EFFECTS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM AND NORTH VIETNAM'S REACTION TO THE BOMBING PAUSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100090005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 1, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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1 February 1966
INTELLIGENCE .1ELIORANDUM
SUBJECT: Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program and
North Vietnam's Reaction to the Bombing Pause
SUMMARY
Between 2 March and 24 December 1965 the Rolling Thunder
Program carried out a total of over 2,4, 000 sorties against military
and economic targets its. North Vietnam. The attacks against fixed
economic targets in North Vietnam destroyed almost 17 percent of
total petroleum storage capacity, over 27 percent of electric power
generating capacity, and about 5 percent of railroad yard and port,
capacity.
The air strikes have caused a gradual erosion of national capacity
in specific military areas -- ammunition depots, 34 percent; barracks,
15 percent; and supply depots, 9 percent. Almost 1, 200 pieces of
transport equipment were destroyed and over 2, 000 were damaged by
the air attacks. In addition to these direct losses the air attacks have
exacted an increasin toll in terms of higher costs and disruption of
DIA REVIEW COMPLETED
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normal activity. Costly reconstruction efforts have required a
widespread reallocation of manpower and a resulting decline in
industrial perforrxmance. Problems consequent to distribution of
food supplies have become fairly common. The bombings have also
forced the regime to accept.losses resulting from its inability to
maintain important export trades.
In South Vietnam, military supplies had been cached before the
United States began its interdiction efforts. With these and with
locally produced food, we estimate that the levels of combat by the
V.C/PAVN over the past year required only about 12 tons of supplies
from the DRV -- largely ammunition.
The Bombing Pause, 24 December - 30 January
The North Vietnamese have taken advantage of the bombing pause
to recoup, to the maximum possible extent, from the effects of the
Rolling Thunder Program.
show that two airfields
in North Vietnam have been made operational for jet aircraft and that
construction of two additional airfields is under way (see Map 1 and
Tab A). Air defense systems have been strengthened along lines of
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communication both in the DRV and in Laos.
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logistic network in Laos and North Vietnam has undergone extensive
reconstruction or repair. Alternative highway routes and bypasses
have been constructed, and inland waterways have been dredged with
60 small dredges in an attempt to make the logistic system more flexible
and less vulnerable to air attack (see Tab B). Substantial amounts of
men, food, and supplies have been moved into the southern part of North
Vietnam where they are stockpiled and hold as reserves or moved for-
ward through the Mu Gia pass into Laos and South Vietnam (see Map 2
and Tab Q.
struck traffic through Laos
during the bombing pause was about double the average level during 1965
(see Tab D).
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the DRV utilized the bombing
pause to build fords paralleling bridges, to cache ready repair forms
and materials near bridge and key railroadpoints, and to store metal
screens near dikes plus some dispersal of war materiel and supplies.
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In South Vietnam personnel
infiltration has continued at a high level. More than 1, 000 PAVN troops
were reported seen entering Quang Tri Province in South Vietnam on
Christmas. Day. The IIanoi.rogirre has created at least four new
"battlefront headquarters" in South Vietnam (see Map 3).
A resumption of UTS/GVN air attacks will underscore the determina-
tion of the United States to get on with the war and will restore if not
increase the aggravations under which North Vietnam attempts to direct
and to support the Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam.
Similarly, a boost in morale will be given SVN and other allied forces.
Since a resumption of bombing will have to cope with a greatly expanded
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logistic network and increased stockpiles of materials, a considerably
greater effort would probably be needed to reduce the flow of supplies
now than when Rolling thunder began in March 1965. On the other
hand, with more PAVN troops in SVN, they will require greater logistic
support, considerably greater if the tempo of combat is advanced.
Under these conditions logistic supply would become more difficult
and costly as a result of heavy air interdiction of LOCs, and hence
would submit the Hanoi regime to material pressures. Even though
air interdiction may be unable to cut off the flow of supplies completely
it can limit the sire of the force the North Vietnamese can co7rnrrmit,
restrict the level of combat they could sustain, and slow down their
reinforcement and resupply.
If the US air offensive were to include an attack on North Vietnam's
bulk petroleum storage facilities, the immediate economic effects would
be felt principally in transportation. Substantial distribution problems
would arise but they could be partially overcome in a relatively short
time by using primitive means of transport or using stockpiles. The
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greatest impact of a sustained to?is of petroleum facilities would be
on military operations within North Vietnam, plus a lesseniuig in the
capability and speed of reinforcing VC/PAVN forces in SVN. We
estimate, however, that with Chinese cooperation, which would require
extensive trucking and costly emergency action, the problem of
petroleum supplies could be substantially resolved after an initial
period of adjustment. Petroleum imports could probably be restored
to the levels required to maintain essential military operations, but
the rate of buildup would be limited. In addition, armed reconnaissance
would slow down reinforcement of men and supplies. They would be
forced to travel mainly at night. Trucks would require about 12 days
frov..'s Hanoi to VN instead of about 4 days with unrestricted travel.
The escalation of the war in SVN would reflect this in fewer potential
attacks and with some lessening of Communist morale and general
capabilities.
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1. . The Rolling Thunder Program
A. Clbjectives
Between 2 March and 24 December 1965 the United States and
South Vietnam conducted an air offensive against North Vietnam the
Rolling Thunder Program. The objectives of this program were:
a. to reduce the ability of or raise the
cost to North Vietnam of infiltrating men and
equipment into South Vietnam.
b. to increase the political cost to North
Vietnam of continuing to support Pathet Lao
and Viet Cong activities in South Vietnam.
c. to encourage the people and the govern-
ment of South Vietnam.
B. Physical Effects
Through 24 December 1965 the Rolling Thunder Program, car-
ried out 7, 700 strike sorties against fixed targets and almost 16, 500
armed reconnaissance sorties. A tabulation of the physical damage
resulting from the attacks on fixed targets is shown in the table.
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Physical Darn ;e Resultinrf fro i_the Rolling Thtuider Proxan
2 March 2 Deee nber 1 b ~' .
Fixed Targets
Target Percent
Strikes
o
D
f N
es
ational Capacity
tro- ed
Barracks
44
14.6
Ammunition depots
13
34.2
POL storage
4
16.7
Supply depots
18
9.4
Powerglants
27.5
Maritime ports
5.7
Railroad yards
k'xplosives plant
71.0
Airfields
Runways
cra
te
red, 25 percent
of the
bui
ld
in-s destroyed
at airfields attacked
45 percent of the buildin;_;s
destroyed at bases attacked
Brid-:es
Communications
installations
Radar sites
SIAM sites
Locks and dams
42
2
13
23
39 not usable
2 destroyed
3 destroyed, 6 d ringed,
4 redeployed prior to attack
11 possibly dame
tw~ ed, 3 not
observed, 1 destroyed
1 destroyed
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In addition to the damage caused by strikes against fixed targets, the
armed reconnaissance missions included some attacks on fixed targets,
but concentrated principally on attacks against antiaircraft sites,
bridges, and lines of communication (LOC). The armed reconnaissance
missions are credited with the following damage against transportation
equipment:
`i`"?e Destroye Dsztaag -d
Vessels (,Tanks, etc.) 477 853
Vehicles 483 565
Railroad stock 236 601
Although the economic and. military losses caused by the
US/GVN air strikes have been small in relation to total national activity,
they have exacted a toll in terms of higher costs and disruption of normal
activity. Reconstruction efforts have been hampered by difficulties in
the allocation of manpower, by managerial inefficiencies, and by a
downturn in industrial performance in some sections of the economy.
The regime has also had problems in the distribution of food particularly
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to relocated elements of the population and to the large -increments of
workers detailed to reconstruction and repair activities. These prob-
lerrms have not been insoluble and by the time of the bombing pause the
disruptions to most normal economic activities had been minimized by
the adoption of emergency measures to repair key transportation targets
and by the diversion of some import traffic from sea to rail shipment.
The regime has been much less successful in coping with the sharp
decreases in exports resulting from the bombing. The interdiction of
the. Hanoi w Lao Cai rail line, for example, has resulted in a complete
cessation of apatite export since early August 1965. The sharp increase
in requirements for cement in military construction and in the repair
of bomb-damaged structures resulted in a decline in cement exports of
72 percent below the average level of. exports prior to the Rolling
Thunder Program.
The DRV attempted to offset much of the losses inflicted in
specific military areas by abandoning facilities or engaging in the large-
scale dispersal of men and materials. Much of North Vietnam's ability
to adjust to the US/GVN air strikes is a reflection of an increasing
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dependence on other Communist countries for material and technical
assistance. Imports from Communist countries of military and eco-
nomic assistance goods rose sharply in the last six months of 1965.
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C. Effect on Transportation and. Infiltration
North Vietnam has had to move only small amounts of
supplies to South Vietnam -- 12 tons or less a day during most of
1965 -- over a well-developed network of roads and trails which are
relatively invulnerable to air attack. The US/GVN air attacks have,
however, made logistic supply a considerably more difficult and costly
process. Large amounts of manpower have been diverted from productive
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employment to repair and keep open the LOC's in South Vietnam and
Laos. The DRV has, moreover, been compelled to use night-time
operations only in the forward movement of men and supplies. A truck
moving from Hanoi to points near the South Vietnam border would
ordinarily make the trip in about 4 days of day and night travel. When
confined to night-time operations this same trip would require a mini-
mum of 12 days.
Ii. Activities in North Vietnam Since the Pryuso in the Eombinf;
A. Airfields
During the bombing lull the North Vietnamese have been
actively expanding their operational airfield system capable of handling
jet aircraft.
The lack of a sufficient number of airfields capable of handling
jet aircraft has long been a prime weakness in Hanoi's air defense
system. Use of the new fields will extend DRV fighter time in the air
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significantly, particularly with respect to meeting attacks coming in
from the sea in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
At Dien Bien Phu Airfielc
Vietnamese are extending the length of the runway from approximately
4, 000 feet to 6, 000 feet, probably to accommodate jet fighters. Such
use of th.e field would extend significantly the range of DRV fighters
operating against US planes corning in over North Vietnam from the
direction of Thailand.
first stages in the construction of an airfield with a 6, 600-foot runway
on the outskirts of Yen Bai. When this airfield is ready to handle jets,
it will fill a gap between Dien Bien Phu and the Hanoi area and will en-
hance the ability of the North Vietnamese to intercept aircraft attacking
from Laos (see Tab A).
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Reconstruction of Trans o~ nation Facilities in North Vietnam
The North Vietnamese have used the bombing lull to repair lines
of co.nxmunication and to prepare themselves for new attacks. They have
had the time and outside assistance to organize transportation and repair
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activities more adequately and to establish alternative means of trans-
portation. They have been building new roads and river crossings, so
that they will have alternative routes when and if the primary roads are
again interdicted by air strikes.
ridges
are being rebuilt and.reinforced and that emergency bridges and ferries
or fords are being installed at some key points (see Tab B). Many of
these fords will be difficult to block by air strikes. Numerous items
of road construction equiprxment, such as scrapers, excavators, tractors,
and bulldozers as well as structural steels and prefabricated shapes for
bridge repair and reconstruction, have been received from the USSR.
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E. Buildup of Su lies in the Southern Provinces of North Vietnam
The North Vietnamese have taken full advantage of the cessation
of bombing to increase the flow of supplies to the southern provinces of
North Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam.
ruck convoys moving during daylight hours on
route 15, which leads to Mu Gia Pass and the infiltration corridor in.
'on the roads in southern North Vietnam -- most of
them on route 15 (see Tab C). The air strikes had almost eliminated
truck movements during daylight hours in this area.
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Increased use of the inland waterways to move both economic
and military traffic was observed in the latter part of 1965, and this
development continued during January. In some cases the inland
waterways have been used to supplement the highways and in other
cases as alternatives when certain sections of highways were closed
because of bomb damage. A number of small dredges have been im-
ported, and increased dredging of waterways has been taking place
since the start of the low water season.
F. Protection of Darns and Dikes
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The North Vietnamese
apparently are taking at least rudimentary measures to protect key
locations against flood waters. Truckloads of iron mesh squares,
said to be used as a foundation for dikes to protect against flooding,
have frequently been seen in Hanoi..
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III. Activities in Laos
The bombing pause has not spared targets in Laos from continued
air attack. Throughout 1965, truck traffic continued to increase
as the capacity of routes was expanded. Through truck traffic is
now possible, in dry weather, from Mu Gia Pass on route 12, at the
Laos/North Vietnam border, to the Laotian border provinces adjacent
to South Vietnam (see Map 2). The possibility of interdicting the supply
routes in Laos is made much more difficult with the addition of the
alternative routes now available to the North Vietnamese. The foot
trail arouahl the end of the Demilitarized Zone, a known personnel
infiltration route, has more elaborate improvements with many new
narrow bridges over streams and hand rails along its steeper grades.
Since the bombing pause,I
increased movements of traffic on the Laotian routes.
I
911, a newly completed north-south road from the
Mu Gia Pass area, has seen more than 600 trucks moving south past
its vantage point since 27 December. The parallel old road, route 23,
is apparently carrying somewhat less traffic than it did a year ago.
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In combination, however, these two roads are carrying about twice
the southbound traffic that was observed during the dry season from
December to May a year ago. At that time the average southbound
movement was 17 trucks a day, whereas this year
Ian average of 34 trucks a day moving south on
the two roads
IV. Activities in South Vietnam
The continuing heavy movement of trucks south through North
Vietnam and Laos makes it appear highly probable that North Vietnam
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has been at least maintaining the pace of its infiltration of military
personnel ever Since the bombing ceased.
a force of about 1, 000 North Viet-
namese regulars had moved into Quang Tri Province on Christmas Day.
All these activities indicate that Hanoi has continued to infiltrate regular
troops since the bombing lull, although it may be months before enough
evidence is available to sort out the exact movements and the size of
the infiltrating elements.
As Communist force.7 in South Vietnam have increased rapidly dur-
ing the past year, their tactical headquarters have also been enlarged
in both scope and number in order to coordinate the numerous units
of regimental strength. There are indications of at least four so-
called "battlefront headquarters (see Map 3). These are commands
capable of controlling division-level operations by three or more
regirmients.
I These headquarters
are mobile, and are capable of either detaching regiments or
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battalions for independent operations or absorbing new units as
circumstances may require. Although these "battlefront headquarters"
have not yet operated in combat at the full level of their operational
capabilities, reports of major enemy actions in 1965 revealed several
instances in which elements of two or three Communist regiments operated
in conjunction. Thus it now seems reasonably clear that the Communist
forces in South Vietnam have the potential capability to operate at
,_the division level.
V. Effects of a Resumption of Bombing
A. Effects on the Hanoi R,~Pime
A resumption of the bombing will serve notice that the US,
having had its peace moves rejected by the Hanoi regime, is determined
to get on with the war. Although Hanoi may react to the resumption
of bombing in its usual tough and unyielding position, several factors
.,may work to create additional pressures on the regime.. Since
the DRV used the bombing pause to build up and strengthen its
logistic network, a revived Rolling Thunder Program will have to
expand a considerably greater effort to reduce the flow of supplies
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to Laos and South Vietnam. Under these conditions, logistic supply
would become more difficult and costly. Over a sustained period of
time, this could subject the Hanoi regime to mounting pressures in
attempting to maintain its logistic capabilities. The resumption of air
attacks could in a period of time, particularly if coupled with increasing
losses in the South, cause the populace to be less willing to support the
regime in its conduct of the war.
B. Effects of Bombing, Petroleum Storace Facilities
North Vietnam. depends upon imports for all of its supplies
of petroleum, and its bulk storage facilities had a con-ibined pre-attack
capacity of about 214, 000 tons. Of this total, Rolling Thunder strikes
eliminated about 37, 000 tons of capacity, or 17 percent. The surviving
tankerage has the capacity to hold about one year"s requirements of about
175, 000 tons.
At present, nine major storage terminals contain 168, 000 tons
of bulk storage capacity. An additional 9, 200 tons of storage capacity
is widely dispersed. Successful air attack would eliminate the principal
petroleum storage facilities and would preclude the delivery of petroleum
supplies in bulk by tankers.
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The loss of petroleum storage facilities -- and their contents --
would have an immediate effect on the economy. The major effect would
be on transportation. Civilian motorized transportation would come to a
quick halt. The transport of food, raw materials, and finished goods
would be curtailed drastically. Some relief would be found by using
primitive means of transport or through use of existing stockpiles.
Precise data on stockpiles of petroleum in North Vietnam,
including that in drums. and small buried tanks, are not available.
The inventory represented by these expedients -and by untargeted
facilities' is small, totaling only about 10, 000 tons -- less than a
month's supply at current supply rates.
A sustained loss of petroleum storage facilities coupled with
an inability to import even minimum operating requirerre nts would have
its greatest effect on military operations. North Vietnamese military
forces account for about 60 percent of total petroleum consumption, or
a monthly average of about 8, 500 tons. North Vietnam with Chinese
cooperation would probably be able to maintain petroleum imports,
however, at almost normal levels. The supply of essential imports of
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petroleum for military requirements would appear to be almost
In a reasonable period of time, the North Vietnamese
with the help of China could organize some emergency supply of
petroleum. Given sufficient time and additional expense and effort,
the total amount of petroleum normally consumed by North Vietnam --
some 15, 000 tons a month -- could be delivered at Fort Bayard in
China and moved by rail to Ping-hsiang. Assuming that trucks could
make the round trip from Ping-hsiang to Hanoi in four days in spite
of interdiction, about 800 trucks could probably handle this volume.
Even on a worst-case basis the regime could meet its most essential
requirements for petroleum -- that needed to maintain the logistic
pipeline to South Vietnarn. At the end of 1965 the North Vietnam forces
in Military Region IV (MR IV) (including the four southern provinces
of North Vietnam) were estimated to have been consuming petroleum
at a rate of roughly 1, 500 tons a month. This petroleum supports
three major activities: (a) the maintenance of lines of communication
and transport: facilities within MR IV and leading from North Vietnam
to Laos, (b) the operations associated with the use of MR IV as a
military staging area, and (c) the actual movement of men and supplies
into Laos and South Vietnam.
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