INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000600090005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 21, 1965
• Content Type: NOTES

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/21 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000600090005-6
BRIEFII'T NOTES
FOR DCI
(MAP, INDONESIA)
I, In Indonesia, President Sukarno and the army are
continuing to maneuver for position in the after-
math of the left wing coup attempt of September 30th.
A. There are now essentially two governments in
Indonesia. One is headed by Sukarno, and the
other consists of the top army leadership.
These two factions are competing for power,
but for the moment they need each other.
They also fear that there will be civil war
if they come to outright and open opposition.
1. The army needs Sukarno's name and his
unifying influence to consolidate its
position, and particularly to control the
political situation in central Java, where
the Communists have accumulated considerable
strength.
2. Sukarno, for his part, appears reluctant
to face up to the. army leaders until he
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can rehabilitate the Indonesian Communists
as a strong and acceptable base of support.
B. Sukarno's announcement that he has appointed
Major General Suharto commander of the army is
a definite plus for the army.
1. Suharto led the army's countermoves against
the September 30 coup attempt. He was the
army's choice to replace the assassinated
General Yani.
2. Sukarno wanted to name a general who would
take a "softer" line against the Indonesian
Communist Party--the PKI. The army leaders
agreed to insist on Suharto, and the Pres-
ident apparently yielded to strong army
pressure.
II. The army is riding high and going its own way,
regardless of Sukarno's announcements that he will
decide what should be done about the coup attempt.
The generals are continuing their repressive cam-
paign against the PKI and its front organizations.
A. Most Moslem and other anti-PKI political or-
ganizations and youth groups, encouraged by the
army, have continued to demonstrate against the
PKI. They are calling for the abolition of the
party.
Mobs have sacked every major party or front office in
Djakarta.
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B. Local military -overners have banned PK1 activity in
Djakarta and some of the islands. firmed troops at one
point even entered a Chinese embassy office in B,jnkta.rta,
which has drawn a very stiff protest from Pekin;.
The army itself has arrested several top Com-
munists and perhaps as many as 2,000 PKI and
PKI front members suspected of complicity in
the coup attempt.
have already been executed.
C. The PKI's underground structure no doubt remains
intact, but the overt apparatus and the party's
communications are in obvious disarray.
III. The Army leadership appears to be determined to
resist Sukarno's attempt to paper over the Sep-
tember 30th coup attempt and to return to the
political situation which existed before that in-
cident.
A. Sukarno and his chief lieutenent, Foreign Minister
Subandrio, have been issuing statements designed
to dampen the army offensive against the PKI
and regain control of the situation.
B - S
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1. Sukarno has stated that "peace and tran-
quility" are needed so that he may solve
what he says is now a "political rather
than a military problem.?
Sukarno may
be willing to sacrifice the PKI and its top
leaders in order to placate the army.
B. Top army generals apparently believe that
Sukarno himself approved the coup attempt as
a means of reducing the army's ability to oppose
the Communists, but had not intended the murder
of the generals.
so far we have no positive
proof of Sukarno's complicity.
1. There is, however, no doubt that the PKI
was involved in the plot at an early stage.
Communist paramilitary personnel, trained
by the Indonesian air force, were responsible
for the brutal murders of the six army generals.
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C. Some of the army leaders apparently consider the
present situation to be their last chance to
take decisive action against the PKI. They
feel that unless firm action is taken now,
Indonesia will inevitably slide into Communism.
1. Although the army's specific plans are not
known,
the army
will try to get along with Sukarno without
relaxing its present drive against the PKI
and allied leftist parties. They hope that
eventually Sukarno would have to accept the
new political balance or step down.
IV. It is questionable, however, whether the army will
be able to outmaneuver Sukarno,
A. The political leadership of the army, never
strong, has been significantly weakened by the
death of six of its top generals.
B. Sukarno remains the symbol of Indonesian national
independence and pride for the masses of people.
In a showdown between Sukarno and the army leaders,
many army units would not oppose a direct order
from Sukarno. A total repression of the PKI
by the army would almost certainly require
Sukarno's acquiescence--which is highly unlikely--
or his enforced silence.
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V. For the immediate future, however, President Sukarno's
position as unchallenged boss has been weakened, and
Indonesian Communists should remain on the defensive
for some time.
A.
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