INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000700080003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 12, 1966
• Content Type: NOTES

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12 May 1966
DCI BRIEFING NOTES
INDONESIA
I. The new Indonesian Government is embarking on a
moderate course in both domestic and international
affairs.
A. Indonesia's three major leaders now are General
Suharto, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, and the
Sultan of Jogjakarta, who directs economic
matters.
1. They are giving top priority to solving
domestic problems. This means, first of
all, trying to put Indonesia's long misused
economy on a more rational basis.
2. Malik and the Sultan have stated publicly
that they will accept aid from any country.
The US is sending 50,000 tons of rice--a frac-
tion of Indonesia's need--in the near future.
3. Malik has announced that Indonesia will return
to its former neutral path in international
affairs, and has expressed an intention to
return Indonesia to the United Nations.
II. Sukarno is still president and prime minister, but
his de facto power is slight.
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A. He continues to maneuver to regain at least
the appearance of political initiative. His
assets have been so greatly reduced, however,
that at most he should only be able to ob-
struct the government's new policies tem-
porarily.
B. Some of General Suharto's advisers are sug-
gesting that he depose or exile Sukarno;
Suharto, aware of Sukarno's continuing popu-
larity in parts of the nation, apparently
prefers to do neither.
III. While relations with the West have improved, re-
lations with Communist China are at an all-time
low.
A. Anti-Chinese activity has mounted throughout
Indonesia.
1. Overseas Chinese schools have been closed,
and many Chinese businesses have been con-
fiscated by anti-Communist Moslem groups.
2. In mid-April, in the most extreme of many
attacks on official Chinese installations,
the Communist Chinese Embassy in Djakarta
was sacked.
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B. The new Djakarta regime, by its failure to curb
this activity, appears to be pushing relations
with Peking to the breaking point. Neither Peking
nor Djakarta appear willing to initiate a formal
break, however. Continuing propaganda warfare
between Peking and Djakarta is likely to become
more and more abusive.
C. Foreign Minister Malik and other leaders have
expressed a desire to end Indonesia's
confrontation with Malaysia, but there are no
firm indications that the new government is ready
to accept the present composition of the Malaysian
federation.
1. Confrontation, therefore, is likely to con-
tinue on a political level, while its military
aspect, already at a low level, gradually
diminishes.
2. Djakarta's announcement that it will soon
recognize Singapore is viewed primarily as an
effort to bolster the Indonesian economy by
resuming the once-lucrative trade with Singa-
pore. At the same time, Djakarta's overture
to Singapore has already served to widen the
breach between Malaysia and Singapore--an
extra dividend for Indonesia.
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3. Talks in Bangkok on 30 April and 1 May
between the Indonesian and Philippine
foreign ministers produced an understand-
ing that the Philippines will recognize
Malaysia in early June and that Indonesia
will recognize Singapore shortly there-
after.
4. Malik has told a Malaysian official that
Indonesia would like another survey of
public opinion in Malaysia's Borneo
territories as to whether people want to
remain under Malaysian administration.
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