DCI BRIEFING FOR SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 21, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DC I BRIEFING FOR
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE,
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
C O N T E N T S
Pa ge
The B-52 Strike
1
South Vietnam Military Developments
4
South Vietnam Political Developments
8
North Vietnam
12
SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY
17
SOVIET AIRCRAFT
19
Anglo-French CONCORDE
26
DOMINICAN REDUBLIC
28
ALGERIA
34
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If I may start with South Vietnam, I would like to
deal first with the results of the strike by B-52 bombers
from Guam last Friday at that Viet Cong base area about
10 miles northnorthwest of Ben Cat.
A.F
a--sl ^ V-ie-v t o t ka t t ire
be 1be s--4-i!d any damage to-?he inst X1 *-i
t '
1.
been able to check only a small portion of the
area bombed---the teams that went in had time
only to cover areas with about 45 bomb craters,
and we know there are about 900, so by rule of
thumb we can estimate that the ground teams
covered about five percent of the ground.
2. This is an area where the Viet Cong have been
so secure that for several years the South
Vietnamese have been unable to penetrate in
force. The air strike, however, made the Viet
Cong pull out so fast that these small
reconnaissance units of about 50 men each, led
by US special'-forces personnel, were able to
reconnoiter the area for some four hours.
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3. One training camp consisting of classroom
buildings and bunkers, which had apparently
been occupied by a Viet Cong battalion, had
been evacuated so recently that there was still
warm rice and tea on the tables.
B. The first team, zigzagging through jungle so dense
that visibility was cut to 10 to 15 feet, found
three large storage buildings and some smaller
ones believed to be command posts, with an
extensive system of entrenchments, bunkers, and
tunnels.
C. The second team covered the central portion of
the target area with the classrooms I mentioned.
The whole area was interlaced with ventilated
tunnels.
D. The third team found three company-sized bivouac
areas with rice stores, a new trench system with
underground shelters, and anti-aircraft sites.
E. All three teams received Viet Cong sniper fire,
but destroyed all the installations and supplies
they found, using explosives and grenades. When
they ran out of explosives, they called in an
air strike on one area and noted a secondary
explosion.
1. The teams found stocks of uniforms, a printing
press, and a number of documents.
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The MACV report on the air strike and the ensuing
ground reconnaissance states that the operation
"is considered successful from this end."
1. The report stresses the small portion of
the target area which the teams could cover
and adds: "The damage and casualties which
may have occurred in the remainder are, of
course, conjecture, but the law of averages
indicates they should be heavy."
II. Incidentally, according to CINCPACFLT, on Sunday a
Soviet trawler was busy in the area where one of the
B-52's crashed off the northwest coast of Luzon,
apparently grappling for the wreckage. The depth
of the ocean in this area is about 2,000 fathoms,
leaving little prospect that the Soviet ship can
recover any wreckage, but the message said that if
the Soviets persisted they would be warned that the
wreckage is US property.
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SOUTH VIETNAM MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
III. In South Vietnam, the expected summer offensive by
the Viet Cong is clearly under way. During the past
week, major operations have tapered off, but we expect
the Viet Cong will initiate a new round of heavy fighting
at any moment. The major focus has been shifting back
and forth between the provinces in the north of the
country, and those just north and northeast of Saigon.
There are still large Viet Cong concentrations in both
areas which have not been committed.
A. The most significant action of the Viet Cong campaign
to date took place around the district capital of
Dong Xoai, about 60 miles north of Saigon in
Phuoc Long Province.
1. On June 9th, a Viet Cong regiment--believed
to be the same one which briefly overran the
provincial capital at Song Be a month ago--
attacked and overran Long Xoai, as well as
a nearby Special Forces camp where 20 Ameri-
cans were based,
2. The Communists were finally dislodged from
the town on June 11th by a Ranger battalion
flown into the area, but only after the Viet
Cong had destroyed one government relief
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battalion and had received a major pound-
ing from US and Vietnamese air strikes.
4. On June 12th, a South Vietnamese airborne
battalion sent to help pursue the Viet Cong
was ambushed in a rubber plantation near
bong Xoai, losing about two-thirds of its
complement.
5. It will be some time before we caw have ac-
curate casualty totals. In one area, for
instance, 400 bodies have been found, but
not
it hasnyet been possible to determine how
many were Viet Cong and how many were govern-
ment soldiers. US losses were seven killed,
15 wounded, and 12 missing.
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B. The Communists may be trying to seize the local
plantations to establish a major base area in
Phuoc Long Province. We have no indication that
the Communist regiment involved in the Dong Xoai
operation has withdrawn,
suggests they may have swung 20 miles north for
another crack at Song Be, the provincial capital.
C. Earlier, at the beginning of June, at least
three government battalions, one of them a
marine reserve unit, were rendered combat in-
effective during a major Viet Cong regimental
assault around Ba Gia, a government outpost in
Quang Ngai Province in the north.
1. This battle came on the heels of wide-
ranging attacks on major land-communica-
tions, marking a sudden shift of Viet
Cong action to the northern provinces.
2. It was followed up, in the first week of
June, by a series of 12 successful Viet
Cong ambushes, primarily in the highlands
bordering Laos and Cambodia.
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3. A Viet Cong who defected on June 3rd in
the highlands province of Phu Bon claimed
to be from North Vietnam's 325th Division,
and alleged that all three of the division's
infantry regiments are now in Kontum,
Pleiku, and Phu Bon provinces. His state-
ments are not confirmed, but sizeable
forces were clearly involved in recent
ambushes in all three provinces.
D. These heavy Viet Cong attacks and ambushes have
seriously depleted the government's limited
general reserve. At the time of the Dong Xoai
battle, at least five of the 11 battalions of
the general reserve were either crippled or needed
in Saigon. Most of the rest are committed in the
north. Although the US paratroop battalion which
was flown to a nearby staging airfield was not
committed at Dong Xoai, we can expect increasing
calls from the Vietnamese for commitment of our
units in response to major Viet Cong attacks.
F. US strength in South Vietnam now amounts to about
53,500 men. About 21,000 of these are listed as
combat forces. An Australian infantry battalion
has arrived, and South Korea is thinking of
sending a full division.
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F. While we cannot yet be sure how extensive the
Viet Cong offensive will be this summer, we
are inclined to believe that the Viet Cong will
stick to--but intensify--their existing patterns
of classic guerrilla activity designed to isolate
and erode government forces. They are, however,
showing increased willingness to engage in oc-
casional set-piece battles despite the govern-
ment's ability to counter with air power.
SOUTH VIVTNAMVSV POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS
IV. The resignation of the Quat government in Saigon on
June 11th and the resumption of authority by the
military confronts South Vietnam with another in-
ternal shakeup at a time when the generals have
their hands full militarily.
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A. This time, the generals stepped back in at the
request of the civilian leadership. Premier
Quat was attempting to reshuffle his cabinet,
and the Chief of State, Suu, refused on constitu-
tional grounds to let Quat dismiss two ministers
who had refused to resign.
B. The opposition to Quat was led by militant
Catholics who accused Quat of favoring the Bud-
dhists and leaning to neutralism, and by southern
regionalists who felt they were not given an
adequate share of the government, They were
agitating for Quat's removal, and Quat himself,
feeling that he did not have enough support to
govern, asked the military to step in and
mediate the impasse.
C. The generals had been showing growing impatience
with the government stalemate, and they responded
to Quat's request by resuming control. On Saturday,
after a week of consultations, the generals announced
a new regime which will permit strong military
supervision of governmental affairs in South Vietnam.
There is a Congress of the Armed Forces composed of
all the generals, the corps commanders, and the
division commanders.
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D. In the name of this Congress, a smaller group of
senior generals will be responsible for day-to-day
supervision of governmental affairs.
E. The executive function will be carried out by a
largely civilian cabinet, including seven holdovers
from the Quat government, headed by Air Marshal
Nguyen Cao Ky.
Ky, the colorful, impulsive and young prime minister,
gave a colorful acceptance speech Saturday in which
he called for total mobilization to defeat the
Communists. He warned war profiteers and the
regional, religious, and political interest groups
that there would be severe punishments if they
continued to place their interests against those of
the country.
G. The speech bore out earlier indications that most of
the generals are bent on a regime which will place
strong emphasis on austerity and national discipline.
It remains to be seen, however, whether even a more
dictatorial regime with a militant appeal can resolve
the deep divisions among the South Vietnamese.
V/ H. H. The Buddhists and Catholics are both reacting warily
to the return of military rule. The Buddhists find it
hard to swallow appointment of a Catholic, General Thieu,
to the dual position of chief of state and chairman of
the ruling military group. The Catholics, for their part
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working through their favorite generals, will
still be the dominant force in Vietnamese
politics.
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NORTH VIETNAM
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V. In North Vietnam, we have now found four surface-to-air
missile sites, all of them 10 to 15 miles from Hanoi.
At least three of them are still under construction.
A. 6nly one of the sites has any equipment in
evidence, and our reconnaissance has detected
no missiles.
B. A Soviet diplomat recently said that there are
also SAM sites around the port city of Haiphong.
We have no evidence to support this, but weather
has prevented good photography of the Haiphong
area for about a month.
VI. The latest photography shows eight IL-28 BEAGLE jet
light bombers in North Vietnam, all of them flown in
across China from the Soviet Union.
A. There are also 69 MIG-15 or MIG-17 jet fighters,
and a few more being assembled.
1. Another Soviet diplomat has hinted that some of
the jet fighters are being flown by Soviet
pilots. We have no evidence that they are
flying combat missions, and we believe that
there are enough trained North Vietnamese
pilots to handle the aircraft on hand.
, however, that Soviet
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pilots are flying aircraft in North Vietnam.
They are probably checking out newly-arrived.
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B. The first engagement with MIG jets over North Vietnam
since April 4th came on June 4th, when four MIGs
jumped two of our Navy fighters flying a protective
patrol about 30 miles south of Hanoi. The MIGs
fired unguided air-to-air missiles which missed.
One of our pilots obtained a radar lock-on, but his
missile malfunctioned, and the MIGs broke contact.
1. On June 17, two Navy jets, again on protective
atrol, picked up four MIGs on their radar about
40 miles south of Hanoi, closed, and shot down
two with air-to-air missiles.
a third MIG did not get home. We had no losses,
but the Communists claim they shot down our two
aircraft.
2. On June 20, a US piston-engine fighter-bomber
shot down a MIG fighter.
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C. The Soviets are apparently also providing the
North Vietnamese with more effective radars,
and possibly antiaircraft guns.
D. The latest phase of our air attacks on North
Vietnam involves some economic targets, such as
thermal power plants and port facilities, and
A few of the targets are north of the 20th par-
allel. The major emphasis continues to be on
military targets and transportation facilities.
101. The North Vietnamese are using ferries.. to
replace destroyed bridges. This requires
from the northern part of the country are
being moved south to repair roads and bridges.
E. In early June we received additional indications
that the North Vietnames3, for the present at
lighter loads, and more trucks.
least, are completely. uninterested in negotiations.
The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, talking to
the chief of the Canadian ICC delegation, simply
repeated the standard Hanoi "Four Points," which
center on the complete withdrawal of the US mili-
tary presence in South Vietnam.
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II. Peiping is probably quite optimistic about Communist
prospects in South Vietnam, and the Chinese are al-
most certainly encouraging the DRV and Viet Cong to
keep the pressure on--and possibly to step up the
pace of the war.
A. Peiping's recent actions suggest that the Chinese
believe this course has increased the chances of
a US escalation which might involve air strikes
against targets inside China. In the past few
weeks Peiping has made a concerted effort to
deter the US by a series of new warnings concern-
ing the possible consequences.
1. Chinese propaganda, and private statements
by leaders in Peiping, have apparently been
calculated to underscore earlier threats
that Communist China might become more di-
rectly involved, and would respond to blows
against China by launching a Korean-type war
in Southeast Asia.
2. There is, however, no evidence that the Chi-
nese are making active preparations for in-
tervention of this sort at the present time.
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B. These warnings have been accompanied by increased
civil defense preparations, which probably reflect
genuine Chinese fears that the warnings may have
no effect.
1.
a decision was made about mid-May to
step up civil defense measures, especially in
southern regions.
2. Plans to evacuate nonessential citizens to the
countryside have been reported from half a dozen
cities. A number of cities are known to be
holding air raid drills and building air raid
shelters.
3. The Civil Defense preparations we have noted so
far should not be taken as signs that the Chinese
intend to initiate a major new military action in
Southeast Asia. No unusual troop deployments have
been detected in South China, and the Chinese mil-
itary posture in general appears defensive.
4. The continuing rail disruptions in South China prob-
ably reflect priority shipment of military freight
to North Vietnam from China and the USSR. They are not
of a magnitude which would suggest any major Chi-
nese troop movement.
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SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY
I. We are watching the activities of Soviet military
forces even more closely than usual, because of the
Vietnam situation.
!/ a Generally, the activities of Soviet strategic
strike forces, as well as ground and air defense
forces, appear to be at normal levels for this
time of year. Soviet forces have been exercising
in East Germany and the Western USSR.
VB. Recently as many as 18 submarines have been active
outside home waters at one time. This is a high level
of out-of-area submarine activity, but there does
not appear to be-any significant change in the
areas where they are operating. We do not see
any activity which is ominous in relation to the
international situation.
II. Soviet missile testing and space programs are very
active.
A. At least four ICBM development and modification programs
are in progress at the Tyuratam test rangehead. On May
28th we obtained some particularly clear photography of
the launch complex used for some of these new programs.
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This photograph shows one of the sites with a missile
ready for firing. Our latest photography on June 15
shows no missile on the pad. This puzzles us, because
we datected no ICBM firing activity in the intervening
period. The missile must have been pulled off the pad
because of some malfunction.
B. Recent satellite photography also has shown continued
construction progress on big space booster launch
facilities at Tyuratam. Some of these may be for
a manned lunar landing program.
/C. Soviet attempts to reconnoiter the moon continue
to be frustrated by failures. Lunik-6, launched
on June 8th, was the ninth straight failure since
the beginning of 1963. It was the fourth attempt
this year, and its timing also reflected a feeling
of urgency behind the Soviet effort.
D. The Soviets' own satellite reconnaissance program
is in full swing for this year. It resumed active
operations in March following a near standdown
during the poor lighting and weather conditions
of the winter months.
Cosmos 68, launched on June 15th, was the
seventh reconnaissance satellite this year.
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SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
strides since World War II in aircraft propulsion,
aerodynamics, and in the capacity and technological
level. of its aircraft industry.
A. Wartime damage was overcome by 1950 through use
of German prisoners of war and a high priority
for reconstruction. Since 1950, plants connected
with the aviation industry have been expanded
greatly, and that expansion continues.
V "l. Many of the plants have the large, high-bay
structures necessary for the design and
quantity production of modern aircraft.
There are now 24 airframe and 12 aircraft
engine plants, totaling about 77 million
square feet of space.
In the mid-1950's, the USSR began to emphasize
development and production of turbojet: and turboprop
transport aircraft. The outcome is highlighted in
the present Paris Air Show, which includes all the
major Soviet transport and cargo aircraft and
helicopters currently in production or under
development.
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C. The Soviets are not only supplying the civil
air fleets for themselves, and their satellites,
but are making a concerted effort to sell their
transports in the free world.
1. They are even entered in the intense
international rivalry to develop, build,
and sell a supersonic transport, and are
very probably trying to get their prototype
airborne ahead of the competing Anglo-French
CONCORDE SST.
D. Soviet aircraft design has emphasized simplicity
and economy of construction, at the expense of
performance, economy of operation, economy of
maintenance, passenger comfort, and safety
requirements. The airframes have extremely long
life, but the engine life of Soviet transports
has been extremely short in comparison to that of
comparable western aircraft.
II. The Soviet aircrt display in Paris include$ the TU-124
;? - ---a d AN '34 pas transports, the AN-12 cL "plane,
and the MI-6 he ' all of which are in series
p od ction and have been for some years. The long-range
Nod
D probably did not enter production until late 1964,
at which time the standard IL-18V was still being produced
for export.
A. They are also displaying four prototypes and one
model of aircraft still under development.
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D. TheklIL 62 prototype, a passenger transport, may enter
production late this year or early next year. We
already have some sales literature for it, in both
Russian and English. It will be placed on long-
distance national and international routes.
C. The TU'-134, also being shown in prototype, will
probably replace the TU-124 in production this
year, and may enter scheduled service with AEROFLOT
in 1966
.
D. The MI-10 FLYING CRANE helicopter was seen for the
first time in July, 1961, and since then minor
modifications have been incorporated into the design.
If the Soviets put the MI 10 into series production,
they will probably do so only in limited numbers.
III. The star of the show, judging by the headlines and press
notices, is the giant cargo version of the AN-22 transport,
designed by Antonov, which made a surprise appearance in
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A. The intelligence community has been aware of the
development of this aircraft since 1962, but the
Soviets have been conspicuously silent about it
until this week.
1. The first reference to an aircraft called the
AN-22 was in a classified Soviet military article in
1961, which we got in 1962. The article claimed
that the AN-22 would considerably increase the
future airlift capability of the airborne forces.
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. We found a new runway and a large final assembly
building under construction at Tashkent,
obviously for the giant aircraft--and the first
prototype was probably completed just after
midyear of 1964. Photography of Kiev in September
showed that the AN-22 had been sent to Antonov's
design bureau there for testing.
Incidentally, from the satellite photography of
Tashkent and the later Kiev intelligence, we
postulated the dimensions and performance charac-
teristics of the AN-22. Here is a series of sketches
we put together, and a comparison of our estimates
with the figures reported from Paris.
The AN-22, the world's largest aircraft, has four
turboprop engines of 15,000 horsepower, fitted with
counter-rotating propellors. The wing is mounted on
top of the fuselage. The tail assembly consists of
two huge rudders mounted on a horizontal stabilizer.
C. The six big dual landing-gears fold into pod-like
structures on the sides of the fuselage. The design
permits landings on dirt runways, and the4aircraft
requires a landing run of slightly more than 3,000 feet.
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D. The maximum range of the AN-22 is 6,600 miles non-stop
with a payload of 45 tons, or 3,100 miles with the
maximum payload of 80 tons at 420 miles per hour and
an altitude of 36,000 feet. (These figures are statute
miles, the comparison chart is in nautical miles.)
E. The mentions you may have read of 720 passengers
refer to a civil transport version which has not yet
been built, which is to have a double-decked fuselage
somewhat longer than the cargo version. The cargo
version has a fuselage 190 feet long and 19 to 22
feet in diameter, and a wingspan of about 210 feet.
for ex
ort
AN-22 will be read
claim th
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in 1967, but we believe this unlikely. The aircraft
is still undergoing flight tests, and apparently only
the one prototype has been built so far. Production
probably will not begin until next year.
IV. An even newer aircraft, the TU-144 SST, or supersonic
transport, was unveiled in the form of a model at the
Paris Air Show. Here are some photographs of that model.
VA. The TU-144 is a delta-wing aircraft similar in
appearance to the CONCORDE SST being developed by
the British and French. Four engines are to be mounted
under the wing. The aircraft is to have a capacity of
121 passengers, a speed of 1,550 m.p.h., range of
4,000 miles, and cruising altitude of 65,000 feet.
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VB. TASS says the TU-144 is to enter service in 1971,
which appears to be a reasonable target date.
A sign on the model in Paris says the prototype is
to fly in :1968. We think the Soviets will probably
try to beat the first flight of the CONCORDE,
scheduled for early 1968 but probably subject to
some slippage. The Soviets may make some effort
to put their SST over Moscow by November, 1967,
for the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution.
V. Efforts to sell Soviet transport aircraft in the Free World
have heretofore been directed primarily at the underdeveloped
countries, but with the Paris Air Show, they are apparently
shifting to the larger market in the industrialized West.
A. The main vehicle for the immediate future will probably
be the 186-seat IL-62, a four-engine jet transport
being offered for export next year, at a price which
the Soviets claim will be lower than that of the
British Super VC-10. (The British price is about $8 million
B. Moscow says it will offer discount prices for cash, and
accept payments in commodities from the underdeveloped
countries.
C. Aside from sales to Communist nations, the USSR has been
able to sell commercial transports (IL-14, IL-18, AN-24,
and TU-124) to the UAR, Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia, Ghana,
Guinea, and Mali. Ghana and Guinea are both dissatisfied
with the cost and maintenance problems of the IL-18, and
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D. As part of its effort to increase Soviet prestige
through aviation, the USSR has not only given
the leaders of a number of newly independent
countries plush IL-14 and IL-18 transports for
personal use---also MI-4 helicopters, but is
also working hard to get international air routes
to Tree World countries.
AEROFLOT now offers service to 27 countries,
and has applications filed for permission to
open a number of new routes, particularly in
Africa.
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THE CONCORDE SST PROGRAM
/dI. Development of the Concorde Supersonic Transport
(SST), the most significant of a number of joint
British-French programs, is well under way. The
goal for the test flights of the first prototype
is early 1968, with hopes of putting the planes in
service in 1971.
A. These goals--which represent a slippage of two
years from the original 1962 plans--still look
too optimistic.
- B. Thus the Europeans may lose one of their main
advantages--the lead-time they had over the US
program.
II. The tremendous costs are worrying the British; this
caused Wilson's new government to decide to pull out
of the program last fall. Labor later reversed this
decision after an uproar from Paris, but Wilson will
still have an eagle eye out for rising development
costs--which may force both countries to stretch the
program out over a longer period of time.
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A. Other slowdowns in Concorde might result from
unexpectedly lord research on the sonic boom
problem, where the Europeans are trailing the
US.
Up,to now, the orders for the US SST are out-running
those for the Concorde by about 2-1; there are ten-
tative orders for 96 US planes and 47 for the Concorde.
A. Foreign airlines are still holding back until they'
know more about tho respective planes; the market
is estimated to be for about 400 planes, of which
one-quarter to one-third would be ordered by
European airlines.
B. In coming months, there is likely to be much pres-
sure on European airlines to "buy European" and
take the Concorde. There is currently some pres-
sure on West Germany and Italy to play some part
in development.
Up to now, the urouean airlines have placed tech-
nical performance tyrst. With SST's costing over
$20 million each, they are likely to continue to
put quality ahead of politics.
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21 June 1965
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
I. In the Dominican Republic, the contending factions are
both busy studying the proposed solution made public
on June 18th by the three-man OAS committee. For the
moment, Santo Domingo is relatively quiet, but the
peace proposal came on the heels of two days of heavy
fighting between the rebels and troops of the Inter-
American Peace Force. The fighting resulted in three
US soldiers killed, and 37 Americans and five Brazilians
wounded. Rebel losses
own admission, and the
another 30 city blocks
with the rebel
The OAS committee,
representatives of
were substantially higher by their
fighting also cost the rebels
as US troops expanded the corridor
positions attacking them.
composed of Ambassador Bunker and
Brazil and El Salvador, has given
its proposal wide dissemination to the Dominican
public. The people apparently are ready for anything
that promises a quick return to normal life, but
neither side of the rebellion has accepted the OAS
formula officially.
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B. The OAS proposal is vaguely worded, and will probably
need some clarification, negotiation, and adjustment.
Basically, it calls for the creation of a provisional
government and an institutional act that will serve
as a provisional charter until a constitutional
assembly can be held.
1. It proposes an end to the fighting, and surrender
to the OAS of all arms held by civilians.
2. OAS-supervised elections are to be held in
six to nine months.
3. All leaders of democratic political parties are
to be allowed to return to the Dominican Republic
under OAS safeguards to participate in politics,
including elections.
4. All commercial and industrial establishments
are to be re-opened.
C. The OAS proposal was made public against a background
of apparent weakening of rebel morale. We have good
evidence of a falling-out even among the three
Communist parties, and the rebels have probably
been hit hard by the unexpectedly sharp response
to the sharp fighting they provoked on June 15th.
We believe this was probably an attempt to give them
grounds for a new appeal to the United Nations to
enlarge its involvement in the dispute.
II. Both Dominican regimes have continued their attempts to
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but neither side has had any outstanding
success to date.
A. In a sudden move to gain support, Imbert on
June first offered to let the OAS set the date
for elections that would be open to all non-
extremist candidates, and supervised by the OAS.
The rebels rejected the initiative as "another
Imbert farce." Imbert later retreated from his
proposal, saying that the "Caamano problem"
must be solved before any solution can be found.
B. Imbert appears to be under some pressure from
his military leaders to avoid concessions to
the rebels. They disapproved of his transfer
of the National Palace to OAS control and may
have been behind his refusal to allow the OAS
to control Radio Santo Domingo. Their reactions to
the OAS proposal vary, but most officers remain
inclined to achieve a more definitive military
defeat of the rebels.
C. On June 12 Imbert held a rally that attracted
8 to 10 thousand listeners. The overwhelming
proportion of them were from the working classes.
Many were brought in by the loyalist government
from the surrounding countryside.
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II. The rebels appear to be increasingly tense as the
stalemate continues. This is indicated by tightened
security measures in the rebel sector of Santo
Domingo, and by possible dissension between Caamano's
Communist backers and his supporters in Juan Bosch's
Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD).
A. Caamano is still
demanding a five-
point program as the basis for a settlement.
These include: retention of the 1963 Bosch
Constitution; maintenance of the Bosch-dominated
Congress; incorporation of rebel military leaders
into the military forces; a government of "Dem-
ocratic personalities" (probably excluding Im-
bert); and the immediate departure of the in-
terventionist forces. Imbert and his supporters
find the first four of these points unacceptable.
B. Communist influence among the rebels remains
strong. They are particularly active in rebel
paramilitary units and in propaganda activities.
In fact, one adviser to the Communists recommended
that they tone down their propaganda because its
Communist origin was too obvious.
C. The rebels have been increasing their propaganda
against the US, probably because they feel that
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the US is preventing a settlement favorable
to them. The large (6-10,000) rebel rally
on June 5th vociferously stressed an anti-US
theme.
D. The rebels held a demonstration on June 14th
that was in effect co-sponsored by the
pro-Castro Fourteenth of June group (APCJ)
and Caamano's government. Several Communists
spoke, including one who advocated taking
the revolution into the interior. The fact
that the rebel government co-sponsored thi
demonstration indicates the degree to which
they are responsive to Communists and other
extremists, who, it is estimated, make up
about 65% of the rebel paramilitary units.
III. Exiled President Juan Bosch has continued, from
his haven in Puerto Rico, to guide rebel leaders
and to boost the morale of rebel forces through
recorded speeches urging the people to maintain
the struggle. He has begun getting reports from his
political lieutenants in Santo Domingo, however,
that many of his followers are tired of fighting
and want a settlement.
A. Bosch now is advising rebel leaders how to
handle negotiations; he :apparently plans to
modify rather than reject the OAS proposals.
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IV. The Latin American contingents in the Inter-American
Peace Force now patrol much of the International
Security Zone. The Brazilian troops in particular
seem to be very effective.
A. There now are 1,200 Brazilians, 250 Hundurans,
160 Nicaraguans, 21 Costa Ricans, and three
men from El Salvador, under the command of a
Brazilian general, Hugo Panasco Alvim. A
company of Paraguayans is coming soon.
B. The US force now totals 12,400 men. Our
casualties to date have been 25 dead and
160 wounded.
V. There have been sporadic outbreaks of violence
in the Dominican interior. These have included
attacks on police stations and army posts.
A. The outlook is for more violence, but rebel
capabilities may be more limited than we
believed. Monday, June 14, was the anni-
versary of the abortive 1959 Castro-backed
invasion against Trujillo, from which the
Fourteenth of June Political Group, a major
supporter of Caamano, takes its name. The
APCJ was expected to attempt to celebrate
with demonstrations throughout the country,
but Monday, except for the rally in the capital,
was fairly quiet.
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I. Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella-.-who in 1964 was
made a "hero of the Soviet Union and was awarded
the Lenin Peace Prize--was overthrown on June 19th
by a well-organized military coup staged by the
Deputy Premier, Defense Minister Houari Boumedienne.
A. Boumedienne reportedly was helped by three
former ministers whom Ben Bella had dismissed.
B. The Algerian people apparently accepted the turn-
over; the country remains calm. In the past two
years there has been increasing disillusion over
the regime's failure to get the economy moving
and reduce unemployment.
C. The only expressed opposition has come from an
organization of Algerian emigres which denounced
the coup as a "fascist" plot.
II. Boumedienne, a former school teacher who was educated in
Cairo, has established a Revolutionary Council. Al-
though its precise composition is not yet known, presum-
ably it will carry over most of the Ben Bella cabinet
except a few who have been arrested.
A. The council decided on Sunday that a new government
would not be formed until after the Second Afro-
Asian Conference, which is supposed to meet June 29.
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held on schedule now.
III. Ben Bella achieved power in 1962 largely through
Boumedienne's support. Friction has been noted be-
tween the two for the past two years. Boumedienne
has objected to Ben Bella's extreme leftward swing,
his close relations with France, his attempts to
isolate Boumedienne henchmen such as the former in-
terior minister and the foreign minister, his recent
"deal" with Berber dissidents in the Kabylie, and
ultimately a Ben Bella order to arrest some 150 opponents.
IV. The new regime has announced that it will not change
the policies of nonalignment and support for liberation
groups. However, it is likely to pay more attention
to the faltering Algerian economy than to foreign
ventures, especially in Black Africa. Boumedienne
is likely to orient Algeria more toward the Arab
Middle East, and may establish a regime similar to
that of Nasir's Egypt.
V. The Foreign Ministry does not intend to solicit recog-
nition. Algeria will consider recognition is de facto
A. Communist China, Indonesia, and Syria have already
declared their formal recognition.
B. Some small improvement in relations with the US may
be anticipated. The foreign minister has assured
the US Ambassador that he wants "fruitful coopera-
tion with the US," and that even though Algeria
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wants good relations with states like Cuba, it would
not permit these relations "to be used as a provo-
cation." He may ask that US aid be continued. It is
about to terminate. It amounted to about $35,000,000
a year and was feeding one-third of Algeria's popu-
lation.
C. The coup probably will delay a petroleum accord
with France, which was about to be signed after
18 months of negotiations.
D. Morocco and Tunisia--who regard Boumedienne as a
determined, malevolent extremist--are uneasy.
Both had backed Ben Bella as the lesser of possible
evils. Both can be expected to press for increased
US and western military assistance.
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