AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM (1 JAN - 31 MAR 68)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 31, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100 5 00 -
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORTH VIETNAM
(1 JAN - 31 MAR 68)
S-3060/AP-4A
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING, DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050001-8
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 793 and 794.
The transmission or revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050001-8
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MUCK GAGE
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IPH NG RR BRIDGE
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100050001-8
 Approved E C Ise- D9AdD &E- 5OiUS(EM0050001-8
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
(1 JAN - 31 MAR 68)
FOREWORD
This report is prepared at the
request of the Secretary of Defense
for an evaluation of certain effects
of the ROLLING THUNDER program. The
report covers three general areas of
concern: Effects on Military Targets;
Leadership and Public Reactions; and
Effects on the NVN Economy. The dis-
cussion of political effects is limited
to those developments within North
Vietnam which relate to Hanoi's attitude
toward continuing the war and the effects
the ROLLING THUNDER attack has on civilian
morale in North Vietnam.
THIS REPORT WILL HENCEFORTH BE
PREPARED ON A QUARTERLY BASIS.
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Q5R Q0 00050001-8
 Approvrt!-F"9161 %Q14109. 91KIFrO 2S5'OIWb`1b0050001-8
An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam
January-March 1968
SUMMARY
1. (S/NFD) President Johnson's speech of 31 March restricting
the ROLLING THUNDER program to operations south of the 20th parallel
was the most significant development during the first quarter of
1968. During the three months preceding the Presidential announce-
ment, a combination of bad weather, operational restrictions and
diversion of sorties to the Khe Sanh area limited the ROLLING THUNDER
effort. The level of air activity was at its lowest point since the
first quarter of 1966. Only 14,700 attack sorties were flown against
targets during the quarter, compared with a quarterly average of
21,700 sorties in 1967 and 20,300 in 1966 (see graph, Tab B). Primary
emphasis was against lines of communications south of Thanh Hoa, where
about 75 per cent of all attack sorties were flown.
2. (S/NFD) The capability of the transport system probably improved
during the period although key bridges in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas
remained interdicted. Major rail and road construction continued
in all ?egions of Nor.tl Vietnam. Motor vehicle activity throughout
the southern Panhandle area was at a high level. Pilot reports of
trucks destroyed or damaged were at levels approximately twice that
of the last quarter of 1967. Damage to railroad rolling stock and
watercraft, however, was approximately 50 per cent less than that
achieved during the preceding period.
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 Appro E OGRE11 eeNG/0f/O G N2MAM M 00050001-8
3. (S/NFD) Air defense activity was also at low levels compared
with the previous period. Antiaircraft artillery continues to be
the most effective defense weapon. SAM deployment south to the DMZ
area continued to be noted during the period indicating Hanoi's in-
tent to maintain and increase its threat to US aircraft in the south.
4. (S/NFD) North Vietnam's industry has suffered little additional
damage since the end of 1967. Sixty to 70 per cent of the total
electric generating capacity is estimated out of operation at the end
of the quarter. The record level of goods being imported through
Haiphong Port during the quarter added considerably to ship congestion
although priority cargoes such as food and petroleum were discharged
quickly.
5. (S/NFD) The measurable value of damage inflicted during the
quarter totaled $18.0 million, significantly below the quarterly
averages for the previous two years of the bombing program. Cumulative
value of damage is estimated at $436 million. In addition to these
measurable losses there continue to be many other losses which
cannot be assigned meaningful values. The air strikes have degraded
North Vietnam capability for sustained large-scale military operations
in South Vietnam. Nevertheless, increased levels of combat and
stepped-up infiltration of men and supplies during the first quarter
demonstrate that North Vietnam retains the capability to support
military activities in the South at increased levels of combat.
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 ApprovS(EF(oREITaeebbG/0;1(O:P E[IGN2 "&6&i00050001-8
Effects on Military Targets
1. (S/NFD) Adverse weather conditions in the north, restrictions
on bombing, and the diversion of aircraft to the Khe Sanh area limited
air activity against North Vietnam during the first quarter of 1968.
The total of 14,700 attack sorties flown during the period was the
lowest since the first quarter of 1966 when the bombing was suspended
for nearly a full month. Most of the effort was directed against
lines of communication, primarily in the Panhandle, although several
targets were attacked for the first time including the Hanoi Port
facilities and the Hanoi Radio station. Airfields, industrial
facilities, SAM and AAA sites, storage areas, and artillery positions
and troop concentrations in and near DMZ were also attacked. Nearly
all attacks in the northeast had to be accomplished using radar bomb-
ing systems, and definitive bomb damage assessments were severely
limited.
2. (S/NFD) The Hanoi Railroad/Highway (Doumer) Bridge over the
Red River, interdicted in December 1967, remained out of service
throughout the quarter and continued to prevent through rail service
to Hanoi from Haiphong, Dong Dang, and other northern points. The
movement of goods through Hanoi continues, however, via 13 highway
bypasses and a rail perry all within 12 miles of the original bridge.
A new combination rail bridge/barge crossing was observed under
construction just south of the rail ferry in photography of mid-March.
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 Appro f! "lreTas+404/O K4 $294S)S6A100050001-8
The Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge over the Canal des Rapides was
damaged in February but rail traffic apparently was not significantly
curtailed as a train was observed crossing the bridge three days later.
3. (S/NFD) Damage to the Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge, inter-
dicted in September 1967, prohibited through rail service to and from
the port throughout the quarter. In early January, some movement of
rail cars to and from the port area was resumed by means of a rail
pontoon bypass bridge. Although the original bridge has had a span
missing throughout the quarter, photography revealed that a truss
section mounted on a rail car could have been emplaced at night. The
three highway bridges in Haiphong are interdicted, but at least 10
highway ferries or pontoon bridges and a cable bridge are available
for the movement of goods from the port by truck. In addition, a new
highway cable bridge is under construction south of the Haiphong Rail/
Highway Bridge. A comparison of photography of 13 January and 4 March
revealed a large reduction in the amount of cargo in open storage at
the port.
4. (S/NFD) Attacks against the rail system decreased in comparison
with the previous three month period. Nearly all the effort was
against rail yards, sidings, and bridges on the Hanoi-Vinh line. Most
of the system in the North was considered open for through service
during the period with the only key interdictions being at the Doumer
Bridge, the Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge, and the Hai Duong
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 ApproSE GR&TeasNO1/dO Rdd 2 MS & M100050001-8
Railroad/Highway Bridge west of Haiphong. The line south from Hanoi
was serviceable most of the time due to extensive repairs but movement
below Thanh Hoa was limited. Damage levels to locomotives and rolling
stock were on the order of those of the first quarter of 1967, but
less than half the quarterly average for the entire year.
5. (S/NFD) Air strikes against heavy truck traffic in the Panhandle
resulted in approximately twice as many trucks reported damaged or
destroyed compared with the preceding quarter. Reported vehicle
activity
increased over the previous quarter, reflecting increased supply
requirements in support of the war in South Vietnam. During March day-
time sightings of trucks increased dramatically over the levels of
January and February. Reports of motor vehicle activity south of
Thanh Hoa shows a relatively large and continuing flow of traffic
passing through the Panhandle into Laos via highway Routes 7 and 15.
Roadwatch reports from teams along Route 15 in the vicinity of the
Mu Gia Pass indicate that the average number of trucks during the
first quarter of 1968 was about twice the level of the previous quarter.
6. (S/NFD) Recent photography shows increasing concentrations
of POL drums and POL tank trucks dispersed along highway Routes lA,
15, and 151. Similar activity was noted further south on Route 101
and secondary roads in the DMZ area. The presence of at least 50
tank trucks in Nam Dinh and POL drums in large quantities may reflect
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a shift of some POL supply and distribution facilities further south
to support increased use of motor vehicles, construction equipment,
and motorized watercraft.
7. (S/NFD) During the first quarter, photography revealed wide-
spread road repair and construction activity in North Vietnam. Large
amounts of heavy road construction equipment have been imported in
recent months. A new road, Route 415, which will link the Ningming
area of China with Haiphong was nearing completion by the end of
January. Construction activity was observed during the quarter on
Routes 19, 191, and 6 in the northwestern portion of the country. The
improvement of these routes will provide a more direct motorable link
between China and northern Laos through North Vietnam. A new all-
weather road extending from the Dong Hoi area toward the southwestern
corner of the DMZ was observed under construction in January. By
March the route was under construction within two miles of the Laos
border.
8. (S/NFD) Strikes against transshipment points and port facilities
remained at about the same level as the last quarter of 1967, but those
against watercraft decreased by more than 50 per cent, compared with
the last quarter of 1967. Damage and destruction of watercraft
decreased by a similar factor. During the period, about 50 transship-
ment points were attacked including an initial strike on the Hanoi
port facility which handles 30 per cent of all inland water traffic.
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 Appro$IFo~el~aAcQ/01/Oice!-kN2,QJ2 25600050001-8
9. (S/NFD) North Vietnamese air defense activity was generally
low throughout the quarter as a result of reduced United States strike
activity in the key target areas in the northeast. Antiaircraft
artillery and small arms fire still remained the most effective
weapon against strike aircraft accounting for approximately 25 US
losses, less than half the comparable losses suffered in the last
quarter of 1967. Enemy fighter operations were credited with destroy-
ing nine US aircraft during the period compared with 11 in the preceding
quarter. Analysis of enemy fighter tactics continues to reflect
selective reaction by the North Vietnamese, with the MIG-21 conducting
the most aggressive patrols and ranging farther from the Hanoi area.
The enemy persists in maintaining a small operational capability in
North Vietnam even though all of the airfields except Hanoi/Gia Lam
were struck on several occasions. Eight MIG aircraft were shot down
during the quarter. Reports continue to indicate that the vulnerability
of enemy fighter aircraft to bombing attack is being reduced by using
MI-6/HOOK helicopters to disperse the aircraft from the airfields
and later to return them for operations.
10. (S/NFD) SAM missile activity was lower than any quarter
during 1967. Approximately 400 missile firings were noted, compared
with 600 during the first quarter, and nearly 1,200 in the last quarter
of 1967. Eight US aircraft were lost to SAM's. This approximates the
fire-to-kill ratios previously established. The reduction in SAM
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 ApproSECR EeeasNOl/f9QRc1J1 82Db 100050001-8
firings is due in part to the reduced flight activity in the areas
of heavy SAM defenses -- attack sorties in the northern area were
less than half the number of the previous quarter -- and may also
reflect a tighter discipline in weapons release. Of significance is
the continued SAM activity in the Panhandle from Thanh Hoa south to
the DMZ. January photography revealed a cluster of four SAM sites
near Thanh Hoa, two of which were occupied. at least 25X1D
two elements active near Vinh, and an additional element near the DMZ
fired four missiles at B-52's. Twenty new SAM sites were detected
during the period, seven in the vicinity of the DMZ.
Leadership and Public Reactions
11. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese leadership in the past several
months has mounted its most intensive campaign to date to get the bomb-
ings stopped. Since Foreign Minister Trinh's 29 December "will talk"
offer, the regime has made a concerted effort to win support for its
position and to increase international pressure on the US to end the
air attacks. Since the first of the year, the North Vietnamese have
contacted governments in Western Europe, Africa and the Middle East
to press their case. Hanoi's unprecedented move in mid-February of
releasing three US pilots probably was intended as a sign of their
good will.
12. (S/NFD) These efforts culminated in a rapid North Vietnamese
response to President Johnson's speech of 31 March announcing a partial
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 ApproSME'RricTleesG1/iii&LrR 826UAOiRM100050001-8
bombing halt. In a 3 April statement, Hanoi agreed to make contact
with a US representative, "to determine the unconditional cessation
of US bombing raids and all other acts of war against the DRV so.that
talks may start." Regime statements indicate that proposed "contacts"
with the US will deal primarily with achieving an end to all acts of
aggression against North Vietnam, but could also include a discussion
of date, place and level of "formal talks" after the bombing halt is
agreed.
13. (S/NFD) Popular morale in North Vietnam apparently has not
deteriorated significantly. The hardships and shortages caused by the
bombings, and by the entire war effort have probably developed some
fatalism among the populace but the regime's control apparatus seems
more than adequate to quell any overt anti-regime sentiment. Recent
publication of a decree formulated last fall aimed at "counter-
revolutionaries" and a series of articles in the press stressing the
need for more intensive public security suggests that popular dis-
affection may be of increasing concern. The announcement of the
limited bombing halt brought an air of relief to Hanoi; however,
official propaganda has cautioned the populace against counting on
an early end to the war and has endeavored to prepare them for
greater hardships ahead.
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 ApprovlF P~Wn AQ /09/Q ! iP!-M291Jd20MM00050001-8
shortages of consumer goods and most foodstuffs continue, but the problem
is well within manageable limits. The rice ration, at least in Hanoi,
is being maintained at the usual level, and
-rice has been a little more plentiful.
Effects on the Economy
15. (S/NFD) North Vietnam's industry has remained basically un-
changed since the end of 1967. Most of the larger electric power and
manufacturing facilities continue either to be inoperative or to
operate at a fraction of their prestrike capacity. There are, however,
tentative signs that some improvement may be achieved in the near
future. Industrial targets struck during the first quarter of 1968
include seven power plants, the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant, and
six small manufacturing plants. More than 50 strikes were carried out
against these targets but most of the strikes involved single aircraft
using radar bombing techniques.
16. (S/NFD) Repair work was first noted in mid-March at the
Haiphong Cement Plant and the adjacent Haiphong West Power Plant, both
of which had been heavily damaged in April 1967. Until March it had
appeared that restoration of heavily damaged industrial facilities
such as these would be postponed as long as bombing continued. The
repair effort on these two plants, however, suggests that similar
work may be under way elsewhere.
17. (S/NFD) At the end of March the electric power industry was
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 Approv k FoKIN 1!A/09/Q R F N20209F M00050001-8
essentially the same as at the end of 1967. Total generating capacity
out of service at the end of March is estimated to have been between
115,000 and 130,000 KW, or 60 to 70 percent of national installed
capacity, compared with a peak of 80 per cent out of service from
June through October 1967. Of the 13 power plants previously damaged,
three are in partial operation, five are not in service, and the status
of five plants is uncertain. Progress in repairing the Hanoi power
plant increased its capability since the first of the year from 50 per
cent to an estimated 75 per cent of the plant's installed capacity.
Construction of a blast wall surrounding the main power plant build-
ing to the roofline is nearly complete. The North Vietnamese continue
efforts to keep the main power network functioning by rerouting
transmission lines and by relocating transformers in revetted, dis-
persed positions. Power supply in Hanoi and Haiphong still is
characterized by rationing and frequent outages.
18. (S/NFD) An unprecedented announcement by the regime on
15 March heralded the presentation of 50,000 metric tons of rice,
10 million meters of textiles and 100 tons of medical supplies to
the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. No reference was
made to the timing of deliveries, but the presentation was made
allegedly to alleviate hardships resulting from the Allied reaction
to the Tet offensive. Both rice and textiles are imported and are
tightly rationed in the North. The rice donation is equivalent to
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 ApproSAC R EJessNO1/fiQR(Ij1 82QMRM100050001-8
the annual North Vietnamese ration for approximately 300,000 persons
and the textile donation is equal to the annual ration of two and a
half million persons.
19. (S/NFD) Identified seaborne imports during the quarter amounted
to 458,000 metric tons, the highest quarterly total since the bombing
started in 1965. Imports of both petroleum and miscellaneous and
general cargoes reached record highs. The record level of petroleum
imports -- 105,000 metric tons -- is believed to be in response to
the increased truck and watercraft traffic observed throughout the
country. Despite an increase in estimated consumption to 30,000 tons
a month, stocks on hand at the end of March were equal to about 80 days
of supply. An estimated 25,000 tons of petroleum from the Soviet Far
East are believed to be available in storage in South China.
20. (S/NFD) Seaborne exports totaled 146,000 metric tons during
the quarter. This amount is almost 50 per cent lower than exports
during the first quarter of 1967, but substantially higher than the
88,000 tons exported during the fourth quarter. The improvement is
due almost entirely to the repair of the damaged coal processing
facilities at Cam Pha.
21. (S/NFD) The increases in seaborne trade resulted in ship layover
time at Haiphong increasing from an average of 15 days in January to
28 days in March. Priorities in discharging cargo were given to ships
delivering foodstuffs and petroleum. The average discharge time for
Appro,Tpleasq
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UNITED STATES ATTACK SORTIES AGAINST TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM,
BY QUARTER,
700
. 700
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 ApproSEC R UeUeesN01/ff9QR&QN82DbS5EM100050001-8
small tankers was about four days during the quarter compared with
nine days in 1967.
22. (S/NFD) Cumulative measurable damage attributable to the
ROLLING THUNDER program through March 1968 is estimated at $436 million.
(see Tab A). Of this amount, $18.0 million was inflicted during the
first quarter, lower than the quarterly averages for the past two
years and a continuation of the downward trend evident since the
second quarter of 1967 when damage of $80.6 million was inflicted.
Damage to the economic sector amounted to $12.6 million, primarily
as a result of attacks against lines of communication and from losses
arising from decreased exports. Damage to the military establishment
was minimal during the quarter, accounting for only $5.4 million. In
addition to these measurable losses there continue to be many other
losses to both the economy and the military establishment which cannot
be assigned meaningful values.
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 ApproS&d(ER EIieesMO1/MR EIb(R 82WA RM100050001-8
TAB A
Value of Economic and Military Damage
Attributed to the ROLLING THUNDER Program
1965 Through March 1968
Economic
Military
ect Losses Million US$
Di
Direct Losses
Million US$
r
Railroad/Highway Bridges 37.4 a/b/
Barracks
31.2 a/
Transportation Equipment 79.6
Ammunition Depots
5.3 a/
Electric Power Plants 33.1 a/
Motor Vehicle Depots and
Petroleum 7.5
Supply Areas
11.0 a/
Manufacturing Facilities 18.1 a/
Airfields
1.9 a/
Railroad Yards
and Shops 6.6 a/
Radar and Communications
Maritime Ports
and Shipyards 2.7 a/
Sites
2.9 a/
Miscellaneous
Armed
SAM Sites
8.7 a/
Reconnaissance
Naval Bases
1.9
Aircraft
47.6
SUBTOTAL, Direct Losses 187.4
Naval Craft
Miscellaneous Armed
4.8
Indirect Losses
Reconnaissance
Exports 39.9
TOTAL, Direct Losses
136.3
Agriculture c/ 60.5
Fishing 12.5
TOTAL
Indirect Losses 112.9
SUBTOTAL
Million US$
,
TOTAL, Direct & Indirect 300.3
Economic 300
Military 136
TOTAL 436 d/
a/ Estimate is incomplete because of inadequate post-strike photography.
b/ Of the total, $8.0 million is estimated to have been expended to date on the
repair of damaged and destroyed bridges and $29.4 million is estimated for
complete restoration in the future of bridges damaged or destroyed. In
addition, $1.6 million would be required to make temporary repairs to
presently unrepaired bridges.
c/ It should be noted that losses of agricultural crops are arbitrarily attri-
buted entirely to the indirect effect of the bombing. An unknown part of
these losses is in fact due to weather and other natural causes.
d/ Excluding the cost of trucks destroyed and damaged by US naval operations
along the coast of southern North Vietnam.
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DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA-CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
Copy
THE WHITE HOUSE:
Vice President 1
Gen Maxwell Taylor 1
Mr Bromley Smith 5
DEFENSE:
SECDEF 2
ASST SECDEF (ISA) 2
ASST SECDEF (Systems Analysis) 2
ASST SECDEF (PA) 1
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 1
TREASURY (Secretary) 1
USIA 1
AID 1
NASA 1
NSA 5
STATE 20
AEC 1
FBI I
NIC 1
ACDA 1
CHAIRMAN, JCS 1
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF 1
J-1 1
J-3 2
J-4 1
J-5 1
J-6 1
SACSA 1
NMCC 3
ARMY:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2
DCSOPS 1
ACSFOR 1
ACSI 1
ACSI-CI 1
ACSI-Eastern 1
STAG 1
ApprovS eri fe ase f k1tffff Stjj%f?(W0050001-8
 ApproSE CR1EL&---teNdQ /0F/0 R1-GN2Ddfi DM 00050001-8
Copy
NAVY:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2
NAVINTCOM
1
NAVINVSER
1
NFOIO
1
92F
1
92F6
1
AIR FORCE:
CHIEF OF STAFF
2
ACSI (AFNIN)
1
AFNINDE
8
AFNIEBB
1
AFISI (Spec Investigation)
1
AUL (Air Univ Library)
1
MARINE CORPS:
COMMANDANT
G-2
CINCPAC
2
CINCPACAF
10
CINCUSARPAC
1
CINCPACFLT
1
COMUSMACV
2
7AF
2
COMSEVENTHFLT
1
COMATKCARSTRIKEFORSEVENTHFLT
(CTF 77)
1
CINCLANT
1
CINCSTRIKE
1
CINCSAC
1
SAC 544
1
CINCTAC
1
AFSTRIKE
1
CONTIC
1
CINCALCOM
1
CINCEUR
1
CINCUSAREUR
1
CINCUSAFE
1
CINCNAVEUR
1
CINCCONAD
1
CIA
125
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
1
DIA
39
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SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~
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9~~y
169
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