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December 16, 2016
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December 27, 2004
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June 21, 1965
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Approved For Releas TOIT e 20g5/0A/E0.: 025R000500210002-6 25X1 25X1 DC I BRIEFING FOR SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE C O N T E N T S Pa ge The B-52 Strike 1 South Vietnam Military Developments 4 South Vietnam Political Developments 8 North Vietnam 12 SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY 17 SOVIET AIRCRAFT 19 Anglo-French CONCORDE 26 DOMINICAN REDUBLIC 28 ALGERIA 34 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Release 200 NOR 82 R0002P R000500210002-6 If I may start with South Vietnam, I would like to deal first with the results of the strike by B-52 bombers from Guam last Friday at that Viet Cong base area about 10 miles northnorthwest of Ben Cat. A.F a--sl ^ V-ie-v t o t ka t t ire be 1be s--4-i!d any damage to-?he inst X1 *-i t ' 1. been able to check only a small portion of the area bombed---the teams that went in had time only to cover areas with about 45 bomb craters, and we know there are about 900, so by rule of thumb we can estimate that the ground teams covered about five percent of the ground. 2. This is an area where the Viet Cong have been so secure that for several years the South Vietnamese have been unable to penetrate in force. The air strike, however, made the Viet Cong pull out so fast that these small reconnaissance units of about 50 men each, led by US special'-forces personnel, were able to reconnoiter the area for some four hours. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-PQR82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Rele DQ0T) Mar. se 2005701706 : (I 3. One training camp consisting of classroom buildings and bunkers, which had apparently been occupied by a Viet Cong battalion, had been evacuated so recently that there was still warm rice and tea on the tables. B. The first team, zigzagging through jungle so dense that visibility was cut to 10 to 15 feet, found three large storage buildings and some smaller ones believed to be command posts, with an extensive system of entrenchments, bunkers, and tunnels. C. The second team covered the central portion of the target area with the classrooms I mentioned. The whole area was interlaced with ventilated tunnels. D. The third team found three company-sized bivouac areas with rice stores, a new trench system with underground shelters, and anti-aircraft sites. E. All three teams received Viet Cong sniper fire, but destroyed all the installations and supplies they found, using explosives and grenades. When they ran out of explosives, they called in an air strike on one area and noted a secondary explosion. 1. The teams found stocks of uniforms, a printing press, and a number of documents. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 25X1 Approved For Release 200W0 0025R000500210002-6 25X1 The MACV report on the air strike and the ensuing ground reconnaissance states that the operation "is considered successful from this end." 1. The report stresses the small portion of the target area which the teams could cover and adds: "The damage and casualties which may have occurred in the remainder are, of course, conjecture, but the law of averages indicates they should be heavy." II. Incidentally, according to CINCPACFLT, on Sunday a Soviet trawler was busy in the area where one of the B-52's crashed off the northwest coast of Luzon, apparently grappling for the wreckage. The depth of the ocean in this area is about 2,000 fathoms, leaving little prospect that the Soviet ship can recover any wreckage, but the message said that if the Soviets persisted they would be warned that the wreckage is US property. Approved For Release 20010'I/08E~T DP82R0002 R000500210002-6 25X1 25X1 'Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 SOUTH VIETNAM MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS III. In South Vietnam, the expected summer offensive by the Viet Cong is clearly under way. During the past week, major operations have tapered off, but we expect the Viet Cong will initiate a new round of heavy fighting at any moment. The major focus has been shifting back and forth between the provinces in the north of the country, and those just north and northeast of Saigon. There are still large Viet Cong concentrations in both areas which have not been committed. A. The most significant action of the Viet Cong campaign to date took place around the district capital of Dong Xoai, about 60 miles north of Saigon in Phuoc Long Province. 1. On June 9th, a Viet Cong regiment--believed to be the same one which briefly overran the provincial capital at Song Be a month ago-- attacked and overran Long Xoai, as well as a nearby Special Forces camp where 20 Ameri- cans were based, 2. The Communists were finally dislodged from the town on June 11th by a Ranger battalion flown into the area, but only after the Viet Cong had destroyed one government relief Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 TOP SECR battalion and had received a major pound- ing from US and Vietnamese air strikes. 4. On June 12th, a South Vietnamese airborne battalion sent to help pursue the Viet Cong was ambushed in a rubber plantation near bong Xoai, losing about two-thirds of its complement. 5. It will be some time before we caw have ac- curate casualty totals. In one area, for instance, 400 bodies have been found, but not it hasnyet been possible to determine how many were Viet Cong and how many were govern- ment soldiers. US losses were seven killed, 15 wounded, and 12 missing. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release'200M IM . CIA DP82R0 025R000500210002-6 x Approved For Rele B. The Communists may be trying to seize the local plantations to establish a major base area in Phuoc Long Province. We have no indication that the Communist regiment involved in the Dong Xoai operation has withdrawn, suggests they may have swung 20 miles north for another crack at Song Be, the provincial capital. C. Earlier, at the beginning of June, at least three government battalions, one of them a marine reserve unit, were rendered combat in- effective during a major Viet Cong regimental assault around Ba Gia, a government outpost in Quang Ngai Province in the north. 1. This battle came on the heels of wide- ranging attacks on major land-communica- tions, marking a sudden shift of Viet Cong action to the northern provinces. 2. It was followed up, in the first week of June, by a series of 12 successful Viet Cong ambushes, primarily in the highlands bordering Laos and Cambodia. TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Rele 3. A Viet Cong who defected on June 3rd in the highlands province of Phu Bon claimed to be from North Vietnam's 325th Division, and alleged that all three of the division's infantry regiments are now in Kontum, Pleiku, and Phu Bon provinces. His state- ments are not confirmed, but sizeable forces were clearly involved in recent ambushes in all three provinces. D. These heavy Viet Cong attacks and ambushes have seriously depleted the government's limited general reserve. At the time of the Dong Xoai battle, at least five of the 11 battalions of the general reserve were either crippled or needed in Saigon. Most of the rest are committed in the north. Although the US paratroop battalion which was flown to a nearby staging airfield was not committed at Dong Xoai, we can expect increasing calls from the Vietnamese for commitment of our units in response to major Viet Cong attacks. F. US strength in South Vietnam now amounts to about 53,500 men. About 21,000 of these are listed as combat forces. An Australian infantry battalion has arrived, and South Korea is thinking of sending a full division. -?- Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 TOP SE 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 F. While we cannot yet be sure how extensive the Viet Cong offensive will be this summer, we are inclined to believe that the Viet Cong will stick to--but intensify--their existing patterns of classic guerrilla activity designed to isolate and erode government forces. They are, however, showing increased willingness to engage in oc- casional set-piece battles despite the govern- ment's ability to counter with air power. SOUTH VIVTNAMVSV POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IV. The resignation of the Quat government in Saigon on June 11th and the resumption of authority by the military confronts South Vietnam with another in- ternal shakeup at a time when the generals have their hands full militarily. TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 A. This time, the generals stepped back in at the request of the civilian leadership. Premier Quat was attempting to reshuffle his cabinet, and the Chief of State, Suu, refused on constitu- tional grounds to let Quat dismiss two ministers who had refused to resign. B. The opposition to Quat was led by militant Catholics who accused Quat of favoring the Bud- dhists and leaning to neutralism, and by southern regionalists who felt they were not given an adequate share of the government, They were agitating for Quat's removal, and Quat himself, feeling that he did not have enough support to govern, asked the military to step in and mediate the impasse. C. The generals had been showing growing impatience with the government stalemate, and they responded to Quat's request by resuming control. On Saturday, after a week of consultations, the generals announced a new regime which will permit strong military supervision of governmental affairs in South Vietnam. There is a Congress of the Armed Forces composed of all the generals, the corps commanders, and the division commanders. -9- TOP SECRET Approved For Releasi-20-0-610-1 106 - Q A LR89R( 0025R000500210002-6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2 0025R000500210002-6 I al~~ 25X1 D. In the name of this Congress, a smaller group of senior generals will be responsible for day-to-day supervision of governmental affairs. E. The executive function will be carried out by a largely civilian cabinet, including seven holdovers from the Quat government, headed by Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky. Ky, the colorful, impulsive and young prime minister, gave a colorful acceptance speech Saturday in which he called for total mobilization to defeat the Communists. He warned war profiteers and the regional, religious, and political interest groups that there would be severe punishments if they continued to place their interests against those of the country. G. The speech bore out earlier indications that most of the generals are bent on a regime which will place strong emphasis on austerity and national discipline. It remains to be seen, however, whether even a more dictatorial regime with a militant appeal can resolve the deep divisions among the South Vietnamese. V/ H. H. The Buddhists and Catholics are both reacting warily to the return of military rule. The Buddhists find it hard to swallow appointment of a Catholic, General Thieu, to the dual position of chief of state and chairman of the ruling military group. The Catholics, for their part Approv~8rafel~~sl / S~I~~F?~2Ft151~~U~~~L- ' TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved For Releq 1AIRDP82 working through their favorite generals, will still be the dominant force in Vietnamese politics. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Release NORTH VIETNAM 25X1 V. In North Vietnam, we have now found four surface-to-air missile sites, all of them 10 to 15 miles from Hanoi. At least three of them are still under construction. A. 6nly one of the sites has any equipment in evidence, and our reconnaissance has detected no missiles. B. A Soviet diplomat recently said that there are also SAM sites around the port city of Haiphong. We have no evidence to support this, but weather has prevented good photography of the Haiphong area for about a month. VI. The latest photography shows eight IL-28 BEAGLE jet light bombers in North Vietnam, all of them flown in across China from the Soviet Union. A. There are also 69 MIG-15 or MIG-17 jet fighters, and a few more being assembled. 1. Another Soviet diplomat has hinted that some of the jet fighters are being flown by Soviet pilots. We have no evidence that they are flying combat missions, and we believe that there are enough trained North Vietnamese pilots to handle the aircraft on hand. , however, that Soviet 25X1 pilots are flying aircraft in North Vietnam. They are probably checking out newly-arrived. Approved ForaSWG 20,0501/MeCO4 [1PM0 5F *O(MOD21.0002-6 -12- TOP SECRE Approved For Rele se -RDP82RO 025R000500210002-6 B. The first engagement with MIG jets over North Vietnam since April 4th came on June 4th, when four MIGs jumped two of our Navy fighters flying a protective patrol about 30 miles south of Hanoi. The MIGs fired unguided air-to-air missiles which missed. One of our pilots obtained a radar lock-on, but his missile malfunctioned, and the MIGs broke contact. 1. On June 17, two Navy jets, again on protective atrol, picked up four MIGs on their radar about 40 miles south of Hanoi, closed, and shot down two with air-to-air missiles. a third MIG did not get home. We had no losses, but the Communists claim they shot down our two aircraft. 2. On June 20, a US piston-engine fighter-bomber shot down a MIG fighter. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 C. The Soviets are apparently also providing the North Vietnamese with more effective radars, and possibly antiaircraft guns. D. The latest phase of our air attacks on North Vietnam involves some economic targets, such as thermal power plants and port facilities, and A few of the targets are north of the 20th par- allel. The major emphasis continues to be on military targets and transportation facilities. 101. The North Vietnamese are using ferries.. to replace destroyed bridges. This requires from the northern part of the country are being moved south to repair roads and bridges. E. In early June we received additional indications that the North Vietnames3, for the present at lighter loads, and more trucks. least, are completely. uninterested in negotiations. The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, talking to the chief of the Canadian ICC delegation, simply repeated the standard Hanoi "Four Points," which center on the complete withdrawal of the US mili- tary presence in South Vietnam. -14- 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 II. Peiping is probably quite optimistic about Communist prospects in South Vietnam, and the Chinese are al- most certainly encouraging the DRV and Viet Cong to keep the pressure on--and possibly to step up the pace of the war. A. Peiping's recent actions suggest that the Chinese believe this course has increased the chances of a US escalation which might involve air strikes against targets inside China. In the past few weeks Peiping has made a concerted effort to deter the US by a series of new warnings concern- ing the possible consequences. 1. Chinese propaganda, and private statements by leaders in Peiping, have apparently been calculated to underscore earlier threats that Communist China might become more di- rectly involved, and would respond to blows against China by launching a Korean-type war in Southeast Asia. 2. There is, however, no evidence that the Chi- nese are making active preparations for in- tervention of this sort at the present time. 25X1 TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Releas0W B. These warnings have been accompanied by increased civil defense preparations, which probably reflect genuine Chinese fears that the warnings may have no effect. 1. a decision was made about mid-May to step up civil defense measures, especially in southern regions. 2. Plans to evacuate nonessential citizens to the countryside have been reported from half a dozen cities. A number of cities are known to be holding air raid drills and building air raid shelters. 3. The Civil Defense preparations we have noted so far should not be taken as signs that the Chinese intend to initiate a major new military action in Southeast Asia. No unusual troop deployments have been detected in South China, and the Chinese mil- itary posture in general appears defensive. 4. The continuing rail disruptions in South China prob- ably reflect priority shipment of military freight to North Vietnam from China and the USSR. They are not of a magnitude which would suggest any major Chi- nese troop movement. -16- 1 -1 TOP SVCRE 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For ReIdX* 2316L 6 : CIA-RDP82R0 025R000500210002-6 25X1 SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY I. We are watching the activities of Soviet military forces even more closely than usual, because of the Vietnam situation. !/ a Generally, the activities of Soviet strategic strike forces, as well as ground and air defense forces, appear to be at normal levels for this time of year. Soviet forces have been exercising in East Germany and the Western USSR. VB. Recently as many as 18 submarines have been active outside home waters at one time. This is a high level of out-of-area submarine activity, but there does not appear to be-any significant change in the areas where they are operating. We do not see any activity which is ominous in relation to the international situation. II. Soviet missile testing and space programs are very active. A. At least four ICBM development and modification programs are in progress at the Tyuratam test rangehead. On May 28th we obtained some particularly clear photography of the launch complex used for some of these new programs. -17- Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Relet2/96 This photograph shows one of the sites with a missile ready for firing. Our latest photography on June 15 shows no missile on the pad. This puzzles us, because we datected no ICBM firing activity in the intervening period. The missile must have been pulled off the pad because of some malfunction. B. Recent satellite photography also has shown continued construction progress on big space booster launch facilities at Tyuratam. Some of these may be for a manned lunar landing program. /C. Soviet attempts to reconnoiter the moon continue to be frustrated by failures. Lunik-6, launched on June 8th, was the ninth straight failure since the beginning of 1963. It was the fourth attempt this year, and its timing also reflected a feeling of urgency behind the Soviet effort. D. The Soviets' own satellite reconnaissance program is in full swing for this year. It resumed active operations in March following a near standdown during the poor lighting and weather conditions of the winter months. Cosmos 68, launched on June 15th, was the seventh reconnaissance satellite this year. TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01 /0. 8 - 5R000500210002-6 TOP SECRET Approved For Release /0 ~ono~0025R000500210002-6 SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT strides since World War II in aircraft propulsion, aerodynamics, and in the capacity and technological level. of its aircraft industry. A. Wartime damage was overcome by 1950 through use of German prisoners of war and a high priority for reconstruction. Since 1950, plants connected with the aviation industry have been expanded greatly, and that expansion continues. V "l. Many of the plants have the large, high-bay structures necessary for the design and quantity production of modern aircraft. There are now 24 airframe and 12 aircraft engine plants, totaling about 77 million square feet of space. In the mid-1950's, the USSR began to emphasize development and production of turbojet: and turboprop transport aircraft. The outcome is highlighted in the present Paris Air Show, which includes all the major Soviet transport and cargo aircraft and helicopters currently in production or under development. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/069 CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Relp pe g , q C. The Soviets are not only supplying the civil air fleets for themselves, and their satellites, but are making a concerted effort to sell their transports in the free world. 1. They are even entered in the intense international rivalry to develop, build, and sell a supersonic transport, and are very probably trying to get their prototype airborne ahead of the competing Anglo-French CONCORDE SST. D. Soviet aircraft design has emphasized simplicity and economy of construction, at the expense of performance, economy of operation, economy of maintenance, passenger comfort, and safety requirements. The airframes have extremely long life, but the engine life of Soviet transports has been extremely short in comparison to that of comparable western aircraft. II. The Soviet aircrt display in Paris include$ the TU-124 ;? - ---a d AN '34 pas transports, the AN-12 cL "plane, and the MI-6 he ' all of which are in series p od ction and have been for some years. The long-range Nod D probably did not enter production until late 1964, at which time the standard IL-18V was still being produced for export. A. They are also displaying four prototypes and one model of aircraft still under development. Approved For Release 2005/011U97CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 25X1 Approved For RelI ,e g 9 0p : CIA-RDP82F OOO25R000500210002-6 25X1 D. TheklIL 62 prototype, a passenger transport, may enter production late this year or early next year. We already have some sales literature for it, in both Russian and English. It will be placed on long- distance national and international routes. C. The TU'-134, also being shown in prototype, will probably replace the TU-124 in production this year, and may enter scheduled service with AEROFLOT in 1966 . D. The MI-10 FLYING CRANE helicopter was seen for the first time in July, 1961, and since then minor modifications have been incorporated into the design. If the Soviets put the MI 10 into series production, they will probably do so only in limited numbers. III. The star of the show, judging by the headlines and press notices, is the giant cargo version of the AN-22 transport, designed by Antonov, which made a surprise appearance in cl~~__ rTPU4- A. The intelligence community has been aware of the development of this aircraft since 1962, but the Soviets have been conspicuously silent about it until this week. 1. The first reference to an aircraft called the AN-22 was in a classified Soviet military article in 1961, which we got in 1962. The article claimed that the AN-22 would considerably increase the future airlift capability of the airborne forces. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 2~IA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved Fo a Di/ 1/06: CIA-RDP8 25X1 25X1 . We found a new runway and a large final assembly building under construction at Tashkent, obviously for the giant aircraft--and the first prototype was probably completed just after midyear of 1964. Photography of Kiev in September showed that the AN-22 had been sent to Antonov's design bureau there for testing. Incidentally, from the satellite photography of Tashkent and the later Kiev intelligence, we postulated the dimensions and performance charac- teristics of the AN-22. Here is a series of sketches we put together, and a comparison of our estimates with the figures reported from Paris. The AN-22, the world's largest aircraft, has four turboprop engines of 15,000 horsepower, fitted with counter-rotating propellors. The wing is mounted on top of the fuselage. The tail assembly consists of two huge rudders mounted on a horizontal stabilizer. C. The six big dual landing-gears fold into pod-like structures on the sides of the fuselage. The design permits landings on dirt runways, and the4aircraft requires a landing run of slightly more than 3,000 feet. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 -22- TOP SECHFT 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/ QlA-RQP 025R000500210002-6 J D. The maximum range of the AN-22 is 6,600 miles non-stop with a payload of 45 tons, or 3,100 miles with the maximum payload of 80 tons at 420 miles per hour and an altitude of 36,000 feet. (These figures are statute miles, the comparison chart is in nautical miles.) E. The mentions you may have read of 720 passengers refer to a civil transport version which has not yet been built, which is to have a double-decked fuselage somewhat longer than the cargo version. The cargo version has a fuselage 190 feet long and 19 to 22 feet in diameter, and a wingspan of about 210 feet. for ex ort AN-22 will be read claim th ~' Th So i t p y . v e e s e in 1967, but we believe this unlikely. The aircraft is still undergoing flight tests, and apparently only the one prototype has been built so far. Production probably will not begin until next year. IV. An even newer aircraft, the TU-144 SST, or supersonic transport, was unveiled in the form of a model at the Paris Air Show. Here are some photographs of that model. VA. The TU-144 is a delta-wing aircraft similar in appearance to the CONCORDE SST being developed by the British and French. Four engines are to be mounted under the wing. The aircraft is to have a capacity of 121 passengers, a speed of 1,550 m.p.h., range of 4,000 miles, and cruising altitude of 65,000 feet. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 23lA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Rp ase - 00025R000500210002-6 VB. TASS says the TU-144 is to enter service in 1971, which appears to be a reasonable target date. A sign on the model in Paris says the prototype is to fly in :1968. We think the Soviets will probably try to beat the first flight of the CONCORDE, scheduled for early 1968 but probably subject to some slippage. The Soviets may make some effort to put their SST over Moscow by November, 1967, for the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution. V. Efforts to sell Soviet transport aircraft in the Free World have heretofore been directed primarily at the underdeveloped countries, but with the Paris Air Show, they are apparently shifting to the larger market in the industrialized West. A. The main vehicle for the immediate future will probably be the 186-seat IL-62, a four-engine jet transport being offered for export next year, at a price which the Soviets claim will be lower than that of the British Super VC-10. (The British price is about $8 million B. Moscow says it will offer discount prices for cash, and accept payments in commodities from the underdeveloped countries. C. Aside from sales to Communist nations, the USSR has been able to sell commercial transports (IL-14, IL-18, AN-24, and TU-124) to the UAR, Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Ghana and Guinea are both dissatisfied with the cost and maintenance problems of the IL-18, and Ap~FBve F3'oP Ieaose v5M1/fW' G9X P82 OOb25R000500210002-6 25X1 Approved For R"sitg /06 : CIA-RDP82R0 025R000500210002-6 25X1 D. As part of its effort to increase Soviet prestige through aviation, the USSR has not only given the leaders of a number of newly independent countries plush IL-14 and IL-18 transports for personal use---also MI-4 helicopters, but is also working hard to get international air routes to Tree World countries. AEROFLOT now offers service to 27 countries, and has applications filed for permission to open a number of new routes, particularly in Africa. Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 SECRET 25X1 THE CONCORDE SST PROGRAM /dI. Development of the Concorde Supersonic Transport (SST), the most significant of a number of joint British-French programs, is well under way. The goal for the test flights of the first prototype is early 1968, with hopes of putting the planes in service in 1971. A. These goals--which represent a slippage of two years from the original 1962 plans--still look too optimistic. - B. Thus the Europeans may lose one of their main advantages--the lead-time they had over the US program. II. The tremendous costs are worrying the British; this caused Wilson's new government to decide to pull out of the program last fall. Labor later reversed this decision after an uproar from Paris, but Wilson will still have an eagle eye out for rising development costs--which may force both countries to stretch the program out over a longer period of time. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Relea - 00025R000500210002-6 A. Other slowdowns in Concorde might result from unexpectedly lord research on the sonic boom problem, where the Europeans are trailing the US. Up,to now, the orders for the US SST are out-running those for the Concorde by about 2-1; there are ten- tative orders for 96 US planes and 47 for the Concorde. A. Foreign airlines are still holding back until they' know more about tho respective planes; the market is estimated to be for about 400 planes, of which one-quarter to one-third would be ordered by European airlines. B. In coming months, there is likely to be much pres- sure on European airlines to "buy European" and take the Concorde. There is currently some pres- sure on West Germany and Italy to play some part in development. Up to now, the urouean airlines have placed tech- nical performance tyrst. With SST's costing over $20 million each, they are likely to continue to put quality ahead of politics. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Approved For Release 2W5@1(p6R; CJAqRDP82R00025R000500210002-6 21 June 1965 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC I. In the Dominican Republic, the contending factions are both busy studying the proposed solution made public on June 18th by the three-man OAS committee. For the moment, Santo Domingo is relatively quiet, but the peace proposal came on the heels of two days of heavy fighting between the rebels and troops of the Inter- American Peace Force. The fighting resulted in three US soldiers killed, and 37 Americans and five Brazilians wounded. Rebel losses own admission, and the another 30 city blocks with the rebel The OAS committee, representatives of were substantially higher by their fighting also cost the rebels as US troops expanded the corridor positions attacking them. composed of Ambassador Bunker and Brazil and El Salvador, has given its proposal wide dissemination to the Dominican public. The people apparently are ready for anything that promises a quick return to normal life, but neither side of the rebellion has accepted the OAS formula officially. 28- S E C R E T Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 25X1 Approved For Release 290gl0v0w : f lk,,RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 B. The OAS proposal is vaguely worded, and will probably need some clarification, negotiation, and adjustment. Basically, it calls for the creation of a provisional government and an institutional act that will serve as a provisional charter until a constitutional assembly can be held. 1. It proposes an end to the fighting, and surrender to the OAS of all arms held by civilians. 2. OAS-supervised elections are to be held in six to nine months. 3. All leaders of democratic political parties are to be allowed to return to the Dominican Republic under OAS safeguards to participate in politics, including elections. 4. All commercial and industrial establishments are to be re-opened. C. The OAS proposal was made public against a background of apparent weakening of rebel morale. We have good evidence of a falling-out even among the three Communist parties, and the rebels have probably been hit hard by the unexpectedly sharp response to the sharp fighting they provoked on June 15th. We believe this was probably an attempt to give them grounds for a new appeal to the United Nations to enlarge its involvement in the dispute. II. Both Dominican regimes have continued their attempts to mobA piro mass Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RP 82R00025R000500210002-6 ppor t rough rallies and demonstrations, Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 but neither side has had any outstanding success to date. A. In a sudden move to gain support, Imbert on June first offered to let the OAS set the date for elections that would be open to all non- extremist candidates, and supervised by the OAS. The rebels rejected the initiative as "another Imbert farce." Imbert later retreated from his proposal, saying that the "Caamano problem" must be solved before any solution can be found. B. Imbert appears to be under some pressure from his military leaders to avoid concessions to the rebels. They disapproved of his transfer of the National Palace to OAS control and may have been behind his refusal to allow the OAS to control Radio Santo Domingo. Their reactions to the OAS proposal vary, but most officers remain inclined to achieve a more definitive military defeat of the rebels. C. On June 12 Imbert held a rally that attracted 8 to 10 thousand listeners. The overwhelming proportion of them were from the working classes. Many were brought in by the loyalist government from the surrounding countryside. -30- 25X1 59 Approved For Release - 25R000500210002-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 II. The rebels appear to be increasingly tense as the stalemate continues. This is indicated by tightened security measures in the rebel sector of Santo Domingo, and by possible dissension between Caamano's Communist backers and his supporters in Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). A. Caamano is still demanding a five- point program as the basis for a settlement. These include: retention of the 1963 Bosch Constitution; maintenance of the Bosch-dominated Congress; incorporation of rebel military leaders into the military forces; a government of "Dem- ocratic personalities" (probably excluding Im- bert); and the immediate departure of the in- terventionist forces. Imbert and his supporters find the first four of these points unacceptable. B. Communist influence among the rebels remains strong. They are particularly active in rebel paramilitary units and in propaganda activities. In fact, one adviser to the Communists recommended that they tone down their propaganda because its Communist origin was too obvious. C. The rebels have been increasing their propaganda against the US, probably because they feel that -31- Approved For Release 2005/0 RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/0e R -RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 the US is preventing a settlement favorable to them. The large (6-10,000) rebel rally on June 5th vociferously stressed an anti-US theme. D. The rebels held a demonstration on June 14th that was in effect co-sponsored by the pro-Castro Fourteenth of June group (APCJ) and Caamano's government. Several Communists spoke, including one who advocated taking the revolution into the interior. The fact that the rebel government co-sponsored thi demonstration indicates the degree to which they are responsive to Communists and other extremists, who, it is estimated, make up about 65% of the rebel paramilitary units. III. Exiled President Juan Bosch has continued, from his haven in Puerto Rico, to guide rebel leaders and to boost the morale of rebel forces through recorded speeches urging the people to maintain the struggle. He has begun getting reports from his political lieutenants in Santo Domingo, however, that many of his followers are tired of fighting and want a settlement. A. Bosch now is advising rebel leaders how to handle negotiations; he :apparently plans to modify rather than reject the OAS proposals. -32- Approved For Release 2005/01 I -RDP82R00025RQ00500210002-6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/91/JD6C CtA-DP82R00025R000500210002-6 IV. The Latin American contingents in the Inter-American Peace Force now patrol much of the International Security Zone. The Brazilian troops in particular seem to be very effective. A. There now are 1,200 Brazilians, 250 Hundurans, 160 Nicaraguans, 21 Costa Ricans, and three men from El Salvador, under the command of a Brazilian general, Hugo Panasco Alvim. A company of Paraguayans is coming soon. B. The US force now totals 12,400 men. Our casualties to date have been 25 dead and 160 wounded. V. There have been sporadic outbreaks of violence in the Dominican interior. These have included attacks on police stations and army posts. A. The outlook is for more violence, but rebel capabilities may be more limited than we believed. Monday, June 14, was the anni- versary of the abortive 1959 Castro-backed invasion against Trujillo, from which the Fourteenth of June Political Group, a major supporter of Caamano, takes its name. The APCJ was expected to attempt to celebrate with demonstrations throughout the country, but Monday, except for the rally in the capital, was fairly quiet. -33- Approved For Releas - 25R000500210002-6 S E C R E T 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/SBC-R -bP82R00025R000500210002-6 I. Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella-.-who in 1964 was made a "hero of the Soviet Union and was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize--was overthrown on June 19th by a well-organized military coup staged by the Deputy Premier, Defense Minister Houari Boumedienne. A. Boumedienne reportedly was helped by three former ministers whom Ben Bella had dismissed. B. The Algerian people apparently accepted the turn- over; the country remains calm. In the past two years there has been increasing disillusion over the regime's failure to get the economy moving and reduce unemployment. C. The only expressed opposition has come from an organization of Algerian emigres which denounced the coup as a "fascist" plot. II. Boumedienne, a former school teacher who was educated in Cairo, has established a Revolutionary Council. Al- though its precise composition is not yet known, presum- ably it will carry over most of the Ben Bella cabinet except a few who have been arrested. A. The council decided on Sunday that a new government would not be formed until after the Second Afro- Asian Conference, which is supposed to meet June 29. App MN FR R ash ~ W/bO3 F&Mkgd&3RM 21&O& be SECRET Approved For Release 2005/SBCR& P82R00025R000500210002-6 held on schedule now. III. Ben Bella achieved power in 1962 largely through Boumedienne's support. Friction has been noted be- tween the two for the past two years. Boumedienne has objected to Ben Bella's extreme leftward swing, his close relations with France, his attempts to isolate Boumedienne henchmen such as the former in- terior minister and the foreign minister, his recent "deal" with Berber dissidents in the Kabylie, and ultimately a Ben Bella order to arrest some 150 opponents. IV. The new regime has announced that it will not change the policies of nonalignment and support for liberation groups. However, it is likely to pay more attention to the faltering Algerian economy than to foreign ventures, especially in Black Africa. Boumedienne is likely to orient Algeria more toward the Arab Middle East, and may establish a regime similar to that of Nasir's Egypt. V. The Foreign Ministry does not intend to solicit recog- nition. Algeria will consider recognition is de facto A. Communist China, Indonesia, and Syria have already declared their formal recognition. B. Some small improvement in relations with the US may be anticipated. The foreign minister has assured the US Ambassador that he wants "fruitful coopera- tion with the US," and that even though Algeria Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : X-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 .J 0- SECRET Approved For Release 2005/&C ZbP82R00025R000500210002-6 wants good relations with states like Cuba, it would not permit these relations "to be used as a provo- cation." He may ask that US aid be continued. It is about to terminate. It amounted to about $35,000,000 a year and was feeding one-third of Algeria's popu- lation. C. The coup probably will delay a petroleum accord with France, which was about to be signed after 18 months of negotiations. D. Morocco and Tunisia--who regard Boumedienne as a determined, malevolent extremist--are uneasy. Both had backed Ben Bella as the lesser of possible evils. Both can be expected to press for increased US and western military assistance. -36- Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500210002-6