BRIEFING OF CIA SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE - 4 AUGUST 1964 - 9:00 A.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000400160001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 18, 1964
• Content Type: MFR

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18 August 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Briefing of CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services
Committee - 4 August 1964 - 9:00 a. m.
1. The Director met with the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed
Services on 4 August 1964 at 9:00 a. m. Mr. Vinson was in the chair.
Also present for the Subcommittee were:
L. Mendel Rivers
F. Edward Hebert
Melvin Price
Charles E. Bennett
George Huddleston, Jr.
Leslie C. Arends
William G. Bray
Frank C. Osmers
John R. Blandford, Counsel
Also present for the Agency were:
Ray Cline
Arthur C. Lundahl
John S. Warner
There was a security check of the room before the hearing and no
transcript was taken.
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2. The Director discussed the OXCART program pointing out
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3. The Director then discussed the overflight program over
Communist China using U-2s. He stated that for two to three years we
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I I He further indicated that they are not generally vulnerable
to MIG-21s although possibly, with a lucky shot on a zoom, they might be
vulnerable. There was a query from Mr. Bray about MIG-21s in
Communist China and the Director indicated that we had recently identified
about nine which possibly had been brought from North Korea. The question
was raised as to whether or not the usefulness of the U-2 was at an end and
whether or not satellites could fill the bill. The Director stated that we
achieved better resolution through the U-2s and they are relatively easier
to handle in terms of targeting.
4. The Director pointed out that looking at all of the activities in
the area of Soviet military developmental work, the picture that emerges
is one of a broad, balanced dynamic program moving forward steadily in
several fields at the same time. He listed these fields:
New ICBMs are being tested.
New systems are under construction at the Tyuratam
test center.
A new ICBM deployment concept is beginning.
New facilities are being constructed at nuclear
materials production plants.
New electronics installations--possibly related to an
anti-satellite mission-- are being built.
New defensive missile installations are under
construction.
The Director then stated that it is evident that the Soviets are continuing
to invest heavily in the qualitative improvement of both their long-range
strike capability against the U. S. and in their strategic defenses. The
Director pointed out that there was a contradiction between the Soviet
actions and military posture, and their soft-talking and apparent peaceful
actions in the UN and otherwise. The Director stated we should not be
lulled by the apparent attitude of the Soviets when we look at their actions.
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5. The Director read from his briefing papers as follows:
"Over the past several months we have been getting increasing
evidence that a new generation of Soviet ICBMs is being developed.
A. You will recall that the last time I briefed you
we had determined that the Soviets were testing two new
missiles, which we now call the SS-9 and the SS-10.
B. Three Soviet missile range instrumentation ships
are now in the Pacific to monitor long range firings of ICBMs.
They are generally in position south of Johnston Island, and
Moscow has issued a warning to avoid two impact areas there
from today until the end of the year.
1. One of the impact areas is farther from
Tyuratam than any previously used--7, 000 nautical
miles.
2. We expect the Soviets to test the SS-9, and
possibly the more untried SS-10 over these extended
ranges. They might also try extended range firings
of their established ICBMs from operational sites.
C. We have recently identified six single, dispersed
silos under construction at Tyuratam. One of these silos is shown
on the board you see now. It is obvious that the Soviets are
vigorously pushing this mode of deployment.
D. At present, the 18 established ICBM complexes have
their launchers deployed in clusters of two or three, which make
it possible for several to be destroyed by a single nuclear blast.
The Soviets may be curtailing this mode of deployment. (See Map
of Soviet ICBM complexes. )
1. We recently have had to reduce our count
of the number of Soviet ICBM launchers. We formerly
listed 238 operational or under construction, but currently
are down to 230.
2. Several SS-7 and SS-8 sites begun last year appear
to have been abandoned; at the least, construction has been
halted for some time.
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3. Of the above, we estimate that 190 are
operational.
E. We now have discovered what we believe to be a new
ICBM complex under construction in an area 80 miles south of
Semipalatinsk- -the first new complex in about two years. (Show
board of Zhangiz Tobe)
1. In the new complex the silos under construction
are dispersed in a single silo pattern, similar to those
under development at Tyuratam. The SS-9 or another
new missile probably will be deployed at this site.
2. The silo is bigger in diameter than others we
have seen, which could mean that it is designed to launch
the missile without first raising it to the surface.
3. If this pattern is extended to other parts of the
Soviet Union, it will, of course, greatly increase the
number of aiming points for the U. S. strike force.
III. The USSR also is expanding production of materials needed
to manufacture nuclear weapons.
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The Director added that in two or three years the Soviet's capability
of production of materials needed to manufacture nuclear weapons will
be substantially increased. The Director stated that it was not a matter
about which we should be excited but we should be alert.
6. The Director stated we are becoming concerned with the
possibility that the Soviets are moving to develop an anti-satellite capability.
They are aware of our satellite reconnaissance program, and from their
own experience with satellite reconnaissance vehicles they probably have
gleaned some idea of how successful we have been. We would expect them
to be developing ways of denying us this type of information. Recently we
have seen the beginnings of construction of large, expensive electronics
installations, both deep in the USSR and on its periphery. These installations
appear to be phased array radars and may have satellite tracking functions.
One of them, located at Olenegorsk, may also be a ballistic missile early
warning radar. The fact that one of the installations is located at the
Sary Shagan anti-missile test center suggests that the Soviets may intend
to use them as ABM acquisitions radars as well.
7. The Director added that as in the period just before Powers was
shot down, the Soviets were quiet until they developed the capability of
shooting down the U-2, and now they are being quiet and may be developing
a capability to intercept our satellite reconnaissance vehicle. If the
Soviets were successful in achieving this capability, this would create a
serious problem for intelligence. The Director indicated that there is
one group which believes nuclear weapons would be needed to knock out
a satellite, but others believe that the Soviet guidance systems may be
good enough to enable them to achieve a knockdown with high explosives
or pellets.
8. The Director pointed out that there were two potential escapes
for the Soviets in connection with the nuclear test ban treaty. They might
well regard either the explosion of a nuclear device by the Chinese
Communists, or the French explosions of a thermonuclear weapon, as 25X1
an excuse to renounce the treaty and resume testing.
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10. The Director then returned to his briefing paper reading as
follows:
'V. As for Soviet defense, two defensive missile
installations are under construction in the general Leningrad-
Moscow area. They appear to be designed for long range,
surface-to-air intercept of aircraft and standoff weapons like
our HOUND DOG air-to-surface missile.
A. We have evidence suggesting that one of the
three sites making up the probable ABM complex at
Leningrad will have one of these new SAM complexes.
1. However, we believe that, temporarily
at least, the Soviets are abandoning their efforts
to install an ABM system around Leningrad. Even
if ABM construction were to resume now, it is
unlikely that a system could become operational
before 1966.
B. Work on the suspect ABM system around
Moscow continues. The large inverted V-shaped
radar being built south of the city could be part of
the Moscow system.''
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u VI. The Soviet Navy lately seems to be more willing
to see the sea than it has in the past. There have been a number
of long-range nuclear submarine patrols by Pacific and Northern
Fleet units.
A. In addition, ships and submarines from all
three Western fleets--Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea--
have been conducting exercises in the Mediterranean
since mid-June.
B. The Soviets now have an initial operational
capability for a submerged launch ballistic missile, with at
least two such submarines in commission. In contrast to
our POLARIS system, each submarine apparently has only
three tubes, and the range of the missile is much shorter--
about 700 nautical miles.
C. The Soviet submarine fleet appears to be putting its
present emphasis on both nuclear and conventional submarines
armed with cruise missiles.
1. There are now about 30 of these boats in
commission, capable of launching missiles from the
surface to a range of about 450 miles. They could be
used to engage either surface fleets or shore targets.
2. The cruise-missile boats are getting bigger
and bigger. A class with six launchers has been
succeeded by types with eight launchers. Just
recently, we photographed a submarine at Severomorsk
which appears to be big enough and long enough to be a
nuclear submarine with 10 cruise-missile tubes.
D. All construction appears to have stopped on
submarines which fire ballistic missiles from the surface.
E. The Soviets now have over 30 nuclear submarines
with various types in service. They have overcome some
of the bugs that plagued the nuclear subs at the outset, but
it still appears that a surface tender accompanies each
nuclear boat on out-of-area cruises.
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11. In connection with Soviet ground forces, the Director
stated that there is growing evidence that the Soviet forces in East
Germany are being reorganized and that some withdrawals may be
taking place. The number of divisions may be reduced from 23 to 21.
He stated that we could expect Khrushchev to seek diplomatic and
propaganda mileage from these actions.
12. The Director returned to the briefing paper as follows:
"VIII. I mentioned in June that the outer space
probe the Soviets launched on April 2--which they called
ZOND I--probably was intended as a Venus mission and
should arrive there about July 20.
A. The Soviets never did call it a Venus
mission, although they claimed to have made two
mid-course corrections putting the probe on a
proper course.
B. The target date has passed in silence--
and apparently the probe did too. As far as we can tell,
communications failed again, denying the Soviets any
information on Venus which they could have used as a
propaganda triumph. "
13. The Director then briefed on Cuba from the briefing paper
as follows:
"In Cuba, the last major withdrawal of Soviet military
personnel appears to have been completed. Since the 1962
missile crisis, some 20, 000 Soviet servicemen have been
pulled out in four major withdrawal periods, with about 5, 000
personnel leaving the island during each period. The most
recent period extended from the beginning of May through the
end of July, during which time more than 5, 000 Russians sailed
from Cuba on 14 Soviet passenger ships."
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14. It now appears that there are only about 2, 000 Soviet
military technicians and advisors left in what has become essentially
a Soviet military aid and advisory group on the island. All Soviet
communications facilities in Cuba have been de-activated or turned
over to the Cubans except for one naval link which will probably
terminate operations soon. No Soviet operational or combat units
are known to remain on the island.
15. Thus, the Cubans most certainly have full control over the
operation of all Soviet weapons left behind, including the surface-to-air
missiles. The Soviets have removed all their sensitive radar and
communications gear, and as far as we can tell, they now give only
advice to the Cuban armed forces, backed up by their political and
economic leverage. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that
the Soviets have retained some sort of physical restraint over the actual
firing of the SA-2 missiles in Cuba.
16. The Director added that we have no evidence that the Soviets
have retained physical control over the firing of SA-2 missiles but on
the basis of judgment believe that they probably have in order to avoid
the confrontation resulting from a shoot down of a U-2.
17. The Director returned to the briefing paper as follows:
"Both the Soviets and Cubans have indicated, however,
that they do not intend to get into a wrangle over the U-2 issue
until after the U. S. elections, at which time Castro has said
he will take the issue to the UN General Assembly. Castro also
took the occasion of his 26 July speech to play down the U-2
issue somewhat. He said that "for the sake of peace" he would
be patient with the U-2 planes for the time being. There is always
the possibility of an unauthorized shoot down or an impulsive
decision by Castro in reaction to an exile raid or minor clash
with the U. S. In any case, Castro probably has little confidence
that the Soviets would provide any real assistance if the U. S.
forcibly reacted to a U-2 shoot down. it
18. Castro's defiant reaction to the OAS sanctions against his
regime indicates no let up of Cuban subversion in Latin America. It
belies a report we had from Venezuela early in July that Cuba, possibly
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at Soviet urging, was restricting its support for revolutionaries.
Castro in his 26 July speech asserted Cuba's right to support
revolutionaries in any country which opposes his regime. He
specifically sent his encouragement to the "courageous" rebels and
guerrillas of Venezuela and Guatemala. The speech suggested that
only those countries which shun the effort to isolate Cuba can count
on immunity from Cuban subversion. He praised Mexico in particular
for voting against the OAS sanctions, and offered to conclude a mutual
non-intervention treaty. He added that Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia--
which also opposed the sanctions--could join in.
19. The Director stated that the Cuban subversive effort in Latin
America generally is not as extensive as it had been and is not too
serious at this time. He pointed out that Latin American countries
generally have taken a firmer stand than in the past. Mr. Arends
inquired whether this was a desire to work with the U. S. or was it a
realization of the dangers. The Director stated he did not believe it was
solely their desire to please the Americans, but that they have come to
realize that the governments of all their own countries may be at stake.
Mr. Osmers inquired whether there was any evidence of a -split within
the regime. The Director said that we could not identify any such possible
split but that it may develop as economic conditions deteriorate. It was
pointed out that we have been working in the hope of developing such a split
but there is no such evidence at this time.
20. The Director indicated that we continue to receive reports
on missiles in Cuba and that every effort is being made to verify this.
However, we have not been able to obtain any evidence on this subject
and the Director commented it is difficult to prove the negative. Mr.
Arends inquired whether we were getting better information. The Director
indicated that he thought we were getting better information but some of our
nets have been rolled up and we have established new ones. He indicated
that information i1Z5X1
Cuba is quite good. Mr. Vinson inquired whether the newspaper reports
concerning the execution of CIA agents are accurate. The Director indicated
in many cases the individuals involved were not connected with the Agency
The Director again
touched on the question of whether Castro is secure, indicating that
generally he has things under tight control with the military and the
security forces, and despite the economic decline and the consequent
hardship, Cuba is a fertile land and there probably will not be starvation.
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21. The Director touched briefly on the forthcoming Chilean
election of 4 September. It was pointed out that there is a well organized
Communist effort to support Allende. The Communists are being supplied
with considerable money and are making strenuous efforts.
I IAt this point the polls would indicate that Frei is in a comfortable
position but the Director stated he could not make any prediction on the
outcome.
22. Mr. Cline briefed on the Southeast Asia situation, stating
that the pace of the fighting has been greatly intensified in South Vietnam.
In July the Viet Cong made 12 major attacks using at least one battalion.
It was pointed out their battalions run about 400 men. He stated there
were more major attacks in July alone than there were in the first five
months of 1964 or in the first nine months of 1963. Mr. Cline pointed
out that these attacks were in addition to the continued high rate of
terrorism, sabotage, and harrassment. On the question of ammunition
and supplies, Mr. Cline indicated there was some surprise at the
continued intensity of the Viet Cong effort, since normally there would
have to be a lull for replenishing supplies. In terms of casualties it was
stated that these efforts are costly to the South Vietnamese forces.
Though the South Vietnamese have sustained more casualties, the Viet
Cong have suffered more fatalities. Mr. Cline gave figures on casualities
covering the three weeks of July from the date General Taylor arrived.
He indicated there were a total of 2304 incidents. South Vietnamese
forces killed were a total of 689 and Viet Cong 1310. On an over-all
basis, including killed, captured, wounded or missing, the total casualties
were: South Vietnam, 2650, and Viet Cong, 1500. It was pointed out that
there is evidence that individual North Vietnamese soldiers are present
with the Viet Cong forces. This suggests that Hanoi may have used up
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the pool of able-bodied southerners who withdrew to the north with
the Viet Minh at the time of partition. Mr. Cline pointed out that
MACV after an intensified effort has recently increased its estimate
of Viet Cong hard-core regular strength from 25, 000 to a range of
28, 000 to 34, 000. It was stated that this did not represent a sudden
reinforcement.
23. Mr. McCone commented on the covert operations in North Vietnam
which had been previously conducted by CIA but which were turned over to
MACV. He indicated that there had been many disappointments with these
operations with a number of teams rolled up and that the sabotage efforts
have not been too significant. The Director pointed out that he was not
offering this in criticism but only that it is disturbing. It would indicate
that the people in North Vietnam are not receptive or in the mood to assist
South Vietnamese teams infiltrated into the area. Mr. Cline indicated
that we have no firm evidence of negotiations by any of the major leaders
in South Vietnam with the North Vietnamese although there is some evidence
of minor officials conducting talks. Mr. Cline indicated that the political
honeymoon General Khanh may have enjoyed is long since ended. There
is rough weather ahead with bickering among the leaders and increasing
rumors of coup plotting although there is not firm enough evidence to cause
alarm at this time, still they cannot be dismissed.
24. Mr. Cline agreed with Arends' statement that this means that
we should not be surprised if we read about a coup in the newspapers
tomorrow. Mr. Cline touched on the difficulties between Khanh and
General "Big" Minh. It was indicated, however, that Khanh still seems
to be in control.
25. Mr. McCone touched on some of the considerations involved
in the Laos situation. It was indicated there was some effort to establish
preconditions to any negotiations based on the Geneva accords. These
would include Communist withdrawal and a cease fire. Also, the parties
in Laos should meet with the members of the ICC to go into these matters
prior to any conference of the Geneva participants. The Director indicated
the Soviets would certainly like to retain influence in Southeast Asia and
are not desirous of turning over their influence to the Chinese Communists.
Further, as co-chairman of the ICC they do have a responsibility to see
that the accords are respected.
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26. Mr. Arends queried the Soviet financial obligations to the
UN. The Director indicated that, of course, they have the obligation
but take the position that they do not agree with the UN operations in the
Congo and insist that this was a matter which should have been handled
in the Security Council and not the General Assembly.
27. Mr. Vinson inquired as to the Communist influence in the
Harlem riots and the Director replied that this was not of official
concern to the Agency but rather to the FBI.
28. As to the fighting in Laos, Mr. Cline briefed the Subcommittee
generally in accord with the briefing paper.
29. Mr. Cline briefed on the attack on the MADDOX pointing out
that this was a routine patrol in international waters engaged in ELINT
activities. It was pointed out that the torpedo boat attack on the MADDOX
on 2 August was apparently planned and ordered by land-based authorities
in North Vietnam. At least one of the three torpedo boats was severely
damaged and may have been sunk and the others were probably damaged.
It was pointed out that the DRV authorities may have believed the MADDOX
was involved in the harrassing raid conducted by South Vietnam craft
against the North Vietnam coast on the night of 30 July. Mr. Cline pointed
out that in fact the MADDOX was not so involved. It was pointed out that
the MADDOX was 29 miles out from the coast at the time of the attack.
There appeared to be a clear concensus of the members of the Subcommittee
that the rules of engagement were too strict for U. S. forces in the area.
30. Mr. Cline turned to Cyprus. He stated that this remains
a dangerous and delicate situation and that while there are numerous
proposals the situation seems to have reached an impasse. Mr. Cline
discussed the various partition lines which have been discussed with
the Turks. He stated that Makarios is not agreeable to any of these
proposals and apparently is playing his own game in harrassing the UN
on the island. It was indicated there are Communist elements which are
influencing Makarios in his actions. He stated that the four-way talks
continue which involve the Greeks, Turks, British, and U. S. In the
meantime, the Turks continue their military exercise. Mr. Cline concluded
that we sho]do beease DU sWj
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31. Mr. Cline briefed very quickly on the Congo situation
indicating it is beginning to fall apart. Using maps, he illustrated
rebel control of territories and their move toward Stanleyville. He
mentioned the evacuation from Stanleyville of the U. S. Consul and
described the rebels as being various tribal groups who generally oppose
any central authority. However, the rebels have been infiltrated by
Communists from Brazzaville and Burundi under influence of the
Communist Chinese. Mr. Cline pointed out that Tshombe is attempting
to pull together some military forces and is now in the process of
re-activating his Katanga gendarmes. Mr. Cline pointed out that in
fact there is very little real fighting and that when the rebels move into
an area the Congolese army simply moves out and refuses to fight.
32. The meeting adjourned at 11:00 a. m.
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JOHN,. WARNER
egis ative Counsel
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