MINUTES OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE USCIB COMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PRACTICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00527R000100070003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MIN

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MEMBERS PRESENT:
STATE:
OSD:
FBI:
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USAF, Army, OSD and Navy review(s) completed.
MINUTES OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE
USCIB COMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PRACTICES
MR. JEROME D. FENTON. OSD, CHAIRMAN
CIA:
NSA:
ARMY:
NAVY:
AIR FORCE:
USCIB:
Mr. Otto F. Otepka
Mr. Jerome D. Fenton
Mr. Bernard A. Wells
Brigadier General H. 0. Paxson
Rear Admiral R. H. Rice
Brigadier General Edgar A.
Major W. R. Culmer
SECRETARY: LCDR., P. J. Karl
ALSO PRESENT:
Mr. Hugh S. Erskine
Col. Sidney S. Rubenstein
Mr. Robert E. Drake
Mr. Jerome T. French
ARMY: LtE. Col. John B. Pratt
Major E. L. Stackhouse
Major C. C. Quigley
AIR FORCE: Lt. Col. Dean C. Gibbons
Lt. Col. Overton Harris
Major John H. Remick
Sirmeyer., Jr.
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The second meeting of the USCIB Committee on COMINT Personnel
Security Standards and Practices was-held in room 3E869, the Pentagon,
on 11 October 1955. The Chairman called the meeting to order at 1015.
Before proceeding to the business of the meeting the Chairman circu-
lated the text of a recent British Government report on the MacLean--
Burgess case ad printed in the New York Times. He remarked that the
report presented a remarkable parallel to the Petersen case and recom-
mended that the members give it the widest possible distribution within
their respective agencies.
The Chairman noted that all reports had been submitted and circula-
ted to each member for study. He suggested that the members first con-
sider the recommendations which had been made with a view to establish-
ing a small ad hoc drafting committee for the purpose of preparing a
revision of USCIB Directive No. 5. The revision would be in light of
reports submitted and would take into account the discussion of these
reports at today's meeting. He suggested that comments on the recom-
mendations be fairly general until the ad hoc committee is named, after
which he said he thought the group could go into a more detailed exam-
ination of the reports. An item by item reaumg of the discussion
follows;
Item A--Determination of "Need to Know"
The chairman observed that the reports indicate general agreement
on the requirement for each member of USCIB to review the "need to know"
aspect of the indoctrination procedures in his agencies, with the
objective in mind of reducing the number of people. He noted that the
Army, OSD and USCIB reports called for much stricter application of the
"need to know" principle, the Army suggesting that the subject is one
for constant continuing review and recommending compartmentation as a
device to facilitate obtaining the objective. He said that the absence
of detailed comments by other members on this item would be construed
to indicate general concurrence.
There were no additional comments on Item A.
Item B--Pre-access screening and investigation
The Chairman noted that there was a pattern of agreement on a
broadening of the background investigation with greater emphasis on
personnel interviews. He remarked that observations were made on the
use of the polygraph and the "10 year rule", stating that, while the
two have no surface similarity, it would only be fair to observe that
both items will provoke some differences of opinion in the later dis-
cussions. He said the Army suggested that requests for investigations
of individuals nominated for COMM clearance should be flagged in such
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a way as to alert field investigative units to the necessity of using
mature, highly competent investigators. He hoted also that the Army
recommended a background investigation'be conducted expeditiously on
all persons given an interim clearance when nominated for access to
COMINT, except in the case of general officers.
The Chairman observed that CIA called for a revision of USCIB
standards to include the neighborhood investigation and interviews
with close associates. Additionally, CIA called for information con-
cerning persons whose family or associates are, or might be, foreign'
government officials, whether such governments are friendly or not.
The "10 year rule" should be dropped, according to CIA. Finally, CIA
observed that USCIB member agencies should be prepared to use the poly-
graph at least on persons strongly suspect, and, in any case where the
national interest demands, the fullest verification by a security inter-
view.
The OSD report cr.lled for more thorough pre-access screening to
include an initial personal interview conducted by trained and experi-
enced personnel for the purpose of eliminating potential undesirables.
A requirement for a neighborhood check was also recommended.
The Navy similarly recommended that CIBD ##5 be revised to require
a neighborhood check in the investigation of all persons requiring COMINT
clearance.
NSA recommended a favorable background investigation be completed
before granting access to COMINT. Background investigations should be
broadened to include neighborhood checks, credit checks, and interviews
with more than 2 developed references. An intensive interview should
be conducted with all personnel having access to COMINT, either civil-
ian or military, and this would be desirable with the aid of the poly-
graph. Finally, NSA recommended that the investigative agencies han-
dling investigations for the COMINT community should be given an educa-
tional lecture regarding the sensitivity of the COMINT business so that
they will be aware of what is pertinent in these investigations.
The State Dept. supported the NSA view that all proposed indoctrin-
ees should be given an interview aided by the polygraph, with the ex-
ception of high ranking officials appointed by the President with the
approval of the Senate. (These people would already have been inves-
tigated under procedures established by the White House.)
The USCIB Secreteri.at indorsed the use of the polygraph in the
pre-access personal interview and recommended'that the background in-
vestigation include a neighborhood check (including a barracks check
for military personnel).
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Item C--Clearance Standards
The Chairman observed that there was general agreement among the
members that waiver authority for these standards should not be dele-
gated too far.. The ensuing discussions brought out the fact that ex-
ceptions are normally made only by the UZOTh member or his deputy, with
the exception that in the military services the heads of the COMINT
operating agencies normally are empowered to grant waivers for personnel
under their cognizance.
The State Dept. member reiterated the view of his department that
any exception to the USCIB clearance standards should be made only by
the full Board.
Item D--Indoctrination
The Chairman noted that there was no divergence on this item inas-
much as all members called for improvements.
Admiral Rice explained that indoctrination and education of, the
producers of COMINT were handled as parts of the Navy COMINT training
program. Ile said all Navy personnel engaged in COMINT activities were
required to refresh their recollections on COMINT security matters at
periodic intervals. Further, he said he understood that each Navy COMINT
unit has an organized security education program. With respect to im-
proving COMINT security education, Admiral Rice expressed the hope that
NSA might be able to take the Navy under its wing.
The Chairman observed that in the area of initial indoctrination
and continuing education it would be fair to say that all concerned
had expressed a general interest in better and more complete indoctrin-
ation procedures. He said he thought the ad hoc committee should be
able to come up with something definite on this item.
Item E--Supervision and Control of COMINT Personnel
The Chairman noted, that the members were unanimously in favor of
closer supervision and compartmentation but expressed divergence in the
methods of achieving these objectives.
Item F--Re-Investigation and Inspection of COMINT Personnel
The Chairman observed that there was uniformity among the 'members
on a need for more frequent investigations, pointing out that again
they differ on the methods to be used. The Chairman then noted the
observations made by the members as follows:
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Air Force--Re-investigation at intervals not to exceed 5 years
for all personnel having access to Category III COMINT, leaving the re-
investigation of all other COMINT personnel to the discretion of the
member agencies. Minimum requirements for. re-investigation of civilian
personnel should be a National Agency Check, a neighborhood check, and
an interview conducted with the polygraph, if available. Finally, the
minimum requirement for re-investigation of military personnel should
be made only when specifically required by the member agency.
Army--A bring-up investigation on' indoctrinated personnel at
intervals not to exceed 3 years, such investigation to include a neigh-
borhood check or, in the case of military personnel, a barracks or unit
check. Bring-up investigation should be conducted on the more knowledge-
able COMINT personnel at least every year, the scope to be gradually en-
larged so that it would apply eventually to everyone indoctrinated for
COMINT.
CIA--Member agencies should be required to conduct periodic
personnel security interviews of all COMINT cleared individuals either
with or without the polygraph.
OSD--Re-investigation consisting of at least a National Agency
Check should be required at more frequent intervals, with 3 years as a
suggested minimum. For key personnel, however, the reopened investiga-
tion should include a full background investigation.
Navy--Recommend that CIBD #5 paragraph 6 be replaced by the
following:
"Persons cleared for COMINT and retaining that status
permanently, or over a long period of time, shall be subjected to
such periodic re-investigations as are considered necessary by the
USCIB member concerned. Such reopened investigations shall be con-
ducted by the investigative services available to the member agency.
The minimum requirement for a reopened investigation shall consist
of a National Security Check and a review of an up-to-date personal
history statement or other similar documentation. Re-investigation
shall be conducted whenever derogatory information arises about any
individual cleared for COMINT and is relevant to his eligibility
therefor.
"Where possible, re-investigations shall routinely be made
at intervals not to exceed five years. Those individuals deemed
by the USCIB member concerned to occupy particularly sensitive
positions shall receive the most intensive, thorough re-investi-
gation possible and shall be re-investigated as often as appropriate.
A particularly 'sensitive' billet is considered to include one where
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the incumbent has the 'need to know', and has access to particularly
sophisticated or a wide variety of cryptanalytic techniques, or who
has a broad knowledge of U. S. COMINT resources and successes, or
who may for other reasons be a likely target of foreign intelligence
services."
PISA--Strict adherence to the re-investigation requirement to in-
clude a National Agency Check, a local law enforcement agency check,
local credit check, neighborhood investigation and references, super-
visors and fellow employees.
USCIB Secretariat--A re-investigation at least every 2 or 3 years
to include a National Agency Check, a records check, a review of a
current PHS and a neighborhood check.
The Chairman observed that it would be difficult to decide whether
the interval between investigations should be 2, 3, or 5 years and
suggested that the ad hoc committee address itself to that problem.
General Paxson observed that the economic factor played an impor-
tant part in implementing these re-investigations. He said there did
not appear to be enough money, agents, and time to re-investigate all
COMINT personnel at frequent intervals.
Admiral Rice said he thought we would be kidding ourselves and
USCIB if we set up requirements for re-investigations which could not
be met. If there were not stated requirements for re-investigations,
he said, he thought we could all beam our resources on the known targets.
He concluded by pointing out that the backlog of the individual investi-
gative services was constantly going up.
General Sirmeyer reiterated the Air Force view that people having
access to Category III COMINT should be re-investigated periodically.
He said it would be wrong to gear our security to the ability of an
investigative agency to get the job done. Consequently he said we
should be willing to pay the price.
The Chairman remarked that much of the material we seek to protect
is just as important as AEC material, noting that Congress applauds the
fact that AEC personnel are checked by the FBI. He stated that the
Military Services have called for an improvement in the quality of their
investigators in COMINT cases and he wondered whether the ad hoc com-
mittee should not consider an FBI investigation at the apex of sensiti-
vity. In this way, he said, we would be sure of getting the best
quality possible in our investigations.
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General Paxson referring to the "10 year rule" remarked that the
Army is constantly fighting the battle of dropping investigation re-
quirements on personnel in the higher echelons.
General Sirmeyer stated that the Air Force Security Service had
discarded the "10 year rule", explaining that everyone to be indoc-
trinated for COMINT is required to be investigated.
Item G--Security Education
The Chairman noted that in this area the reports expressed uniformity
on the need for more and better quality security education. He said he
thought the members would agree that the ad hoc committee should come
up with a practical program in this field, noting, of course, that any
such program would necessarily vary in its application within the several
agencies. General Sirmeyer remarked that it might be a good idea for NSA
to establish minimum standards of COMINT security education for the others
to follow.
Item H--Post Access Control
The Chairman noted that the only comments in this area were made
by NSA as follows:
"The Security Office of the cognizant agency should be con-
sulted in every case where an individual having access to COMINT
is to travel officially or unofficially outside the continental
limits of the U. S. This is to prevent several problems: (a)
people who are too knowledgeable from going to certain places, (b)
to give the Security Office an opportunity to give the individual
a security briefing, and (c) to prevent certain individuals who
are under current investigation from travelling outside the U. S."
In response to a question, the NSA member explained that his divi-
sion had discovered that people were being assigned overseas, either on
a temporary or a permanent basis, who for security reasons should never
have been so assigned. He pointed out that many problems are encountered
overseas which are not normally met in the States. Previously, he said,
there had been no checking with the Security Division prior to assigning
people to overseas positions. This has been corrected and now the Secur-
ity Division approves or disapproves overseas assignments on the basis
of security considerations. He concluded by stating that all personnel
going overseas must have a security briefing.
The CIA member indicated that this was not a particular problem for
his agency but recommended that it be considered favorably by the ad hoc
committee. He explained that CIA requires all its personnel to clear
with Security concerning certain outside activities, such as joining an
organization, planning foreign travel for personal reasons, or the like.
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General Paxson observed that the problem is two-fold; on the one
hand there are the operating people 'such as NSA and ASA, while on the
other hand there are the policy people such as the Army G-2, who must
travel to sensitive and dangerous areas on official business.
The NSA member explained that the Director himself decides on the
need for travel or assignment overseas in cases where there is any doubt.
The Air Force member acknowledged that a real problem existed but
observed that it was hardly feasible for the Military Services to
attempt to give a pre-embarkation security briefing for all COMINT
personnel.
The Chairman suggested that the members pause at this point for
the selection of an ad hoc drafting committee. In that a small group
would be more cohesive, he recommended that membership on the committee
be kept to a minimum. The function of the drafting committee, the
Chairman continued, would be to re-examine carefully all the reports
submitted by the members and tie them in with a review of CIBD #5, the
basic document. He said he hoped the group could meet promptly, with
a view to having a tentative revision of CIBD #5 completed within 30
days. He suggested that the revision be prepared as a report for
circulation to and consideration by the full committee. Such a revision
of CIBD #5 would not be binding on any member, he said, until ultimately
accepted by USCIB.
As to the composition of the group, the Chairman recommended a re-
presentative from NSA, CIA, OSD, and one individual to represent the
three Services. The Service members present indicated their concurrence
in having one Service member speak for all three.
The Chairman stated that he would nominate Mr. Robert Drake as the
OSD member of the drafting group and suggested that members submit nom-
inations direct to him. (Note: The following nominations were subse-
quently submitted to Mr. Drake:
NSA:
Services: Major John H. Remick, USAF
It was generally understood that Major Remick could call upon
other Service members for assistance as necessary. In this regard,
Admiral Rice noted that CDR Thomas would be available until about the
end of October, at which time he was scheduled for transfer.)
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The composition of the drafting committee having been agreed upon,
the Chairman observed that the three areas of "need to know", indoctrin-
ation, and security education appeared to require no further discussion,
inasmuch as all members were in general accord on these items. He
suggested, therefore, that the committee address itself to those areas
wherein there were sharp differences of opinion which must be reconciled.
As a starting point, he referred to the area of'General Recommendations