrate more deeply into Laos but would be hindered by poor roads and long supply lines in any effort to reach A'ieratiane or pisot east 0041 Vieill3111 thilla'S South Sea Fleet (Amid easily defeat an unassisted Vietnamese Navy, and could conduct raids, small amphibious op- erations, or esen linmiit.d sealift for Chinese ground forces along the Vietnamese coastline So iii naval units and aircraft regularly operate front Vietnam, arid the Chinese ss 1)111(1 have to reckon with these fours Both air forces could be reinforced quicldv, hot Chinese numerical superiority. probably 551111141 wear down the unassisted 'Vietnamese Air Force despite its slight qualitative superiority. China will probably re- tain and improve its advantage over ?iietnam, but will continue to require extensive preparations prior to launching any major offensive. 81. The terrain along the Sino-Vietnamese border is rugged and defendable on both sides. Thus, even in a defensive mode Chinese ground forces are de- ployed well forward. 82. Capabilities in Other Areas. The Chinese have a formidable naval, air, and ground coastal de- fense capability. The Navy can defend the coast against any seaborne invasion. China will not have a significant opon-ocean war-fighting capability against a major adversary during the next decade, hut some progress in this area is being made. Its submarine force already can conduct significant antishipping operations. 83. China is unlikely to initiate any major military action inn the East and South China Seas through the in with the possible exception of action against Vietnam over disputed islands or territorial seas. Both have claims to the Paracel (Xisha) and Spratly (Nansha) Islands, and dispute rights to some waters of the Tonkin Gulf and South China Sea. (See figure 1-5.) In the case of Taiwan, Beijing had adopted a patient and limithreatening attitude even before the normalization of relations with the United States and certainly perceives little if any threat from Taiwan. 81. China is not capable at present of a successful amphibious invasion of Taiwan.' The PLA has suf- ficient ground troops in the military regions opposite Taiwan to invade the island without weakening those forces confronting the Soviet Union, but, to be success- ful, China would first have to win air and sea superi- ority around Taiwan. Such air operations would re- quire a drawdown of fighter-brunber and bomber aircraft front the four northern military regions. Acquiring the command and control capabilities, land- ing ships, means for naval bombardment, and (raining would probably' take at least 10 years. 85. Korea. The capability to support a North Koreim attack on South Korea has improved vastly' since the early 105%. II 11n. Chinese were to fight in 118 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 225X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret Area of Chinese and Vietnamese Territorial Dis Gulf of China Hainan Dao ck. Vietnam UnCillosiflod utes in the South China Sea s4? 'L 1 Macara (Pori) Hong Kong (UA.) Protaa islands' (Oomph. ClAmitso) ? Panic* Wands (xlsha Otinele0) South (0.o Merle Si) . . China Sea $wot* Wind. Menthe MM..) ? ? (Doo Mmes. 110) *. ? cr:.9 1, I> P P'eng-hu LielPtio llow4dere?1 Taiwan ? Figure r5 Philippines Sulu Sea ;.6(4,1 660 1.19 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secre Korea again, they could apply sufficient strength to overwhelm the forces now in South Korea. Today, however, China's military requirements along the Sino-Soviet frontier and the wide range of possible US reactions to Chinese military intervention in Korea severely limit Beijing's freedom of action, and the Chi- nese would probably discourage a North Korean at- tack. If the North should launch a major offensive, China probably would provide no more than token military suppmt. It might provide substantial simport if the course of a conflict threatened the survival of the North Korean regime. 86. Central tia. PLA capabilities in Central Asia (including India) and Tibet (Xizang) are extremely limited, Mountainous terrain, the great distances in- volved, and the relatively small size of PIA forces in the west would prevent China from conducting more than punitive expeditions against border incursions. Chiliese logistic. shortcomings in the I Iimalayas are be- ing alleviated bv the comtruction of roads, a POI, pipeline, and a rail line into the area, but such im- provements cannot overcome the problems inherent in maintaining forces in difficult, remote terrain, and severe weather. Tlw PIA would probably seek to keep open its highway to Pakistan and block the movement of hostile troops into Urumqi from Afghanistan. Outlook 87. China will continue to try to improve its na- tional security by countering Soviet influence, improv- ing its ability to influence events in Asia, and generally expanding its role in international affairs. Achieving these goals will detwnd heavily on three variables: ? The ability of the present leadership to maintain internal political stability and continue the commitment to the Four Mmkierili/al iOnS. - Thv successful implementation of current eco- nomic policies, w hich depends in some measure on the continuing availability' of foreign techin/illgy. ? The avoidance of major hostilities with the USSR or 1'ietnam that could divert limited resources away from modernization, 88 We believe that the prospects for political stability' in China are better than at any time in the last two heath's . Younger leaders being des ated tmm key positions Hill gradually' consolidate their power, and debilitating INA% yr struggles appear unlikely.. In the last three ears leadership elements riot committed to the current line or to modernization have been quietly removed, and the Politburo and other top echelons are now relatively unified. However, social and political problems related to economic moderniza- tion will create strains that could divide the leadership and factional infighting could increase. Debate over modernization policy is inevitable and at least some elements of that policy?but not i.e drive itself ? could be altered significantly. 89. The major domestic concern of today's leader- ship is the economy. While only modest gains are now being made, the Chinese economy eventually will be able to produce at higher levels and will be better able to absorb foreign technologies. Improved manage- ment, foreign advice and equipment, and priority funding can be expected to produce gains in agricul- ture and industry by 11985. The leadership hopes that deemphasis of heavy industry in favor of light industry will improve China's ability to earn foreign exchange, create more new jobs, and gain technical expertise. Sustained agricultural growth will eventually cause a decline in import costs for 1?0(1 and fibers and should allow for increased imports of complete plants, equip- ment, and technology. Continued industrial expansion will diminish the need to import finished and semifinished industrial goods for defense and other in- dustries. However, major setbacks in such key areas as population control, food supply, and energy produc- tion would trigger short-term policy adjustments at the national bye!. The probability of major reverses ap- pears remote at this time. 90. Defense modernization currently has the lowest priority of the Four Modernizations, The Chinese per- ceive the Soviet Union as a long-term threat and ap- 'war to believe that their present deployment of forces and warming diplomatic relations with the United States and I.:m(4w offer enough of a deterrent to keep the USSR at bay for the foreseeable future. In the face of a heightened Soviet threat, the Chinese obviously' would reconsider the priority of defense. The dilemma they face, however, is that they lack sufficient re- sources to improve their overall defense posture in the short term, a lid evemu a major diversion of resources would In any case lw accomplished too late to affect the situation. China's military Ls eakuesses are rooted deficiencies in training and technology' that will re- quire years to overcome. Ironically, the massive size of China's forces complicates the modernization drive since those resources committed to defense moderniza- tion can benefit only small parts of the military' estab- lishment at any' one (11114.. 1.20 Top SEIM 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret 91. Thus, the (Ii nest' will continue to approach military nnxlernizaticon gradualls' and will supply new weajxms to the PEA as the defense Industrie., benefit from increased investment and from both Western and indigenous technology. Only a small number of new weapons are likely to be introduced into the forces by 1985, but in the later 19S0s increasing num- bers of new sse31X)11S probably will become available, Perhaps most important, (Nu's research and devel- opment will gain sophistication, enabling China to gradually resolve weaknesses in key technical areas such as metallurgy and electronics. The introduction of new industrial management techniques and the cre- ation of a pool if trained technicians and engineers will enable defense modernization to gain momentum by the close of the 19S0s. 92. The most dramatic achievement in the nuxl- ernization of China's military forces will be the deployment of a small force of full-range ICBMs and the apjx?arance of a submarine-launched ballistic mis- sile system by the late 19S0s. The numbers and types of weapons will not appreciably add to Cloina's ca- pability to fight a nuclear war, but will improve the survivability and deterrent value of Ow force. 93 The defense gaps most likely to receive early attention from the leadership?and w hich will be remedied by early introduction of new equipment? are those that reflect serious Chinese sulnerabilities ? Chief among these are weak antitank and low- altitude air defense capabilities. There have been some attempts to correct these deficiencies, such as the reported development tof Chinese variants of the Sagger antitank guided missile (AU AI) and Grail shoulder-launched surface-to-air MiS- Sile (SAI). A low-altitude SAM for both land- based and shinborne air defense is under desel- opment. More and Ix-Iter antitank and air defense weaponry can be expected in the near term. ? Mobility and tactical communications also use problems ( bluest intereq in a sariety tof foreign trucks, tracked %eludes, tactical radios, and se- cure communications des ices 5% ill be reflected in 11(.1k eliiii1)111Clit ssit11111 three too fist. sears Better radars for ground and air use may also appear. ? Another critical problem has been China's inabib It s to build modern engines for aircraft The Spey engine purchase from the United Kingdom and extensive study of US and European engines should help resolve this problem. Gas turbine technology will also acquired from the West for naval application. 94. New tactics and doctrine will have to be devel- oped to make effective use of new weapons introc!uced in the P1 A. Chinese forces will be required to conduct frequent exercises to gain operational familiarity with the new weapons, and the services will develop in- creasingly sophisticated training programs for heir personnel, including specialized technical training and joint service exercises. The Chinese probably will modify PEA organization to take better advantage of such weapons?for example, creating special, highly mobile units armed with antitank guided missiles. Also, the requirement for more sophisticated mainte- nance and the increased flow of specialized parts through supply channels ss ill undoubtedly result in tkvelopment of a more onnplex military logistic In-Rani/Atm. 95. China's military doctrine?which dictates how forces are organized and strategies developed?is likely to change only slightly in the next 10 years "People's War Under Modern Conditions" is for China a realistic and practical military doctrine. China's massive population, limited economic and technical capabilities, and vast territory suggest the ob- vious?use of terrain and ininwnse manpower to over- whelm enemy advantages inn technology. Defense in depth will remain the princiry strategy by which the Soviet threat will be countered. 96. In uuui, Cliint'SC defense policy will change little in the corning decade. Nevertheless, aging in ctommanders will be replaced aml Chinese bones will become more professional and !miter trained, but the emphasis will remain on defense. IntroducLon of new equipment will be selective and will focus on key vulnerakilities !Modernization of the economy? Particularly the industrial and scientific sectors?vsen- Wally will create the necessary tedmical base to sup. port a more modern military establishment. Introduc- tion of new weapons and equipment in the late 195th may produce changes in the forces hut will probably not cause China to develop forces based upon tech- nohogy rat in z than manpower. !Manpower, geographs, and a small StrilirgIC nuclear forte will reirial In Chhij'S Prinurv assets for deterring aggression, and defense in depth in necessary strategy for dealing w jib insasion 1-21 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secre Section II CHINA'S MILITARY FORCES Top Sitcret 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00-786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret II. CHINA'S MILITARY FORCES 1. China has developed the full range of military forces befitting a major military power: strategic nu- clear forces, a coastal defense IlaVy moving toward the open ocean, and large ground and air forces. Never- theless, all of these forces are at the mercy of China's antiquated technological and industrial establishment, which can produce only weapon systems at least a gen- eration behind those of modern Western and Soviet bloc forces. Just to achieve today's state of the art 10 to 20 years hence, China must leap decades of technology. 2. China's forces?collectively knovvn as the Peo- ple's Liberation Army (PL/v)?also reflect a genera- tion of Chinese isolation from the modern world and 50 years of the supremacy of Maoist ideology. The military doctine and tactics, training, and organization that have evolved are consistent with the size and quality of China's armed forces and are well adapted to China's geographic and strategic situation, but are not suitable to modern, high-intensity conflicts. 3. This section of the Estimate addresses the current state of China's forces, their missions and capabilities, and the prospects for their future through the 1980s. A. STRATEGIC ATTACK Current Forces 4. China has deployed a small, 1960s-vintage force of ballistic missiles (see figure 11-1) and bombers for strategic offense. Although it could threaten US forces and allies in Asia, its operational delivery vehicles can- not reach the- continental United States. The force is far too small to threaten the USSR with a disarming first strike, but its growing retaliatory capability is al- ready a deterrent to Soviet nuclear atiack.I We believe that, in the even 01 a soviet nuclear attack on China, sufficient Chinese launchers would survive to deliver a small but destructive retal- iatory' strike, principally against urban and industrial targets in the eastern USSR. 5. Since 1974, Ilcijitig slowly has increased the site and eapabil ty of its missile force and has In- creased the emphasis on survivability. Tlw CSS-2 Intermediate-range ballistic' (11111M) now constitutes the bulk of Ilie force. ? There has been an apparent decrease in activity associated with the CSS-1, China's first medium- range ballistic missile (MR BM). ? We believe China's first ballistic missile, the Soviet SS-2 short-range missile system (SRIA), has been dropped from the operational Inventory. Beijing still has not deployed a full-range ICBM sys- tem or an SSBN/SLIIM system. 6. For its Ixsinber force Beijing has continued its slow but steady production of TU-16 bombers that could conduct strikes along China's periphery'. Ha. Chinese have nude progress recently in some developmental programs that long have been under way. The sub- 11-3 Top Swot 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 z DA I 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret marine-lauriclied ballistic missile (SbliNI) program for collecting electronic and photographic intelligence oritinues at a slow pace, firings of the 1:3,000-Lin- information and for communications by 19S6 range U.SS?X- continue, and space pro qrrairis !lase been publicly accorded high priority in China's Land-Based Ballistic Missiles long-range program for moderni/ing science and tech- nology. 11't. believe that, unless these programs falter, the Chinese will haw a few full-range l(:11kIs arid per- haps a ballistic missile submarine hi Ilie nest fise :111,41 are 11LI'l) to )JAW 11P41,111011J1 SjiciljtvS 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 11.4 Top Secret 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 R Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret Bombers VI I lr ganita Hon. ( 'composition. and 114, otgAtlitattoo iii 1h(. tItiocw bomber forte Ut- ak ate% il% primal% riii%%iiiii i% comentiorial bomb. ing %%illiiir China.% holder% or along it% pciinhei%, 111 1,311111.11, 1,111111111i111,1141111 1011, Y4.1411 1)01111141 ill. 1101110 and 1111111111111/111(11111 W01111111 MC .1%%1$111111 III liii, It rutty, and 11ui cIE E'IIIII 11141 NIP 11011/C11d. 1111 1l1411111111 1/11111V 7%4,1141 %II' 111(1 hew it lio 0111.,1? lii/a110/1, 110111111, 111,11 1111111?14 1101111111 111111% 1111111111111' 10111111,11111 411%.11,111* horn other air form% Itornher% 011- (1,111', Ilkl? 011111 air unil%, 'miler 11H tit,Iiiit of the aopronri,ite wr?ite bra111111.11111%. l%1111411 1111111101 11111 1,0111111,11111110, 111 1111' 1111111,11) t11,61111% 111 11111 atl'at ill 1%111(11 11111 30' 11,1411 2(1 Still, although (.1iiria 11(111 !MU :11 (111111'.111.11 %Irategic loornher force in the t S II so% id 4?114., it hat 11411 ImIrillperc to drop Millen de% ice% in a 11% 1111111.1r let!' awl pro1,31)1% 11311 coniingctic% 1)1311% to ow woo of it% IIN) intermediate-range T1%10 Bad- ger% and poc%ilill a "mall pcirtion of it% 100 medium- range 1 1.-25 Beagle% in a unclear role The 11.-Iti%, all of ,%lik h are nuclear cat.t.ible, %%ould he the 0101 4111.11111'ui ( 1)orn1itrs for cut 11 operation% The% ha% ea eoriihat radiii% III 1,550 nautical mile% %%ith a 1,500 kg horn!, load, %%hi% II %% mild enable them to ktrike all the area% coser(41 11% the S111 11\1 and I 111451 force nuclear %%capon% 30 1 111551% et, there %%11111(1 he formidable limita- tion% on ming liii -1 Ulric for strikes agaimt selhIt- itiutiuti !argil% such a% thow in the tSSII Unlike US and St % iet bomber., none tif (hi n'. natiVerc are equipped %% Oh clectrotik countermeasure% agaimt air defence, and the% MT IAIIIII)Ch S tilltivrahle at medium and high altitudes t(1 crierri% air( raft arid curface-to- air uticcile% 1%1 I he Chiriew hake onl% occacion- all$ conducted the 11m -altitude bomber training that %%ould 111(lec'all In inwro%I. their penetration capahilit% 11-1 1 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 L OA I 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Socroi Rongoo of Chines* ?potations! Strategic MIsseles flprort.b 31. The 11.-2S, too, could be used for nuclear strike, de.pity its relatively short combat radius There are about 1()0 airfields in China from %stitch 11.-28s can operate, and staging horn those airfields closest to the border would permit operations against a substantial portion of the built-up area of the central and eastern USSR. The Il.-2s could also reach targets in Korea arid Taiwan and, if staged from points close to the border, northern Luzon in the Philippines and a large part of Vietnam. China used the Beagle in two nuclear tests to drop devices Nevertheless, while a few of China's Beagles may have a secondary nuclear attack role, their vulnerability to modern air defenses, the 1112 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25)0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Too Svrot Approximate Coverage of Chinese Bombers 25X1 25X1 manner ill hkh II.-2S unitc train, and the we for filch the aircraft mac decigned argue that they mill lpp primarth for comentional or?conceivahlv? theater nuclear bombing of target %%Rhin China or on j tc immediate oerinherv 1.13 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Too Socrot 25X1 25X1 Command and Contra If China cccry to or it botolg?rs for nuclear inicsionc, operational molt pr( hal)11 %could be directed 1)1 Air l'otcr II I1 Ileiiiort, nhich has a vortimmiivations lie %cork that rail IiIpacs tecrional Air Force commande atid cornormiicate directh %cid' Intik Owl air (-mil) mirk !IonIher milli chosen to perforin nuclear attar fiti%cions probabll %could be assigned targets I Beijing, cc hich ccovild alco ecetrike the arithotih to t leaw our kir ?ceaporic Programs 25X1 25X1 25X1 II 14 Top Secret 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 R Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret orbit I Col et ticon at ii'. it lo$ 111r saiellites and the performaric e iii the spates raft nicht Med that Work our Irnilik%11'111% '.'.,r ii 3111'311$ 25X1 25X1 25X1 25 Space Systems IS 1iijiiigc cpac e program remains de?elopmerilal. hut it is illg significant progress 1 he Chinese are upgrading old lac ili? ek, hii,hlirg Tif'%% 13/111(11 and cop- "mint facilities. and seeking space .f't /Mob PSO from the Vt,'(.4.1 A decade ago they orbited t?c o small engineer- ing 11'0 citelliteC ith the CSI.-1, a space IsioRter ?ersion of the CSS-3 WM1 ReNeen Joh 1975 and Jamiar$ 1975. the thinew ii411 the larger (51,-2 launch %rid( le to (orbit six 1.1\1':. and ',holographic re( ()MIA ssa rat cAtVilitt'4 I .N1 ,-Z has pabilit$ to put a 2.000-kg payload into a loss Earth an etalerlated ca? 31 Communications Satellites. China has been interested in 3 domestic comm.inications satellite Olive at least 1000 11) 1972 the antenoas at more thanItt ,?atellite ground %Res %%co. cAternall$ complete. The Chinese filed %% Oh the International Telecommunica- tions t'llion (111) notice of Ihivir intent to launch No e?Perimentat geostatiotiar$ tommomication satellites cloning the pnriod 1979-SO, lint sse are uncertain V1111(1/1(1 ORA Ail! meet e? en the re'. iced 1951-52 cchedille To achie%e the lift needetl to place a satellite in geostationarv wl nit. they are de'. eloping a high-en- ergy Ihird?stage motor to use %%ith the CSL-2 flms - esti. they hate had !ethnical difficulties in deselop- nig the third stage The communications satellite and the groom(' station network '.s ill l. capahle of sus icing all of China 52 The Ciiiitece pill to adsanced nications satellite from the United States, and they have used the Franco-German satellite. Symphonic, A, already in gccostatiionary orbit, for testing Experience gained in the Sy rnplionie.1 tests %s ill alien% the Chinese to operate a system using their rmn satellite ss hen it becomes a% a ilahle 5:3 Meteorological Satellite. The C :knew report- edly k'.e de?eloped the prototpe of a meteorological Catellite. A% ikl ?t ill ha?e a %NI& and ra-ar-infrared No-channel scanning radiometer as the principal sen- sor, The Chinese announced that the initial Winch of 11.17 Top Secret X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Stool a Son-ssucluorious satellite is sclieduled itt 19S2, but problems with the third stage of the CS1.-2 launch %chicle will likels delay the launch A geostalionary meteorological satellite is planned for launch in 1985 51 Significant ads ala es in China's space capalilli? ties are likely in the coming decade. We espett the Chinese to develop a modified 4:S1.-2 space booster ssith a high eflerg$' ihitll stage (?aPable if Placing pay- loads of (iscr 5,(XX) kg into low Earth orbits and of launching satellites into geostationary and highly ellip- Huai dolts This system will probably hecome ()per- ational in the earlyao-middle 1980s, and will enable China to carry out a variety of space missions for mili- tary support including meteorological, adsanced Pholoreconnaissarice, and communications missions (1 out i iutil rig access to ?Vestern space lecluniliogs. will likely enable China to us ercimie problems vs ith spacecraft guidance, attitude control, power supply sensors. and electronic ss sterns and to make stnaller and lighter spacecraft components Prospects 55 We f.presee only a modest increme in the ca- liabilities of Chitia's strategic nuclear attack forces during the nett five sears Several factors influence this estimate, ? The Chinese almost certainly perceive that their nuclear forces already provide a credible deter- rent against an attack by the USSR. and that mas- sive growth of the force would be required to obtain a significant increase in the force's ss ar-f ight ing capability against the Soviets ? Technological and economic constraints will in- hibit rapid growth of the Chinese strategic strike capability. Only minimal Western technology is likely to be available for strategic weapons, and we expect the Chinese to subordinate expend- itures for obsolescent strategic weapons to spend- ing for the development of more capable future ss stems ? We have detected no recent new starts on missile bases, which in the past have taken at least five years to build. 56. We project gradual increases in deploy ment of the CSS-2 and CSS-3 systems. Deplosmeni of the limited-range CSS-3 at roll-out launch sites probably. will occur in small monk I'S, enhancing China's mini- mal capability to cover targets in the western USSR. We expect Ile addition of some 10 to 20 PRIM launchers its er the nett few sears, hut no increase and perhaps a decline in the deplosment of the (:15-1 S1111111 Production of the TU-10 liomber probably will continue at a rate 44 about three to five per sear, but vve see no lodicationv of appreciable change in the primr.ry mission of these aircraf fit of the 11,-28 medhitn-range bondier. 57. We estimate that those delivery systems now under development that will become operational in the 1980s will Ire deplosed only in modest numbers. The two CSS-X?4 silos 14 ill soon be externally com- plete, and we think that these sites will be operational within a year. We expect the Chinese esentually to deploy additional CSS-X? Is tilina's first ballistic missile submarine probably will become operational tround the mid-to-late 1980s. A second unit may also become (gyrational late in the decade. 58 We believe that those missile aod space sv sterns that become operational in the nett live years will provide the basis for additional systems that could reach operational status during the second half of the decade. They probably will include: A modified CSS-X-4 us ith improved guidance and reentry vehicle ss stems, -- A new space launch vehicle or an upgraded (;SL-2 launch vehicle to support expanding activities in space. ? A land-based, solid-propellant missile 59. The Chinese continue to espand their capacity to design, produce, and test o!id- and liquid- propellant systems, and they are improving their weapon design technology an adding to their capac- ity to prodoce fissile material In addition, the Chinese will have to overcome many chronic problems in educa- tkm, research, industrial management, and technology that will continue to restrain progress in weapon ()s- tem development throughout the decade. We do, how- ever, expect an increasing emphasis on solid-propel- lant R&D during the 1980s. 11.18 Top Sec(tf 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release Top Secret 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 25X1 iissistarice that %s ill liase mime Intim% I rin 1Ve base no es ideme id follovi.on program% for nolog$ arid other either the It. 1i or II,?2S ',limber, and qlvii on a number of Militilr) anti militau?related 1111)int$111' lkitnIX'l .1101)1%1101 11114 $1'.1f. It 11111111 grams For 11.1111111e, tedinolog% avipilled for cominii? A140.11,11' In ill!'tin i 11110 Ater NS'S !Manor's and %dentine satellite %%stems Is likels hi 25X1 base wine modest 1 on itithiar$ spa?. program% 25X1 arid perhaps indiretth strapon% programs 25X1 lw 111111.1(1 4)1" ?11(1t foreign led nologs o China's strategic sIstrins oser the periodif thi% e Innate ill depend s% hat geijinit in twits intern hi acquire, %shriller it %%ill be able t() obtain %%hat or hgm long it %sill Lilt' In accilliiialet hdt('%t it gets Dining their 111,111) innIS" (net 11 past Isso sears. (:hinese delegations base espressed a interest in a host of technologies that could lease at Plication% in China's prourams---for esample. erk, other di-drunks. and solid propellant% Hut inn conniries that hawi capabilits to proside ailsamr. tedinolog% %%wild, for a %Arlo) of reasons. ;milli', or at Iraq inhibit transfer of equipment or let hriohv dire( tl% aoplicable to strategiC %%ea it Ne%ertheles %se !whew that China %%ill be able to acquire led 25 11.19 Top Secret X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret Implicolions Capabilities Against the USSR hi if thy prywiit Ironic In ritit?ile dtlelopmerit and deplo$ nivrit procird acV14' project. the capabilit$ of nut kat forte to rytaliate aitailot larguicIii tlw 1 SSit ill lie enhanced tittlif`%% hat ilw (bolo) MVO of a inaIi force of (",SS-:1, land of t ;SS- X- it could add lizroifi( milk to China t iitttiiil itiitiiiiiiI t apahilit$ to lirike the more Ilea% ? il$ populated and intlintriali/ed area' in thy ctestern USSII In addition, the %lo?? urimill in tin iiiarriiitr of It .- I ti lionilicrc that yoniii ?trikr along China's puripli- ur$ and illy fit operational SSIIN iIl fintlwr in- udimbiliit to target important area% in I hit va?tyrri SSII bf, 1.:$eti If China %%ere In aucclerate de$elopmetil and deplo$ merit of IC1111 forces arid folios% .011 re- gional $$ the forti. %nal not significantl$ reaw before titid?110$3 an e$ rill, China.% regional %Idly CJ pabilitv %mild ni tI be omit It larger limn fia$r projected, 25X1 25X1 5X11 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 2bA1 25X1 11.20 Top Secret 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 R Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Trends and Developments 97. We believe Ihat deployment of a new twin-jet fighter, the F-8 (Xian A), will improve China's strate- gic air defense over the next five years. We estimate that this Chinese-designed aircraft will enter the oper- ational inventory in the coining year. The F-8 will feature improved performance at medium-to-high al- titudes and might be etiuipped with improved avionics and armament. O. The Chinese also are working on a new combat aircraft to be powered by the British-designed Spey engine, but we do not expect it to be introcluced into the forces until the mid-to-late 1980s. We believe it will be capable of both ground attack and intercept. Such an aircraft probably' will be more reliable, carry larger payloads, and have better performance than any now in the Chinese inventory. The Spey will help provide the base of technology necessary to produce other types of aircraft engines. 09. me Chinese have deployed an indigenously de- signed and Produced air-to-air missile with infrared guidance?the PL-2- 25X1 They have studied the Soviet Atoll, the 25X1 American Sidewinder, and the French Matra, but we do not know which system has most influenced their new missile. Thus far, deployment has been to their F-7/ MIC-21 units and to selected F-6/MIG-19 units, primarily those that are radar equipped. I lowever, the bulk of their interceptors are still only cannon eqI ipped. III). We ('visec't the PI.-3, a larger sersion of the ?sith longer range and improved (wing, to be deploy ed within the next two years. claims that the P1.-.1, its first A AM to have both 'dram! and Selliiiillist-radar seekers, is scheduled for deployment lii IfiSI A %side 414.1)144 'Relit of Ilw PIA missile, if complemented by improved air Intercept radars, would constitute the most promising 'and economical) asenue to significantly improsing China's air defense 11-24 25X1 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret 101. The other improvement programs we have de- tected would not add substantially to Chinese air de- fense capabilities before the mid-to-late 19805. China probably has been working on improved models of airborne-intercept radars to permit all-weather opt-r- ations, provide greater search and track range, and al- low interceptors to engage targets at longer range. The Chinese probably also are developing improved ground-based early warning radars. They are devel- oping a second smaller SAMI?the CSA-X-2?which we believe is intended for low-altitude air defense of ground forces and naval ships, but could be used in a strategic air defense role. There is no evidence that they are developing a follow-on to the CSA- 1. 102. Despite China's expressed intereL., in several air defense systems produced in the West, there is no firm exidence that it actually intends to purchase any of them. We believe that large-scale purchases are un- likely because of the high cost, China's traditional reluctance to become dependent on foreign suppliers, and the reluctancy or miwillingness of some foreign s4nirces to supply the systems. China may attempt to negotiate agreements that include production rights and techiliejl cosistance while restricting the purchase of end item 5 to those required for training or as proto- types. The transfer of technology would take several years to absorb, however, and would not improve Chi- na's air defense capabilities significantly before the mid-1980s. Prospects 103. We estimate that China's strategic defenses will improve gradually over the next five years. ? The Chinese probably will begin full-scale pp duction of the F-8, but we estimate that no more than 160 are likely to be operational by mid-1985. ? Production of F-6 and F-7 aircraft probably will continue through 198:3, after which the upgrad- ing with improved engines, avionics, and A Aixts for the aircraft may occur, ? Deployment of the CSA-1 is likely to continue at a rate of alxmit five battalions (30 launchers) per year, along with steady production of existing models of antiaircraft guns. ? We do not believe that the Chinese Wil I have an adequate capability for the automated han- dling and processing of air surveillance data dur- ing the next five years. 104. On lire basis of these considerations, we project a force mix (see table 11-3) which assumes that: ? A new SAM for strategic defense will not be de- ployed in quantity. ? The number of aircraft In the force will be main- tained at about the ? The F-8 will first enter the force in 1081. Table 11-3 Estimated Chinese Strategic Defense Forces 1960-85 (Midyear) _ 1940 1941 - _ 1942 1941 1944 1945 Surface to-Air klissile cliatiakoris), All ('S'-1 95 100 105 110 115 115 Interceptor Aircraft F-5 MIG-17 Fresco aim] AIWA 5; 4404 1,700 I MO 1,600 1.550 1,500 1,400 F?ti MI( 19 Firmer 2.760 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,700 F-7,A11(;-21 Fislebecl 100 110 160 190 210 200 F-4 Alan .%) 0 20 50 90 140 200 Total Air( rah 4,500 4,550 4,560 4,540 4,390 4,500 0.25 Top Social 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 4oni C. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES 112 C.liina's general purpose ground, air, and naval forces consist of over 4 millio3 men The verb' sum Ihese forces attests to 11elling's reliance on nurnIxtri for military' strcemb, and reflects the recognition of the leadership that, riser the corning decade, resource and technical limitations will preclude the fielding of general purpose forces equipped with a wide arras' of modern %%capons China's forces are, however, well structured and deployed to defend China's territory, and even have some capability for limited interven- tion In peripheral areas. 113. Tk ground forces?the bulk of the 1'1,A?re- main the basis of Chinese in strength Still a predominantly infantry force, ground units have ken strengthened in the 1070s with substantial armor and art iiIerb', 1,arge, heavily armed, static defense units 11-26 Top Secret 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret were also formed during the 1970s to garrison critica are.,e along the invasion routes into China from tlic nortb, These garrison units now supplement die for- midab:e array of l'imstal defenses estaldished in tile I960s. The ground forces still lack adequate tactical and strategic mobility, flexible command and control, and modern firepower and armor, and they rely on largely outmoded weaponry. Prospects for significant improvement in the 19S0s are not promising. 114. The air forces also reflect a reliance on ill!"{- hers, with about 4,500 air defense aircraft (see section II B) and about 1,200 ground attack aircraft. The equipment is largely a generation out of date, its ar- mament is meager, and the proficiency Of its person- nel inferior by Western or Sosiet standards. Some progress is likely in the 19SO, but additional air-to- air missiles and better fighters will not substantially alter air force capabilities 115. The Navy, ss bile numerically one of the larg- est in the world, remains a coastal defense force, with large inventories of small patrol boats and diesel attack submarines. While the Navy has little capability for operations at present in the 19S0s we foresee?building on developments of the late I970s? a grossing effort to develop such capability. The fleet lacks effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and air defelse capability, and dots not have the firepower :ogistics for significant amphibious operations. Nevertheless, China has made some progress toward building a more modern fleet: two nuclear attack sub- IllarilICS have been launched; a ballistic. missile sub- marine is under construction: several large oceangoing atiMiliArit'S !WV(' been built; development of a surface- to-air missile is under way; and development of larger surface combatants is likely during the 19S0s. 116 China's regular ground forces are hacked up by more than 100 million paramilitary personnel. Most are assigned to the militia, about 7 million of ss horn are armed and periodically trained, and constitute a de facto inamxmer reserve and h)gistie support base. In ss artime, the iii lit a %%0111d sripxirt regular forces lOgiSileallY, Sense as fillers for depleted units, and fight as guerrillas in etietny-occupied areas 117. The PIA, despite its obvious deficiencies, is generally a professional, if hulghuh ihIhlcI,tl, force mid is capabls led and well structured to defend China against consentional attack It could effeclisely de- fend China against any potential mrutnn, usupt per- hips the USSR, and could mount operations Heti' 11111itt'd0o{r( thus into peripheral Asian countries 11-27 Top SIKrOt 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret Chinese Mititary Regions and Fleet Areas Fi we 119 ?,,r1; I o 5**IC fleet Yellow Sea O' NANJING r7. ) fisl 5.? Fleet Ea s: Chlne Sea , Fl Vi0\0: r . vs, abAtiCpt/OU., . , . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret Support and Logistics 124. Stockpiles of general supplies, an and l'01. are pre-positioned throughout China in a system of central. regional, local, and unit supply, %s lack in some measure Would ease the burden on the road and rail networks in Wartime. Nevertheless, sup- port is hindered by an austere logistic organitation xs ithin units and an overall shortage of motor trans- port. Nlosernent and distribution of supplies, there- fore, depend heavily on the efforts of militia and or- dinary civilians organized into a local logistic support system. 125. Unit and rNiorial stocks appear sufficient to sustain high-intensity combat for short periods without replenishment. Major items of equipment?such as ilf- mor and artillery?probably ssould be depleted rap- idly- PIA main force units?particularly in a nuclear en% ironment ? probably would etrwrience Severe shortages of critical items such as Po! ? s hich would degrade their ability to engage the enemy in regular, large-scale battles. Guerrilla and small-unit operations would be less af- fected by any disruption of supplies. 126. Outside China's borders, the system would lx' hard pressed to maintain a sufficient flow of supplies over long lines of communication. During the 1979 Vietnam incursion, maintenance orgariiiations report- edly could not handle the yolume of repair required. A high rate of motor transport breakdown would therefore impact heavily on the osvrall supply system If die Chinese. had penetrated deeply into Vietnam iiiFeloroary 1979?imolving 'was y fighting xs ith Vietnamese mail. force disisions around II and I ntensive use 0' the Air Force?the hqistic system probably %%mad base been Melt 127. Military air logistic rctsuirctiicsits arc eorisoli- dated Iii the General Hear tiers ices 1)epartment, ss hich has InI111.11) and distribution responsibil- ity for as l4111111 1114turi.11 the. as jatlouc S1111111$ 1U140.11)1y NOIdd IX141/1911 Wtil, hilt, lii the usetit lit a surprise military confront:I- tion, units would be forced to rely on existing stock- pi k's to acL'omplisk assigned tasks, at least initially. Maintenance, inspection, and repair practices would be too rigid to deal with the problems encountered in subtained combat operations. 25X1 25X1 25X1 128. The Chinese Navy operates major naval 25X1 bases, each having sufficient maintenance, ordnance, arid logistic support to cover all routine ships' require- ments and most short-run emergencies. Similar but less extensive support is available fromnmaller bases, 25X1 well dispersed along the coastline. Logistic support for operations outside Chinese territorial waters is mar- ginal. This deficiency is being offset in part by the i.14.:.gra1ion into the fleet of new auxiliaries, including three large underway replenishment oilers (A011s) and three large submarine rescue ships (ASI(s). 11-29 top Secret 25X1 25X1 2bA1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 ??? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret Ground Forces Organization, Composition, and Disposition 133. China's ground forces are the largest standing army in the world-3.6 million troops in some 270 divisions and about 300 iirlependent regiments (see table 11-4). Although predominantly infantry, there are armored, artillery, airborne, and railway engineer divisions as well. Chinese units are divided into main and regional forces with separate and distinct roles. 131. Main force units consist of tactical maneuver ele nents (armies, independent combat divisions, and incependent regiments) and combat support and serv- ici, support units, and are Available for combat in any part of China or outside its borders. During peacetime, the highest combat formation is an army usually com- posed of three infantry divisions. 135. Regional forces?garrison, border de .(ense, and internal security units?defend relatively corn pact geographic areas with or without the assistance of main forces. They are less likely to be employed uU of their assigned area of responsibility than are Main force units. ? Garrison units are assigned to defend territory r, particular importance to the overall defense of China. They normally occupy well-prepared positions, often in wigged terrain, along main ap- proaches to key areas of China. They are well equipped with field and antiaircraft artillery, antitank weapons, and heavy infantry weapons. ? Border defense units are primarily reconnais- sance forces that provide early warning of an en- emy attack and intelligence about the size and axis of an attack. They are trained and equipped to fight as light infantry. ? Internal defense units?formed in large meas- ure to contend with Cultural Revolution chaos? serve essentially as heavily armed police. 136. There are about 185 main force and 87 re- gional force divisions. More than half the force?about Table 11-4 Chinese Ground Force Order of Battle Mid-1980 ?slain Force Dnisions Sino- Sosiet Border Sino- Vietnirr.ew Border Beinainder a Country Total Infantrv IS 20 43 121 Armored h 0 3 . II, Airborne 0 0 3 3 12 2 6 20 AAA 7 3 7 17 Hail as engineer 12 0 1 11 flegional Ftbr('e 1)11.isloos 1 SS Carris4m 22 2 23 47 Border defense 5 0 6 internal tirferise 11 5 16 14 Ii? Regular Fortes remould 1 MO/ 1.720 1310 '3.611 Militia l'ersonnel 11.000) 26(K) 131%1 2O0 6,(0() ' An additional disislom mas be forming 11-30 Top $ftrit 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Too Secret 1.7 millionItql?is the four northern military regions opposite the USSR. In general, they represent China's best equipped and most prepared 11 huts Anothe.r miilion troops are deployed along the CI USt and opposite V10113111. The central ITSCRC (the Withal' MR and portions of surrounding regions) has most of the remaining Main forces, including three armored divisions and China's only airborne forces, and is available for reinforcement of threatened areas. 1:37. Although !WV: Units %t ert. created ill the %sake of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflicts, China has stressed qualitative rather than quantitative improve- ment since that time. 11(4%st:en 197:3 and 1978 the number of ground force units increased little., suggest- ing that Beijing believed its forces mere large enough to meet any crisis in C, . near future. Since late 197S, however, China has created or added units along is frontiers w ith Vietnam and Laos, and in the north- west. 13S. The People's Militia is a part-rime paramili- tary organization found throughout China. Over 100 million strong, it would provide substantial wartime in and logistic support to the PLA. Al-out 7 million militia members are armed anti receive peri- exlic training. Military Equipment 1:39. Chinese ground force equipment is largely. bawd on Sus id t designs and production technology of the 195(h, ssith significant modifications esident in only a fess instances A large output of infantry w eap- this and artillery pieces on er the years has provided large nurnLd?rs of thew systems in the force., and' the 11MIlber of armored vehicles has grown gradually dur- ing the past decade. In general, Chinese wvaporis are inferior to those in Soviet hands, and critical gaps or numerical deficiencies account for major weaknesses of the current force.: pow tactical mobility, limited organic air defense, limited antiarmor capabilities, and acute logistic problems. Present production levels are. sufficient to continue furnishing gradually increasing quantities of combat materiel to selected units. The introduction of more sophisticated weaponry is ex- pected in the near future. (See table 11-5 for current major items of equipment.) Capabilities and Limitations 110. Infantry arid Airborne Forces. Infantry units are. the backbone of the PLA and would bear the brunt of fighting in any conventional conflict. Main force infantry divisions have 12,000 to 14,000 men in three maneuver regiments and various ...,pporting units. About half ol the divisions have tank regiments and armored reconnaissance companies. There are. few ar- mored personnel carriers (AII:s) organic to Chinese infantry divisions. 141. Though China produces an All:, extensive medianization of forces does not appear imminent. China's APC, the M-1967, is similar to the US M-113 and has been used primarily as a reconnaissance and tactical command vehicle in armored units. Since. se- ries production began in 1967, between 1,:300 and 1,10/ have. entered the force?nearly two-thirds de- ployed in the military regions opposite the Soviet Union, but only two mechanized regiments?probably experimental?have been formed. 25X1 25X1 11-31 Top Swell 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-.RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secre 112.The concept of infantry mechanization has been under study by the 19,A since the early 1970s, 11CM l'Ver, tilt ClInIUSC apparently' concluded that their !United resources would be lk.tter sr tent upgrading ar- mored and artillery' units, particularly in the Sitio- Sets iet Itorder area litTen111, In us t'Ver, the h. aslership has expressed c?oncern oser China's limited tactical mobility on the modern battlefield, and this concern bas been reflected in st.seral recent training During the !text decade ss (' es pect further test and es aluation of mechanization and the selective incorporation of mechanized infantry into armored di- s isions This may lead to gradual conversion of se- lected infantry dis iSi()IIS iii 11Ie north and northeast into mechanized units. 113 China's airborne army, consisting of three air- borne disisions, is part of the central reserve. It is sup- ported by dedicated airlift--the Air Force's 1:3th Air Transport Di% ision?arid is capable of relatisely rapid reactiein to peripheral areas of (lima. The disisions base light artillery and antitank weapons that can 1W dromx.el ss it It the airlsarte troems The 1:3th Air Di- -.ision has a nhilkininill single-lift capability of about tssii regiments (5,:3(X0 trek ups). 11 I trniored Forces, china has eight armored di- visions in the Bening, Shenyang, and Lanzhou Military Regions in the north, and three in the central reserve. ;Nearly all are located at or hear rail terminals, from ss ii kit they could deploy to reinforce other areas as required. Most armored divisions and independent regiments have no organic infantry or artillery. 145 The l'I.A has deserted special attention to its an forces since. 1969, Older tanks and assault guns for the rumst part hast. been replaced by the TIP(' 59 main battle tank, basically a tom of the S41%irt 1-51% mounting a 100-mor gun It lacks many Ira- lures and capabilities considered standard in modern tanks, but will remain a credible main kettle. tank until tin' Sirs jets deploy substantial numbers of the T-tir T-72 faint's of tanks to the Far Fast. The. Type 62 light tank, a scaled.dow it model of the T, pt. 59, is %% idyls' deployed as well The Chinese are des eloping a new main kettle tank, but it is unlikely ter cutter the insentory in large. until the late. 19SO, and hes oral Pi Tho amount of armor in the insentory is stead- uly it reaong, arid China probaltly ss ill continue. Ill Link frInlin'iliN to 111,011 1-111TV infant, dis NMI% 1 licti. Ono/4111h ssull 1W only minimal growth in the number of armored divisions and separate armored regiments, 147. Antiarmor Forces. Chinese infantry and gar- rison divisions?main force and regional force?have antitank companies in each regiment. Three inde- pendent antitank divisions are located in the jinan and Shenyang Military Regions, nrobably as reserves. 148. :1iina has no widely deployed antitank guided inrissile (ATGN1), a serious deficiency. Infantry and artillery units have large inventories of short-range antitank weapons, including It PC-2 and R1'C-7 gre- nade launchers, recoilless rifles, and increasing num- bers of 85-mm and 100-mni antitank guns. The forces currently have little effective antiarmor capability' at ranges beyond 1,500 WM'S, 110W ever. The Chinese recently 11,11:11E'd to produce a copy of the Soviet AT-:3 Sagger ATCM and deployment of this man- portable weapon is anticipated, Beijing may conclude an agreernent for acquisition In for- eign sources of a vehicle-mounted system of greater range than the Sagger. If this should occur, China probably would purchase the smallest munber possible and try to acquire the technology and licenses to co- produce such weapons. 149. The. PLA recently displayed a truck-mounted multiple rocket launcher that scatters antitank mines, and unveiled a hand-held very short range antitank rocket, 150. Artillery. The PLA is well equipped with a Ide range of field artillery, Half is organic. to the Main force infantry disisions. The remainder Is or- ganic to (:hina's field artillery disisions, garrison di- s isions, anti headquarters elements of the :36 armies. The unaiority is deployed in the four military regions opposite. the. USSR. Artillery disisionts ss ill probably re- inforce the infantrs. disisiems and the garrison strongpoints More recently, multiple rocket launcher (%1111.) regiments have been formed and assigned to seseral independent artillery divisions 151. The Army has art estimated 16,((X) field add- icts' nieces, most cr1 ss inch are. modeled after Sets let tossed gurus Artillery at army and disislorial lesels normally imitates KS., 100-, 122-, and 1:10-noun field guns, 122-min howitzers, 152-pinto goin-hovsitzers, and 1:10 111111 multiple rocket launcher similar to the. Set? sie.t 11%11/17 In the. iniel?1970s, a sulf?propelled %yr- 11.32 Top Swot 25X1 25X1 25X1 LOA"! 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret shin of the 122-nun howitzer w as introduced and one regiment equipped with it. Store recently an MBE 1111111utcd on an armored, tracked chassis w as repont- edly undergoing test and esaluation Limited depiny- ment of additional self-propelled artillery w ill enhance fire support fur mobile operations in north and north- east Chill& 152. Air Defense Forces. Chinese ground forces have 17 antiaircraft artillery divisions, some inde- poident AAA regiments, and over 1(X) AAA battalions organic to the main force infantry divisions. Chinese AAA is based on Soviet moxlels of the late 19505. Most regiments have a battalion each of the 57-min, :37-mm, and %PE AAA pieces. Altogether, up to 10,0(X) pieces are available for the defense of ground forces. This force would be augmented by Air Force SAM/AAA battalions assigned a strategic defensive role if the garrison' and main force units had to defend a major city such as Shenyang. Divisions of antiaircraft artillery would prombably reinforce main force infantry. divisions or garrison divisions as required. 15:3. The Chinese are developing a new, low-to- medium-altitude surface-to-air missile?the CSA-X-2? presumably for both ground force and naval applica- tions. Limited deployment of such mobile SAN1s ith the ground forces probalily will occur by 19S5 and will enhance defense against ground attack aircraft at medium and low altitude. lo addition, a man-porta- ble SAM similar to the SA-7 Grail for use against low- flying aircraft is probably. entering Production 151. Training. Field training is conducted on am annual cycle (hat begins with indisidual and small- unit exercises and progresses to divisional and, on occasion, joint?sers ice 111:111C111ers Since time ground forces returned to a more professional training pro- gram following tlit. (:oltorA1 Resolution, exerckes prngressively haw gross mm in complexity and included more participating units 155. Training scenarios routinely. emphasize tour- humid arms and flexibility of operations, and appear to) include realistic combat conditions and attention' to details Armin omits hase practiced closer coordination ssitim summating artillery., support to infantry units in positional defense, withdrawal under fire, and road marches and msi I imimial assaults Training and omper? minimal messages haw relic( ted the inn 1110011 (If en- gineer and other supporting elements arid the realistic reporting (if ammunition consumption and casualties Trends and Prospects 157. Gradual, systematic efforts at bircc improVe- merit ss ill he aimed at ensuring that Chinese gommul forces, at a minimum, retain their current level of defensive capability against all potential threats. Al- though the number of infantry and field artillery units will increase little, their operational proficiency ss ill improse ss ith more intensise training and better equipment. 15S. Although ChinL has been increasing the 1111111- her of border defense units along the Vietnamese fron- tier since late 1978, the ()serail number of regional forces is unlikely to illCrejSt. markedly during the 19S0s SIMIC new border defense and garrisonm (wits will probably be created--particularly along the SOH/- Si/Viet and Sino- Vietnamese borders. 159. By Ble end iii the decade, armored Units, anti- tank capability, and infantry mobility probably will have been improved by introducing greater numbers of tanks and antitank guided missiles (perhaps I ncluding helicopter-mounted 1110(lels), mum lest amounts of self-propelled artillery., and more transport and bridging equipment. The selective incorporation of mechanized infantry units into the force also will enhance ground force capabilities. 160. Barring a significant improvement of Sol iet forces facing China, the ability of FLA ground forces to counter a major Soviet conventional invasion ss ill im- prove by the late 1111i0s. Enhanced mobility and fire- pow er will enable Chinese forces to maneuver more effectisely against breaktimnighs, reinforce threatened areas, launch counterattacks, and conduct organized retrograde operationms. Furthermore, thew strengtheneti capabilities, supplemented by gains in supporting airpower in the latter half of the decade, will enable the PIA better to contest a limited or general ground ifira? Si011 lint time Chinese will still hase little hope of presenting a determined Sox let attack from Imenetrating intim China on a lq I orw of St'stlid axes 161 Though Chinese ground (nays in the later 19Mh sslll continue to surpass those iii Wier Asian powers, Beijing w ill mit design') a butte capable og 11-33 Top Secrip1 25X1 25X1 25X1 9)(1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret powers, Beijing will not develop a force capable of posing a serious offensive threat to the USSR. The Chi- nese will remain capable of moving major forces for limited objectives into other contiguous countries, The 11.A 's ability to conduct large-scale out-of-country on- erations, however, will contimw to be severely re- stricted by insufficient strategic mobility and by logis- tic limitations. Tactical Air Forces 162. The l'1 .A has some 2,000 bomber, fighter- bomber, reconnaissance, electronic countermeasure (ECNI), and military transport aircraft (see table IF 6). (See section II B for diSCUSS1011 of interceptors.) These aircraft are organized into 17 air divisions and nine independent regiments. Organization, Composition, and Disposition 163. Ground Attack Forces. China's tactical com- bat aircraft ?1)ombers, fighters, and fighter-bomb- ers?are assigned to both the Air Force and the Naval Air Force, but there is no organization comparable to the IS Tactical Air Command or Soviet Frontal Avi- ation. Air Force tactical units are controlled routinely by the Air Force commanders of the military regions in which they are based. There are seven Air Force bomber divisions and six fighter-bomber divisions, 161. Naval aircraft are controlled by Naval Air Force Ifeadquarters in Beijing, which probably dele- gates peacetime control of the aircraft to the fleets to which they are assigned. The Navy has three bomber divisions and orw regiment of fighter-bomb- ers. Naval Air Force tactical aircraft suppmt naval forces through maritime reconnaissance, surface at- tack, and minelaying operations. 16,5. Tactical aircraft are assigned to support ground forces by interdiction and ground attack; they also train to support the Navy for coastal defense. Na- val pilots are trained for surface attack and minelaying operations. Roth Air Force and Naval Air Force units would be assigned ground attack missions for defense against or support of amphibious operations. 166. Most of the ground attack force is in northeast and east China, reflecting Beijing's priority for defense in these areas (see figure 11-10); ground attack require- ments in southeast, south, and central China would be met by the relocation of aircraft. Ground attack forces have deployed to peripheral bases to support mit-of- country operations?for example, before the Sino- Vietnamese war. 167. Transports and Helicopters. China has more than 550 transports and 430 helicopters assigned to the Air Force and Naval Air Force. Most are home-based in central China, but some transpotts support the Navy along the coast. Most of the force is for support of the national and regional headquarters, and for transport of military cargo and personnel and for sup- port of airborne operations. Table 11-6 Chinese Tactical Air Force Order of Battle mid-19S0 Sino- Id Nader Sino- na mese Ito order lietnainder of Ct)unttl Total liganliers 145 I'S 250 f)70 (1U?10.11,2h, Fighter lagnials 450 205 .555 (A-5 1?1141?15) 111coonnaissat(r 55 10 145 210 111.-2511.101(;.1S, 17/19. 11E.-6) If 95 10 210 115 (Shoti Anti medium range) Iltlintisters 90 130 210 (14111, nolloun, Total 145 910 1 9'41 11-34 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret Equipment and Armament 169 ThetrtijpiiI ,,It I. I.iiuuiI 1 C hlij.s In tit air flirt us has .iinit? 110 11.?2hs, and mime 550 A-5% and \11(;-15 livIitur-Imitillics. 'Ilium. ( ralt t iiiiuitl irc maul! \kith vim., lig I1:1%, and Ixtiels It int rl,Ii IIu IIiiIiilii aid Ohl I1ttliS' Iii liii IiIEiI.JlI4li.II1.41 Ow dill 'Ai 1..41111 III the I. '11.41,1411 11-35 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Too Swot I!' tat tn al alit tali, the 111.1 is attcnipting its 414.%dop 1.44114 al air?to-suilate l'ASkls), 111)111mi:4 air? tivali iiiiIls. guns, tot.Iet. and a disersificsi iti%cliltit$ I lit. pate oil susIs deselopineril %sill tnitesoint 111611114% Mid the manakin% of foreign s%II ms arid les linoloo 170 I In militars air tratsport torte is a 111151111e of foreign and doniesticalls produced aircraft 1 he ( 1111114 lime imported alit rail such as the Trident from Britain and the ,IN-12 and \-26 from the SSII and ale deli( ntlent on thew foreign suppliers for IMO gine 11dIlt Mid II1111 uiii 4'11(*IA 171 There are about '(Al major transports ;gross ss tight of '1010 kilt,grattil or greater) curretills as. signed to 6511 asiattoIt. including a satiety of Sosiet? made airs raft, some liocing 707,s and 7 17s, and British Tridents anti Viscounts in addition, orgolia. thins el' under vs a% %% It Ii Western companies to cot nNlihe a %meets of aircraft such as the 1)C-90). Ji 'tat II, and I. and French lielicoptors The tis ii fleet is is dude to augment the militars fleet in ail VII1(1141111.1. and these cis il ackets ssould double (111ria's airlift caiiait iii VtilfIllflf. Thew s isil aircraft, host- et. are not IA ell suited for military cargoes and ssoulil haw difficult nyelating fr(im landing sitilts 172 11m,tit !t0 percent of the l'i ?'s helicopters are Sos (:Iiitiese-built Nil- I ilomids 1"lie -hi- m 4' a1C41 bast' 1)l1f(11.1411 MI-fis and NII-Ss from the Sosiet Union and Super Frelritis and Alonettes from France Four It()?105 light helicopters }lase been pm- ( hawd from German% and at least eight fiell-2 12 me- dium helicopters from the Slates for use in tisil ms ialiiii So hr thina has not beam] tn prodihe unfit flour of natise design Capabilities and limitations 173 VieuIiiIit of China's aircraft 1,, conduct k and maritime strike operations is linnihtilliN sulk ien( les in range. (lion e 4,1 %%capons. Pas loati. it ionic s. ;Ind elec title citintermeasiircs tear \foreo?er. these dein 4'm11141 require. tlic? ihinese fl ,ortics than tither NVi,tern fif So- s itt sir NI al. Iiiese an coins alent Pesci of target ii linage Vie ( 11(11Af?%f'f, 1)fni),114) cannot siis- lain high sortie rates for long periods 1)11ring the Sitio- Victnamese Vk.sf kf'% cry aircraft IrldiflICTI'.7,(1' pf(11)!CIIIC \seri slit wintered. c%[11 4' raf 'sire not insolsed ;II (011111,11 ()ri the 10.0,is of training terns. ii is likels OW I ttn111,1 f15 1110A11) PlupLifIlle01 has hot thiseloped a air-support capalillit% in the \Vesivrii sense, anti 1k 0011101 0.111fer hem% losses attempting to conduct ground al? !auk operation% against targets defended Iry iiimierit W401001(1.11.0411 air defense s%sfirilis and aircraft 171 Bomber c rests are probalris pions icril finis in ilas light boniliing in clear sseather. Although Badger and Reagle aircraft ate equipped milli radar, a lack of realistic' training iestricts their ahilit% to eotithict nighttime or alkseather iiperati4ilis Like's targets for thew lionsbers %mild liesuppl% depots, comientratiom of troops, and lines of communication 1 lie Beagle 1101111)(15 a?Sigliet1 It, the NakiA Vorre are des- ignated for maritime strikes, kit mo also have we- ?Wars ground attack missions 175. Chinese A;r Form flakier-lion-doers ' %mild be used for strikes near the battle area anti interdiction against eneniv supply' lines Naval A-5 fighter-iximbers pm% hie an additional ground Oa( k as %s ell as mari- time strike capabilits. A-5 fighter-loomber effective- ness ssollhl lie 1Mitet1 15) defitielIcieS iii ordnance capacity. rs,r, row choices of ordnance, wut deliserl- aeciitaor, lack of ECM, and limited range. NIIG?15s and ?Il(;?17s share similar limitations, and are even further restricted in range and pasload The site and sophistication of corm% (owes, the location of the bat. the area, and the logistic suptiort as allahle %% mild deter- mine the estent Gi Chinese losses. 176. China's present !Whims' air transport capahil- its is restricted to airlift vdthin the count o. and to peripheral areas. The ina}or limitation is the lack of adequate medium- and long-range transports; less than half of the force has a radius of operation greater than Y10 rialitical miles Olit.of?countts. airborne or aerial require tiepin% ment for- siippl% operations %soul(' %% aril st2ging haws before initiating operations, and such operations %% mild be hampers-41n he small cargo anti troop capacities of most of the aircraft. A major airlift effort ssould require large numbers of aircraft and high 'or lie rates, neither of sshich China is ca- pable of handling at this time lot example, the Chi- louse (1?011(1 airlift al pout 2,000 metric tons of cargo. or troops, or 17.0(X1 paratroops to a radius of 3tX1 run from their staging haws Ords? 710 metric tons of cargo. or 9,000 troops, or 1,14X) pat Atroops conld lie trampfirlcil to a radius of 1010 mn China could sus- tain such airlifts mil% for almint three (lass After that 25X1 1-36 Top Secret 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret 11m iota, capacits ssimild 1m. icsliiied I s about 10 pt.rt era 177 C IiIa tiiiI'ilit II 441111111 I la( tit al air reconnaissance lm. mils marginal if l'Ill'Irl$ air (14.1cr1ke% %?r 1.44)4141 I III 1.111111.4 %?4.14111% Ill,4 441,441440.- 1 i11111 11111( ekk11111 .11141 11.1111.111441 11111101dt .111 1 1u111' 0401,11111111g. .41141 till airlrono 1,1Attotoik 11,151, A lo%% proioahilittIII fair?i% al in A Iiiv1i 11icral itorinic lit Trends and Prospects 179 %VC I IditA v the C 1111114' 144 111 OR(' 1111.41(1 priorit$ than in the past on ininrmf'111C111 of their grolind attack c apahilit s In the nett (luta& %sr ewe( I 141 tee 111V1.1111?11 ground ,1111( lk training. pox 1114111r 111 4 if .1r 11111400AI 1 111411111-1 444t1114/ r i gradnal c.?itarikion of th . force. arid programs unipliasi/ing iniprosed 1tykocii air JO, nio and ground attatk air c raft Ciff- 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 II Risen a high priori's. a .1.1SNI prohafils 25X1 tould he operational 11n. 111111-141S0s. arid %%mild most likels be used III ani antishipping role or for cle. fense suppression as all antirailar %sr-apron China Ind,- alils hat the let linological varialiilits to design and produce improsed aircraft (A1)1)01. /drge unguided air- to- surface rim kis based on the Sri% let S-2I design. and a '.% lilt' %ark's- of bombs iiimitmliars. nuclear. clukter. Improsed tactical %%capons should enter the 'mentors tiser the nod 10 sears 1 S3 In the earls 107(k dm. ss as III acquire foreign inilitars transport air; raft In the 111S0s China s'. iii continue to pcircliatr. air( raft it cannot like the 717?Imit ssill adisels seek luuihit %colones Slit!) 1Vesterli companies to acquire moduli transport tech ?whims arid produt espertise Impros vinyl& in the aircraft industrs- should ott lir 3% a result of this nevi thioese-1Ve.tern (-0(qm-ration. and China's airlift tapacits and capahilits should improse steadds. ISI Tim. thine g. apparentls are %s ell a1%klire of thwir deficiunciet in aerial reeminaickance Anil !lase cinharked on .4.%cral programc to improse their ta- paln1iR fic.ported1) they are atturnpling dc.%(.1op a photoreconnaickamt. ?atiatit iif the MiT;-21. an air- ( raft that should offer int reased ix.rformance met 114. t tirrent \11(;-15s and MIG-10s pliotorocormaiccance mission rTla) also be Planned lot tine F-S. I itit s%ir f` that stic ii lite of the 17-S ssould IN wconclars to its dr,plos meld as xi inter( e)tor IS1 Tim. t.hineg. has e tested three tspes of re- motels piloted %chides MIA's). and it is likels that at least one s'. ill be (lentos ed as a ff.( orithikkantv drone fm- missions in heas ifs defended arta'. On the basis of test-flight actisity. PIMA (Ayr. it ss ill be at least rise sears Im.f ore vs idespread deplos went of .01(11 41 krelll (e11111 take place 11-37 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 lop Soccer Novo! Forces Organization, Composition, and Disposition I S7 Nits s has wt.. of the largest ill?coloties Iii the %odd (41. teilde 11.7) litsiiiIar lilt's, though lipilurussis P Iii riumbris. are main!) small units suitable primaril$ for coastal patrol Neserthcless, a transition illtu itlocti ox11 uuasal force has begun Progress has been doss because of deficiencies in resources. Inadequate let Ithologs, and the sofipe of the impros e- merits required 1SS. The Chinese Nass is a separate sets ice arm of the l'I.A Nasal Ileadquarters In Beijing is sul)ordi- nate to the General Staff 1)epartmen1. A separate Na- sal Air Force esists to assist the forces afloat in caus- ing out their sarietl missions' The Nass also has a small number of land-based cinise missile sites dis- ...sed along the coast. 019. Three fleets?north, east, and south?serve as peacetime operational commands for the Nass. (Fleet areas are shown in figure 11-9, on page 11-28.) Ships in each fleet are organired by (lye for administration and, in some cases, for operational control. Commands include those for submarines, main surface com- batants, missile and torpedo attack boats, ausiliaries, and nasal coastal defense forces ' The Nat al Air Pour is dittlittind in the Air rorve fledkm 190. The backbone of the fleet remains the large number of submarines and missile attack boats, al- though in recent years there has been growing cm- Plu?it on major surface combatants. The merall tom- 110011011 01 I he (firm continues to tilled concern for the as r' primary mission, coastal defense, I loss ever, since the mid-1970s the Navy's mission has mantled and now Includes ttruntering the Soviet presence in the Far East and establishing a greater Chinese politi- cal presence there. Equipment and Armament 191. A majority of China:: principal combat ships are less than 10 years old, but the designs of most slate from the 19505 or earlier. Nonetheless, the Navy is well trained and reasonably well equipped for its coastal defense mission, with its present inventory of some 100 diesel attack submarines and almost 240 mis- sile boats. The Navy has more than 33 principal com- batants; these add little to overall firepower?because of the limited number of antiship missiles per ship? but have considerable importance because of their ability to operate at greater ranges and in more severe sea conditions than the smaller missile boats. 192 The main weapon of the surface forces is the surface-to-surface cruise missile, 1k-skies producing the 23-nm-range CSS-N-1, a (ivy of the Sosiet St$ s cruise missile, the Chin-se have developed and produced a lengthened version, the 15-nm CSS-N-2, perhaps with an infrared capability, These missiles, though based on Soviet technology of the 1950s, play a central role Table 11-7 Chinese Naval Order of Rattle Mid-1930 Nntlh Sri 1.1cf.1 134 Sri rlert Sn/1111 Sea Intal Cill,rnarinet 10 20 101 Prim /Pal knave combatant% irlf-ttrot (-ft and friizairti 9 17 11 37 Minor cninhafantc lioatt 92 95 15 213 74 10n 77 2.55 Snlimarine (lhavit 25 20 25 75 'Ariasf a I patrol tine, tligh 120 io 150 -150 Amphibiont wart' ar.? thipt ILST. 1.5511 It 15 19 15 Mine- warfare chips 12 15 17 It 11.39 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Teo S?tre iii China's nasal defensise capabilities and ssillcon- tinue to do mi throughout the 19S0s 191 The Chinese has e etwinnitered problems deseloping a shiphorne surfaceloair missile system. am! their %Mimi. forms remain estremmly sulnerahle 10 high.speed Mt attack, Ii,imdlng nasal operations to the comhat radius of land-based fighter air; raft China has had a loss ?Iii-medium-altitutle SAM wider title!. opment since the mid.1900s Unlike the CI qw of the Sibs cruise missile. this SAM probably is based on a Chinese design One of Its (P Jiangdong frigates has been outfitted ss ith SAM laundwis as part of this pro- gram, and the missile hat reventls undergone test launches from the frigate. We capes I the ss stem to beerime operational in the early 19isOs 191 ( 'a ins tuitional (:hinew nasal gun S1 stems Pre for the most part So; let, Japanese. British. and CS ss rayons of World War 11 s intage that cannot compete against todas 's modern systems While some R&D is in progress. advancement has been slow. China has produced onlv three nasal gun sy steins during the past two decades?a twin 130-mm, a twin 100-mm, and a Its in Si aler-conled 57.min, all clerked from earlier So% let systems Production of some gun ss stems has not met the demand?shits occasionally has e op- erated ssithout guns or ssith guns other than those for %% hid) they apparenth ss ere designed There is esi- dente that the Chinese are attempting to develop ta- dat-directed gunfire control ssstems (current ss stems are largely optical), but progress in this area is also slow . Capabilities and limitations 191. The is y's capability to carry out its primary. mission?defense of the Chinew mainland against consentional surface attack?is substantial Land- based and seaborne naval assets are designed to com- plement one another effectiveh, producing a fully integrated coastal defense SI stem. Chinese forces, tsith their sheer numbers, are employed in a defense-in- depth stratees %% Oh three osedapping perimeters. and could repulse or make eaceedingly costly any waborne attack (see figure 11.11). China's coastal geography. constrains the movement of attacking naval forces and enhances defense. 196. Some 100 diesel submarines pros ide the outer Perimeter of China's fomard nasal defense awl %ill remain a prominent feature in the Chinese nasal in- ventory for many years. These boats are %sell suited for operations in the shallow w aters of China's broad econtinental shelf. Submarines currentiv pros ide China Ss ithu its onl Met use naval defense against enemy task forces milli standoff sit Ike capabilities, such as air- craft carriers 197. liehind this tone mime 35 destrows and frig- ates, all but Wten armed w ith c rube missiles, are Mail- able for operations. The alii14 of thew milts to op- erate at greater ranges and in more adserse %rather pros ides added sersatility and depth to China's coastal defenses With cruise missiles as their primers' ()flew she 5b stems, these ships have a potentially high elitism( ace capability, a capahility they %mild other. %Ise lack given the general obsolescence of their other offensive weapons sIstems These larger combatants can also Set% e AS command ships lot controlling co- ordinated defense operations involving minor combatants. 194. sear shore, about 2.10 missile boats, with some 7(X) Sts; missile launchers, most& an excellent anti- surface-ship capabilitv. Emplosed along the entire coastline in small squadrons, thew units constitute the thickest concentration of China's naval defenses. Their missiles. vdth a 2.5-nm range and terminal homing, %mid be very effective against surface ships: about 2.10 fast torpedo boat; pro; ide backup at shorter ranges A small number of strategically hwated land- based cruise missile sites and numerous batteries of shore guns serve as an additional backup should na's at-sea defenses be breached. 199. Air Force and Naval Air Force aircraft, %stitch provide air defense for the fleet close to the coast. %sonic' also supplement the Navy's surface attack ca- pability and supply some aircraft for maritime surveillance. 200 The Chinese maintain their ships in ex- cellent condition, and most units arc probably ready to put to sea on short notice. 201. The lack of modern ASW and shiplxnne air defense systems currently present the most serious limitations to Chinese naval ssartitne capabilities, particularly as operating distance from shore increases 11-39 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Chinese Naval Defense Zones Mongolia China Top Secret BEIJING* U.S.S.R. Neal% 1140fee ? South Nemo Sea _ef C.* , / 1 / / Isireifft / / / - / I, / :1 / / / / / .:4,51,1tl` PhItIppines i? IT40 Top Secret DEFENSE ZONES Inret kerddie Outer ^ ',roc*? s^,e?i / 6' 6...r I ? 1.?e VA**. "to .,J,11 rit"0, r*Ir ereiNcyr- I r T!OrS__Up Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret RUFF The siniets hi the late 11950s supplied China stub %Op. 111,11 ill(' drirt 1411111/1111111 that had limited range, depth perwiration, and technological reliability. The (:hinese ptobahly improsed the equipment iii the last 20 v ems Stoic-mei, the NJ%$ has inl 104%1C deloill 11.1fge% 111141 n4111011(61 lilt keit in its AS11' weapons his entory 202 1 lie Chinew Nasy is hIsthl s '11,141,114e en? cnis air au i at k (Igniter air( raft carrying ait?to-slit. face (teapot's. Chinese ships base only 1Vorld War 11 antiaircraft guns, most ?4 which are optically sighted and trianuallt aimed Some radar the control sy st? ins are (lidera but there is tontiderable doubt alxiiit their ef let tis vilest This s mineral dill testrit Is the Mk, fwer- atlinhil radii ?4 Chinese ships to about 250 kilometert. the matimum effettise range ?4 land-bate(' (;(11 ss sterns 203 China's small amphiliimis lift salahillit Is in- creasing. hut falls fat short of the requirements for operations against a moor objettise such as Taks an Since 1977 the Chinec have shown greater interest irnprosing and etpanding this capability through aniphiliionc-related (raining cultist's and building new ships In 1975 they an amphiliout ship construc- tion program that to date has iloublcd the 517C of (hi- na.% IM11 fleet ito 31) and is adding three I,STs Although there has not lx-en a major change In the as '5 amphibious lift capabilitv, it is Ognificant that thew I,SNIs and ISts are the first landing ships built in China in 25 years, and that building programs are on midis under way. 201 The Chinese Nas v has stime capability for mine warfare. but there is insufficient esid(nce to gauge the extent of that capability. Trends and Prospects 205 Chinew leaders clearlt. understand that improsing the war-fighting capabilities of their naval force% is a long-term effort and one that faces strong competing requirements, some of greater urgency. from ground, air, and missile forces They are also ass are that many of the improsements in the as y. cannot be ac hies ed without foreign astistance. Al- though the Chinese have et pressed tars ing degrees of interest in a ss ole range of foreign nasal equipment, we tarty that, as with other set-% ices of the PIA, actual purchases ss ill focus on the acquisition and absorption of technology Because of the economic constraints that will continue to face Chiiwte military and it is than leadert, 011VclIlllkhI 1111101:1WS of nasal weapon 1)Sirlli% that Might occur will be kilt small and are likely to include attempts to acquire produc- tion rights 200. Perhaps the tin it OltniliCant nasal detelop? ment has the pirxhit ikon of IN mu Ilan?clast nit- leat- attack sidmiatine% The seti,m1 Ilan it currentiv math for sea trials, and preparations may. I e under way. for the launch of a third nuclear unit, probab1y. the long-assailed protoly jw of a nuclear. med hallIstie missile submatine (SSIIN). The first 1Ian units have sets ed a major tole in the development ?4 a suitable propulsion system for the SSI1N. How- ever, sse believe the Chinese will initiate series production of such unitt. The Chinese proloalult re- quire additional nuclear attack submarines to patrol the deeper ss aters off China's continental shelf. 207. The Chinese Nast has gone through a long period of des elopment marked by Impressive lams th of the sulimatine and missile boat insentories The North and Fast Sea Ileett, sshich have enjoyed higher priority than the South, are vets- close to what appears to be (heir planned strength in dicsel submarines and missile boats. The production of such units has de. dined and is now dedicated largely to equipping the South Sea Fleet. This buildup of toililiern units, under NM' since the late 1970s, ss ill continue slow Is for the nett few years. 205. The growth of the South Sea Fleet has been accomplished by adding rwsslv built ships and transferring ships from other fleets. China's height- ened concern met protecting its island claims against the Vietnamese and ever-growing So% lel naval actis it s. in the area will !Ads result in additional deplot merits to this area. 209. The Chinese are taking other steps to improve their defense capabilities. For etample, they recently. launched a third Ming-class unit, which represents a mcxlification to the R-dass fly mid-decade we (Aped either a further nu-dirk-anon of, or a succeeding class to, the II-clacs. 210. The principal combatants, however, are the ships that will realin the greatest change in the nett decade. Since the mid-1970s priority naval ship construction in China has turned away from the hi- class submarine and small missile boat programs and toward the production of the larger ships. We expect the Jianghii frigate to continue in production, although there have been no new static it' over a year. hula 11-41 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Uct et demilqers will also likely remain in ptoduction (lir a Fess more years Both classes enhance China's nasal defences hy extending esisting defense capahilities seaward 211 ridlowing the successbil deplos merit of the (NA?X?2 missile aboard the weond jtatigdonst frigate, the Chinese prolmbly will concentrate on a new class of ship (4111i pped with Ixd facr-to-ait and surface- to ? 51If face missiles as well as improved ASW capabili- ties Such a ship would succeed the present Lucia de- stroser as (;hina's largest surface combatant. Its deselopment, likely in the micl.19S0s. will bolster es. Wing naval defenses and represent a significant step toward providing the integral fleet defense necessary for more distant nasal operations 212 The jiarighit program will likely be succeeded later in the decade bs. a new class incorporating im? proved weapons and design features. !Telling has ex- pressed interest in buy ing gas turbine engines for com- batants smaller than destroser sire. Stich ships, an outgrowth of both the Jianghtt and hangdong pro- grams, could readily serve as escorts for larger cotn? hatants and as support units for eventual task force operations 213 I)itring the past few stars the Chinev base shown intetest in helicopter carriers, explorin the pos- sibilities of purchasing or constructing one. There is no firm evidence that China plans to move ahead with these purchases in the near future Indeed. rem'', reports indicate that there has been a serious curtailment of such major contract purchases cloning a period of economic retrenchment. Any plans T(.'S .30S 4 ,S0 25X1 25X1 for esentual acquisition of a light aircraft cattier for helicopters or Harrier-Ism aircraft undoubtedly re- main in the early Planning or feasibilits' study stage. Nevertheless, wr %Mild not diSethillt the possible rOf III of carrier by the end of the &cede. One cattier, howeser, Possiblv for esticti? nictitation with ASW or other missions. would hake little impact on near-term Chines( naval capabilities. 214. Chinese preparations for future naval oper- ations are evident in the construction of new types of auxiliary ships, in the continued search for more modern equipment and technology, in the modetnita. tint' of shipyards, and in the more professional naval operations and training king conducted. Throughout the 19S0s, the Chinese will introduce more modern weapons :.,to the fleet, gradually upgrading Its combat capabilities (see table 11.8). 215. The primary misskm of the as in the [Ws will remain coastal defense, with emphasis on realistic training exercises, development of profesconal and extending operations farther from the coast. The submarine force appears to be moving toward patrols of about 30 days. Some submarines probably are extending their operations into the Philippine Sea while the majority will continue to operate within their fleet areas. 216, During the nest decade, the Navy probably. 25X1 will more actively monitor the Soviet presence in the China Seas and peripheral open-ocean areas. It will probably develop dedicated intelligence collection ships (Ws) to monitor the Soviet presence in the Tsu- shima Straits and South China Sea, and may venture into the Pacific and Indian Oceans to observe Sosiet operations. 11-42 Top Secret 225X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Teiri ANNEX SINO-SOVIET MILITARY SITUATION Top,84e1 25X1 25X1 ft. 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Tap UM, SINO?SOVIET MILITARY SITUATION Mutual Threat Perception and Force Buildup The Sino-sosiet dispute basically is a reflection of the clash of Chinese and Sm let national interests The bonds that lied China to the USSR began to un? rase' seriously in the late 1950s Sos let apprehension (net China's long-term reliability led to the refusal to I ros hie China nuclear %% capons, the withholding of military support during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 193S, and the ss ithdraw al of Sosiet advisers In 1960 Tensions increased over a series of national and kko- IugkaI a border dispute?in the early 1960s China esploded its first nuclear Joke in October 1964 and Sino-Soviet border talks broke down in August 19M. The USSR then began to strengthen its forms in the border area,' reflecting Moscow's concern and uncertainty about Chinese intentions The buildup was not a reaction to an increased Chinese (Timer). Urinal military threat, because there had ken no discernible change in the strength of the Chinese. Forces in the border area, nor had there been serious military border incidents. 2 From 1965 to 1969. Sosiet forces in the border area grew from 13 to 27 ground combat disisions, From 1,(XX) to 1,400 fisecl?ss ing combat aircraft (tac- tical and air defense), and from )s73 to 1,000 strategic surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers Moreover, in 1966. the Sos lets signed a Trraty of Friendship. Cooperation. and NIntual Assistance with Mongolia, formalizing the Sor;et military prc7ence there and ensuring access to the frontier onls 6c,) kilometers from Beijing :3 The Chinese initially were slow to respond to the So% let Inn!dup. cc hich coincided roughls with the initi- ation of the Cultural liesolution, and during the pe- riod 1963-65 some Chinese units were moved out of northeast China for domestic seciirity arid political reasons ("Jana also ss as concerned at 'fiat time with the potential US threat in Indochina 1 he Soc fel mili- other% ire ?per ified, (be bordcr area is defined as the low ( hinese militai retions opposite the ge,t t'nfoo. NIrocolia, and the forir SOS iut military distridi rfrpocite (:bina tars. buildup. Moscow's ins aslon of Czechoslovakia, and the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1965 increased China's uneasiness, however, Border clashes along the lissuri River in 1969 dearly alarmed the Chinese and focused their at on the serious vulnerahilities of China's defenses. Chinese forces then began to shift from a defense oriented primarily against attack from the sea to a defense against a So- viet thrust from the north. China also launched an estensIve effort to improve the capabilities of its Peo- ple's Liberation Army (PEA) and enhance its SURIVahility* in the event of a Sos let attack. Trends in the Military Balance .1. Both Soviet and Chinese force levels in the bor- der area have grown slowly but continuously since the early 197th (see figure A-1), although the majority of the ground forms and of the Soviet air forces now in place mere there by 1972 3. Sot-let Detelopmenht. Sim, 1972 improve- ments in the l'SSR's military isosture opposite China have been essentially qualitative, although there has been some numerical Increase, and far outstrip Chi- nese improvements during the same period. Obsoles- cent aircraft have been systematically replaced with more sophisticated models. On the ground, the Soviets have introduced new equipment, and Improved the rear sers ices. They also have expanded permanent fortifications in static defense areas at potentially sulnerable points. 6. The general pattern of qualitative improvement was altered beginning in 1976 IA ith the addition of a tank disision in Mongolia and three, possibly four, new motorized rifle divisions in the Far East Military District. While the overall deplosment of Soviet forces in the Far East MD is defensive, the new divisions there are situated on likely Invasion routes into China. 7. In 1979 the Soviets established an operational theater-level command?a Theater of Military Oper- ations including at least the Par Fast, Trandraikat and Siberian Military Districts?in the Soviet Far East and A-1 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Ere 25X1 25X1 A"igilvil the folltirt tieltill1 CollInlander 401 the itrogind lithe+ as tis i,ninai,der Sits Ii 3 commAnd is fre? quentil 01)5e15e51 10 %inlet .51( 1545 hut ni established and stalled mils iii waitinte S '1 livre has also been an irtiiisuihI hItli lesel iii Su i% ivt users ises in the Situ 15(15id border area since the beginning of 1979 Ifs miels ear, 12 eserciset at the itiIttai district les el and two theaterlesel e'- er( tW% hail occurred In March 1979, eine of the largest command post and field training eitertikt% of recent c3114 55 .1% iiitiii,ttted iii Slongo143, It Imokod elements of at least three armies. one airbrirne dis Won, and IS ('I 31m) militars tralispetrt flights from the European USSR Ari airlift of this scope to the rat East riser such a short time was unprecedented Purthermiiii two Transbatkai NW Ills i?10114 that deplosed to \fon- golia for the cwt.( ise did nett return to their home ga r? Hums but remaines1 itt NIongolia 9 %Vet base not noted any Sestet force des elopment III the border area that could be fudged a direct eofl. teepience of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. We believe the large-scale esercise last year was progransed prior to the Chinese insasion of Vietnam Failure to ad- s mice its tinting for the purpose of deterring Chinese military aetion against Vietnam suggests the colds(' had lortger term implications 10 (lancet" Deuelopments. On the Chinese side of the border, emalitatise improvements have lagged. largels because of resource constraints and the rel- atively backward state of Chinese militars technology. The ( :Nurse generally base sought to achieve the most effective tise of esisting weaponry. and defensive dis- positions, to inn prose training. and to develop cam- ouflage and protective des ices to enhance stirs iv- ability. Substantial artillery and armor have been added. and an imprictant aspect of the Chinese effort has been the des eloivnent of complex defensive areas along potential avemies of approach from the USSR and where terrain most favors the defense. The Chi- nese also stepped lip an already estensise program to pros ide underground storage facilities at airfields throughout China We estimate that more than half of China's fighter aircraft inventors could now be af- forded some degree of protection by these facilities 11. .1n important des elopment since 1976 has been the effort to upgrade military capabilities in the Eanihou and l'rumoi Military Regions, where. over the pre% ions 10 sears, the priority for itnprosing com- bat potential ss as lower than elsewhere along the hos.- der. Stich improsements indicate that the Chinese %%mild offer a mote tivtermined imistantv in %%(...tein China Current FOrCel 12 Snuff Awes, turretIlv, about one-foutili of Suis Iii ground forces?at least 12 combat ills isions and 160,000 men ?are deploled opposite China, along ith about 1,900 fited?ssing combat aircraft (1.200 tactical aircraft or 25 percent of the force, and 700 air defense aircraft or 20 percent of the force) In addition, there are some 34X1 aircraft subordinate to the tios let Pacific Fleet, user 54X1 assault and transport helicopters. and about 1,2(X) strategic and 1,(XX) mo- bile tactical SAM% in the area 14. Supplementing the Soviet ballistic missiles ate over 200 strategic bombers?about 150 of which are Badger intermediale-range bombers. They cars strike any target in China with air-to-surface missiles Or Ixtrnbs. Moreover, all modem Solid tactical aircraft are probablv nuclear capable. I i. Within the ground forces dedicated to the bor- der region. the 1:11(X.;-7 has been sit 0(4 deployed at division level and a 12-launcher Scud brigade has been allocated to most armies. One Scalelsoard brigade has been deployed to each of the four military districts. 16. There are also several ground force divisional mobilintion bases in the region. Most are colocated with an actise division, and each contains the critical combat equinment for a motoriml rifle disision. The equipment is intended to permit rapid activation of additional divisions in wartime. Most of the standing divisions and support units in the Far East are manned below wartime strength; upon mobilitation, the Man- ning level would espaml to over 1 million men. 17. The moderni7ation and increased operations of the Soviet Navy in the Far East further esacerhates Sino-Soviet tension. The Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet b primarily oriented against the United States. Ilowever, when the Chinese invaded Vietnam the Soviets tem- porarily dispatched task forces to the East China Sea and the lIainan Island vicinity. The SO% let Navy now A-2 Top Secret X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Secret continuoirds operates in the Sonth ( hina Sea. makes combatant % kits to 5'imirmainese outs. and %Lige% recon? naissance am! AS1V ant raft from 1'ictnamese airfield% IS thltivie rorces. 1 thitiew t intentl$ has almmt 100 iufftltftl unilikt di% I iuisaid some 2,115 tonthat ant raft (11(I wound attat k and 1.715 air de. f How) iii 111104111% 4 oproi Kite the us's!' and sdung,,,ha 1 lie 11.1% 1.4 (1)911Mt MR fah that could at the air effort 19. The Chinese ballistic missile force consists of imuld.range Rims and 1101Sb and 51011?1% There also are .erne 100 intermediatcrange It-10 Pinlger loombets. and met ?100 medintwrange lx,rnl?ers. prtmarils II, 25 Beagles, in the tactical air force SW Sr is ict target % in the rat Fast are ss ithin range of the it 10, although the capahilits of this aircraft to penetrate is lei air defenses is marginal II,-2Ss can conduct offensise operation% against S4)% kl targets hi the immediate border area The Chinese Na%) does not hate a strategic strike canahilits. 20. We Wiese the Chinese. unlike the Sosiets. maintain their fighting units lii the border arca near full personnel strength, although the amount and qual. its of unit equipment vary. The I 7-million-man ground (lime opposite the timid Union and Slongolia would be augmented in wartime i mr,bilited c is ilian mu)Port organintions and paramilitars krces 21. DisnotItiott. The majority of opposing Chinese and Sos let forces are not close to each oticl. The Sosi- ets have deployed major ground force units near the border in psalm' to conduct major defensive or offen- cjs e operations on short notice. Much or this deplos- ment is ilk gated by the need to protect the Trans- Siberian Ilailroad and other main lines of eomremmi. cation and nearbv Sosiet population crniers uhich. particularly in the Ear East Military District and por- tions of the Tranchaikal Military District. are near the border. The Chinese, on the other hand, have located their major ground force units in a series of defensive areas well back (150 to :3(X) km) from the border in the first terrain suitable for defence, but well forward of Beijing and industrial centurs in soothern Shen) ang MP. China's major maneuver forces are located be- hind the defencise area; in position to react to enemy incursions The Balance 22 Snuiet Union. The balance along the border continues to (as or the USSR. Although &phis ed Chi- A-3 Top Secret new forces nninninher the !ins lets In' about four to one, the Sims let forces att. superior In weaponry rand Illobilits The Sas ids ground (owe IN1111111111111 Is 11114)re 11110:11'111. 1110 lune more tanks and antitank s) %IOUs. ?110erior artillers firepower and mobilits, and a 11111tiovoll. of tat Well !MASI% and tattical 1111( leaf N tap- iris Sims let forces are immethanited, whereas Chinese mu mitts are largely husk or loot rm?bile, Both offensis els and defensisely, Susie( aircraft are far sun( riot to (:hina's 23 The Soviets have no significant military steak' !messes that would impat t on their shott-term ability to cope ss ith any Chinese military threat. In the ease of a protracted war, however, they would have extended and es nosed lines of communication Into the Ear East The 641e-tracked Trans-Siberian Railroad, the main line of communication from European Russia, gen- erally parallels the border in the northeast and at some isoints is only a fest kilometers from China. The USSR Is constructing a northern branch, the "Ilaikal-Arnur- Maglsital" or "llANI" route. as Part of a long-range program to develop the economic potential of the So- stet Far East, and its completion in the mid-to-late 1950s still reduce the sidnerabilits of Soviet rail links to the border region 21 We believe surrentls deplosNI timid forces base the following capabilities. ? The Sosiets could stop any Chinese offensive, and are capable of incursions into China %sill, a good chance of initial success. Substantial re- inforcements v%ould be required, however, to permit overrunning northern China ? In the air. Sosiet fighters should be able to ex- ploit China's air defences and gain local air superiority.. The Sosiet Air rorce could, in conjunction with SAM defenses. beat back Chi- nese air attacks against Sosiet or Mongolian in- stallations and, musing secure Sosiet airbases tac- tical fighter-bombers could strike targets in China imp to 1.100 km lx,sond the border. Over time, in a conventional star, losses of Sosiet at- tack aircraft could be si?able. ? The Sosiet Pacific Fleet, ssith its numerical superiority. is essentially an oceangoing force targeted primarily against the United States It has limited amphibious assault capability The Soviet as would predominate at sea and could preclude an significant Chinece nasal actions. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Sotto! 25X1 25X1 t sing Yiisht atierript huffier!, perhaps inwormsentional, oper? could ciamilint nuclear strikes diraiint MIS !MCI at inns against the 'ft alms Siberian Balitthiti to dis. ill ( riipt Scis lel retopplv. *OW :Iiirt.r's strategic. nuclear forces, though tel-25X1 23 Chinn. chinese militats adsantages lie Ii, the sast evrranse i1 rwitherim China, much of the terrain (inciting the defender, a lame standing ground four hich it deplov ill, reads, and erpiipped to fight a consentirioal defense In depth, and a law supportise population In addition to regulat fortes. thi-re are in the border region about 2 3 million lightly amid, loosely organiied paramilitaty troops These military and paramilitary forces are bound together by a ss at- concept that stresses the creation of flexible forces capable of emmsetitional military operations aug- mented by guerrilla warfare 20 Perhaps China's greatest asset is an ability to absorb punishment and make the duration and cost of a loge-scale invasion prohilmitise for the Sosiets China's installations and lines of communication are ssell back from the border. 0110%04 the Chinese to choose and prepare the battlefields that most effec- tisely use the defender's advantage of interior lines of communication Mnst of China's tactical airfields are more than 300 km from the Smiet and Mongolian borders. and would get some early Naming of attack Furthermore. China's Imre inventory of aircraft and hardened storage facilities %souk! help the Air Force sins he for an extended period, es en faced with sus- tained vonsentional attacks Despite significant defi- ciencies hi China's air defenses. cumulative attrition of Sos let aircraft ormuld be costly in the event of a protracted conventional campaign 27. We believe Chinese forces have the following capabilities ? The Chinese have perhaps an even chan,r of stalemating a major Sot let conventional offen- sive (which would nrobably require approxi- mately SO di% isions) aimed at seiring Beijing and advancing into the North China Plain Even so. large portions of the Beijing and Shenyang MRs conkl he overrun and held by Soviet forces, but at great cost Chinese forces could also thss art a Sot imi amphibions attack ? The Chinese have only limited offensive ca- pabilities, but could conduct local munterof fen- sive operations within China They also could atisely small, present a creslihk. deterrent IfIl111? clear attack. The Sus lets could not be sure of destroying all of China's missile force without suffering retallattory attacks against Sums let urban/indirstrial and military cronpleves, pos. sibly escri Slostow. Current Militoty Options n In the event that the Sot let leadership decided that time protection of national interests requited mili- tary action against China, a number of options would be available, ranging from limited conventional raids and demonsitations to nuclear strikes and full-scale invasion Most options, hoss ever. vioult1 provoke a Chi- nese military response and tisk a prolonged including the use of nuclear vseamns. 29. Soviet options involsing just conventional forces range from a contrived incident or series of incidents on the border to full-scale offensives aimed at gaining and holding Chinese territory. Small-scale forays in re- sponse in Chinese incursions, or for the purpose of demonstrating Sot let displeasure and resolve, would entail only limited military tisk. Even a limited strike, however, would substantially raise the level of tension. A critical factor in Soviet decisionmaking would be the extent of the USSR's ability to control the level of military confrontation. Fot example, a limited So- iet convectional attack aimed at major objectives in the Shenyang MR could be launched by forces cur- rently in place, with some chance of success. It would risk a Chinese escalating response and prolongation of the conflict, 30. A large Soviet conventional attack aimed at selling Beijing and northeastern China, would requite sending substantial Soviet reinforcements to the Far East. The combination of Chinese manpower, pre- pared defenses, favorable terrain, and seasonal weather conditions, as well as the extension of the al- ready limited Soviet lines of communication in the Far East into China proper, probably would :cad to a stale- mated conflict?although the Sot lets could make ma- jor territorial gains 31. The Soviets almost certainly do not slew a demonstrative nuclear strike as a siable option, Ix- cause of the real risk of Chinese retaliation Similarlv. A-6 top Secret 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Top Sotto if Stol ki !Mt ll'Af %Ifikl* alined al tlestoqingt.loina's in kat fri411.11of (I of prooloalols Nolild not %IR.. 32 Soso t nuclear atiac k a itallOt (:11111('W f?f 'Avg lc fun v follossed los a grolotiol Aim supported los tat tit al wooled,. sseapons ith the purpose of fx.of.? troiuItn defy 11114. ( .1.1tia occupsing lame areas. would require a massise commitment of S00% let gen- eral purpose foorces. and ssould risk nuclear tetaliation In the esent of a pro itthcted ss ar ut lorass losses. the sos jets folglif be in the tmeot ton of has tog to shift fotces from the vkesteth Cssli 31 1he chines', set k to asIdil a direct militars coti- frofilation N ill) the Sos let Union and base attempted to cider a Sos lel attack on China los making it appear too costls In the es cot of a Sosiet attack. Beijing's aim ssonold loe to confine the conflict to the cons en- tional les ci %%here the 1 hinece (eel the can make matimum use of ads antages in mantwaser, terrain. in- terlot lines of commomication, ancl clefensise tom- Plows to prolong the conflict to Seis let diads antage 11 The 11..1 is not equipped. structured. or :ode- guilds sliglIWO(11 If, conduct major offerocise ?pet. Minns ac toss the Sosiet border Ans limited Chinese offensise efforts in the border area, such as a (:laitece- contrised l000rder raid. limited poiroitise attack. or at- tempt too interdict Sosiet lines of comnsoinicolion, drass immediate and oserposserong So% iet reaction 15 Chinese forces cannot combat effectise oper- ations against a modern force in a nuclear mar. and the Chinese are unlikels to initiate the me of modem- NVAI101{% A tim lit 0.1,411141V Mkt k mould lease ( .1110,1 (Cs% 1,1410111 IM.101111 fUlillial1111 'Mike%IIII ltlIltiof11,of areas and soft rnilitats targets 'floe Chinese proloalols loopy !loot their estensise dispercal and other ',assist, defense measures mill help them dole out a strategic nuclear Alla( k. Newish's( enough force to obit,' of es C11111.111V defeat a frolloss?on insatioo Outlook 1(i In sly% of goosing Sinott'S Japanese telation- ships, and the possibilits of rettessed toluhik I Imittoeto China and Vietnam. the Soo lett base Ilk feaWd their (concern lot iinprosing militats capabilities in the Far Fast From the S41% let % less point, the potential for toas- t.g to fight a simultaneous No-front ss it) China Is' the East and %nil NATO in the West- -has prob. ahls increased Therefore, sse espect to see a (contin- ued military buildup and qualitatise imptosement in borces opposite China These deselopments ill pto- skle Moscow milli brimmed clefensise capabilities against not only Chinese forces Init also IS fotces in Asia in the es cot of large-scale conflict ssith the %Vest Additionally, it ss iii pros ide the CS11 ith increased capability for offensive militaty operations against China 37. The Chinese are %s ell as'. are of their military shortcomings and ha-. e. particularly since I976, es- pressed itx teasing concern oset the need to upgrade the PI.A. Beijing has accessed the So'. let Union as a long-term threat to China, and recent Sos let force im- pros emeriti ptobahly has e I ntreaq-ti Belling's (concern For these reasons, see espect the forces artased against the Sosiet threat to continue recrising a high ptiority in the allocation of irnprosements. In the near term, hosseser, it is unlikely that China, because of its re- source constraints, can significantly affect the balance bets seen t:hinese and So'. jet forces A-7 Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 DISSEMINAtION NOtICE 1. this document wot disseminated by the Notional I Align Assessment Center. this copy It for the Information ond use of the recipient ond of persons under hi, or her jurisdiction on a need?Ici-know basis. Additional essential disserninotiort may be outhorited by the lot, lowing ot;icials within their retpective depor Intents: a. Director of Intelligence and fleseorch, for the Deportment of Stole b Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Of Ike of the Secretory of Defense ond the orgonitation of the Joint Chiefs of Stoff c. 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At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IACD-69/2, 22 June 1933. 4. the title of this document when used separately from the fest is unclassified. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0 25X1