POLICY REGARDING COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND NAVY IN THE COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE FIELD.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00527R000100100012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 30, 1945
• Content Type: MF

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ANNEX D-2
NAVY PLAN OF 30 MAY 1945 FOR ARMY & NAVY
OLLAB ORATION IN THE, C(7I, 9U;~1I ;A ION IN~E IIGE'NOE
Op-20-G/jac
Serial 000629020
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30 May 1945
TZI MORANDUM FOR -CAPT. W. R. SMEDB12 III (F-20 )
Subj: Policy regarding collaboration between the Army and
Navy in the Communication Intelligence Field.
Ref: (a) Statement of policy regarding collaboration between
Army and Navy in the communication intelligence
field enunciated by the Army-Navy Communication
Intelligence Board, submitted to ANCICC by General
Bissell via General Clarke, 9 May 1945.
Encl: (A) Proposed plan for the coordination of C.I. activities.
1. Forwarded herwith as enclosure (A) is our reply to re-
ference (a). The plan for post-war operation included in this
reply represents the best thought of Op-20-G personnel and is
based not only upon our operations in this war but upon our
pre-war experiences. There is practically unanimous agreement
among us in regard to these proposals and we believe that only
under some such arrangement can we achieve maximum efficiency
in the future.
2. Except for one or two points, the plan is largely in
effect at the present time, although not working as effectively
as it might. The chief differences in the new proposal are a
new method of allocating work and the new concept of a joint
intelligence center. The latter has been frequently advocated
during the war and is the system in effect in the British
Services. To us, it is the outstanding, if not the sole, virtue
of their organization as compared to our, drawing up the
proposed plan, we have endeavored to take ttts best features of
both the British and U.S. systems.
3. This plan has not yet received A-rl Redmants approval
but I believe that he is fully in accord with the principles
set forth therein. It is suggested that you consult with those
Army, Navy and NSA review(s)
completed.
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ANNEX D-2 (CUNT-D)
4OMINCH officers who are concerned and ascertain their views
on the proposals. We are convinced that, in view of the
changes in the international situation, an early agreement
on future policy for G. I. operations and a reallocation of
work are urgently needed.
J. N. WENGER
Op-20-G.
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ANNEX D- 2 (+CONT '.a)
30 May 1945
MEMORANDUM
Subject: Policy Regarding Collaboration between the Army
and Navy in the Communication Intelligence Field,
Ref: (a) Statement of Policy Regarding Collaboration
between Army and Navy in the Communication
Intelligence Field Enunciated by the Army-
Navy Communication Intelligence Board, sub-
mitted to ANCICC by General Bissell via
General C l arke , 9 May 1945.
E .ol: (A) Proposed Plan for the Coordination of Communi-
cation Intelligence Activities.
1. Reference (a) was submitted at the ANCICC meeting
on 9 May 1945 by General Bissell via General Clarke for the
approval. of Navy members. Comments of the Navy on the pro-
posals contained therein follow.
2. (a) Paragraph 1 of reference (a) does not establish
a terminal date for the agreements in effect between the U.S.
Army and British and the U.S. Navy and British. Since the U.S.
Navy has an agreement with the British which will be in effect
only for the duration of the war, it is felt that a similar
terminal date should be established for the agreement between
the U.S. Army and the British. This will ensure the achieve-
ment of ,ANCICC's objective, mentioned in paragraph 2 of refer-
ence (a), which aims at the establishment of a joint Army-
Navy agreement rather than separate agreements with other
agencies.
(b) The word "implied" in relation to agreements in
force between the U.S. services and the British may give rise
to differing interpretations. It is felt that all basic
agreements should be so clearly stated in writing that there
will be no doubts as to their implications.
(c) The question of establishing a joint Army-Navy
policy concerning complete collaboration with the British for
the duration of the war and in the postwar era has been refer-
red to ANCIB by ANCICC. 'ANCIBts decision in this regard, which
is expected in the near future, should help achieve the object-
ives of paragraphs 1 and 2 of reference (a).
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ANNEX D-2 (CONTID)
Paragraph 2 of reference (a) is concurred with.
4. In, regard to paragraphs 3 and 4 of reference (a),
the prospect of extensive clandestine and guerilla activities
in the European area for some time to come, the restoration of
the exiled governments and liberated nations of Europe to
diplomatic and economic life, and the uncertain course of our
relations with certain major powers present the problem of
dealing with an increasing volume of hitherto unobtainable
traffic. In addition, the end of hostilities in Europe and
the increasing tempo of war in the Pacific will necessitate
a redeployment of Army and Navy communication intelligence
activities. In the Pacific area, the responsibilities of the
U.S. Army presumably will increase as it takes over the task
of defeating Japanese land forces on their home islands and
on the Asiatic mainland.
5. The end of the Pacific war will be the signal for
retrenchment in personnel and material allowances by both the
Army and Navy. Congress will insist upon the most efficient
and least expensive military and.naval establishments possible,
no matter what commitments are made for the armed forces.
Another factor to be considered is that most of the skilled
reserve personnel, trained in the complicated procedures of
the Army and Navy communication intelligence organizations,
will desire to return to civilian life at the end of the war.
Therefore, the greatly curtailed facilities and the compara-
tively few expert personnel remaining In the postwar services
will have to be used to the best advantage. Furthermore, a
thoroughly effective collaboration between the two services
will help preserve their common interests in relation to
national or other intelligence agencies.
6. In view of the foregoing and in the light of prewar
experience, it is obvious that successful C.I. operations of
adequate scope and efficiency can be carried on in the future
only if an effective working partnership between the Army and
Navy can be established. Such a partnership will require the
defining of certain objectives and the assignment of definite
responsibilities to each service by ANCIB. At present the
Army and the Navy have fields of interest currently assigned
to them by a joint agreement between Army, Navy and the FBI'
dated 30 June 1942, as modified by a further agreement of 25
August 1942. These agreements, concluded under the pressure
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ANNEX D-2 (CONT'D)
of war and with certain reservations, are incomplete and
have been interpreted differently by each service. The Army
has questioned their validity and has described them as out-
moded and no longer binding in some respects. In connection
with the recent controversy over the allocation of commercial
traffic, the Commanding Officer of SSA on 10 May 1945 raised
the question of reallocation of existing responsibilities in
the signal intelligence field as between the Army and Navy to
the end that duplication may be avoided and the greatest
efficiency achieved in producing intelligence vital to the
early defeat of Japan. To ensure complete coordination in the
assignment of future tasks and to comply with the basic, respon-
sibilities of the Army and Navy in regard to national defense,,
it is proposed that a reallocation of the assignments of the
respective services be made immediately by ANCIB in order to
permit necessary postwar planning without further. delay.
7. Paragraph 5 of reference (a) would seem to imply an
extension of the functions of ANCIB to include cryptological
as well as.cryptanalytical !natters. The Navy concurs in this
extension and suggests that irnr:iediate action be initiated to
expand the powers of ANCIB to realize t:1:his objective. It is
assumed that each service will reserve the right to ensure
compliance with its own security regulations on items which
have no joint interest or which must be restricted to those
who need to know.
8. In regard to the proposal in paragraph 6 of refere-
once (a), it is suggested that a joint communication intelli-
gence policy be adopted by the Army and Navy as quickly as
practicable without waiting for the end of the war. As a
basis for this, the Navy herewith submits a proposed plan
!Enclosure (A)7 for the coordination of Army-Navy communica-
tion intelligence activities which it hopes will meet with
the approval of the Army. The object of this plan is to en-
sure the most efficient use of available facilities and talent
provide adequate training of personnel for war, and ensure
maximum coverage of all potential assignments by proper divi-
sion of the work load.
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ANNEX D-2 (COITT'D)
Proposed Plan for the Coordination
Intelligence Activities
A. Operational Control
(a) Joint Folic Board - comprising the highest com-
munication and. intelligence authorities of, the Army and Navy,
who under the authority of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and
the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. and Chief of Naval opera-
tions, will be charged with establishing the joint policies
and coordinating the activities of the communication intelli-
gence organizations. ANCIB, which is already in existence,
meets this requirement and is functioning advantageously.
(b) Coordinating committee -- comprising technical re-
presentatives of the members o the central policy board,
whose task it will be to implement established policies and
to recommend to the board modifications of policies concern-
ing communication intelligence. ANCICC, which is already in
existence and functioning in accordance with the directives
of ANCIB, meets this requirement.
(c) Subcommittees of the Coordinating Committee --
comprising technical representatives of the coo rdnaing com-
mittee who will conduct the necessary joint operational and
liaison activities of each service. Subcommittees of ANCICC,
which are already in existence, meet this requirement.
B. Operations
Insofar as the operating and processing sections of the
two organizations are concerned, it is proposed that the
services maintain:
(a) Coordinated but Independent D/F Activities -- to
ensure that different needs of each service are met.
(b) Coordinated but Independent Interce t Control to ensure that each service wi l acquire the type of
traffic it requires for its primary responsibility, (2) assist
the other service where essential and practicable, and (3) col-
laborate in the fields of secondary interest to obtain optimum
coverage. For most efficient operation the two controlling
groups should be physically adjacent to each other.
ENCLOSURE (A)
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ANNEX D-2 (C ONT ! D )
(c) Coordinated but Independent Intercept Activit.Ies -