COMMUNIST CHINA - - DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE (SINCE LAST BRIEFING ON 26 MAY)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000700080002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1966
• Content Type: BRIEF

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COMMUNIST CHINA -- DEVELOPMENTS IN
LEADERSHIP R
rid ing on JB-May)
(since last
I. A shake-up o-f Mao Tse-tung's inner circle of ad-
visers definitely appears to be taking place.
A. Last week we told you that we had been de-
tecting signs that a behind-the-scenes power
struggle was under way.
B. Mao Tse-tung's personal position still seems
to be secure. His grip probably was loosened
for a time during his recent 52 month absence
from public view, but he appeared to be healthy
and alert in movies taken in early May.
C. This is what we now think about the status
of his five top advisers:
1. Peng Chen, sixth in the power structure,
has probably been the victim of a power
play engineered by his old rival Teng
Hsiao-ping. He is still out of sight
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2. Teng is the powerful general secretary.
Peng's removal would strengthen his po-
sition and likely weaken that of Liu
?Shao-chi who has been number two in the
party since at least 1945. It is even
possible that the highly militant and
vigorous Teng has supplanted the color-
less Liu as Mao's chosen successor.
3. The flexible Chou En-lai--China's Mikoyan
--appears thus far to have managed to
stay aloof from the fray. He is a useful
technician and as such has a good chance
to survive.
4. Contrary to Western press speculation,
Defense Minister Lin Piao probably is
not a contender for power. His name is
often used to reinforce Mao's authority,
but he has been chronically ill for
nearly 30 years. Lin seemed to be ex-
tremely frail in recent movies taken
with Mao Tse-tung. He probably does
not aspire to the top job.
II. The Chinese Communists still haven't named any
important victims.
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A. This indicates that the shake-tip is still un-
folding.
Lo Jui-ching had been removed
as army chief of staff two months or so ago.
Lo, a 'top security man as well as chief of
the army, is one of a group of key officials
who have been out of public view for many
months and who may have been casualties of
the struggle. Others on the list are the
head of the central committee's propaganda
department and the commander of the Peking
Military Region, who is Yang Yung.
C. On 26 May a deputy director of the Central
Committee Propaganda Department was accused
of backing an "antiparty" play produced in
Shanghai. Certain other "muddleheaded" high
officials were also said to have supported
the play.
D. A new nationwide campaign has been develop-
ing this past week against unnamed high of-
ficials who have ridiculed the practical
value of Mao Tse-tung's political tracts.
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1. One of the most widely publicized cases
involves a Shanghai melon peddler who
wrote an article in 1965 explaining how
Mao's works had helped him sell his
melons before they rotted. This article
was republished on 14 May by Liberation
Army Journal, which as we pointedoout
las-t week has been spearheading the at-
tack on "antipar-ty" officials.
2. The melon peddler on 25 May then pub-
lished a statement demanding the unmask-
ing of a high official who, he said, had
ridiculed his article.
3. A similar incident involving a ping pong
player who claims he was greatly benefited
by Mao's thinking has been widely publi-
cized.
4. Referring to these incidents, Liberation
Army Daily promised "to fight to the bit-
ter end against anyone that-strikes at
Mao's thinking regardless of how powerful
he may be, how high his position is, how
famous, or how strong a backer he has."
E. On 27 May "antiparty" charges were leveled
for the first time against a provincial
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official. This was a ',Vice governor'of Shantung
Province, who was also director of the cul-
tural department of the provincial party com-
mittee. He was accused of working hand in
glove with the group of conspirators in the
Peking city apparatus whom,.we told you about
last week. The charges against this man
probably will lead to attacks on higher of-
ficials in Shantung and perhaps other prov-
inces.
III. We still feel strongly that factions in the lead-
ership have been disputing with one another.
A. This is indicated by the conflicting positions
taken by various party newspapers over several
of the crucial issues.
1. The initiative in launching the attacks
has been consistently taken by Liberation
Army Journal, not the Peoples Daily and
Red Flag, normally the two most authorita-
tive journals in China.
2. In fact Peoples Daily and Red Flag have
at times directly opposed the army paper.
A major charge implicating Peking Mayor
Peng Chen has been that the journals of
his municipal party committee refused to
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accept a dictum laid down by Liberation
Army Journal on 29 November 1965 that
a certain play was a quote big poison-
ous weed unquote.
3. Although the parallel has not yet been
publicly drawn, we have checked and
found that Peoples Daily and Red Flag
also took the incorrect line of the
Peking city journals. Our check also
reveals that neither Peoples Daily nor
Red flag got around to labeling the
play a poisonous weed until:April.
B. What the confusing record of these news-
papers indicates to us is that Mao Tse-tung
has been standing above the struggle while
the acting party leader has been under at-
tack by someone who controls the Liberation
Army Journal.
1. During Mao's absence the acting party
leader would be Liu Shao-chi.
2. Teng Hsiao-ping could control the army
paper, which is not actually published
by the army but by the army's General
Political Department. This is directly
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subordinate to the party secretariat
headed by Teng.
C. Since April Peoples Daily and Red Flag have
both fallen in line with the army paper,
a sign that Mao is again exercising a unify-
ing influence.
1. The Liberation-Army' Journal coiitinub
to spearhead some attacks, however, sug-
gesting that its backers still have ob-
jectives they haven't yet reached.
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1 June 1966
DCI BRIEFING NOTES
I. Fidel Castro's recent actions appear to result
from deepening personal frustrations over the
regime's continuing inability to surmount basic
economic and administrative problems.
A. The administrative purge of a number of
medium-level officials in the ministries of
foreign affairs, foreign trade, and CUBANA
airlines was designed to restore dynamism
to Castro's regime and to revive revolution-
ary enthusiasm. It may have had the opposite
effect, however.
1. The March 7 to March 11 trial of Major
Rolando Cubela, sentenced for plotting
to assassinate Castro, probably had the
same goal, as well as the aim of deter-
ring other would-be plotters.
2. Armed Forces Vice Minister Ameijeiras was
dismissed on March 17. A drunkard and
a marijuana user, he had long been in
disfavor with the regime. Several top
military commands have been routinely
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reshuffled since the first of,the year;
the principals involved were not cashiered
and retain their prominence as political
bureau members of Castro's Communist
Party.
B. In his speech on March 13 at Havana University,
Castro hurled new insults at Peking and charged
that the Chinese leaders, in their old age,
have confused Marxism-Leninism with fascism.
The attack was essentially a reiteration of
Castro's earlier statements and came exactly
one year after his first criticism of China.
1. For the first time Castro has denounced
President Eduardo Frei of Chile and his
Christian Democratic Party.
a. He said that in Chile "the only way
to win the revolutionary struggle
will be by armed struggle," and he
denounced Frei as a coward, a liar,
and a reactionary. Havana radio has
begun beaming a special:'propaganda
program to Chile attacking Frei and
his government.
b. The attacks reflect the same mili-
tancy displayed at the January
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Tri-Continent Conference and indicate
that Castro is losing interest in co-
existence and compromise in the hemi-
sphere.
C. The state of alert declared throughout Cuba
on May 27 was ostensibly a Cuban reaction to
US moves, the most outstanding of which was
the killing of a Cuban soldier by a sentry
at the Guantanamo Naval Base on May 21. In
reality, there are indications that Cuba in-
tended to provoke an incident with the US in
order to reinforce its "anti-imperialist"
posture and to divert the attention of the
people from current economic difficulties.
1. The soldier was shot and killed by the
US sentry after penetrating the base per-
imeter during a reconnaissance of a newly
laid minefield. Such penetrations of the
base perimeter have continued--presumably
at the direction of the Cuban Government.
Any additional incidents will further
heighten the already tense situation on
the island and provide the Castro regime
with additional "justification" to demand
greater sacrifices of the people.
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2. The alert also is probably intended to
test the efficiency of the Cuban defen-
sive system, provide realistic training
for armed forces personnel, and flush out
"counterrevolutionaries" unfortunate
enough to misjudge the reasons for the
alert.
II. Despite Castro's deepening frustrations, his po-
sition in Cuba remains pre-eminent.
A. The large and efficient military and security
forces under Raul Castro are strong and loyal
to the regime. We think they are more than
adequate as a defense against insurrection
or invasion--barring substantial US assistance.
B. The 55,000 members of the Cuban Communist Party
are drawn from an elite core of Castro's most
militant supporters. They form the regime's
inner bureaucracy.
1. Last October Castro announced the formation
of a political bureau, a secretariat, and
five standing committees within a 100-man
central committee.
2. The party controls provincial and local
affairs, education and indoctrination,
and the mass organizations.
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3. About one fifth of the party members and
two thirds of the central committee mem-
bers are from the Cuban armed forces.
C. Factionalism in the regime appears to be at
its lowest level since Castro came to power.
1. Nearly the entire top civilian and mili-
tary leadership is included in the central
committee.
a. About 20-prominent "old" Communists
have gained added stature thrdUUgh
membership.
b. There are no adherents of the eco-
nomic policies of Che Guevara on the
central committee.
D. Despite these factors contributing to the re-
gime's stability, there is no doubt that the
over-all political climate in Cuba has shifted
somewhat in the past year. An air of uncer-
tainty is prevalent in Havana which--if not
checked--could lead to further disenchantment.
III. Castro recognizes that he has no alternative to
continued large-scale aid from the Soviet Union.
As a result, he has continued to move closer to
Moscow, and has cooled toward the Chinese.
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A. The October visit of Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko to Cuba and Raul Castro's six-week
visit to the USSR and Eastern Europe in
October and November were probably gener-
ally aimed at reviewing Soviet-Cuban rela-
tions.
B. Castro probably no longer views all of Latin
America as on the brink of revolution. He
now limits clandestine Cuban support and con-
centrates it where revolutionaries are most
active. Nevertheless, Cuban propaganda on
behalf of armed revolution since the Tri-
Continent Conference has reached a level of
intensity not seen since 1963.
1. Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia are
Castro's three principal targets.
2. In addition, Cuba has sent military
personnel to help insurgents in the Congo,
and to train other African revolutionaries
in Brazzaville.
IV. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the former minister of
industries, and the regime's foremost revolution-
ary, left the Cuban political scene last spring.
He may also have left Cuba.
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A. Guevara may be carrying out the pledge attributed
to him by Castro to assist other revolutionary
movements.
B. Guevara's eclipse stemmed from differences
with Castro over basic questions relating to
the development of the Cuban economy, and to
the attitude Cuba should take toward revolu-
tionary activity elsewhere in the hemisphere.
V. Cuba's economic performance remains spotty, and
the long-range outlook is uncertain.
A. The 1965 sugar harvest of about 6 million tons
surpassed the yearly harvest of the pre-Castro
years.
1. This demonstrated the effectiveness of
wide economic and administrative reforms
applied during 1965.
B. The 1966 harvest probably will be in the neigh-
borhood of 4.5 million tons--2 million tons
short of the goal. Severe drought has been
blamed by Castro for this shortfall.
1. The outlook for future sugar earnings is
clouded by continuing harvesting and mill-
ing problems, and by uncertain world
sugar prices.
SECRET
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A. Guevara may be carrying out the pledge attributed
to him by Castro to assist other revolutionary
movements.
B. Gueva:raTs eclipse stemmed from differences
with Castro over basic questions relating to
the development of the Cuban economy, and to
the attitude Cuba should take toward revolu-
tionary activity elsewhere in the hemisphere.
V. Cuba's economic performance remains spotty, and
the long-range outlook is uncertain.
A. The 1965 sugar harvest of about 6 million tons
surpassed the yearly harvest of the pre-Castro
years.
1. This demonstrated the effectiveness of
wide economic and administrative reforms
applied during 1965.
B. The 1966 harvest probably will be in the neigh-
borhood of 4.5 million tons--2'million tons
short of the goal. Severe drought has been
blamed by Castro for this shortfall.
1. The outlook for future sugar earnings is
clouded by continuing harvesting and mill-
ing problems, and by uncertain world
sugar prices.
SECRET
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SECRET
2. General economic mismanagement continues
although some improvement has been made
in the past year.
3. Shortages in certain food and consumer
goods may become worse in 1966, but Castro
can continue to rely on large-scale Soviet
assistance.
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