SOUTH VIETMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000400160008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 1, 1964
• Content Type: BRIEF

CLI
Approved Fri- QRSd-MMA'12-&4A'F
DRAFT DCI BRIEFING FOR
VINSON SUBCOMMITTEE
battalion--more major attacks in July alone than
there were in the first five months this year,
Cong made twelve`s attacks using at least one
or in the first nine months of 1963. The twelve
y one or more companies of Viet Cong regulars,
epresent the most aggressive level of Viet
battalion attacks, combined with eight attacks
Pong military activity to date. The high rate
f terrorism, sabotage,and harassment was main-
tained at the same time.
. In part, this stepped-up fighting may be
intended to welcome General Taylor, and to
point up the fact that ten years after the
Geneva Accords ended the war against France
in July 1954, Vietnam is still partitioned.
1. In addition, the step-up reflects the
onset of the summer monsoon season, when
the rains hamper guerrilla movement less
than they slow down government reaction.
Approved FgrrbY
"se6/A~ *ihQi~ 00160008-7
(Map, South Vietnam)
1 August 1964
~~. In South Vietnam, the pace of the fighting has
been greatl died.. During July, the Viet
25X1
 Approved For Re[eQA0b7 &CREaP 2R00025R000400 60008-7
2. To some extent, however, the Viet Long
activity suggests that some of the im-
proved government operations are begin-
ning to hurt--particularly those in the
vicinity of Viet Cong base areas or in-
filtration routes. Several of the larger
Viet Conk; attacks in July have been
directed at Ranger and Special Forces
units which have been used in such
operations.
South Vietnamese commanders in the northernmost,
provinces claim that there now are regular Worth
Vietnamese military units south of the demarca-
tion line. Hanoi has the capability to move units
in and out of South Vietnam, as it does in Laos,
but we have no supporting evidence and are not
inclined to accept the presence in South Vietnam
of units directly subordinate to the North Viet-
namese army,
A. At least two prisoners captured this month,
however, are native northerners. One cia:iw,3
that his entire unit of about 100 men, part
of a regular North Vietnamese division, was
in_P xltra ted piecemeal into South Vintnca:
25X1
R r1
Approved For RPfj0W ftq
08-7 25X1
 Approved I ir4 Vas$AA IRTOT 400160008-7
and split up in groups of 10 or 12 men, possibly
tined for regular Viet Cong units.
This suggests to us that Hanoi may have
used up the pool of able-bodied southerners
who withdrew to the north with the Viet
Minh at the time of partition, and that
Hanoi now is prepared, whatever the inter-
national complications, to stiffen the Viet
Cong with PAVN regulars who have never been
in South Vietnam.
B. MACV has recently increased its estimate of
Viet Cong hard core regular strength from
25,000 to a range of 28,000 to 54,000. This
does not represent a sudden reinforcement, but
the acceptance of new formations which have
been identified over the past five or six
months. MACV does estimate that Viet Cong
strength in the four northern provinces has
increased by about 13 percent.
1. We are prepared to believe that there
may be more VC battalions than our OB
has been carrying--rather than regular
PAVN units--in the provinces nearest the
demarcation line.
C. Another rather ominous note is the increasing
25X1
Approved FrOleas(O~f14 JE 12Ti&
00400160008-7 25X1
7
 Approved For R e4e 200S4 G 2R00025R00040016 008-7
capability and readiness of the Viet Cong
regulars to stand and fight against South
Vietnamese regulars. This spring one such
running action went on for five days. The
Viet Cong still set the pace of the fighting,
and hold the initiative.
III. Government operations have been stepped up, and
in many cases are better planned and better exe-
cuted than they were six months ago.
A. There are now 20 to 25 major operations--
involving a battalion or more--in progress
on any given day, and small-unit actions
have run as high as 2,000 a day.
1. The trouble is that most of these opera-
tions do not make contact with the
enemy, and some that do are ambushed on
the enemy is initiative, The South Viet-
namese just cannot be persuaded to put
out adequate patrols when they move.
2. Also, too many of the larger operations
are one-shot search-and-clear operations,
which do not contribute to lasting paci-
fication. There are only 11 clear-and-
hold operations in progress,
25X1
Approved For Taff o 1 Rr
q q 008-7 25X1
 Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RD 008-7
TOP SECRET
B. The desertion rate among government troops
has dropped off from the painful peak it
reached earlier this year, but the other
statistics on casualties and weapons losses
remain generally unfavorable to the govern-
ment side and we still list 14 provinces
as critical.
C. New machinery has just been set up, both
in the South Vietnamese government and in
the US Embassy, for a coordinated concentra-
tion on the task of pacification in the
most critical provinces right around Saigon.
The necessary committees and task forces
began to come into being just before Ambas-
sador Lodge's return, and it is still too
early to predict their effectiveness, but
the country team and the Vietnamese both have
high hopes.
JIV. In the political arena, whatever honeymoon General
Khanh may have enjoyed when he first took over has
long since ended. We have been getting increasing
rumors of coup plotting and--during the past two weeks--
reports that some major governmental reorganization
is impending.
A. None of the coup rumors has been firm enough
25X1
np 21NM U!-fr* 25X1
Approved For a ease D 0160008-7
 r 30QB1Qy1r 00400160008-7 25X1
25X1 Approved-F 01a0 L3.r_JUAMI
or detailed enough yet to cause a state of
alarm, but we cannot dismiss them lightly.
One more coup--or the removal of Khanh by
other means such as assassination--might
well be the end of any effective South Viet-
namese resistance to the Communists.
The latest reporting suggests that Khanh has
been undergoing a "crisis of confidence"
stemming from internal opposition and frus-
tration over the lack of progress, and that
one or another of the factions among his
military colleagues may force him to make
changes or to relinquish command without the
disruptive effects of a coup.
1. According to these reports, Khanh would
be succeeded either by his predecessor,
General "Big? M or by Defense Minister
Khiem, who has been one of the mainstays
of the Khanh regime. Khiem has figured
in many of the reports of alleged coup
plotting.
2. For the moment, however, Khanh still seems
-- - ------------
to be in control.
C. The open differences between Khanh and US
representatives over the "march to the north"
theme has an obvious role in the present
confusion.
rr~~++//~~~ ~~rr -6_
ApprovedTa ease "1E CIA
RDP82R00025R
25X1
 Approved For F1P0(/GRi4rXPi
1. On the one hand the show of disagreement
probably encourages his opponents to be-
lieve that the time is favorable for a
move against Khanh.
2.
his talk about carrying the war to North
Vietnam is designed to rally public sup-
port. He implies that the South Vietnamese
people will lose heart if some action is
not taken soon promising an eventual end
to the fighting, either by expanding the
war to the north or by negotiation.
D. Khanh may hope--perhaps by unilateral South
Vietnamese action--to force the US to commit
its power more fully in Southeast Asia by
involvement in attacks on North Vietnam and
possibly even Communist China.
1. We have some reports, however, suggesting
that Khanh's purpose is to give the South
Vietnamese--once we have rejected any ex-
pansion of the fighting--the justification
to reach a negotiated settlement with the
Communists--a settlement which would neces-
sarily involve US withdrawal from Southeast
Asia.
25X1
Approved For R sg,2,p0OW1 fil ff8rR00025R000400160p08-7
25X1
 Approved For Re4eQ4008 g-! [~ 8B
V. The outlook in Southeast Asia is for continued
and intensified Viet Cong military pressure in
South Vietnam, and continued attempts in Laos
to expand the Communist position there by any
means short of those calculated to risk outside
intervention in force. Meanwhile the Communists
and a fairly potent array of non-Communist ele-
ments like the French will push major diplomatic
and propaganda efforts, urging the neutralization
of the entire area.
A. The Communists are hard at work portraying
the withdrawal of the United States from
Southeast Asia as inevitable, in the hope
that first our allies and then the United
States itself will despair of either a nego-
tiated or a military solution.
U. One of the main Peiping themes is that the
US is only feigning determination for politi-
cal purposes during the election campaign,
and that after November the paper tiger will
give up and go home.
1. (Incidentally, the Communists used the
same line in Latin America about our at-
titude toward Castro, in hopes of dis-
couraging firm OAS action against Cuba.)
25X1
Approved For ReMp060tH AZ,RTB 0008-7 25X1
 Approved For R e KWOO"B-! "Ow R00025R0004001 0008-7
C. This makes us wonder whether the Chinese Com-
munists and the North Vietnamese believe the
signals we have been sending them for more
than two months, trying to tell them in a
variety of ways that Laos and South Vietnam
are of vital concern to us and that the con-
tinuing heavy Communist pressure in Southeast
Asia is bringing about an intolerably critical
situation,
D. The Communists certainly have received the
messages, as they have acknowledged them with
propaganda blasts. They probably believe,
however, that our hard line is in large part
a political maneuver. It will probably be
difficult to change their assessment before
Election Day.
E. Peiping and Hanoi may also calculate that
only some spectacular Communist success would
evoke the threatened major US response, and
that they need not worry about continuing the
conflict at present levels.
F. At the same time, they have begun sending
signals back to us that they too regard the
Laotian and Vietnamese situations as vital,
25X1
Approved For OO ,ifti2vy -T 60008-7 25X1
 Approved For ReTeG200&4% C"a;8 R00025R00040016 008-7
implying that the only safe way out of a
volatile situation is to nogotia e on Cora-
munist terms
Peipin and :tanoi apparently have made propara-
tiono to provide aircraft ~,omaf~a~. ~..~.for North Viet-
na.ca if the military s: c.uation warrants,,
A. The Co mrun .st 'Leaders met in 'China last mo
t
Probably to ddiscuss the situation in Sou tae:
tot
Asia and tie defense of North Vietnam a ain>st
possible ,1ttac%.*
k.. Hanoi is highly vulnerable to air attack. .
It has no combat aircraft, and only
light and medium anti-airc a.Lt artille.wy,
' 3 ; ed up by :a modest e ' y warning radT-ir
v ~
r+
r.i .+.aa ..~. t Augur 'h`nase jet :Mg-Alters
011,G-1 s) Were gloved to Mengt.'.?u A; :i .~::9.cid
s
about, 40 rail is ......'t~1m?m ti: e Tietna.mes
C` er0 '~'r.:. nor:ce can augmented
quick.y .
Since aimidg-Jtm'y an unusual number oz .trti.its
3 Via' ail a;;::, have been noted betwee
and AlengtEzu and the Chines e jets based
at Men;tvu :i ecei tl.y appear to have mim:?de
25X1
Approved Forp2 I/'Ir$~C-sFtD 60008-7 25X1
penetrations of .i,io?.rt:h
 Approved For WaP20059GR R 82R00025R00040 160008-7
Vietnamese airspace during practice
flights
B. Hanoi's newly constructed airfield at Phuc
Yen has recently become operational.
1. Aerial photography of 12 July revealed
10 transport aircraft there. Construc-
tion is continuing on auxiliary facilities.
2. Phuc Yen and at least 3 other fields in
North Vietnam are capable of handling jet
aircraft up to medium bombers.
who recently re-
turned from training in the Soviet Union in-
dicate that more than 500 North Vietnamese
have been undergoing aviation training at
various bases there.
1. Approximately 200 to 300 of these students
are said to be pilot trainees. Some of
them have trained in jet light bombers and
fighters.
2. There are tenuous indications that Hanoi
may have called home some of its pilot
trainees early in July.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Rei"IVOC~flV "T 2R00025R000400 60008-7 25X1
k.y_LLJ t~ i
 Approved For Rc4e 20M% 1C 9P8 R00025R000400 60008-7
. Although the MIG-21 is substantially superior
to other fighters in the Chinese Air Force,
the handful we have seen so far will not appre-
ciably increase China's air defense capability.
China now has an estimated 1,900 jet fighters.
These are mainly MIG-15s and MIG-17s, but
there are about 75 MIG-19s.
C. Communist China is not believed capable at
present of producing the supersonic MIG-21.
D. The state of Sino-Soviet relations since 1961
makes it doubtful that the planes were supplied
by the Soviet Union alter that time.
1. It is possible that the Soviet Union began
supplying these aircraft before military
cooperation was suspended, and that it took
the Chinese until mid-1963 to put them into
operational use.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For r0( / y2r l # P ZKUUUZOKUUU4UJ1 25X1
 Approved For RXUP00S4H C"A 0008-7
2. The Soviets have supplied MIG-21s to
most of the Eastern European countries
as well as to Cuba, India, Indonesia,
Egypt, Iraq, and North Korea.
25X1
The Unsuccessful torpedo boat attack on the USS
Maddox on 2 August was apparently planned and
25X1
ordered by land-based authorities in North Viet-
- 17
1. At least one of the three torpedo boats
was severely damaged and may have been
sunk. The others were probably hit by
fire from the Maddox or from supporting
US aircraft.
B. North Vietnamese naval entities have dis-
played increasing sensitivity to US and
South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf
of-Tonkin during the past few months.
1. The DRV authorites may have believed
that the Maddox was involved in the
harassing raid conducted by South Viet-,
namese craft against the North Viet-
namese coast on the night of 30 July.
-13-
Approved For F 00 1 JE!d 7 60008-7 25X1
 Approved For RXD.006S&C"CT8 00025R00040 160008-7
C. In the light of North Vietnamese sensitivity
to naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin,
it is thought likely that orders have been
issued to DRV military authorities to take
such action as they see fit against intrud-
ing craft. Further attacks on US units
operating in the area are thus possible.
1. The Communist bloc may attempt to use
the Maddox incident to stir interna-
tional apprehension over possible con-
sequences of US and South Vietnamese
military activity directed against North
Vietnam.
DMD
Approved For Rxi p20Q6/ / I tT
10008-7
25X1
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000400160008-7
Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000400160008-7