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June 16, 1965
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Approved For ReeSWA/j 25X1 25X1 CIA SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY I. VIETNAM II, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC III. SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY (TKH) IV. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT V. EUROPE VI. CYPRUS VII. THE MIDDLE EAST VIII. BOLIVIA IX. VENEZUELA PERU XI. ARGENTINA Pa-es Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 VIETNAM I. In North Vietnam, we are beginning to see some of the dimensions of the Soviet assistance program. A. We have found three surface-to-air missile sites so far, all of them generally about 15 miles or so from Hanoi to the south. At least two of them are still under construction. Only one of the sites has any equipment in evidence, and our reconnaissance has detected no missiles yet. 1. A Soviet diplomat recently said that there are also sites around the port city of Haiphong. We have no evidence to substan- tiate this remark, but weather has pre- vented good photography of the Haiphong area for about a month. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 B. The latest photography shows eight IL-28 BEAGLE light jet bombers in North Vietnam, all if them flown in across China from the Soviet Union. There are also 63 MIG-15 or MIG-17 jet fighters, and a few more being assembled. The first 44 of these were flown in from China; the rest have apparently been shipped in crates from the Soviet Union. 1. Another Soviet diplomat has hinted that some of the jet fighters are being flown by Soviet pilots. We have no evidence of this, and believe that there are enough trained North Vietnamese pilots to handle the aircraft they have on hand. 2. On June 4, Communist jet fighters over North Vietnam made their first attempt in two months to engage US aircraft. Four MIG fighters jumped two US Navy fighters flying a protective patrol about 30 miles south of Hanoi. They fired unguided air-to-air mis- siles which missed. One of our pilots ob- tained a lock-on with his radar on one of the Communist jets, but his missile failed to fire. Before any further action could be taken, the MIGs broke contact and took off for the North. -2- TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Relea 2005/01/06 : Cl -RDP82900025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 C. The Soviets are apparently also providing the North Vietnamese with more effective radars, and possibly antiaircraft guns. D. The latest phase of our air attacks on North Vietnam involves some economic targets, such as thermal power plants and port facilities, and A few of the targets are north of the 20th par- allel. The major emphasis continues to be on military targets and transportation facilities. 1. The North Vietnamese are using ferries to replace destroyed bridges. This requires lighter loads, and more trucks. housands of workers from the northern part of the country are being moved south to repair roads and bridges. E. In early June we received additional indications that the North Vietnamese, for the present at least, are completely uninterested in negotiations. The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, talking to the chief of the Canadian ICC delegation, simply repeated the Standard Hanoi "Four Points," which center on the complete withdrawal of the US mili- tary presence in South Vietnam. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 II. Peiping is probably quite optimistic about Communist prospects in South Vietnam, and the Chinese are al- most certainly encouraging the DRV and Viet Cong to keep the pressure on--and possibly to step up the pace of the war. A. Peiping's recent actions suggest that the Chinese believe this course has increased the chances of a US escalation which might involve air strikes against targets inside China. In the past few weeks Peiping has made a concerted effort to deter the US by a series of new warnings concern- ing the possible consequences. 1. Chinese propaganda, and private statements by leaders in Peiping, have apparently been calculated to underscore earlier threats that Communist China might become more di- rectly involved, and would respond to blows against China by launching a Korean-type war in Southeast Asia. 2. There is, however, no evidence that the Chi- nese are making active preparations for in- tervention of this sort at the present time. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 B. These warnings have been accompanied by increased civil defense preparations, which probably reflect genuine Chinese fears that the warnings may have no effect. 2. Plans to evacuate nonessential citizens to the countryside have been reported from half a dozen cities. A number of cities are known to be holding air raid drills and building air raid shelters. 3. The Civil Defense preparations we have noted so far should not be taken as signs that the Chinese intend to initiate a major new military action in Southeast Asia. No unusual troop deployments have been detected in South China, and the Chinese mil- itary posture in general appears defensive. 4. The continuing rail disruptions in South China prob- ably reflect priority shipment of military freight to North Vietnam from China and the USSR. They are not of a magnitude which would suggest any major Chi- nese troop movement. Approved For Relea 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 III. In South Vietnam, the expected summer offensive by the Viet Cong is clearly under way. So far, the ma- jor focus is shifting back and forth between the provinces in the north of the country and those just north and northeast of Saigon. There are still large Viet Cong units or concentrations which have not been committed. A. The major Viet Cong action at present is taking place around the district capital of Dong Xoai, about 60 miles north of Saigon in Phuoc Long Province. 1. On June 9th, a Viet Cong regiment--believed to be the same one which briefly overran the provincial capital at Song Be a month ago-- attacked and overran Dong Xoai, as well as a nearby Special Forces camp where 20 Ameri- cans were based. The Communists were finally dislodged from the town on June 11th by a Ranger battalion flown into the area, but only after the Viet Cong had destroyed one government relief TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 battalion and had received a major pound- ing from US and Vietnamese air strikes. 3. We now know L__F that the Communists had learned where the first relief battalion would land and were waiting for it. 4. On June 12th, a South Vietnamese airborne battalion sent to help pursue the Viet Cong was ambushed in a rubber plantation near Dong Xoai, losing about two-thirds of its complement. 5. It will be some time before we can-have ac- curate casualty totals. In one area, for instance, 400 bodies have been found, but not it hasnyet been possible to determine how many were Viet Cong and how many were govern- ment soldiers. US losses are seven killed, 15 wounded, and 12 missing. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 B. US officials believe the Communists may be trying to seize local plantations to establish a major base in Phuoc Long Province. On June 15th-- yesterday--a district capital about 25 miles to the northwest in Binh Long Province was attacked. 1. With only three understrength government bat- talions at Dong Xoa~, and with at least one additional Viet Cong regiment potentially available from their Zone D base just to the south, the situation is still critical. 2. Because at least five of the government's 11-battalion general reserve have either been crippled or are needed in Saigon, and most of the rest are committed in the north, one US airborne battalion has been moved to a nearby staging airfield for possible use. C. Earlier, at the beginning of June, at least three government battalions, one of them a marine reserve unit, were rendered combat in- effective during a major Viet Cong regimental assault around Ba Gia, a government outpost in Quang Ngai Province in the north. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : - 0025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 1. This battle came on the heels of wide- ranging attacks on major land-communica- tions, marking a sudden shift of Viet Cong action to the northern provinces. 2. It was followed up, in the first week of June, by a series of 12 successful Viet Cong ambushes, primarily in the highlands bordering Laos and Cambodia, 3. A Viet Cong who defected on June 3rd in the highlands province of Phu Bon claimed to be from North Vietnam's 325th Division, and alleged that all three of the division's infantry regiments are now in Kontum, Pleiku, and Phu Bon provinces. His state- ments are not confirmed, but sizeable forces were clearly involved in recent ambushes in all three provinces. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CI 0025R000500200002-7 TOP SECRET D. While we cannot yet be sure how extensive the Viet Cong offensive will be this summer, we are inclined to believe that the Viet Cong will stick to--but intensify--their existing patterns of classic guerrilla activity designed to isolate and erode government forces. They are, however, showing increased willingness to engage in oc- casional set-piece battles despite the govern- ment's ability to counter with air power. E. US strength in South Vietnam now amounts to about 53,500 men. About 21,000 of these are listed as combat forces. An Australian infantry bat- talion has arrived, and the South Koreans are talking of sending a division to South Vietnam. IV. The resignation of the Quat government in Saigon on June 11th and the resumption of authority by the military confronts South Vietnam with another in- ternal shakeup at a time when the generals have their hands full militarily. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 A. This time, the generals stepped back in at the request of the civilian leadership. Premier Quat was attempting to reshuffle his cabinet, and the Chief of State, Suu, refused on constitu- tional grounds to let Quat dismiss two ministers who had refused to resign. B. The opposition to Quat was led by militant Catholics who accused Quat of favoring the Bud- dhists and leaning to neutralism, and by southern regionalists who felt they were not given an adequate share of the government, They were agitating for Quat's removal, and Quat himself, feeling that he did not have enough support to govern, asked the military to step in and mediate the impasse. C. The generals had been showing growing impatience with the government stalemate, and they responded to Quat's request by resuming control. There is little assurance, however, that the military, with a war on their hands and little interest in day-to-day administration, will be able to resolve the deep divisions among the South Viet- namese, even with a more dictatorial regime. TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 There are already indications that the Catholics who were working for Quat's ouster are just as concerned over military rule. V. Although Quat and his colleagues are still acting as caretakers, our information is that the mili- tary plan to replace Quat with a military premier and a small mixed wartime cabinet. A. The generals have already announced the forma- tion of a supreme military committee to set up and supervise the government; the chairman of this committee and prospective new chief of state is a Catholic, General Nguyen Van Thieu, Quat's defense minister, and an apparent com- promise choice to cope with the ambitions of younger more radical officers. B. Possibly in line as the new premier, or at least the key voice in "directing the government," is General Nguyen Cao Ky, the flamboyant air force chief and a self-styled reformer. C. There are signs in public statements by Thieu, and in clandestinely reported remarks of Ky and others of the inner military circle, that the generals incline toward a tightly-run, tough Approved For Release 25X1 25X1 Approved For Relea%Jpt 't*l regime which will sweep out corrupt or entrenched elements of earlier regimes and perhaps nationalize certain economic interests of the local French and Chinese communities. D. Some of the younger generals, along with the Tri Quang wing of the Buddhist leadership, have long argued that some sur4i re o:tut ionary approach to government is essential if the war is to be won. TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 SECRET DOMINICAN REPUBLIC I. In the Dominican Republic, heavy fighting broke out in downtown Santo Domingo, the capital, yesterday. At least two US soldiers were wounded, and there are press reports that one was killed. Early reports indicated that the fighting began when the rebels fired on US forces. A. The crisis now is nearly eight weeks old, but there is no early prospect for a political solution, and a military solution appears unlikely. 1. The loyalist troops mounted a successful drive in late May to clean out rebel pockets in the northern part of the capital, but this initative ended when they reached the corridor stretching across. the town from the international safety zone. B. Imbert has continued his attempt to mobilize mass support through rallies and demonstrations but has largely been unsuccessful. He has gained the support of some conservative parties II-1 SECRET Approved For Rele se 2005/01/06: CIA-RD P82R00 25R000500200002-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 and politidians who give a right-wing cast to his regime. B. In a sudden move to gain support, Imbert on June first offered to let the OAS set the date for elections that would be open to all non- extremist candidates, and supervised by the OAS. The rebels rejected the initiative as t'another Imbert farce." Imbert later retreated from his proposal, saying that the "Caamano problem" must be solved before any solution can be found. C. Imbert appears to be under some pressure from his military leaders to avoid concessions to the rebels. They disapproved of his transfer of the National Palace to OAS control and may have been behind his refusal to allow the OAS, to control Radio Santo Domingo. Some of the loyalist military commanders are probably toying with the idea of taking direct action against the rebels. D. On June 12 Imbert held a rally that attracted 8 to 10 thousand listeners, The overwhelming proportion of them were from the working classes. Many were brought in by the loyalist government from the surrounding countryside. 11-2 Approved For Release 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/0.4f4A-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 II. The rebels appear to be increasingly tense as the stalemate continues. This is indicated by tightened security measures in the rebel sector of Santo Domingo, and by possible dissension between Caamano's Communist backers and his supporters in Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). A. Caamano appears to remain intransigent towards a political solution. He is demanding a five- point program as the basis for a settlement. These include: retention of the 1963 Bosch Constitution; maintenance of the Bosch-dominated Congress; incorporation of rebel.military leaders into the military forces; a government of "Dem- ocratic personalities" (probably excluding Im- bert); and the immediate departure of the in- terventionist forces. Imbert and his supporters find the first four of these points unacceptable. B. Communist influence among the rebels remains strong. They are particularly active in rebel paramilitary units and in propaganda activities. In fact, one adviser to the Communists recommended that they tone down their propaganda because its Communist origin was too obvious. C. The rebels have been increasing their propaganda against the US, probably because they feel that 11-3 Approved For Relegse 2995f9 W-4-4-WA. i14 90025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/ & ftRDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 the US is preventing a settlement favorable to them. The large (6-10,000) rebel rally on June 5th vociferously stressed an anti-US theme. D. The rebels held a demonstration on June 14th that was in effect co-sponsored by the pro-Castro Fourteenth of June group (APCJ) and Caamano's government. Several Communists spoke, including one who advocated taking the revolution into the interior. The fact that the rebel government co-sponsored this demonstration indicates the degree to which they are responsive to Communists and other extremists, who, it is estimated, make up about 65% of the rebel paramilitary units. III. Exiled President Juan Bosch has continued, from his haven in Puerto Rico, to guide rebel leaders and to boost the morale of rebel forces through recorded speeches urging the people to maintain the struggle. A. Bosch has advised the rebels to exploit the charges of loyalist atrocities. B. He has also instructed the rebel leaders not to rush into negotiations. He says that the stalemate is not their problem but that of the US and OAS. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 iMP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 Approved For Releas IV. The OAS has been increasingly active and may be- come a major force. A. A special three-man committee composed of representatives of the US (Ellsworth Bunker), Brazil, and El Salvador who are charged with helping OAS Secretary General Mora find a solution to the problem. This group, since the withdrawal of the Bundy mission, is now the main hope in this regard. B. The OAS Commission has met with a group of Dominican professionals and businessmen in an attempt to find a third force that might be the core of a new government. It is un- likely that Imbert would accept such a gov- ernment and even less likely that Caamano would approve it. V. The Latin American contingents in the Inter- American Peace Force are playing a more important role. They now patrol much of the International Security Zone. The Brazilian troops in particular seem to be very effective. There are now 1,200 Brazilians, 250 Hondurans, 160 Nicaraguans, 21 Costa Ricans and 3 El Salvadorans under the command of Brazilian General Hugo Panasco Alvim. A company of Paraguayans is coming soon. 11-5 Approved For Releas - 25R000500200002-7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/OgIR& T DP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 VI. There have been sporadic outbreaks of violence in the Dominican interior. These have.included attacks on police stations and army posts. A. The outlook is for more violence, but rebel capabilities may be more limited than we believed. Monday, June 14, was the anni- versary of the abortive 1959 Castro-backed invasion against Trujillo, from which the Fourteenth of June Political Group, a major supporter of Caamano, takes its name. The APCJ was expected to attempt to celebrate with demonstrations throughout the country, but Monday, except for the rally in the capital, was fairly quiet. B. Some rebel leaders evidently feel that the stimulation of manifestations of militant support in the interior is the last card they may be able to play. There are con- tinued reports of planned widespread dis- turbances and even of forthcoming attempts by rebel supporters to seize certain key interior cities. C. US Forces in the Dominican Republic now total 12,400 men. The Marine Brigade has been withdrawn. Our casualties to date have been 19 dead and 119 wounded. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : C&IR6P82R00025R000500200002-7 SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 16 June 1965 DCI Briefing SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY I. We are watching the activities of Soviet military forces even more closely than usual, because of the Vietnam situation. A. Generally, the activities of Soviet strategic strike forces, as well as ground and air defense forces, appear to be at normal levels for this time of year. B. Soviet forces in East Germany and western USSR have been conducting exercises, and as many as 18 submarines have been active outside their home waters. (This is a high level of out-of- area sub activity, but it is occurring in areas used before during the past year). We do not see any activity which is ominous in relation to the international situation. II. Soviet missile testing and space programs are very active. A. At least four ICBM development and modification 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For ReleaspO?h ICIA-RDP82R000t5R000500200002-7 25X1 programs are under way at the Tyuratam flight test rangehead. We have identified the launch complex for some of these new programs and obtained particularly fine satellite photography of this area on May 28th. Here is a photograph showing one of the launch sites and a missile which is ready for firing. B. Recent satellite photography also has shown continued construction progress on big space booster launch facilities at Tyuratam. Some of these may be for a manned lunar landing program. C. Soviet attempts to reconnoiter the moon continue to be frustrated by failures. Lunik-6, launched on June 8th, was the ninth straight failure since the beginning of 1963. It was the fourth attempt this year, and its timing also reflected a feeling of urgency behind the Soviet effort. D. The Soviets' own satellite reconnaissance program is in full swing for this year. It resumed active operations in March following a near standdown during the poor lighting and weather conditions of the winter months. Currently, they are launching one about every 20 days Cosmos 68, launched yesterday morning, was the seventh reconnaissance satellite this year. TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : 5R000500200002-7 Approved For ReleaTs@P1(ffi39: CIA-RDP82R 025R000500200002-7 SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT strides since World War II in aircraft propulsion, aerodynamics, and in the capacity and technological level of its aircraft industry. A. Wartime damage was overcome by 1950 through use of German prisoners of war and a high priority for reconstruction. Since 1950, plants connected with the aviation industry have been expanded greatly, and that expansion continues. 1. Many of the plants have the large, high-bay structures necessary for the design and quantity production of modern aircraft. 2. There are now 24 airframe and 12 aircraft engine plants, totaling about 77 million square feet of space. B. In the mid-1950's, the USSR began to emphasize development and production of turbojet; and turboprop transport aircraft. The outcome is highlighted in the present Paris Air Show, which includes all the major Soviet transport and cargo aircraft and helicopters currently in production or under development. Approved For Release 2005/01}$0.51: CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 Approved For Re' a Qd!a WtY 6: CIA-RDP82R 0025R000500200002-7 C. The Soviets are not only supplying the civil air fleets for themselves, and their satellites, but are making a concerted effort to sell their transports in the free world. 1. They are even entered in the intense international rivalry to develop, build, and sell a supersonic transport, and are very probably trying to get their prototype airborne ahead of the competing Anglo-French CONCORDE SST. D. Soviet aircraft design has emphasized simplicity anffl economy of construction, at the expense of performance, economy of operation, economy of maintenance, passenger comfort, and safety requirements. The airframes have extremely long life, but the engine life of Soviet transports has been extremely short in comparison to that of comparable western aircraft. IT. The Soviet aircraft display in Paris includes the TU-124 and AN-24 passenger transports, the AN-12 cargo plane, and the MI-6 helicopter, all of which are in series production and have been for some years. The long-range IL--18D probably did not enter production until late 1964, at which time the standard IL-18V was still being produced for export. A. They are also displaying four prototypes and one mode o ircmt~0 f 06 :CIA RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approve or Release 25X1 Approved For Ree9RAT/ CIA-RD 025R000500200002-7 B. The IL-62 prototype, a passenger transport, may enter production late this year or early next year. We already have some sales literature for it, in both Russian and English. It will be placed on long- distance national and international routes. C. The TU-134, also being shown in prototype, will probably replace the TU-124 in production this year, and may enter scheduled service with AEROFLOT in 1966. D. The MI-10 FLYING CRANE helicopter was seen for the first time in July, 1961, and since then minor modifications have been incorporated into the design. If the Soviets put the MI 10 into series production, they will probably do so only in limited numbers. notices, is the giant cargo version of the AN-22 transport, designed by Antonov, which made a surprise appearance in Paris yesterday. (15 June) A. The intelligence community has been aware of the development of this aircraft since 1961, but the Soviets have been conspicuously silent about it until this week. A Soviet military officer claimed that the AN-22 would considerably increase the future airlift capability of the airborne forces. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/O1/fi.63 CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 TOP SECRFTI Approved For Release 2005/01 - 0025R000500200002-7 3. We found a new runway and a large final assembly building under construction at Tashkent, obviously for the giant aircraft--and the first prototype was probably completed just after midyear of 1964. Photography of Kiev in September showed that the AN-22 had been sent to Antonov's design bureau there for testing. 4. Other than that stray distant snapshot, the AN-22 up to yesterday had not posed for pictures,-and 25X1 25X1 still did not have the pictures which this morning's papers have from Paris. B. The AN-22, the world's largest aircraft, has four turboprop engines of 15,000 horsepower, fitted with counter-rotating propellors. The wing is mounted on top of the fuselage. The tail assembly consists of two huge rudders mounted on a horizontal stabilizer. C. The six big dual landing-gears fold into pod-like structures on the sides of the fuselage. The design permits landings on dirt runways, and thecaircraft requires a landing run of slightly more than 3,000 feet. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 IV-4 Approved For F$ X) j D. The maximum range of the AN-22 is 6,600 miles non-stop with a payload of 45 tons, or 3,100 miles with the maximum payload of 80 tons at 420 miles per hour and an altitude of 36,000 feet. E. The mentions you may have read of 720 passengers refer to a civil transport version which has not yet been built, which is to have a double-decked fuselage somewhat longer than the cargo version. The cargo version has a fuselage 190 feet long and 19 to 22 feet in diameter, and a wingspan of about 210 feet. F. The Soviets claim the AN-22 will be ready for export in 1967, but we believe this unlikely. The aircraft is still undergoing flight tests, and apparently only the one prototype has been built so far. Production probably will not begin until next year. IV. An even newer aircraft, the TU-144 SST, or supersonic transport, was unveiled in the form of a model at the Paris Air Show. Here again the only photographs available as of yesterday were newspaper photographs cabled from Paris. A. The TU-144 is a delta-wing aircraft similar in appearance to the CONCORDE SST being developed by the British and French. Four engines are to be mounted under the wing. The aircraft is to have a capacity of 121 passengers, a speed of 1,550 m.p.h., range of 4,000 miles, and cruising altitude of 65,000 feet. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 ? TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/01/04 25X1 B. TASS says the TU-144 is to enter service in 1971, which appears to be a reasonable target date. C. A sign on the model in Paris says the prototype is to fly in 1968. We think the Soviets will probably try to beat the first flight of the CONCORDE, scheduled for early 1968 but probably subject to some slippage. The Soviets may make some effort to put their SST over Moscow by November, 1967, for the 56th anniversary of the October Revolution. V. Efforts to sell Soviet transport aircraft in the Free World have heretofore been directed primarily at the underdeveloped countries, but with the Paris Air Show, they are apparently shifting to the larger market in the industrialized West. A. The main vehicle for the immediate future will probably be the 186-seat IL-62, a four-engine jet transport being offered for export next year, at a price which the Soviets claim will be lower than that of the British Super VC-l0. (The British price is about $8 million B. Moscow says it will offer discount prices for cash, and accept payments in commodities from the underdeveloped countries. C. Aside from sales to Communist nations, the USSR has been able to sell commercial transports (IL-14, IL-18, AN-24, and TU-124) to the UAR, Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Ghana and Guinea are both dissatisfied with the cost and maintenance problems of the IL-18, and are trying to get their money back. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 IV-6 Approved For Release 2005/01 00025R000500200002-7 TOP SECRET D. As part of its effort to increase Soviet prestige through aviation, the USSR has not only given the leaders of a number of newly independent countries plush IL-14 and IL-18 transports for personal use---also MI-4 helicopters, but is also working hard to get international air routes to Tree World countries. 1. AEROFLOT now offers service to 27 countries, and has applications filed for permission to open a number of new routes, particularly in Africa. 25X1 /0 Approved For Release 2005/016 CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 SECRET 1 -1 THE CONCORDE SST PROGRAM I. Development of the Concorde Supersonic Transport (SST), the most significant of a number of joint British-French programs, is well under way. The goal for the test flights of the first prototype is early 1968, with hopes of putting the planes in service in 1971. A. These goals--which represent a slippage of two years from the original 1962 plans--still look too optimistic. B. Thus the Europeans may lose one of their main advantages--the lead-time they had over the US program. II. The tremendous costs are worrying the British; this caused Wilson's new government to decide to pull out of the program last fall. Labor later reversed this decision after an uproar from Paris, but Wilson will still have an eagle eye out for rising development costs--which may force both countries to stretch the program out over a longer period of time. IV-8 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/~-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 A. Other slowdowns in Concorde might result from unexpectedly long research on the sonic boom problem, where the Europeans are trailing the US. III. Up to now, the orders for the US SST are out-running those for the Concorde by about 2-1; there are ten- tative orders for 96 US planes and 47 for the Concorde. A. Foreign airlines are still holding back until they' know more about the respective planes; the market is estimated to be for about 400 planes, of which one-quarter to one-third would be ordered by European airlines. A. In coming months, there is likely to be much pres- sure on European airlines to "buy European" and take the Concorde. There is currently some pres- sure on West Germany and Italy to play some part in development. C. Up to now, the European airlines have placed tech- nical performance first. With SST's costing over $20 million each, they are likely to continue to put quality ahead of politics. SEC 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 I. Greek-Turkish negotiations are under way in an at- tempt to find a solution for the Cyprus problem. J.Jttle progress has been made but the talks are ,Nroceeding in a. cooperative atmosphere. A. The talks have dealt with a solution based on "enosis"--the union of Cyprus with Greece-- with concessions -- presumably territorial -- for Turkey. 1. According to one report, the Turks are asbi.ng for territorial compensation either on Cyprus or in Greece proper; The Greeks are talking about minor border rectifica- tions in Thrace, or a leased base on Cyprus. 2. The Turks are talking in terms of an area equivalent to about 20% of Cyprus, where the ethnic Turks amount to about 20% of the population. This works out to about 715 square miles, which may not appear substan- tial to us, but it is more a question of principle than of acerage. VI-1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 C. Opposition elements in Greece -- both right and far left -- are ready to attack the government if significant concessions are made. II. The Greek Cypriots view the Greek-Turkish talks with apprehension, fearing a sell-out of Cypriot territory in exchange for enosis. A. The island has been relatively peaceful for several weeks but tension between the com- munities remains high. B. The Greek Cypriots could torpedo the Greek- Turkish negotiations at any time by mounting attacks against the Turkish Cypriots -- thus provoking a probable Turkish military response, possibly aimed at Greece rather than Cyprus. C. Greece has an estimated 10,000 troops on Cyprus but apparently cannot control Archbishop Makarios. III. The Greek Cypriots are continuing to build up their military capabilities. bELZIlff Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 A. Equipment associated with Soviet-built surface- to-air missiles is on the island, but there is no confirmation that missiles themselves have yet arrived. 25X1 I SSECRET I Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/Q6I,RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 MIDDLE EAST I. In the Middle East factionalism and rivalry in the Arab camp have given rise to a new crop of coup rumors, just at the time when Israel is taking a harder line against border incursions and the Arab plans to divert Jordan waters. A. Syria has been demanding a more aggressive Arab reaction to the Israelis. The May 31 speech by Egyptian President Nasir was a weak --but accurate--apology for the inability of the Arab camp to challenge the Israelis mili- tarily at this time. B. There is substantial evidence that the Egyp~- tians and Iraqis are again plotting to over- throw the Baathist military regime in Syria. The Syrians are aware of these efforts, and can probably forestall them.. C. Iraq itself is in poor position to take part in coups against another government. Presi- dent Arif, who holds the shaky regime to- gether, is ill and rumored to have cancer. VII-1 Approved For Release F.. 25R000500200002-7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/0&JDP82R00025R000500200002-7 The costly military campaign against the Kurds is on again, with little promise of success. 1. There are coup rumors again in Baghdad. Moves toward unity with Egypt have antag- onized those who oppose Nasir, while at the same time they have been so minimal that they have not satisfied those who de- mand union. II. Arab terrorist raiding parties are striking into Israel from Lebanon and Jordan. The two govern- ments are probably not directly involved, but have been unable to stop the raids and are afraid that they will either provoke further Israeli reprisals or raise tension to such a pitch that they cannot successfully resist Egyptian sugges- tions that other Arab forces be stationed in Leb- anon and Jordan, III. In Yemen, Egyptian troop strength has been in- creased steadily ever since October, 1962. It now amounts to some 53,000 to 58,000 men. A. Despite this heavy Egyptian commitment, there is a military stalemate with the royalists, who are supported by Saudi Arabia. Approved For Release 25R000500200002-7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/$MD,gW?RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 B. The new head of the Yemeni republican gov- ernment, Prime Minister Numan, has been urging the withdrawal of Egyptian troops. He feels that if the UAR presence were re- moved, he could find enough commom ground with the Yemeni tribes and the Saudis to end the civil war. Nasir, however, is trying to undermine Numan's government and replace it with pro-Egyptian ministers. C. Nasir would certainly like to extricate him- self from this mess. His military commander in Yemen admits that Egypt can?t win. It is not only costly and showing no signs of suc- cess, but ties up about one third of his ground forces at a time when other Arabs are challenging him to take a more defiant pos- ture against Israel. 1. Nasir cannot afford to pull out of Yemen, however, unless he can leave a friendly republican government in reasonably se- cure control there. He sees no early prospect for such a solution, and without it, he would not only give up any influence in Yemen, but would lose considerable pres- tige in the Arab world. VII-3 Approved For Release 2005/01/HgC-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/ &IAIRDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 2. Algerian President Ben Bella has initiated diplomatic contacts between Nasir and Faysal, hoping that they will reach an understanding about Yemen 25X1 Approved For Releas Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 DCI BRIEFING 16 June 1965 1. In Bolivia, military occupation of all nationalized mines was completed late last week without resistance, thus bringing at least a temporary respite in the month-old political crisis. A. Military occupation of the mines is the first step in the junta's rehabilitation program for Bolivia's all-important mining industry. 1. The miners, undisciplined and led by extremists, have resisted effective government authority since the 1952 revolution. 2. The Bolivian government, finally faced up to this, realizing that it cannot begin to cope with its economic problems before it estab- lishes sound management of the nationalized mines. 3. The deportation or arrest of extremist mine leaders, and a military show of force has apparently overcome miner resistance to the reform program. VIII-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 SECRET B. The junta now faces the important task of prov- ing to the miners that conditions will improve under the new program. 1. The miners will tolerate peaceful occupation of the mines for a while, but resistance will stiffen and another crisis will loom if the junta does not provide tangible re- suits to back up its promises. II. The power struggle between the co-presidents of the junta, Barrientos and Ovando, remains a disturbing element in the political picture. A. It stems from the ambitious character of the two generals. Each wants to be president, and both have significant military support, but only Barrientos has popular political support. VIII-2 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 SECRET C. Relations between the two men came dangerously close to the breaking point on May 24. 1. At that time Barrientos, then sole head of the junta, had begun deporting the principal extreme leftists and was moving the army against the armed workers' militias and striking workers. 2. Ovando, who was commander of the armed forces, signed a cease-fire pact with the workers without consulting the rest of the junta. The agreement in effect gave the workers al- most everything they demanded, and would have denied the government the necessary means of controlling the mines. D. Barrientos moved Ovando up to the co-presidency and took over joint command of the armed forces, in order to keep an eye on him, to neutralize his power, and, most importantly, to maintain unity in the armed forces. A split in the mili- tary would probably have plunged the country into Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 civil war, and still could. So far this maneuver by Barrientos has succeeded. Ovando is lying low, and unity of the armed forces has been pre- served, but a final showdown between the two seems inevitable. SECR 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Approved For Release 2005/01ta4-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 DCI BRIEFING II. The Venezuelan Communist Party was disappointed over the meager propaganda impact of terrorist actions last month. A. The party hopes to change this by giving the FALN?s new campaign clearly defined objectives calculated to produce maximum propaganda ef- fect. III. Guerrilla activity continues about.100 miles east of Caracas. A. The army has stepped up its antiguerrilla cam- paign in the region. Approv 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 SECRET 16 June 1965 DCI BRIEFING PERU) I. In Peru, the MIR, or Movement of the Revolutionary Left, which is pro-Cuban and pro-Peiping, appears to have begun guerrilla activity. II. The MIR has about 1,000 members, at least 150 of whom have received extensive guerrilla training in Cuba, Communist China, and North Korea. It has been preparing for guerrilla warfare now for two years. A. The MIR has three guerrilla camps near the location of last week's attacks. X-1 SECRET Approved For Release 25R000500200002-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM have stated that guerrillas at these camps planned to begin raids on mines to obtain dynamite beginning in mid-June. B. MIR also has a guerrilla camp near Cuzco in Southern Peru and three in the northern part, of the country. Guerrillas in the southern camp reportedly will soon begin small-scale attacks there. III. The MIR is not an immediate threat to the Peruvian Government. A. Government security forces are now in pursuit of the guerrillas, but are hampered by the rugged terrain, the hostility of the peasants, and the concealment tactics of the guerrillas. 25X1 Approved, For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500200002-7